California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · May 1, 2000

Student v. Bellflower Unified School District

SEHO Case No. SN 449-00 · Hearing Officer Suzanne B. Brown

Bellflower Unified must return a not-yet-eligible student to the Intensive Learning Center under stay put after a disciplinary transfer.

Split decision: student prevailed on 1 of 4 issues

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Noted in the decision

This is the expedited stay put phase of a bifurcated case. The decision notes that eligibility and compensatory education were to be heard in a non-expedited hearing set for May 18–19 and June 6–7, 2000, or alternatively June 6–9, 2000.

Summary

A nine-year-old third grader at Bellflower Unified's Intensive Learning Center (ILC) had never been found eligible for special education. After he made a threatening statement to classmates in March 2000, the District suspended him and moved to transfer him to another elementary school. His parents filed for due process and asked that he "stay put" at the ILC. The case was split. This expedited decision addressed only stay put. Eligibility and compensatory education were set for a later hearing.

Under the 1997 IDEA amendments, a student not yet found eligible can claim stay put only if the district knew of a possible disability before the misconduct. In September 1998, the mother had asked in writing for an assessment for learning disabilities following her son's brain surgeries. The District admitted this letter met two of the "basis of knowledge" criteria. Hearing Officer Suzanne Brown found that the other two criteria were not met: the student's reading had reached grade level, and no teacher had referred him for special education.

The District relied on an exception for districts that decide not to assess and give proper written notice. The Hearing Officer held the exception did not apply. The student study team's notes never said the District would not assess, and the parent received no procedural safeguards. The District was ordered to return the student to the ILC immediately while the case was pending.

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Why it matters

The decision shows how SEHO applied the 1997 IDEA "basis of knowledge" rule to a student disciplined before any eligibility finding. A parent's written request for an assessment was enough to trigger stay put. A student study team decision to monitor the student instead, without written notice and procedural safeguards, did not defeat it. The Hearing Officer also noted that California law may require an assessment once a referral is made.

Issues and holdings

  1. Dismissed / withdrawnAssessment

    Issue 1 (original statement of issues). Is Petitioner entitled to an evaluation for special education?

    Removed from the hearing because both parties agreed the District had already agreed to evaluate Student.

  2. Not reachedEligibility

    Issue 2 (original statement of issues). Is Petitioner eligible for special education as a handicapped child?

    Not part of the expedited hearing; set for the non-expedited hearing in May/June 2000.

  3. Not reachedChild find

    Issue 3 (original statement of issues). Is Petitioner entitled to compensatory education?

    Not part of the expedited hearing; set for the non-expedited hearing in May/June 2000.

  4. Student prevailedStay put

    Issue 4 (heard as the sole Issue 1). Is Petitioner entitled to remain in his current educational placement at the Intensive Learning Center during the pendency of due process proceedings?

    The District had a basis of knowledge of a disability because the parent asked in writing for an assessment. The 34 C.F.R. 300.527(c) exception did not apply because the District gave no proper written notice of its decision not to assess and no procedural safeguards. Student may stay put at the ILC.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • Placement ordered. District shall immediately return Student to his placement at the Intensive Learning Center until resolution of this due process proceeding, unless the parties agree otherwise.

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Key authorities

20 U.S.C. § 1415(j); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(8); 34 C.F.R. § 300.527; 34 C.F.R. § 300.503; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3021; Cal. Education Code § 56505(d); Cal. Education Code § 56029; Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Education (1st Cir. 1984); SEHO SN 1357-97 (Stanislaus County Office of Education and Ceres Unified); SEHO SN 754-98 (San Antonio Union School District)

People named in the decision

  • Janan Hughes, District teacher on special assignment; provided home instruction, Bellflower Unified School District
  • JoAnne Cunningham, District third-grade teacher; student study team participant, Bellflower Unified School District
  • Kathleen Torres, Student's third-grade teacher, Bellflower Unified School District, Intensive Learning Center
  • Lucia Tracy, District reading specialist, Bellflower Unified School District
  • Rick Kemppainen, District assistant superintendent, Bellflower Unified School District
  • Linda Smedley, District director of student services, Bellflower Unified School District
  • Mrs. Gallegos, Student's second-grade teacher; made student study team referral, Bellflower Unified School District, Intensive Learning Center
  • Vikki Rice, Educational advocate for Student
  • Tania Whiteleather, Attorney for Student
  • Trevin Sims, Attorney for District

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard in Bellflower, California, on April 6 and 7, 2000, before Suzanne Brown, Hearing Officer, California Special Education Hearing Office, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific.

Petitioner STUDENT (hereinafter referred to as Petitioner or STUDENT) was represented by attorney Tania Whiteleather. Also present on STUDENT's behalf were his parents, MR. AND MRS. PARENT, and his educational advocate, Vikki Rice. Respondent Bellflower Unified School District (hereinafter referred to as District) was represented by attorney Trevin Sims. Also present on the District's behalf was Linda Smedley, District director of student services.

Petitioner called the following witnesses to testify at the hearing: Janan Hughes, District teacher on special assignment; JoAnne Cunningham, District third-grade teacher; Kathleen Torres, District third-grade teacher; MOTHER, Petitioner's mother; Lucia Tracy, District reading specialist; and Rick Kemppainen, District assistant superintendent. The District conducted its own examination of these witnesses, and did not call any additional witnesses to testify.

Oral and documentary evidence was received. At the conclusion of the hearing, each party presented an oral closing argument. The Hearing Officer permitted each party to submit an optional written closing brief. The record was left open for the submission of such closing briefs; only the District chose to submit a closing brief. Upon receipt of the District's brief on April 11, 2000, the record was closed and the matter was submitted for decision.

ISSUE

(1) Is Petitioner entitled to remain in his current educational placement at the Intensive Learning Center during the pendency of due process proceedings?

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Petitioner's statement of issues for hearing initially included the following four issues:

(1) Is Petitioner entitled to an evaluation for special education?

(2) Is Petitioner eligible for special education as a handicapped child?

(3) Is Petitioner entitled to compensatory education?

(4) Is Petitioner entitled to remain in his current educational placement at the Intensive Learning Center?

On the first day of hearing, prior to witness testimony, the participants in the hearing discussed the identification of issues. Both parties concurred that the District had agreed to evaluate Petitioner for special education; thus the Hearing Officer ruled that Issue No. 1 was no longer an issue for hearing. Regarding Issues No. 2 and 3, the Hearing Officer ruled that those issues were not the subject of the expedited hearing. Both parties agreed that Issues No. 2 and 3 would be addressed at the non-expedited portion of the hearing, which will occur in May and June, 2000. (Footnote 1) Accordingly, the Hearing Officer ruled that Issue No. 4 remained the only issue to be adjudicated at the expedited hearing. Issue No. 4 solely concerns Petitioner's "stay put" placement during the pendency of the due process proceedings. Petitioner had previously made a prehearing motion for the Hearing Office to order that he be permitted to stay put at the Intensive Learning Center; at that time the Hearing Office ruled that an evidentiary hearing was required to determine the issue.

BACKGROUND FACTS

STUDENT is a nine-year-old boy who lives with his parents and brothers within the boundaries of the Bellflower Unified School District. STUDENT has never been found eligible for special education.

From August 1996 until February 1997, STUDENT attended first grade at a private school. STUDENT was diagnosed with neurocysticerosis, a rare brain condition which caused lesions on his brain. From February to August 1997, STUDENT had a series of three brain surgeries. STUDENT did not attend school for the remainder of the 1996-97 school year, but did receive some home instruction from District teacher Janan Hughes. STUDENT's mother reported that, after his surgeries, STUDENT demonstrated severe loss of skills in many areas, including reading, balance and coordination.

In fall 1997, STUDENT's parents enrolled him in first grade within the District. For the 1997-98 school year, STUDENT attended first grade at the District's Steven Foster Elementary School. In August 1998, the District opened its Intensive Learning Center (ILC), where STUDENT began second grade. At the beginning of the school year, District reading specialist Lucia Tracy tested STUDENT's reading abilities and determined that he was reading at a "preprimer" level. Ms. Tracy recommended that STUDENT receive reading specialist services, and for the rest of the school year STUDENT attended Ms. Tracy's small-group reading instruction.

On September 1, 1998, Mrs. PARENT wrote a letter to the ILC indicating that she had concerns about STUDENT's progress and requesting "an assessment for learning disabilities that may be the result of brain surgery." In response to Mrs. PARENT's letter, STUDENT's second-grade teacher, Mrs. Gallegos, made a referral to the student study team (SST). On September 24, 1998, the SST met to discuss STUDENT. Mrs. PARENT and Mrs. Gallegos both attended the meeting, along with four other District instructors. During the meeting, the SST discussed Mrs. PARENT's letter, and discussed the possibility of assessing STUDENT for special education. After discussion, the team decided to try modifications to STUDENT's regular education environment. The modifications included changing his seat in the classroom and continuing his time with the reading specialist. The team agreed to monitor STUDENT's progress.

The SST meeting produced a one-page SST Summary Sheet, which lists the following actions to be taken: "make sure his seating is best for his hearing...monitor progress...refer to see reading specialist." (Petitioner's Exh. G.) The SST Summary Sheet does not make any reference to assessment for special education, and no provisions for assessment were made. District teachers explained that they had discussed at the SST meeting that they would not refer STUDENT for an assessment yet, but instead would monitor how he progressed using the regular education modifications to his program. (Testimony of Ms. Hughes, Ms. Cunningham.) Mrs. PARENT testified that she did not understand that STUDENT would not be assessed for special education, and explained that she did not really understand what an assessment entailed.

The SST met one additional time during STUDENT's second-grade year, in March 1999. Mrs. PARENT did not attend the meeting. Mrs. PARENT testified that she did not receive any notice of the meeting; the evidence suggests that the practice of District teachers is to send meeting notices home with students, to be hand-delivered to the parents. (See testimony of Ms. Hughes, Mrs. PARENT.)

In June 1999, Ms. Tracy administered reading tests to STUDENT and determined that his reading ability had reached grade level; thus Ms. Tracy concluded that STUDENT should no longer remain in the reading specialist program. In fall 1999, STUDENT entered Kathleen Torres' third-grade class at ILC. Ms. Torres testified that STUDENT was within the average range of the third-grade class. Ms. Torres explained that she spoke with Mrs. PARENT regarding tactics for motivating STUDENT and regarding structuring a system to reward him for good work.

In November 1999, the SST met again regarding STUDENT, and again STUDENT's parents were not in attendance. Mrs. PARENT testified that the night prior to the 7:30 a.m. meeting, she discovered the notice of the SST meeting in STUDENT's backpack. (Footnote 2)

In early March 2000, an incident occurred which resulted in STUDENT's suspension from school. STUDENT reportedly made a statement to two classmates to the effect that "I'm going to bring a shotgun and blow your heads off." The District suspended STUDENT for three days, and informed his parents that he would be transferred to Thomas Jefferson Elementary School, another elementary school within the District. (District's Exhs. 13, 14; testimony of Mrs. PARENT.) The PARENTs requested that STUDENT remain at ILC and indicated that they believed that STUDENT had the right to "stay put" at ILC. The District did not agree to the request, but indicated that it would treat the stay put request as a request for a special education assessment. (Testimony of Rick Kemppainen; District's Exhs. 16, 17.) On March 17, 2000, STUDENT's educational advocate submitted to the Hearing Office a due process request and motion for stay put.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Under the stay put provisions of federal and state special education law, a special education student is entitled to remain in his or her current educational placement pending the completion of due process hearing procedures unless the parties to the hearing agreed otherwise. (20 U.S.C. § 1415(j); Cal. Education Code § 56505(d).) In 1997, Congress amended the IDEA to extend the protections of stay put to some students not previously identified as eligible for special education and related services, but only under limited circumstances. (20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(8); 34 C.F.R. § 300.527.)

A student who has not been determined eligible for special education is entitled to the protections of stay put only if (1) the student engaged in behavior that violated a rule or code of conduct of the local educational agency (LEA), and (2) the LEA is deemed to have had knowledge that the student suffered from a disability before the behavior that prompted the disciplinary action occurred. (20 U.S.C. § 1415 (k)(8)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.527(a).) The LEA is deemed to have had a basis of knowledge that a student has a disability if any of the following occurred before the behavior that caused the disciplinary action:

1. The parent of the child has expressed concern in writing to personnel of the appropriate LEA that the child is in need of special education and related services; 2. The behavior or performance of the child demonstrates the need for those services, in accordance with 34 C.F.R. § 300.7; 3. The parent of the child has requested an evaluation of the child; or 4. The teacher of the child, or other personnel of the LEA, has expressed concern about the behavior or performance of the child to agency or other personnel in accordance with the agency's established child find or special education referral system.

(20 U.S.C § 1415(k)(8)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.527(b).)

In the present case, Petitioner alleges that the District had a basis of knowledge pursuant to all four of the above criteria. Initially, the second criterion can be eliminated as a potential basis of knowledge, because there is insufficient evidence to establish that STUDENT's behavior or performance demonstrated the need for special education services. (See 34 C.F.R. § 300.7; Cal. Education Code § 56026.) The key evidence in support of Petitioner's claim is Mrs. PARENT's testimony that, after his brain surgeries, STUDENT had a substantial loss of his reading skills. Indeed, the evidence supports the conclusion that STUDENT was not reading at grade level for approximately the first two years after his surgeries; in August 1998, the District reading specialist found that STUDENT should receive reading specialist services because he was reading significantly below grade level. (Testimony of Ms. Tracy.) Mrs. Gallegos, STUDENT's second-grade teacher, also was concerned about his reading level. (Petitioner's Exhs. F, J.) However, at the end of STUDENT's second-grade year, the reading specialist found that he was reading at grade level. (Testimony of Ms. Tracy.) Similarly, STUDENT's third-grade teacher testified that STUDENT's reading in her class was at grade level. (Testimony of Ms. Torres.)

Additional evidence from STUDENT's teachers does not support Petitioner's claim. Ms. Hughes, who taught STUDENT for two months via home schooling after his surgeries, testified that STUDENT's skills were within the average range. STUDENT's progress reports in first, second and third grades indicate generally satisfactory progress. (District's Exhs. 20, 21, 22.) Kathleen Torres, STUDENT's third-grade teacher, wrote that STUDENT was easily distracted and often did not complete assignments. (District's Exh. 22.) However, Ms. Torres explained during her testimony that STUDENT performed within the average range of most third-graders and that she had never had any concern that STUDENT might be a student in need of special education or related services. (Testimony of Ms. Torres.)

Overall, the evidence presented at hearing failed to establish that STUDENT's behavior or performance demonstrated a need for special education services. While the evidence regarding STUDENT's difficulties with reading is inconclusive as to whether or not STUDENT needed special education services at that time, the subsequent improvement in his reading level without special education services weighs in favor of the finding that, for purposes of 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(k)(8)(B), such need was not demonstrated. Thus, the District is not deemed to have a basis of knowledge pursuant to the second criterion of 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(k)(8)(B) and 34 C.F.R. Section 300.527(b).

Similarly, the fourth criterion can be eliminated as a potential basis of knowledge. There is no evidence that STUDENT's teacher, or any other District personnel, expressed concern about STUDENT's behavior or performance in accordance with the District's child find or special education referral system. While Mrs. Gallegos made a referral to the SST, and that referral form listed STUDENT's reading level as a concern, she made the referral because of Mrs. PARENT's request for an assessment. There is no indication that Mrs. Gallegos expressed any concerns about STUDENT to the District director of special education, or otherwise sought to have STUDENT assessed for special education. Accordingly, the District is not deemed to have a basis of knowledge pursuant to the fourth criterion of 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(k)(8)(B) and 34 C.F.R. Section 300.527(b).

Additionally, Petitioner argued at hearing that the District's decision to conduct an evaluation of STUDENT after the behavioral incident in March 2000 constituted evidence that the District knew that STUDENT was a student with a disability. However, Assistant Superintendent Rick Kemppainen explained that the District agreed to assess STUDENT after receiving the PARENTs' request for stay put following the March 2000 behavioral incident. (Testimony of Mr. Kemppainen; District's Exh. 16.) In light of the factual circumstances, the District's decision to assess after the behavioral incident does not constitute evidence that the District had a basis of knowledge prior to the incident.

Regarding the third criterion of Section 300.527(b), the parties stipulated at hearing that STUDENT's mother requested in writing that STUDENT be evaluated for learning disabilities. Similarly, the District acknowledged that Mrs. PARENT's letter constituted a written expression of concern sufficient to meet the first criteria for District's basis of knowledge. (District's Closing Brief, p. 4.) Thus, it is undisputed that the first and third criteria for basis of knowledge have been met.

Nevertheless, the District argues that stay put does not apply because of an exception to the "basis of knowledge" provisions cited above. Pursuant to the 1999 Final Regulations to the IDEA, an LEA is not deemed to have had knowledge if, as a result of receiving the information specified above, the LEA determined that an evaluation was not necessary and provided the required notice to the child's parents. (34 C.F.R. § 300.527(c).) The required notice must include the following: 1. A description of the action proposed or refused by the LEA; 2. An explanation of why the agency proposes or refuses to take the action; 3. A description of any other options that the agency considered and the reasons why those options were rejected; 4. A description of each evaluation procedure, test, record or report the LEA used as a basis for the proposed or refused action; 5. A description of any other factors that are relevant to the agency's proposal or refusal; 6. A statement that the parents of a child with a disability have protection under the procedural safeguards of this part and, if this notice is not an initial referral for evaluation, the means by which a copy of a description of the procedural safeguards can be obtained; and 7. Sources for parents to contact to obtain assistance in understanding the provisions of this part.

(34 C.F.R. § 300.503(b).) The Final Regulations envision that proper notice of the above factors be provided in writing. (34 C.F.R. § 300.503(a), (c).) Additionally, the notice must be written in language understandable to the general public. (34 C.F.R. § 300.503(c).)

Notably, the Final Regulations had not yet been issued at the time the District received Mrs. PARENT's referral for assessment. Mrs. PARENT's letter is dated September 1, 1998, and the first SST meeting occurred on September 23, 1998. In contrast, the U.S. Department of Education did not issue the Final Regulations until March 12, 1999, and did not require LEAs to comply with the Final Regulations until July 1, 1999. Thus, the exception set out in Section 300.527(c) did not exist at the time that the events in question occurred. Ordinarily, the Hearing Office would not hold a party to regulations issued after the events in question. However, since the District is seeking protection under the Final Regulations, the Hearing Officer will consider whether or not the District complied with those Regulations.

The evidence established that the District did not give STUDENT's parent the notice required pursuant to Section 300.503, as required by Section 300.527(c). When the SST concluded that it would not refer STUDENT for a special education assessment, the District did not provide Mrs. PARENT with any written notice of that decision, other than the brief notes of the SST meeting. (Testimony of Mrs. PARENT, Ms. Cunningham, Ms. Hughes.) The SST notes did not include any indication that the District had decided against assessing STUDENT, and Mrs. PARENT credibly testified that she did not understand that STUDENT would not be assessed. (Testimony of Mrs. PARENT; Petitioner's Exh. G.) Thus, to the extent the District notified STUDENT's parent of the decision not to conduct an assessment, that notification was neither written nor clearly understandable to the general public.

Moreover, the District did not provide STUDENT's parents with any information regarding the existence of the procedural safeguards applicable to parents of children with disabilities. Mrs. PARENT testified that she never received any information regarding her rights if she disagreed with the decision of the SST, and there is no evidence to the contrary.

Thus, in light of all circumstances, the Hearing Officer concludes that the exception to the "basis of knowledge" factors contained in Section 300.527(c) does not apply in the present matter. Although the District decided not to conduct the assessment that STUDENT's mother had requested, it did not provide her with adequate notice of the decision not to assess. The Section 300.527(c) exception does not apply, and the District is found to have had a basis of knowledge that STUDENT was a student with a disability pursuant to the first and third criteria of 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(k)(8) and 34 C.F.R. Section 300.527(b).

Notably, even if the District had met the requirements of the Section 300.527(c) exception, it is unlikely that the exception would be applicable in California. California Code of Regulations Title 5, Section 3021 provides that "all referrals for special education and related services shall initiate the assessment process." (Footnote 3) Because Mrs. PARENT made a referral for STUDENT to be assessed, she initiated the assessment process, and under California law, the District was obligated to conduct the assessment. California law does not appear to contain any exception to an LEA's obligation to conduct an assessment once a referral for assessment has initiated the assessment process. (See Education Code § 56320 et seq.) The Hearing Office has consistently held that, where California law is more protective of students than the federal law, California law controls in this state. (See Order Denying Request For Expedited Hearing, California Special Education Hearing Office, Case No. SN 1357-97, Stanislaus County Office of Education and Ceres Unified School District v. STUDENT (October 30, 1997); Order Granting Stay Put Motion, California Special Education Hearing Office, Case No. SN 754-98, STUDENT v. San Antonio Union School District (June 11, 1998); Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Education for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 736 F.2d 773 (1st Cir. 1984).) Therefore, had the District met the requirements of the Section 300.527(c) exception, arguably the District still could have been obligated to assess STUDENT under state law. However, since the District did not comply with the Section 300.527(c) exception, the Hearing Officer need not rule on this issue in the present case.

Because the District is deemed to have had a basis of knowledge that STUDENT was a student with a disability, STUDENT has the right to "stay put" under federal law. The stay put protection provides that, unless the parties agree otherwise, the student is to remain in his last agreed-upon educational placement until resolution of the due process proceedings. (20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).) In the present case, there is no dispute that STUDENT's last agreed-upon educational placement was at the ILC. Thus, STUDENT should be returned to that placement pending the outcome of the due process hearing.

ORDER

The District shall immediately return STUDENT to his placement at the Intensive Learning Center until resolution of this due process proceeding, or unless the parties reach an agreement otherwise.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to California Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this requirement: the Petitioner prevailed on the only issue heard and decided.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. California Education Code § 56505(i).

DATED: May 1, 2000 ___________________________________ Suzanne B. Brown Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

1. To address Issues No. 2 and 3, the parties agreed that the hearing would reconvene on May 18 and 19, and June 6 and 7, 2000. Because the Hearing Officer notified the parties that she may be conducting another hearing on May 18 and 19, the parties agreed to hold the hearing on June 6, 7, 8 and 9, 2000, if the Hearing Officer is unavailable on May 18 and 19.

2. Mrs. PARENT explained that she had previously called the school office and requested that they contact her at the hospital during that time period, because one of the FAMILYs' other sons was in the hospital and needed surgery. Mrs. PARENT later learned from STUDENT's teacher about what happened at the SST meeting. Mrs. PARENT asked Ms. Torres how the school could hold the meeting after Mrs. PARENT had informed them that she and her husband would be staying with their other son at the hospital. Mrs. Torres replied that she did not realize that the hospital stay meant that the PARENTs could not attend the SST meeting.

3. California Education Code section 56029 defines "referral for assessment" as "any written request for assessment to identify an individual with exceptional needs made by a parent, teacher, or other service provider."