California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · August 15, 2003

Student v. Long Beach Unified School District

SEHO Case No. SN 404-03, SN03-00404 · Hearing Officer John G. Andersen

Long Beach Unified must provide two hours of weekly speech therapy, 20 compensatory hours, and reimbursement for private therapy.

Split decision: student prevailed on 3 of 8 issues (2 in part)

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Summary

The parents of a three-year-old filed for due process against Long Beach Unified School District. Their daughter is eligible for special education because of a severe speech and language impairment caused by an unrepaired cleft palate. Until she turned three, Harbor Regional Center paid for two one-hour sessions of individual speech therapy each week at Kidstreet Institute, a nonpublic agency, with speech pathologist Jane Haddad. At the November 2002 IEP meeting, the District offered 30 minutes of individual therapy and 30 minutes of small-group therapy each week at Prisk Elementary School. The parents turned down that offer and paid for Kidstreet themselves. In April 2003, money pressures forced them to cut back to one hour a week.

Hearing Officer John G. Andersen found that the District's offer did not provide a FAPE. The student's needs were severe and urgent. Her IEP had six goals and twelve objectives, and 30 minutes of individual therapy could not cover them. He rejected the District's claim that her prosthetic palate (obturator) limited how much therapy she could tolerate. However, he found the District's therapists fully qualified, so Kidstreet was not the only appropriate provider. He found no procedural violation in the District's failure to name the therapist, and he did not decide whether the offer was predetermined. He ordered an IEP amendment for two hours of individual therapy a week, 20 hours of compensatory therapy, and reimbursement of the parents' Kidstreet costs. He denied monthly consultation services.

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Why it matters

The decision shows how SEHO compared a district's offered service minutes with the number of IEP goals and the student's documented needs. It also shows that a parent's preferred provider was not required when district therapists were qualified. SEHO also did not require the district to name the specific therapist in its offer.

Issues and holdings

  1. Dismissed / withdrawnEligibility

    Issue FN1. Has STUDENT been determined eligible for special education services under the appropriate basis for eligibility (Petitioner asserted she was inappropriately found eligible on the basis of speech and language impairment only).

    Petitioner withdrew this issue (and the related assessment question) on the first day of hearing.

  2. Student prevailed in partFAPE: services offered

    Issue 1a. Has the District offered appropriate frequency and duration of services? (District offered 30 minutes individual and 30 minutes small-group speech therapy weekly.)

    The 30/30 offer was insufficient for the student's severe, urgent needs and six goals/twelve objectives; she needed two one-hour individual sessions weekly, but requested monthly consultative services at preschool were not shown to be necessary.

  3. District prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue 1b. Has the District offered STUDENT an appropriate placement for services? (Whether only the Kidstreet speech pathologist, rather than a District speech pathologist, could appropriately serve her.)

    District speech pathologists, including the one assigned to Prisk, were fully qualified and experienced with cleft palate, obturators and PROMPT; a change in therapist would cause only temporary, minimal difficulty.

  4. District prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue 1c(i). Was the District required to identify a therapist in its placement offer?

    Law does not require naming the provider or the provider's attendance at the IEP meeting; parents asked nothing about the therapist, so their participation was not impaired.

  5. District prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue 1c(ii). Did the District misrepresent its ability to provide services?

    Even if the assessor said the Prisk therapist had cleft palate experience, the statement was accurate, so there was no misrepresentation.

  6. Not reachedIEP procedure

    Issue 1c(iii). Were the services offered by the District pre-determined before the IEP?

    Unnecessary to resolve because the offer was already found substantively inadequate.

  7. Student prevailed in partFAPE: services offered

    Issue 2. Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory educational services?

    Student awarded 20 hours of compensatory individual speech therapy for therapy lost and regression since April 2003; compensatory consultative services denied for lack of evidence.

  8. Issue 3. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to be reimbursed for private speech and language therapy they have obtained for STUDENT?

    Parents provided appropriate therapy through a certified nonpublic agency and licensed pathologist after the District failed to offer FAPE, so they are entitled to reimbursement.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • Order to convene IEP meeting. Reconvene IEP team within 15 calendar days to amend the November 2002 IEP to offer twice-weekly one-hour sessions of individual speech and language therapy through the District's preschool speech pathologist at Prisk Elementary School 'for the remainder of her 2002-2003 school year' (order also states needs for November 2002 through November 2003 require two hours weekly).
  • Order to provide or change services. Two hours per week of individual speech and language therapy (two one-hour sessions) to be offered in the amended IEP.
  • Compensatory education. 20 additional hours of individual speech therapy, provided over ten months by District speech pathologists; weekly frequency and duration to be set by the IEP team so as not to interfere with medical treatment and private preschool.
  • Reimbursement. Reimburse parents for all speech and language therapy expenses through Ms. Haddad and Kidstreet Institute after Harbor Regional Center stopped funding, within 30 days after receiving written documentation; dollar amount not stated.

Total: 20 hours of compensatory services

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Key authorities

Rowley; Gregory K. v. Longview School District; Union School Dist. v. Smith; Amanda J. v. Clark County School District; W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School District; Burlington; Student W. v. Puyallup School District; Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter; Alamo Heights Ind. Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ.; Lester H. v. Gilhool; Miener v. State of Missouri; Menlo Park Elementary School District, 36 IDELR 230 (SEHO 2002)

People named in the decision

  • Sarah Jocham, District administrator (District representative at hearing), Long Beach Unified School District
  • Donna Jeffers, District speech and language specialist; assessor who formulated the 30/30 offer, Long Beach Unified School District
  • Jane Haddad, Private speech-language pathologist (nonpublic agency); witness for Student, Kidstreet Institute
  • Kidstreet Institute, Certified nonpublic agency providing speech and occupational therapy
  • Julia Hobbs, Independent speech-language pathologist; expert witness for Student, St. John's Hospital Cleft Palate Team / UCLA cranio-facial team
  • Karen Yaghoubian, Speech and Language Services Coordinator; witness for District, Long Beach Unified School District
  • Suzanne Boyles, School psychologist; IEP team member and witness for District, Long Beach Unified School District
  • Fabi Moy, Contract speech-language pathologist; witness for District, Long Beach Unified School District (contract)
  • Amy Culligan, Speech-language pathologist assigned to Prisk Elementary School (proposed provider), Long Beach Unified School District
  • Harbor Regional Center, Regional center that funded early intervention services before age three

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

BEFORE THE

SPECIAL EDUCATION HEARING OFFICE

)

In the matter of: ) Case No. SN03-00404 )

STUDENT, )

Petitioner, ) DECISION )

vs. )

)

LONG BEACH UNIFIED SCHOOL )

DISTRICT, )

Respondent )

____________________________________)

This matter was heard before John G. Andersen, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in Long Beach, California, on July 10, 11, 15 and 16, 2003.

Petitioner STUDENT was represented at the hearing by attorney Bruce Bothwell and appeared through her parents, MR. and MRS. PARENT. Respondent Long Beach Unified School District (District or Respondent) was represented by attorney Adam Newman and appeared through administrator Sarah Jocham.

Petitioner offered testimony from the following witnesses: Donna Jeffers, a speech and language specialist for the District, Jane Haddad, a speech and language specialist from Kidstreet Institute, Julia Hobbs, an independent speech and language specialist, and STUDENT’s mother, MOTHER, who is a pre-school special education teacher in the Downey Unified School District. Respondent offered testimony from Karen Yaghoubian, the District’s Speech and Language Services Coordinator, Suzanne Boyles, a school psychologist in the District, and Fabi Moy, a speech and language pathologist employed by the District.

Oral and documentary evidence was received from both parties. At the conclusion of the testimony, counsel for the parties presented closing oral arguments, and written closing briefs were received by the Hearing Officer on July 21, 2003. Thereafter, the record was closed, and the matter was submitted for decision. ISSUES TO BE DECIDED (Footnote 1)

1. Has the District offered STUDENT an appropriate placement and designated instructional services which will allow her to obtain a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment?

2. Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory educational service?

3. Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to be reimbursed for private speech and language therapy they have obtained for STUDENT?

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

STUDENT, a three year-old who resides within the geographic boundary of the District, was born on [date redacted] with a severe cranio-facial anomaly (CFA) commonly referred to as a “U-shaped, cleft palate” which extends through both her hard and soft palate. (Footnote 2) STUDENT also suffers from micrognathia, a condition characterized by a small lower mandible. Since the time of her birth, STUDENT has undergone two unsuccessful surgical procedures to repair her palate, including an attempt to close the palate with a tissue graft from her tongue, which has left her tongue scarred and asymmetrically shaped. At the present time, STUDENT’s medical providers have established no specific time-frame for attempting further procedures to repair her palate. Although the medical providers hope to perform such procedure(s) between her fourth and fifth birthdays, the medical consensus is that STUDENT must grow physically larger and stronger before she can tolerate further surgery to her palate.

Following her birth at Long Beach Memorial Hospital, STUDENT’s medical team immediately observed problems secondary to the CFA, including an inability to suckle and lack of coordination between swallowing and breathing. At the age of two weeks, STUDENT received a surgically placed gastric feeding tube and, at the age of four weeks, underwent a tracheotomy to create a temporary breathing airway (tracheostomy) pending surgical repair of the CFA. After her initial discharge from the hospital at six weeks of age, STUDENT began receiving speech and language therapy, as well as occupational therapy, at Long Beach Memorial Hospital. During this early speech therapy, the primary focus was building STUDENT’s tolerance for a Passy-Muir speaking valve she was required to use because of the tracheostomy. The occupational therapy focused on coordination of breathing and swallowing, as well as tolerance of food in her mouth.

In September of 2000, at the age of nine months, STUDENT began receiving services through the Harbor Regional Center (HRC), including speech and language therapy and occupational therapy to address her continuing feeding difficulties. These services were provided at Kidstreet Institute (Kidstreet), a certified non-public agency. While at Kidstreet, STUDENT received her speech therapy exclusively from Jane Haddad, a fully licensed, credentialed and certificated speech pathologist who was also part of the Kidstreet professional team that initially assessed STUDENT for HRC. Although the actual frequency was impacted by ongoing medical treatment for the CFA and related conditions, STUDENT was recommended and scheduled to receive bi-weekly (twice each week), one-hour sessions of individual speech and language services from Ms. Haddad during the entire period of her placement through HRC. (Footnote 3) These speech therapy services through HRC continued until STUDENT’s third birthday in November of 2002, at which time the District became the public agency responsible for assessing and serving her needs.

Although the frequency and duration of her recommended speech therapy remained essentially unchanged throughout the HRC placement at Kidstreet, STUDENT’s medical condition and speech therapy needs were very much in flux. Not only did STUDENT endure failed surgical procedures to repair her palate in December 2000, and again in July 2001, she also suffered respiratory complications due to the extended placement of the tracheostomy tube. (Footnote 4)The gastric feeding tube was not removed until May 2001, and the tracheostomy tube was not permanently removed until February 2002. (Footnote 5) Finally, in October of 2001, after it became apparent that her palate could not be repaired in the immediate future, STUDENT’s medical providers resorted to a palatal obturator as a temporary solution to the CFA. The palatal obturator, essentially a removable appliance which functions as a prosthetic hard palate, must be periodically expanded and refitted after the initial application. The obturator is characteristically uncomfortable for STUDENT to use, particularly so in the days and weeks after it has been expanded. STUDENT’s last obturator expansion was performed in October of 2002.

In November of 2002, having reached the age of three years, STUDENT was no longer eligible to receive speech and language service through HRC. Consequently, a meeting was held in October of 2002 between STUDENT’s parents and representatives from both the District and HRC, at which the transition from one responsible public agency to the other was explained. (Footnote 6) Subsequently, the District conducted its own assessment of STUDENT, and an initial Individualized Education Program (IEP) team meeting was scheduled for November 18, 2002. At the November 2002 IEP meeting, there was no controversy or dispute regarding STUDENT’s eligibility for special education services. All parties agreed, and still agree, that STUDENT has a severe speech and language impairment, with particular needs in the areas of articulation, sound production and resonance secondary to her CFA. Moreover, at the November 2002 IEP team meeting, STUDENT’s parents, Ms. Haddad, and representatives of the District together wrote, revised and re-wrote a number of specific goals and objectives for STUDENT’s speech and language therapy. STUDENT’s mother signed the November 18, 2002 IEP document indicating consent to these goals and objectives.

Despite this broad common ground, the parties were unable to reach an agreement at the November 2002 IEP meeting because of differing opinions regarding the frequency, duration and provider of the STUDENT’s speech and language therapy. The District’s offer was to provide STUDENT with thirty minutes of individual therapy each week, as well as thirty minutes of small group therapy each week (30/30), with an unidentified, District-employed speech and language pathologist at the District’s Prisk Elementary School. Her parents believe that the frequency and duration of services offered by the District are inadequate to meet STUDENT’s unique needs, and further believe that those unique needs can only be appropriately met through the continued utilization of Ms. Haddad and Kidstreet as the provider of the services.

Rather than accept the District’s offer, MR. and MRS. PARENT have undertaken, at their own expense, to maintain STUDENT’s speech therapy with Ms. Haddad and Kidstreet at the level previously provided by HRC. From November 2002 through March 2003, STUDENT continued to receive bi-weekly, one-hour sessions of individual therapy from Ms. Haddad. In April of 2003, due to financial pressures, STUDENT’s parents reduced the therapy with Ms. Haddad to a single, one-hour session each week.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

Petitioner contends that her right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE) was denied by the District, both in substance and procedure. Petitioner asserts that the District’s offer of speech and language therapy at Prisk Elementary School is substantively inappropriate because the offered services are not designed to meet her unique educational needs. More specifically, Petitioner asserts that the frequency and duration of the speech therapy offered at Prisk allow insufficient time for her to benefit from the therapy, and also that the District’s speech and language pathologists lack sufficient experience and training to permit STUDENT to benefit from any services they might provide.

Petitioner also contends that her procedural rights under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act were violated by the manner in which the November 18, 2002 IEP team meeting was conducted. Petitioner asserts that her parents were denied the right to fully participate in the IEP team’s determination of the appropriate placement, duration and frequency of the speech therapy needed by their daughter, as well as in the identification of her particular needs and the formulation of appropriate goals and objectives for that therapy. Petitioner further asserts that the District had pre-determined the placement, frequency and duration of the offered services, based upon issues other than her unique educational needs.

The District asserts that is has offered STUDENT a free, appropriate public education, and that no procedural violations occurred during the November 2002 IEP team meeting. The District contends that the offer of 30/30 speech therapy services is designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs, and that its own speech therapists are sufficiently qualified to provide the services.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Under both State law and the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), students with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); Cal. Educ. Code § 56000. The term “free appropriate public education” is defined as special education and related services that are available to the student at no charge to the parent or guardian, which meet the State’s educational standards, and conform with the student’s individualized education program. 20 U.S.C. § 1418. In Hendrick Hudson Board of Education v. Rowley, 485 U.S. 176, 200-02 (1982), the United States Supreme Court interpreted the IDEA to require that a disabled student’s education be designed to meet the student’s unique needs, provide the student with some educational benefit, and conform with the student’s IEP. 485 U.S. at 200-01. Finding that Congress included no language suggesting an obligation to maximize the potential of disabled students, however, the Court characterized the Act as providing a “basic floor of opportunity.” Id. Thus, in resolving the question of whether a school district has offered a FAPE, the focus is on the adequacy of the district’s proposed program. See Gregory K. v. Longview School District, 811 F.2d. 1307 (9th Cir. 1987). A school district is not required to place a student in a program preferred by a parent, even if that program will result in greater educational benefit to the student, so long as the district’s proposed program is designed to meet the student’s unique needs, comports with the student’s IEP, and provides the student with some educational benefit. Id.

The Court in Rowley also recognized the importance of adhering to the procedural requirements and protections afforded by the IDEA, which are designed to ensure effective parental participation in the IEP process and careful consideration of a student’s educational needs. One of the rights afforded to parents is the right to be provided a formal written offer of placement by the school district. Union v. Smith, 157 F.3d 1519 (9th Cir. 1994); cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 428 (1994). The Union court noted that one of the reasons for requiring a formal written offer is to provide parents with the opportunity to decide whether the offer of placement is appropriate and whether or not to accept the offer. Id. However, not every procedural flaw constitutes a denial of a FAPE. Procedural flaws must result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student, or seriously infringe on the parent’s participation in the IEP process, to constitute a denial of a FAPE. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07; see also Amanda J. v. Clark County School District, 267 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2001); W.G. v. Board of Target Range School District, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483-84 (9th Cir. 1992).

A. Has The District Offered Petitioner A Free Appropriate Public Education?

In this matter, there is no controversy between the parties regarding STUDENT’s eligibility for special education services. STUDENT has a severe speech impairment as a result of her cleft palate, and all concerned parties agree that she requires speech and language therapy, focusing primarily on articulation and sound production. Because her mouth and airway structures are incomplete, STUDENT cannot form sounds properly and speak clearly. Speech and language therapy is needed to teach STUDENT proper articulation technique and prevent her from adopting improper compensation strategies.

The parties disagree regarding the frequency and duration of speech therapy STUDENT should receive, as well as the actual provider of the therapy. Petitioner contends that District’s proposal for thirty minutes of individual therapy and thirty minutes of small group therapy each week is inadequate to meet her unique needs. Petitioner asserts that a minimum of two one-hour sessions of individual speech therapy per week are required at this time. Petitioner also disputes the appropriateness of the District’s proposal to provide the speech and language therapy through a District-employed speech and language pathologist. Petitioner contends that the only speech pathologist who can appropriately provide the necessary services is Ms. Haddad of Kidstreet, the speech pathologist who has been serving her through HRC since she was ten moths old. Petitioner asserts that because of the existing, long-term professional relationship with Ms. Haddad, and because Ms. Haddad is intimately familiar with her complex case and history, no other speech and language pathologist has the necessary experience or training to appropriately serve her unique needs.

1. Has the District offered appropriate frequency and duration of services?

The testimony clearly establishes that STUDENT is unique in both her medical/physical condition and her educational needs. Julia Hobbs, a speech pathologist with over twenty-five years of experience and an impressive background in CFAs, (Footnote 7)testified that it is virtually unprecedented for a three year old child to have such an unrepaired cleft palate in this medical era where pediatric palate reconstruction surgery is performed with such a high success rate. Further, Ms. Hobbs testified that, because of this success rate for corrective surgery, only approximately two percent of children born with a cleft palate are required to use an obturator. Moreover, by virtue of the second failed attempt to repair her palate, STUDENT’s tongue is now both scarred and asymmetrically shaped. The testimony and records submitted at the hearing also clearly establish that STUDENT’s disability is quite severe. STUDENT’s level of intelligibility to an unfamiliar listener was estimated at only twenty percent when she was assessed by the District in November of 2002. All speech pathologists testifying at the hearing agreed that STUDENT’s level of intelligibility is extremely low.

At the November IEP team meeting, in order to address STUDENT’s needs, the participants first focused on the development and formulation of appropriate goals and objectives to guide her speech and language therapy. The District’s speech and language pathologist who assessed STUDENT, Donna Jeffers, initially suggested four specific language articulation goals, each with two accompanying objectives. Based upon input from Ms. Haddad, who attended the IEP team meeting with STUDENT’s parents, these proposed goals and objectives were augmented with an additional articulation goal, a new airflow goal, and four additional specific objectives. (Footnote 8) Ms. Haddad actually suggested supplementing the District’s proposed articulation goals and objectives with additional phonemes. Ms. Jeffers testified that, in her opinion, the additional phonemes proposed by Ms. Haddad were not developmentally appropriate for a three-year-old pupil. Nonetheless, following the extended discussion of goals and objectives at the November IEP team meeting, the parties apparently came to a consensus. The November 18, 2002 IEP document unequivocally states that STUDENT’s parents “consent to the goals and objectives.” See Petitioner’s Exhibit K, page 11; Respondent’s Exhibit 4, page 11. (Footnote 9) Although the parties reached common ground on the issue of goals and objectives for STUDENT’s speech and language therapy, sharp and unresolved differences of opinion emerged at the IEP meeting regarding the manner in which therapy would be implemented to achieve the goals and objectives.

Ms. Jeffers, who formulated the 30/30 speech therapy proposal on behalf of the District, testified that thirty minutes of individual therapy and thirty minutes of small group therapy were appropriate because of the fact that STUDENT’s obturator was in the process of being expanded/enlarged at the time of the November 2002 IEP. Ms. Jeffers suggested that STUDENT could not tolerate more than thirty minutes of individual therapy each week because of the obturator, and that the goals and objectives formulated at the IEP meeting could be addressed in that period of time each week. Ms. Jeffers further testified that the additional thirty minutes of small group therapy, where STUDENT would be placed with two or three other pupils with similar speech and language disorders, was appropriate because it would allow her to implement the various speech strategies taught in the individual therapy sessions. (Footnote 10) Ms. Jeffers also testified that STUDENT’s parents were advised, at the November 2002 IEP meeting, that the frequency and duration of STUDENT’s therapy could be adjusted upward or downward in the future, should the assigned speech and language pathologist determine the necessity for such adjustments. (Footnote 11)

Countering the District’s position on the appropriateness of the 30/30 therapy schedule, Petitioner presented the testimony of Ms. Haddad and Ms. Hobbs. Ms. Haddad testified that, in her opinion, STUDENT should continue to receive at least two hours, and perhaps three hours, of individual therapy each week. In addition, Ms. Haddad opined that STUDENT also should receive one hour each month of consultative services at her preschool, in order to facilitate the carryover of the speech and language goals into her general educational environment. Ms. Haddad’s recommendation is based upon her view that the 30/30 therapy proposal does not afford sufficient time for STUDENT to progress in her speech skills and does not allow enough time to accomplish the goals and objectives described in the November 2002 IEP document. In support of her recommendation, Ms. Haddad pointed to the fact that, in some respects, STUDENT’s speech and language skills have actually regressed since April of 2002, when her parents reduced the therapy to one hour each week due to financial pressures. In particular, Ms. Haddad testified that STUDENT’s progress on “tongue tip” exercises came to a “screeching halt” after the therapy schedule decreased in April of 2002. In Ms. Haddad’s opinion, the 30/30 therapy proposal is only minimally beneficial and would certainly result in further regression of STUDENT’s speech development. Ms. Haddad also was critical of the small group therapy proposal, asserting that the benefit of such therapy is greatly diluted by the fractional time spent with each pupil in the group. Ms. Haddad testified that the District’s 30/30 proposal merely translated into forty minutes of therapy each week, based on the assumption that the group would include two other pupils.

Ms. Hobbs similarly testified that STUDENT should receive three hours of individual speech therapy each week. Ms. Hobbs based her recommendation on the fact that STUDENT is now using an obturator. Ms. Hobbs stated that STUDENT currently is within a “window of opportunity” during which she has an urgent need for intensive therapy. Ms. Hobbs testified that, if STUDENT receives the required intensive therapy, she will be capable of intelligible speech within three to four years. On the other hand, without the intensive therapy, Ms. Hobbs believes that STUDENT will not be able to reach an acceptable level of intelligibility for eight or nine years. (Footnote 12) With regard to the District’s proposed 30/30 therapy schedule, Ms. Hobbs testified that thirty minutes of individual therapy is “better than nothing,” and might prevent STUDENT’s speech from getting worse. However, Ms. Hobbs could not state that thirty minutes of individual therapy would actually benefit the STUDENT. Ms. Hobbs also believes that STUDENT would not benefit from small group therapy because she needs one-to-one interaction with a speech pathologist to progress in her speech skills.

The final witness to offer testimony relevant to the appropriateness of the District’s 30/30 proposal was Ms. Fabi Moy, a speech pathologist with whom the District contracts to provide therapy for its preschool pupils. (Footnote 13) Ms. Moy testified that she provides many District pupils with speech therapy on a 30/30 schedule. According to Ms. Moy, however, none of her preschool pupils in the District receive more than thirty minutes of individual therapy each week. Although Ms. Moy testified that thirty minutes of individual therapy each week is a sufficient amount of time to provide a preschool pupil with speech and language therapy, in response to questions from the Hearing Officer, she further testified that preschoolers in the District typically have only two or three speech and language goals specified in their IEP documents. (Footnote 14)

Based upon the testimony and evidence presented by the parties, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District’s offer to provide 30/30 speech language therapy is insufficient to meet STUDENT’s individual needs. STUDENT’s speech therapy needs have been demonstrated to be both significant and urgent, and the District’s proposed frequency and duration of services can only be characterized as minimal. The Hearing Officer is persuaded that STUDENT’s use of an obturator is cause for more intensive speech therapy, rather than a justification to limit her therapy. For the first time in her life, STUDENT now has a structure inside her mouth (albeit prosthetic) which she can use to develop articulation skills that typically developing peers have been learning and using virtually since birth. Unless STUDENT can develop these articulation skills and techniques quickly, she will be permanently delayed in her educational opportunities.

Other than the fact that STUDENT’s obturator had been expanded approximately one month before the November 2002 IEP, the District’s witnesses offered no explanation for why they were proposing a seventy-five percent reduction from the two hours of individual speech therapy she was determined to need before she reached the age of three. Although Ms. Jeffers and Ms. Moy suggested that, in light of the recent expansion of the obturator, STUDENT would not be able to tolerate more than thirty minutes of individual therapy each week, the evidence is precisely to the contrary. STUDENT was first fitted with the obturator in October of 2001, and this appliance was last expanded in October 2002. Yet, from October 2001 until April of 2003, STUDENT was receiving two hours of speech therapy each week. No evidence or testimony was presented supporting the suggestion that STUDENT had difficulty tolerating this level of therapy, even during the difficult periods when the obturator was being expanded. Indeed, the testimony demonstrates that STUDENT regressed in her speech skills when her parents reduced the schedule to one hour each week in April of 2003.

The IEP team determined that STUDENT’s speech therapy needs required six separate annual goals, and twelve related therapy objectives. Particularly in light of Ms. Moy’s testimony that District preschoolers receiving thirty minutes of weekly therapy typically have only two or three objectives specified in their IEPs, it is clear that thirty minutes of individual weekly therapy will not allow STUDENT’s therapist to adequately address all of the goals and objectives set forth in the November 2002 IEP document. Moreover, although the District has presented compelling evidence that small group therapy can be beneficial, the Hearing Officer is not persuaded that such group therapy is the appropriate venue for addressing STUDENT’s numerous goals and objectives which would not be addressed in the thirty minutes of weekly individual therapy. Under these circumstances, the Hearing Officer concludes that STUDENT’s speech therapy needs can only be addressed appropriately if she is provided with bi-weekly, one-hoursessions of individual speech therapy. However, the Hearing Officer is not persuaded that consultative services also are necessary at the present time. Other than presenting the fact that monthly consultative services were previously provided through HRC, Petitioner did not offer any testimony or evidence explaining the continued need or appropriateness of such consultative services. (Footnote 15)

2. Has the District offered STUDENT an appropriate placement for services?

Petitioner contends that the District’s offer of speech and language therapy is inappropriate because the services will be provided by a District speech and language therapist, rather than Ms. Haddad of the Kidstreet Institute. Petitioner asserts that the District’s therapists lack sufficient training, background and experience to provide appropriate services. Petitioner asserts that her medical condition is so complex and unique that her resulting speech and language needs can only be appropriately served through continued therapy by Ms. Haddad. Petitioner also asserts that, because she and Ms. Haddad have an established therapeutic relationship, any change in therapists would be detrimental to her educational interests.

Important to the analysis and discussion of this issue is the fact that the District’s offer of services for STUDENT did not identify the specific speech and language pathologist who would actually provide the therapy. Rather, the offer simply specified that services would be provided by the District speech therapist assigned to Prisk Elementary School, without identifying the particular therapist by name. As discussed in Part C of this decision, infra, Petitioner contends that the District’s failure to identify a specific speech therapist in its offer of placement constitutes a procedural violation of her rights under the IDEA. Distinct from that argument, however, is the issue of whether STUDENT’s speech and language therapy needs can be met by any therapist other than Ms. Haddad.

Petitioner’s argument that only Ms. Haddad can provide appropriate services is based largely on the contention that the District has not properly assessed her physical condition. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that, in addition to her CFA and resulting medical complications, she also suffers from apraxia and dysarthria, (Footnote 16)conditions which render her needs more unique and complex. (Footnote 17) No contention is made, however, that STUDENT’s IEP goals and objectives should be changed or modified due to these additional speech disorders. Indeed, Ms. Haddad testified that STUDENT’s apraxia and dysarthria would simply necessitate the employment of different and additional therapeutic techniques. According to Ms. Haddad, the “PROMPT” therapy technique (Footnote 18) is the most appropriate means to address STUDENT’s apraxia and dysarthria.

The District disputes the claim that STUDENT suffers from apraxia and dysarthria. Ms. Jeffers, who conducted the District’s speech and language assessment of STUDENT, testified that she observed no indication of apraxia or dysarthria during her assessment. Ms. Moy, who also conducts speech and language assessments for the District, but who has never observed or assessed STUDENT, testified that a diagnosis of apraxia, dysarthria and cleft palate was highly unusual. Indeed, Ms. Hobbs, clearly the most experienced of the speech pathologists who testified at the hearing, concedes that the diagnosis of apraxia and dysarthria is a controversial issue within the field and that not all speech and language pathologists will agree with such a diagnosis.

The District also points to the fact that Ms. Haddad made no reference to apraxia or dysarthria in her written progress reports until November of 2002, suggesting that the issue was being raised at the last minute to supplement Petitioner’s position on placement for services. Ms. Haddad’s explanation for not mentioning the apraxia and dysarthria in her reports until November 2002 is that, although she saw signs and symptoms of these conditions much earlier in her treatment of STUDENT, she made no specific mention of them until they were confirmed by Ms. Hobbs in the August 6, 2002 St. John’s Cleft Palate Team Summary Report (Petitioner’s Exhibit G). (Footnote 19) However, there was no explanation offered for Ms. Haddad’s failure to mention these conditions in her August 27, 2002 Progress Report (Petitioner’s Exhibit F).

Despite the conflicting testimony as to whether STUDENT suffers from apraxia and dysarthria, however, the evidence presented at the hearing clearly demonstrates that the District’s speech and language therapists, including the therapist assigned to Prisk, are fully qualified, experienced and trained to provide appropriate services consistent with the November 2002 IEP. Ms. Yaghoubian, the District’s Speech and Language Services Coordinator, testified that Ms. Amy Culligan is the speech therapist currently assigned to Prisk Elementary School. As the Speech and Language Coordinator, Ms. Yaghoubian is familiar with the credentials, training and experience of the District’s various speech therapists. Ms. Yaghoubian testified that Amy Culligan has a masters degree in communication disorders, is a state licensed speech pathologist, possesses a Clinical Rehabilitation Credential and has been certified in clinical competence by the American Speech Language Hearing Association (ASHA). Ms. Yaghoubian also testified that, as the Speech and Language Coordinator, she is familiar with Ms. Culligan’s pupil case load and continuing educational studies. Ms. Yaghoubian “conservatively estimates” that in her four years as a speech therapist for the District, Ms. Culligan has provided services to at least one student each year suffering from a cleft palate, and also has provided therapy to District pupils suffering from apraxia and dysarthria, as well as pupils who are required to use an obturator. Ms. Yaghoubian further testified that Ms. Culligan has received training in the PROMPT therapy technique, (Footnote 20)and also has attended the St. John’s Hospital Cleft Palate Symposium. (Footnote 21)

Petitioner has offered no testimony or other evidence even remotely supporting the assertion that the District’s speech and language pathologists are unqualified or otherwise not suitable to provide therapy consistent with the November 2002 IEP. To the contrary, it is abundantly clear that the District’s speech therapists are equally qualified, if not more qualified, than Ms. Haddad in every respect. (Footnote 22) Indeed, Ms. Moy, who did testify at the hearing, has over twelve years of experience as a speech pathologist. She has a masters degree in communication disorders, a state speech pathology license, and has been certified in clinical competence by ASHA. Ms. Moy has extensive experience working with pupils who have cleft palates, and is trained and certified in the PROMPT methodology. At the hearing, Ms. Moy testified that she would be available to provide therapy to STUDENT if Ms. Culligan could not do so for any reason.

Given the education, training and experience of the District’s speech pathologists, the only significant possible advantage to continued therapy through Ms. Haddad and Kidstreet is continuity and her familiarity with STUDENT. Ms. Haddad has been providing speech therapy to STUDENT since the age of ten months, and certainly has more experience with her needs than anyone else. Nonetheless, Ms. Haddad herself testified that any appropriately licensed, credentialed, trained and experienced speech pathologist would be capable of serving STUDENT’s speech therapy needs. Similarly, although Ms. Hobbs testified that she felt it was “critical” that STUDENT continue to receive therapy from Ms. Haddad, on cross-examination Ms. Hobbs conceded that any licensed and credentialed speech pathologist with experience in cleft palates should be able to provide appropriate services to STUDENT.

The testimony and evidence clearly demonstrate that Ms. Haddad is not the only therapist who can provide appropriate services to STUDENT. Moreover, there is no indication that STUDENT would suffer educational or emotional detriment if she were to begin receiving speech therapy from a therapist other than Ms. Haddad. (Footnote 23) STUDENT has been assessed to possess higher than average cognitive abilities and does not suffer from any psychological condition or other disorder, such as autism, which would impair her ability to form an appropriate therapeutic relationship with a new speech pathologist. (Footnote 24) Although Ms. Hobbs characterized the established relationship between STUDENT and Ms. Haddad as “a wonderful thing” and “a dream come true,” it is apparent that such characterizations are based on Ms. Haddad’s success in serving STUDENT over the last two and one-half years, rather than anything unique in the therapeutic relationship or STUDENT’s needs. The testimony and evidence in this regard persuades the Hearing Officer that any change in speech therapists will cause STUDENT only to experience the temporary, minimal difficulties of a typical three-year-old who is introduced to a new and unfamiliar adult.

3. Did the District violate Petitioner’s procedural rights under the IDEA?

Petitioner contends that her procedural rights under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act were violated by the manner in which the November 18, 2002 IEP team meeting was conducted. Specifically, Petitioner contends that the District failed to identify or accurately describe the qualifications of the pathologist who would provide speech services to her at Prisk Elementary School. Petitioner asserts that these failures precluded her parents from meaningful participation in the IEP process. Petitioner contends that under the IDEA, her parents were entitled to be provided with all relevant information concerning the services offered, including information regarding the provider’s ability to provide services. Petitioner further asserts that the District’s offer of services was pre-determined before the IEP meeting, based upon issues other than her unique educational needs. The District, on the other hand, asserts that it has no obligation to identify a particular therapist as part of its offer of services. The District also denies that its offer of speech and language services was pre-determined in any way.

(i) Was the District required to identify a therapist in its placement offer?

Petitioner concedes that there is no statute or regulation obligating the District to specify the identity or qualifications and experience of a special education service provider within a pupil’s IEP document. See Petitioner’s Final Brief, p. 1. Nonetheless, Petitioner asserts that the District’s failure to provide such information during the IEP meeting deprived her parents of the opportunity to fully participate in the IEP process. Petitioner also suggests that the speech therapist from Prisk should have been a member of the November 2002 IEP team, or at least should have been present at the IEP meeting.

MOTHER, who is a pre-school special education teacher in the nearby Downey Unified School District, testified that IEP meetings in Downey typically include the speech and language therapist who is being proposed as the pupil’s speech services provider. She contends that such practice is the only proper means to allow a pupil’s parents the opportunity to determine whether the school district’s placement offer is appropriate. (Footnote 25) Regardless of the practice in the Downey district, however, California and federal law do not require that a proposed service provider attend the IEP. See Title 34, Code of Federal Regulations, § 334. Moreover, the California Special Education Hearing Office has consistently held that the failure to provide detailed information regarding a proposed service provider does not render a school district’s offer of services fatally vague or unspecific. See e.g., Menlo Park Elementary School District, 36 IDELR 230 (2002).

The testimony and evidence persuade the Hearing Officer that no information was withheld from Petitioner’s parents regarding the District’s offer of speech therapy services. Indeed, it is clear that this information was not a matter of concern to the parents at the November 2002 IEP team meeting. The record indicates that STUDENT’s parents were only interested in obtaining continued services through the current, non-District speech provider. MR. and MRS. PARENT asked no questions at the November IEP meeting regarding the identity or professional background and experience of the Prisk speech therapist, and never expressed any interest in obtaining this information after the meeting was concluded. As such, the Hearing Officer finds that the District’s failure to volunteer this information at the November 2002 IEP team meeting did not deprive the Petitioner’s parents of their opportunity to fully participate in the development of STUDENT’s special education service plan.

(ii) Did the District misrepresent its ability to provide services?

In her testimony, MOTHER stated that the only discussion regarding the Prisk speech therapist at the November 2002 IEP meeting was a representation by Ms. Jeffers that the therapist was credentialed and had prior experience working with pupils suffering from cleft palates. On the other hand, Ms. Jeffers testified that, at the time of the November 2002 IEP meeting, she did not know whether Ms. Culligan, the therapist then assigned to Prisk, had prior experience with cleft palates. Based upon this conflict in the testimony between MOTHER and Ms. Jeffers, Petitioner argues that the District “misrepresented” the nature of the services that would be provided and “seriously infringed” the parents’ right to participate in the IEP process.

Regardless of whether Ms. Jeffers made the statement attributed to her by MOTHER, the testimony of Ms. Yaghoubian, the District’s Speech and Language Services Coordinator, clearly establishes that Amy Culligan does have experience working with cleft palates. If Ms. Jeffers did make the representation, it nonetheless was factually accurate. Under these circumstances, the Hearing Officer cannot find that the District misrepresented, or attempted to misrepresent, the qualifications and experience of the proposed speech and language provider.

(iii) Were the services offered by the District pre-determined before the IEP?

Petitioner contends that the speech therapy services offered by the District were not based upon her unique educational needs, but rather were pre-determined before the November 2002 IEP team meeting. MOTHER testified that, at the IEP meeting, Ms. Jeffers sought to justify the proposed 30/30 speech therapy schedule by stating that the District “usually offers this level of service to three-year-old pupils.” In a similar vein, Ms. Haddad testified that Ms. Jeffers characterized the 30/30 speech therapy as the schedule which the District used for pupils with speech problems similar to those of STUDENT. Ms. Jeffers denies making this statement, and Ms. Boyles testified that no such statement was made at the November 2002 IEP meeting. Moreover, all witnesses who testified on behalf of the District deny that the District offers speech services based upon a pupil’s age, or based upon the schedule offered to other pupils. (Footnote 26)

The existence of any practice by which a school district offers a “standard” level of speech therapy to a pupil would be an extremely serious violation of the IDEA’s mandate that services be designed to meet a pupil’s unique needs. However, the Hearing Officer has already concluded that the District’s offer of 30/30 speech and language services is substantively inadequate to meet STUDENT’s unique and quite urgent needs for therapy. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer concludes that it is unnecessary to resolve this issue or make any determination regarding the credibility of the witnesses offering the conflicting testimony.

B. Is STUDENT Entitled to Compensatory Educational Services?

When a school district fails to offer a pupil the free appropriate public education mandated by the IDEA, such pupil is entitled to relief that is “appropriate” in light of the purposes of the IDEA. School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education, 471 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1985); see also 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(2)(B)(iii). Court decisions subsequent to Burlington have extended the available relief to include compensatory education. See, e.g. Lester H. v. K. Gilhool and the Chester Upland School District, 916 F.2d 865 (3rd Cir. 1990); Miener v. State of Missouri, 800 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1986). There is no obligation, however, to provided day-for-day or hour-for-hour compensation. “Appropriate relief is relief designed to ensure the [pupil] is appropriately educated within the meaning of the IDEA.” Student W. v. Puyallup School District, 31 F.3d 1489, 1496-97 (9th Cir. 1994).

As discussed in Part A of this decision, supra, the Hearing Officer has concluded that the District did not offer STUDENT a FAPE at the November 2002 IEP team meeting. As a remedy for this denial, Petitioner seeks one hour per week of compensatory speech therapy, as well as one hour per month of consultative services at her pre-school. As noted earlier, however, Petitioner did not present any evidence or testimony linking her speech therapy needs with ongoing consultative services, or demonstrating any detriment to her therapy when the consultative services ceased after April of 2003. As such, consultative services will not be ordered as a component of compensatory education for STUDENT.

The District should have provided STUDENT with bi-weekly, one-hour sessions of individual speech therapy once it became the public agency responsible for serving her special education needs. Although STUDENT’s parents initially took it upon themselves to provide therapy at this appropriate frequency and duration following their rejection of the District’s offer, since April 2003, STUDENT has only been receiving a single, one-hour session of weekly therapy due to her parents’ financial condition. Accordingly, since April 2003, STUDENT has received twenty fewer hours of speech therapy than she would have received if she had been offered therapy at the frequency and duration appropriate to met her unique educational needs. Moreover, Ms. Haddad has testified that STUDENT has been regressing in her speech skills since April of 2003, when the therapy was reduced to the level of one hour per week. Under the circumstances, the Hearing Officer concludes that STUDENT is entitled to twenty hours of compensatory speech therapy to remedy the speech skills regression she has experienced since April 2003.

C. Are Petitioner’s Parents Entitled to Reimbursement for Private Speech Therapy?

Under Burlington, the parents of a special education eligible pupil may be entitled to reimbursement for the costs of a placement or service they have procured for their child when a district has failed to provide a FAPE. Such private placement or services, however, must be appropriate under the IDEA and replace services that the district was required to provide. Burlington at 369-70; Payallup at 1496. Nonetheless, the Burlington rule of reimbursement is not so narrow as to permit reimbursement only when the placement or services chosen by the parent are found to be the exact proper placement or services required under the IDEA. Alamo Heights Ind. Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1161 (6th Cir. 1986). A parent’s placement need only address the child’s needs and provide educational benefit. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13-14 (1993).

The Hearing Officer has concluded that the District’s offer of 30/30 speech and language therapy was inadequate to meet STUDENT’s needs, and has further determined that those needs could only be appropriately served through bi-weekly, one hour sessions of individual therapy. Following the November 2002 IEP team meeting, Petitioner’s parents began paying the costs for STUDENT to receive speech therapy at the appropriate frequency and duration necessary to meet her needs. The provider of these services, Ms. Haddad through Kidstreet, was unquestionably appropriate; Kidstreet is a non-public agency certified by the State of California to provide speech and language services, and Ms. Haddad is a fully licensed and credentialed speech pathologist. Accordingly, Petitioner’s parents are entitled to be reimbursed for these expenditures.

ORDERS

After careful consideration the arguments of counsel in support of their respective positions, and the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the following orders are made:

1. The District’s offer of individual speech and language therapy for thirty minutes each week is inadequate to meet STUDENT’s unique education needs and will not provide her with any educational benefit. STUDENT’s unique educational needs during the period November 2002 through November 2003 can only be met if she receives two hours of individual speech and language therapy each week. Accordingly, the District shall reconvene STUDENT’s IEP team within fifteen calendar days for the purpose of amending the November 2002 IEP to offer STUDENT bi-weekly, one-hour sessions of speech and language therapy through its pre-school speech and language pathologist at Prisk Elementary School for the remainder of her 2002-2003 school year;

2. The District shall provide STUDENT with compensatory educational services in the form of an additional twenty hours of individual speech therapy. These additional twenty hours of compensatory educational services shall be provided to STUDENT over a period of ten months. The weekly frequency and duration of such compensatory speech therapy services shall be determined by the STUDENT’s IEP team so as not to interfere with STUDENT’s medical treatment and private preschool classes. Such compensatory speech therapy services shall be provided through the District’s speech and language pathologists;

3. Petitioner’s parents shall be reimbursed for all speech and language therapy expenses incurred through Ms. Haddad and Kidstreet Institute after the time that the Harbor Regional Center discontinued funding speech and language service through that provider. Such reimbursement shall be made by the District within thirty days after receiving written documentation of these expenditures;

4. All other requests for relief are denied.

PREVAILING PARTY FINDINGS

Pursuant to California Education Code section 56507(d), the following findings are made as to the prevailing party on each issue submitted for resolution:

Issue No.1

Has the District offered STUDENT an appropriate placement and designated instructional services which will allow her to obtain a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment?

Petitioner is the prevailing party on this issue.

Issue No. 2

Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory educational services?

Petitioner is the prevailing party on this issue.

Issue No. 3

Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to be reimbursed for private speech and language therapy they have obtained for STUDENT?

Petitioner is the prevailing party on this issue.

RIGHT TO APPEAL

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. Any such appeal must be made within ninety (90) days of receiving this decision.

DATED: August 15, 2003 __________________________________ John G. Andersen, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

1. Petitioner previously also sought resolution of the following issue: “Has STUDENT been determined eligible for special education services under the appropriate basis for eligibility.” Petitioner asserted that the District had inappropriately found her eligible on the basis of speech and language impairment only. On the first day of the hearing, Petitioner withdrew this issue from consideration by the Hearing Officer.

2. STUDENT and her mother both have been diagnosed with Andersen’s Syndrome, a rare, inherited genetic disorder. Andersen’s Syndrom is characterized by, among other features, CFAs and neuromuscular deficits. See Petitioner’s Exhibit N and Respondent’s Exhibit 5 (medical journal articles regarding Andersen’s Syndrome). STUDENT’s mother testified that there are only approximately twenty confirmed cases of Andersen’s Syndrome in the United States.

3. For a brief period of time in 2001, STUDENT was scheduled to receive one hour of her weekly speech therapy with Ms. Haddad in a group setting with one other child. However, due to medical complications and scheduling difficulties with both children, Ms. Haddad testified that these group sessions usually were conducted with only one of the two children.

4. STUDENT was hospitalized in September 2000 due to pneumonia. Moreover, the tracheostomy tube, which was only intended as a temporary airway until the palate could be repaired, had to be surgically removed and replaced due to infection in July 2001. STUDENT also required surgically placed pressure equalizing tubes in her ears due to continuing infections.

5. Additionally, STUDENT has wound healing difficulties. After the tracheostomy tube was removed in February 2002, the stoma (the opening surgically placed in her trachea) did not heal properly, necessitating a further revision surgery.

6. There is no indication that STUDENT’s parents were unfamiliar with the change in legal responsibility for funding STUDENT’s speech and language services. To the contrary, MOTHER herself is a pre-school special education teacher.

7. Ms. Hobbs has been a speech pathologist member of the cranio-facial/cleft palate teams at the University of California, Los Angeles and at St. John’s Hospital in Santa Monica for over twenty years. She has also been a lecturer and instructor at the UCLA School of Medicine and School of Dentistry for nearly twenty-five years.

8. Ms. Haddad testified that she advocated these additional goals and objectives because those proposed by Ms. Jeffers were not ambitious enough. Ms. Haddad also testified that, in her opinion, the goals and objectives should have been for STUDENT to produce the target phonemes at the phrase and sentence level, rather than just the syllable and single word level.

9. At the due process hearing, STUDENT’s parents asserted that their consent to the goals and objectives was given “under duress.” However, the testimony from the November 2002 IEP meeting participants, and the fact that the goals and objectives were modified and supplemented based upon the input of Ms. Haddad, persuades the Hearing Officer to conclude that the STUDENT’s parent’s were not under duress when they consented to the goals and objectives. Indeed, at the same IEP meeting, the parents refused to consent to the proposed placement, frequency and duration of the speech therapy offered by the District. As such, MR. and MRS. PARENT were clearly capable of expressing and asserting a viewpoint contrary to the District, and their after-the-fact claim of duress is simply not supported by the evidence.

10. Ms. Jeffers testified that she formulated her recommendation for the frequency and duration of STUDENT’s therapy after consulting with Karen Yaghoubian, the District’s Speech and Language Services Coordinator, and Fabi Moy, another District speech and language pathologist. Although Ms. Yaghoubian and Ms. Moy both confirmed that they had spoken to Ms. Jeffers regarding the frequency and duration of STUDENT’s therapy, neither of these witness could recall the specifics of their conversation with Ms. Jeffers on the subject. However, Ms. Moy did testify that the ability to tolerate an obturator is “the biggest” issue to consider when determining the appropriate frequency and duration of speech therapy for a pupil using such an appliance. Ms. Yaghoubian testified in similarly general terms that group speech therapy is beneficial to all pupils in the group because it allows them to work on the articulation skills while they are listening to the other pupils in the group. Ms. Yaghoubian also stated that group therapy is beneficial to a pupil’s self-esteem, because it allows pupils to understand that others have the same or similar language problems.

11. While this assertion may be factually correct, consistent with the requirements of Union, the adequacy of the District’s proposal for STUDENT’s speech therapy can only be determined on the basis of the frequency and duration actually offered.

12. Although Ms. Hobbs stated that STUDENT’s urgent need for intensive therapy was necessary to “maximize her potential,” the Hearing Officer interprets this statement as a reflection of STUDENT’s precarious stage of development.

13 Ms. Moy works on a so-called “50-50" contract, where she devotes half of her schedule to providing speech therapy to District pupils at various District facilities, and half of her schedule to her private practice clientele.

14. On redirect examination by the District’s counsel, Ms. Moy stated that an additional two or three goals could be addressed during a pupil’s small group therapy session. This testimony, however, directly contradicts that of Ms. Jeffers and Ms. Yaghoubian, who both asserted that the purpose of the small group sessions is to work on articulation skills and strategies learned in the pupil’s individual speech therapy session.

15. Indeed, STUDENT’s mother testified that these consultative services were discontinued in April or May of 2003, but stated that she did not know why they were discontinued. MOTHER only posited that these services “may have” been discontinued due to financial constraints, leaving open the possibility that they were no longer necessary.

16. Apraxia is a neurologic speech disorder characterized by an impaired ability to coordinate oral movement, and dysarthria is a condition marked by weakness and or paralysis of speech musculature. Neither of these purported conditions is directly related to STUDENT’s CFA. However, the Hearing Officer notes that such conditions appear to be consistent with Andersen’s syndrome, which is characterized by CFAs and neuromuscular deficits. See footnote 2, supra.

17. Nonetheless, Petitioner does not assert that any additional assessments must be conducted by the District with regard to apraxia and dysarthria, and does not seek reimbursement for any independent assessment to identify those conditions. As discussed in footnote 1, supra, Petitioner withdrew the issue of whether she was appropriately assessed from the Hearing Officer’s consideration on the first day of the hearing.

18. “PROMPT” is an acronym for Prompts for Restructuring Oral Motor Phonemics Techniques, a therapeutic methodology using multiple modalities to improve articulation and sound production. PROMPT is a recognized form of treatment for oral-motor disorders, including cleft palates, as well as apraxia and dysarthria.

19. Ms. Hobbs testified that her diagnoses of apraxia and dysarthria were based on a thirty to sixty minute observation of STUDENT when she was brought by her parents to the St. John’s Cleft Palate Team for a second opinion following the two failed palate repair surgeries.

20. Ms. Yaghoubian and Ms. Culligan actually went through their PROMPT training together at the PROMPT Institute approximately three to four years ago.

21. Petitioner suggests that the District’s failure to produce Ms. Culligan for testimony at the hearing is improper and should cast a shadow of doubt over testimony regarding her qualifications, experience and training to serve STUDENT’s needs. However, Ms. Yaghoubian clearly has the foundation of knowledge to provide such information to the Hearing Officer. If Petitioner believed that direct testimony from Ms. Culligan would have been helpful, or more helpful, to resolving the issue of placement, Petitioner should have subpoenaed Ms. Culligan to appear at the hearing.

22. Ms. Haddad received her masters degree in speech pathology in 1995 and, thus, is a relatively inexperienced speech therapist by comparison.

23 Ms. Jeffers testified that STUDENT would not suffer any detriment by virtue of a change to a new speech pathologist. Indeed, Ms. Jeffers stated that pupils generally benefit when they change therapists from time to time. According to Ms. Jeffers, pupils often will reach a “plateau” in their therapy with a particular pathologist after one or two years.

24. Suzanne Boyles, the school psychologist member of STUDENT’s assessment team and a member of the November 2002 IEP team, testified that she saw no indication during the assessment that STUDENT would have any difficulty adjusting to a new speech therapist.

25. Ms. Boyles testified that the District does not have the proposed speech therapist attend IEP team meetings “because it smacks of pre-determination of services.”

26. While Ms. Moy testified that she currently does not provide more that thirty minutes of individual speech services to any District pre-school pupil, such testimony falls well short of proving the existence of a “standard” level of services offered in the District. This is particularly so, given that Ms. Moy does not provide speech therapy in the District on a full-time basis.