California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · April 6, 2001
Student v. Sequoia Union High School District
SEHO Case No. SN 392-01 · Hearing Officer Trevor Skarda
Sequoia Union High School District must stop expulsion after Hearing Officer finds car-keying incident was a manifestation of ADHD.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Summary
A 15-year-old student was eligible for special education under specific learning disability, based on an attention disorder (ADHD). He challenged the Sequoia Union High School District's manifestation determination. The District sought to expel him over an October 2000 incident in which he allegedly scratched the principal's car with a key. IEP team meetings in October 2000 and January 2001 both found that the conduct was not a manifestation of his disability and that his placement was appropriate. The student's advocate challenged those findings.
Hearing Officer Trevor Skarda found that the student's ADHD impaired his ability to control the behavior. Cindy Pattison, a county mental health clinician who had counseled the student for years, testified that his ADHD caused impulsiveness and poor judgment. In her view, this drove the alleged act whether or not other students had pressured him. Teacher reports, his earlier discipline record and the district psychologist's own testing on judgment and distractibility supported her view. The District's manifestation form was a preprinted checklist that recorded little of the team's reasoning. District witnesses could not recall the details of the discussion. The district psychologist also conceded that if the student was impulsive and did key the car, his disability may have affected his control. The Hearing Officer ordered the District to permanently stop all expulsion proceedings tied to the incident. The Hearing Officer did not separately decide whether the placement was appropriate.
Why it matters
This decision shows how SEHO applied the 1997 IDEA manifestation standard, which asks whether the disability impaired the student's ability to control the conduct. A checklist that recorded no team reasoning carried little weight against a treating clinician's testimony, teacher reports and the student's behavior history.
Issues and holdings
- Student prevailedDiscipline
Issue 1. Was STUDENT's conduct of "keying" a car a manifestation of his disability?
The student's ADHD-related impulsiveness and poor judgment impaired his ability to control the alleged car-keying, so the conduct was a manifestation of his disability and the District must stop expulsion proceedings.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- The District shall permanently cease all expulsion proceedings related to the October 16, 2000 incident.
Key authorities
34 C.F.R. § 300.523(c); Cal. Educ. Code § 48915.5(a); Cal. Educ. Code § 56507(d)
People named in the decision
- Joyce Willett, director of special education, Sequoia Union High School District
- Shelley Patnoe, school psychologist (conducted preexpulsion assessments; called by Hearing Officer), Sequoia Union High School District
- Mr. Andersen, general education English teacher, Sequoia Union High School District
- Joseph Leonor, group supervisor, witness for Student, Gateway School
- Cindy Pattison, licensed clinical social worker, expert witness for Student, San Mateo County Mental Health
- Paul Foreman, advocate for Student, Community Alliance for Special Education (CASE)
- Lee Thompson, attorney for District
- Lisa Soto Hernandez, deputy county counsel, San Mateo County
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Trevor Skarda, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in Redwood City, California, on March 13, 2001. Petitioner STUDENT (Petitioner or STUDENT) was represented at the hearing by advocate Paul Foreman from the Community Alliance for Special Education (CASE). Also present on behalf of STUDENT was his mother, MOTHER. Respondent Sequoia Union High School District (District) was represented at the hearing by attorney Lee Thompson. Also present on behalf of the District were Joyce Willett, director of special education, and Lisa Soto Hernandez, deputy county counsel.
The following witnesses were called by Petitioner to testify: Joseph Leonor, group supervisor at the Gateway School; MOTHER; and Cindy Pattison, licensed clinical social worker. The District called Joyce Willett. The Hearing Officer called Shelley Patnoe, school psychologist in the District.
Oral and documentary evidence was received. The parties provided oral closing arguments and, later, submitted supplemental closing arguments, which were received by the Hearing Office on March 19, 2001. Thereafter, the case was closed, and the matter was submitted for decision.
ISSUE
Was STUDENT’s conduct of “keying” a car a manifestation of his disability?
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT, age 15, resides within the boundaries of the Sequoia Union High School District (District). He has been eligible for special education services under the category of specific learning disability because of an attention disorder since at least 1993. According to STUDENT’s last IEP, he exhibits a severe discrepancy between ability and achievement in the areas of listening comprehension, math calculation, and math reasoning.
STUDENT was involved in a behavioral incident on October 16, 2000 (this behavior precipitated the expulsion proceedings that are the subject of the instant due process hearing), wherein he allegedly scratched a car – owned by principal of the school – with a key. STUDENT was suspended on October 18, 2000. The District then initiated expulsion proceedings against STUDENT for causing damage to private property and disrupting school activities, and because STUDENT’s “presence . . . causes a continuing danger to the physical safety of the pupil or others.” District’s Exh. A.
At the time of the October 16, 2000 incident, STUDENT was on probation.(Footnote 1) Because of his alleged(Footnote 2) involvement in the car-keying incident, STUDENT was placed by the San Mateo County Courts at the Gateway Center – an alternative school for minors on probation – where he has continuously attended since November 2000.
In preparation for the upcoming manifestation IEP team meeting, STUDENT’s teachers filled out progress reports regarding STUDENT’s scholarship, conduct and attendance. According to his teachers, as of October 19, 2000, STUDENT was failing four classes and “barely passing” physical education. All of his general education teachers indicated that STUDENT had the ability to pass their classes. Three of his general education teachers indicated that STUDENT was “passive.” His English teacher, Mr. Andersen, indicated that STUDENT was “disruptive” and wrote that STUDENT “does not work ever. I have asked him many times to get work in, but he does not. He has poor conduct and chooses to disrupt class.” [Emphasis in original].
Shelley Patnoe, a District school psychologist, conducted a preexpulsion “assessment” on October 20, 2000, which included only a record review.(Footnote 3) In the assessment report, Ms. Patnoe notes, in pertinent part, as follows:
The first records we have include a report of his three-year review in 1996. Testing at that time revealed average cognitive development in both verbal and nonverbal areas. At that time he was placed in a Special Day Class and was receiving 26.5 Mental Health services. Academically, STUDENT demonstrated weaknesses in written language and math. His disability was identified as Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder for which he was being medicated. STUDENT was reported to be an engaging youngster in a one-on-one situation but his behavior in group situations was an ongoing concern indicated on the IEP. The 1996 IEP recommended that he be moved from SDC to RSP at the end of the 1996 school year.
STUDENT’s 1997 IEP reveals that he had been placed in the Resource Program at the beginning of the school year. His academic achievement had improved but his behavioral issues were still a concern. It is noted that although he was medicated for ADHD, he did not take his medication consistently.
District’s Exh. B.
The District held the first manifestation IEP meeting on October 23, 2000. The IEP team notes read, in pertinent part, as follows:
The IEP team met to determine whether the present behavior as outlined by the disciplinary record is a direct manifestation of the student’s learning disability. After hearing from all team members, the team determines that both IEP & placement were appropriate, & the psychologist reported that the behavior is not a manifestation of student’s disability. The team determines that expulsion proceedings may move forward. IEP team rests to allow administration to move student temporarily to the alternative student center through the proceedings.
Petitioner’s Exh. 16. [Emphasis in original]. The IEP also indicates that the special education teacher reported “generally good behavior” but that STUDENT has “difficulty controlling behavior.” MOTHER signed the IEP. Id.
In November 2000, MOTHER retained the services of Paul Foreman from CASE, who rescinded MOTHER’s agreement to the October 23, 2000 manifestation IEP. The District agreed to temporarily cease expulsion proceedings.
Thereafter on January 4, 2001, Ms. Patnoe conducted a second preexpulsion assessment. She administered the Wechsler Intelligence Test for Children (WISC-III), the Wechsler Individual Achievement Test (WIAT), which measures achievement in the areas of reading, math and writing, the Bender test of Visual Motor Gestalt, and the Test of Auditory Perceptual Skills-Upper Level (TAPS-UL). On the TAPS-UL, STUDENT scored in the seventh percentile, and Ms. Patnoe found that STUDENT exhibited a “significant” weakness in the area of auditory processing. On the WISC-III, STUDENT received a standard score of 85 on the verbal scale, 98 on the performance scale, and 90 on the full scale. The assessor noted that STUDENT’s “weakest performance was on a subtest measuring practical reasoning and use of judgement.” STUDENT received a standard score of 84 on the “freedom from distractibility” scale, which placed him in the 14th percentile. In the summary section, Ms. Patnoe wrote, in pertinent part, as follows:
STUDENT’s cognitive development falls with in the average range overall. His verbal skills are low average while nonverbal cognitive development is somewhat stronger. Results indicate that STUDENT is somewhat distractible . . . his auditory perceptual skills are below average . . . [and a] significant discrepancy . . . in math still exists. He continues to be eligible for special education assistance as a student with a learning disability . . . .
Petitioner’s Exh. 18.
The District held a second manifestation IEP team meeting on January 26, 2001. The results of the IEP meeting were the same as the first: The team agreed that STUDENT was properly placed at the time of the subject behavior and that his behavior was not a manifestation of his disability. STUDENT’s mother signed the document.(Footnote 4)
STUDENT was involved in four other behavioral incidents between February 2000 (his first year in the District) and the car-keying incident. On February 4, 2000, STUDENT was disciplined for defiance in class, cussing and slamming a door. On March 15, 2000, STUDENT was disciplined for “being argumentative” with a teacher, cursing, and refusing to work. On May 15, 2000, STUDENT was disciplined for “disruption.” On October 6, 2000, STUDENT was disciplined, including a suspension for two days, for performing an obscene act wherein he simulated a penis with a foxtail. District’s Exh. B. No functional behavioral assessment or behavioral intervention plan has been developed for STUDENT while in the District.
For the past year and a half, STUDENT has been receiving counseling services from Cindy Pattison, a licensed clinical social worker employed by San Mateo County Mental Health. Ms. Pattison provides services to STUDENT related to his attention problems, as well as other issues. The services are currently provided through the “Crossroads” program, a joint probation-mental health program. Testimony of Pattison.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ISSUE NO. 1: Was STUDENT’s conduct of “keying” a car a manifestation of his disability?
Both federal and State law provide that before a student with a disability can be expelled from school, the IEP team must determine that the conduct for which the student is being recommended for expulsion was not a manifestation of his disability.
Pursuant to 34 C.F.R. §300.523(c), the IEP team and other qualified personnel may only determine that the conduct was not a manifestation of the child’s disability if they (1) First consider, in terms of the behavior subject to disciplinary action, all relevant information, including – (i) Evaluation and diagnostic results, including the results or other relevant information supplied by the parents of the child; (ii) Observations of the child; and (iii) The child’s IEP and placement; and (2) Then determine that – (i) In relationship to the behavior subject to the disciplinary action, the child’s IEP and placement were appropriate and the special education services, supplementary aids and services, and behavior intervention strategies were provided consistent with the child’s IEP and placement; (ii) The child’s disability did not impair the ability of the child to understand the impact and consequences of the behavior subject to disciplinary action; and (iii) The child’s disability did not impair the ability of the child to control the behavior subject to disciplinary action.
California law is similar to the federal law; however, the wording is slightly different. California Education Code Section 48915.5(a) provides that a child with previously identified exceptional needs who is receiving special education services may only be expelled if the following conditions are met:
(1) An individualized education program team meeting is held and conducted . . .
(2) The team determines that the misconduct was not caused by, or was not a direct manifestation of, the pupil’s identified disability.
(3) The team determines that the pupil had been appropriately placed at the time the misconduct occurred.
In this case, the Petitioner alleges that STUDENT’s alleged conduct was a manifestation of his disability. Specifically, Petitioner alleges (1) that STUDENT’s disability seriously impaired his ability to control his behavior and (2) that STUDENT’s placement at the time of the car-keying incident was not appropriate.
With regard to Petitioner’s first contention, Petitioner argued specifically that one result of STUDENT’s severe ADHD condition is “impulsive” behavior. The Petitioner argued that, whether STUDENT was coerced or not,(Footnote 5) the behavior in question (“keying” the principal’s car) was an “impulsive” act, and as such STUDENT’s disability did impair his ability “to control the behavior subject to disciplinary action.”
The District’s position at Hearing was essentially that the manifestation IEP team discussed, among other things, whether STUDENT’s disability impaired his ability to control the subject behavior, and that, based on then-available information, the IEP team properly determined that STUDENT could control the behavior. Specifically, the District argues that it did not know that STUDENT was receiving counseling. The District also argued that because STUDENT claims that he was coerced, that his behavior could not have been “impulsive.”
In support of his position, Petitioner called Cindy Pattison, a licensed clinical social worker, employed by San Mateo County Mental Health. Ms. Pattison has a Bachelors degree and a Masters in social work and has over 27 years experience treating children with ADHD and other disabilities.
Ms. Pattison first met and began providing counseling services to STUDENT when he was nine years old through a court diversion program. She continued to provide those services for approximately one year, at which point STUDENT was referred to a separate agency for similar services, although he apparently did not pursue the referral. About a year and a half ago, Ms. Pattison began treating STUDENT again – the frequency of the therapy has varied between one session each week to one session every three weeks – pursuant to the “Crossroads” program, a joint probation-Mental Health program. She explained that STUDENT has a long history of impulsiveness, that he has consistently displayed trouble with focusing, attention and poor judgment. Ms. Pattison also explained that STUDENT’s hyperactivity, which was initially extremely severe, has lessened as he has aged.
Ms. Pattison testified that STUDENT’s impulsiveness is connected to the alleged behavior of keying the principal’s car. She explained that STUDENT’s ADHD is typified by an inability to stop and think before he acts and that STUDENT’s cause and effect thinking is impaired. She further testified that STUDENT also has consistently displayed poor judgment and that the combination of poor judgment and impulsive behavior is a result of STUDENT’s ADHD. Ms. Pattison explained that over the course of her therapy, she has been working with STUDENT and teaching him to, among other things, stop and think before he acts. In her opinion, whether or not STUDENT was coerced or threatened (as STUDENT maintains), the alleged act of “keying” the car was a result of STUDENT’s disability in that his ADHD inhibited his ability to control the behavior.
Ms. Pattison testified that STUDENT takes medication that helps to control, but does not eliminate, his ADHD symptoms. She testified that over the last year and a half, there was a period of time when STUDENT resented taking his medication and failed to do so (MOTHER testified similarly). Ms. Pattison, as well as MOTHER, was unsure whether STUDENT was taking his medication at the time of the subject behavior.(Footnote 6)
The District called Ms. Willett, who testified, in pertinent part, about the IEP team’s decision that STUDENT’s disability did not impair his ability to control his behavior. She explained that STUDENT’s “ADHD was certainly noted” by the team, but that his teachers, with the exception of one, reported “acceptable behavior” in class. She could not remember details of the surrounding discussions.
The Hearing Officer called Ms. Patnoe to testify. Ms. Patnoe was the school psychologist who conducted the preexpulsion assessment. She said that the behavior of “being with the group of boys who conducted this act is not a function of his behavior, attention deficit.”(Footntoe 7) She could not remember the details of IEP team discussions. Ms. Patnoe testified that, although she does not believe STUDENT is impulsive (she said she would have picked it up on the WISC), that if STUDENT were impulsive, and the behavior he actually engaged in was keying the car, that his impulsiveness may have inhibited his ability to control the subject behavior.
The Hearing Officer notes that the critical portion of the manifestation IEP document, where the IEP team makes the determination as to whether the behavior was a manifestation of the disability, was a preprinted checklist. While nothing prevents the District from using an appropriately crafted checklist, the problem is that very little information is provided regarding, for instance, the basis for the team’s decision that STUDENT’s disability did not inhibit his ability to control his behavior. All that the District witnesses could recall was generally that there were lengthy discussions, and that at the end, all present agreed at the final “roll call” that each of the boxes should be checked. The IEP itself does not include information reflecting any meaningful discussion, only that all members agreed that the appropriate “box” should be checked.
The Hearing Officer finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that STUDENT’s ADHD inhibited his ability to control his behavior (keying the car).
First, the weight of the evidence establishes that STUDENT acts impulsively and uses poor judgment as a result of his disability. Both STUDENT’s mother and Ms. Pattison testified that STUDENT is impulsive and that he exhibits poor judgment. Moreover, the IEP notes that STUDENT’s special education teacher reported that STUDENT exhibited “disruptive behavior.” This is consistent with the English teacher’s statement that STUDENT displayed “poor conduct and chooses to disrupt class.” Additionally, Ms, Patnoe’s first preexpulsion assessment generally notes that STUDENT’s behavior in group situations was a concern in the past and her second preexpulsion assessment found that on the WISC-III, STUDENT’s “weakest performance was on a subtest measuring practical reasoning and use of judgement.”
Second, the weight of the evidence established that STUDENT’s impulsiveness, combined with his poor judgment, inhibited his ability to control the car-keying behavior. As discussed above, Ms. Pattison testified that STUDENT’s ADHD inhibited his ability to control the subject behavior. She has treated individuals with similar problems for more than 20 years, and has provided extensive services to STUDENT regarding, among other things, his impulsiveness and poor judgement. MOTHER testified similarly to Ms. Pattison regarding STUDENT’s impulsiveness and poor judgment. Additionally, two of STUDENT’s teachers witnessed behavioral problems, including disruptive behavior. Moreover, STUDENT has a record of behaviors both in and outside of the classroom which are consistent with the subject behavior. District’s Exh. A. In contrast to the testimony of a qualified expert (Ms. Pattison), STUDENT’s mother, the observations of two of STUDENT’s teachers, as well as the record of consistent behaviors, the District provided no persuasive testimony to support the IEP teams’ decision that the car-keying behavior did not inhibit STUDENT’s ability to control the subject behavior. Finally, Ms. Patnoe, a District psychologist, testified that if STUDENT were “impulsive” and if he keyed the car, that his disability may have been inhibited his ability to control his behavior.(Footnote 8)
In sum, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT’s ADHD inhibited his ability to control the behavior of keying the principal’s car, the behavior for which the District seeks expulsion. The District provided virtually no evidence that his disability did not inhibit his ability to control the subject behavior. As such, STUDENT’s behavior was a manifestation of his disability. Because STUDENT’s behavior was a manifestation of his disability, the District must cease all expulsion proceedings related to the behavior.(Footnote 9)
ORDER
The District shall permanently cease all expulsion proceedings related to the October 16, 2000 incident.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute: The Petitioner prevailed on the sole issue heard and decided.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i).
DATED: April 6, 2001 ________________________ Trevor Skarda, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
Footnote 1: The circumstances surrounding STUDENT’s probation were not disclosed at the hearing. Footnote 2: According to his mother, MOTHER, criminal charges related to the keying incident were dropped. Footnote 3: Under “Reason for Referral,” the assessment report indicates that “since STUDENT’s mother refused to make STUDENT available for testing, the assessment will consist of a record review.” Footnote 4: The Parents’ advocate was not present at the IEP meeting, although the District tried to contact him in order to invite him. In any event, Petitioner later revoked consent to the IEP. Footnote 5: STUDENT was at the January 26, 2001 manifestation IEP team meeting, along with his mother. According to the IEP team meeting notes, STUDENT indicated that other students pressured him into his involvement, although STUDENT apparently maintains he did not actually key the car in question. Footnote 6: The IEP reflects that STUDENT’s special education teacher also noted that STUDENT sometimes failed to take his medication, and apparently, that this failure adversely affected his behavior. Petitioner’s Exh. 19. Footnote 7: The behavior that precipitated the expulsion process was not STUDENT “being with the group” at the time the car was scratched. As developed above, the District is seeking expulsion because STUDENT “caused or attempted to cause damage” to school or private property, because he disrupted school activities, and because, due to the “nature of the violation,” STUDENT poses a continuing threat to his safety and to the safety of others. Footnote 8: Although, again, she testified that she did not believe that STUDENT was impulsive and that she believed the subject behavior was “being with the group” that keyed the car. Footnote 9: CVAP provides intensive services to young children with autism, and consults regularly with schools and families regarding children with autism. Ms. Long first met STUDENT in February 1999 when the District contracted with CVAP to observe and consult regarding STUDENT’s program. Since July 1999, Ms. Long has observed STUDENT weekly and provides on-going consultation with STUDENT’s teachers and aides. Ms. Amerine-Dickens supervises Ms. Long. She has not met STUDENT.
