California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · October 2, 2000

Student v. Bellflower Unified School District

SEHO Case No. SN 449-00 · Hearing Officer Suzanne B. Brown

Bellflower Unified prevails: student with ADD and a written-expression discrepancy is not eligible for special education, and compensatory education is denied.

District prevailed on all issues

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Noted in the decision

The decision follows an earlier "Decision Re: Expedited Hearing" in this matter (May 1, 2000), which held that the student was entitled to stay put at the Intensive Learning Center; a later clarification specified Ms. Torres' third-grade class. Footnote 6 reports that federal courts then heard the stay put matter. The district court reportedly allowed a daily metal detector search, and the Ninth Circuit reportedly stayed that ruling.

Summary

The parents of a ten-year-old Bellflower Unified student who had just finished third grade filed for due process after the District tried to transfer him to another school following a disciplinary incident. An earlier expedited decision kept him in his third-grade class at the District's Intensive Learning Center under stay put. This decision addressed whether he was eligible for special education and whether he was owed compensatory education. The student had attention deficit disorder (ADD) and had brain surgeries in 1997. The District's assessment found him ineligible. A private psychologist, Dr. David Van Zak, found learning disabilities caused by brain damage.

Measured against the student's full-scale IQ, the Hearing Officer found a severe discrepancy in written expression that was caused by an attention-related processing disorder. She did not accept Dr. Van Zak's use of verbal IQ alone, which was the basis for his finding of discrepancies in reading and math. Still, the student did not qualify as having a specific learning disability because regular education could correct the discrepancy. His grades were passing, his reading reached grade level with a reading specialist, and his SAT-9 scores rose to the average range. He also did not qualify as other health impaired. His attention, balance, memory, and maturity issues did not limit his strength, vitality, or alertness in a way that hurt his school performance. Because he had not been eligible since his mother's September 1998 assessment request, compensatory education was denied.

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Why it matters

The decision shows how SEHO applied California's three-part specific learning disability test. A severe discrepancy and a processing disorder were not enough when grades, specialist reading help, and improving test scores showed regular education could correct the gap. It also shows the Hearing Officer choosing full-scale IQ over verbal IQ for the discrepancy calculation.

Issues and holdings

  1. District prevailedEligibility

    Issue 1. Is Petitioner eligible for special education (as a handicapped child), under the categories of specific learning disability or other health impairment?

    The student had a severe discrepancy in written expression caused by a processing disorder, but it could be corrected in regular education, so he was not eligible as SLD. His ADD and other conditions did not limit strength, vitality, or alertness in a way that hurt his educational performance, so he was not eligible as OHI.

  2. District prevailedChild find

    Issue 2. Is Petitioner entitled to compensatory education (for the District's alleged failure to find him eligible since September 1, 1998)?

    The student was not eligible during the 1998-99 or 1999-2000 school years, so he had no right to FAPE. Even if he had been eligible, the evidence did not show a need for compensatory education.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • All of Petitioner's claims for relief were denied.

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Key authorities

Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts; Student W. v. Puyallup School Dist.; Norton v. Orinda Union Elementary School District (SN 681-94), aff'd 168 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 1999); Student v. Long Beach Unified School District (SN 721-99); Education Code section 56337; Title 5 CCR section 3030(j) and (f)

People named in the decision

  • Vikki Rice, educational advocate for Student
  • Barbara Baxter, former educational advocate, witness for Student
  • Dr. David Van Zak, licensed psychologist (neuropsychology), independent assessor and expert witness for Student
  • Dr. Linda Smedley, director of student services / special education director, Bellflower Unified School District
  • Elizabeth Brown, school psychologist, District assessor, Bellflower Unified School District
  • Janan Hughes, teacher on special assignment; home instruction teacher, Bellflower Unified School District
  • JoAnne Cunningham, third-grade teacher, Bellflower Unified School District
  • Kathleen Torres, third-grade teacher (Student's teacher), Bellflower Unified School District, Intensive Learning Center
  • Lucia Tracy, reading specialist, Bellflower Unified School District, Intensive Learning Center
  • Rick Kemppainen, assistant superintendent, Bellflower Unified School District
  • Mrs. Gallegos, second-grade teacher, Bellflower Unified School District, Intensive Learning Center

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard in Bellflower, California, on July 17, 18, 19, 2000, and by telephone on July 24, 2000, before Suzanne Brown, Hearing Officer, California Special Education Hearing Office, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific.(Footnote 1)

Petitioner STUDENT (hereinafter referred to as Petitioner or STUDENT) was represented by attorney Tania Whiteleather. Also present on STUDENT's behalf were his parents, MOTHER and FATHER, and his educational advocate, Vikki Rice. Respondent Bellflower Unified School District (hereinafter referred to as District) was represented by attorney Trevin Sims. Also present on the District's behalf was Dr. Linda Smedley, District director of student services.

Petitioner called the following witnesses to testify at the hearing: MOTHER, Petitioner's mother; Barbara Baxter, former educational advocate; and Dr. David Van Zak, psychologist. The District called one witness to testify: Elizabeth Brown, District school psychologist.

Additionally, as discussed in more detail in the "Procedural Matters" section of this Decision, the Hearing Officer agreed to consider all testimonial and documentary evidence previously admitted during the two hearing days of the expedited portion of this case. Thus, the Hearing Officer also considers the testimony of Petitioner's witnesses at the expedited hearing: Janan Hughes, District teacher on special assignment; JoAnne Cunningham, District third-grade teacher; Kathleen Torres, District third-grade teacher; MOTHER, Petitioner's mother; Lucia Tracy, District reading specialist; and Rick Kemppainen, District assistant superintendent. At the expedited hearing, the District conducted its own examination of these witnesses, and did not call any additional witnesses to testify.

At the hearing on July 17, 18, 19 and 24, 2000, oral and documentary evidence was received. The record was left open for the submission of written closing briefs. Upon receipt of the briefs, the record was closed and the matter was submitted for decision.

ISSUES(Footnote 2)

(1) Is Petitioner eligible for special education?

(2) Is Petitioner entitled to compensatory education?

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Petitioner initially filed for due process hearing on March 17, 2000. Because the matter involved a disciplinary change of placement, the case was scheduled for an expedited hearing. The expedited hearing convened on April 6 and 7, 2000. Prior to that hearing, Petitioner submitted the following as his issues for hearing:

(1) Is Petitioner entitled to an evaluation for special education?

(2) Is Petitioner eligible for special education as a disabled child?

(3) Is Petitioner entitled to compensatory education?

(4) Is Petitioner entitled to remain in his current educational placement at the Intensive Learning Center?

At the expedited hearing, the parties agreed that Issue No. 1 was no longer an issue for hearing, because the District had agreed to evaluate Petitioner for special education. The Hearing Officer ruled that Issue No. 4 would be determined at the expedited hearing, while Issues No. 2 and 3 would be determined at a subsequent non-expedited hearing.

On May 1, 2000, the Hearing Officer issued her decision on the expedited portion of this case. On June 6, 2000, the hearing reconvened regarding the two non-expedited issues in the case. However, the parties indicated that, while the District had conducted the assessment that Petitioner had requested, the IEP team had not yet met to consider the assessment. In light of the circumstances, the Hearing Officer rescheduled the non-expedited portion of the hearing for July 17, 18 and 19, 2000.

At the beginning of the non-expedited portion of the hearing, the parties requested a ruling as to whether the evidence admitted during the expedited portion of the hearing would be part of the evidentiary record for the non-expedited portion of the decision. Because both hearings concerned the same case, the case was not bifurcated, and the same parties and hearing officer participated in both hearings, the Hearing Officer ruled that the testimonial and documentary evidence admitted during the expedited portion of the hearing would be considered part of the record for the non-expedited portion of the hearing.

During the hearing, an issue arose regarding the time period for which Petitioner sought compensatory education. Petitioner argued that he had alleged that the District had failed to fulfill its "child-find" obligations beginning in spring 1997, and that he was entitled to compensatory education to remedy the denial of free appropriate public education (FAPE) from spring 1997 to the present. Based on the language of Petitioner's issue statement, including proposed resolutions, and the initial discussion at hearing regarding those issues, the Hearing Officer ruled that Petitioner's claim for compensatory education dates back only until September 1, 1998, when MOTHER sent the District a letter requesting an assessment of STUDENT.(Footnote 3)

An additional evidentiary issue arose concerning admission of new documentary evidence. Attached to its closing brief, the District submitted documents containing general information about thinkFAST!, a series of mental tests that Petitioner's expert administered to STUDENT. Petitioner submitted a motion to deny admission of these documents on the ground that Petitioner had not received the documents five business days prior to hearing. (See Education Code § 56504.5(e)(7).) Regarding Petitioner's motion to deny admission of the thinkFAST! documents, it is necessary to note that, during telephone testimony, Dr. Van Zak discussed the contents of a chart of STUDENT's performance on the thinkFAST! tests. At that time, the Hearing Officer ruled that this chart could be admitted into evidence.(Footnote 4) However, the Hearing Officer did not admit any documents containing general information about thinkFAST!. Petitioner is correct that the general information about thinkFAST! was not provided five days prior to hearing as required by Education Code section 56504.5(e)(7). Petitioner's motion to deny admission of these documents is granted; the thinkFAST! excerpt materials attached to the District's closing brief are not admitted into evidence.

BACKGROUND FACTS

STUDENT has just turned ten years old. He lives with his parents and brothers within the boundaries of the Bellflower Unified School District. STUDENT has never been found eligible for special education. He has been diagnosed with attention deficit disorder (ADD) and has been taking the prescription medication Adderall to improve his attention. He has suffered from asthma, and has some problems with balance and coordination as a result of neurological problems and neurosurgeries in 1997.

From August 1996 until February 1997, STUDENT attended first grade at a private school, Long Beach Adventist. In early 1997, STUDENT was diagnosed with neurocysticerosis, a rare brain condition which caused lesions on his brain. From February to August 1997, STUDENT had a series of three brain surgeries. STUDENT did not attend school for the remainder of the 1996-97 school year, but did receive some home instruction from District teacher Janan Hughes. STUDENT's mother reported that after his surgeries, STUDENT demonstrated severe loss of skills in many areas, including reading, balance and coordination. He had difficulty running or skipping, and could no longer balance well enough to ride a bicycle. STUDENT's mother recalled that, initially after the first surgery in February 1997, STUDENT had forgotten his phone number and, while he could identify letters of the alphabet, he had forgotten what those letters meant.

At the beginning of the 1997-98 school year, STUDENT initially returned to school at Long Beach Adventist. Because he had missed significant portions of the 1996-97 school year, school personnel and STUDENT's parents agreed that he should attend first grade again. After several weeks, PARENTS decided that, at that point, STUDENT needed more resources than Long Beach Adventist could provide. In late fall 1997, STUDENT transferred into first grade at the District's Steven Foster Elementary School. On his first grade progress report, his marks in mathematics and language arts were in the "satisfactory" range and indicated that he was approximately on grade level.

In August 1998, the District opened its Intensive Learning Center (ILC), where STUDENT began second grade. At the beginning of the school year, District reading specialist Lucia Tracy tested STUDENT's reading abilities and determined that he was reading at a "preprimer" level. Ms. Tracy recommended that STUDENT receive reading specialist services, and for the rest of the school year STUDENT attended Ms. Tracy's small-group reading sessions.

On September 1, 1998, MOTHER wrote a letter to the ILC indicating that she had concerns about STUDENT's progress and requesting "an assessment for learning disabilities that may be the result of brain surgery." In response to MOTHER's letter, STUDENT's second-grade teacher, Mrs. Gallegos, made a referral to the student study team (SST). On September 24, 1998, MOTHER, Mrs. Gallegos and four other District instructors attended the SST meeting. After discussion, the team decided to try modifications to STUDENT's regular education environment. The modifications included changing his seat in the classroom and continuing his time with the reading specialist. The team did not refer him for special education.

In October 1998, Mrs. Gallegos sent PARENTS a notice of unsatisfactory progress, informing them that STUDENT was not reading at grade level. (District's Exh. 4.) On January 5, 1999, Mrs. Gallegos sent another notice. She wrote that "the quality of work (or lack of) the lack of attention, the incomplete assignments, I feel are primarily a result of him not feeling well. He continues to progress in reading, but not at grade level yet." (District's Exh.6.) However, on STUDENT's second-grade progress report, dated January 8, 1999, Mrs. Gallegos wrote that "STUDENT is reading at the 2nd grade level." (District's Exh. 21.)

In March 1999, the SST again met regarding STUDENT, although without either of his parents in attendance.(Footnote 5) The team notes state that "Writing is very poor - He often uses excuses to get out of work." (District's Exh.8.) Also in March 1999, PARENTS received another notice from Mrs. Gallegos, which indicated that STUDENT needed improvement in neatness, math and spelling. Mrs. Gallegos wrote that "STUDENT seems to be feeling fine in class and hasn't complained about any symptoms. He is having difficulty staying focused for periods of time and turning in quality work." (District's Exh. 7.)

Overall for his second-grade year, STUDENT's grades included one "Needs Improvement," in language arts during the first quarter of the year. For the rest of the year his language arts grades were in the "satisfactory" range, as were his grades in mathematics, social studies, science and health. (District's Exh. 21.) In June 1999, Ms. Tracy administered reading tests to STUDENT and determined that his reading ability had reached grade level; thus Ms. Tracy concluded that STUDENT should no longer remain in the reading specialist program. (Testimony of Ms. Tracy; District's Exh.34.)

In fall 1999, STUDENT entered Kathleen Torres' third-grade class at ILC. While STUDENT no longer received help from the reading specialist, he did attend Project Reach, a reading tutoring program for students with reading skill levels between the 20th and 35th percentiles. (Testimony of Ms. Tracy; Petitioner's Exh. X.)

Regarding STUDENT's third-grade year, Ms. Torres testified that STUDENT was within the average range of the class. However, STUDENT often did not turn in homework, resulting in several "homework alert" notices being sent home to his parents. On his progress reports for the first three quarters of the school year, STUDENT received grades in the "satisfactory" range in social science, science, health, fine arts and physical education, but received "needs improvement" marks in science lab. In both language arts and mathematics, he received several "below grade level" marks for the first quarter, but received "meets grade level" marks for the second and third quarters. Also during the second and third quarters, STUDENT received marks of "above grade level" in the language arts areas of "Writing Applications," "Listening and Speaking," and "Technology Integration."

In early March 2000, an incident occurred which resulted in STUDENT's suspension from school. STUDENT reportedly made a statement to two classmates to the effect that "I'm going to bring a shotgun and blow your heads off." The District suspended him for three days, and informed his parents that he would be transferred to another elementary school within the District. (District's Exhs. 13, 14; testimony of MOTHER.) STUDENT's parents did not agree to the transfer. Petitioner filed a due process request and stay put motion with the Hearing Office.

Prior to the hearing, the parties agreed that the District would assess STUDENT for special education eligibility. On April 6 and 7, 2000, the Hearing Office convened an expedited due process hearing regarding whether or not STUDENT was entitled to stay put in his placement at ILC. On May 1, 2000, the Hearing Office issued its decision on that matter, ruling that STUDENT was entitled to stay put at the ILC, pursuant to 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(k)(8)(A)(B) and 34 C.F.R. Section 300.527(a)(b). Pursuant to a subsequent motion for clarification, the Hearing Office later specified that the stay put placement was in Ms. Torres' third-grade class at ILC.(Footnote 6)

In May 2000, District school psychologist Elizabeth Brown and other District staff conducted the District's assessment of STUDENT. That assessment included evaluation in the areas of cognitive abilities, academic achievement, visual perception, motor development, speech and language functioning, social behavior and adaptive behavior. (Testimony of Ms. Brown; District's Exhs. 15, 37.) The assessment concurred with an earlier diagnosis that STUDENT has attention deficit disorder (ADD), but concluded that he was not eligible for special education. (District's Exh. 37; Petitioner's Exh. II.)

Also in May 2000, STUDENT's parents took him for an independent assessment by Dr. David Van Zak, a licensed psychologist with specialities in neuropsychology, forensic examination and psychopharmacology.(Footnote 7) Dr. Van Zak disagreed with the District's assessment and instead concluded that STUDENT had significant learning disabilities and organic brain damage as a result of his neurological condition and subsequent neurosurgeries. (Testimony of Dr. Van Zak; Petitioner's Exh. JJ.)

On June 19 and July 5, 2000, the IEP team convened to discuss the District's assessment. The IEP team also reviewed a letter from Dr. Van Zak regarding his findings from his evaluation of STUDENT. (Petitioner's Exhs. JJ, KK.) The IEP team disagreed with Dr. Van Zak's findings. District Special Education Director Dr. Linda Smedley wrote in the IEP team notes that "the District believes [STUDENT's range of test scores] is not indicative of a learning disability because he is functioning in the average range and at grade level and his area of weakness in written language can be addressed through the regular education curriculum." The IEP team concluded that STUDENT was not eligible for special education, but suggested developing a plan to provide modifications and supports under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. STUDENT's parents dissented from the team's determination. (Petitioner's Exh. KK.)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

(1) Is Petitioner eligible for special education as a handicapped child?

Under the amended Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and state law, children with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). (20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); Cal. Educ. Code § 56000.) A "child with a disability" is a child with mental retardation, hearing impairments, speech or language impairments, visual impairments, emotional disturbance, orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments or specific learning disabilities who, by reason thereof, needs instruction, services or both which cannot be provided with modification of the regular school program. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A); Education Code § 56026(a) and (b).)

In the present case, Petitioner argues that he is currently eligible for special education under the categories of specific learning disability (SLD) and other health impairment (OHI).(Footnote 8) Thus, this Decision will evaluate Petitioner's eligibility under those two categories.(Footnote 9)

Specific Learning Disability (SLD)

The IDEA defines "specific learning disability" as a "disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes involved in understanding or using language, spoken or written, which disorder may manifest itself in a imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or do mathematical calculations." (20 U.S.C. § 1401(26).) California Education Code section 56337 specifies that the following three requirements must be met in order to satisfy eligibility criteria for a specific learning disability (SLD):

(a) A severe discrepancy exists between the intellectual ability and achievement in one or more of the following academic areas: (1) Oral expression;

(2) Listening comprehension;

(3) Written expression;

(4) Basic reading skills;

(5) Reading comprehension;

(6) Mathematics calculation;

(7) Mathematics reasoning;

(b) The discrepancy is due to a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes and is not the result of environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantages. (c) The discrepancy cannot be corrected through other regular or categorical services offered within the regular instructional program.

Pursuant to section 56337(c), the existence of a severe discrepancy alone is not sufficient to qualify a student as eligible for special education due to an SLD. Rather, the local educational agency must also be unable to remediate the student's severe discrepancy within the regular instructional program. (See also Education Code § 56026(b); California Special Education Hearing Office, STUDENT v. Long Beach Unified School District, SN 721-99, Decision (2000); California Special Education Hearing Office, Norton v. Orinda Union Elementary School District, SN 681-94, Decision (1995), aff'd, 168 F.3d 500, 29 IDELR 1068 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 74 (1999).)

Addressing each subsection of section 56337, the Hearing Officer finds as follows:

(a) Severe discrepancy between intellectual ability and achievement

A severe discrepancy can be established either through a formula using standardized tests, by alternative means when standardized tests are considered invalid, or through determination by an IEP team that such a discrepancy exists. (Title 5 CCR § 3030(j)(4).) The existence of a severe discrepancy cannot be based solely upon a single score or product of scores, test or procedure. (Title 5 CCR § 3030(j)(4).)

When standardized tests are considered valid for a student, a severe discrepancy is established by the following:

[F]irst, converting into common standard scores, using a mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15, the achievement test score and the ability test score to be compared; second, computing the difference between these common standard scores; and third, comparing this computed difference to the standard criterion which is the product of 1.5 multiplied by the standard deviation of the distribution of computed differences of students taking these achievement and ability tests (Title 5 CCR § 3030(j)(4)(A).)

The calculation of this formula has commonly involved interpreting the required difference for a severe discrepancy between ability and achievement standard scores to be at least 22.5 points (1.5 multiplied by the standard deviation of 15), adjusted by 4 points, which is one standard error of measurement. This computed difference constitutes a severe discrepancy when "such discrepancy is corroborated by other assessment data which may include other tests, scales, instruments and work samples, as appropriate." (Id.) Additionally, the discrepancy cannot be primarily the result of limited school experience or poor school attendance. (Title 5 CCR § 3030(j)(5).)

In the present case, there was no allegation or evidence that standardized tests are invalid in measuring STUDENT's ability or achievement. Therefore, to determine if a severe discrepancy exists, STUDENT's scores on standardized intellectual testing can be compared with his scores on achievement testing.

As part of the District's assessment, STUDENT took one test of cognitive abilities, the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Third Edition (WISC-III), and three tests of academic achievement: the Wechsler Individual Achievement Test (WIAT), the Peabody Individual Achievement Test-Revised (Peabody), and the Woodcock-Johnson-Revised (WJ-R). On the WISC-III, STUDENT scored in the high average range, with a verbal IQ of 123, a performance IQ of 110, and a full-scale IQ of 118. (Testimony of Elizabeth Brown; District's Exh. 37.) District school psychologist Elizabeth Brown explained that comparison between STUDENT's full-scale IQ of 118 and his scores on the academic achievement tests did not result in severe discrepancies of 22.5 points or greater. (Id.)

Ms. Brown acknowledged that STUDENT's scores of 82 on the WIAT written expression subtest, 81 on the WIAT writing composite and 91 on the WJ-R broad written language composite did result in severe discrepancies when compared with STUDENT's full-scale IQ of 118. However, Ms. Brown explained that STUDENT's score of 99 on the Peabody written language composite did not create a severe discrepancy when compared with STUDENT's full scale IQ. Ms. Brown explained that the Peabody written language subtest appeared to be a better gauge of STUDENT's written language abilities than the WIAT writing test. On this point, Ms. Brown wrote that "STUDENT appears to perform better on writing tests which provide a visual rather than a verbal prompt. He was provided with visual prompts on both the WJ-R and the [Peabody]."

Regarding STUDENT's scores of 87 on both the Peabody and WIAT spelling tests, Ms. Brown explained that spelling scores are not used to determine a severe discrepancy pursuant to Education Code section 56337(a). Ms. Brown further explained that the single discrepancy with the WIAT Writing Composite score did not indicate an SLD, because state law prohibits making any eligibility determination based solely on one test score.

In contrast, Petitioner's expert, Dr. David Van Zak, testified that STUDENT does manifest several severe discrepancies when comparing his achievement test scores with his verbal IQ. Dr. Van Zak asserted that the verbal IQ has higher reliability than the full-scale IQ, because the verbal IQ skills are widely distributed throughout the brain and are a purer measure of cognitive ability. Dr. Van Zak explained that, when compared with STUDENT's verbal IQ, STUDENT's achievement test scores demonstrate severe discrepancies in several areas. Those discrepancies included those evidenced by STUDENT's scores of 87 on the WIAT spelling subtest, 82 on the WIAT written expression subtest, 81 on the WIAT writing composite, 87 on the Peabody spelling subtest, 96 on the WJ-R letter-word identification subtest, 91 on the WJ-R dictation subtest, 93 on the WJ-R writing samples subtest, and 91 on the WJ-R broad written language composite. Dr. Van Zak stated his conclusion that STUDENT has specific learning disabilities in reading, writing and math.

Regarding the existence of a severe discrepancy, neither party's position is entirely persuasive. The District's position that no severe discrepancy exists is unconvincing because, even using the full-scale IQ, STUDENT manifested severe discrepancies on the WJ-R dictation subtest, the WJ-R broad written language composite, the WIAT written expression subtest and the WIAT writing composite. Even considering Ms. Brown's explanation that the Peabody and WJ-R writing subtests are better measures of STUDENT's ability than the WIAT writing subtests, STUDENT's score on the WJ-R broad written language composite still produced a severe discrepancy. Moreover, while Ms. Brown is correct that Education Code section 56337(a) does not specifically list spelling as an academic area which can constitute the basis for a severe discrepancy, spelling is an essential component of written expression and thus warrants consideration when determining the existence of a severe discrepancy in that area. In light of all of these factors, it is evident that STUDENT has a severe discrepancy in written expression pursuant to Education Code section 56337(a)(3).

On the other hand, Petitioner has failed to prove that he manifests severe discrepancies in reading and math. Dr. Van Zak's testimony that such severe discrepancies exist was based on use of the verbal IQ as the measure of STUDENT's cognitive ability.(Footnote 10) Dr. Van Zak argued that the verbal IQ should be the measure of cognitive ability because it has higher reliability. Dr. Van Zak stated that the full scale IQ has statistical reliability of .97, while the verbal IQ has statistical reliability of .99. Yet Ms. Brown explained that utilization of the full scale IQ provides a more complete picture than the verbal IQ alone. In fact, Dr. Van Zak also testified that the full scale IQ is useful when trying to obtain an overall view of the student's cognitive abilities. Considering the relatively strong statistical reliability of the full scale IQ score, the Hearing Officer agrees that use of the full scale IQ will provide the most complete view of STUDENT's cognitive ability. Thus, utilizing the full-scale IQ as the measure of cognitive ability, only the discrepancy in written expression constitutes a severe discrepancy pursuant to section 56337(a).

(b) Discrepancy is due to a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes and is not the result of environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantages

For purposes of this subsection, basic psychological processes include "attention, visual processing, auditory processing, sensory-motor skills, cognitive abilities including association, conceptualization and expressive." (Title 5 CCR § 3030(j)(1).) In the present case, the evidence clearly established that STUDENT has an attentional disorder. (Testimony of Ms. Brown, Dr. Van Zak, MOTHER; Petitioner's Exh. GG; District's Exh. 37.) He has been diagnosed with attention deficit disorder and takes medication for this condition. (Id.) Moreover, Dr. Van Zak testified that STUDENT has damage in the brain's left temporal lobe, cortex, cardate and basal ganglia, and that such damage is the likely cause of STUDENT's discrepancy between ability and achievement. Additionally, neither party contends, nor does any evidence suggest, that the discrepancy is due to environmental, cultural or economic disadvantages. (District's Exh. 37.) In light of all of these factors, Petitioner has met the requirements of section 56337(b).

(c) Discrepancy cannot be corrected through other regular or categorical services offered within the regular instructional program

The testimony of STUDENT's third-grade teacher supports the District's position that STUDENT's severe discrepancy can be corrected through the regular instructional program. Mrs. Torres testified that STUDENT was within the average range of the third-grade class. Mrs. Torres stated that STUDENT often was not motivated to do his written work, but he would do good work to obtain rewards that he liked. Mrs. Torres reported that STUDENT's class performance and homework completion improved after she and PARENTS instituted a reward system and a communication system of sending a note from teacher to parent every day.

STUDENT's grades generally support Mrs. Torres' position. On his progress reports, STUDENT received grades in the "satisfactory" range in social science, science, health, fine arts and physical education. STUDENT also received some marks of "above grade level" in the social science area of "Physical and Human Geography" and the language arts areas of "Writing Applications," "Listening and Speaking," and "Technology Integration." STUDENT received only a few "needs improvement" marks, including his "effort" grades for the first quarter in both language arts and mathematics, both of which improved to "meets grade level" for the second and third quarters.(Footnote 11)

Similarly, during STUDENT's second-grade year, he received passing grades. STUDENT received only one "needs improvement" grade, in language arts during the first quarter of the year. For the rest of the year, his language arts grades were in the "satisfactory" range, as were his grades in mathematics, social studies, science and health. (District's Exh. 21.) While STUDENT's second-grade teacher did issue notices of unsatisfactory progress, STUDENT's grades and progress with the reading specialist indicate that his academic situation improved as the school year progressed. (See testimony of Ms. Tracy; District's Exhs. 26, 27, 18, 29, 30, 31.) At the end of the school year, the reading specialist determined that STUDENT's reading was no longer below grade level. (Id.; District's Exh. 34.) Such academic improvement further indicates that STUDENT was able to make progress in the regular education program despite his severe discrepancy in written expression.

STUDENT's SAT-9 scores also support the argument that he does not need special education services to address his severe discrepancy. At the end of third grade, STUDENT's SAT-9 national percentile scores were as follows:

Total Reading 57-5 Total Mathematics 66-6 Vocabulary 78-7 Problem Solving 76-6 Reading Comp. 45-5 Procedures 51-5

Language 34-4 Spelling 29-4

As Mrs. Torres noted in her testimony, these scores were in the average to above average range. In the "content clusters" of each subject tested, the SAT-9 student report indicated that STUDENT's score was below average in structural principles of spelling, sight words and math number facts, but his scores were average or above average in the other thirty content clusters. (District's Exh. 39.) These strong scores are also significant considering Dr. Van Zak's testimony that STUDENT might not do well on the SAT-9 because he might not be able to finish under the time limits and because ADD students tend to be more distracted when taking tests in a group than when taking tests alone.

These SAT-9 scores also demonstrated improvement over STUDENT's SAT-9 scores from the previous school year. In second-grade, STUDENT received SAT-9 scores of 10th percentile in language, 9th percentile in spelling and 19th percentile in word study skills. The remainder of his scores were in the average range. The improvement in language and spelling, areas strongly related to STUDENT's severe discrepancy in written expression, supports the position that STUDENT is able to correct his severe discrepancy without special education supports or services.

In contrast to this evidence, Dr. Van Zak testified that it is medically necessary that STUDENT receive special education, and that STUDENT will not be able to make sufficient educational progress without one-to-one instruction. Dr. Van Zak testified extensively about his conclusions regarding signs and symptoms of brain damage that STUDENT manifests. Indeed, Dr. Van Zak asserted that STUDENT's brain damage has created absolute limits on his learning which he may not be able to go beyond. Dr. Van Zak acknowledged that STUDENT is very bright and may develop strategies to compensate in some areas, but advised that those strategies will likely not work as STUDENT advances to higher grades.

However, the Hearing Officer considers that STUDENT's recent academic progress indicates that, at this point, he remains able to learn and to remediate his severe discrepancy within the regular education system. Moreover, while Dr. Van Zak is knowledgeable in neuropsychology, he has not actually observed STUDENT function in a classroom with other students. Regarding Dr. Van Zak's predictions about STUDENT's progress in the upper grades, STUDENT's special education eligibility beyond the current school year is not yet at issue and thus is not addressed in this Decision.

As for other evidence suggesting that Petitioner needs special education to address his severe discrepancy, Petitioner submitted his scores from a recent administration of the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS). (Petitioner's Exh. NN.) The ITBS scores were somewhat lower than his scores on the SAT-9; his scores ranged from a low of 1.5 grade level equivalent on punctuation to a high of 4.6 grade level equivalent on vocabulary. Other than the punctuation score, overall his scores were distributed somewhat evenly among second, third and fourth grade level equivalents. His average score on all of the ITBS subtests created a composite grade equivalent of 3.4, a few months behind his actual grade level at the time he took the test.

In any event, STUDENT's scores on the ITBS do not contradict evidence of his academic progress in regular education. First, the ITBS scores are not particularly reliable evidence, given that the test administrator did not testify and little other evidence was provided regarding the nature of ITBS or the conditions when STUDENT took the test. Moreover, STUDENT's ITBS scores appear to be in the average range, only a few months behind grade level.(Footnote 12) The ITBS scores do not contradict the conclusion that STUDENT is able to correct his severe discrepancy without special education.

Thus, the evidence has established that STUDENT has a severe discrepancy in written expression which is due to a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes. However, the evidence further established that STUDENT's severe discrepancy can be corrected within the regular instructional program. Therefore, STUDENT does not qualify as eligible for special education based on a specific learning disability.

Other Health Impaired (OHI)

A student meets the eligibility criteria for OHI when the student has:

limited strength, vitality, or alertness, due to chronic or acute health problems, including but not limited to a heart condition, cancer, leukemia, rheumatic fever, chronic kidney disease, cystic fibrosis, severe asthma, epilepsy, lead poisoning, diabetes, tuberculosis and other communicable infectious diseases, and hematological disorders such as sickle cell anemia and hemophilia which adversely affects a pupil's educational performance....such physical disabilities shall not be temporary in nature....

(Title 5 CCR § 3030(f).)

Additionally, as with any special education eligibility category, the student's impairment must require "instruction, services or both which cannot be provided with modification of the regular education program." (Education Code § 56026(b).)

As discussed previously in this decision, Petitioner has been diagnosed with ADD and takes the prescription medication Adderall to improve his attention. STUDENT also has balance and coordination problems, which came into existence only after his brain surgeries. MOTHER described how STUDENT has difficulty with running or dribbling a basketball and is unable to balance well enough to roller skate or ride a bicycle or skateboard. MOTHER explained that when STUDENT plays in Park league baseball, he can throw the ball but has problems running. Dr. Van Zak asserted that STUDENT's balance and coordination problems are due to brain damage in the basal ganglia.

MOTHER also stated that STUDENT has demonstrated memory problems since his brain surgeries. MOTHER described how STUDENT now often forgets things and does not learn from experience; MOTHER said that she will scold or punish him for something, but he will later repeat the same behavior and not understand why he is again being punished. Dr. Van Zak testified to his opinion that STUDENT has processing problems in his short-term memory, and that those problems are a symptom of brain damage.

Additionally, both MOTHER and Mrs. Torres testified that STUDENT is immature for his age and grade. Mrs. Torres acknowledged that STUDENT was the most immature student in his third-grade class. Dr. Van Zak testified that he believes STUDENT has difficulty with emotional regulation due to brain damage in the cardate nucleus.

The issue for determination is thus whether STUDENT's health problems and ADD result in "limited strength, vitality or alertness" that adversely affect his educational performance. Regarding his ADD, STUDENT has demonstrated some inattention in the classroom. (District's Exh. 7.) However, the evidence established that his inattention was not unusual for his age and did not significantly interfere with his classroom performance. (See testimony of Mrs. Torres; District's Exhs. 21, 22.) There is no persuasive evidence that STUDENT's ADD constitutes "limited strength, vitality or alertness" that adversely affects his educational performance.

Similarly, STUDENT's problems with balance, coordination, memory and emotional regulation do not meet the criteria of section 3030(f). None of the testimony or documentary evidence indicated that these problems caused STUDENT to have limited strength, vitality or alertness in the classroom, doing homework, or on any other occasion that would adversely affect his educational performance. Thus, STUDENT does not meet the criteria for special education eligibility due to OHI.

(2) Is Petitioner entitled to compensatory education?

Compensatory education is an equitable remedy which may be available when a local educational agency has denied a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to a student eligible for special education services. (Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 360 (1985); Student W. v. Puyallup School Dist., 31 F.3d 1489 (9th Cir. 1994).) Petitioner has never been found eligible for special education and this Decision likewise has not found him eligible under either of his proposed eligibility categories. Thus, Petitioner currently has no right to receive a FAPE.

However, Petitioner also alleges that the District should have found him eligible previously, and that he is entitled to compensatory education for the District's failure to provide him with a FAPE during past school years when he was eligible. As discussed in the "Procedural Matters" section of this Decision, the Hearing Officer ruled that Petitioner stated his claim for past eligibility beginning on September 1, 1998, when his mother sent the District a written request for an assessment.

The discussion under Issue No. 1 analyzes Petitioner's classroom performance and educational experiences during both the 1998-99 and 1999-2000 school years. As detailed above regarding SLD eligibility, the evidence established that Petitioner was able to perform within the average range in his classroom despite his severe discrepancy in written expression. During his second-grade and third-grade years, Petitioner earned passing grades and demonstrated improvement in several academic areas.

Regarding past OHI eligibility, the only evidence of limited strength, vitality or alertness during his second-grade year is Mrs. Gallegos' notation that she felt that STUDENT's "quality of work (or lack of) the lack of attention, the incomplete assignments...are primarily a result of him not feeling well." (District's Exh. 6.) However, two months later Mrs. Gallegos wrote that "STUDENT seems to be feeling fine in class and hasn't complained about any symptoms. " (District's Exh. 7.)

As discussed under Issue No. 1, there is no persuasive evidence that Petitioner suffered the "limited strength, vitality or alertness" that would render him eligible as OHI. In light of all circumstances, Petitioner has not established that he was eligible due to an OHI during the 1998-99 or 1999-2000 school years.

Moreover, even if Petitioner was previously eligible pursuant to either eligibility category, there is insufficient evidence to establish that he needs compensatory education to remedy any denials of FAPE during the 1998-99 or 1999-2000 school years. In light of all evidence, Petitioner is not entitled to receive compensatory education.

ORDER

All of Petitioner's claims for relief are denied.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to California Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this requirement:

(1) Is Petitioner eligible for special education?

The District prevailed on this issue.

(2) Is Petitioner entitled to compensatory education?

The District prevailed on this issue.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. California Education Code § 56505(i).

DATED: October 2, 2000 ___________________________________ Suzanne B. Brown Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

Footnote 1: This matter also convened briefly in Bellflower, California, on June 6, 2000. However, the hearing was rescheduled to allow the IEP team time to meet regarding the recent assessment of Petitioner. Thus, the Hearing Officer did not hear any witnesses or admit any evidence on June 6.

Footnote 2: Petitioner's closing brief raises new issues, including allegations of procedural violations, which were not identified in his statement of issues for hearing and were not identified as issues during discussions on the first day of this hearing. Accordingly, this Decision does not address those new issues. Moreover, it is unclear what proposed resolution Petitioner seeks regarding the new issues he has alleged. Additionally, some of Petitioner's new issues, such as his allegation of a stay put violation, were addressed fully in this matter's "Decision Re: Expedited Hearing," issued on May 1, 2000.

Footnote 3: It is notable that in the "Decision Re: Expedited Hearing" issued in this matter on May 1, 2000, the Hearing Office considered whether, during the period between March 1997 and March 2000, STUDENT's behavior or performance demonstrated that he needed special education services. Based in part on the testimony of his home study teacher, Janan Hughes, the Hearing Officer concluded that the evidence failed to establish that STUDENT's behavior or performance demonstrated a need for special education services during that period.

Footnote 4: Neither party ever submitted this chart to the Hearing Office. Thus, the chart was never admitted into evidence.

Footnote 5: MOTHER testified that she had not been notified of the SST meeting.

Footnote 6: The parties indicated at hearing that federal courts subsequently heard the matter of STUDENT's stay put placement. Reportedly, the federal district court ruled that the District could conduct a metal detector search prior to admitting STUDENT into Mrs. Torres' classroom each day, but reportedly the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stayed that ruling. (Petitioner's Closing Brief; testimony of MOTHER.)

Footnote 7: Petitioner has not requested reimbursement for Dr. Van Zak's assessment. Testimony at hearing indicated that the cost of the assessment was paid by Petitioner's health insurance.

Footnote 8: Petitioner has not argued that he is eligible for special education under the category of traumatic brain injury. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(12).) While California law does not specifically identify "traumatic brain injury" as an eligibility category, a student who meets the federal definition qualifies as eligible for special education pursuant to California Education Code section 56056(a). Footnote 9: Petitioner also argues that the District determined prior to the IEP meeting that STUDENT was ineligible for special education. (See testimony of Ms. Rice.) However, the evidence was insufficient to establish that such predetermination occurred or that the IEP team failed to allow the parents and other team members to participate fully in the team's eligibility determination.

Footnote 10: Additionally, Dr. Van Zak testified that the thirteen-point discrepancy between STUDENT's performance IQ and verbal IQ was clinically significant. The District presented no evidence to the contrary on this point. The Hearing Officer is persuaded that this discrepancy may have some level of statistical significance. (See also Kaufman, Intelligent Testing With The WISC-III, (1994), p. 102.) However, neither Dr. Van Zak's testimony nor any other evidence established that this discrepancy between the performance and verbal IQs constitutes a severe discrepancy between cognitive ability and academic achievement pursuant to Education Code section 56337(a), nor that the thirteen-point difference warranted utilization of the verbal IQ as the sole measure of STUDENT's cognitive ability. (Cf. Norton v. Orinda Union Elementary School District, supra at 13-14.)

Footnote 11: STUDENT's math scores declined to "approaching grade level" for the fourth quarter of the school year, although his fourth quarter grades are likely less indicative of his classroom performance, due to the interruptions and upheaval in his school attendance that quarter.

Footnote 12: While Petitioner argues that his grade level should be considered as if he were one grade ahead, because he repeated first grade, such argument ignores that he repeated first grade in large part because he missed attending several months of school that year. Moreover, STUDENT's birthday is in September, so he is only a few months older than his classmates. Given that some elementary schools outside California require students to be five years old before entering kindergarten, other students in STUDENT's class may have birthdays shortly after STUDENT's.