California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · June 12, 2003

Student v. Capistrano Unified School District

SEHO Case No. SN 390-03 · Hearing Officer Suzanne B. Brown

Capistrano Unified offered an appropriate regular preschool placement and services to a preschooler with autism; all reimbursement claims denied.

District prevailed on all issues

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Noted in the decision

Footnote 1 states that the Decision was amended to correct a typographical error in the hearing dates, with no other changes. The decision also describes a prior SEHO decision between the same parties (SN02-01703, Hearing Officer Vincent Pastorino, January 10, 2003).

Summary

The parents of a 3-year-old boy eligible for special education based on autism filed for due process against Capistrano Unified School District. In an earlier case, a January 2003 Hearing Office decision ordered the District to offer a regular preschool class. It also ordered the IEP team to give priority to the private Country Village Preschool or a similar class, and to consider more services. At the January 24, 2003 IEP meeting, the District formally offered a fee-based regular preschool class at Viejo Elementary School. The offer included 25 hours per week of intensive behavioral instruction (IBI) aide support, plus speech-language therapy, occupational therapy (OT) and physical therapy. District staff also said they would accept Country Village as a compromise. The parents never signed the IEP. Their attorneys later wrote that the parents accepted Country Village and the aide but not the other services.

Hearing Officer Suzanne B. Brown ruled for the District on every issue. Viejo was the formal offer. The parents never clearly accepted the compromise, and accepting only part of it did not count as acceptance, so there was nothing to implement. The right OT staff attended the IEP meeting, and the team considered the reports from the parents' private providers. The Viejo class was similar to Country Village and was the least restrictive environment (LRE). The added services made up for the support the student would have had in an autism class. The flaws in the goals were minor. Oral-motor goals were not required because the parents had not consented to an oral-motor assessment. All reimbursement was denied.

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Why it matters

This decision shows how SEHO separated a district's formal IEP offer from a compromise proposed at the meeting. A parent who accepted only part of a compromise did not create a duty to implement it. The decision also shows that parents who refuse consent to a district assessment cannot later claim that goals in that area are missing.

Issues and holdings

  1. District prevailedImplementation

    Issue 1. Has the District implemented STUDENT's program for the 2002-2003 school year in conformity with the accepted portions of the IEP?

    The District's formal offer was Viejo, not Country Village. The parents never clearly accepted the District's compromise offer of Country Village, and accepting only part of a compromise was not acceptance. Because no part of the IEP was agreed to, there was nothing to implement.

  2. District prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue 2a. Failing to have the appropriate team members present at the IEP meeting (absence of the occupational therapist who had worked with STUDENT)

    Two District occupational therapists who knew about the student's OT needs attended. Education Code section 56341(b) does not require every provider who has worked with a student to attend.

  3. District prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue 2b. Failing to consider the information presented by the parents at the IEP meeting

    The team heard detailed reports from the parents' private providers, changed some goals and present levels, and discussed the parents' proposal. Drafting an offer before the meeting and keeping it unchanged was not predetermination.

  4. District prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue 2c. Failing to offer appropriate placement, behavior therapy, occupational therapy, and speech-language therapy

    The Viejo regular preschool class was similar to Country Village and was appropriate in the LRE. The added 25 hours per week of IBI, the extra speech session and the extra OT session replaced the support of the autism class. The District's failure to schedule an IBI program observation that was requested shortly before the hearing did not deny the parents participation.

  5. District prevailedIEP content

    Issue 2d. Failing to draft appropriate goals and objectives addressing each of STUDENT's behavior, occupational and speech-language needs

    The objections reflected differences of opinion or minor gaps in detail, such as not listing the OT or speech provider as responsible for behavior goals. These did not deny FAPE.

  6. District prevailedIEP content

    Issue 2e. Failing to draft goals and objectives addressing STUDENT's oral motor needs

    The parents did not sign the District's oral-motor assessment plan, and the District did not have to rely on private reports. The lack of oral-motor goals therefore did not deny FAPE.

  7. Issue 3a. Reimbursement for tuition for the Country Village Preschool in the approximate amount of $764.00

    The District offered FAPE, so reimbursement was denied.

  8. Issue 3b. Reimbursement for CARD services in the approximate amount of $4,056.25

    The District offered FAPE, so reimbursement was denied.

  9. Issue 3c. Reimbursement for speech therapy in the approximate amount of $1,200

    The District offered FAPE, so reimbursement was denied.

  10. Issue 3d. Reimbursement for mileage in the approximate amount of 1,220 miles

    The District offered FAPE, and the parents never clearly accepted the compromise that included mileage, so reimbursement was denied.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • All of Petitioner's claims for relief were denied.

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Key authorities

Rowley; Union School Dist. v. Smith; Gregory K. v. Longview School Dist.; W.G. v. Target Range School Dist.; Burlington; Florence County School Dist. Four v. Carter; Student W. v. Puyallup School Dist.; Andress v. Cleveland ISD; Vander Malle v. Ambach; Hudson v. Wilson; Alamo Heights ISD v. State Bd. of Educ.; Student v. Ocean View ESD (SEHO SN 1306-00 order)

People named in the decision

  • Diane Lappi, executive director of special education, Capistrano Unified School District
  • Kimberly Gaither, District legal assistant, Capistrano Unified School District
  • Sharla Pitzen, program specialist, Capistrano Unified School District
  • Jennifer Greenfield, IBI autism supervisor, Capistrano Unified School District
  • Claudia Ginsberg-Brown, supervising occupational therapist, Capistrano Unified School District
  • Natalie Angelo, occupational therapist assigned to Viejo, Capistrano Unified School District
  • Michelle Wright, speech-language pathologist (District witness), Capistrano Unified School District
  • Natalie Vega, speech-language pathologist (District witness), Capistrano Unified School District
  • Victoria Lloyd, preschool teacher, Viejo Elementary School, Capistrano Unified School District
  • Nancy Lin, occupational therapist who had worked with student
  • Laurie Cohen, independent occupational therapist; witness for Student
  • Anahita Parsi, CARD supervisor/behavior therapist; witness for Student, Center for Autism and Related Disorders (CARD)
  • Abby Rozenberg, private speech-language pathologist; witness for Student
  • Laura Molica, law clerk; witness for Student
  • Judy Segal, speech and language evaluator (September 2002 evaluation)
  • Nancy Press, OT assessor
  • Jan Blancher, UC Riverside professor; proposed parent expert observer, UC Riverside
  • Paul Roberts, attorney for Student at IEP meeting, Roberts & Adams
  • Vincent Pastorino, Hearing Officer in prior case SN02-01703, Special Education Hearing Office
  • Joy Redmon, Hearing Officer, prehearing conference, Special Education Hearing Office
  • Center for Autism and Related Disorders (CARD), private ABA/behavior therapy agency
  • Country Village Preschool, private regular education preschool
  • Newport Speech Language Centers, private speech-language provider
  • Rainbow Kids, private OT/PT provider under IFSP
  • Sky Pediatrics, OT assessment provider
  • Regional Center of Orange County, Part C service provider (IFSP)

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Suzanne B. Brown, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in San Juan Capistrano, California, on April 24, 29-30, and May 1, 2003.

Petitioner STUDENT (Petitioner or STUDENT) was represented at the hearing by attorney Michael Jewell from the law office of Roberts & Adams. Present on STUDENT’s behalf were his parents, FATHER and MOTHER. Respondent Capistrano Unified School District (District) was represented by advocate Robert Roice. Present on the District’s behalf was Diane Lappi, the District’s executive director of special education. District legal assistant Kimberly Gaither was also present on behalf of the District during part of the hearing.

Petitioner called the following witnesses to testify: FATHER, Petitioner’s father; MOTHER, Petitioner’s mother; Laura Molica, law clerk; Laurie Cohen, occupational therapist; Anahita Parsi, CARD supervisor; and Abby Rozenberg, speech-language pathologist.

The District called the following witnesses to testify: Diane Lappi, executive director for special education; Claudia Ginsberg-Brown, occupational therapist; Michelle Wright, speech-language pathologist; Natalie Vega, speech-language pathologist; Victoria Lloyd, preschool teacher; and Sharla Pitzen, program specialist.

Oral and documentary evidence was received at the hearing. Upon receipt of written closing arguments, the record was closed on May 12, 2003, and the matter was submitted for decision.

ISSUES

1. Has the District implemented STUDENT’s program for the 2002-2003 school year in conformity with the accepted portions of the IEP?

2. Did the District commit procedural and substantive violations constituting a denial of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for STUDENT in the 2002-2003 school year beginning January 24, 2003, as follows:

a. failing to have the appropriate team members present at the IEP meeting; b. failing to consider the information presented by the parents at the IEP meeting; c. failing to offer appropriate placement, behavior therapy, occupational therapy, and speech-language therapy (Footnote 2) ; d. failing to draft appropriate goals and objectives addressing each of STUDENT’s behavior, occupational and speech-language needs; e. failing to draft goals and objectives addressing STUDENT’s oral motor needs?

3. Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the following expenses:

a. tuition for the Country Village Preschool in the approximate amount of $764.00; b. CARD services in the approximate amount of $4,056.25;

c. speech therapy in the approximate amount of $1,200;

d. mileage in the approximate amount of 1,220 miles?

BACKGROUND FACTS

Petitioner STUDENT is three years, ten months old and lives with his parents and two older siblings within the boundaries of the District. At all relevant times, STUDENT has been and remains eligible for special education due to his autism.

In 2001, STUDENT was diagnosed as autistic and thereafter began receiving services from the Regional Center of Orange County (Regional Center) pursuant to an Individual Family Service Plan (IFSP). At various times those services included occupational therapy (OT) and physical therapy (PT) from Rainbow Kids, behavior therapy from Center for Autism and Related Disorders (CARD), and speech-language therapy. The Regional Center continued to provide these services until STUDENT’s third birthday in July 2002.

In May and June 2002, District staff conducted the District’s initial assessment of STUDENT. On June 20, 2002, STUDENT’s Individualized Education Plan (IEP) team convened for the first time but did not reach agreement about STUDENT’s placement or program. For the 2002-2003 school year, the District offered to place STUDENT for four hours a day, five days a week in a structured autism class at the District’s Viejo Elementary School (Viejo), with designated instruction and services (DIS) of OT and speech-language therapy. The District also offered a six-week transition/maintenance plan for summer 2002, which offered STUDENT ten hours per week of CARD services, reduced from the ninety hours per month STUDENT had been receiving under his most recent IFSP. The District’s offer provided for terminating the CARD services on August 31, to be replaced by five hours per week of behavior services from the District’s intensive behavioral instruction (IBI) program once the school year began in early September 2002.

The IEP team convened again on July 22, 2002, but again did not reach agreement regarding STUDENT’s placement or program. On July 24, 2002, the Hearing Office received the parents’ request for due process hearing, which the Hearing Office identified as case no. SN02-01703. STUDENT did not enroll in a District program, and instead the PARENTS privately funded applied behavior analysis (ABA) services from CARD and speech-language therapy by Abby Rozenberg and Newport Speech Language Centers. Beginning in September 2002, the PARENTS placed STUDENT at Country Village Preschool (Country Village), a private, regular education preschool, which he attended with the assistance of a one-to-one aide from CARD. After the school year began in September 2002, STUDENT received OT and PT services from the District pursuant to stay put; several weeks thereafter, STUDENT began receiving speech-language therapy from a District speech-language pathologist pursuant to stay put.

The due process hearing in SN02-01703 convened in November 2002 before Hearing Officer Vincent Pastorino, and resulted in a Decision issued on January 10, 2003. That Decision found in part that the District’s proposed placement in the Viejo structured autism class was appropriate at the time it was made in July 2002. However, in light of STUDENT’s subsequent progress in his unilateral placement at Country Village preschool in fall 2002, a regular education preschool with a one-to-one aide was prospectively appropriate as the least restrictive environment (LRE). The Decision ordered the District to offer to place STUDENT in a regular education preschool for four hours per day, five days per week. Regarding which regular education preschool STUDENT should attend, the Decision ordered the IEP team to give priority consideration to Country Village or else to a classroom situation similar to Country Village. The Decision also concluded that the District’s offer of OT, speech-language and IBI behavior therapy services was appropriate at the time the offer was made in July 2002, in conjunction with the proposed structured autism class placement at Viejo.(Footnote 3) However, the Decision stated that STUDENT’s placement in a typical preschool class instead of a structured autism class would likely require a significant increase in the amount of DIS he required. The Decision did not specifically order an increase in STUDENT’s DIS services, but ordered the IEP team to consider the need for an increase in services. Additionally, the Decision ordered the District to submit to the PARENTS a written plan for assessment of STUDENT’s oral-motor skills.

The Decision ordered the District to convene an IEP meeting within fifteen days in order to design STUDENT’s placement and services pursuant to the Decision’s specifications. After receipt of the Decision in mid-January 2003, District program specialist Sharla Pitzen and District IBI autism supervisor Jennifer Greenfield observed STUDENT during his school day at Country Village. On January 24, 2003, the IEP team met. STUDENT’s CARD behavior therapist, Anahita Parsi, and his private speech-language pathologist, Abby Rozenberg, each reported on STUDENT’s then-current levels of functioning. Team members engaged in a lengthy discussion about STUDENT’s levels of functioning and his proposed goals and objectives. District staff recommended conducting a functional analysis assessment; the parents indicated that they did not agree but would consider it. District staff also recommended conducting an oral motor assessment.(Footnote 4) The team discussed STUDENT’s progress at Country Village. The District members of the IEP team offered placement in the regular education preschool class taught by Victoria Lloyd at the District’s Viejo Elementary School. The offer included IBI supervision for six hours per week and the services of an IBI aide for 25 hours per week, with the IBI aide spending approximately 21 hours in school as STUDENT’s one-to-one classroom aide and the remaining four hours working with STUDENT at home. Additionally, DIS of OT, PT, and speech-language therapy would be provided by District staff. (Dist. Exh. 3, pgs.1, 41.) District special education director Diane Lappi indicated that the District could arrange for the parents to visit Viejo and observe the proposed placement. (Dist. Exh. 3, p. 4.)

Petitioner’s attorney, Paul Roberts, indicated that the PARENTS did not agree to the Viejo placement and wanted STUDENT to remain at his current preschool, Country Village, with DIS of three hours per week of individual speech-language therapy, two hours per week of clinic-based OT, two hours per week of individual PT, and ABA services in the amounts recommended by CARD. District staff raised concerns about Country Village, including that its preschool program was only for three hours per day, five days a week, in contrast to the Decision’s order that the District offer STUDENT a preschool placement for four hours per day, five days a week. Petitioner’s attorney proposed that the Country Village placement could be expanded to four hours per day by adding an hour for STUDENT’s lunch each day.

The District members of the January 24, 2003 IEP team indicated that they continued to recommend Viejo as the placement but would be willing to compromise by agreeing to the Country Village placement, with the District providing a classroom aide. Regarding the amount of DIS, the District offered that services would initially remain the same, but DIS providers would monitor STUDENT’s progress to determine whether services needed to be increased as suggested in the Hearing Office Decision. (Pet. Exh. 8, p. 5.) The parents did not sign their consent to the IEP and the meeting ended without the parties reaching agreement.

Following the January 24, 2003 IEP meeting, the parents’ attorneys and District staff wrote several letters back and forth, each disputing the other party’s version of what the parties had agreed to at the IEP meeting. The parents’ attorneys asserted in various letters that the IEP team had agreed to place STUDENT at Country Village with the support of a one-to-one aide. (Pet. Exhs. 20, 23, 26.) In response, Ms. Lappi wrote that no agreement had been reached at the IEP meeting and the parents had not signed their consent to the IEP. (Pet. Exhs. 21, 22, 29.) Ms. Lappi also requested clarification regarding what the parents were seeking and what portions of the IEP they agreed to. Thereafter, in a letter dated March 5, 2003, District program specialist Sharla Pitzen wrote to the PARENTS to reiterate the District’s offer from the January 24 IEP meeting. Ms. Pitzen’s letter explained that the District continued to offer the Viejo preschool class but that District staff at the IEP meeting had offered to defer to the parents’ request for the Country Village preschool. (Pet. Exh. 25.) Ms. Pitzen noted that the parents still had not signed the IEP and therefore the District could only provide STUDENT’s program pursuant to stay put. Ms. Pitzen’s letter explained that the last signed IEP was actually STUDENT’s IFSP, but that because the January 24, 2003 IEP proposed more services than those contained in the IFSP, with the parents’ consent the District would begin providing those additional services as part of the stay put placement.

On February 25, 2003, the Hearing Office received a due process request on behalf of Petitioner. In a letter dated March 12, Mr. Jewell wrote to Ms. Pitzen requesting that the District allow UC Riverside Professor Jan Blancher to observe the IBI program. In a letter dated March 13, District legal assistant Kimberly Gaither responded that the District would not permit that observation because it would be “primarily for the purpose of obtaining information that may be presented at hearing.” (Pet. Exh. 28.) The letter indicated that PARENTS would be permitted to observe the IBI program and could contact Ms. Pitzen to arrange the observation. Thereafter MOTHER attempted to schedule an observation of the IBI program, but was not successful. (Pet. Exh. 30; testimony of MOTHER, Ms. Pitzen.)

Throughout this period, STUDENT continued to attend preschool at Country Village, although he no longer attended with a one-to-one aide. The PARENTS continued to fund STUDENT’s behavior therapy from CARD, although due to financial constraints they reduced the amount he received to eight hours per week. STUDENT continued to receive his speech-language therapy from Abby Rozenberg, although likewise with reduced hours due to financial constraints. On April 11, 2003, occupational therapist Laurie Cohen observed STUDENT in his preschool class pursuant to an independent occupational therapy assessment.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Under both State law and the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), students with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). (20 U.S.C. § 1400; Cal. Educ. Code § 56000.) The term “free appropriate public education” means special education and related services that are available to the student at no charge to the parent or guardian, that meet the State educational standards, and that conform to the student’s individualized educational program (IEP). (20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18).)

“Special education” is defined as specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet the unique needs of the student. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(25).) The term “related services” includes transportation and other services as may be required to assist a student to benefit from special education. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(22).) California Education Code section 56363 similarly provides that designated instruction and services (DIS), California’s term for related services, shall be provided “when the instruction and services are necessary for the pupil to benefit educationally from his or her instructional program.” (Cal. Education Code § 56363(a).)

1. Has the District implemented STUDENT’s program for the 2002-2003 school year in conformity with the accepted portions of the IEP?

The analysis of whether a student has been provided a free appropriate public education (FAPE) is twofold, requiring the Hearing Officer to decide whether procedural steps have been followed and whether the proposed placement is substantively appropriate. (Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson School District, et al. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176.) One factor involved in determining whether a school district substantively offered a FAPE is whether the District provided a program that conformed to the student’s IEP. (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207; Gregory K., 811 F.2d at 1314; 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.) In the present case, Petitioner alleges that at the IEP meeting on January 24, 2003, the District offered to place STUDENT at Country Village preschool with a one-to-one aide, with mileage reimbursement to the parents for their transportation of STUDENT to and from the preschool. Petitioner argues that his attorneys accepted this offer in a letter to the District dated January 27, 2003, but despite this acceptance the District never funded the preschool placement, never provided the one-to-one aide, and never reimbursed the parents for mileage.

In contrast, the District explains that the IEP team’s formal offer was not for placement at Country Village, but instead was for placement at Viejo. The District contends that the District members of the IEP team indicated that they would agree to Country Village as a compromise, but the parents never signed their consent to the IEP document or any other written agreement and never clearly indicated that they accepted the Country Village compromise proposal.

Thus, this analysis must determine whether the IEP team offered Country Village, whether Petitioner accepted and whether that acceptance triggered the District’s obligation to implement Country Village as the agreed-upon placement. California law provides that a special education program cannot be implemented until the student’s parent consents in writing to all or part of the IEP. (Cal. Education Code § 56346(a).) Section 56346(a) further states that “if the parent does not consent to all the components of the [IEP], then those components of the program to which the parent has consented shall be implemented so as not to delay providing instruction and services to the pupil.” (Cal. Education Code § 56346(a).) Additional legal provisions regarding IEPs include the IDEA’s procedural requirement that a school district must make a formal, written offer of placement.(Footnote 6) (Union School District v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1526 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 428 (1994); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3).)

In the present case, the evidence established that the District formally offered Viejo as the proposed placement. Page 1 of the January 24, 2003 IEP document clearly states that a regular education preschool class at Viejo is offered, with DIS services of OT, PT, speech-language therapy and the IBI/autism support program. Additional details about the program are found on page 41 of the IEP document, under a heading entitled “Proposed Viejo Placement.” (Dist. Exh. 3, p. 41; Pet. Exh. 8, p. 42.) District employees testified that Viejo was the placement offer. (Testimony of Diane Lappi, Sharla Pitzen.) In a letter dated March 5, 2003, Ms. Pitzen reviewed all of the components of the District’s Viejo placement offer and reiterated that Viejo was the District’s recommended placement for STUDENT. (Pet. Exh. 25.)

The evidence further established that, despite the District’s placement offer at Viejo, after a lengthy discussion District staff stated at the IEP meeting that they would agree to the PARENTS’ preferred placement, Country Village, as a compromise. Ms. Lappi and Ms. Pitzen both testified that the District offered to defer to the parents’ wishes and agree to Country Village, but that Viejo was nevertheless the District’s recommended placement. Consistent with this testimony, the IEP notes describe the District staff’s reasons why they recommended Viejo instead of Country Village, including the concern that Country Village’s program was for only three hours per day, contrary to the Hearing Office Decision’s order to offer STUDENT a preschool program for four hours per day. The IEP Notes also reflect the District’s subsequent offer to compromise by agreeing to Country Village. The final page of the IEP notes state in part:

The District’s IEP team continues to recommend [the] program & services as stated in the meeting notes. However, the District will defer to the parents (sic) request due to recent information that Country Village will provide a 4 hour day preschool to include 1 hour lunch from 12-1 daily. District will provide aide support in the classroom to generalize skills. Services will remain at a level stated in the order and the likihood (sic) of the need to increase as stipulated in the order will be monitored by all DIS providers based on STUDENT’s progress in those DIS areas.

(Pet. Exh. 8, p. 7; Dist. Exh. 3, p. 5.)

Despite this language and the written description of the Viejo placement on pages 1 and 41 of the IEP document, Petitioner’s parents both testified that they understood that Country Village was the District’s IEP placement offer. Notably, the PARENTS acknowledged that they both left the IEP meeting early and relied on their legal representatives to represent them at the meeting and inform them about what occurred in their absence. Given the language contained in the IEP document and the discussion that took place at the IEP meeting, the Hearing Officer is not persuaded that the District had failed to adequately convey that Viejo was the District’s IEP placement offer.

Petitioner contends that inconsistencies between the testimony of Ms. Pitzen and that of Ms. Lappi support Petitioner’s claim that the District offered Country Village as the IEP placement offer. This argument is not persuasive; any inconsistencies were minor and did not contradict the evidence indicating that Viejo was the District’s placement offer. In their testimony, both Ms. Pitzen and Ms. Lappi described how District staff offered the Viejo placement at the IEP meeting but later in the meeting indicated that the District would be willing to compromise by agreeing the parents’ request for Country Village. Ms. Lappi testified that the District’s offer to agree to the parents’ request was “taken off the table” at the end of the IEP meeting on January 24, while Ms. Pitzen testified that the compromise offer remained open after the IEP meeting ended. Regardless of whether the compromise proposal remained open after the end of the IEP meeting, neither witness’s testimony supports Petitioner’s claim that Country Village was presented as the District’s formal placement offer.(Footnote 7) Thus, the Hearing Officer finds that the District’s formal offer of placement was for Viejo. After discussion at the IEP meeting, the District staff indicated they would be willing to compromise by deferring to the parents’ request for Country Village but with fewer hours of DIS than the parents were seeking. (Pet. Exh. 8, p. 7, Dist. Exh. 3, p. 5; testimony of Ms. Lappi, Ms. Pitzen.)

The next questions are whether the parents conveyed their acceptance of this compromise and, if so, whether the parents’ acceptance of only part of the compromise proposal nevertheless obligated the District to implement the portion that was accepted. There is no dispute that the IEP meeting ended without any agreement about STUDENT’s placement; the parents did not sign or initial their consent to any placement. Petitioner argues that his attorney, Mike Jewell, accepted Country Village as the placement in his brief letter to Ms. Lappi dated January 27, 2003. (See Pet. Exh. 20; Pet. Closing Brief, p.5.) The relevant portion of the letter states:

While PARENTS are in agreement to STUDENT’s continued placement at Country Village and the support of a 1:1 aide at school, they do not believe the other services offered by the District at the IEP meeting appropriately met STUDENT’s unique needs and therefore, they will be providing STUDENT with appropriate educational services and will seek reimbursement from the District for the same.

In response, Ms. Lappi wrote back in a letter dated January 31, 2003. (Pet. Exh. 21.) In response to the portion about STUDENT’s placement, Ms. Lappi wrote:

Lastly, you indicated that the parents want continued placement at Country Village School and a 1:1 aide as well as private services for DIS and will seek reimbursement. This position does not comport with the SEHO order. Please provide the specifics of what the parents are going to provide and demand reimbursement and those specific demands will be a ddressed. The Hearing Office did NOT order the same program STUDENT was getting by the same providers and that appears to be what you have indicated in your letter; the parents will not be reimbursed by the District if this is the case.

Mr. Jewell did not respond to this letter. In another letter dated February 10, 2003, Ms. Lappi wrote to Mr. Jewell, stating that “the District is very concerned that you have not provided clarification requested on January 31st.” Ms. Lappi’s letter indicated that because of the vagueness of Mr. Jewell’s letter, the District could not identify what the parents were seeking and therefore the District requested clarification.

In response, Mr. Jewell sent Ms. Lappi a brief letter dated February 18, 2003. (Pet. Exh. 23.) The pertinent parts of Mr. Jewell’s letter stated only:

We believe we have clearly outlined our position with respect to the District’s failure to comply with the Special Education Hearing Office’s order and further explanation is not warranted….With respect to the District’s offer to reimburse the parents for transportation, STUDENT’s parents are willing to accept the District’s offer to reimburse them for transportation to and from Country Village pre-school and to and from services for STUDENT.

In light of Mr. Jewell’s letter, District program specialist Sharla Pitzen wrote to the PARENTS to reiterate the District’s offer from the January 24 IEP meeting. Ms. Pitzen’s letter, dated March 5, 2003, reiterated the details of the District’s IEP placement offer, including the regular education preschool class at Viejo and DIS provided by District staff. Ms. Pitzen explained that that was the appropriate placement and services that the District continued to offer. Ms. Pitzen indicated that at the IEP meeting on January 24, 2003, the District staff agreed to defer to the parents’ request for placement at Country Village. (Pet. Exh. 25.) Ms. Pitzen noted that the parents still had not signed the IEP and therefore the District could only provide STUDENT’s program pursuant to stay put. Ms. Pitzen’s letter explained that the last signed IEP was actually STUDENT’s IFSP, but that because the January 24, 2003 IEP proposed more services than those contained in the IFSP, with the parents’ consent the District would begin providing those additional services as part of the stay put placement.

In response, attorney Paul Roberts sent Ms. Pitzen a letter dated March 10, 2003, disputing the representations in her March 5 letter. (Pet. Exh. 26.) Mr. Roberts’ letter asserted that the PARENTS had accepted the District’s offer of placement at Country Village but had not accepted the other programs and services that the District offered at the IEP meeting on January 24.

Ms. Lappi replied to that letter in a March 18 letter that disputed Mr. Roberts’ account. Ms. Lappi recounted how the PARENTS had never conveyed their consent to the District’s offer and had never initialed their consent to any part of the IEP, placement or services. Ms. Lappi reiterated how both her January 31 and February 10 letters had requested clarification about what the parents were seeking, but neither the PARENTS nor their attorneys provided any clarification or any indication that the parents would consent to part of the IEP. Ms. Lappi noted that because the PARENTS had filed for due process without consenting to any part of the IEP, STUDENT’s placement was governed by stay put. (Pet. Exh. 29.)

It is apparent from the correspondence between the parties that neither the PARENTS nor their attorneys clearly conveyed an acceptance of the District’s proposal to defer to the parents’ request for Country Village. Moreover, it was apparent from Ms. Lappi’s January 31 and February 10 letters that she did not understand Mr. Jewell’s January 27 letter to convey acceptance of the District’s offer to defer to the parents’ request for Country Village. Thus, Petitioner’s attorneys were notified that they had not clearly conveyed acceptance of an identifiable program yet they refused to clarify with a clearer statement. In light of all evidence, the Hearing Officer finds that the PARENTS did not clearly convey their acceptance to the District’s offer to defer to their request for the Country Village placement.

In any event, even if the PARENTS had clearly conveyed their desire to accept the proposed compromise, their attempt to accept only the placement and not the DIS likely would not have required implementation of the placement pursuant to Education Code section 56346(a). If part of the District’s formal IEP offer had been accepted, the District would have been obligated under section 56346(a) to implement the accepted portion of the offer. However, this Decision has already determined that the proposed Country Village placement was a proposed compromise to resolve the dispute, not the District’s formal IEP offer. Section 56346(a) does not appear applicable to the compromise proposal, which would otherwise be governed by ordinary contact law. There is no legal provision that partial acceptance of a settlement proposal or compromise proposal creates a contract; rather, partial acceptance would likely constitute a rejection and counter-offer. Thus, Petitioner’s purported agreement to the Country Village portion of the compromise would not have obligated the District to implement the Country Village placement.

Therefore, because no portion of the IEP was agreed-upon, the District did not fail to implement STUDENT’s IEP.

2. Did the District commit procedural and substantive violations constituting a denial of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for STUDENT in the 2002-2003 school year beginning January 24, 2003, as follows:

a. failing to have the appropriate team members present at the IEP meeting

Parents of children with disabilities are provided procedural protections under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.) The Supreme Court noted in Rowley that “Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of participation” at every step “as it did upon the measurement of the resulting IEP.” (Rowley at 205-206.) Procedural violations which result in a “loss of educational opportunity” or which “seriously infringe the parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP formulation process clearly result in the denial of a FAPE.” (W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School District No. 23 (9th Cir. 1992) 960 F.2d 1479, 1484.) Procedural violations which do not result in educational loss for the student or an infringement upon parental participation in the IEP process are insufficient to support a finding that the student has been denied a FAPE. (Ibid.)

California Education Code section 56341(b) identifies the necessary members of the IEP team, including: (1) one or both parents, (2) a special education teacher of the pupil, (3) a regular education teacher of the pupil, (4) a representative of the responsible local educational agency (LEA), and (5) an individual who conducted an assessment of the student, or who is knowledgeable about the assessment procedures used to assess the student and is familiar with the assessment results or recommendations. Additionally, section 56341(b)(6) indicates that, at the discretion of the parent or the LEA, the team may include “other individuals who have knowledge or special expertise regarding the pupil, including related services personnel, as appropriate.”

In the present case, Petitioner alleges that the District failed to comply with section 56341(b) by failing to include as part of the IEP team an occupational therapist knowledgeable about STUDENT’s OT needs. Petitioner argues that Nancy Lin, the occupational therapist who had worked with STUDENT on two occasions, should have been in attendance at the IEP meeting and that her absence “denied his parents an opportunity to meaningfully participate in the IEP.” (Pet. Closing Brief, p. 21.)

Section 56341(b) does not require attendance at the IEP meeting by every individual who has worked with the student. Here, both Natalie Angelo, the occupational therapist assigned to Viejo, and Claudia Ginsberg-Brown, the District’s supervising occupational therapist, were present at the January 24, 2003 IEP meeting.(Footnote 8) (Testimony of Ms. Ginsberg-Brown; Pet. Exh. 8, p. 2.) Ms. Ginsberg-Brown is a licensed, board-certified occupational therapist with a master’s degree in occupational therapy. Ms. Ginsberg-Brown was knowledgeable about the OT assessments by Sky Pediatrics and Nancy Press. (See Pet. Exhs. 11, 36; testimony of Ms. Ginsberg-Brown.) Ms. Ginsberg-Brown also testified that she had spoken with Ms. Lin about STUDENT’s OT needs prior to the IEP meeting. The IEP notes reflect that Ms. Ginsberg-Brown answered questions from the PARENTS about implementation of the OT services. Accordingly, the presence of Ms. Ginsberg-Brown and Ms. Angelo at the IEP meeting provided individuals knowledgeable about STUDENT’s OT needs and the OT services being offered. The absence of Ms. Lin from the IEP meeting did not violate section 56341(b) and the District did not fail to have appropriate members present at the IEP team.

b. failing to consider the information presented by the parents at the IEP meeting;

Petitioner argues that, to the extent the District’s offer at the end of the IEP meeting remained the same as the pre-printed offer District staff wrote in advance of the meeting, the District’s failure to change its offer was evidence that the District had pre-determined what it would offer STUDENT and was not considering the information presented at the IEP meeting. (Pet. Closing Brief, p. 9, fn. 2.) This argument is not persuasive and is not consistent with the requirements of the IDEA; a procedural violation does not occur simply because school employees are not persuaded by a parent’s position and continue instead to offer the school’s preferred program. Moreover, case law and Hearing Office decisions have consistently held that, assuming the parents have the opportunity to participate in the discussion at the IEP meeting and suggest changes to the document, school employees’ pre-drafting of an IEP document does not constitute a denial of FAPE. (See, e.g., Hudson v. Wilson (W.D. Va. 1986) 1986-87 EHLR Dec. 558:186, 189.)

In any event, the claim is not supported by the evidence. The IEP notes, the audiotapes of the IEP meeting and the testimony of several witnesses established that the team members listened to detailed presentations by the parents’ private service providers, CARD therapist Anahita Parsi and speech-language pathologist Abby Rozenberg. The IEP team members discussed the information presented and agreed to make some changes to the IEP goals, objectives and present levels of performance. (See, e.g., Pet. Exh. 8, pgs. 27, 38-39.) Subsequently the IEP team discussed the proposal for placement and services made by the parents’ attorney, Paul Roberts. In light of these facts, there is no indication that the District members of the IEP team failed to consider the information presented by the parents.

c. failing to offer appropriate placement, behavior therapy, speech-language therapy and occupational therapy;

The standard for determining whether the District’s proposed program substantively offered a FAPE involves the following three factors: whether the program was designed to address STUDENT’s unique needs; whether the program was reasonably calculated to provide him with educational benefit; and whether the program conformed to his IEP. (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 176; Gregory K. v. Longview School District (9th Cir. 1987) 811 F.2d 1307, 1314; 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.) In Rowley, the Supreme Court decided the appropriate level of instruction and services that must be provided to students with disabilities in order to satisfy the IDEA. The Court held that the IDEA does not require that a student be provided with the best available special education instruction or services, or that those services maximize a student's potential. The Court stated that “the ‘basic floor of opportunity’ provided by the Act consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the child.” (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200.) Moreover, as long as a school district provides an appropriate education, methodology is left up to the school's discretion. (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208.)

Special education law also requires that a student be educated in the least restrictive environment (LRE) and that removal of a student from the regular education environment occur only when the nature or severity of the student’s disability is such that education in regular education classes cannot be achieved satisfactorily. (20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.550(b); Education Code § 56031.) Furthermore, the IDEA specifies additional requirements for the provision of a FAPE, such as the obligation to enable the child to be involved in and progress in the general curriculum. (See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 300.347(a).)

To summarize, the IDEA and Supreme Court’s decision in Rowley require that an appropriate program: (1) be designed to meet the student’s unique needs; (2) be reasonably calculated to provide the student with educational benefit; (3) conform to the student’s IEP; and (4) be in the LRE. (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; Rowley, supra, 458 U.S. at 188.)

Regarding STUDENT’s unique needs, the Decision issued on January 10, 2003 found that STUDENT needed a placement and services to address deficits in the areas of communication, speech and language, socialization and behavior, self-help skills, sensory processing, fine-motor skills and gross-motor skills. To briefly summarize, in May and June 2002 his test scores on the Vineland were in the first percentile in daily living skills, socialization and adaptive behavior, with a score in the seventh percentile for communication and sixteenth percentile for motor skills. His cognitive functioning tested in the average to low average range. He exhibited some “maladaptive behaviors” such as non-compliance, tantrums, mild aggression, inappropriate eating, running away and inappropriate toy play, although in general the frequency of these behaviors had diminished somewhat over the 2001-2002 school year. Despite behavior issues, he was able to participate in all activities in his regular education preschool class without any significant behavior problems. He was also able to play with typically developing peers and initiate oral communication with those peers.

At hearing in the present case, Petitioner contended, and the District did not dispute, that STUDENT had made some progress since November 2002. In support of this position, STUDENT’s current service providers gave testimony and written reports regarding STUDENT’s recent progress. (See testimony of Ms. Parsi, Ms. Rozenberg; Pet. Exhs. 17, 18, 37; see also Pet. Exh. 8.) Ms. Rozenberg testified that STUDENT continued to have the same areas of need in speech-language, as reported in Judy Segal’s September 2002 speech and language evaluation. (See Pet. Exh. 12.) Neither party contended that STUDENT’s needs had particularly changed since the November 2002 hearing in case SN02-01703. In light of all evidence, including that STUDENT was attending his preschool without an aide and receiving only limited DIS, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT’s needs remained generally the same as those identified in the January 2003 Decision.

Placement

The next step is to consider whether the District’s proposed placement was appropriate. In SN02-01703, the hearing officer determined that, in light of the mandate for LRE and STUDENT’s success in a typical preschool class in fall 2002, currently the appropriate placement for STUDENT is a typical preschool class with IBI aide support. That Decision ordered the District to offer STUDENT a placement in a typical preschool class for four hours a day, five days a week, which was the same number of hours the District offered in July 2002 for the Viejo structured autism class. That Decision ordered that when the IEP team selected a typical preschool placement for STUDENT, the team “shall give special weight to the fact that STUDENT’s success at Country Village Preschool has been demonstrated, and Country Village shall be given priority consideration. If Country Village is not selected, then a class situation similar to STUDENT’s preschool class at Country Village shall be given priority consideration.” (Decision, p. 32.)

In the present Decision, the Hearing Officer has already determined that Viejo was the placement the District formally offered at the IEP meeting on January 24, 2003. Therefore this analysis will consider the appropriateness of the Viejo typical preschool class, in light of the orders and findings in the prior Decision.

The January 24, 2003 IEP team notes indicate that the District members of that IEP team considered Country Village but instead recommended Viejo as the placement. Those IEP notes state in part:

Information about placement/services was shared with the team by Ms. Pitzen. Country Village Preschool, where STUDENT is currently attending, was discussed and considered; CUSD Viejo fee-based preschool was discussed and considered. At Viejo, all STUDENT’s services could be offered and IBI services were also outlined by Ms. Pitzen (see attachments). In comparing the options, Viejo was deemed to be a more appropriate placement because all of STUDENT’s service could be provided on site which would facilitate collaboration and generalization.

The District offered placement at the fee-based preschool class at Viejo taught by Victoria Lloyd, plus IBI aide support and other services. The class is “fee-based” in that parents of regular education children pay a fee for those children to attend, but the District pays the fee for special education students who attend the class pursuant to an IEP. The students range in age from three to five years old. One group of students attends on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, while a second group of students attends on Tuesdays and Thursdays. One class has twelve students and the other has fourteen students. In previous years, Ms. Lloyd has taught autistic students and other special education students in her preschool classes. Currently, except for one student who receives speech therapy, all of the preschool students enrolled in Ms. Lloyd’s class are typically developing and attend regular education only. However, next door to Ms. Lloyd’s classroom is a special day class (SDC) for autistic students, and for an hour each day one student from that class attends Ms. Lloyd’s class, accompanied by a shadow aide from the SDC. Ms. Lloyd explained that she is assisted by one classroom aide for the full school day and also by another teacher from 10:00 a.m. to noon each day. Ms. Lloyd described the daily schedule and typical activities of the preschool class. Those activities included circle time, snack time, cooking, recess, cleanup, music and/or dancing, lunch, and use of activity centers with activities such as art, language, reading aloud, puzzles and manipulatives, and math activities. Circle time would generally include activities such as story time, sharing/talking time, phonics using the “Zoophonics” program, counting, shapes, and learning the calendar. The entire class runs from 8:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m., a total of three and a half hours; the District’s IEP offer was for STUDENT to attend that class five days a week.(Footnote 9)

Reviewing the description of Country Village contained in the prior Decision and the limited evidence about Country Village admitted during the present hearing, the proposed Viejo preschool class taught by Ms. Lloyd is similar to STUDENT’s preschool class at Country Village. Both classes are comprised of typically developing peers whose parents pay a fee for their attendance. The classes have similar, typical preschool activities including circle time, snack time, recess, art, music, cooking and pre-academics such as reading/language activities. Both classes allow the students to choose among centers where they work on different activities and projects.

The differences between the two classes are generally minor. The Country Village class is slightly smaller, with eight to twelve students in the class instead of the twelve to fourteen currently in the Viejo class, although the Viejo class has an aide as well as a teacher in the classroom. The Country Village class operated in the afternoon, while the proposed Viejo class is in the morning.

In light of all evidence and the findings contained in the prior Decision, the Hearing Officer concludes that the Viejo preschool class is similar to STUDENT’s preschool class at Country Village. The proposed Viejo class would therefore be an appropriate placement for STUDENT in the LRE.

Behavior Therapy, Speech-Language Therapy and OT

Designated instruction and services (DIS) must be provided “when the instruction and services are necessary for the pupil to benefit educationally from his or her instructional program.” (Cal. Education Code § 56363(a).) At the IEP meeting on January 24, 2003, and again in Ms. Pitzen’s letter dated March 5, 2003, the District offered the following DIS in conjunction with the formal placement offer of a Viejo regular education preschool class: IBI program services of 25 hours per week (to include both classroom aide support and generalization in the home); speech-language therapy for two 30-minute individual sessions and one 30-minute small-group session each week; OT for one 30-minute individual session and one 45-minute group session each week; and PT for one 60-minute individual session per week plus one 15-minute consultation per month.(Footnote 10)

In comparison, the Decision in SN02-01703 reported that in July 2002, the District’s DIS offer was for IBI program services five hours per week, speech-language services for one 30-minute individual session and one 30-minute group session per week, and OT for one 30-minute small-group session per week. (STUDENT v. Capistrano USD, SN02-01703, Decision, pgs. 3-4, 21.) Those services were offered in conjunction with the proposed placement at the Viejo structured autism class. The hearing officer in SN02-01703 determined that, in light of the extensive instruction and generalization that would have been provided in the structured autism class, the District’s offer of DIS was appropriate except for the absence of physical therapy (PT) services. However, the Decision specified that STUDENT’s prospective placement in a typical preschool class instead of a structured autism class required the IEP team to consider increasing STUDENT’s DIS, particularly the IBI, speech-language therapy and OT services. (Id. at 31, 34.)

Regarding the IBI services, the parties dispute whether the District’s current offer constituted an increase from the previous offer. While on its face the number of IBI hours increased from five to twenty-five hours per week, Petitioner argues that this is not an actual increase because the twenty-five hours includes approximately twenty hours of classroom support, leaving only five hours for behavior therapy in the home. In determining whether twenty-five hours per week constituted an appropriate amount of IBI services, the Hearing Officer considers that the District’s prior offer for the structured autism class did not include a one-to-one aide. The prior Decision stated that an increase in DIS would likely be warranted because the level of intensive support, instruction and generalization available in the structured autism class would not be available in a typical preschool class. In the structured autism class, STUDENT would have received all but five hours per day of his behavior therapy from the teacher and trained aides during class time. Thus, the current offer of an additional twenty hours per week of IBI services operates to replace the behavior therapy STUDENT would have received in the structured autism class.(Footnote 11) Moreover, the structured autism class had a 2:1 student-to-teacher ratio, so STUDENT will be able to receive more one-to-one instruction with his one-to-one IBI aide in the typical preschool class.

Petitioner raises other arguments disputing the appropriateness of the IBI services, such as Petitioner’s claim that he risks regression if he switches from his CARD program to another program. The prior Decision already found that IBI services were appropriate for Petitioner and ordered the District to offer him IBI services. Given that there has been no significant change in STUDENT’s needs since the prior hearing, the Hearing Officer will not reopen topics already determined in the prior Decision. Therefore, the Hearing Officer concludes that the current offer of twenty-five hours per week of IBI services is appropriate and compensates for the IBI support STUDENT would have received in the structured autism class.

Additionally regarding the IBI program, Petitioner argues that the District committed procedural violations that denied the PARENTS an opportunity to participate in the IEP process by denying the parents and their expert an opportunity to observe the IBI program. Previously the Hearing Office has ruled that if a district offered a placement for a pupil but did not allow the parent and the parent’s educational expert to view the proposed placement, this could violate the parent’s right to participate in the development of the program by not allowing the parent to make an informed decision. [Student v. Ocean View ESD and West Contra Costa Consortium for Special Education, SN 1306-00, Order Regarding Motions To Allow Observations Of Classrooms and Educational Setting (July 10, 2001)(citing Cal. Educ. Code § 56506(d).)] However, when a request to observe a placement is made for the purpose of obtaining information in preparation for litigation, and not the desire to make an informed choice regarding a proposed placement, there appears to be no right to observe the placement. (Id.)

In the present case, Ms. Lappi stated during the IEP meeting on January 24, 2003, that the PARENTS could visit and observe at Viejo. Subsequently, in a letter dated March 12, 2003, Petitioner’s attorney wrote to Ms. Pitzen requesting that the District allow UC Riverside Professor Jan Blancher to observe Viejo’s IBI program. In a letter dated March 13, District legal assistant Kimberly Gaither responded that the District would not permit that observation because it would be “primarily for the purpose of obtaining information that may be presented at hearing.” (Pet. Exh. 28.) The letter indicated that PARENTS would be permitted to observe the IBI program and could contact Ms. Pitzen to arrange the observation.

In April 2003, MOTHER attempted to schedule an observation of the IBI program, but was not successful. (Pet. Exh. 30; testimony of MOTHER, Ms. Pitzen.) From April 7-9, 2003, MOTHER contacted various District staff members and continually requested to observe the IBI program at Viejo. (Testimony of MOTHER; Pet. Exh. 30.) On April 10, 2003, Ms. Pitzen telephoned MOTHER and told MOTHER that she needed some time to set up the observation. Ms. Pitzen testified that there was a school break in mid-April, but that the observation was scheduled for the week after the break. MOTHER testified that the parents could not observe the program because the District scheduled the observation for April 22, 2003, the day the present hearing was scheduled to begin.

Parents are entitled to view a proposed program to allow them to make an informed choice when deciding whether or not to accept the proposed program.(Footnote 12) For the same reasons, parents may also be entitled to have their expert view the proposed program. In the present case, the District offered the Viejo observation at the IEP meeting on January 24, 2003. As detailed previously in this Decision, Petitioner’s attorneys indicated in letters that the parents wanted Country Village as the placement and did not agree to the District’s proposal for DIS. Petitioner filed for due process hearing on February 25, 2003, and thereafter requested observation of the IBI program by the parents and their expert. In light of all circumstances, including the parents’ initiation of their observation requests only two weeks before the start of the hearing, the District’s failure to schedule the IBI observation was not a denial of the parents’ right to participate in the IEP process and make an informed decision regarding the proposed program.

Regarding speech-language therapy, Petitioner similarly raises arguments attempting to revisit determinations made in the prior Decision regarding the appropriate type and amount of speech therapy. The prior Decision found that the District’s offer of one weekly 30-minute individual speech-language session and one weekly 30-minute group speech-language session was appropriate for STUDENT in the context of the structured autism placement. Because STUDENT’s needs have not significantly changed since the prior hearing, this Decision will not reopen findings made in the prior Decision. Instead, the present Decision will consider only what speech-language services are appropriate in light of the change of placement to a typical preschool class.

At the IEP meeting on January 24, 2003, the District offered an increase of one 30-minute individual speech-language session per week, in addition to the 60 minutes per week contained in the previous offer. In determining whether the increased amount was appropriate to address STUDENT’s needs, the Hearing Officer again considers the prior Decision’s reasoning for ordering the IEP team to revisit the amount of DIS. An increase in speech-language services would likely be required because STUDENT would not have the intensive and overlapping instruction available in the structured autism class. The prior Decision stated that each student in the structured autism class received one 30-minute group speech session per week. That weekly session emphasized social communication in addition to individual communication goals. (Decision, p. 24.) In the present case, the Hearing Officer also considers that attending a typical preschool setting will likely offer STUDENT increased opportunities for social communication, particularly when facilitated by his aide. Also in light of the increased IBI instruction noted above, the Hearing Officer finds that the addition of one 30-minute individual speech-language session was sufficient to compensate for the loss of the in-class speech-language support that would have been available in the structured autism class.

Regarding OT, the District offered an increase of one additional 45-minute group OT session per week, in addition to the 30 minutes per week that had previously been offered. The prior Decision stated that the students in the structured autism class received one 45-minute group OT session per week. Given the partial overlap between Petitioner’s OT and PT needs as noted in the prior Decision, it is also relevant that the District’s offer added direct PT services of one hour per week plus 15 minutes of consultation per month. In light of all evidence, the Hearing Officer finds that the additional 45-minute group OT session is a sufficient increase to replace the OT services STUDENT would have otherwise received in the structured autism class.

Thus, the Hearing Officer finds that the IBI services, speech-language therapy and OT services offered were appropriate.

d. failing to draft appropriate goals and objectives addressing each of STUDENT’s behavior, occupational and speech-language needs;

Petitioner argues that he was denied a FAPE because some aspects of several of the IEP goals and objectives were inappropriate, while the IEP team failed to include other goals that were appropriate.(Footnote 13) In addition to arguing that the goals and objectives were appropriate, the District points out that the IEP team spent hours reviewing the 31 pages of goals and objectives. During that time neither the PARENTS nor STUDENT’s private service providers, Ms. Parsi and Ms. Rozenberg, voiced the objections Petitioner now raises. (See testimony of Ms. Parsi, Ms. Rozenberg, MOTHER; Pet. Exh. 8.)

Petitioner’s claims regarding the appropriateness of the goals and objectives indicated some differences of opinion or minor lack of detail, not a denial of FAPE. For example, speech-language pathologist Abby Rozenberg testified that the speech-language pathologist should have been identified as a responsible individual for IEP goal 18, concerning reduction of tantrum behavior. Similarly, private occupational therapist Laurie Cohen testified that the IEP should have identified the occupational therapist as one of the individuals responsible for implementing IEP goal 17, concerning remaining near his teacher or other adult, and IEP goal 19, concerning reduction of aggressive behavior. (Dist. Exh. 3, pgs. 25, 27.) District OT Claudia Ginsberg-Brown agreed that the occupational therapist could work on these two goals, but explained that the failure to specifically list the occupational therapist on the IEP document was not significant.

Considering also the length and complexity of STUDENT’s goals and objectives, the Hearing Officer finds that the failure to specifically identify the occupational therapist or speech-language pathologist on those behavior goals did not deny STUDENT a FAPE. Moreover, because the academic program offered was appropriate to meet STUDENT’s needs and allow educational benefit, to the extent that Petitioner’s differences of opinion regarding particular objectives identified inconsistencies or omissions, those inconsistencies or omissions did not rise to the level of a denial of FAPE.

e. failing to draft goals and objectives addressing STUDENT’s oral motor needs?

In the present case, Petitioner argues that the District denied him a FAPE by failing to offer IEP goals and objectives to address his oral motor deficits. The District argues that it has not been able to draft any goals and objectives in this area because the parents have not signed their consent to the assessment plan.

Reassessment of a student with disabilities must be conducted at least once every three years, or more frequently, if conditions warrant a reassessment. (Cal. Educ. Code § 56381; 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (a)(2)(A).) In Gregory K. v. Longview School District, 811 F.2d 1307, 1315 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit stated “if the parents want [their child] to receive special education under the Act, they are obligated to permit such testing.” In Andress v. Cleveland Independent School School District, 64 F.3d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1995), the Fifth Circuit concluded that a parent who desires for her child to receive special education “must allow the school district to evaluate the child; there is no exception to this rule.” (See also Vander Malle v. Ambach, 673 F.2d 49, 53 (2nd Cir. 1983).) While the law provides that a school district has the right and obligation to conduct these reassessments, parental consent for an evaluation is required before a school district can assess the child. (Cal. Educ. Code § 56321(c); 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(C)(i).

The prior Decision found that the District’s assessment of STUDENT’s oral motor deficits had been deficient and therefore ordered the District to submit to the parents a written plan for assessment of STUDENT’s oral motor deficits. (Decision, pgs. 14, 17.) The District provided this assessment plan at the IEP meeting for a parent’s signature, but the PARENTS did not return a signed copy of the document.

Petitioner argues that the District already had sufficient information about his oral motor needs from Ms. Rozenberg’s January 2003 speech-language progress report. However, nothing in the law requires a school district to rely on private assessments as the basis for an offer of a FAPE. If the parents wish the child to receive special education services under the IDEA, they are obligated to permit the district to conduct such testing. (Gregory K., 811 F.2d at 1315 (9th Cir. 1987).

Because the parents did not consent to the assessment of STUDENT’s oral motor deficits, the District could not conduct the assessment. The District was not obligated to accept the findings of the parents’ independent evaluations. Therefore, because the District was not permitted to assess STUDENT in the area of oral motor deficits, the absence of oral motor goals on the IEP did not constitute a denial of FAPE.

3. Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the following expenses:

a. tuition for the Country Village Preschool in the approximate amount of $764.00; b. CARD services in the approximate amount of $4,056.25;

c. speech therapy in the approximate amount of $1,200:

d. mileage in the approximate amount of 1,220 miles?

Parents may be entitled to reimbursement for the costs of placement or services they have procured for their child when the school district has failed to provide a FAPE and the private placement or services are determined to be proper under IDEA and are reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit to the child. (School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Education (1985) 471 U.S. 359; Student W. v. Puyallup School District (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 1489, 1496.) Parents need not provide the exact proper placement or services required under IDEA, but rather must only provide a placement or services that address the student’s needs and provides the student with educational benefit. (Florence County School District Four v. Carter (1993) 510 U.S. 7, 13, 114 S.Ct. 361; Alamo Heights Independent School District v. State Board of Education (5th Cir. 1986) 790 F.2d 1153, 1161.) In addition, equitable considerations may be considered in granting relief, and courts have broad discretion in granting relief. (Burlington, supra; Student W. v. Puyallup School District (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 1489, 1496.)

In the present case, the Hearing Officer found that the District offered an appropriate program and services. Therefore, awarding reimbursement to the parents is not warranted.

ORDER

All of Petitioner’s claims for relief are denied.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to Education Code section 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute: The District prevailed on all issues heard and decided.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this Decision. (Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i).)

Date: June 12, 2003 ____________________________________ Suzanne B. Brown, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

1. The Decision is amended to correct a typographical error regarding the dates the hearing was held. No other changes to the Decision have been made. 2. The parties confirmed the issues during a prehearing telephone conference before Hearing Officer Joy Redmon on April 14, 2003. When the hearing began on April 24, 2003, Petitioner confirmed that the issues remained the same, except for the additional issue of whether the District complied with the Hearing Office’s Decision in SN02-01703. The Hearing Officer presiding in the present case explained that compliance complaints are heard by the California Department of Education, not the Hearing Office, but that the Hearing Officer would consider the prior Decision’s findings of appropriateness and would accept those findings as true and accurate. During the hearing, the parties both presented evidence regarding whether the District had offered an appropriate preschool placement in light of the orders contained in the prior Decision. In light of this evidence and Petitioner’s claim regarding compliance with the prior Decision, the present issues reflect the addition of “appropriate placement” in Issue 2(c). Although appropriate placement was not specifically identified as an issue during the prehearing conference or at the beginning of the hearing, the presentation of evidence at the hearing indicated that the parties were litigating that issue. 3. The Decision in SN02-01703 also addressed several other claims that Petitioner had raised. Petitioner prevailed on his claims that the District’s maintenance/transition plan for summer 2002 was inappropriate, that the District’s failure to offer PT services for the 2002-2003 school year was inappropriate, and that the District had failed to properly assess in the areas of speech-language and PT. The District prevailed on other claims. 4. The District later presented the PARENTS with a proposed assessment plan for the oral motor assessment, but the PARENTS did not sign the plan. Petitioner asserted at hearing that an oral motor assessment is unnecessary because a recent speech-language evaluation assessed in the area of oral motor skills. 5. STUDENT’s CARD therapist, Anahita Parsi, recommended STUDENT receive twenty hours per week of therapy, twelve hours per month for his therapists’ clinic attendance, and six hours per month of program supervision. 6. In Union, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the reasons for imposing the requirement: (1) to alert the parents of the need to consider seriously whether the school district's proposed placement is appropriate under the IDEA; (2) to help the parents determine whether to oppose or accept the placement with supplemental services; and (3) so that the school district is more prepared to introduce sufficient relevant evidence of the appropriateness of the placement at a due process hearing. (Id.)

7. Given that employees of the same school district could easily coordinate their testimony to eliminate inconsistencies, the existence of minor inconsistencies suggests candor and therefore does not necessarily undermine the witnesses’ credibility. 8. Ms. Angelo did not testify and therefore details about her knowledge of STUDENT’s OT needs were not available. 9. The proposed class schedule for STUDENT that was provided at the IEP meeting described a school day running until noon four days a week and until 1:30 p.m. on Tuesdays, to cover STUDENT’s attendance at speech-language and IBI sessions. (Dist. Exh. 3, p. 41.)

10. The offer also included six hours per month of supervision by the District IBI supervisor and a student progress/clinic meeting for staff to attend for two hours per month. 11. District program specialist Sharla Pitzen testified that the delivery of the IBI services would be flexible and would be adjusted depending on STUDENT’s needs and progress. As an example, Ms. Pitzen indicated that STUDENT’s in-home IBI services could be increased if he did not require a shadow aide all the time in his preschool class. Petitioner argues that this flexibility was not conveyed to the PARENTS. Ms. Pitzen persuasively testified that she was not able to explain this to the PARENTS at the IEP meeting because Mr. Roberts repeatedly cut off any discussion of the Viejo placement; other evidence, including the IEP notes and audiotapes, support this account. (See Dist. Exhs. 3, 9.)

12. There may be instances where unusual circumstances make an observation impossible, such as when a school is starting a new class and therefore the proposed class does not yet exist. 13. The issue of including an oral motor goal is addressed in the section below, Issue 2(e), and therefore will not be addressed here.