California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · April 3, 2000

Student v. Fremont Unified School District et al.

SEHO Case No. SN 437-98 · Hearing Officer Trevor Skarda

Fremont Unified and Alameda County Mental Health owe nothing for Utah residential placements, a private evaluation, or a hospital program.

District prevailed on all issues

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Summary

A student filed for due process in April 1998 against Fremont Unified School District and Alameda County Mental Health. In October 1997 the District found her eligible as seriously emotionally disturbed. Before that, from April 1995 to September 1997, her parents had placed her in two private residential schools in Utah. The family sought $116,124.81 for the Utah placements and $3,816.05 for a private evaluation at the Menninger Clinic in Kansas. They also sought the part of an October–December 1997 partial hospitalization program at Alta Bates/Herrick Hospital that insurance did not pay.

Hearing Officer Trevor Skarda ruled for the respondents on every issue. Child find claims for the period before April 6, 1995 were barred by the three-year statute of limitations because the mother knew the underlying facts. The Hearing Officer still reviewed the whole 1994-95 year and found that the District met its duty. A District program specialist offered to assess the student in September 1994, and the mother declined. The mother also knew the assessment process from her son's special education. While the student was in Utah, the family had no contact with the District about her, and the District had working child find procedures. The Menninger evaluation was not reimbursable because it came before the District's assessment. Under the Clovis case, the Alta Bates program was a medical placement, not an educational one. No relief was ordered.

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Why it matters

The decision shows how SEHO handled child find when a parent turned down a district's offer to assess and shared few details about the child's problems. It also shows SEHO applying Clovis to treat a partial hospitalization program as a medical service. In addition, it denied reimbursement for a private evaluation obtained before the district assessed.

Issues and holdings

  1. Issue 1A. Should STUDENT have been identified as eligible for special education through the child-find provisions of Education Code 56300 prior to April 1995?

    Claims that the District failed in child find before April 6, 1995 were time-barred because the parent knew or had reason to know the underlying facts. Reviewing the full 1994-95 year anyway, the Hearing Officer found the District met its duty: it offered to assess in September 1994 and the parent declined.

  2. District prevailedChild find

    Issue 1B. Did the District fulfill its child-find obligations from April 1995 through 1997?

    The District met its child find duty. The student was out of state, the family had no contact with the District about her until June 1997, and the District had working child find policies and procedures.

  3. Issue 1C. Did the District offer STUDENT a free appropriate public education for the 1994-95, 1995-1996 and 1996-1997 school years, including the extended school years? (Reimbursement of $116,124.81 for out-of-state placements, April 1995 through September 1997)

    No denial of FAPE resulted from any failure to identify or assess, so reimbursement was denied. In the alternative, the Utah placements gave no shown educational benefit, and the only evidence of benefit was hearsay.

  4. Issue 2. Should the District reimburse STUDENT's parents the sum of $3,816.05, the cost of a 1997 evaluation at the Menninger Clinic in Kansas?

    Reimbursement was denied because the Menninger evaluation happened before the District assessed, so the parents could not have obtained it out of disagreement with the District's assessment (Ed. Code 56329(b)).

  5. Issue 3. Should the District and Mental Health reimburse STUDENT's parents for the unreimbursed portion of the Alta Bates/Herrick Hospital partial hospitalization program from October 1997 to December 1997?

    Under Clovis, Alta Bates was a medical partial hospitalization program focused on stabilizing the student, with little educational component and no grades or credits. It was not a related service, so neither the District nor Mental Health had to reimburse.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • All of Petitioner's requests for relief were denied.

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Key authorities

Alexopoulos v. San Francisco Unified School District (9th Cir. 1987); Clovis Unified School District v. California Office of Administrative Hearings (9th Cir. 1990); Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garret F. (1999); Irving Independent School District v. Tatro (1984); School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education (1985); Florence County School District Four v. Carter (1993); Education Code 56300, 56301, 56329(b), 56043; 5 C.C.R. 3021(a), 3030(i)

People named in the decision

  • Sharon Wnuck, program specialist, Fremont Unified School District
  • Dennis Devine, Ph.D., school psychologist and assessor, Fremont Unified School District
  • Laurie Berberian, psychologist and assessor, Fremont Unified School District
  • John Nelson, special day class teacher for students with emotional disturbance; assessor, Fremont Unified School District
  • Chris Berney, vice principal, Hopkins Junior High School, Fremont Unified School District
  • Barry Hottle, teacher, Fremont Unified School District
  • JoAnne Dankwardt, former registrar, Mission San Jose High School, Fremont Unified School District
  • Claire Hintergardt, former program specialist, Fremont Unified School District
  • Anne Power, sixth grade teacher, Gomes Elementary, Fremont Unified School District
  • Jan Colburn, math teacher, Hopkins Junior High School, Fremont Unified School District
  • Carolyn Novosel, chief of children's specialized services, Alameda County Mental Health
  • Elizabeth Uno, AB 3632 coordinator, Alameda County Mental Health
  • Carla Danby, case manager, Alameda County Mental Health
  • J. Bromberg, Ph.D., private psychologist who administered the WISC
  • Marcia Ove, private therapist
  • Patricia Kelly, private family/marriage counselor
  • Jaap Kaur Waraich, M.D., treating psychiatrist, CPC Fremont
  • Miriam Boden, private educational consultant
  • Richard Ruderman, former attorney for Student
  • Sierra School, private school (unilateral placement, fall 1994), Santa Clara, California
  • CPC Fremont, short-term psychiatric hospital
  • Charter Provo Canyon School, private residential placement, Provo, Utah
  • Sorenson's Residential Treatment Center, private residential treatment center, Koosharem, Utah
  • Menninger Clinic, private evaluation provider, Kansas
  • Alta Bates/Herrick Hospital, partial hospitalization program
  • LaCheim School, school placement funded by District

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Trevor Skarda, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, in Fremont, California, on September 23 and 24 and December 13, 14, 15, 1999. Petitioner STUDENT was represented at the hearing by attorney Bob N. Varma. Also present on behalf of Petitioner was MS. PARENT, STUDENT's mother. (Footnote 1) Respondent Fremont Unified School District (District) was represented at the hearing by attorney Bridget A. Flanagan. Also present on behalf of the District was Sharon Wnuck, program specialist for the District. Respondent Alameda County Mental Health (Mental Health) was represented by Deputy County Counsel Willie Lott, Jr. Also present on the behalf of Alameda County Mental Health was Carolyn Novosel, chief of children's specialized services for Alameda County Mental Health.

The following witnesses were called by Petitioner to testify: MS. PARENT; Sharon Wnuck; Dennis Devine, Ph.D., the District's school psychologist.

The following witnesses were called by the District to testify: Chris Berney, vice principal at Hopkins Junior High School; Barry Hottle, teacher; JoAnne Dankwardt, fomer registrar at Mission San Jose High School; Claire Hintergardt, former program specialist for the District.

The following witnesses were called by Mental Health to testify: Carolyn Novosel; Dr. Elizabeth Uno, the AB 3632 coordinator for Alameda County Mental Health; Carla Danby, case manager for Alameda County Mental Health.

Oral and documentary evidence was received. Following receipt of written closing arguments, the case was closed, and the matter was submitted for decision.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

Petitioner seeks reimbursement from the District for tuition and related costs incurred by her parents for two unilateral placements in Utah from April 1995 through September 1997. Petitioner also seeks reimbursement from the District for an assessment privately obtained during the summer of 1997. Finally, Petitioner seeks reimbursement from both the District and Mental Health for the "unreimbursed" portion of the cost of her placement at Alta Bates/ Herrick hospital in California from October through December 1997.

Regarding the Utah placements, Petitioner contends that the District failed to satisfy its child find obligations prior to April 1995. (Footnote 2) Specifically, Petitioner argues that the District "knew or should have known" that Petitioner was eligible for special education services prior to April 1995 because of Petitioner's "rapid decline in behavior and school performance over the prior two years." As a result of its failure, Petitioner argues, the District failed to offer Petitioner a free and appropriate public education from April 1995 through September 1997.

Regarding reimbursement for the private assessment, Petitioner contends that because the District allegedly failed in its child find obligations from approximately 1992 until June 1997, that it should reimburse Petitioner for the private assessment obtained in September 1997.

Regarding Petitioner's placement at Alta Bates, Petitioner argues that both the District and Mental Health failed to offer STUDENT a free appropriate public education in a timely manner after she returned to California in the fall of 1997. Therefore, Petitioner contends, the District and Mental Health should reimburse Petitioner for the portion of the placement not paid for by Petitioner's insurance.

The District contends, with regard to the Utah placements, that Petitioner's claim for reimbursement is barred by the statute of limitations because the District's alleged child find failure occurred outside the applicable three-year period (prior to April 1995). In any event, the District argues, it met its child find obligations from 1992 through 1998. In the alternative, the District argues that Petitioner has the burden of proof to demonstrate that STUDENT qualified for special education and related services prior to October 29, 1997 (when she was first found eligible by the District).

With regard to the private assessment, the District contends that Petitioner is not entitled to reimbursement because she did not and could not disagree with the District's assessment.

With regard to the Alta Bates placement, the District contends that it is not obligated to pay for the portion of the placement not reimbursed by insurance because: (1) Alta Bates is a hospitalization program, (2) Petitioner's parents placed her at Alta Bates before the October 1997 IEP meeting and before they submitted written consent for a residential placement, and (3) Mental Health became responsible for case management after the IEP team recommended residential placement for Petitioner.

Also with regard to the Alta Bates placement, Mental Health contends that Alta Bates was not an educational placement, and therefore, reimbursement is inappropriate. Mental Health also argues that it met all relevant time lines with related to STUDENT's assessment and placement after the IEP team recommended residential treatment for STUDENT.

ISSUES (Footnote 3)

1. Should the District reimburse Petitioner's parents the sum of $116,124.81, the amount paid for tuition and the related costs associated with her out-of-state placements from April 1995 through September 1997?

A. Should STUDENT have been identified as eligible for special education through the child-find provisions of Education Code 56300 prior to April 1995?

B. Did the District fulfill its child-find obligations from April 1995 through 1997?

C. Did the District offer STUDENT a free appropriate public education for the 1994-95, 1995-1996 and 1996-1997 school years, including the extended school years?

2. Should the District reimburse STUDENT's parents the sum of $3,816.05, the cost of a 1997 evaluation at the Menninger Clinic in Kansas?

3. Should the District and Mental Health reimburse STUDENT's parents for the unreimbursed portion of the Alta Bates/Herrick Hospital partial hospitalization program from October 1997 to December 1997? (Footnote 4)

BACKGROUND FACTS

STUDENT, age 19, was born on [date redacted]. She currently resides in the Pleasanton area, where she attends Mt. Diablo Valley Community College and works at Blockbuster Video.

STUDENT has two younger siblings, BROTHER and BROTHER. BROTHER has been identified as a eligible for special education since 1991 when STUDENT was in the sixth grade at Gomes elementary school. BROTHER has received continuous services since that time from the Fremont Unified School District. His parents have attended IEPs on an annual basis and obtained an independent assessment in 1992. Ms. PARENT has also attended at least one student study team meeting for BROTHER, and initiated an assessment referral, along with the SST team, on January 14, 1993. District's Exhibit No. 45. Moreover, the parents have received a notice of parental rights on an annual basis for both BROTHER and BROTHER from 1995 through 1997. Testimony of PARENT.

STUDENT attended Gomes Elementary in the District from the first through the sixth grades. During sixth grade (the 1991-1992 school year), STUDENT received primarily B's and C's from her teacher, Anne Power. (Footnote 5) She was absent a total of 30 days over the course of the school year and tardy 16 times. STUDENT received grades of C, C and B-, for each of the three trimesters in the area of citizenship. Ms. Power noted on her report card that STUDENT generally "needs to improve" in the area of organizational skills. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 158.

On November 23, 1991, STUDENT was administered the Weschler Inteligence Scales for Children (WISC) by J. Bromberg, Ph.D. She received a verbal IQ score of 131 and a performance IQ score of 124. Her full scale IQ score was 131. District's Exhibit No. 2.

STUDENT attended Hopkins Junior High School, also in the District, during seventh and eighth grades. She was placed in the GATE (Gifted and Talented Education) English class during both years. In the first semester of her seventh grade (the 1992-1993 school year), STUDENT received two B's and four C's, including a C in GATE English. She was absent approximately seven days during the first semester. (Footnote 6) Petitioner's Exhibit No. 157. During the second semester, STUDENT's absences totaled between 26 and 31 days for each of her six classes. She received three C's, two B's and one grade of D. Four of her six teachers noted on STUDENT's second semester report card that her excessive absences and her tardiness were affecting her course work. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 156.

STUDENT's grades continued to deteriorate during eighth grade (the 1993-1994 school year), and her pattern of absences continued. STUDENT was absent eight days in four of her classes, six days in one class and one day in GATE English during the first semester. She received one B, one C, two D's and two F grades (in Social Science and French 1). Her teachers' comments indicate generally that her assignments were incomplete. Petitioner's Exhibit No.155. During the second semester, STUDENT's grades and absences were as follows:

Period Course Name Grade Absences 1 Math 8 D 23 2 Social Science F 17 3 P.E. D+ 14 4 GATE English C 17 5 Cooking 2 B- 14 6 Science F 18

Petitioner's Exhibit No. 152.

STUDENT was absent a total of 25 times during sixth grade, 35 during seventh grade and 21 days during eighth grade. Every absence was excused by her parents. District's Exhibit No. 13.

According to Ms. PARENT, STUDENT became lethargic and had trouble getting up and going to school in the morning beginning in the seventh grade, with increasing frequency during the eighth grade. She had few friends and began wearing black clothes and listening to "dark" music. Moreover, STUDENT increasingly fought with her brothers and was embarrassed by her brother BROTHER's behaviors. Additionally, although STUDENT participated in volleyball during the sixth and seventh grades, she quit after the summer program concluded in 1993. Ms. PARENT also testified that she frequently argued with her husband during this time, and that STUDENT was increasingly agitated by her brother BROTHER's behavior. She also testified that STUDENT's other brother, BROTHER, "got on STUDENT's nerves." Testimony of PARENT.

During her eighth grade year, STUDENT's parents received notices regarding STUDENT's attendance problems, and her consistent failure to do her homework. (Footnote 7) Petitioner's Exhibit No. 148 and 149. Her first period-teacher, Jan Colburn, sent several notices documenting STUDENT's failure to complete her math homework. District's Exhibit No. 5. STUDENT forged her mother's signature on one of them, the rest were signed by her mother. District's Exhibit No. 5. STUDENT received several detentions and at least one Saturday school because of her attendance problems and her failure to complete her homework. District's Exhibit No. 6.

By letter dated February 4, 1994, the District notified STUDENT's parents of the promotion policy at Hopkins Junior High School and that STUDENT would not be allowed to participate in promotion ceremonies and other activities if her grades did not improve. The same letter invited her parents to contact STUDENT's teachers or the vice principal, Chris Berney. District's Exhibit No. 4. STUDENT's mother participated in a telephone conference on March 11, 1994, regarding STUDENT's tardies to first period, and both her father and mother met with Ms. Berney regarding her tardies and failing grades on May 4, 1994. District's Exhibit No. 7. On June 6, 1994, the District informed STUDENT's parents that STUDENT was not eligible to graduate because of her failing grades and that she would be "socially promoted" to high school. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 135.

Although STUDENT was scheduled to attend Mission San Jose high school, a District high school, at the start of the 1994-1995 school year, STUDENT's parents enrolled her at Sierra School, a private school located in Santa Clara, California. District's Exhibit No. 12 and Testimony of PARENT. (Footnote 8) STUDENT's parents placed STUDENT at Sierra because the vice principal at her previous school had told them that there were "no options" other than social promotion to high school or repeating eighth grade. Testimony of PARENT. Ms. PARENT testified that she chose Sierra instead of Mission San Jose because it had smaller classes (5 to 15 students), and, therefore, STUDENT would be less likely to "slip through the cracks."

She attended Sierra for one semester. STUDENT received one B (Biology), two C's (Algebra and Journalism), two D's (English and P.E.) and one F (American History). She did not receive special education services from Sierra. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 145 and Testimony of PARENT. STUDENT was disciplined at Sierra for various behaviors, including smoking a cigarette while in class. Eventually, Ms. PARENT began "checking in" with the principal of Sierra every morning to inquire about STUDENT's status. Although STUDENT was not expelled, according to Ms. PARENT, there was "some question" as to whether Sierra wanted STUDENT to return for a second semester. Testimony of PARENT.

On September 26, 1994, after STUDENT had begun the Fall semester at Sierra, Ms. PARENT had a conversation with Claire Hintergardt, the District's program specialist, regarding the progress of STUDENT's sibling, BROTHER, who had been receiving special education services from the District for some time. During the conversation, Ms. PARENT indicated that she was concerned about STUDENT's behavior, but did not specify what type of behaviors. Ms. Hintergardt asked Ms. PARENT if she wanted the District to assess STUDENT. Ms. PARENT declined. Testimony of PARENT and Hintergardt, District's Exhibit No. 15.

In approximately November 1994, STUDENT began receiving individual counseling from Marcia Ove. Ms. Ove was recommended by Patricia Kelly, a marriage counselor who had been counseling Ms. PARENT and her husband, FATHER, since 1989. Testimony of PARENT.

STUDENT enrolled at Mission San Jose high school on February 15, 1995. According to Ms. PARENT, STUDENT was allowed to enroll at Mission because of an "agreement" between STUDENT, Marcia Ove and Ms. PARENT. She was disenrolled on March 20, 1995. During her enrollment at Mission San Jose, STUDENT was absent six days, two of the absences unexcused and four excused. Testimony of Dankwart and District's Exhibit No. 13. There were no parent-teacher conferences during STUDENT's stay, and STUDENT appeared "happy." Testimony of PARENT.

On March 16, 1995, STUDENT was voluntarily admitted to CPC Fremont, a short-term care psychiatric hospital, upon the recommendation of her private therapist due to increasing depression and self-destructive behavior, including carving a small heart on her arm with a razor blade. (Footnote 9) Petitioner's Exhibit Nos. 329 and 338. STUDENT's voluntary stay became involuntary after she successfully escaped from the facility and was apprehended by her father. (Footnote 10) Testimony of PARENT. After STUDENT was admitted to CPC Fremont, STUDENT's parents entered her bedroom at home and discovered several wall paintings of a dark and disturbing nature. Testimony of PARENT and Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 471 to 477.

Ms. PARENT testified that at some point during STUDENT's stay at CPC Fremont, she called someone at Mission San Jose high school and informed him or her that STUDENT was at CPC Fremont, although she was not sure whom she spoke to or when she placed the call. Ms. PARENT added that the person she spoke to told her that she did not need to go to the school and do anything. Ms. PARENT also stated that she received no letters, and only one phone call regarding STUDENT's absences. No one at the District offered to provide services or homework for STUDENT. According to Ms. PARENT, she did not call the District or inquire as to educational services because someone at CPC Fremont told her that they had "on-board" educational services and support on site, and that they would satisfy the "education code requirements."

STUDENT was discharged from CPC Fremont on Arpil 5, 1995. The discharge summary, prepared by Jaap Kaur Waraich, M.D., notes that STUDENT was found to be "significantly depressed." Dr. Waraich also notes that:

The patient was correct in that she asserted that her family could not deal with her at this time. Stressors in the family included the parents starting to separate, as well as having a younger brother who is autistic. Mother, in one of her conversations, did say to me that she could not handle having the patient home at this point in time. Family insisted that the patient be placed in a long term residential facility and they found a facility that was out of state for her.

Petitioner's Exhibit No. 330. Ms. PARENT verified that she requested the residential placement because she "could not handle" STUDENT at home, and verified that she, along with her husband, began looking for a residential placement while STUDENT was at CPC Fremont.

Upon her discharge from CPC Fremont on April 5, 1995, Petitioner's family sent her directly to the first of two private placements in Utah -- Charter Provo Canyon School (Provo Canyon) located in Provo, Utah. They hired a private escort service to accompany her to Provo Canyon. Provo Canyon was chosen based on the recommendation of a private educational consultant, Miriam Boden. Ms. Boden failed to inform Ms. PARENT that STUDENT may have been eligible for special education services at the District's expense or that Ms. PARENT had the right to request an assessment at the District's expense. Testimony of PARENT.

STUDENT attended Provo Canyon from April 1995 through May 13, 1996. Testimony of PARENT and Petitioner's Exhibit No. 109. On May 13, 1996, she was enrolled at Sorenson's Residential Treatment Center (Sorenson's) in Koosharem, Utah. She was discharged from Sorenson's in September 1997, although her parents were notified that she was required to leave in June 1997. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 60 and Testimony of PARENT. From Sorenson's, STUDENT was brought directly to the Menninger clinic in Kansas, where she was evaluated from September 8 through September 12, 1997. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 100.

STUDENT did not return home to California until September 1997. Petitioner's family had no contact with anyone from the District with regard to STUDENT from March 1995 through June 1997. Testimony of PARENT.

On June 26, 1997, Petitioner's mother requested that the District assess STUDENT for eligibility for special education services as seriously emotionally disturbed. District's Exhibit No. 16. Thereafter, the District prepared an assessment plan and submitted it to Ms. PARENT. District's Exhibit Nos. 17 and 21. She did not sign and return the assessment plan until September 2, 1997.

In a letter dated September 8, 1997, Richard Ruderman, Petitioner's former attorney, requested that the District expedite the assessment process. District's Exhibit No. 20. (Footnote 11)

District assessed STUDENT over six test sessions beginning on September 19, 1997, and ending October 7, 1997. She was assessed by Dennis Devine and Laurie Berberian, psychologists, John Nelson, special day class teacher of seriously emotionally disturbed students. The total assessment time exceeded fourteen hours. Testimony of Devine. The assessment report concludes as follows:

STUDENT's difficulties in the social and emotional domains are not the result of social maladjustment. These problems have been observed for at least three years, and have remained fairly consistent in terms of the particular themes. Given that STUDENT's social and emotional problems exist to a marked degree and are associated with functional academic impairments, we advise the IEP team to consider eligibility for her as an Emotionally Disturbed pupil. Further, as part of her IEP, appropriate transition goals should be developed. District's Exhibit No. 25.

An IEP meeting was held on October 29, 1997. The IEP team found STUDENT eligible "as a student that meets the criteria for seriously emotionally disturbed due to an inability to build and maintain satisfactory relationships, a pervasive mood of unhappiness and inappropriate types of behavior or feelings under normal circumstances that have been evidenced for a long period of time and to a marked degree." District's Exhibit No. 29.

Prior to the IEP meeting on October 17, 1997, STUDENT's parents placed her at Alta Bates/Herrick Hospital in a partial hospitalization program. District's Exhibit No. 44. STUDENT remained in the Alta Bates partial hospitalization program through December 30, 1997. District's Exhibit No. 44.

STUDENT began attending LaCheim school, paid for by the District, in March 1998. She received her GED and graduated from the program in 1998. Testimony of PARENT.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

ISSUE NO. 1: Should the District reimburse Petitioner's parents the sum of $116,124.81, the amount paid for tuition and the related costs associated with her out-of-state placement from April 1995 through September 1997?

1(A): Should STUDENT have been identified as eligible for special education through the child-find provisions of Education Code 56300 prior to April 1995?

1(B): Did the District fulfill its child-find obligations from April 1995 through 1997?

1(C): Did the District offer STUDENT a free appropriate public education for the 1994-95, 1995-1996 and 1996-1997 school years, including the extended school years?

Petitioner was first found eligible for special education as seriously emotionally disturbed in October 1997. Petitioner's parents seek reimbursement for the tuition and related costs they incurred from April 1995 through September 1997 based on the District's failure to initiate an assessment and identify STUDENT as eligible for special education prior to April 1995. (Footnote 12) As such, the primary issue at hearing was whether the District met its child find obligations with regard to STUDENT prior to April 1995, including whether the District knew or should have known that STUDENT was a student with a disability.

California law imposes detailed and demanding requirements on school districts to ensure that students who may be disabled are promptly and appropriately assessed. School districts must systematically seek out all individuals with exceptional needs. Education Code 56300. Districts must establish written policies and procedures for a continuous child-find system, and the policies and procedures must include written notification to all parents of procedures for initiating a referral for assessment. Education Code § 56301. All referrals for special education and related services must initiate the assessment process and must be documented. 5 C.C.R. 3021(a). When an oral referral is made by a parent, the staff of the school district must offer assistance in reducing the request to writing. Id. Clearly, California requires districts to take a proactive role in seeking out and assessing children with possible disabilities.

Petitioner argues that the accumulation of information and events preceding her parents' unilateral decision to place STUDENT out of state in April 1995 should have alerted the District to the possibility that STUDENT was a pupil with severe emotional problems. Had it fulfilled its child find obligations, the District would have initiated a referral for a special education assessment. Petitioner argues that STUDENT's declining grades and attendance problems beginning in approximately 1992 and culminating in her social promotion to high school in June 1994 due to two failing grades, should have alerted the District that STUDENT may have been eligible for special education.

The District argues that the bulk of the events occurred well outside the applicable statute of limitations and that her falling grades and attendance problems occurred up to six years before Petitioner filed for due process on April 6, 1998. The statute of limitations bars Petitioner's reimbursement claims, according to the District, for any failure on the District's part to refer STUDENT for special education and related services while she was enrolled at Hopkins Junior High School (1992-1994), Sierra School (September 1994 to January 1995) and Mission San Jose High school (February 15 to March 20, 1995).

The District cites Alexopoulos v. San Francisco Unified School District (9th Cir. 1987) 817 F.2d 551, in support of its position. Alexopoulos held that the statute of limitations begins to run when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the action. Id. at 555.

Petitioner agrees that the statute of limitations applies with regard to any claim outside the applicable three year period. (Footnote 13) However, Petitioner argues that while the statute of limitations bars claims prior to April 1995 (including Petitioner's potential claim for reimbursement for the Sierra School placement during the first semester of the 1994-1995 school year), it does not bar the introduction of evidence from outside of the statutory period. Essentially, Petitioner argues that the injury that is the basis for her action is the cost of the out-of-state placement, which occurred within the three-year period.The Hearing Officer finds that the injury that is the basis of the action in the present case is not the subsequent costs incurred by Petitioner's parents, rather, it is the District's alleged failure to identify and assess STUDENT as eligible for special education. Thus, under Alexopoulos, the statute of limitations operates as a bar for Petitioner's claims that the District failed to identify and assess STUDENT during the 1992-1993 (seventh grade), 1993-1994 (eighth grade), and 1994-1995 school years, if Petitioner knew or had reason to know of the facts underlying the District's alleged failures. (Footnote 14)

The Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner either knew or had reason to know as early as 1992 of the facts underlying the District's obligation to identify and assess STUDENT. Ms. PARENT testified that she received annual notices of her right to refer STUDENT for special education and related services as early as STUDENT's third grade year at Gomes elementary. Petitioner's Exhibit Nos. 35 -38. Moreover, she testified that she was aware that STUDENT was to be socially promoted, and that she met with Chris Berney (vice principal at Hopkins Junior high school) at least one time in May 1995 to discuss STUDENT's grades, tardiness and excessive absences. Furthermore, Ms. PARENT testified that she received notice of her rights as a parent under the Individual's with Disabilities Education Act on an annual basis beginning as early as January 1994 with regard to her son BROTHER. Additionally, Claire Hintergardt, the District's program specialist, testified that Ms. PARENT was aware of the student study team (SST) referral process, and that she participated in an SST meeting in January of 1993 with regard to BROTHER. Most significantly, Ms. PARENT testified, and Ms. Hintergardt confirmed, that in September 1994, the District orally offered to assess STUDENT, and Ms. PARENT declined.

As developed above, the statute of limitations bars claims that the District failed in it's child find obligations prior to April 6, 1999, because Ms. PARENT knew or should have known of the facts underlying the District's obligation to identify and assess STUDENT. Nonetheless, the statute of limitations does not bar the Hearing Officer from considering events that occurred prior to April 6, 1995, in his determination of whether the District met its child find obligations on and after April 6, 1995. The alleged basis for special education eligibility -- seriously emotionally disturbed -- requires a finding that a student exhibit one of five characteristics "over a long period of time and to a marked degree." Cal. Code Reg. Tit. 5 §3030(i). This determination necessarily requires a hearing officer to examine events, including behaviors, over a long period of time. Moreover, a district's child find obligations are continuous and ongoing, and an IEP is an annual document. Therefore, events over the course of the entire school year are relevant in the determination of whether the District fulfilled its child find obligation on and after April 6, 1995. The Hearing Officer will therefore consider evidence from the entire 1994-1995 school year in his disposition of the present issue, whether the district met its child find obligations with regard to STUDENT before her parents placed her in a residential program in Utah in April 1995.

Child Find During the 1994-1995 School Year

STUDENT enrolled at the Sierra School in Santa Clara at the beginning of the 1994-1995 school year. On September 26, 1994, after STUDENT had begun the fall semester at Sierra, Ms. PARENT had a conversation with Claire Hintergardt, the District's program specialist, regarding the progress of STUDENT's sibling, BROTHER, who had been receiving special education services from the District for some time. During this conversation, Ms. PARENT indicated that she was concerned about STUDENT's behaviors and that STUDENT was having problems. She did not specify what type of behaviors or problems. Ms. Hintergardt testified that she did not know if the "problem" was an unwanted pregnancy or some other family problems, and that she knew that STUDENT's younger brother was a source of embarrassment for STUDENT. Ms. Hintergardt asked Ms. PARENT if she wanted the District to assess STUDENT. Ms. PARENT declined and told Ms. Hintergardt that she and her husband wanted to "handle the problem themselves." (Footnote 15) District's Exhibit No. 15.

Ms. PARENT testified that she chose not to avail herself of the District's verbal offer to assess STUDENT because while STUDENT was at Hopkins, the vice principal, Ms. Berney, told Ms. PARENT there were "no other options available" other than social promotion to high school or repeating the eighth grade. She felt that because Ms. Berney worked on the junior high campus, she was in a better position to know what options were available for her daughter than a District representative such as Claire Hintergardt (in spite of the fact that she dealt with Ms. Hintergardt with regard to BROTHER's special education services). She stated that the reason she declined the offer to assess was that she had sought help for her son BROTHER "continuously" and that the District had assessed him and found him to be ineligible. She further testified that she was familiar with the District's assessment process.

STUDENT was reenrolled in the District on February 15, 1995, at Mission San Jose high school. Ms. PARENT testified that she recalled talking to a "counselor" when she enrolled STUDENT, but did not recollect telling the counselor or anyone at the District that STUDENT had been receiving counseling services from Marcia Ove since November 1994, or about her concerns regarding STUDENT's behavior.

JoAnn Dankwart, one of two registrars at Mission San Jose during February 1995, testified that, at that time, when a student such as STUDENT enrolled mid-year, the parent and student would meet with an administrator and that they were provided with an emergency card and a notice of parent rights, including the right to an assessment. Ms. Dankwart noted that there is no indication in STUDENT's cum file that she received her statement of parent rights.

STUDENT was disenrolled on March 20, 1995, while she was still in CPC Fremont. According to Ms. PARENT, she called someone at the school and told that person that her daughter was at CPC Fremont, and that that person told her that she had to do nothing more.

Based on the weight of the evidence, the Hearing Officer finds that the District fulfilled its child find obligations with regard to STUDENT during the 1994-1995 school year and that it was not required to initiate a referral for special education services. First, the most significant, undisputed fact is that the District actually offered to assess STUDENT in September 1994. Ms. PARENT's statement that she felt that STUDENT's vice principal at Hopkins Junior high was in the best position to know what "options" were available was disingenuous at best, and inconsistent with the fact that Ms. PARENT was already communicating with Claire Hintergardt with regard to BROTHER's special education program. Ms. PARENT's second reason for rejecting the offer, that she felt the assessment process had not worked adequately with regard to BROTHER, is irrelevant. In any event, the District had no duty to forward a written assessment plan to Ms. PARENT after her conversation with Ms. Hintergardt. Ms. PARENT did not specify what type of behaviors or problems she was experiencing with STUDENT. As such, the District lacked knowledge of sufficient behaviors or events which would have required it to initiate its own referral over Ms. PARENT's rejection.

Ms. PARENT was aware of her rights to request a free assessment for special education services. In addition to the fact that Claire Hintergardt offered to assess STUDENT, Ms. PARENT testified that she received the District's standard notice of parent's rights for STUDENT's two siblings every year for several years (although she did not recall receiving one for STUDENT during her eighth grade year), and those rights include the right to request a referral for special education services. She also attended annual IEP meetings for BROTHER beginning in 1993. At each of the IEP meetings she received a notice of her rights under the IDEA. Ms. PARENT actually made a referral for an assessment for STUDENT's brother BROTHER in January 1994. (Footnote 16) She knew and understood the assessment process.

The limited contacts with the District during the 1994-1995 school year did not create a duty on the part of the District to initiate its own assessment of STUDENT. There was no evidence that the District knew about the counseling STUDENT began receiving in November 1994, and Ms. PARENT did not inform anyone at the District regarding the counseling when STUDENT enrolled on February 15, 1995. Additionally, there is no evidence that anyone at the District knew that STUDENT was experiencing emotional problems from February 12, 1995, to March 20, 1995. In fact, Ms. PARENT testified that STUDENT was "happy" during the time she was at Mission San Jose high school. Finally, Ms. PARENT's conversation with the District where she informed an unidentified person that STUDENT was at CPC Fremont, alone, did not create a duty to assess STUDENT. (Footnote 17)

In sum, nothing that occurred up to the time that Petitioner's parents removed her from the District and sent her to Utah should have triggered an assessment. More importantly, STUDENT's parents had the opportunity to notify someone at the District about STUDENT's problems and behaviors. They were knowledgeable about their rights, especially their right to have STUDENT assessed. Accordingly, the District fulfilled its child find obligations during the 1994-1995 school year with regard to STUDENT.

Child Find During the 1995-1996 and 1996-1997 School Years

As stated above, STUDENT was out of the State from April 1995 through September 1997. Moreover, her family had no contacts with the District with regard to STUDENT from March 1995 to June 1997, when Ms. PARENT requested an assessment. Testimony of PARENT. Additionally, Ms. PARENT continued to interact with the District, including Claire Hintergardt, during this time period with regard to her son BROTHER's special education program, and Ms. PARENT never mentioned STUDENT's private, out-of-state placement. Testimony of Hintergardt.

The District also met its general proactive responsibilities during the 1995-1996 and 1996-1997 school years, including the extended school years. Sharon Wnuck, the District's program specialist since 1989, testified about the District's child find policies and procedures. She explained that the District provides parent right notices, which go home with each child every year. Ms. Wnuck also explained that the District maintains ongoing relationships with private schools in the area in an attempt to identify children in need of special education services. She further testified that every school in the District has had a student study team in place since 1989. Moreover, the District regularly contacts local hospitals in an effort to identify special education eligible students. Ms. Wnuck also indicated that she has met with CPC Fremont more than once with regard to a student and has attended exit meetings for students hospitalized at CPC Fremont, and that the District maintained a home-hospital program at CPC Fremont.

Based on the weight of the evidence, the Hearing Officer finds that the District met its child find obligations during the 1995-1996 and 1996-1997 school years.

In sum, the evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner was denied an appropriate education as a result of any failure by the District to identify and assess STUDENT. Moreover, the Hearing Officer finds that the District had policies and procedures in effect during the relevant time periods which satisfied the child find requirements of both State and federal law. As a result, Petitioner is not entitled to reimbursement for the sum of $116,124.81. (Footnote 18)

ISSUE NO. 2: Should the District reimburse STUDENT's parents the amount of $3,816.05, the cost of a 1997 evaluation at the Menninger Clinic in Kansas?

A Parent may be entitled to reimbursement for an independent assessment if, among other things, the parent disagrees with an assessment obtained by a public agency, and as a result, seek an independent assessment. Cal. Educ. Code § 56329(b).

In the present case, STUDENT's parents did not (and could not) disagree with the District's assessment. The District forwarded an assessment plan to STUDENT's parents on July 23, 1997. The parents signed the assessment plan and returned it on September 2, 1997. The independent assessment at the Menninger clinic was done from September 8 - 12, 1997. STUDENT did not return from the Menninger clinic until after September 12, 1997. Thereafter, the District assessed STUDENT. Given the order of the assessments, it is concluded that STUDENT's parents did not obtain the Menninger assessment because they disagreed with the District's assessment. Accordingly, the request for reimbursement is denied.

ISSUE NO. 3: Should the District and Mental Health reimburse STUDENT's parents for the unreimbursed portion of the Alta Bates/Herrick Hospital partial hospitalization program from October 1997 to December 1997?

Petitioner was unilaterally placed by her parents at Alta Bates/ Herrick hospital beginning approximately October 17, 1997, until December 31, 1997.

Both the District and Mental Health argue that reimbursement is not warranted because STUDENT's placement at Alta Bates was a medical service provided in a partial hospitalization program. Petitioner argues that the Alta Bates placement was both an educational placement and a "day treatment program, " not a "partial hospitalization program," because Mental Health's assessment reads "School: Herrick Partial Day Tx" in the header. Mental Health's Exhibit No. 6. Petitioner also argues that the Alta Bates placement was "educationally necessary" because it helped STUDENT emotionally and she eventually returned to school, where she flourished.

The Individuals with Disabilities act provides that counseling services and medical services (for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) may be related services if they are "required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education . . . ." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22). In Clovis Unified School District v. California Office of Administrative Hearings (Shorey) (9th Cir. 1990) 903 F.2d 635, the Ninth Circuit interpreted similar language in the Education of the Handicapped Act at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17). In that case, the court held that the analysis of whether a placement at an acute care psychiatric hospital was an excludable medical service or a related service "must focus on whether [the student's] placement may be considered necessary for educational purposes or is a response to medical, social, or emotional problems that is necessary quite apart from the learning process." Id. at 643. The Court considered several factors, including that the intensity of the student's program indicated that the services were focused on an underlying medical crisis. Id. at 645. The Court also considered the fact that the student received treatment at a medical facility, and that Congress chose not to include hospitalization explicitly as a related service under the Act. Id. at 645-646. Moreover, the Court noted that the placement itself "hardly provided [the student] with any educational services." See also, Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 119 S.Ct. 992 (1999); Irving Independent School District v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 104 S.Ct. 3371 (1984).

Elizabeth Uno, the AB 3632 coordinator for Alameda County Mental Health testified that Alta Bates is not an educational placement, but rather, a short-term, psychiatric treatment facility. She testified that the purpose of Alta Bates is to stabalize patients and that it does not provide long-term treatment and the educational component is very limited. She explained that, generally, students bring work to Alta Bates from their regular school program. Carolyn Novosel, the chief of service for children's specialized services for Alameda County, also testified that Alta Bates is a partial hospitalization program and that it is generally a placement where a child is evaluated and treated in order to stabalize his or her psychiatric condition. Ms. PARENT testified that STUDENT received no grades, credits or units while placed at Alta Bates. Moreover, the Alta Bates intake assessment indicates that the "target partial hospitalization goals" were as follows:

To assist patient with transition from residential to home, assist in IEP process, evaluate patient's current level of depression, assess for meds, work with family, related to patient's transition home/difficulties therein. District's Exhibit No. 45.

The great weight of the evidence, including the testimony of Ms. Uno, Ms. Novosel and Ms. PARENT, establishes that STUDENT's placement at Alta Bates was not an educational placement, but a partial hospitalization program aimed at aiding STUDENT with the transition from her out of state placements to her home. As was the case in Clovis, the focus of STUDENT's placement at Alta Bates was her medical crisis, services were provided at a hospital, and there was little if any educational component. Moreover, STUDENT received no grades, credits or units for any educational services she received at Alta Bates. While it may be true that, as Petitioner points out, the brief placement at Alta Bates accomplished more for STUDENT's mental health than over two years of residential treatment out of state, it was not "required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education."

Because Alta Bates was not a related service as anticipated by the IDEA and Clovis, Petitioner's parents are not entitled to reimbursement.

ORDER

All Petitioner's requests for relief are denied.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute: Respondent prevailed on all issues heard and decided.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i).

DATED: April 3, 2000 ____________________________ Trevor Skarda, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

1. Mr. PARENT, STUDENT's stepfather, was also present during the morning of the first hearing day.

2. Petitioner stipulated at the outset that her claim for reimbursement for the 1994-1995 school year is limited to costs incurred from April 1995 through the end of the extended school year (the request for due process was received by the Hearing Office on April 6, 1998). Petitioner was also privately placed during the first semester of the 1994-1995 school year, but does not seek reimbursement for that placement.

3. The issues listed here differ in both number and content from those noticed by Petitioner prior to the hearing. Changes were made for purposes of clarification.

4. Petitioner's claim for reimbursement for the 1997-1998 school year is limited to the "unreimbursed" portion of the cost of her placement at Alta Bates/ Herrick Hospital from October 1997 through December 1997. The remainder of this placement was funded by Petitioner's insurance. The "unreimbursed" portion of her totals "approximately $3000.00," according to Petitioner.

5. STUDENT received grades of A for all three trimesters in her computer literacy class.

6. Her report card reflects that she was absent seven days in four classes, and eight days in two classes.

7. Apparently there were many notices sent to STUDENT's home, some of which were intercepted by STUDENT and never reached her parents. Testimony of PARENT.

8. Along with other information forwarded to Mission San Jose high school, STUDENT was identified as an "attendance at-risk student" by Hopkins junior high school. District's Exhibit No. 9.

9.According to Ms. PARENT, STUDENT showed the "heart" to Ms. Ove during therapy. Neither Ms. Ove, nor the family therapist, Ms. Kelly, was called as witnesses. However, the admission documents from CPC Fremont indicate Ms. Ove had been treating STUDENT for depression "for several months" and that her treatment included prescriptions for the drugs Paxil and Desyrel. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 340.

10. STUDENT reported physical abuse by her father to the staff at CPC Fremont, and a report was made to Child Protective Services (CPS). Petitioner's Exhibit No. 330. According to Ms. PARENT, STUDENT's reports were exaggerated.

11. STUDENT was at the Menninger clinic in Kansas undergoing an evaluation from September 8 through the 12, 1997.

12. The District also had ongoing search and serve obligations during the period that STUDENT was out of state, which are discussed below.

13. In fact, Petitioner stipulated at the first day of hearing that she sought reimbursement only for STUDENT's out-of-state placement and related costs incurred after April 6, 1995 – exactly three years before she filed her due process hearing request.

14. California Education Code §56043(p) provides that "any request for a due process hearing . . . shall be filed within three years from the date the party knew or had reason to know of facts underlying the bases for the request . . . ."

15. On direct examination, Ms. PARENT was asked, "Do you recall if [Ms. Hintergardt] made you any offer for special education services for STUDENT?" She responded "yes" and explained that Ms. Hintergardt had offered to have STUDENT assessed for special education eligibility.

16. She testified at the hearing on redirect examination that she did not believe that because she knew that BROTHER was eligible and was involved in the assessment process for BROTHER, that she should have known that STUDENT also may have been eligible. Her attorney made a similar argument in his closing brief. Again, Ms. PARENT admitted on direct examination that she understood that Ms. Hintergardt was offering to initiate the assessment process to determine if STUDENT was eligible for special education. Whether she understood that the possible basis for eligibility was different is irrelevant.

17. It is unfortunate that a referral was not made by the District or the staff at CPC Fremont, especially considering that the District had a contact person at CPC Fremont at the time. However, the District's child find policies and procedures are not required to guarantee successful identification of every special education eligible child whose parents reside in the boundaries of the District; this is a goal, not a requirement. That goal is particularly difficult to obtain, as in the present case, where limited information (if any) is provided by parents who are fully aware and knowledgeable of the assessment process as well as the availability of services, and who, for personal reasons, choose not to avail themselves of those services.

18. Assuming arguendo, that the District can be held responsible for failing to identify and assess STUDENT before her parents unilaterally placed her out of State, Petitioner had to show that the services for which she seeks reimbursement were appropriate under the IDEA. School Comm. of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369, 105 S.Ct. 1996 (1985); Florence County School Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13, 114 S.Ct. 361 (1993). Although the Supreme Court has recognized that the parents' placement does not have to meet a standard as high as a school district must meet, the parents' placement must still meet the other requirements of the IDEA, such as providing a placement that addresses the student's needs and provides some educational benefit. Id. In the present case, the evidence provided at the hearing indicates only that STUDENT continued to struggle both emotionally and academically in both of her out-of-state placements; she was essentially expelled from both schools and her grades did not improve. As such, STUDENT did not receive educational benefit. Moreover, Petitioner provided only hearsay evidence with regard to whether the out-of-state placements provided her with some educational benefit. Hearsay evidence, alone, is insufficient to support a finding. California Administrative Code, Title 5, § 3082(b).