California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · April 24, 2003

Student v. Lancaster School District

SEHO Case No. SN 464-03 · Hearing Officer Michael F. Geary

Lancaster School District not required to provide one-to-one tutoring or a calculator; Hearing Officer denies all claims.

District prevailed on all issues

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Summary

A non-attorney advocate, working with an attorney, filed for due process for a 13-year-old eighth grader at Amargosa Creek Middle School in Lancaster School District. The student had received special education since second grade. At his September 2002 triennial review, the IEP team found he no longer qualified under serious emotional disturbance but was still eligible because of a specific learning disability. He stayed in a special day class for reading, written language and math and began taking some general education classes. The family accepted the March 2003 IEP except for two requests: 45 minutes a week of one-to-one tutoring from a credentialed teacher, and use of a calculator.

The Hearing Officer denied the district's motion for nonsuit, noting that no rule allows that motion in these hearings. He then found that both IEPs were reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit without the extra services. The special day class teacher and the school psychologist testified that the student was making excellent progress, as shown by his grades and test scores. His father agreed. The teacher said a calculator would undermine the student's math learning. The only contrary evidence was the advocate's opinion, which carried little weight because he had limited qualifications. All claims were denied. In a separate section, the Hearing Officer found that the student's advocate and attorney had not represented him competently. He also stated that the advocate's brochure falsely claimed the Hearing Office recommended his organization.

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Why it matters

The decision shows how SEHO applied the Rowley "some educational benefit" standard. A parent's wish for extra services did not show a denial of FAPE when the evidence showed the student was making progress. The decision also shows a Hearing Officer weighing an advocate's qualifications and addressing the quality of a student's representation.

Issues and holdings

  1. District prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue 1. Does the Petitioner need one-to-one tutoring and the use of a calculator during the 2002-2003 school year to benefit from his education? (whether the September 2002 and March 2003 IEPs were reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit without individual tutoring of 45 minutes per week from a credentialed teacher in reading, written language and math, and without a calculator)

    Both IEPs were designed to meet the student's needs and were reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit; the student was making good progress, and one-to-one tutoring and a calculator were not needed.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • All of the Petitioner's claims to relief were denied.

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Key authorities

Rowley; Seattle School District No. 1 v. B.S.; Union School Dist. v. Smith; Gregory K. v. Longview School District; W.G. v. Target Range; Clyde K. v. Puyallup School District

People named in the decision

  • Terry Welch, special education teacher (SH-SDC), Amargosa Creek Middle School, Lancaster School District
  • Patricia Wilson, school psychologist (triennial assessor), Lancaster School District
  • Lexy Conte, co-principal, Amargosa Creek Middle School
  • Sue James, director of student services, Lancaster School District
  • Brian Allen, non-attorney advocate and educational consultant for Student; witness, Dream Team Network North
  • Ron Lackey, Ed.D., student advocacy and consultation business operator, Dream Team Network South
  • Egon Mittelmann, attorney for Student, Law Offices of Robert D. Pellinen & Associates
  • Robert D. Pellinen, attorney (law office of record for Student), Law Offices of Robert D. Pellinen & Associates
  • Carol J. Grogan, attorney for District, Lancaster School District
  • Stacy Inman, attorney for District, Lancaster School District

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Michael F. Geary, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in Lancaster, California, on April 3, 2003.

Petitioner STUDENT (Petitioner or STUDENT) was represented at the hearing by attorney Egon Mittelmann, who is associated with the Law Offices of Robert D. Pellinen & Associates. Brian Allen, who does business as Dream Team Network North, was also present and participated as Petitioner’s advocate. Mr. PARENT, STUDENT’s father, was present during part of the hearing.(Footnote 1) Respondent Lancaster School District (Respondent or District) was represented at the hearing by attorney Carol J. Grogan. Another attorney, Stacy Inman, also was present for the District during the morning session only. Sue James, the District’s director of student services, was present throughout the hearing.

The Petitioner called the following witnesses: Mr. PARENT; Terry Welch, STUDENT’s special education teacher at Amargosa Creek Middle School (Amargosa); Patricia Wilson, a District psychologist; Lexy Conte, a co-principal at Amargosa; and Brian Allen.

The District called Sue James and examined the witnesses called by the Petitioner.

The oral and documentary evidence was presented at the hearing. Closing arguments of the parties were heard, and the record was closed on April 3, 2003.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Following the taking of testimony from Petitioner’s witnesses and an indication by Petitioner that he would be offering no other documents or testimony during his case in chief, the District made a motion for a nonsuit or, alternatively, a motion to dismiss the Petitioner’s claims. The motions were made on the ground that the evidence showed that as a matter of law the Petitioner was entitled to none of the relief sought. The Petitioner opposed the motion.

There is no provision in the law that authorizes a motion for a nonsuit in a special education due process hearing. That motion was denied. It is within the authority of the Hearing Officer to dismiss issues or an entire case if there is no dispute as to the material facts and those facts establish as a matter of law that one or the other party is entitled to a decision in its favor. The Hearing Officer had not yet had the opportunity to review the documentary evidence in any detail. The District indicated that it had testimony to offer. It was possible that the Petitioner could seek to offer rebuttal testimony or other evidence. Because it appeared that the presentation of evidence was almost concluded and that both of the parties would be better served by the issuance of a formal decision on the merits, the motion to dismiss was denied.

ISSUE

Issue No. 1: Does the Petitioner need one-to-one tutoring and the use of a calculator during the 2002-2003 school year to benefit from his education?

CONTENTIONS

The Petitioner’s contention was that that he needs individual tutoring in reading, written language, and math for forty-five minutes per week from a credentialed teacher, and the use of a calculator to benefit from his education. The District asserts that the September 2002 and March 2003 IEPs were both reasonably calculated to provide an educational benefit to STUDENT without the additional services sought by Petitioner.

BACKGROUND

STUDENT is thirteen years and ten months old. He is currently in the eighth grade at Amargosa and has been eligible for and receiving special education since August 1996, when he was in the second grade. STUDENT was initially found eligible for special education under the category specific learning disability (SLD). His early placement was in a general education setting, but with services through the resource specialist program (RSP) to help him with language arts. Later, due to increasing concerns about his behavior, STUDENT was reassessed and also found eligible for special education under the category serious emotional disturbance (SED). He was subsequently placed in a special day class for severely handicapped students (SH-SDC), where he remained full-time until his triennial individualized education plan (IEP) meeting on September 19, 2002.

STUDENT was reassessed again as part of the triennial review in September 2002. The results of that assessment were reviewed at the September 19, 2002 IEP meeting. The IEP team determined that STUDENT was no longer eligible for special education under the category SED, but that he remained eligible as a child with a specific learning disability. The team also agreed that STUDENT was ready to begin a gradual transition back into the general education environment (sometimes referred to as “mainstreaming”). His placement in the SH-SDC for social studies, language arts, and math was to continue, but STUDENT was to join general education peers for science and physical education classes and for lunch. STUDENT was also to continue receiving psychological counseling services under Chapter 26.5, Division 7, Title 1 (§§ 7570, et seq.) of the California Government Code.(Footnote 2) The team also agreed that further mainstreaming opportunities would be provided and that the team would meet again in March 2002 to discuss those opportunities. High school transition was to be addressed at a later meeting because the team was not able to predict what STUDENT’s program might be when he entered high school.

On February 5, 2003, Mr. Allen wrote to the District to request a March 2003 IEP meeting, an event that had already been contemplated by the parties. On February 18, 2002, Mr. Allen again wrote to the District to repeat the request for a March 2003 IEP meeting and to propose another IEP meeting in May to discuss a transition plan for STUDENT, another event that was already under consideration.

On March 10, 2003, Mr. Allen filed a request for a due process hearing. The request alleges that the District’s placement of and services to STUDENT were not providing educational benefit. No further details were provided. On March 11, 2003, Mr. Allen provided, in summary, the following proposed resolutions. He requested that the District be ordered to (1) provide a placement and services to meet STUDENT’s needs; (2) convene an IEP meeting on March 27, 2003 to discuss mainstreaming; (3) provide individual tutoring by a credentialed teacher in reading, written language, and math; (4) convene an IEP meeting in May 2003 to discuss transition; and (5) pay Petitioner’s attorneys’ fees.

On March 17, 2003, the parties agreed to convene an IEP meeting on March 27, 2003. On March 20, 2003, Mr. Allen filed another issue statement. This one listed the same issue but some different proposed resolutions. Petitioner requested that the District be ordered to (1) provide a placement and services to meet STUDENT’s needs; (2) provide individual tutoring by a credentialed teacher in reading, written language, and math; (3) convene an IEP meeting in May 2003 to develop a transition plan for STUDENT; (4) provide assistive technology, a calculator, for STUDENT’s use in school; and (5) pay Petitioner’s attorneys’ fees.

On March 24, 2003, the District offered to convene another IEP meeting in May to discuss a transition plan for STUDENT.

The District convened an IEP meeting on March 27, 2003, as planned. The District members of the IEP team recommended continued placement in the SH-SDC but with increased participation of STUDENT in general education classes. STUDENT was offered science, physical education (PE), and an exploratory class with general education peers, as well as lunch. STUDENT’s father requested individual tutoring and the use of a calculator because of his concerns about STUDENT’s math and reading skills. The District suggested that STUDENT could attend the after-school tutoring session that is available to all students three times per week. STUDENT’s teacher explained that STUDENT’s use of a calculator would be counterproductive. The participants agreed that a further IEP meeting would be held in May 2003 to discuss a transition plan. Mr. PARENT did not agree to the IEP while at the meeting. However, on March 31, 2003, Mr. Allen wrote to the District to convey Mr. PARENT’s agreement to the IEP except with regard to the tutoring and calculator issues. Petitioner claims that the September 2002 and March 2003 IEPs were not reasonably calculated to provide an educational benefit to STUDENT for the 2002-2003 school year because they did not include the provision of those two services. This was the only issue presented for hearing.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Issue No. 1: Does the Petitioner need one-to-one tutoring and the use of a calculator to benefit from his education?

A FAPE is special education and related services that are available to a student at no charge to his or her parent or guardian, meet the standards of the State educational agency, and are provided in conformity with the student’s IEP. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8). It includes special education and related services that are designed to meet the child’s unique needs that cannot be met with modification of the regular instructional program. Cal. Educ. Code § 56031. It must enable the student to be involved in and progress in the general curriculum and provide the opportunity to be educated and participate with nondisabled students to the maximum extent possible (often referred to as least restrictive environment or LRE). 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345.

An appropriate public education does not mean the absolute best or “potential-maximizing” education for the student. Seattle School District No. 1 v. B.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1996); Union School District v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1524 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 965 (1994). Moreover, the focus of the inquiry should not be on whether the student may obtain greater benefit in the placement that is preferred by the parents but, rather, whether the school district’s proposed placement is reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit to the student. Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982); Gregory K. v. Longview School District, 811 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987).

In summary, to be substantively appropriate, an IEP must (1) be designed to meet the student’s unique needs; (2) be reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit; (3) conform with the student’s IEP; (4) enable the student to be involved in and progress in the general curriculum; and (5) provide the student with the opportunity to be educated and participate with nondisabled students to the maximum extent possible.(Footnote 3)

STUDENT’s areas of need are not in dispute. As a result of an auditory processing problem, he requires help with reading, written language, and math. Although the Petitioner does not allege that the District failed to provide and offer a program that was designed to meet his unique needs, some discussion of this issue is necessary.

Both of the IEPs at issue offer essentially the same program. STUDENT is placed in the SH-SDC that he has been in since the 2001-2002 school year. He continues to receive mental health services pursuant to Chapter 26.5. The September 2002 IEP provides that STUDENT will be mainstreamed in two classes, Science and PE, and for lunch. The March 2003 IEP provides for the same placement and services but also for mainstreaming in an additional class. This change results in STUDENT’s greater participation in the general education curriculum.

Several witnesses testified regarding the subject IEPs. Terry Welch has been the teacher of STUDENT’s SH-SDC class for several years. Mr. Welch is assisted by two paraeducators. There are approximately fifteen children in the class. Mr. Welch believes that the September 2002 and March 2003 IEPs, which both continue STUDENT’s placement in the SH-SDC for reading, written language, and math, are designed to meet his need for assistance in those areas while also providing an increasing opportunity to participate in the general curriculum.

Patricia Wilson has been a credentialed school psychologist for four years. She conducted the recent psychological assessment for STUDENT’s triennial review and has observed STUDENT often in his classrooms. She also was present at both the September 2002 and the March 2003 IEP meetings. In Ms. Wilson’s opinion, the subject IEPs were both designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs.

Because there was substantial evidence that the September 2002 and March 2003 IEPs were both designed to meet STUDENT’s needs and because the Petitioner offered no evidence to the contrary, the Hearing Officer finds that the September 2002 and March 2003 IEPs were both designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs.

The Petitioner’s contends that the subject IEPs were not reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit. Mr. PARENT testified that his son wants individual tutoring because he does not want to be teased or embarrassed and that since STUDENT saw his sister using a calculator to do her schoolwork, he wanted one of his own to do simple mathematical calculations. He admits that he thought the after-school tutoring discussed at the March 27, 2003 IEP meeting was a good idea at the time, but explained that he was convinced otherwise after talking to his son and Mr. Allen, who pointed out that the tutoring was not the one-to-one that STUDENT wanted.

Mr. Welch testified that although STUDENT would benefit from individual tutoring, as would almost any child, in his opinion individual tutoring is not required for STUDENT to meet his goals and objectives and is not educationally necessary. He explained that this ratio of staff to students allows for significant opportunities for one-to-one assistance. He believes that STUDENT’s current SDC program provides meaningful benefit without additional tutoring. He also believes that STUDENT should not be allowed to use a calculator to do simple math calculations. In his opinion, the use of a calculator by STUDENT would undermine the learning process and interfere with the Petitioner’s development of critical thinking skills.

Ms. Wilson agreed that STUDENT’s current program is calculated to provide, and is in fact providing, meaningful educational benefit to him and that STUDENT does not need individual tutoring or the use of a calculator to achieve his educational goals. She stated that STUDENT is making excellent progress in his current program, including his general education classes, as evidenced by his improving grades and standardized test scores, the reports of his teacher, and Ms. Wilson’s own observations. Even Mr. PARENT agrees that STUDENT is doing well in his current program. He acknowledges that his son’s grades and overall performance are improving, but he thinks STUDENT would do even better with the additional services sought in this proceeding.

The only evidence offered by the Petitioner that even suggested that the September 2002 and March 2003 IEPs were not reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit to STUDENT was the testimony of Brian Allen, STUDENT’s educational consultant and advocate. Mr. Allen was called by the Petitioner to state his opinion regarding STUDENT’s need for individual tutoring. The District challenged the qualifications of Mr. Allen to offer an opinion regarding the special education or related services that STUDENT needs. The Hearing Officer allowed the testimony on the basis that the Hearing Office generally admits evidence that is arguably relevant and not cumulative and then weighs it accordingly.

Mr. Allen testified that the education, training, and experience that qualified him to state an opinion concerning STUDENT’s special education needs consisted of one three-unit college-level course on understanding and educating the disabled, participation in IEPs, mediations, and due process hearings, attendance at monthly meetings of a child and parent advocacy group, and work with Ron Lackey, Ed.D., who conducts a similar student advocacy and consultation business under the name “Dream Team Network South.” Mr. Allen provided no further details concerning his education, training, and experience in the area of special education. He went on to testify that, in his opinion, STUDENT has made no progress in his program since the September 19, 2002 IEP was implemented. He did not adequately explain how he arrived at this opinion or the bases for it, except to observe that STUDENT is not performing at grade level. Mr. Allen did not dispute the District’s evidence that standardized test scores, grades and the opinions of STUDENT’s teacher and the school psychologist all indicate that STUDENT is making progress and receiving a substantial benefit from his education without tutoring. He also did not dispute Mr. PARENT’s testimony that STUDENT has made progress and is doing well in his current program.

The Hearing Officer was persuaded by the testimony of Mr. Welch and Ms. Wilson that the subject IEPs were and are reasonably calculated to provide an educational benefit to STUDENT. There was abundant evidence that STUDENT has benefited from the implementation of the September 2002 IEP and will continue to benefit from the March 2003 IEP. According to all reliable witnesses, including STUDENT’s father, the Petitioner is making progress in his current program. The fact that STUDENT is not performing at grade level is not an indication that the program is not appropriate. As pointed out by Mr. Welch, all of his students in the SH-SDC have weaknesses and none of them is working at grade level. There was no credible evidence that the Petitioner needs one-to-one tutoring or the use of a calculator to benefit from his education. All of the evidence demonstrates that STUDENT is receiving meaningful benefit without either of these.

There is no dispute regarding whether or not STUDENT’s program conforms to the last agreed-upon IEP of September 2002. The Petitioner also does not dispute that the subject IEPs enable the student to be involved in and progress in the general curriculum and provide the student with the opportunity to be educated and participate with nondisabled students to the maximum extent possible. It is clear from the evidence that both the District and parent are working appropriately toward those ends.

The Hearing Officer finds that the Petitioner does not need one-to-one tutoring or the use of a calculator to benefit from his education.

OTHER MATTERS

The Hearing Officer feels compelled to address an additional matter of some significance: the quality of STUDENT’s representation in this case. It is the belief of the Hearing Officer that in spite of the quality of that representation the Hearing Officer made a correct determination under the law for STUDENT . However, for the reasons discussed below, it is the Hearing Officer’s view that STUDENT’s parents should not be obligated to pay for the services rendered by the advocate and attorney in this matter.

Brian Allen filed this request for due process for STUDENT. Although the request was also nominally filed by the Law Office of Robert D. Pellinen and Associates, it appears that Mr. Allen was actually representing the interests of STUDENT and that he did most of the work on the matter prior to the hearing. It is the Hearing Officer’s belief that Mr. Allen’s request was filed without there really being any significant issue in dispute. With the exception of attorneys’ fees, the only issue raised in the original issue statement that did not relate to matters that the District had either already agreed to or was likely to agree to was the request for individual tutoring. The only new issue raised later was the claim that STUDENT needed a calculator, a matter that was apparently never even raised with the District. As discussed above, Mr. Allen had no evidence upon which to base his claim that STUDENT needed either the tutoring or the calculator to receive a benefit from his education. The Hearing Officer believes that Mr. Allen knew before he gave testimony at the hearing that he was not qualified to state the opinions he ultimately testified to under oath. All along, Mr. Allen ignored the clear evidence that

STUDENT was receiving a meaningful benefit from his program without the services Petitioner sought.

At the very least, the Hearing Officer questions the ability of Mr. Allen to provide the services he sought to provide here for STUDENT. The law provides that parties to special education due process proceedings have the right “to be accompanied and advised by counsel and by individuals with special knowledge or training relating to the problems of children and youth with disabilities.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(1); Cal. Educ Code § 56501(e)(1). Mr. Allen did not demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Hearing Officer that he possessed the special knowledge or training required by the cited statutes.(Footntoe 4)

There also is the question of the manner in which Mr. Allen promotes himself in the literature that he provided to the Hearing Officer at the Hearing. Mr. Allen’s advertising brochure states, or at least strongly implies, that his organization provides advocates and attorneys who are knowledgeable about disabilities and special education law and that the Hearing Office recommends his organization to parents who feel they need expert advice and representation. The first of these assertions, that Mr. Allen’s organization provides advocates and attorneys who are knowledgeable about disabilities and special education law, was not borne out in this case. The second assertion, that the Hearing Office recommends Mr. Allen’s organization to parents who feel they need expert advice and representation, is clearly false and quite probably fraudulent. Mr. Allen and his associates would be well advised to not make any written or oral representation to anyone suggesting that the Hearing Office recommends them. It is unlawful to falsely represent one’s qualifications or endorsements. (See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200.)

Egon Mittelmann is a licensed attorney. Unlike Brian Allen, Mr. Mittelmann is bound by all the statutes and rules governing the practice of law. It is the duty of an attorney licensed in this state to counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him legal or just and not to encourage either the commencement or continuance of an action or proceeding from any corrupt interest. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068. In addition, the Rules of Professional Conduct that govern attorneys licensed in this state provide for discipline if a member of the Bar intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly fails to perform legal services with competence. Cal. Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rule 3-110. This rule applies not only to the work done by the attorney, but also to any work done by others under his or her direction and control. (See: Drafter’s Notes to Rule 3-110.)

When Mr. Mittelmann, and through him Mr. Pellinen, took on the responsibility of acting as an attorney for STUDENT in this matter, they also assumed responsibility for any acts or omissions of those working under their direction and control. In addition to that vicarious responsibility, Mr. Mittelmann is also responsible for his own professional conduct. He demonstrated such insufficient learning, skill, and familiarity with the pertinent facts of this case as to warrant a finding that he failed to act competently in connection with his handling of this matter.

These are matters of great importance. All involved in the representation of STUDENT in this case should take careful note and conduct themselves accordingly in their future involvement in legal matters. With regard to matters within the jurisdiction of the Hearing Office, they should be advised that Hearing Officers have the power to initiate contempt and sanction proceedings. Although those proceedings would never be initiated without just cause, they will be pursued as warranted.

ORDER

All of the Petitioner’s claims to relief are denied.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to Cal. Educ. Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute:

The District prevailed on the sole issue.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this Decision. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i).

Dated: April 24, 2003 __________________________________ Michael F. Geary, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

1. Mr. PARENT excused himself from the hearing early to attend to other business. He expressly requested that the hearing proceed in his absence. 2. The reference in the IEP to mental health services was to “AB 3632,” which is a reference to Assembly Bill 3632, which was passed in 1984 to become a part of Chapter 26.5. 3. In addition to the substantive FAPE requirements, the United States Supreme Court has held that the IDEA requires certain procedural protections that will allow the student and parents to effectively participate in the IEP process. Rowley, supra, at pp. 206-207. Not every procedural flaw is critical, but one that results in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringes on the parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP process may in and of itself constitute a denial of a FAPE. W.G. v. Bd. of Trustees of Target Range School District No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483-1484 (9th Cir. 1992; Clyde K. v. Puyallup School District No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1994). However, there was no claim in this case that there were any procedural defects. 4. Mr. Mittelmann stipulated at the hearing that Mr. Allen had no understanding or ability as an educational consultant or advocate.