California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · March 14, 2003

Student v. Saddleback Valley Unified School District et al.

SEHO Case No. SN 416-03, SN03-00416 · Hearing Officer Patrick J. Balucan

Saddleback Valley Unified's 32-day-late initial IEP denied FAPE, but the Hearing Officer denied residential placement and all other relief.

Split decision: student prevailed on 1 of 9 issues

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Summary

The parents of a 16-year-old student filed for due process against Saddleback Valley Unified School District and the Orange County Health Care Agency. The student had been eligible for special education as emotionally disturbed since March 2003. The parents had placed her at Medpro, a residential substance-abuse treatment facility. They sought residential placement, compensatory services and reimbursement.

The District admitted that its initial assessment and IEP were about 32 days late. Hearing Officer Patrick J. Balucan rejected the District's argument that the delay did not matter because the student did not really need special education. He held that the delay denied her a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for 32 days. He found no other violations. A 2001 talk about anger management after a suspension was not a referral for special education. No evidence supported the claimed "perceptual" disability. The referral to the mental health agency was not late, and its assessment was proper. Agency and District witnesses found the student was not currently depressed. No witness showed she needed a residential placement to benefit from her education. Holding the April 30 IEP meeting without the parents did not harm them, because the offer did not change and they attended the May 14 meeting. A daily resource (RSP) study-skills class plus mental health services met her needs. The Hearing Officer denied all relief. The requested remedies were not tied to the delay, and the student was passing her classes.

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Why it matters

This decision shows that SEHO treated a conceded timeline violation as a denial of FAPE but still awarded nothing. The requested remedies did not match the 32-day delay, and the student was progressing. It also shows that SEHO separated a residential placement needed for substance-abuse treatment from one needed for educational benefit.

Issues and holdings

  1. Student prevailedAssessment

    Issue 1. Did the District fail to complete Petitioner's assessment and conduct her initial IEP meeting within statutory timelines?

    The District conceded the initial IEP was about 32 days late under the 50-day timeline; the Hearing Officer held this denied FAPE for 32 days but ordered no remedy.

  2. District prevailedChild find

    Issue 2. Did the District fail to "search and serve" Petitioner from March of 2001 as a special education student?

    The father's request for follow-up on anger management after a March 2001 suspension was not a special education referral, and discipline problems alone did not show a need for special education.

  3. District prevailedAssessment

    Issue 3. Did the District assess Petitioner in all areas of suspected disability?

    No evidence supported a claimed 'perceptual' difficulty; cognitive, achievement and speech-language testing were average or normal, and the student passed the high school exit exam.

  4. District prevailedAssessment

    Issue 4.1. Did the District appropriately refer Petitioner for mental health (AB 3632) services?

    No evidence of 38 disciplinary violations; the mental health team had enough information; the referral was not late because the father did not return consent until about March 13, 2003.

  5. District prevailedAssessment

    Issue 4.2. Was the Orange County Health Care Agency's AB 3632 mental health assessment appropriate?

    The agency knew of the Medpro placement; any failure to consult Medpro staff resulted from the advocate's refusal; interim comments by the psychiatrist were irrelevant; parents participated fully.

  6. Issue 4.3. Should the mental health recommendations have included a residential treatment facility rather than outpatient therapy?

    The student was not currently depressed, and no witness showed she needed residential placement to benefit from education; outpatient therapy and drug and alcohol referral were appropriate.

  7. District prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue 5.1. Did the District fail to comply with procedural requirements by holding the April 30, 2003 IEP meeting without parents or advocate and by failing to implement behavioral goals or the service plan?

    Even if meeting without parents was a violation, it caused no harm because the offer did not change and parents took part at the May 14 meeting; the District could not implement an IEP without consent.

  8. District prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue 5.2. Did the District's offer of placement and services fail to meet the substantive requirements of State and federal law?

    One period per day of a resource (RSP) study-skills class plus the mental health referral met the student's needs for homework completion and behavior; no authority required a diploma plan in the IEP.

  9. Issue 6. Is Petitioner entitled to compensatory education, reimbursement or prospective placement for the failure of Respondents to provide her with a FAPE?

    The requested remedies had no link to the 32-day delay, and the student was progressing, so the Hearing Officer denied all relief and declined to fashion any other remedy.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • All of Petitioner's claims for relief were denied, including compensatory education, reimbursement for Dr. Potts's counseling and out-of-state residential placement. No remedy was ordered for the 32-day timeline violation.

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Key authorities

Rowley; W.G. v. Target Range; Clyde K. v. Puyallup; Gregory K. v. Longview; Adams v. Oregon; Fuhrmann v. East Hanover; Burlington; Student W. v. Puyallup; Florence County v. Carter; Lester H. v. Gilhool; Miener v. Missouri; Alamo Heights

People named in the decision

  • Dr. Rona Martin, director of special education, Saddleback Valley Unified School District
  • Robert White, SELPA director, South Orange County SELPA
  • Manuel Robles, AB 3632 coordinator, Orange County Health Care Agency
  • Patricia Rogers, program manager, Orange County Health Care Agency
  • Eric Setlich, school psychologist, Saddleback Valley Unified School District
  • Dr. Simon Andrew Casey, program director, residential treatment facility; witness for Student, Medpro
  • Richard Lappin, licensed clinical social worker, mental health assessor, Orange County Health Care Agency
  • Dr. Anna-Lisa Stonehill, child and adolescent psychiatrist, mental health assessor, Orange County Health Care Agency
  • Dr. James Schaeffer, mental health assessment team member, Orange County Health Care Agency
  • Dr. Susan Potts, private clinical psychologist, Private provider
  • Dr. Skip Gooch, coordinator for special services, Saddleback Valley Unified School District
  • Elizabeth Brown, speech-language assessor, Saddleback Valley Unified School District
  • Mr. Christensen, assistant principal, La Paz Middle School
  • Dr. Vivian Chan, diagnosing physician (major depressive disorder), Not stated
  • Medpro, private residential treatment facility, Private provider

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

BEFORE THE

CALIFORNIA SPECIAL EDUCATION HEARING OFFICE

In the Matter of:STUDENT, Petitioner,vs.SADDLEBACK VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT and ORANGE COUNTY HEALTH CARE AGENCY, Respondents. ))))))))))))))) Case No. SN03-00416DECISION

This matter was heard before Patrick J. Balucan, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in Mission Viejo, California, on June 26 and 27 and July 1, 2, and 3, 2003.

Petitioner STUDENT (STUDENT or Petitioner) was represented at the hearing by advocate Jillian Bonnington. Also present on STUDENT’s behalf was MOTHER, her mother, and FATHER, her father. Respondent Saddleback Valley Unified School District (District) was represented at the hearing by attorney Patrick Munoz and Dr. Rona Martin, the District’s director of special education. Also present on behalf of the District was Robert White, the director of the South Orange County SELPA. Respondent Orange County Health Care Agency (HCA) was represented at the hearing by attorney Jan Martin and Manuel Robles, the AB 3632 coordinator for the Health Care Agency. (Footnote 1) On days when Mr. Robles was not present, HCA was represented by Patricia Rogers, a program manager with HCA.

Petitioner called the following witnesses to testify: Dr. Martin; Eric Setlich, a District psychologist; FATHER; and Dr. Simon Andrew Casey, the program director at the Medpro treatment facility. The District called the following witnesses: Dr. Martin and Mr. White. OCHCA called the following witnesses to testify: Richard Lappin, a clinical social worker with HCA, and Dr. Anna-Lisa Stonehill, a child and adolescent psychiatrist with HCA.

Oral and documentary evidence was received. The record was held open for the receipt of closing briefs. After receipt of the closing briefs, the record was closed and the matter was submitted for decision.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR HEARING

1. Did the District fail to complete Petitioner’s assessment and conduct her initial IEP meeting within statutory timelines?

2. Did the District fail to “search and serve” Petitioner from March of 2001, as a special education student?

3. Did the District assess Petitioner in all areas of suspected disability?

4. Did the District and OCHCA appropriately refer, assess, and make appropriate recommendations for mental health services?

5. Did the District deny Petitioner a FAPE from March 25, 2003 to the present by failing to develop and implement an appropriate IEP?

6. Is Petitioner entitled to compensatory education, reimbursement or prospective placement for the failure of Respondents to provide her with a FAPE?

BACKGROUND FACTS

STUDENT is a sixteen-year-old student who has been eligible for special education since March 25, 2003 as emotionally disturbed (ED). STUDENT currently does not attend school within the District. Since approximately April 25, 2003, she has been placed by her parents in a residential treatment facility called Medpro due to her abuse of alcohol and marijuana.

Over the past several years, STUDENT has been involved in multiple behavioral incidents at school and toward her parents. When she was in eighth grade at La Paz Middle School, she was caught with stolen property from another student and suspended for three days. On March 28, 2001, STUDENT was again suspended from school for spraying Bactine in the face of two classmates. When STUDENT was in ninth grade at Mission Viejo High School, she continued to demonstrate problems with attendance and was increasingly challenging of her parents’ authority. In March of 2002 of this school year, she began receiving psychological therapy from Dr. Susan Potts, and on June 22, 2002, she was admitted to UCI Medical Center for violent behavior, having threatened to kill herself and hitting her father and her sister. She was discharged on June 28, 2002, with a diagnosis of major depressive disorder and cannabis abuse.

In the fall of 2002, she began attending school at Mission Viejo High School. On October 30, 2002, she was suspended for possession of stolen property. On November 19, 2002, STUDENT was caught attempting to use marijuana on campus and was in possession of two baggies of marijuana. The police took a report, and STUDENT was suspended for five days.

STUDENT was initially referred for special education on November 25, 2003. On that day, Mr. PARENT approached Dr. Skip Gooch, the coordinator for special services with the District, in order to request an assessment and secure special education services for STUDENT. On December 5, 2002, Eric Setlich, a district psychologist, prepared an assessment plan that indicated that the District wished to conduct assessments in the following areas: academic/pre-academic achievement, social/adaptive behavior, and intellectual/cognitive development. The District also requested permission to review STUDENT’s medical records. On that same day, FATHER signed the assessment plan and provided his consent to conduct the assessment.

STUDENT’s troubles at school continued. On January 14, 2003, the governing board of the District voted to expel STUDENT because of her possession of marijuana on campus in November of 2002. However, the governing board of the District voted to suspend the expulsion in accordance with a voluntary discipline agreement, in which STUDENT attended school under the provisions of a behavioral contract. She transferred to Trabuco Hills High School. On February 6, 2003, the Orange County District Attorneys office filed a petition with the juvenile court to have STUDENT declared a ward of the court due to the incident of theft on October 30, 2002.

Via letter dated February 26, 2003, Petitioner requested that the District refer her to the Orange County HCA for assessment to determine her eligibility for mental health services. Furthermore, in a letter dated March 1, 2003, PARENTS requested this due process hearing because of STUDENT’s ongoing behavioral, academic and emotional issues. PARENTS alleged, among other things, that the District did not complete its assessment of STUDENT in a timely manner. They also requested placement in a residential facility. On or about March 13, 2003, FATHER provided his consent for the referral to HCA.

The District conducted its assessment in March of 2003. Eric Setlich prepared a report of the assessment findings dated March 18, 2003. Based upon his testing, Mr. Setlich reported that STUDENT’s nonverbal reasoning abilities were much better developed than her verbal reasoning, and the her overall cognitive abilities were in the average range. He also reported that there was no particular weakness in her subtest standard scores on the Weschler Individual Achievement Test (WIAT) and again scored in the average range overall. Using the Milon Adolescent Clinical Inventory (MACI), a personality inventory, Mr. Setlich found that STUDENT displayed narcissistic and antisocial personality traits, with histrionic and negative features.

On March 25, 2003, the District and PARENTS convened an IEP meeting to determine STUDENT’s eligibility for special education and what, if any, special education services she would require. At this meeting, the District found that STUDENT was eligible for special education as emotionally disturbed (ED) due to a diagnosis of major depressive disorder by Dr. Vivian Chan. At this meeting, the District offered to provide STUDENT with one period a day of RSP class, and to continue the referral process to the Orange County Health Care Agency to determine whether she qualified for mental health services. More specifically, at the parent’s request, the District made the referral to mental health to determine whether STUDENT qualified for residential placement. PARENTS did not provide their consent to implement this IEP. Subsequently, on March 27, 2003, HCA received STUDENT’s mental health referral packet from the District. The next day, Richard Lappin met with PARENTS to begin the mental health assessment process.

The District and PARENTS met to go forward with the due process hearing on April 2, 2003. However, the parties did not go forward with the hearing. Rather, the District agreed to conduct additional assessments of STUDENT to further explore her emotional difficulties and health and medical concerns. The parties also agreed to reconvene an IEP team meeting on April 30, 2003, to discuss the results of the assessment. On April 2, the District presented PARENTS with an assessment plan which called for the following areas to be tested: academic/pre-academic, social/adaptive behavior, communication development, and a health assessment by the school nurse. MOTHER signed the assessment plan and provided her consent to conduct the assessments.

Mr. Setlich conducted the District’s psychological assessments and prepared a report dated April 22, 2003. Mr. Setlich administered the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-Adolescent (MMPI-A) and the Adolescent Psychopathology Scale (APS). Based upon the use of the MMPI-A, Mr. Setlich concluded that STUDENT was not depressed, and that she did not see herself as depressed. Moreover, he characterized STUDENT’s behavioral problems as a conduct disorder. The APS did not reveal any significant clinical disorders. Elizabeth Brown conducted the District’s speech and language assessment and prepared a report dated April 24, 2003. (Footnotes 3) Ms. Brown found that STUDENT’s receptive and expressive language skills, language processing, articulation, fluency and voice are all within normal limits.

On April 25, 2003, STUDENT’s parents admitted her to the Medpro treatment facility due to her cannabis and alcohol dependency.

On April 30, 2003, the District convened a meeting of the IEP team. However, neither STUDENT’s parents nor her advocate, Ms. Bonnington, was present. Prior to April 30, via several correspondences sent to the District, Petitioner’s advocate indicated her reluctance to go forward with the meeting because HCA had yet to complete its assessment and because STUDENT was placed in a residential treatment facility. On the morning of April 30, STUDENT’s parents phoned Mr. Setlich and informed him that neither the parents nor their advocate would attend the meeting because Ms. Bonnington was sick. The District went forward with IEP team meeting. At this IEP meeting, Mr. Setlich and Ms. Brown presented the results of their assessments. HCA did not participate at this meeting. The meeting was continued until after HCA had completed its assessment.

Meanwhile, HCA completed its assessment and prepared a report dated May 12, 2003. HCA’s assessment team consisted of Mr. Lappin, Dr. Stonehill and Dr. James Schaeffer. Based on their assessment, HCA found that STUDENT was not depressed, but was a child that has been experiencing discord both at home and at school. HCA recommended outpatient mental health services in the form of individual and family psychotherapy, consultation with school staff, and a referral to OCHCA’s drug and alcohol service for further outpatient support. On May 13, 2003, Mr. Lappin met with the PARENTS to discuss HCA’s recommendations.

The following day, on May 14, 2003, another meeting of the IEP team was held. At this meeting, the District continued to offer the program, service, and placement recommendations made at the March 25, 2003 IEP meeting. Mr. Lapping from HCA also attended the meeting to present the HCA team’s findings and recommendations regarding STUDENT’s mental health assessments, as well as to present their treatment plan. As noted above, HCA recommended counseling and outpatient therapy. Petitioner maintained her need for inpatient, residential placement. PARENTS did not provide their consent to implement the IEP.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Issue No. 1: Did the District fail to complete Petitioner’s assessment and conduct her initial IEP meeting within statutory timelines?

Petitioner asserts that after her parents provided their consent to assess on December 5, 2002, the District was required to complete her assessment and conduct an IEP meeting by February 8, 2003, but did not do so until March 25, 2003. The law requires that a proposed assessment plan be developed within 15 calendar days of the referral for assessment. (Cal. Educ. Code. § 56321(a).) Exceptions to this timeline are permitted if the referral is made during school vacation periods in excess of 5 calendar days, and in such cases, the assessment plan shall be developed within 10 days after the commencement of the subsequent regular school year of the pupil’s regular school term. (Id.) An individualized education program required as a result of an assessment of a pupil must be developed within a total time not to exceed 50 calendar days from the date of the receipt of the parent’s written consent for assessment. (Cal. Educ. Code §56344.)

The District concedes that it failed to comply with the statutory timelines for completing STUDENT’s initial assessment and conducting her initial IEP team meeting. It admits that the March 25, 2003 IEP was approximately 32 days late. However, the District also argued that STUDENT was not eligible for special education in the first place, and therefore did not need any special education services to benefit from her education. The District argued that it only found STUDENT eligible to avoid a dispute regarding whether the medical/clinical diagnosis of depression was sufficient to qualify STUDENT as ED. Dr. Martin testified at hearing that the team found her eligible in order to provide services to help her and not because they believe she qualified as ED. The District asserts that STUDENT was receiving a FAPE even in general education, and even without the benefit of special education services. Thus, it argues, any delay in the offer of services did not deny STUDENT a FAPE. The Hearing Officer finds this argument unpersuasive. Qualifying STUDENT for special education imposed upon the District a duty to provide a FAPE to her. It cannot absolve itself of that responsibility after the fact by arguing that no remedy attaches for its failure to meet any of the statutorily imposed timelines. A delay in completing assessments necessarily delays the point at which STUDENT’s services would begin. In this case, the delay in conducting the assessments and holding the IEP delayed the point at which STUDENT’s parents received an offer of placement and services. The District has conceded that it failed to conduct the assessment and hold the IEP meeting in a timely manner. Therefore, the District has denied Petitioner a FAPE for 32 days until March 25, 2003. The appropriate remedy will be discussed below.

Issue No. 2: Did the District fail to “search and serve” Petitioner from March of 2001 as a special education student? (Footnote 4)

Petitioner argues that the District failed in its obligation to identify her as eligible for special education since March of 2001. Specifically, Petitioner argues that on March 28, 2001, while STUDENT was in eighth grade at La Paz middle school, she was suspended for spraying Bactine in the face of two classmates. FATHER testified that Mr. Christensen, the assistant principal at La Paz, investigated the incident and told him that STUDENT had a problem with anger management. Mr. Chrisensen stated that he was going to attempt to set up a meeting with teachers that STUDENT had good rapport with. FATHER testified that he requested follow up regarding anger management and self-esteem issues STUDENT may have. However, FATHER testified that Mr. Christensen never followed through with these requests. Petitioner argues that based on FATHER’s request, Mr. Christensen should have reported the incident to the SELPA and that the District should have been aware that STUDENT was in need of special education services.

California law requires school districts to ensure that students who may be disabled are promptly and appropriately assessed. School districts must systematically seek out all individuals with exceptional needs. (Cal. Educ. Code § 56300.) Districts must establish written policies and procedures for a continuous child find system, and the policies and procedures must include written notification to all parents of procedures for initiating a referral for assessment. (Cal. Educ. Code § 56301.) All referrals for special education and related services must initiate the assessment process and be documented. (5 C.C.R. § 3021(a).) When a parent makes an oral referral, the staff of the public school district must offer assistance in reducing the request to writing. (Id.) Clearly, California requires school district to take a proactive role in seeking out and assessing children with possible disabilities.

Significantly, FATHER testified that he did not make a request to the District for special education services after the Bactine incident in March of 2001. His request of Mr. Christensen was simply to follow up with any anger management or self-esteem issues that STUDENT may have. The Hearing Officer finds that this was not enough to inform the District that FATHER was making a request for special education services. FATHER’s request was made in the process of discussions about a behavioral incident that led to STUDENT’s suspension. There was no indication that the discussions were meant to initiate a special education referral or that FATHER meant by his request that Mr. Chistensen should look into whether STUDENT would be eligible for special education services to address these issues. Moreover, Mr. Setlich and Dr. Martin both testified that STUDENT’s discipline problems, in and of themselves, did not indicate a need for special education. As such, the Hearing Officer finds that the District did not fail in its search and serve obligations by failing to refer STUDENT for special education after the Bactine incident in March of 2001.

Issue No. 3: Did the District assess Petitioner in all areas of suspected disability?

Petitioner argues that the District failed to assess STUDENT’s “perceptual difficulties.” Petitioner argued that she has a perceptual problem related to reading, which also affected her in the area of speech and language. Petitioner contends that the District has failed to identify this need and that there is the possibility that she will go through life “functionally illiterate.”

The law requires a school district to assess students in all areas of suspected disability, including when appropriate, health and development, vision, hearing, motor abilities, language function, general ability, academic performance, self-help, interests and social emotional status. (20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3)(C); Cal. Educ. Code § 56320.) The purpose of an assessment is not only to determine an “eligibility” category, but to determine the unique needs of the student. The 1997 amendments to the IDEA clarify that the assessment tools and strategies used must provide relevant information that will directly aid in the determination of the educational needs of the child. (20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3)(D).) However, this is not a new requirement. The California Education Code has consistently required that assessments be geared to providing information relevant for the development of appropriate, individual programming for the students. (See, e.g., Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56320(e) and 56321(a).) Therefore, an assessment must not only identify a qualifying disability but must also assist the team in identifying the student’s unique educational needs.

In this case, Petitioner has failed to present any evidence that she possesses a “perceptual” difficulty. (Footnote 5) FATHER indicated that any problems she may have had with reading stemmed from her lack of motivation. Mr. Settlich testified that that he was unaware of the meaning of a perceptual difficulty. He further testified that his administration of the WISC-III tested in the area of perceptual organization, and that STUDENT’s scores were solidly in the average range. Moreover, Mr. Setlich conducted assessments on two different occasions, in which STUDENT was asked to take a cognitive abilities test and an academic achievement test, as well as fill out several personality inventories. Mr. Setlich testified that he did not observe any perceptual problems in STUDENT. Elizabeth Brown conducted a speech and language assessment of Petitioner in April of 2003 and found that her receptive and expressive language skills, language processing, articulation, fluency and voice are all within normal limits. Moreover, the allegation that STUDENT is “functionally illiterate” is simply not supported by the evidence. In February of 2003, as a tenth grader, STUDENT passed the California High School Exit Exam. It is difficult to believe that STUDENT could pass such a test if she could not read. Based on the foregoing, the Hearing Officer finds that the District did not fail to assess STUDENT’s perceptual difficulty. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the District did not fail to assess STUDENT in all her areas of suspected disability.

Issue No. 4: Did the District and OCHCA appropriately refer, assess, and make appropriate recommendations for mental health services?

Petitioner asserts that the District’s referral to mental health, and HCA’s assessment and recommendations, did not comply with the mandates of State and federal law. Each of these contentions will be addressed in turn.

1. Referral for Mental Health Services

The Petitioner asserts that the referral for an AB 3632 assessment was flawed because it failed to contain nearly all of the 38 disciplinary violations incurred by her since January 30, 2003. Petitioner asserts that only two of those disciplinary violations were included in the referral packet. Petitioner also asserts that the referral for the mental health assessment was late by 30 days.

The contention that the referral packed did not include all 38 of STUDENT’s disciplinary violations she had accrued since January of 2003 is not supported by the record. First, Petitioner failed to present any evidence that she has accrued 38 discipline violations since January of 2003. Nothing in the record before the Hearing Officer indicates that she has accumulated that many violations. Moreover, the evidence before the Hearing Officer shows that when Mental Health conducted its assessments, the team had enough information to determine STUDENT’s needs and make an appropriate recommendation. The assessment report indicated that the team reviewed, among other things, STUDENT’s school records. They also consulted with the District staff and interviewed STUDENT and her parents both together and individually. The HCA assessment team prepared a comprehensive report that noted two truancies, violations for being off campus during lunch, failure to show up for detentions and refusal to do detention assignments, all while attending Trabuco Hills High School. Thus, the evidence shows that HCA was well aware of STUDENT’s disciplinary violations at school.

Petitioner also asserts that the District’s referral to Mental Health was late by approximately 30 days. Petitioner bases this contention upon the fact that, via letter dated February 26, 2003, Petitioner requested a concurrent referral to HCA for mental health services but that Mental Health did not receive the assessment packet until March 27, 2003. State and federal law are silent as to the timeline for the District to forward a referral to mental health after a parent makes a request for a mental health referral. However, there does not appear to be any undue delay in the District’s referral to HCA. FATHER did not return the consent for the HCA referral until approximately March 13, 2003. Thus, almost two weeks had passed before FATHER returned the consent to the District to initiate the referral process. The Hearing Officer finds that the District was not late in providing the referral to Mental Health.

2. Mental Health Assessment

Petitioner asserts that the AB 3632 assessment was inappropriate. Petitioner asserts that HCA failed to take into account her current placement in making its recommendations and failed to incorporate treatment team notes and diagnoses from the Med-Pro Treatment Center. Petitioner further asserts that Dr. Stonehill with OCHCA provided inaccurate and inconsistent information to the parents regarding the need for residential placement, and that OCHCA failed to allow the parents to participate in the development of her service plan.

First, Petitioner alleges that HCA failed to take into account her current placement and the current treatment recommendations from the Medpro treatment facility. However, HCA was well aware that STUDENT was in Medpro. On May 9, 2003, Dr. Stonehill interviewed STUDENT and her parents at the Medpro facility. Dr. Lappin and Dr. Stonehill testified that they were aware of STUDENT’s current placement at the time they made their recommendations. Moreover, Mr. Lappin testified that Ms. Bonnington had informed him that review of records would be sufficient. Mr. Lappin stated that when Petitioner provided him with records, they proved to be illegible. The evidence shows that HCA wished to meet with Medpro personnel, but that Petitioner’s advocate refused to allow it, and would not provide any readable documentation. Therefore, any failure of HCA to include the Medpro recommendations and to consult with Medpro staff was due to Petitioner’s unwillingness to allow such a meeting.

Petitioner also alleges that Dr. Stonehill and OCHCA provided inaccurate and inconsistent information regarding the need for residential placement. FATHER testified that at a meeting he had with Dr. Stonehill on May 1 and 2, 2003, she agreed with the parent’s decision to place STUDENT in a residential treatment facility, and even recommended a facility called Island View. Petitioner asserts that this constituted a recommendation by Dr. Stonehill of a residential treatment facility placement. Dr. Stonehill testified that she never made a recommendation that STUDENT be placed at a residential treatment facility. However, whatever was said at a meeting between Dr. Stonehill and PARENTS on May 1 and 2, 2003, is irrelevant. At the point the meeting occurred, Dr. Stonehill and the HCA assessment team had not yet completed their assessment of Petitioner. HCA’s final recommendation was for individual and family counseling on an outpatient basis, and for a referral to HCA’s Drug and Alcohol Program. Whatever comments Dr. Stonehill had made in the interim, her ultimate recommendation, after completion of the assessment, after all the information was gathered, and after she consulted with the other members of her assessment team, was outpatient therapy and not residential placement. (Footnote 6) Therefore, whether Ms. Stonehill made the alleged comments or not had no effect on whether the assessments were conducted appropriately.

Finally, Petitioner contends that her parents were not allowed to participate in the development of the HCA service plan. The record reflects that STUDENT’s parents met with Mr. Lappin on several occasions, for both clinical interviews and to discuss any questions they may have had about the assessment process. Mr. Lappin met with PARENTS on May 13, 2003 to go over HCA’s final recommendations. PARENTS and their advocate were also present at the May 14, 2003 IEP meeting, at which HCA presented the results of its assessments and presented its recommendations. It was clear that the PARENTS had ample opportunity to provide input and participate in the development of the HCA service plan. Therefore, HCA did not err in this respect.

3. Recommendations for Mental Health Services

Finally, Petitioner argues that the recommendations from Mental Health should have included a residential treatment facility and that the outpatient therapy that they recommended was inappropriate. HCA and the District respond that based on STUDENT’s needs, a residential placement is not required and the programs and services they have offered constitute an education in the least restrictive environment.

Pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and State special education law, children with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE) that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for employment and independent living. (20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); Cal. Educ. Code § 5600.) A “free appropriate public education” consists of special education and related services that are available to the student at no charge to the parent or guardian, meet the State educational standards, and conform to the child’s individualized education program (IEP). (20 U.S.C. § 1401(8).)

“Special education” is defined as specially designed instruction, provided at no cost to parents, that meets the unique needs of the child. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(25); Cal. Educ. Code § 56031.) “Related services” means transportation and other developmental, corrective, and supportive services as may be required to assist a child to benefit from special education. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(22).) State law refers to related services as “designated instruction and services” (DIS) and, like federal law, provides that DIS services shall be provided “when the instruction and services are necessary for the pupil to benefit educationally from his or her instructional program.” (Cal. Educ. Code § 56363(a).) Included in the list of possible related services are psychological services other than for assessment and development of the individualized education program (IEP), parent counseling and training, health and nursing services, and counseling and guidance. (20 U.S.C. §1401 (22); Cal Educ. Code § 56363 (b).) Thus, the mental health services that Petitioner requests are a related services/DIS that must be provided if it is necessary for STUDENT to benefit from special education. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(22); Cal. Educ. Code § 56363 (a).)

To determine whether the residential placement that Petitioner requests is necessary for her to benefit from her special education, it is first necessary to determine what her mental health needs are. These needs are essentially undisputed. All parties agree that STUDENT has used drugs and alcohol, and that she has needs related to her chemical dependency. Moreover, no party disputes that STUDENT has had recent behavioral problems stemming from emotional problems and that she has been diagnosed with oppositional defiant disorder and conduct disorder. All parties agree Petitioner has been diagnosed with depression in the past. The only point of contention is whether she is currently depressed. The only evidence that Petitioner presented of any diagnosis of depression was the testimony of Dr. Casey, who stated that STUDENT was admitted with a diagnosis of major depressive disorder. (Footnote 7) However, Dr. Casey’s testimony on this matter is unpersuasive. Dr. Casey is not a psychologist. (Footnote 8) He provided no basis for the diagnosis that STUDENT was admitted for major depressive disorder. In contrast, Mr. Lappin, a licensed clinical social worker, Dr. Stonehill, a psychiatrist, and Mr. Setlich, a credentialed school psychologist, all testified that, based upon their own testing and their own observations and interactions with STUDENT, there was no evidence that she was depressed. Therefore, on this sole point of contention, the Hearing Officer finds the testimony of the District’s and HCA’s witnesses persuasive that STUDENT was not depressed at the time the District and HCA assessed and made their recommendations.

Having determined Petitioner’s mental health needs, the Hearing Officer now turns to the question of whether she requires a residential placement to benefit from her education. Petitioner presented a letter from Dr. Susan Potts, a clinical psychologist who had in 2002 provided counseling to STUDENT, indicating her recommendation for a long-term, inpatient treatment program as a “medical necessity.” Furthermore, Dr. Andrew Casey, the clinical director at Medpro, stated that STUDENT needed an inpatient, residential placement at Medpro to deal with her chemical dependency issues. Significantly, neither Dr. Potts nor Dr. Casey testified that STUDENT requires a residential placement to benefit from her education. Dr. Casey testified that the educational reason for placing STUDENT at Medpro was only for education regarding substance abuse and that Medpro does not offer a school-based educational component as part of its treatment. And nowhere in Dr. Pott’s letter does it indicate that a residential placement was necessary for STUDENT to benefit from her education.

Moreover, the evidence before the Hearing Officer shows that STUDENT does not require a residential placement for her to benefit from her education. The assessment conducted by HCA indicated that it was recommending outpatient therapy and a referral to HCA’s Drug and Alcohol program. Mr. Lappin testified credibly that several factors counseled against residential treatment, such as STUDENT’s intelligence, her commitment to staying sober, and her parents’ willingness to work toward her success. Mr. Lappin also testified and that STUDENT displayed a plan for continuing her education, which included completing her high school through an alternative program. According to Mr. Lappin, this also counseled against a residential placement. Based on these issues, Mr. Lappin felt that STUDENT should be treated on an outpatient basis. Similarly, Dr. Stonehill testified that residential treatment was not required because she found that STUDENT’s primary problems were with her family and it would be difficult to work on these problems if she was separated from her family.

From the foregoing, the Hearing Officer finds that a residential placement would be inappropriate for STUDENT.

Issue No. 5: Did the District deny Petitioner a FAPE from March 25, 2003 to the present by failing to develop and implement an appropriate IEP?

Petitioner argues that her parents were not able to participate in the development of the IEP because they were not present at the April 30, 2003 IEP meeting and that the District did not implement the behavioral goals or the service plan. Petitioner also alleges that the IEP was deficient in the following respects: her current placement of one period per day of RSP did not meet her needs; the IEP did not provide counseling from the District’s psychologist; it did not provide a behavioral intervention counselor; it did not take into account her truancies; and it did not contain a plan for her to work toward a California high school diploma. Petitioner argues that the IEP should have included a referral to a community day school or high-risk youth program and a residential placement facility.

In Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982), the United States Supreme Court addressed the level of instruction and services that must be provided to a student with disabilities to satisfy the requirements of IDEA. The Court determined that a student’s IEP must be reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit, but that the IDEA does not require school districts to provide special education students with the best education available or to provide instruction or services that maximize a student’s abilities. (Id. at 198-200.) The Court stated that school districts are required to provide only a “basic floor of opportunity” that consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the student. (Id. at 201.)

The Supreme Court in Rowley also recognized the importance of adherence to the procedural requirements of the IDEA. (Id. at 205.) Federal special education law requires states to establish and maintain certain procedural safeguards to ensure that each student with a disability receives the FAPE to which he is entitled and that parents are involved in the formulation of the student’s educational program. (W.G. v. Bd. Of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992).) Procedural flaws, however, do not automatically require a finding of a denial of a FAPE. (Id. at 1484.) Procedural violations may result in a denial of a FAPE if they result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringe on the parent’s opportunity to participate in the IEP process. (Id.)

Therefore, the inquiry in IDEA cases is twofold. (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206.) The first question is whether the school district has complied with the procedures set forth in the IDEA. (Id.) The second is whether the IEP developed through the IDEA’s procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive an educational benefit. (Id. at 207.) The school district has the burden of proving at an administrative hearing that it has complied with the IDEA, including that it provided an appropriate educational placement for the student. (Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).) For the 2000-2001 school year, Student has alleged that the District failed to provide him with an appropriate program.

1. Compliance with Procedural Requirements

Petitioner contends that the District failed adhere to the procedural requirements of State and federal law by holding an IEP meeting on April 30, 2003 without her parents or advocate present and that the District did not implement the behavioral goals or the service plan. As noted above, the courts have created a two-prong test for determining whether a procedural violation resulted in a denial of FAPE for a student: 1) whether a procedural protection has been violated, and 2) whether the violation resulted in a loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringed on the parent’s participation in the IEP process. (W.G., 960 F.2d at 1483.)

The IDEA and State law assures the parents the right to participate in the IEP process. (20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d)(1)(B)(i); Cal. Educ. Code § 56341.5.) In this case, there is no dispute that the District held an IEP meeting on April 30, 2003, without Petitioner’s parents or her advocates present. However, the District argues that Petitioner’s representatives chose not to participate in the IEP and that it was compelled to convene the IEP because it was “placed on the record” at the April 2, 2003 due process hearing.

Even if holding the IEP meeting without Petitioner’s parents and representative present is a procedural violation of State and federal law, Petitioner has failed to show that she suffered any prejudice. On the morning of April 30, STUDENT’s parents phoned Mr. Setlich and informed him that neither the parents nor their advocate would attend the meeting because Ms. Bonnington was sick. The District refused to reschedule and went forward with the meeting. (Footnote 9) At the April 30, 2003 IEP meeting, the District, albeit without the parents present, merely went over the results of the assessments that were agreed to on April 2, 2003. The District IEP team members did not make any changes in its existing offer of placement or services, and continued to offer the services outlined in the March 25, 2003 IEP. Just after the April 30 meeting, Ms. Martin sent Petitioner copies of the assessments, along with a letter indicating that the parents were free to call her if they wished to discuss the results of the April 30, 2003 assessment. Moreover, Petitioner attended an IEP team meeting two weeks later, on May 14, 2003, with the District’s representatives and HCA present. If Petitioner wished to discuss any of the assessments presented at the April 30, 2003 meeting, they could have done so at that time. Thus, the Hearing Officer finds that even though Petitioner’s parents were not at the April 30, 2003 IEP meeting, they had ample opportunity both informally and at the May 14, 2003 IEP meeting, to participate in the formation of STUDENT’s program. Holding the IEP without her parents present did not seriously infringe on their right to participate in the IEP process. Thus, holding an IEP meeting without STUDENT’s parents present did not amount to a denial of FAPE.

The assertion that the District did not implement the behavioral goals or the service plan is simply without merit. Petitioner freely admits that her parents have not signed consent to implement any portions of her IEP. Because Petitioner’s parents have not given consent to implement the IEP, the District is not required, nor is it allowed, to provide those services.

2. Substantive Appropriateness

Petitioner also asserts that the District failed to offer her a program that met the substantive requirements of State and federal law. Petitioner argues that the District offer of placement and services was deficient in the following respects: her current placement of one period per day of RSP did not meet her needs; the IEP did not provide counseling from the District’s psychologist; it did not provide a behavioral intervention counselor; it did not take into account her truancies; and it did not contain a plan for her to work toward a California high school diploma. Petitioner argues that the IEP should have included a referral to a community day school or high-risk youth program and to a residential placement.

To determine whether the District substantively offered STUDENT a FAPE, the analysis must focus on the adequacy of the District’s proposed program. Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987). If the District’s proposed program is designated to address STUDENT’s unique educational needs, is reasonably calculated to provide her some educational benefit, and comports with her IEP, the District offered a FAPE, even if her parents prefer another program and even if her parent’ preferred program would result in greater educational benefit. (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207-208; Gregory K., 811 F.2d at 1314.) The District is also required to offer STUDENT a program which educates him in the least restrictive environment, with removal from the regular education environment occurring only when the nature or severity of her disabilities is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily. (20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(5)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56031.) Therefore, under the IDEA and Rowley, the program the District proposed for STUDENT must meet the following four requirement to constitute an appropriate educational program for her: be designed to meet her educational needs, be reasonably calculated to provide her some educational benefit, comport with her IEP, and provide her education in the least restrictive environment.

To determine whether the District’s proposed program was designed to meet STUDENT’s unique educational needs, it is necessary to have some understanding of what unique educational needs the District knew or should have known about at the time it made its placement offer. See Adams v. Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that review must focus on adequacy of proposed program at time it was drafted). The District cannot be held responsible for information it had no basis for knowing at the time it developed the IEP. Id. However, “[i]n striving for ‘appropriateness,’ and IEP must take into account what was, and was not, objectively reasonable…at the time the IEP was drafted.’” Id. (quoting Fuhrmann v. East Hanover Bd. Of Educ., 993 F.2d 1031, 1041 (3d Cir. 1993)).

First, the Hearing Officer will determine Petitioner’s unique needs. Petitioner presented no evidence as to her unique educational needs with regard to the placement and services offered in the March 25, 2003 IEP. (Footnote 10) Mr. Setlich, the District’s psychologist, identified that STUDENT’s deficits related to education were that she was unmotivated to do her homework and that there were concerns regarding her behavior and discipline. Based on his testing, STUDENT scored in the average to above average range in both her cognitive abilities and her academic achievement. He testified that the STUDENT’s problems with school stemmed from her not turning in her homework and not completing homework assignments. Mr. Setlich also testified that there were concerns regarding her behavior and discipline problems. Thus, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT’s unique needs requires a program and services related to doing her homework, and to addressing her behavioral problems.

Next, the Hearing Officer will turn to whether the program the District offered met STUDENT’s unique needs. At the March 25, 2003 IEP meeting, the District offered one period per day of RSP class, as well as continuing with the referral to HCA for mental health services. Mr. Setlich testified that the RSP class that was offered was a study skills class, in which STUDENT would get help on her homework from an RSP teacher. It was also a structured environment where she could start her homework under supervision from a teacher. Mr. Setlich testified that this class was designed to address STUDENT’s reluctance to complete homework. Furthermore, Mr. Setlich testified that the District would, at STUDENT’s parents’ request, continue with the referral process to HCA address the team’s concerns about STUDENT’s behavior. (Footnote 11) Thus, the Hearing Officer finds that the offer of one hour per day of RSP class and the referral to mental health met STUDENT’s unique educational needs.

Petitioner’s remaining contention is that the program was inappropriate because it did not include a plan for STUDENT to work toward a high school diploma. However, Petitioner has failed to present an authority for the proposition that the IEP must include a plan for STUDENT to work toward a high school diploma.

The Hearing Officer has found that the program the District offered met STUDENT’s unique needs. Petitioner did not contend that the program was not designed to confer educational benefit, that it would not be implemented in conformity with an IEP, or that it was not an education in the least restrictive environment. Therefore, the District has offered Petitioner a FAPE in the March 25, 2003 IEP.

Issue No. 6: Is Petitioner entitled to compensatory education, reimbursement or prospective placement for the failure of Respondents to provide her with a FAPE?

When a school district denies a student a FAPE, the student is entitled to relief that is “appropriate” in light of the purposes of the IDEA. (School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Education (1985) 471 U.S. 359, 369-370; See also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i).) Court decisions subsequent to Burlington also have extended relief in the form of compensatory education to students who have been denied a FAPE. (See, e.g. Lester H. v. K Gilhool and the Chester Upland Unified School District (3d Cir. 1990) 916 F.2d 865; Miener v. State of Missouri (8th Cir. 1986) 800 F.2d 749.) In this case, the only denial of a FAPE occurred when the District delayed in conducting their assessments and holding an IEP.

Parents may also be entitled to reimbursement for the costs of placement or services they have procured for their child when the school district has failed to provide a FAPE and the private placement or services were appropriate under the IDEA and replaced services that the District was to provide. (School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Education (1985) 471 U.S. 359, 369-370; Student W. v. Puyallup School District (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 1489, 1496; 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C).) The Burlington rule of reimbursement is not so narrow as to permit reimbursement only when the placement or services chosen by the parent are found to be the exact proper placement or services required under the IDEA. (Alamo Heights Independent Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., (6th Cir. 1986) 790 F.2d 1153, 1161.) However, the parents’ placement still must meet certain basic requirement of the IDEA, such as the requirement that the placement address the child’s needs and provide him educational benefit. (Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter (1993) 510 U.S. 7, 13-14, 114 S.Ct. 361.)

The Petitioner requests the following as compensatory education services: six months of Sylvan Learning Center; six months of Kumon Math; driver’s education; sewing instruction; video production classes; transportation to and from these services; and a home/hospital teacher for the summer. Petitioner also requests reimbursement for private counseling provided by Dr. Potts and an order continuing Dr. Pott’s therapy services prospectively. Moreover, the Petitioner requests a prospective placement in an undesignated out-of-state residential facility that is certified by California as a nonpublic school, transportation to and from the residential facility, and payment for the cost of “unfettered” family visits to the residential facility a minimum of four occasions per year from anywhere in the world. However, the District argues that there is no nexus between the remedies Petitioner seeks and the failure to complete its assessment and hold the IEP in a timely manner. The District also argued that STUDENT did not qualify for special education and did not need special education services. Because STUDENT was not eligible, the District argued, she suffered no loss of educational benefit by its failure to conduct the assessments in a timely manner.

The Hearing Officer agrees that there is no nexus between the remedies Petitioner seeks and the denial of a FAPE. The District admits that it was 32 days late in performing its assessment and holding the initial IEP. However, Petitioner has presented no evidence that the remedies that she seeks are appropriate. In terms of compensatory education, Courts have held that appropriate relief is relief designed to ensure Petitioner is appropriately educated within the meaning of the IDEA. (Puyallup, supra, 31 F.3d at 497.) Petitioner’s requested relief does not appear designed to compensate her for a loss of educational opportunity. In terms of Petitioner’s request for reimbursement, there was no evidence presented that PARENTS obtained those services in order to replace services the District should have provided. In fact, Dr. Potts provided services in 2002, before the District denied STUDENT a FAPE for 32 days in February and March of 2003. As for the request for prospective placement, Petitioner’s request for an out-of-state residential placement is wholly disproportionate to the denial of a FAPE. Therefore, Petitioner’s requested remedies are denied.

Moreover, the Hearing Officer declines to fashion a remedy in this matter. At present, Petitioner is progressing even without special education services. In February of 2003, she passed the California High School Exit Exam, and she is currently passing all her classes. While she is at Medpro, the District continued to provide her with home-hospital teaching. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that it is inappropriate to fashion a remedy for the District denial of FAPE.

ORDER

All of Petitioner’s claims for relief for denied.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to Education Code section 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following finding is made in accordance with this statute: Respondents prevailed on all issues heard and decided.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this Decision. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i).

Date: March 14, 2003 Patrick J. Balucan, Hearing OfficerCalifornia Special Education Hearing Office

1. The mental health and educational professionals who testified at hearing referred to Chapter 26.5 of the Government Code, governing interagency responsibilities for related services, as “AB 3632.” The Hearing Officer notes that legislation enacted in 1996 (Assembly Bill 2726), amended or enacted provisions of this Chapter. However, the commonly used term “AB 3632” will be used in this Decision to refer to services under Government Code Chapter 26.5.

2. These issues are a restatement of the issues Petitioner presented for hearing, based upon the discussion of the issues held at the beginning of the hearing.

3. Ms. Brown did not testify at the due process hearing

4. Petitioner originally alleged that the District failed in its search and serve obligations since March of 2000. However, upon questioning by Petitioner’s advocate at the due process hearing, FATHER testified that the point at which he believed the District should have been aware that STUDENT was eligible for special education was after an incident that occurred in March of 2001. Petitioner’s choice of the March 2000 date seemed to be a simple expedient to conform to the statute of limitations. No evidence was presented that the District should have been apprised prior to March of 2001 that Petitioner was eligible for special education. The issue has been rephrased to conform to the evidence presented at the hearing.

5. At the beginning of hearing, during the clarification of the issues, Petitioner’s advocate could not explain to the Hearing Officer the precise nature of STUDENT’s “perceptual” difficulty, indicating only that it affected her reading and speech and language. Ms. Bonnington informed the Hearing Officer that she would call an expert witness to shed light on this perceived area of need. No such witness was ever called.

6. As noted above in the Background Facts, STUDENT’s assessment team consisted of Mr. Lappin, Dr. Stonehill, and Dr. James Schaeffer. Mr. Lappin and Dr. Stonehill testified at hearing that the recommendations made in the assessment report were developed with input from all three members of the assessment team.

7. There were also serious doubts about the veracity of documents that were submitted to the District and HCA. There appeared to be several documents with Dr. Casey’s signature. One letter stated the diagnosis of major depressive disorder, and appeared to be signed by Dr. Casey, and another document was a request for home hospital instruction signed by Dr. Casey, both including the caption that Dr. Casey was an M.D./Ph.D. (Petitioner’s Ex. A-74 and A-79.) However, upon reviewing those document, Dr. Casey stated that he did not sign those documents, and the signature appearing there was not his.

8. Dr. Casey received his Ph.D. in Metaphysics from the University of Metaphysics in Studio City, California. He is a psychological assistant whose license is currently on probation. (District’s Ex. 124.)

9. At hearing, the District argued that it felt compelled to go forward with the IEP meeting because it was put on the record at a due process hearing. The Hearing Officer notes that there was no order mandating that a meeting take place on April 30, 2003, and nothing prevented the parties from agreeing to move the date of that IEP meeting.

10. Petitioner reiterated her contention that she required a residential placement to meet her needs. However, that issue was dealt with above in issue number 4 (see above). Petitioner presented no evidence as to the appropriateness of the District’s offer of placement made at the March 25, 2003 IEP meeting.

11. Moreover, after the assessment process was complete, the HCA service plan included providing individual and family counseling. This would address Petitioner’s concerns about counseling not being provided.