California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · April 17, 2003
Student v. El Rancho Unified School District (consolidated)
SEHO Case No. SN 45-03, SN-45-03 · Hearing Officer Sherianne Laba
El Rancho Unified must reimburse parents for discrete trial training it stopped without an IEP meeting; most other claims denied.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Noted in the decision
The decision notes that three earlier due process requests by the parents (SN01-01470, SN01-01959, SN01-02405) were withdrawn, the first after the July 2001 mediated settlement. It also refers to an earlier SEHO stay put order, which the Hearing Officer held was not an adjudication of the District's responsibilities.
Summary
Both sides filed for hearing. The parents of a five-year-old with autism said El Rancho Unified denied him a FAPE from March 2001 to March 2003. They sought reimbursement for private assessments, an in-home Lovaas program from the Lovaas Institute for Early Intervention (LIFE), and private speech therapy from Kidstreet. The Hearing Officer denied reimbursement for the private assessments by Dr. Melanie Lenington and Kidstreet. The parents got them 15 months after the District's testing to update information and to start private services, not because they disagreed with the District's assessments. A July 2001 mediated settlement also released any challenge to those assessments. That settlement also barred all FAPE claims before July 25, 2001, including claims about the 2001 extended school year. In September 2001, the District moved the student from Sorenson to the Maizeland preschool class and ended his five weekly hours of discrete trial training (DTT). It held no IEP meeting. The settlement had been drafted by District counsel and did not authorize either change. The Hearing Officer found a procedural violation and a failure to implement the IEP, which denied FAPE until the March 2002 IEP. The March 2002 offer was found to provide a FAPE. It included an autism-focused preschool class with integration, speech four times a week, and occupational therapy, but no individual DTT. The District was ordered to reimburse parents for five hours of DTT, one hour of supervision weekly, and two clinic hours monthly for September 2001 through March 2002. Compensatory education was denied as duplicative.
Why it matters
The decision shows how SEHO treated a broad mediated release as barring earlier claims while still allowing claims that the district failed to carry out the agreed program. Unclear settlement terms were read against the district that drafted them. Changing a school site or ending services without an IEP meeting was treated as an unauthorized change of placement.
Issues and holdings
- District prevailedIndependent educational evaluation (IEE)
Issue I. Are Student's parents entitled to reimbursement for the independent psychoeducational assessment from Dr. Melanie Lenington and the independent speech and language evaluation from Kidstreet?
No reimbursement: the private assessments were obtained 15 months later for updated information and to start private services, not because parents disagreed with the District's March 2001 assessments, and any such challenge was released by the July 2001 settlement.
Issue II.1. Did the District provide a FAPE from March 2001 through July 24, 2001 (alleged failure to discuss LRE and provide benchmarks at the March 2001 IEP)?
All claims before July 25, 2001 were released by the parties' mediated settlement agreement; the alleged procedural violations were not reached.
Issue II.2. Did the District provide a FAPE from July 25, 2001 through September 2001 (alleged need for a 52-week program / extended school year)?
Challenges to the 2001 extended school year program were resolved by the settlement agreement; the June 2001 IEP governed and no new IEP was required.
- Student prevailedImplementation
Issue II.3. Did the District deny a FAPE from September 2001 through March 2002 by changing Student's placement from Sorenson to Maizeland and deleting his DTT services without an IEP meeting or parental consent?
The settlement agreement, drafted by District counsel, did not authorize moving Student to Maizeland or ending his five weekly hours of DTT; doing so without an IEP meeting denied parent participation and failed to implement the IEP, denying FAPE.
- District prevailedFAPE: services offered
Issue II.4. Did the District's March 2002 IEP offer provide a FAPE from March 2002 through March 2003, including whether it failed to specify how speech and language services would be delivered?
The autism-focused preschool special day class with integration, speech four times weekly for 30 minutes (1:1 or small group), and OT met Student's unique needs and was reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit; individual DTT was not required, and the speech offer adequately stated frequency and duration.
- Student prevailed in partUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue III. If the District failed to provide a FAPE, are parents entitled to reimbursement for the cost of Student's placement with LIFE and private speech and language services with Kidstreet?
Parents were reimbursed for five hours per week of DTT, one hour per week of supervision, and two hours per month of clinic time for September 2001 through the March 2002 IEP; all other reimbursement, including for Kidstreet speech services, was denied.
- District prevailedFAPE: services offered
Issue IV. If the District failed to provide a FAPE, is Student entitled to compensatory education?
Compensatory education was denied because the reimbursement award made Student whole; speech services were delivered as the settlement agreement required.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- Reimbursement. Within 20 days, the District must reimburse parents for five hours of DTT instruction per week, one hour of supervision per week, and two hours of clinic time per month obtained from LIFE, for the period from the start of the 2001 school year through the date of the March 2002 IEP.
Key authorities
Rowley; W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School Dist.; Union School Dist. v. Smith; Gregory K. v. Longview School Dist.; School Committee of Burlington v. Dept. of Education; Student W. v. Puyallup School Dist.; Miller v. Fairchild Indus.; Village of Kaktovik v. Watt; Walczak v. Florida Union Free School Dist.; Mrs. B. v. Milford Board of Education; Cal. Educ. Code § 56324; Cal. Educ. Code § 56346; Cal. Civil Code §§ 1639, 1654
People named in the decision
- Barbara Moore-Brown, director of special and alternative education, El Rancho Unified School District
- Karen Jansen, program specialist, El Rancho Unified School District
- Ann Marie Hernandez, preschool teacher, Sorenson preschool
- Jacquelyne Leigh, school psychologist, El Rancho Unified School District
- Stephanie Resell, special education preschool teacher, Maizeland
- Jennifer Shubin, speech and language pathologist, El Rancho Unified School District
- Sara Napoli, communication specialist (District assessor), El Rancho Unified School District
- Robin Perencevic, behavior specialist
- Erlinda Rodriguez, aide and discrete trial training therapist
- Anissa McNeil, CEO, private speech and language provider, Total Communication Center
- Blake Arakaki, case supervisor and behavior consultant, Lovaas Institute for Early Intervention (LIFE)
- Eric Larsson, executive director, expert witness, Minnesota Families for Early Autism Treatment (FEAT)
- Jane Haddad, private speech and language pathologist, Kidstreet
- Melanie Lenington, clinical psychologist, independent assessor for Student
- Randi Elisa Beinstock, psychologist (January 2001 psychological assessment)
- Warren Finn, advocate (witness)
- Sholeh Iravantchi, paralegal for Student's counsel
- Lovaas Institute for Early Intervention (LIFE), private in-home ABA provider
- Kidstreet, private speech and occupational therapy provider
- Verdugo Hills Autism Project, nonpublic agency, discrete trial training provider
- Gallagher Pediatric Therapy, private occupational therapy provider
- Long Beach Scottish Rite, private speech therapy provider
- Tracy Infant Center, infant center-based program
- Stramski Child Development Center, diagnostic evaluator
- Eastern Los Angeles Regional Center, regional center (Early Start services)
- Magnolia Headstart, Headstart preschool
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Sherianne Laba, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, on January 21-24 and 28-29, and March 17, 2003, in Whittier, California.
STUDENT (Student or STUDENT) was represented by attorney Bruce Bothwell. Also present on Student’s behalf were his parents, FATHER and MOTHER, and paralegal Sholeh Iravantchi. The El Rancho Unified School District (District) was represented by attorney Darin Barber. Also present on behalf of the District was Barbara Moore-Brown, director of special and alternative education.
The following witnesses provided testimony at the hearing: Karen Jansen, program specialist; Ann Marie Hernandez, Sorenson preschool teacher; Jacquelyne Leigh, school psychologist; Stephanie Resell, Maizeland special education preschool teacher; Anissa McNeil, CEO of Total Communications Center; Jennifer Shubin, District speech and language pathologist; Robin Perencevic, behavior specialist; Blake Arakaki, case supervisor and behavior consultant with Lovaas Institute for Early Intervention (LIFE); Eric Larsson, executive director for Minnesota Families for Early Autism Treatment (FEAT); Jane Haddad, speech and language pathologist with Kidstreet; Melanie Lenington, clinical psychologist; Barbara Moore-Brown, director of special and alternative education; Erlinda Rodriguez, aide and discrete trial training therapist; FATHER, father; MOTHER, mother; Darin Barber, attorney; and Warren Finn, advocate.
Oral and documentary evidence was received. The parties’ written closing briefs were received on March 25, 2003. Thereafter, the case was closed and the matter submitted for decision.
ISSUES(Footnote 1)
I Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the independent psychoeducational assessment they obtained from Dr. Melanie Lenington and independent speech and language evaluation they obtained from Kidstreet?
II Did the District provide STUDENT a free, appropriate public education (FAPE) from March 2001, through March 2003?
III If the District failed to provide STUDENT a FAPE, are his parents entitled to reimbursement for the cost of his placement with LIFE and private speech and language services with Kidstreet?
IV If the District failed to provide STUDENT a FAPE, is he entitled to compensatory education?
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
STUDENT contends that the developmental and speech and language assessments conducted by the District in March 2001 were inappropriate because they failed to assess him in all areas of suspected disability. STUDENT further contends that because of these inappropriate assessments, his parents found it necessary to obtain a private developmental assessment from Dr. Melanie Lenington and a private speech and language assessment from Kidstreet. STUDENT’s parents are seeking reimbursement for the cost of those assessments.
STUDENT also contends that the District has both procedurally and substantively failed to provide him with a FAPE from March 2001 to March 2003.(Footnote 2) Procedurally, STUDENT asserts that the District failed to discuss least restrictive environment at the March 2001 IEP meeting, failed to provide benchmarks for the goals and objectives developed at the March 2001 IEP meeting, failed to specify how speech and language services would be delivered at the March 2002 IEP meeting, and in September 2001 changed his placement and deleted his DTT services without holding an IEP meeting.(Footnote 3) Substantively, STUDENT contends that the placement provided by the District did not include goals and objectives that were challenging enough for him and did not provide a program that would meet his unique needs. STUDENT also asserts that he did not receive the one-to-one speech and language services and DTT services as indicated on his IEP.
It is STUDENT’s position that an appropriate program for him should have included:
• a forty-hour-per-week in-home Lovaas program;
• placement in a headstart preschool with aide assistance;
• individual speech and language services three hours per week; and • occupational therapy sessions.
It is STUDENT’s contention that because his unique needs were not met and he did not receive educational benefit from the program provided by the District, his parents are entitled to reimbursement for the cost of his in-home program and private speech and language services provided by his parents. Additionally, STUDENT seeks compensatory education services for the speech and language services and DTT services required by his IEP that the District failed to provide.
The District contends that STUDENT’s claims related to the District’s assessments are barred from consideration by a settlement agreement executed between the parties in July 2001. Alternatively, the District contends that its assessments and reliance upon outside assessments administered to STUDENT were both appropriate. Consequently, the District contends that STUDENT’s parents are not entitled to reimbursement for the private assessments they obtained.
The District also raises the affirmative defense that any claims that STUDENT was denied a FAPE, either procedurally or substantively, prior to July 25, 2001, are barred by the parties’ July 2001 settlement agreement. With regard to STUDENT’s other claims, the District contends that it has provided STUDENT with a FAPE. It is the District’s position that STUDENT participated and progressed in meeting his goals and objectives while enrolled in the District’s program. The District asserts that STUDENT’s parents are not entitled to reimbursement for the DTT or speech and language services they obtained because STUDENT’s parents refused to allow the District to provide the DTT services as provided for in STUDENT’s IEP and because the services obtained from Kidstreet were similar to the services the District offered.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
STUDENT is a five-year-old STUDENT who resides within the jurisdictional boundaries of the El Rancho Unified School District. STUDENT is eligible for special education and related services as a STUDENT with autism. STUDENT is not currently attending public school; however, STUDENT is attending Magnolia Headstart preschool five hours per week, receiving in-home Lovaas/ABA therapy, private speech and language therapy for three hours per week from Kidstreet, and one hour of occupational therapy per week with Kidstreet.
STUDENT was first referred for assessment by his physician in March 2000, just prior to his second birthday. STUDENT was referred to the Stramski Child Development Center and the Eastern Los Angeles Regional Center (ELARC). (District’s Exhibit (D) 6) ELARC evaluated STUDENT in March 2000. (STUDENT ’s Exhibit (S) A; D2) That assessment referred STUDENT to an interdisciplinary team for an eligibility determination to “rule out autism.” At that meeting, ELARC qualified STUDENT for services as a STUDENT developmentally delayed in the areas of communication, cognition, and social/emotional development. (SB; D4) ELARC recommended attendance in a center based infant program and referred STUDENT for a psychological assessment. The center-based services recommended by ELARC began at the Tracy Infant Center in May 2000, where he attended for two hours per day, three days per week. (SC; D5)
In May 2000, pursuant to the pediatrician’s recommendation of March 2000, STUDENT was evaluated by the Stramski Child Development Center. During that assessment, it was noted that while STUDENT was involved in parallel play, he preferred to play by himself, he did not respond to his name or follow instructions without visual cuing, he walked with his eyes half closed holding his hands out, and when frustrated he would flap his hands or tug at his ears. (D6) The Gesell Developmental Schedule was administered and showed his adaptive, gross motor and fine motor skills to be in the twenty-four-month range, his speech and language in the forty- to forty-eight-week range, and his personal/social skills to be in the eighteen- to twenty-four-month range. (D6) Overall, it was reported that “STUDENT exhibits delays in verbal and non verbal communication, severe receptive and expressive language delays, a restricted repertoire of interests and activities consistent with a diagnosis of autism.” (D6) It was suggested that STUDENT would benefit from a small, structured infant stimulation program with an emphasis on improving his social and communication skills. (D6)
The psychological evaluation recommended by ELARC was also completed in May 2000. (D7) The psychologist attempted to administer the Lieter International Performance Scale, Stanford Binet-IV, and Peabody-III. However, administration of these evaluations was discontinued. Three evaluations - the Vineland Social Maturity Scale, the Developmental Profile-II, and the Gilliam Autism Ration Scale - were completed. The results of those assessments were consistent with those obtained by the Stramski Child Development Center. (D7)
In August 2000, a follow-up IFSP was held by ELARC. At that meeting, the IFSP team continued STUDENT’s attendance at the Tracy Infant Center and referred STUDENT to Long Beach Scottish Rite for speech therapy one hour two times per week and to the Verdugo Hills Autism Project (Verdugo Hills) for fifteen hours of discrete trial training per week. (SC-F ; D11,13) The IFSP team also recommended that STUDENT have an occupational therapy (OT) assessment from Gallagher Pediatric Therapy (Gallagher). (D12) Following that assessment, STUDENT received two OT sessions per week.
In November 2001, a reevaluation was conducted by the Stramski Child Development Center. The reevaluation noted improved interaction with his parents, the ability to play gesture games, appropriate interaction with his sibling, and response to his name when cued. (SG) A follow-up psychological evaluation was conducted in January 2001. Overall, it was reported that STUDENT’s parents were pleased with his progress and that discrete trial training had helped to enhance his skills in most areas. It was also noted that STUDENT’s nonverbal cognitive abilities were at age expectancy and that his relative strength was in his visual spatial skills. (SH) However, his adaptive, social, and expressive communication skills continued to be limited and warranted continued intervention. (SH). Follow-up evaluations were also provided by the Tracy Infant Center, Scottish Rite, and Gallagher in February 2001. These reports provided STUDENT’s current abilities, strengths, weaknesses and made recommendations for future services. (SK-M;S).
In February 2001, in anticipation of his third birthday, the District was contacted to conduct an initial assessment of STUDENT. The assessment plan, signed by STUDENT’s parents on February 26, 2001, included assessments to evaluate STUDENT’s developmental status, social/emotional status, communication/auditory perceptual skills, large/small muscle coordination, and visual perceptual skills. (SN; D16) The District’s communication assessment was conducted by Sara Napoli, communication specialist. Ms. Napoli concluded that STUDENT demonstrated delayed receptive language skills, was able to complete one-step simple directions, and to point to two body parts. In the area of pragmatics, STUDENT demonstrated nonverbal language interaction. From these findings, Ms. Napoli recommended that STUDENT attend a special education preschool classroom to address his receptive and expressive language needs. (SO) The District’s school psychologist, Jacquelyne Leigh, also completed a “pre-school program structured observation” which recommended a twenty hour per week structured preschool program for STUDENT s with autism. (SU)
The Verdugo Hills Autism Project also provided an updated progress report in March 2001. The report indicated that STUDENT, among other things, had mastered one to three block imitation, was working on three chain actions, was working on matching two dimensional stimuli, was responding to the verbal instructions “sit down,” “stand up,” “come here,” and “hands quiet,” had mastered the ability to establish eye contact for one second intervals, had demonstrated consistent imitation of verbal utterances, and was also exhibiting spontaneous verbal imitation during structured activities. (SW) Verdugo Hills recommended that STUDENT continue with fifteen hours per week of behavior intervention. (SW)
STUDENT’s initial IEP meeting with the District was held on March 21 and March 29, 2001. At that meeting, the District offered STUDENT placement in a special education preschool program at Sorenson that included speech therapy, the availability of a one-to-one aide, discrete trial training at the school site for five hours per week, discrete trial training supervision for one hour per week, and two hours of occupational therapy per week. (SX-Y; D19) STUDENT’s parents agreed with the offered preschool placement but disagreed with the amount of speech therapy and discrete trial training offered.
A second IEP meeting was held on June 11, 2001. (SD2-D24) The purpose of that meeting was to review STUDENT’s speech and language progress, discuss STUDENT’s discrete trial training program, and to reconsider the level of services being provided by the District. (Sd2-D24). At that meeting, STUDENT’s parents requested that the District consider enrollment for STUDENT in a Headstart preschool with aide support. The IEP team, including STUDENT’s parents, agreed to a program that included speech therapy two times a week for thirty minutes, occupational therapy two times per week for fifty minutes, placement in a special day class with an autism focus for four hours per day five days per week, extended school year services, and individual behavior intervention (DTT services) one hour per day five days per week at the school site with one hour of supervision per week.
Shortly thereafter, STUDENT’s parents filed a request for a due process hearing, which was assigned case number SN01-01470. A mediation was held on July 13, 2001. At that mediation the parties reached a final settlement agreement that took effect on July 25, 2001. (D27) Pursuant to that mediated agreement, the parties agreed that it would increase STUDENT’s speech and language services to four times a week for thirty minutes each session, that his parents would visit the Maizeland preschool special day class, that the District would fund consultation services provided by Verdugo Hills for a total of eight sessions, and that the District would provide transportation. (D27). The parties also agreed “to accept the terms of this agreement as a full and complete settlement of all claims for services and reimbursement related to STUDENT ’s educational placement through and including the date of this agreement...” (D27) Following mediation, STUDENT’s parents withdrew their request for due process (case number SN01-01470).
At the start of the 2001-2002 school year, STUDENT was placed at Maizeland without discrete trial training services. STUDENT’s parents did not agree with this placement and filed again for due process. That case was assigned case number SN01-01959. Shortly thereafter, STUDENT’s parents withdrew their request for a due process hearing, stating that they had decided to accept the District’s offer of placement. (D28)
STUDENT’s next IEP meeting was held on October 22, 2001, as an addendum to the June 11, 2001 IEP meeting. STUDENT’s parents requested the meeting to discuss integration, discrete trial training, transportation, and concerns that STUDENT was one of the highest functioning autistic children in his program as well as other concerns about the program. (SP2:D35). At that meeting, the District IEP team recommended fully integrating STUDENT with his peers one hour per day at the Child Development Center program and during recess. The District also offered to reinstate STUDENT’s discrete trial training services and offered an assessment plan to evaluate STUDENT’s developmental status, including observations by a behavior specialist, to determine the need for discrete trial training. STUDENT’s parents did not consent to this assessment or agree to the recommended changes and subsequently filed for due process hearing on November 2, 2001. That case was assigned case number SN01-02405. Subsequently, that request was withdrawn by his parents.
After the winter holiday, STUDENT’s parents reduced his school day at Maizeland by picking him up at 10:30 a.m. each day. After he was picked up from Maizeland, STUDENT attended a Headstart program at Magnolia School for two hours per day.
In January 2002, the District sent a second request for assessment to STUDENT’s parents. That assessment request requested permission for the District’s autism expert to observe STUDENT at his in-home program, at Magnolia, and review his records. (SA3) Consent for that assessment was refused. However, On January 25, 2002, STUDENT’s mother submitted a request for an IEP team meeting stating that she wished to review his progress and to re-evaluate the program and goal emphasis. (D40). That request for an IEP meeting was amended on February 25, 2002, to include the need to discuss assessment results, develop instructional objectives, review progress, and re-evaluate goal emphasis. (D40).
Because STUDENT’s parents and the District had been unable to agree to the placement recommendations made in October 2001, on February 7, 2002, the District’s sent a second letter detailing its offer of placement, which contained the following:
• A special day class (SDC) for STUDENT s with significant disabilities provided at Maizeland for four hours per day, five days per week; • speech and language services provided four days a week for thirty minutes each session; • occupational therapy at Gallagher Pediatric Clinic two times per week for fifty minutes each session with transportation reimbursement; • specialized transportation to the special day class at Maizeland as well as transportation one-way for STUDENT to parent’s desired location within a ten mile radius of Maizeland; • implementation of an individualized behavior intervention program with the recommendation that an assessment of the need for the program be completed; • one hour of integration per day and for the entirety of recess; • extended year program for the summer 2001.
(SC3;D38)
In February 2002, STUDENT’s mother spent several days observing STUDENT in his program at Maizeland. Following those observations, on March 4, 2002, STUDENT’s parents elected to remove him from the District’s program. However, STUDENT continued in the Headstart program at Magnolia, received speech and language services through Total Communication Center, and received discrete trial services through Vergudo Hills.
In March 2002, the District completed its annual report and held STUDENT’s annual IEP meeting. (D43-45) At that meeting, the District proposed assessing STUDENT in the areas of behavior, readiness skills, and ability to access curriculum. (D45) STUDENT’s parents did not consent to that assessment. Additionally, the District offered STUDENT placement in a special day class for four- and five-year-olds at Meller or Maizeland for four hours per day five days per week. The District also offered STUDENT speech and language and occupational therapy sessions. The meeting was concluded without agreement and reconvened on March 25, 2002. At that time, STUDENT’s parents informed the District that they believed STUDENT required an in-home ABA program. They stated that they would not be accepting the District’s offer of placement and requested that the District fund an in-home ABA program. However, STUDENT’s parents did agree to accept the two hours of speech and language services offered by the District (four thirty minute sessions), as long as those services were provided by a private service provider, and agreed to accept the occupational therapy sessions that were being provided by Gallagher. (D45) Following STUDENT’s parents rejection of the District’s offer of placement, the District filed for a due process hearing.
In May 2002, STUDENT’s parents notified the District that because they disagreed with the assessment conducted by the District in March 2001, they would be obtaining an independent assessment and seeking reimbursement from the District. (SB2) In June 2002, STUDENT’s parents obtained an independent developmental assessment from Melanie Lenington, Ph.D. (D48) After Dr. Lenington completed her assessment, another IEP meeting was held for STUDENT in September 2002. (D51) At that meeting, the District indicated that Dr. Lenington’s report did not provide any additional information and reiterated the offer it made at the March 2002 IEP meeting. Again, STUDENT’s parents declined to accept this offer of placement and instead sought services from LIFE. In November 2002, STUDENT began receiving 35-40 hours per week of in-home one-to-one behavioral treatment from LIFE. (SW3) In January 2003, STUDENT’s parents cross-filed and this matter proceeded to due process hearing on the issues described above.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
I Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the independent psychoeducational assessment they obtained from Dr. Melanie Lenington and independent speech and language assessment they obtained from Kidstreet?
A parent has the right to obtain an independent educational assessment of the STUDENT from a qualified specialist, at public expense, if the parent disagrees with an assessment obtained by the district, unless the District shows at a due process hearing that its assessment was appropriate. Calif. Educ. Code § 56324. Consequently, to address a request for reimbursement, the Hearing Officer must first determine whether there was an actual dispute with the District assessment and then whether the District’s assessment was appropriate.
In this case, STUDENT contends that prior to his initial placement in March 2001, the District failed to assess him in all areas of suspected disability and that the assessments that were conducted were inappropriate. Consequently, STUDENT contends, his parents were required to obtain a private developmental and private speech and language assessment.
The District contends that its assessments were complete and appropriate. The District also raises the affirmative defense that STUDENT’s contentions about the initial assessments were resolved through a July 25, 2002 settlement agreement between the parties, and are therefore barred from further litigation.
The District’s developmental assessment and speech and language assessment were completed in March 2001. In May 2002, STUDENT’s parents notified the District of their disagreement with its assessment and their intent to obtain a private assessment. (SB2) A private developmental assessment was completed by Melanie Lenington in June 2002. (SP3;D48; Test.
of Lenington) A private speech and language assessment was completed by Kidstreet in July 2002. (S3) STUDENT’s parents are seeking reimbursement for these two private assessments.
As discussed above, to obtain reimbursement for an assessment, a parent must have sought the independent assessment because of a disagreement with a district assessment. Calif. Educ. Code § 56324. In this case, STUDENT’s parents sought independent assessments fifteen months after the District completed its assessments. By that time, STUDENT had been attending a District program for over one year and the parties were already involved in protracted litigation.
With regard to the private developmental assessment conducted by Dr. Melanie Lenington, FATHER testified that they did not seek an assessment from Dr. Lenington until after they had met with their current attorney and were referred for an independent assessment. FATHER also testified that he did not request additional assessments from the District prior to contacting Dr. Lenington and that the purpose of the assessment was to obtain an overall picture of what services STUDENT would benefit from “now that he was older.” Furthermore, Dr. Lenington testified that STUDENT’s parents requested a report from her because they wanted to know what would be an appropriate program for STUDENT. According to Dr. Lenington, STUDENT’s parents were happy with a portion of the program he was in but simply wanted her opinion. Lastly, according to Dr. Lenington, it is appropriate to reassess an autistic child on a regular basis, which is what her assessment was intended to do. The testimony of FATHER and Dr. Lenington support the finding that the assessment conducted by Dr. Lenington was not done because of a disagreement with the District’s assessments and reimbursement for this assessment is not supported by the law.
With regard to the private speech and language assessment conducted by Jane Haddad, speech pathologist with Kidstreet, Ms. Haddad testified that she evaluated STUDENT in June 2002 prior to starting private services with him in July 2002. This assessment was conducted as a routine matter prior to services being provided by Kidstreet. Therefore, reimbursement for this assessment is also not supported by the law.
Secondarily, the District has raised the defense that any dispute with the District’s March 2001 assessment was resolved by the parties’ July 25, 2001 settlement agreement. The law governing settlement agreements in California is clear. An agreement to settle a legal dispute is a contract and its enforceability is governed by familiar principles of contract law. Miller v. Fairchild Indus., 797 F. 2d 727, 733 (9th Cir. 1986); Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 223 U.S. App. D.C. 39, 689 F. 2d 222, 230 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In such a situation, each party agrees to “extinguish those legal rights it sought to enforce through litigation in exchange for those rights secured by the contract.” Village of Kaktovik, 689 F. 2d at 230; Protective Closures Co. v. Clover Inds., Inc., 394 F. 2d 809, 812 (2d Cir. 1968). A release generally extends to all matters within the parties’ contemplation at the time it is executed. Chadwick v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. 33 Wb. App. 297, 654 P. 2d 1215, 1217 (Wash. App. 1982).
Here, the parties settlement agreement specifically states that the settlement is a “full and complete settlement of all claims for services and reimbursement related to STUDENT ’s educational placement through and including the date [of] this agreement...” (D27). The plain language of that agreement supports the finding that the settlement agreement covered all claims, including claims related to the assessment, that arose prior to the agreement. This does not mean that the District’s assessments were appropriate, but rather that any challenges to the assessments were resolved by that agreement. Consequently, even if STUDENT’s parents had sought the independent assessment because of a disagreement with the District’s assessments, they waived all claims to that issue in signing the July 25, 2001 settlement agreement and are therefore not entitled to reimbursement for those assessments.
In summary, the evidence establishes that the private assessments obtained by STUDENT’s parents were not done because of a disagreement with the District assessments but rather for other reasons, such as wanting updated information, for start-up services, and, possibly, as a result of pending litigation. Lastly, reimbursement is not permitted because any request for reimbursement is barred by a settlement agreement reached between the parties. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT’s parents are not entitled to reimbursement for the independent assessments obtained from Dr. Lenington and Kidstreet.
II Did the District provide STUDENT a free, appropriate public education from March 2001, through March 2003?
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and State law, children with disabilities are entitled to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); California Education Code § 56000. The term “free appropriate public education” means special education and related services that are available to the STUDENT at no charge, that meet the standard of the state education agency, and that conform with the STUDENT ’s IEP. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8). “Special Education” is defined as specially designed instruction, at no cost to the parents, to meet the unique needs of the STUDENT . 20 U.S.C. § 1401(25).
The term “related services” includes transportation and other developmental, corrective, and supportive services as may be required to assist a child to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22). California Education Code § 56363(a) similarly provides that designated instruction and services (DIS), California’s term for related services, shall be provided “when the instruction and services are necessary for the pupil to benefit educationally from his or her instruction program.”
The analysis of whether a STUDENT has been provided a FAPE is two fold, requiring the Hearing Officer to determine whether procedural steps have been followed and whether the proposed placement is substantively appropriate. Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, (1982) 458 U.S. 176, 206-207.
Parents of children with disabilities are provided procedural protections under the IDEA 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et. seq. The Supreme Court noted in Rowley that “Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of participation” at every step “as it did upon the measurement of the resulting IEP.” Rowley, 458 U.S. 176. 205-206. Procedural violations are violations which result in a “loss of educational opportunity” or which “seriously infringe the parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP formulation process clearly result in the denial of a FAPE.” W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School District No. 23, 960 F. 2d 1479, 1484 (9th Cir. 1992). Procedural flaws; however, do not automatically require a finding of a denial of a FAPE. Id. at 1484. The courts have created a two-prong test for determining if a procedural violation resulted in a denial of a FAPE for a STUDENT : (1) whether a procedural protection has been violated, and (2) whether the procedural violation resulted in a loss of educational opportunity to the STUDENT or seriously infringed on the parents’ participation in the IEP process.
Substantive violations require a separate analysis. In Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley (1982) 458 U.S. 176, the Supreme Court addressed the level of instruction and services which must be provided a STUDENT with disabilities to satisfy the requirements of the IDEA. The Court concluded that the standard for determining whether a local educational agency’s provision of services substantively provided a FAPE involves a determination of three factors: (1) whether the services were designed to address the STUDENT ’s unique needs, (2)whether the services will provide educational benefit to the STUDENT , and (3) whether the services conformed to the IEP. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; Rowley, 458 U.S. 176.
In Rowley, the Court also concluded that the IDEA does not require that a STUDENT be provided with the best available education or services or that the services maximize each child’s potential. The Court stated that “the ‘basic floor of opportunity’ provided by the Act consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the child.” Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200-201. De minimus benefit or trivial advancement, however is insufficient to satisfy the Rowley standard of “some” benefit. Walczak v. Florida Union Free School District, 142 F. 3d at 130 (2nd Cir. 1998). Rather, a child’s academic progress must be viewed in light of the limitations imposed by his or her disability and must be gauged in relation to the child’s potential. Mrs. B. v. Milford Board of Education, 103 F. 3 1114, 1121 (2nd Cir. 1997).
To determine whether the District offered the STUDENT a FAPE, the analysis must focus on the adequacy of the District’s program. Gregory K v. Longview Sch. Dist. (9th Cir. 1987) 811 F. 2d 1307, 1314. If the District’s proposed program would have addressed the STUDENT ’s unique needs, provided him some educational benefit, and comported with his IEP, then the District offered a FAPE, even if the parents prefer another program and even if the parents’ preferred program would likely result in greater educational benefit. Rowly, supra, 458 U.S. at 207-208; Gregory K, supra, 811 F.2 d at 1314.
To summarize, under the IDEA, State law, and Rowley, in determining whether STUDENT has been offered a FAPE, the Hearing Officer must first determine if procedural violations have occurred, and if so did those violations result in a loss of educational opportunity to STUDENT or seriously infringe on his parents’ participation in the IEP process. Second, to determine if the District has provided a substantively appropriate program for STUDENT the Hearing Officer must determine if the program provided meets the following three requirements: (1) is designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs, (2) is reasonably calculated to provide him with some educational benefit, and (3) is provided in conformity with his IEP.(Footnote 4)
In this case, there are four separate time periods at issue. First, from March 2001 until July 24, 2001, STUDENT alleges that the District denied him a FAPE at the March 2001 IEP by failing to discuss the least restrictive environment and failing to provide benchmarks for the goals and objectives. Second, from July 25, 2001 to September 2001, STUDENT alleges that he was denied a FAPE because he was not offered a program that addressed his unique needs or provided him with educational benefit. Third, from September 2001 through March 2002, STUDENT alleges that the District denied him a FAPE by changing his placement and deleting his DTT services without holding an IEP meeting. Lastly, From March 2002 through March 2003, STUDENT alleges that he was denied a FAPE at his March 2002 IEP when the District failed to specify how speech and language services would be delivered, offered him a program that was inappropriate to meet his unique needs, and offered a program that would not provide educational benefit. Each of these time periods and the associated allegations will be addressed separately.
1. March 2001 through July 24, 2001
As discussed above, in July 2001, the parties entered into a settlement agreement. At that time the parties were involved in a due process hearing regarding STUDENT’s education. STUDENT was represented by an advocate experienced in special education law and the District was represented by an attorney. At mediation, facilitated by an experienced mediator, the parties reached a settlement agreement. Pursuant to that agreement, the parties resolved all issues that had arisen regarding STUDENT’s education. The agreement also includes a waiver of unknown claims, which provides that the settlement is a “full and complete settlement of all claims for services and reimbursement related to STUDENT ’s educational placement through and including the date [of] this agreement...” (D27)
The terms of the agreement support the finding that all claims prior to the date of the settlement agreement were resolved by that settlement agreement. Consequently, the Hearing Officer finds that based upon the settlement agreement reached between the parties, all claims related to STUDENT’s education, and any related claim that he was denied a FAPE, prior to July 25, 2001 are barred from consideration. Therefore, the Hearing Officer does not reach a determination whether or not the alleged procedural violations related to the March 2001 IEP occurred.
2. July 25, 2001 through September 2001 - Extended School Year
For this time period, STUDENT asserts that he required a fifty-two week per year program. STUDENT asserts that he was denied a FAPE because the program provided to him did not meet this unique needs or provide him with educational benefit. However, as discussed above, any contentions regarding the appropriateness of the program provided to STUDENT was resolved by the parties’ July 25, 2001 settlement agreement. The last IEP held for STUDENT, prior to the settlement agreement, was in June 2001 and covered the provision of educational services through March 2002. No other IEP meeting was held for STUDENT, nor was such a meeting required, during the extended school year. Consequently, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT’s claims related to the 2001 extended school year were resolved by the parties’ settlement agreement.
3. September 2001 through March 2002
STUDENT alleges that in September 2001 - the start of the 2001-2002 school year - the District changed his placement and deleted his DTT services without an IEP meeting or parental consent. The District asserts that STUDENT’s placement location was changed from Sorenson to Maizeland and his DTT services were eliminated because of the settlement agreement reached between the parties in July 2001.(Footnote 5) The District further asserts that the change in location of services, from Sorenson to Maizeland, was an administrative decision that did not require an IEP meeting or parental consent.
As discussed above, the parties’ settlement agreement resolved all challenges to STUDENT’s March 2001 and June 2001 IEPs. However, this does not preclude STUDENT from challenging the implementation of his IEP. Despite the parties’ settlement agreement, the District had an obligation to implement the agreed upon program. Which, in this case, was identified as the March 2001 IEP, June 2001 IEP, and the parties’ settlement agreement. Therefore, STUDENT’s contentions regarding the implementation of his IEP are appropriate issues for consideration in this Decision.
State law requires that an IEP team meeting be held and parental consent obtained when developing, reviewing, and revising a STUDENT ’s individualized education program or placement. Calif. Educ. Code § 56346; Union School District v. Smith (9th Cir. 1984) F 3d. 1519. California law defines “educational placement” as “that unique combination of facilities, personnel, location or equipment necessary to provide instructional services to an individual with exceptional needs, as specified in the individualized education program.” Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 5 § 3042(a) A particular location, facilities, or personnel available at a site may be an intrinsic component of a child’s placement. Thus, a change in the location in which a child receives his services, as well as the associated changes to personnel, generally constitute a change of placement in California. See. e.g STUDENT v. Banning Unified School District (SN99-00486); STUDENT v. Los Angeles Unified School District (SN95-00300); STUDENT v. Los Angeles Unified School District (SN92-00297).
Here, there is no dispute that from March 2001 STUDENT was attending school at Sorenson and receiving five hours per week of DTT services. There is also no dispute that, based upon the District’s view of the settlement agreement, in September 2001 the District changed STUDENT’s placement to Maizeland and stopped providing the five hours of DTT services that his March 2001 IEP required. As stated above, the law requires that an IEP meeting be held, or agreement reached, before changing a child’s placement. In this case, the dispute between the parties centers on whether or not a settlement agreement reached between the parties constituted an agreement to change his placement such that the District did not need to hold an IEP meeting. The only references to Maizeland in the settlement agreement are that the “parents will visit Maizeland Preschool (‘Maizeland’) special day class for the severely handicapped....” and that “the District agrees to provide one-way transportation for STUDENT to parents’ desired location within a ten (10) mile radius of Maizeland.” (D27). The settlement agreement provides no indication of what school STUDENT would be attending when school resumed in September and therefore provides no guidance.
Under the standard rules of contract construction, the terms of the settlement agreement are controlling. California Civil Code section 1639 provides that “when a contract is reduced to writing, the intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the writing alone, if possible.” Furthermore, in cases of uncertainty, “the language of a contract should be interpreted most strongly against the party who causes the uncertainty to exist.” Calif. Civil Code. § 1654. In this case, the language of the settlement agreement itself does not provide for a change of placement from Sorenson to Maizeland. Furthermore, the settlement agreement was drafted by the District’s attorney. (Test. of Barber, Moore-Brown, and FATHER). Therefore, if the District intended to change STUDENT’s placement through this agreement, in drafting the agreement that intention should have been made clear. No such intention is contained in the settlement agreement. Consequently, the Hearing Officer finds that before making a change of placement from Sorenson to Maizeland the District was required to hold an IEP meeting. The failure to hold such a meeting was a procedural violation.
Additionally, before discontinuing STUDENT’s individual DTT services, the District was required to hold an IEP meeting or obtain parental consent for such a change. Here, as discussed above, STUDENT’s DTT services were discontinued following the settlement agreement. Prior to the settlement agreement, STUDENT’s IEP provided that he would receive five hours of DTT services per week. (SY;D19) The only reference to the DTT services in the settlement agreement is as follows:
The District will fund consultation services provided by Verdugo Hills (“NPA”) for a total of eight (8) sessions between July 13, 2001 and October 31, 2001 at a typical peer class (other than a District class) arranged by the Parents. Each consultation session will last one (1) hour. Stay put will not apply to this consultation service provided by the NPA. (D27).
Barbara Moore-Brown testified that it was the intent of the parties that the implementation of the supervision hours identified in the settlement agreement would replace the five hours of services STUDENT had been receiving per week. However, this is contradicted both by the plain language of the agreement and by the District’s October 2001 offer to reinstate the DTT services. (SP2; D35) The plain language of the agreement refers only to the addition of hours and makes no provision for the deletion of services. Consequently, the Hearing Officer finds that the District has committed a procedural violation by failing to convene an IEP meeting or obtain parental consent before discontinuing STUDENT’s DTT services. Thus, the Hearing Officer finds that by failing to convene and IEP meeting, STUDENT’s parents were denied the opportunity to participate in the IEP process.
Not only does this failure constitute a procedural violation, it is also a substantive denial of FAPE. The District is required to provide a program that is in conformity with a STUDENT ’s IEP. Both STUDENT’s March and June 2001 IEPs required placement at Sorenson and five hours of DTT services per week. (SY;SD2;D19, D24) By failing to provide this placement and services, the District failed to provide a program for STUDENT that comported with his IEP. Under State and federal law, and Rowley this constitutes a denial of FAPE to STUDENT.(Footnote 6) This denial continued until STUDENT’s annual IEP was held in March 2002. Consequently, for this time period, the Hearing Officer does not undertake an entire substantive FAPE analysis because the Hearing Officer has determined that from September 2001 until March 2002 the District failed to provide STUDENT a program that comported with his IEP.
In summary, the Hearing Officer finds that the District committed a procedural violation - failing to convene an IEP meeting or obtain parental consent before changing STUDENT’s placement and deleting his DTT services - which denied STUDENT’s parents the opportunity to participate in the IEP process. Moreover, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT was denied a FAPE when the District failed to provide him a program in conformity with his IEP.
4. March 2002 through March 2003
STUDENT asserts that at the March 2002 IEP the District failed to specify how the offered speech and language services would be delivered and that, generally, the offer of placement and services made at the March 2002 IEP did not constitute a FAPE because it is not designed to meet his unique needs or provide him with educational benefit. To determine whether the March 2002 offer of placement constituted a FAPE, the Hearing Officer first must determine STUDENT’s unique needs at that time.
STUDENT’s Unique Needs
In determining STUDENT’s unique needs, because STUDENT’s assessments were conducted during 2001, it is necessary for the Hearing Officer to look back to those previous assessments for assistance in determining STUDENT’s current unique needs.
Prior to his third birthday, the District’s initial assessment, and his initial IEP, STUDENT was assessed by several different professionals. The results obtained from those assessments, along with the District’s assessments, were used to determine STUDENT’s unique needs when he first came to the District. In January, a psychological assessment was completed by Randi Elisa Beinstock, Psy.D. (SH;D19) In February 2001, an occupational therapy progress report for STUDENT was prepared by Gallagher Pediatric Therapy (Gallagher), an assessment was completed by the Tracy Infant Center, a structured observation was conducted by the District, and a communication evaluation was completed by the District. (SK, SM, SO, SU;D19) In March 2001, a speech progress report was prepared by Long Beach Scottish Rite and a summary of progress was prepared by the Verdugo Hills Autism Project. (SW,SS-ST;D19) These assessments and progress reports provide extensive information on STUDENT’s unique needs. In general, four specific areas of need were identified for STUDENT: behavior, cognitive and adaptive functioning, occupational therapy, and speech and language.
In the area of behavior and cognitive and adaptive functioning, Dr. Beinstock reported that STUDENT could identify some body parts, gesture to make his needs known, and use some words when prompted (SH). Dr. Beinstock also reported that “while STUDENT’s stereotyped and self-stimulatory behaviors had decreased, he continued to be fascinated with things that spin, laughed or cried for no obvious reason, lay on the floor, and liked to put his stomach on cold surfaces.” (SH) STUDENT’s motor skills were his strongest area and consisted of running, climbing and jumping skills. (SH) Additionally, the Tracy Infant Center reported that “STUDENT’s strengths included being able to sort by color, match a picture to picture, picture to object, and shapes to pictures of shapes, which were age appropriate skills.” (SK) STUDENT could also tower seven cues and was described as growing in his problem solving skills. He was behind in the area of pretend play and was ready for strategies that would increase attention, increase his problem solving skills, improve visual discrimination skills, improve imitation skills, and expand upon pretend play. (SK).
In the area of occupational therapy needs, Gallagher Pediatric Therapy, who had been providing occupational therapy services to STUDENT two times per week since October 2000, evaluated STUDENT. Gallagher reported that his areas of deficit included difficulties processing proprioceptive and vestibular sensory information, which affected his organization and behavior. In summary, Gallagher reported that STUDENT required services to address his mild delays in his gross motor skills, fine motor skills, and self-care skills. (SM;D19) The parties did not dispute that areas of need identified by Gallagher were appropriate.
In the area of speech and language needs, Long Beach Scottish Rite, which had been providing STUDENT with services since August 2000, reported that STUDENT was in the process of mastering the prelinguistic skills of matching/sequencing at the two item level for pictures and blocks. Receptively and expressively, STUDENT demonstrated skills in the twelve- to seventeen- month range with emerging skills in the eighteen- to twenty-three-month range. STUDENT had a vocabulary of at least one word, he varied the sounds in syllable strings, he and imitated single words. However, STUDENT did not follow directions without gestural clues or understand verbs in context, did not initiate games/social routines, name objects, produce successive single works, or use the pronoun ‘my.’ (SS-ST;D19) In summary, Scottish Rite determined that STUDENT continued to require therapy to improve his prelinguistic skills of matching/sequencing and memory, improve his receptive language skills, and improve his expressive language skills. (SS-ST;D19)
In June 2001, an IEP meeting was held for STUDENT. (SD2/D24) At that meeting it was reported that STUDENT had made progress since his initial placement in the program. Particularly, it was reported that STUDENT had begun to spontaneously request items and to access language within supported social situations. However, overall, STUDENT’s unique needs remained the same as they were when first identified in March 2001.
By March 2002, STUDENT had been in a school placement for one year and had received a variety of services. At that time, the District obtained some additional reports, a District specialist report, a District communication specialist report, an inclusion support consultation report from Magnolia Headstart, an occupational therapy progress report from Gallagher, and a progress report from Total Communication Center.
One report prepared by Magnolia Headstart is consistent with the testimony of Erlinda Rodriguez, STUDENT’s aide, Ms. MOTHER, and Stephanie Resell, STUDENT’s teacher, as well as with the information contained in the District specialist’s report. (SW2) Overall, it was reported that while STUDENT had progressed in the past year, he continued to have delays in the areas of expressive and receptive language, fine and gross motor skills, behavior, cognitive skills, and social/play skills. (SL3-SM3, SV2-SW2; D43-44) Because STUDENT had progressed in his ability to communicate and to interact with other children, he required a setting that allowed for regular interaction with typically developing peers. (Test. of Resell, Shubin, FATHER, and Rodriguez)
In summary, STUDENT’s unique needs included assistance with improving his expressive and receptive language, fine and gross motor skills, cognition, and social skills including interaction with typically developing peers. Having identified STUDENT’s unique needs, the Hearing Officer turns to the offered program of March 2002 to determine if that program addresses STUDENT’s unique needs.
Goals and Objectives
STUDENT’s March 2002 IEP contains fourteen goals and objectives. (SO3;D45) The goals drafted by the IEP team include goals in the areas of play skills, social skills, classroom behavior, cognitive skills, receptive language, pragmatics, expressive language, behavioral organization, fine motor and motor planning skills, and preacademic skills. There is no dispute that the goals and objectives drafted at the March 2002 IEP meeting were appropriate to meet STUDENT’s unique needs.
Placement and Services
For the remainder of the 2001-2002 school year through March of the 2002-2003 school year, the District’s offer of placement was at Maizeland in an intensive developmental preschool with an autism focus, five days per week for four hours per day with general education integration during structure learning activities and recess. (SO3; D45) The District also offered STUDENT direct speech and language services four times per week, occupational therapy services, and transportation reimbursement. (SO3;D45) Lastly, while individual DTT services were not offered, the District did offer to assess STUDENT to determine if individual DTT services were a necessary component of his program. (D45; Test. of Moore-Brown)
As discussed above, STUDENT’s unique needs required that he have a program that permitted integration with typically developing peers as well as opportunities for language development and development of preschool and cognition skills. The classroom offered by the District addressed those needs by offering an environment that utilized many approaches to teaching including, DTT, TEACCH, and PECS. (Test. of Resell) Additionally, the Maizeland classroom utilized a “center based teaching approach.” like that at his previous placement at Sorenson, to address individual skills and cognition. (Test. of Resell and Moore-Brown)
In March 2002, the District did not offer STUDENT individual DTT services. According to the District, STUDENT had made great strides in his placement, which included the use of DTT in the classroom, and was no longer relying upon PECS for all of his communication needs. (Test. of Resell and Rodriguez) Furthermore, it was reported that he knew all his basic shapes, could complete puzzles, could match a sound to a picture, and had met most of his goals and objectives. (SL3; D43; Test. of Resell). Overall, the evidence presented indicates that STUDENT did not require individual DTT services to meet his unique needs during this time period. While additional assessment information may have determined that DTT services would be beneficial to STUDENT, the information provided at the hearing indicates that the program that was designed for STUDENT addressed his unique needs through the placement and services that were offered to STUDENT.
With regard to the offered speech and language and occupational therapy services, there is no dispute that the offered occupational therapy services were appropriate, and STUDENT’s parents did accept those services. However, STUDENT’s parents did not accept the offered speech and language services because the District allegedly failed to specify how those services would be provided. As discussed above, the Hearing Officer found that the IEP was specific enough to identify the frequency and duration of speech and language services. This frequency and duration were the same that STUDENT had been receiving previously. No evidence was presented to indicate that STUDENT required more or less speech services than he had been receiving; therefore, the level of services offered continued to be appropriate to meet STUDENT’s unique needs.
Furthermore, California Code of Regulations section 3051 specifies that in an IEP the frequency and duration of designated instruction and services, such as speech and language services, shall be specified. In the March 2002 IEP, the District offered STUDENT direct speech and language four times per week for thirty minutes each session in either a one-to-one or small group (1:2 or 1:3) setting. (SO3;D45) This specification identifies the frequency and duration of services being offered which satisfies the legal requirements for specification of services.
In summary, the Hearing Officer finds that the District’s offer of placement from March 2001 through March 2003 was appropriate to meet STUDENT’s unique needs and turns to whether that offer was reasonably calculated to provide STUDENT with some educational benefit and offered in conformity with his IEP.
The program and services offered by the District were similar in many respects to those provided to STUDENT the previous year. However, the difficulty of the goals and objectives in the new program increased. (SO3; D45) In the previous year, STUDENT had progressed while the District’s program. Over the past year, STUDENT’s developmental functioning had increased from the twenty-four month level to the fifty- to fifty-four month level and his expressive and receptive language had increased from the forty- to forty-eight week level to the twenty- to twenty-four month level. (SO, SU, SL-M; D19, S43-44)
Moreover, in as much as STUDENT made progress without benefit of individual DTT services and despite his parents decreasing his classroom attendance, it is reasonable to conclude that the District’s offer of placement and services will continue to provide him with educational benefit. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that in addition to being designed to meet his unique needs, the District’s offer of placement and services was reasonably calculated to provide STUDENT with educational benefit. Lastly, because STUDENT’s parents withdrew him from the District in March 2002, and the only services provided by the District after that date were the occupational services provided through Gallagher, the requirement that the services be provided in conformity with STUDENT’s IEP is not relevant.
In summary, the Hearing Officer finds that the program and services offered by the District were designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs and to provide him with educational benefit, thus constituting a FAPE for STUDENT.
IV If the District failed to offer STUDENT a FAPE are his parents entitled to reimbursement for the cost of his placement with LIFE and private speech and language services with Kidstreet?
Parents may be entitled to reimbursement for the costs of placement or services they have procured for their child when the school district has failed to provide a FAPE and the private placement or services were appropriate under the IDEA and replaced services that the school district failed to provide. School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Education (1985) 471 U.S. 359, 369-370; STUDENT W. v. Puyallup School District, 31 F. 3d 1489, 1496 (9th Cir. 1994); 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C). A hearing officer has broad authority to craft an appropriate equitable remedy. See Burlington. Equitable considerations are appropriate when fashioning compensatory remedies. Thus, an application of equitable principles requires that the actions of the parties themselves must be considered when evaluating the circumstances surrounding the child's lost education opportunity and in creating an adequate remedy. Id.
As discussed above, the Hearing Officer found that the District failed to provide STUDENT with a FAPE from September 2001 through March 2002. During that period, STUDENT was denied DTT services as required by his IEP. Specifically, STUDENT’s IEP required that he receive five hours of DTT services per week, with one hour of supervision per week, and two hours of clinic participation per month. While STUDENT’s parents did not immediately procure appropriate replacement services for STUDENT, they did in fact obtain such services. (Test. of FATHER and Arakaki) The services obtained by STUDENT’s parents were comparable to those that STUDENT was denied by the District. Those services benefitted STUDENT in the same manner that he would have benefitted had the District fulfilled its obligation to provide such services. Therefore, in this case it is appropriate to order reimbursement to STUDENT’s parents for the services they obtained that would replace the services that STUDENT was denied. STUDENT’s parents are entitled to reimbursement for five hours of DTT services per week, one hour of supervision per week, and two hours of clinic services per month, for a time period equal to that of the start of the 2001 school year through STUDENT’s March 2002 IEP.
V If the District failed to offer STUDENT a FAPE is he entitled to compensatory education?
When a school district denies a STUDENT a FAPE, the STUDENT is entitled to relief that is “appropriate” in light of the purposes of the IDEA. School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education, supra 471 U.S. at 369. Court decisions subsequent to Burlington have also extended relief in the form of compensatory education to STUDENT s who have been denied a FAPE. Lester H. v. L. Gilhool and the Chester Upland School District (3rd Cir. 1990) 916 F. 2d 865: Miener v. State of Missouri (8th Cir. 1986) 800 F. 2d 749. However, courts have consistently held that the authority to award compensatory education is derived from 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B)(iii), which authorizes a court to grant such “relief as it determines is appropriate.” The purpose of compensatory education is to replace lost educational services. Moubry v. Independent School District Number 696, 951 F. Supp. 867 (9th Cir. 1996). Compensatory education may be an appropriate equitable remedy when the responsible educational agency has failed to provide a disabled child with an appropriate education as required by the IDEA. Todd v. Andrews, 933 F. 2d 1576 (11th Cir. 1991). Compensatory education is an equitable remedy, and there is no obligation to provide day-for-day or hour-for-hour compensation. “Appropriate relief is relief designed to ensure that the STUDENT is appropriately educated within the meaning of the IDEA.” STUDENT W. v. Puyallup School District, supra, 31 F. 3d at 1497. In crafting appropriate relief, a hearing officer has broad latitude. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k); School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts, supra, 471 U.S. 359.
From September 2001 through March 2002, STUDENT was denied DTT services. Such a denial could result in an award of compensatory educational services. However, STUDENT has been made whole by the award of reimbursement discussed above. Therefore, any additional award of compensatory services is denied.(Footnote 7)
ORDER
1. Within 20 days of this order, the District shall reimburse STUDENT’s parents for the cost of five hours of DTT instruction per week, one hour of supervision per week, and two hours of clinic time per month obtained from LIFE for a time period equal to that of the start of the 2001 school year through the date of STUDENT’s March 2002 IEP.
2. All of STUDENT ’s other requests for relief are denied.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
Pursuant to Education Code section 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with that statute:
I Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the independent psychoeducational assessment they obtained from Dr. Melanie Lenington and independent speech and language assessment they obtained from Kidstreet?
The District prevailed on this issue.
II Did the District provide STUDENT a free, appropriate public education from July 25, 2001 through March 2003?
1. March 2001 through July 24, 2001
The District prevailed on this issue
2. July 25, 2001 through September 2001
The District prevailed on this issue.
3. September 2001 through March 2002
The STUDENT prevailed on this issue.
4. March 2002 through March 2003
The District prevailed on this issue.
III If the District failed to provide STUDENT a FAPE are his parents entitled to reimbursement for the cost of his placement with LIFE and private speech and language services with Kidstreet?
The District prevailed on this issue.
IV If the District failed to provide STUDENT a FAPE, is he entitled to compensatory education?
The STUDENT prevailed on this issue.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this Decision. Calif. Educ. Code § 56505(i).
Dated: April 17, 2003 _________________________________________ Sherianne Laba Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
1. The issues initially identified at the hearing have been reworded, without effect on substance, to facilitate the writing of this decision. 2. At the hearing, the parties agreed to limit the issues to the time period from March 2001 to March 2003. The parties agreed that since STUDENT’s annual IEP was to be held in March 2003, issues related to services after that date were not yet ripe
3. STUDENT’s allegations related to the failure to develop goals and objectives and failure to consider LRE, while raised as an allegation of a procedural errors, these are actually allegations of a substantive error. Despite how the issues were framed at the hearing, each issue will be appropriately considered in the legal analysis of this Decision.
4. The analysis used to determine if a program is substantively appropriate may also included a determination that the program provided access to the regular curriculum and is in the least restrictive environment. However, in this case, it is not necessary for the Hearing Officer to address those factors as they were not contested. 5. The District also asserts that based upon a stay put order issued by SEHO, it has already been determined that STUDENT’s placement at Maizeland was a voluntary placement by his parents, which negates the need for further parental consent. The stay put order the District refers to was an order issued without the benefit of a full evidentiary hearing in a case that had been closed. Furthermore, the purpose of stay put is to maintain a STUDENT ’s placement while a dispute between the parties is being resolved and is not an adjudication of the program offered to a STUDENT or a district’s responsibilities.
6. At an IEP meeting in October 2001, the District offered to reimplement the DTT services. However, despite the inclusion of the DTT services in two previous IEPs the District disputed the necessity of those services and the parties were unable to reach agreement on reimplementation of the services.
7. STUDENT also contends that the speech and language services that he was provided did not comport with his IEP. STUDENT’s June IEP required that he receive two thirty-minute speech and language sessions per week. (SD2; D24) The settlement agreement reached between the parties in July 2001 provided for two additional thirty minute sessions per week. (D27) The uncontradicted testimony of Jennifer Shubin, speech therapist, was that while STUDENT was at Maizeland she provided him with four thirty minute speech and language sessions per week, which was in conformity with the settlement agreement.
