California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · August 17, 1998
Student v. San Francisco Unified School District et al.
SEHO Case No. SN 476-98 · Hearing Officer Hee C. Kim
San Francisco Unified and Community Mental Health must reimburse 80% of KidsPeace residential costs; District must also provide transition services.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Summary
An 18-year-old eleventh grader, eligible for special education for a specific learning disability, filed against San Francisco Unified School District and San Francisco Community Mental Health. Her nonpublic school, Hart Day School, closed in 1997. The District had no IEP or placement ready when 1997-98 began. She started at Lincoln High School in October with a 1:1 paraprofessional. At that IEP meeting she agreed to a mental health assessment referral, but the District never sent it. She was later in a psychiatric hospital from February to May 1998. In May the IEP team added serious emotional disturbance and agreed she needed a residential program, but made no written offer. Her mother placed her at KidsPeace, an uncertified facility in Pennsylvania.
The Hearing Officer found a denial of FAPE. The District lost the referral, missed the annual IEP, held a meeting 12 days late after the mother became conservator, gave no written residential offer, and gave no instruction for about two months during the hospital stay. Transition planning was also inadequate. The Hearing Officer could not order placement at uncertified KidsPeace. Respondents must still reimburse 80 percent of tuition and travel through extended school year, reduced because the mother had not shared information. The District must offer a residential program, fund a vocational evaluation, and develop a transition plan. Other claims were denied.
Why it matters
The decision shows how SEHO applied Union v. Smith and California's definition of a specific placement when respondents only orally recommended a residential facility. It also shows a Hearing Officer refusing to order prospective placement at an uncertified facility, yet granting partial reimbursement for it. Reimbursement was cut 20 percent because the parent did not share information.
Issues and holdings
- Student prevailedAssessment
Issue 1a. Did the District and/or Mental Health deny FAPE during 1997-98 by failing to perform or cause to be performed, within the time required by law, the psychological assessment requested on or about October 8, 1997?
The District got written consent for an AB 3632 mental health referral on October 8, 1997, but never sent it to Mental Health. This violated the 50-day assessment and IEP timeline in Education Code section 56344.
- Student prevailed in partIEP procedure
Issue 1b. Did the District and/or Mental Health deny FAPE by failing to conduct an IEP meeting until May 18, 1998, following receipt of a written request from the mother on or about March 1, 1998?
Because the student was an adult, the mother's March request did not start the 30-day timeline. The timeline started on April 6, when the District received the conservatorship papers and the request. The May 18 meeting was 12 days late, which was de minimis standing alone but counted toward the cumulative denial of FAPE.
- Student prevailedIEP procedure
Issue 1c. Did the District and/or Mental Health deny FAPE by failing to offer an appropriate residential placement after the IEP team determined that a residential placement was necessary?
Neither respondent made a written, specific offer of a residential facility. An oral recommendation of Seneca did not satisfy Union v. Smith or 5 C.C.R. section 3042, so the proposed placement could not be considered.
- Student prevailedIEP procedure
Issue 1d. Did the District and/or Mental Health deny FAPE by failing to provide any instructional services for approximately the first month of the school year?
The District held no annual IEP after May 1997 and had no IEP in effect at the start of 1997-98, so the student missed the first six weeks of school.
- Student prevailed in partImplementation
Issue 1e. Did the District and/or Mental Health deny FAPE by failing to provide any instructional services from early February 1998 to mid-May 1998 while the student was hospitalized?
The District, which was responsible under Education Code section 56167, provided no instruction from mid-February to mid-May. Allowing for the period when the student was not available to learn and the hospital's refusal of homework, this was a denial of FAPE for about two months.
- District prevailedUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue 2. If the District and/or Mental Health failed to offer an appropriate residential placement, are they required to fund placement for the student at KidsPeace?
Education Code section 56505.2(a) bars a Hearing Officer from ordering placement at a noncertified nonpublic school, and KidsPeace was not certified.
- District prevailedThreshold and jurisdiction
Issue 3. Did the District award the student unearned credits toward graduation?
Grade and credit disputes fall under Education Code sections 49066 and 49070, not special education due process, so the issue was not considered. The Hearing Officer added that the evidence would not have shown the credits were unearned in any event.
- Student prevailed in partTransition
Issue 4. Did the District fail to devise and implement a transition plan as required by law?
The District gave no transition services from age 16 (September 1995) until May 28, 1996, or from May to October 1997. The October 1997 IEP's plan, which only had the student look into colleges herself, was inadequate. Only the May 1996 IEP was appropriate.
Issue 5. Did the District fail to assess and/or provide services within time limits following a request from the mother for a speech and language assessment in Spring 1994?
The claim was barred by the three-year limitations period (Alexopulos). The student also gave no evidence on the later period, and the issue was not properly noticed for hearing.
- Student prevailed in partTransition
Issue 6. Is the student entitled to compensatory education?
Compensatory transition services were awarded: a functional vocational evaluation and a detailed transition plan. Requests for two more years of academic instruction and for private speech services were denied.
- District prevailedThreshold and jurisdiction
Issue 7a. Is the mother entitled to reimbursement for attorney's fees?
Under Education Code section 56507(b), a Hearing Officer has no authority to award attorney's fees.
- District prevailedUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue 7b. Is the mother entitled to reimbursement for educational consulting services provided by Virginia Reiss, M.S.?
No authority was shown that would let the Hearing Officer award the costs of an educational consultant.
- Student prevailed in partUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue 7c. Is the mother entitled to reimbursement for expenses relating to the student's placement at KidsPeace, including tuition and costs of travel for the student and her mother?
KidsPeace was appropriate and gave educational benefit. Weighing the equities, including the mother's failure to share information about the student's emotional needs, respondents must reimburse 80% of tuition and of travel costs for the student and her accompanying mother through ESY.
- District prevailedUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue 7d. Is the mother entitled to reimbursement for psychiatric treatment privately obtained for the student since October 8, 1997?
The claim was denied because the student gave no adequate notice that reimbursement for psychiatric treatment was at issue, and it was not proven.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- Order to convene IEP meeting. Within 15 calendar days of the decision, the District must convene the expanded IEP team to discuss, identify and offer an appropriate 24-hour residential treatment program for the next six months. The program must have a high student-staff ratio; comprehensive, intensive therapeutic care; peers at the student's level of functioning; resources to seclude or restrain when necessary; recreational opportunities such as track; and instruction in independent living and prevocational/vocational skills. The student must be invited with her conservator, and may attend by telephone.
- Order to assess. Within 30 calendar days of the student's placement at a residential treatment facility under that IEP, the District must arrange and complete a functional vocational evaluation.
- Compensatory education. Compensatory transition services: within 30 calendar days after the vocational evaluation is completed, the District must convene the expanded IEP team to develop a detailed transition plan. The plan must be based on the evaluation and the student's needs, preferences and interests, and include further instruction in independent living skills and community and/or work experiences, as appropriate. The student must be invited and may attend by telephone.
- Reimbursement. Within 20 calendar days of receiving proof from the mother, respondents must reimburse 80% of tuition and transportation expenses for placing the student at KidsPeace through the end of the District's extended school year. Transportation covers airline tickets and any necessary lodging for both the student and her mother. No dollar amount was stated.
Key authorities
Rowley; W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range; Union School Dist. v. Smith; Alexopulos v. San Francisco Unified School District; Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School District; Burlington School Committee v. Department of Education; Florence County School Dist. Four v. Carter; Alamo Heights ISD v. State Board of Education; Irving ISD v. Tatro
People named in the decision
- Katherine McCauley, compliance officer, San Francisco Unified School District
- Katherine Isheim, compliance consultant, San Francisco Unified School District
- Pamela Mills, Ed.D., Ph.D., school psychologist (SED evaluation), San Francisco Unified School District
- Cori Bussolari, M.Ed., school psychologist (1996 triennial assessment), San Francisco Unified School District
- Morris Henderson, program consultant, San Francisco Unified School District
- Dionne Fomby, school counselor, Lincoln High School
- Carol Butler, school psychologist, Lincoln High School
- Ray Greggains, physical education teacher, Lincoln High School
- Edward Aluk, piano teacher, Lincoln High School
- William Ferree, career education teacher, Lincoln High School
- Helaine Weinstein, senior psychological social worker, San Francisco Community Mental Health
- Meggy Lau, licensed clinical social worker, AB 3632 assessor, San Francisco Community Mental Health
- Virginia Reiss, M.S., licensed educational psychologist and certified educational planner; expert witness for Student, Private practice
- Charles Connor, M.D., attending psychiatrist, California Pacific Medical Center
- Linda Hornbostel, Ph.D., psychologist (hospital psychological testing), California Pacific Medical Center
- Diana Gleason, treating therapist, California Pacific Medical Center
- Elea Bernou, M.A., psychological evaluator (1996), McAuley Behavioral Health Services, St. Mary's Medical Center
- George Hart, founder and director, nonpublic school, Hart Day School
- Kevin Charles, program director, residential treatment program, Seneca Center
- KidsPeace National Center for Kids in Crisis, noncertified out-of-state residential treatment facility (parent placement), Orefield, Pennsylvania
- Seneca Center, residential treatment program orally recommended by IEP team
- Allaire School, private school for students with learning disabilities (prior District-funded placement), Corte Madera
- Institute for the Arts of Living, private therapy provider, San Francisco
- Challenge to Learning, special day school proposed by District
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Hee C. Kim, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), in San Francisco, California, on May 21 and 22 and June 22, 23 and 24, 1998.
Petitioner STUDENT was represented at the hearing by attorney Amanda Metcalf. Also present on STUDENT’s behalf for most of the hearing was her mother. Respondent San Francisco Unified School District (District) was represented by attorney Diane Finkelstein from the firm of Shupe & Finkelstein. Also present on the District’s behalf was Katherine McCauley, the District's compliance officer. Respondent San Francisco Community Mental Health (Mental Health) was represented by attorney Charlotte Siggins, a deputy city attorney. Also present on Mental Health’s behalf was Helaine Weinstein, a senior psychological social worker from Mental Health.
The following witnesses were called by Petitioner to testify: STUDENT’S MOTHER; Virginia Reiss, M.S., a licensed educational psychologist and certified educational planner; STUDENT’S FRIEND with whom she lived for a short while; Charles Connor, M.D., STUDENT’s attending psychiatrist at California Pacific Medical Center (CPMC); STUDENT’s SISTER; Ray Greggains, a physical education teacher at Lincoln High School (Lincoln); Edward Aluk, a piano teacher at Lincoln; and William Ferree, a career education teacher at Lincoln. The following witnesses were called by the District to testify: Katherine Isheim, the District’s compliance consultant; Pamela Mills, Ed.D., Ph.D., the District’s school psychologist; Katherine McCauley; George Hart, the founder and director of the now-dissolved Hart Day School; and STUDENT’s 1:1 paraprofessional at Lincoln. The following witnesses were called by Mental Health to testify: Kevin Charles, the program director at Seneca Center, and Helaine Weinstein.
Oral and documentary evidence was received. The record was held open for the submission of written closing arguments. After the parties' written closing arguments were received, the record was closed and the matter submitted for decision.
ISSUES(Footnote 1)
1. Did the District and/or Mental Health deny STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during the 1997-1998 school year by failing to:(Footnote 2)
a. perform or cause to be performed, within the time required by law, the psychological assessment requested by STUDENT on or about October 8, 1997?
b. conduct an IEP meeting until May 18, 1998, following the receipt of a written request from STUDENT’s mother on or about March 1, 1998 for an IEP meeting?
c. offer an appropriate residential placement after the IEP team determined that a residential placement was necessary?
d. provide any instructional services for approximately the first month of the school year?
e. provide any instructional services from early February 1998 to mid-May 1998 while STUDENT was hospitalized at CPMC?
2. If the District and/or Mental Health failed to offer an appropriate residential placement, are they required to fund placement for STUDENT at KidsPeace?
3. Did the District award STUDENT unearned credits toward graduation?
4. Did the District fail to devise and implement a transition plan as required by law?
5. Did the District fail to assess and/or provide services within time limits following a request from STUDENT’s mother for a speech and language assessment in Spring 1994?
6. Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education?
7. Is STUDENT’s mother entitled to reimbursement for the following costs:
a. attorney’s fees?
b. educational consulting services provided by Virginia Reiss, M.S.?
c. expenses relating to STUDENT’s placement at KidsPeace including tuition and costs of travel for STUDENT and her mother?
d. psychiatric treatment privately obtained for STUDENT since October 8, 1997?
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
In the final days of hearing, both Petitioner and the District sought to introduce, over the objections of the other, documentary evidence that had not been disclosed to the other parties at least five days before the hearing, as required by Education Code §56505(e)(7). For the most part, the party seeking to bar the introduction of the documents had (1) produced the documents, (2) had the documents in their possession, or (3) had already viewed the documents well before the five days prior to hearing. Therefore, there was no real prejudice caused by lack of sufficient notice. However, to remediate any semblance of prejudice, this evidence was admitted subject to the record remaining open for five days after the final day of hearing. During that time, the parties were invited to request additional days of hearing if they wished to address any issues relating to the evidence. No request for additional hearing days was made by any of the parties and, therefore, the record was closed at the end of business on June 29, 1998.
After the record was closed, the Hearing Office received the parties’ written closing briefs. Attached to the Petitioner’s and Mental Health’s briefs were exhibits containing documentary evidence. Neither of these exhibits was introduced into evidence at the hearing. The Hearing Officer notes that the parties’ closing briefs are not evidence to be considered by the Hearing Officer. In any case, the record had already been closed for the submission of additional evidence. For these reasons, the only evidence that will be considered is that which was introduced by the parties at the hearing. Those portions of the parties’ closing briefs which contain facts or other evidence not introduced into the record during the hearing will not be considered by the Hearing Officer in rendering a decision in this matter.
FACTS
STUDENT is an 18-year-old student who has resided in the District ever since her birth on [date redacted]. When she was three years old, her parents divorced and STUDENT continued to live with her mother.
STUDENT was first identified as a special education student after she repeated the second grade while attending Kittredge School, a private elementary school in San Francisco, in 1989. Her primary handicapping condition was identified as a specific learning disability (SLD). She thereafter began to attend, at District expense, Allaire School (Allaire), a small private school for children with learning disabilities in Corte Madera, until she graduated from that school in June 1995. While attending Allaire, STUDENT was provided door-to-door transportation to and from school by the District. (MOTHER’s Testimony.) STUDENT appears to have done well behaviorally and academically at Allaire, receiving straight A’s in some of the later years. (Pet.’s Exh. 154-185.)
In the summer of 1995, STUDENT began to attend, at District expense, Hart Day School (Hart), a small certified nonpublic school in Burlingame. (Hart Testimony.) An IEP Addendum dated June 15, 1995, documents her transfer to Hart and states that door-to-door transportation was “required for [her] safety.” (Pet.’s Exh. 95.) However, during that summer and the following school year, STUDENT’s parents were told that transportation was not available, so they transported STUDENT to and from school themselves. (MOTHER and Hart Testimony.) When her parents could no longer provide the transportation, in approximately September 1995, STUDENT began riding a public bus and train to school at the District’s expense. (MOTHER and Hart Testimony.) Except for the spring semester of the 1996-97 school year, STUDENT appears to have performed well academically at Hart, receiving mostly A’s and B’s. (Pet.’s Exh. 353-354.)
In February 1996, the District’s school psychologist, Cori Bussolari, M.Ed., performed a triennial assessment of STUDENT. (Pet.’s Exh. 36-41.) Ms. Bussolari administered a series of tests and reviewed STUDENT’s educational records. (Pet.’s Exh. 36.) Ms. Bussolari noted that STUDENT did not have a lot of self-confidence in the areas of her academics and socialization activities; she was still very dependent upon adults to get her needs met; she did not take many risks without extreme structure and support; and she excelled in athletics, particularly track, and sports offered a boost to her self-confidence. (Pet.’s Exh. 37, 40.) Ms. Bussolari found that STUDENT continued to qualify for special education services under the category of SLD, as she showed a significant discrepancy between her cognitive abilities, which were in the average range, and her academic achievement in reading. (Pet.’s Exh. 41.)
In early summer 1996, STUDENT reported to her counselors at camp and school that a boy in her neighborhood had been sexually assaulting her after school since January 1996. (MOTHER and Hart Testimony.) She reported that the boy had threatened to kill her and her family if she told. (MOTHER Testimony.) MOTHER reported the charges to the police. (MOTHER Testimony.) After the disclosure, STUDENT began to exhibit suicidal, depressed and sometimes violent behavior. (Pet.’s Exh. 22.)
From June 28 until the end of July, she was hospitalized in the McAuley’s Behavioral Health Services Unit of St. Mary’s Medical Center (McAuley) because it was felt that she presented a danger to herself. (Pet.’s Exh. 22.) During the hospitalization, a psychological evaluation was performed by Elea Bernou, M.A. (Pet.’s Exh. 21-35.) Ms. Bernou administered a series of tests, reviewed records and conducted interviews of STUDENT and her mother. (Pet.’s Exh. 21.) Ms. Bernou concluded from her evaluation that, inter alia, (1) STUDENT was in the low-average to borderline average range of intellectual functioning; (2) she was seriously depressed, and demonstrating internal distress and fearfulness; (3) she had an eating disorder; and (4) she was experiencing feelings of anger, fear, shame, and overwhelming anxiety as a result of the trauma. (Pet.’s Exh. 32-34.) Ms. Bernou noted that STUDENT stated she felt frightened to go home and worried constantly that the boy who raped her would hurt her again. (Pet.’s Exh. 26.) Ms. Bernou recommended that STUDENT receive outpatient psychotherapy at least two times per week, receive family therapy one time per week, and continue at Hart with reassessment in one year. (Pet.’s Exh. 34.)
STUDENT started receiving therapy during the school day at the Institute for the Arts of Living in San Francisco (IAL) in approximately August 1996. She attended school at Hart from 8:00 a.m. until noon, and then went to IAL from 1:00 p.m. until 4:00 p.m for group, individual and art therapy. (MOTHER Testimony.) At about this time, the District began to provide door-to-door transportation by taxi. (MOTHER and Hart Testimony.) It appears that the taxi service was arranged by Morris Henderson, the District’s program consultant assigned to STUDENT’s case, most likely after receiving a letter from a clinical coordinator at the Child/Adolescent Sexual Abuse Resource Center (CASARC). (MOTHER and Hart Testimony.) The letter indicated that STUDENT had recently undergone a traumatic experience and hospitalization, and that she could become “lost” on public transportation. (Pet.’s Exh. 432.)
In August 1996, the boy who allegedly assaulted STUDENT was detained by the police and then tried as a juvenile. (MOTHER Testimony.) STUDENT testified at the trial. (MOTHER Testimony.) After months of criminal proceedings, the boy was found not guilty and released back into the neighborhood in January 1997. (MOTHER Testimony.) According to MOTHER, after the not-guilty verdict, STUDENT fell apart emotionally and was scared that the boy would harm her or her family as he had threatened.
In January 1997, STUDENT moved in with her FRIEND, with whom she had stayed off and on during the summer of 1996. (MOTHER and FRIEND Testimony.) FRIEND reports that STUDENT moved in with her because STUDENT wanted to get out of the neighborhood to which the alleged rapist had been returned and she wanted to be a little more independent. (FRIEND Testimony.) However, once out of the immediate neighborhood, STUDENT was still extremely fearful at first that the alleged rapist would discover where she was staying and was still afraid of encountering him in other neighborhoods. (FRIEND Testimony.) After 3 weeks, STUDENT attempted suicide by overdosing on certain medications. (MOTHER and FRIEND Testimony.)
After the attempt, STUDENT was returned to McAuley and had a number of other brief hospitalizations at McAuley thereafter. (MOTHER Testimony.) In May 1997, IAL refused to continue providing services to STUDENT after she made threats to harm a counselor at IAL. (MOTHER Testimony.) STUDENT returned to full days attending Hart, until approximately two weeks later, when the 1996-97 school year ended. (MOTHER Testimony.)
This was the last school year that Hart was open. MOTHER testified that she began to request an IEP meeting in early February 1997, when she learned that Hart was going to close. (MOTHER Testimony.) Mr. Hart testified that he told Mr. Henderson that he was going to close the school in approximately April 1997, but that he had little contact with anyone else from the District about a future placement for STUDENT because the fluctuating state of her mental health left things up in the air. Mr. Hart did, however, recommend that STUDENT attend South San Francisco High School (So. SFHS) in the South San Francisco Unified School District (So. SFUSD). (MOTHER Testimony.)
MOTHER testified that she attempted to contact Mr. Henderson all that summer about a new placement for STUDENT, but he never returned her calls. Apparently, unbeknownst to MOTHER, Mr. Henderson was on summer break. (McCauley Testimony.) On August 27, 1997, the first day of school, MOTHER and STUDENT went to So. SFHS with the understanding that STUDENT could just enroll at the school. (MOTHER Testimony.) However, they were told that they first had to fill out the appropriate forms in order to get approval from the District and So. SFUSD for an interdistrict transfer. (MOTHER Testimony.) MOTHER spoke with Katherine McCauley about her desire for STUDENT to attend So. SFHS. (MOTHER Testimony.) Ms. McCauley recommended Challenge to Learning (CTL), a special day school, but MOTHER rejected CTL based on her prior observations of the program. (MOTHER and McCauley Testimony.) Ms. McCauley then agreed to help STUDENT enroll at So. SFHS. (MOTHER Testimony.)
On September 22, 1997, the District sent MOTHER a notice that it approved her request for STUDENT to attend So. SFHS and that the permit had been forwarded to So. SFUSD for its approval. (Pet.’s Exh. 418.) However, by letter dated September 25, 1997, So. SFUSD rejected the application for transfer because of overcrowding. (Pet.’s Exh. 419.) Ms. McCauley then received a communication from attorney Amanda Metcalf that the family wanted immediate placement for STUDENT at Lincoln High School within the District. (McCauley Testimony.) Despite overcrowding at Lincoln, Ms. McCauley agreed to place STUDENT at Lincoln with a 1:1 paraprofessional, purportedly on an interim basis. (McCauley Testimony.)
On October 8, 1997, the day before STUDENT started attending Lincoln, an IEP meeting was held at Lincoln which STUDENT, her mother and Ms. Metcalf attended. (Pet.’s Exh. 74.) According to the IEP, for the next year STUDENT was to be placed in the eleventh grade at Lincoln in a “special day class” with six out of seven periods spent in regular education. (Pet.’s Exh. 74.) A paraprofessional was assigned to assist her in transitioning from her small high school setting to Lincoln in all six periods of regular education. (Pet.’s Exh. 76-77.) STUDENT, now 18 years old, signed her consent to the IEP with the exception of the following items noted on an addendum: reimbursement of transportation costs and legal expenses, and the extent of the provision of paraprofessional services. (Pet.’s Exh. 74, 79.)
During the meeting, Katherine Isheim recommended that STUDENT be referred for an AB 3632 mental health assessment based on information that STUDENT had been found with alcohol on school grounds. (Isheim Testimony.) After privately conferencing with her mother and attorney, STUDENT agreed to the referral. (Isheim Testimony.) MOTHER testified that, based on this referral, she terminated the private therapy STUDENT had been receiving for the past few months. (MOTHER Testimony.) There is no evidence that, by this time, the District had been informed by MOTHER or any other person the nature and extent of STUDENT’s emotional problems, or that STUDENT had been receiving outside therapy.
On October 14, 1997, Dionne Fomby, the school counselor, filled out the referral form. (Pet.’s Exh. 350-351.) Ms. Fomby indicated on the form that, inter alia, counseling STUDENT was a labor-intensive and time-consuming activity as STUDENT seemed to have problems daily; STUDENT stated that she feared speaking directly to her mother as her mother could become abusive when she spoke her own mind; STUDENT was never a behavior problem in class; she was unable to manage the taunting of a male classmate who lived across the street from her; no intrapsychic disturbances were apparent; and STUDENT seemed sad, listless, and that she felt powerless over her own destiny. (Pet.’s Exh. 350-351.) During the first day of the hearing on this matter, the District admitted, and Mental Health concurred, that this referral was never sent to Mental Health.
On November 3, 1997, another IEP meeting was held at MOTHER’s request. (Pet.’s Exh. 0073.) This meeting focused only on MOTHER’s objection to the amount of reading and writing required in STUDENT’s modern world history class. (Pet.’s Exh. 0073.)
STUDENT appears to have done relatively well the first semester at Lincoln. STUDENT’s paraprofessional during that time testified that STUDENT did very well with the work presented to her, was very determined to do well in school, had at least two identifiable friends, and went to the Winter Ball. However, according to PARAPROFESSIONAL, STUDENT did express that she was having problems at home and wanted to move out of her mother’s house, and once spoke about depression and hurting herself in December. (PARAPROFESSIONAL Testimony.) After STUDENT mentioned the depression and suicidal tendencies, PARAPROFESSIONAL talked to Ms. Fomby about her concerns. (PARAPROFESSIONAL Testimony.) Ms. Fomby and the school psychologist, Carol Butler, thereafter provided weekly therapy and obtained some outside therapy at the Westside Crisis Clinic for STUDENT. (PARAPROFESSIONAL Testimony.) STUDENT also spoke to Ms. Fomby about wanting to live more independently, and Ms. Fomby advised her as to the adult social services available that might help her do that. (PARAPROFESSIONAL and MOTHER Testimony.) PARAPROFESSIONAL testified that STUDENT seemed to do much better with the counseling. That semester, STUDENT passed all of her classes with C’s, B’s and one A despite receiving incompletes for the first report period. (Pet.’s Exh. 147; Dist.’s Exh. 23-28.)
In January 1998, STUDENT moved back in with FRIEND. (MOTHER Testimony.) On about February 9, she attempted suicide by ingesting 14 Tylenol tablets and was hospitalized at CPMC. (Pet.’s Exh. 4.)
Psychological assessments performed by the CPMC staff found that the recent stressors in STUDENT’s life included moving out of her mother’s house after an altercation with her mother, a very conflicted and allegedly verbally abusive relationship with her mother, guilt about rejecting her father’s offer to move in with him, and stress around getting adult social services. (Pet.’s Exh. 4, 7.) While at CPMC, STUDENT continued to exhibit suicidal tendencies and also appeared to have hallucinatory experiences. (Pet.’s Exh. 4.) Linda Hornbostel, Ph.D., a psychologist, administered a series of tests to STUDENT to assist with the differential diagnosis and assess for psychosis. (Pet.’s Exh. 4, 14.) Dr. Hornbostel found three factors contributed to STUDENT’s emotional instability at the time: unresolved anger and shame about the sexual assaults, difficulty integrating the child and adult parts of herself; and anger and anxiety about the relationship with her mother. (Pet.’s Exh. 6.) Dr. Hornbostel recommended that residential treatment be considered due to STUDENT’s fragile “defensive structure” and that the family get counseling. (Pet.’s Exh. 6.) The staff at CPMC concluded that STUDENT would likely need weeks of structured supportive treatment and continuance on medications to progress any further, and that it would be good for her to stay in the area for continuity of support and treatment until she finished high school. (Pet.’s Exh. 12-13.)
On March 2, 1998, STUDENT was transferred from CPMC to Shrader House, a therapeutic unit with more freedom. (Pet.’s Exh. 17; MOTHER Testimony.) On March 6, she was readmitted to CPMC after she cut herself with broken glass and threatened to jump off the roof at Shrader House. (Pet.’s Exh. 17; MOTHER Testimony.) During this second hospitalization at CPMC, STUDENT alleged for the first time that her father had been sexually molesting her from an early age. (Pet.’s Exh. 14; Dist.’s Exh. 6; MOTHER, FRIEND and PARAPROFESSIONAL Testimony.)
In March 1998, MOTHER requested an IEP meeting. (MOTHER Testimony.) By notice dated March 24, 1998, the District informed MOTHER that an IEP meeting would be held on April 14 at Lincoln. (Pet.’s Exh. 214.) The notice cautioned: “[STUDENT] is of legal age and must be in attendance at this IEP or we will be unable to hold it.” (Pet.’s Exh. 214.) MOTHER signed the notice on or about March 30, and indicated on the notice that the meeting needed to be held at CPMC because STUDENT would still be there. (Pet.’s Exh. 214.) By memo dated March 31, Ms. Isheim informed MOTHER that, as STUDENT was an adult under state law, she must consent to and/or request the IEP for herself. (Pet.’s Exh. 427.) The memo further stated: “If [STUDENT] requests that an IEP be held and request[s] that it take place at her place of hospitalization, we will gladly accommodate her. Until then we await her return to high school and her request for another IEP.” (Pet.’s Exh. 427.)
On Friday, April 3, 1998, MOTHER was appointed STUDENT’s conservator by the San Francisco Superior Court. (Pet.’s Exh. 197.) Shortly after midnight that day, MOTHER faxed to Ms. Isheim’s office the conservatorship papers and a letter stating that, as conservator, her request for an IEP meeting stood and she wanted the IEP to proceed on April 14 at CPMC. (Pet.’s Exh. 213, 430.) Ms. Isheim was on spring break at the time and returned to the District offices on Monday, April 13. (Dist.’s Exh. 34; McCauley Testimony.) On April 13, Ms. Isheim forwarded a memo to MOTHER stating that the IEP was canceled. (Pet.’s Exh. 208.) Ms. Isheim’s memo also stated the following:
Your request for an IEP, now that you are conservator for [STUDENT], can be held as soon as you fill out the packet for Residential Referral. If you believe that residential is necessary for [STUDENT], we will need to re-evaluate her for S.E.D. Therefore, a school psychologist will contact you after your request in writing for a re-evaluation is received. To hold an IEP prior to filling out the Residential Referral Packet and the S.E.D. evaluation, will not result in our being able to address those issues.
On April 14, the Hearing Office received a request for a due process hearing from Ms. Metcalf on behalf of STUDENT. MOTHER returned to the District the signed requests for AB 3632 referral and SED reevaluation on April 16, and written authorization for the District to share information with Mental Health on May 1. (Pet.’s Exh. 206, 207.)
Thereafter, Dr. Pamela Mills, the school psychologist, was asked to determine whether STUDENT would qualify as a seriously emotionally disturbed student. (Mills Testimony.) Dr. Mills was not given permission by CPMC to do any further testing with STUDENT but, on or about May 4, she (1) reviewed the prior psychological evaluations by Dr. Hornbostel and the triennial evaluation by Ms. Bussolari; and (2) interviewed STUDENT, MOTHER and Diana Gleason, STUDENT’s therapist at CPMC. (Mills Testimony; Dist.’s Exh. 8.) Dr. Mills’ interview with Ms. Gleason introduced her to the significant concern the CPMC staff had regarding STUDENT’s ability to remain safe given her multiple complaints of hallucinations, expressions of suicidal ideation, and multiple attempts of self-destructive and self-mutilating behaviors. (Dist.’s Exh. 8.) Based on her interview with STUDENT, Dr. Mills found her to be friendly and cooperative but extremely immature in her thought content. (Dist.’s Exh. 8.) Dr. Mills concluded that STUDENT currently meets the criteria under the IDEA as a student who is emotionally disturbed. (Dist.’s Exh. 8.)
On May 8, Mental Health received the AB 3632 request for assessment for residential placement signed by MOTHER. (Weinstein Testimony.) However, Mental Health had been aware of STUDENT’s case a few weeks before and had been trying to gather information regarding her status through Ms. Gleason, Dr. Connor, Ms. Butler, Ms. Isheim, Ms. Metcalf and KidsPeace even before receiving the referral. (Weinstein Testimony.) Mental Health was able to complete the assessment by May 15, within a week of receiving the referral. (Weinstein Testimony.) Meggy Lau, the licensed clinical social worker who performed the assessment, found from her interview of STUDENT that she was friendly and cooperative, but had a depressed mood and pervasive feelings of fear about her father. (Dist.’s Exh. 6.) Based on her interview with Ms. Gleason, Ms. Lau reached the following conclusion:
[Ms. Gleason] reported that [STUDENT] is actively learning how to cope with the intense feeling and flashback related to the specific trauma in the past. She continues to experience auditory and visual hallucinations relating to the sexual trauma. She often has problems with reality testing and poor impulse control. She is able to respond to treatment but her emotion fluctuates often. She has made progress as evidenced by the decreased frequency of acting out thoughts. She continues to be easily overwhelmed and agitated. In regards to the treatment facility that is appropriate for [STUDENT], Ms. Gleason reported that it does not really matter if the facility is locked or unlocked. It is more important to find a facility that could provide treatment to help [STUDENT] with her impulse control so that she would not hurt herself. Furthermore, Ms. Gleason stated that [STUDENT] would need a treatment facility that has a seclusion room due to her frequent need to be restrained in seclusion. Ms. Gleason also suggested that [STUDENT] be placed in a residential treatment program with other adolescents who are at her level of functioning.
(Dist.’s Exh. 6.) Ms. Lau concluded that STUDENT was eligible for mental health services under AB 3632 because of emotional and behavioral problems that interfere with her ability to attain educational goals. (Dist.’s Exh. 6.) Ms. Lau suggested in her report that STUDENT be placed in “a closely supervised, structured, milieu therapeutic setting that also has an educational component.” (Dist.’s Exh. 6.)
On May 18, an IEP meeting was held for STUDENT. The expanded IEP team agreed that (1) the category of seriously emotionally disturbed (SED) should be added to STUDENT’s primary eligibility designation, and (2) she needs immediate placement in a 24-hour residential treatment program with extended school year services (ESY). (Pet.’s Exh. 227.) The team orally recommended placement at Seneca Residential Placement Center. (MOTHER Testimony.) MOTHER agreed with the SED designation but rejected the placement recommendation. (Pet.’s Exh. 227; MOTHER Testimony.)
Three days later, on May 21, the due process hearing in this matter was convened. During the second day of hearing on May 22, it became apparent that additional hearing days would have to be scheduled. At that time, Ms. Metcalf gave notice to the parties that her client intended to independently place STUDENT at the noncertified residential treatment facility selected by MOTHER, KidsPeace National Center for Kids in Crisis in Orefield, Pennsylvania (KidsPeace). MOTHER sent STUDENT to KidsPeace on June 22, the third day of hearing. (MOTHER Testimony.)
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Under both state law and the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), students with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); Education Code § 56000. The term “free appropriate public education” means special education and related services that are available to the student at no charge to the parent or guardian, that meet the State educational standards, and that conform with the student’s individualized educational program (IEP). 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8). “Special education” is defined as specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet the unique needs of the student including instruction conducted in the classroom, in the home, in hospitals and institutions, and in other settings. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(25).
The term “related services” includes transportation and other services that may be required to assist a child to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22). California Education Code § 56363(a) similarly provides that designated instruction and services (DIS), California’s term for related services, shall be provided “when the instruction and services are necessary for the pupil to benefit educationally from his or her instructional program.”
In Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley (1982) 458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034, the United States Supreme Court determined that a student’s IEP must be reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit. The Rowley Court concluded that the IDEA does not require school districts to provide special education students with the best education available, or to provide instruction or services that maximize a student’s abilities. The Court stated that school districts are required to provide only a “basic floor of opportunity” that consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the student. Id., 458 U.S. at 207-208.
The Supreme Court in Rowley also recognized the importance of adherence to the procedural requirements of the IDEA. Federal special education law requires states to establish and maintain certain procedural safeguards to ensure that each student with a disability receives the appropriate public education to which he/she is entitled and that parents are involved in the formulation of the student’s educational program. The procedural rights that extend to parents include, inter alia: the right to be informed in writing when the educational agency proposes to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child; the right to participate in the child’s IEP; the right to examine all relevant educational records; and the opportunity for mediation and a due process hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b). Procedural violations that result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringe on the parent’s participation in the IEP process may result in the denial of a FAPE to the student. W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range, 960 F.2d 1479 (9th Cir. 1992).
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the District and/or Mental Health deny STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during the 1997-1998 school year by failing to:
a. perform or cause to be performed, within the time required by law, the psychological assessment requested by STUDENT on or about October 8, 1997?
The evidence establishes that at an IEP meeting on October 8, 1997, the District asked STUDENT to give her consent for the District to refer her for a mental health assessment under AB 3632. STUDENT and her mother gave their written consent for the referral on a form that stated, “I understand that the records released will be kept confidential and used professionally for the purpose of evaluating the appropriateness of mental health services as a related special education service. I understand that I will be notified by the San Francisco Community Mental Health Services Department if additional assessments are required.” (Pet. Exh. 652.) Six days later, the school counselor filled out the referral form signed by STUDENT and her mother. The referral was never sent to Mental Health, and Mental Health did not conduct an assessment pursuant to that referral.
Under Title 2 of the California Code of Regulations, a school district may refer an identified special education student to the local mental health program to determine the need for mental health services. 2 C.C.R. § 60040. In referring the student, the school district must (1) obtain written parental consent to forward educational information to the local mental health program; (2) obtain written parental consent to allow the mental health professional to observe the student during school; and (3) propose a date for the IEP meeting. 2 C.C.R. § 60040(c). Under Education Code § 56344, the IEP meeting must take place within 50 days of the receipt of the parent’s written consent for assessment. Section 56344 states, inter alia:
An individualized education program required as a result of an assessment of a pupil shall be developed within a total time not to exceed 50 days, not counting days between the pupil’s regular school sessions, terms, or days of school vacation in excess of five schooldays, from the date of receipt of the parent’s written consent for assessment, unless the parent agrees, in writing, to an extension.
(Emphasis added.) Mental health assessments, like other assessments, must be completed within the 50 days specified in § 56344. See 2 C.C.R. § 60040(d)(2) (“When the mental health assessments cannot be completed within the required time limit specified in Section 56344 of the Education Code, the local mental health professional or designee shall ... notify the [IEP] team administrator or designee.”)
Here, the District received written consent from STUDENT and her mother for Mental Health to assess STUDENT on October 8, 1997. The record discloses that no assessment was performed and no IEP meeting was held pursuant to the written consent, because the District failed to forward the referral to Mental Health. Based on the evidence, the Hearing Officer finds that the District violated its duty under Education Code § 56344 to assess and hold an IEP meeting within 50 days of receiving the consent to assess.(Footnote 3)
b. conduct an IEP meeting until May 18, 1998, following the receipt of a written request from STUDENT’s mother on or about March 1, 1998 for an IEP meeting?
An IEP meeting is to take place whenever, inter alia, the parent requests a meeting to develop, review or revise the IEP. Education Code § 56343(c). When a parent requests an IEP meeting, the meeting is to be held within 30 days from the time the school district receives the parent’s written request. Education Code § 56343.5. If the parent makes an oral request, the school district is to notify the parent of the need for a written request and the procedure for filing a written request. Id. Section 56028 of the Education Code defines the term “parent” as follows:
“Parent” includes any person having legal custody of a child. “Parent,” in addition, includes any adult pupil for whom no guardian or conservator has been appointed and the person having custody of a minor if neither the parent nor legal guardian can be notified of the educational actions under consideration. “Parent” also includes a parent surrogate. “Parent” does not include the state or any political subdivision of government.
(Emphasis added.) Under California law, an adult is an individual 18 years of age or older. Family Code § 6501.
The evidence establishes the following: STUDENT and her mother were informed of STUDENT’s rights as an adult at the IEP meetings held in late 1997 by Ms. Isheim; MOTHER requested an IEP for STUDENT in March 1998; by notice dated March 24, the District informed MOTHER that an IEP meeting was scheduled for April 14 at Lincoln and that STUDENT needed to be in attendance; MOTHER signed the notice on March 30 and indicated that the meeting needed to be held at CPMC for STUDENT to attend; by memo dated March 31, Ms. Isheim informed MOTHER that STUDENT needed to consent to and/or request the IEP herself because she was an adult and that the District would wait for STUDENT’s request for an IEP; on Friday, April 3, MOTHER was appointed STUDENT’s conservator; shortly after midnight on Saturday April 4, MOTHER faxed to Ms. Isheim the conservatorship papers and a letter stating that her request for an IEP “stands”; Ms. Isheim was on spring break at the time and did not receive the conservatorship papers and letter until Monday, April 13; MOTHER returned the signed requests for an AB 3632 referral and S.E.D. reevaluation to the District on April 16, and a written authorization for the District to share information with Mental Health on May 1; thereafter, the school psychologist and Mental Health performed their assessments; on May 18, an IEP meeting was held which determined issues of S.E.D. eligibility and the need for residential treatment. Based on the evidence, the Hearing Officer finds that the District should have held an IEP meeting by May 6, 1998, and that the meeting held on May 18 was twelve days overdue. Since MOTHER had been informed of the transfer of rights to STUDENT, MOTHER’s request for an IEP meeting in March 1998 was not enough to trigger the 30-day time line embodied in Education Code § 56343.5. STUDENT had reached the age of majority by that time, was not conserved and was not under the legal custody of her mother as she was an adult. Further, there was no evidence that STUDENT consented to have an IEP meeting. Instead, the 30-day time line was triggered on April 6 when the District received MOTHER’s proof of conservatorship and the letter MOTHER wrote, as STUDENT’s conservator, that indicated her request for an IEP meeting. April 6 is the first business day on which the District had notice of the conservatorship and a written request by the conservator for an IEP meeting. Whether Ms. Isheim, the person whom the District designated as its representative in this matter, received MOTHER’s fax on April 6 or April 13 is irrelevant. There is no requirement in special education law that the request be served on a particular individual.
Under the circumstances, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed in its duty to hold an IEP meeting within thirty days of receiving a request by STUDENT’s conservator for an IEP meeting.
c. offer an appropriate residential placement after the IEP team determined that a residential placement was necessary?
Among the procedural violations which the Ninth Circuit has held may constitute a denial of FAPE is the failure of a school district to make a formal, written offer of placement in compliance with the IDEA’s procedural requirements. Union School District v. Smith, 20 IDELR 987 (9th Cir. 1994). The court in Smith stated:
We find that a school district cannot escape its obligation under the IDEA to offer formally an appropriate education placement by arguing that a disabled child’s parents expressed unwillingness to accept that placement. The IDEA explicitly requires written prior notice to parents when an educational agency proposes, or refuses, to initiate or change the educational placement of a disabled child. ... [¶] We find that this formal requirement has an important purpose that is not merely technical, and we therefore believe that it should be enforced rigorously.
Smith, 20 IDELR at 990 (emphasis added). The court determined that the requirement of a formal, written offer serves several purposes including (1) creating “a clear record that will do much to eliminate troublesome factual disputes many years later about when placements were offered, what placements were offered, and what additional educational assistance was offered to supplement a placement, if any”; (2) greatly assisting parents in presenting complaints regarding the educational placement of a student by alerting them to the need to seriously consider the placement offered; and (3) making the school district more prepared to introduce sufficient relevant evidence to the hearing officer as to the appropriateness of the placement offered. Id.
Under California law, an IEP must include, inter alia, the “specific” special educational instruction and related services required by the student(footnote 4). Education Code § 56345(a)(3). Title 5 of the California Code of Regulations, § 3042(a) defines “specific educational placement” as follows:
Specific educational placement means that unique combination of facilities, personnel, location or equipment necessary to provide instructional services to an individual with exceptional needs, as specified in the individualized education program, in any one or a combination of public, private, home and hospital, or residential settings.
Here, the expanded IEP team recently determined that STUDENT is a student with a serious emotional disturbance and she needs a residential placement. This was a change from her previous designation of a student with only a specific learning disability, and obviously makes inappropriate her continued placement at Lincoln. The team has recommended immediate placement at a 24-hour residential treatment program for at least the next six months, with extended school year services. Based on this, it cannot be disputed that the District is proposing to change STUDENT’s educational placement and thus a formal, written offer of placement is needed. However, as the District and Mental Health conceded on the first day of hearing, a written offer of placement at a particular residential facility has not been made.
Mental Health argues that since (1) Petitioner understands that respondents are offering Seneca as the appropriate residential placement for STUDENT and (2) much evidence was presented at the hearing about the appropriateness of Seneca for STUDENT, Smith is distinguishable. Mental Health also argues that it fulfilled its obligation by identifying an appropriate placement, i.e, a 24-hour residential treatment program, because federal and state statutes do not require identification of a specific school. These arguments fail in light of California’s definition of placement. The language of § 3042(a) combined with Smith, which is absolute in its mandate that an offer be written, makes clear that the IDEA requires that an offer of placement be written and specific as to the “unique combination of facilities, personnel, location and equipment” necessary to meet a student’s needs. Further, California law provides that when residential treatment is the final decision of the expanded IEP team, the team is to identify one or more appropriate, least restrictive and least costly residential placement alternatives. 2 C.C.R. § 60100(f).
The Hearing Officer finds that neither the District nor Mental Health made a written offer of an appropriate residential placement for STUDENT for the remainder of the 1997-98 school year, including the extended school year. Therefore, the District and Mental Health have failed to satisfy the requirements of Smith and California special education law. Based on the failure to make a written offer, the placement proposed by Mental Health cannot be considered by the Hearing Officer.(Footnote 5)
d. provide any instructional services for approximately the first month of the school year?
The evidence establishes that STUDENT attended Hart School at the District’s expense during the 1996-97 school year, but it closed after that year and she was left without a school assignment for the following year. An IEP meeting was held at Hart to review STUDENT’s IEP on May 28, 1996, but the next review did not occur until October 8, 1997. The May 28, 1996 IEP was in effect only for one year, i.e., until May 28, 1997. From May 28 to October 8, 1997, STUDENT was left without an IEP and without an educational placement. Further, there is no evidence that the District offered any placement in writing at all for the 1997-98 school year, until Lincoln was assigned in October. As a result, STUDENT missed the first six weeks of the 1997-98 school year.
The IDEA clearly states: “At the beginning of each school year, each local educational agency ... shall have in effect, for each child with a disability in its jurisdiction, an individualized education program.” 20 U.S.C. §1414(d)(2)(A). There is no dispute that STUDENT is a “child with a disability in [the District’s] jurisdiction.” Further, both state and federal law require that IEPs be reviewed and revised, if necessary, at least annually by the IEP team. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(I); Education Code § 56343(d).
Based on the evidence, the Hearing Officer finds that the District violated its duty to (1) hold an IEP at least annually and (2) have in effect at the beginning of the 1997-98 school year an IEP for STUDENT. These failures by the District resulted in STUDENT not receiving any educational services for the first six weeks of the 1997-98 school year.
e. provide any instructional services from early February 1998 to mid-May 1998 while STUDENT was hospitalized at CPMC?
The evidence discloses that STUDENT was attending Lincoln pursuant to her October 8, 1997, IEP until February 9, 1998, when she was admitted to CPMC after a suicide attempt. During the first eight days at CPMC, STUDENT was exhibiting active suicidal tendencies and hallucinatory episodes, and was placed on one-to-one observation and briefly in the seclusion room. (Pet.’s Exh. 10.) Thereafter, the suicide risk she exhibited gradually decreased and she was taken completely off suicide precautions during the latter part of her hospital stay. (Pet.’s Exh. 10.) Ms. Gleason noted in her discharge report: “The patient’s school and teachers were kept aware of disposition plan and the patient’s eventual return to school following ADU.” (Pet.’s Exh. 12.) On March 2, STUDENT was discharged to Shrader House but was readmitted to CPMC on March 6 after another suicide attempt.
A week or two after her readmittance, Ms. Isheim received word from the school that, after it became apparent that STUDENT would be hospitalized for more than a few days, Ms. Butler had tried to provide STUDENT with her homework but CPMC would not allow it. (Isheim Testimony.) On March 24, Ms. Butler attended a staffing meeting in which the CPMC staff told her that they did not want STUDENT to have any external stimulation as she was considered very fragile, but that they would consider having a tutor for one hour per week. (Dist.’s Exh. 31.) Ms. Isheim also spoke to someone at CPMC who told her that STUDENT was very fragile but that the school could try having a teacher come for one hour one time and, if successful, this could be expanded. (Isheim Testimony.) Ms. Isheim could not remember when this conversation took place. Thereafter, in approximately May 1998, the District began to provide tutoring to STUDENT at CPMC. (McCauley Testimony.)
At the hearing, Dr. Connor testified that he never advised the District that STUDENT was not to receive academic instruction at CPMC. He stated that, except for the time immediately following her initial admittance, he believes she would have benefitted from some academic instruction because she did well with on-task activities and with the tutoring that was provided near the end of her stay at CPMC.
Under Education Code § 56167(a), individuals with exceptional needs who are placed in a psychiatric hospital are the educational responsibility of the school district in which the hospital is located. There has been no dispute that the District remained the local educational agency responsible for STUDENT’s educational needs after she was admitted to CPMC.
Based on the evidence disclosed at hearing, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to provide any educational services to STUDENT from mid-February until about mid-May. This failure by the District is partially ameliorated by a couple of facts: (1) academic instruction would not have been productive when, during the initial period of her stay at CPMC, STUDENT was actively suicidal; and (2) the District did attempt to provide some instruction in the form of homework packets about mid-March but was denied access by CPMC staff. However, the District presented no evidence that STUDENT was unavailable for learning during the entirety of her initial stay at CPMC and, as for her second stay, CPMC indicated a willingness by at least the end of March to try tutoring on a trial basis. Therefore, based on the above, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to provide STUDENT a FAPE for approximately two months between February and May 1998.
***
In summary, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to perform the following obligations: (1) assess and hold an IEP meeting within fifty days of receipt of written consent to assess in October 1997; (2) hold an IEP meeting within thirty days after receiving a written request from STUDENT’s conservator for a meeting; (3) offer an appropriate placement in writing after the IEP team determined that an immediate residential placement was necessary in May 1998; (4) hold an annual IEP meeting by at least May 1997, which resulted in STUDENT not receiving any academic instruction during the first six weeks of the 1997-98 school year; and (5) provide academic instruction for approximately two months in Spring 1998 during STUDENT’s hospitalization.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed in its obligation to provide STUDENT a FAPE during the 1997-98 school year. Standing alone, some of the violations by the District might not have amounted to a denial of FAPE. For example, the twelve-day delay in holding the IEP meeting in May 1998 was only a de minimis violation, especially in light of the fact that two assessments had to be completed in order for the IEP team to make a determination regarding the type of placement STUDENT needed. However, considered collectively, the violations clearly resulted in a loss of educational opportunity as they caused STUDENT to miss three to four months of academic instruction, and prevented her from being assessed by Mental Health until almost six months after receipt of her consent to assess and from receiving an offer of an appropriate residential program.
ISSUE NO. 2: If the District and/or Mental Health failed to offer an appropriate residential placement, are they required to fund placement for STUDENT at KidsPeace?
Petitioner requests that STUDENT be placed at public expense at KidsPeace, a noncertified nonpublic school/residential treatment facility.
School districts are not required to pay for the cost of educating a student with a disability at a private school if the school district has made a free appropriate public education available to the student. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(I). A nonpublic school placement can be provided when no appropriate public education program is available. Education Code § 56365. However, even where a school district has not offered the student a FAPE, Education Code § 56505.2(a) restricts the power of a hearing officer to award a nonpublic school placement. Section 56505.2(a) states:
A hearing officer may not render a decision that results in the placement of an individual with exceptional needs in a nonpublic, nonsectarian school, or that results in a service for an individual with exceptional needs provided by a nonpublic agency, if the school or agency has not been certified pursuant to Section 56366.1.
(Emphasis added.)
It is undisputed that KidsPeace is not certified pursuant to Education Code § 56366.1. Therefore, Petitioner’s request that the Hearing Officer order the District and/or Mental Health to fund placement for STUDENT at KidsPeace must be denied.
ISSUE NO. 3: Did the District award STUDENT unearned credits toward graduation?
Petitioner alleges that the District awarded STUDENT academic credits that she did not actually earn, and that this will result in a premature graduation and termination of her eligibility for public education. (Pet.’s Issue Statement dated May 18, 1998.) During the course of the hearing, Petitioner examined three of the eight instructors STUDENT was assigned during the fall semester of the 1997-98 school year at Lincoln(Footnote 6). The evidence establishes that STUDENT missed approximately the first six weeks of school since she did not begin attending Lincoln until on or about October 8, 1997. She received incomplete marks in all of her classes for the first report period in the fall semester, except in William Ferree’s career education class for which she received a C. (Pet.’s Exh. 147.) Despite the incomplete marks, she received final grades of C’s, B’s and one A in all her classes that semester.
Although not raised by either respondent, the threshold question the Hearing Officer must first address is whether the Special Education Hearing Office has the jurisdiction to determine an issue with regard to the assignment of grades and academic credits. The Education Code provides procedures for school districts to follow when changing grades, but there is no indication in the Code that this is an issue which may appropriately be raised in a special education due process hearing. See Education Code §§ 49066, 49070. Instead, sections 49066 and 49070 of the Education Code clearly delineate a procedure for parents to challenge grades that does not involve special education due process hearings.
In looking to special education law, the Hearing Officer also finds no legal authority giving the Hearing Office jurisdiction over this issue. Education Code § 56501(a) provides the jurisdictional statement for due process hearings in the State of California. Section 56501(a) states that parents and public education agencies may initiate due process hearings under any of the following circumstances: (1) there is a proposal to initiate or change the identification, assessment, or educational placement of the child or the provision of a free, appropriate public education to the child; (2) there is a refusal to initiate or change the identification, assessment, or educational placement of the child or the provision of a free, appropriate public education to the child; and (3) the parent refuses to consent to an assessment of the child.
In the present case, there is no evidence to suggest that the academic credits in issue were the result of a proposal to initiate or change STUDENT’s educational placement, or a refusal to initiate or change her educational placement. STUDENT was only in the eleventh grade during fall 1997, and now continues to be classified as an eleventh grader as she missed essentially all academic instruction during the spring of 1998. The proposed change in her educational placement, i.e., from her home school to a residential treatment program, was not in any way related to the academic credits in issue. Petitioner’s reason for resolving the issue of whether the academic credits were unearned in a special education due process hearing is attenuated at best.(Footnote 7) Under the circumstances, the Hearing Officer finds that there is no indication that the District’s award of academic credits had any connection to the provision of special education services. There is no relationship, causal or otherwise, between the academic credits at issue and any change or proposed change in STUDENT’s identification, assessment or educational placement. Further, the Education Code designates a procedure and a forum for Petitioner to challenge the awarding of these credits, which is not in a special education due process hearing. Therefore, this issue will not be considered.
The Hearing Officer notes that, even if this issue was appropriate for consideration, it is unlikely that Petitioner's request would be granted based on the testimony of Messrs. Greggains, Ferree and Aluk. Their testimony revealed that STUDENT did well in their classes after she began attending, and that absences are counted from the time a student enrolls and not before. Petitioner failed to present substantial evidence that the academic credits awarded to her had not been earned.
ISSUE NO. 4: Did the District fail to devise and implement a transition plan as required by law?
An amendment to the IDEA, effective October 1991, requires that, beginning at age 16 and annually thereafter, the student’s IEP must include a statement of transition services the student needs before leaving the school setting. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(vii); formerly 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20)(D). California law, which became effective January 1993, contains similar provisions. Education Code § 56345.1.
Transition services include instruction, related services, community experiences, the development of employment and other post-school adult living objectives, and, when appropriate, acquisition of daily living skills and functional vocational evaluation. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(30)(C). The services are to be designed within an “outcome-oriented process, which promotes movement from school to post-school activities, including secondary education, vocational training, integrated employment (including supported employment), continuing and adult education, adult services, independent living, or community participation.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(30)(A).
A determination of appropriate transition services must be based upon the individual student's needs, taking into account the student's preferences and interests. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(30)(B). Toward this end, the District was required to invite STUDENT to attend each of her IEP meetings and, if she did not attend, to take other steps to ensure that her preferences and interests were considered. 34 C.F.R. § 300.344(b)(1), (2). Further, the IEP must include, when appropriate, “a statement of the interagency responsibilities or ... linkages” that are required for the transition services. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(vii).
STUDENT turned sixteen years old on September 19, 1995. All of her IEPs since May 24, 1991 have included a designation of “career education awareness,” “pre-vocational awareness,” or “vocational awareness.” (Pet.’s Exh. 74, 83, 93, 97, 106, 112, 119, 122.) However, not until her IEP dated May 28, 1996, were any transition services actually provided for in the IEP. According to the May 28, 1996 IEP, STUDENT was to (1) experience an interview by way of a mock interview held by staff; (2) learn lifeskills math and math for consumers; (3) increase vocational awareness and interest by choosing three specific career interests; and (4) improve her social skills by speaking more clearly, holding conversations on her own, and initiating peer contact. (Pet.’s Exh. 85-86, 90.) Pursuant to her October 8, 1997 IEP, she was to pursue information to select a college program by investigating catalogs and writing for information. (Pet.’s Exh. 78.) Finally, there was testimony from MOTHER and PARAPROFESSIONAL that in January 1998 the school counselor informed STUDENT of the adult social services available to help her live independently.
Based upon the above evidence, the District clearly failed to meet its obligation to provide transition services after STUDENT turned sixteen from September 19, 1995, to May 28, 1996. The District also failed to meet this obligation from May 28, 1997, to October 8, 1997, when STUDENT did not have an IEP in effect.
As for the May 28, 1996 IEP, the Hearing Officer finds that it contained appropriate transition services. However, the District presented no evidence that STUDENT was invited to attend, or did attend, the IEP meeting in order for the team to take into account her needs, preferences and interests. Despite this procedural error, it appears that STUDENT’s needs were taken into account by the team in developing her goals. The IEP noted, inter alia, that STUDENT had depressed expressive and receptive language skills, and problems interacting with her peers. (Pet.’s Exh. 92.) These needs were addressed by the socialization and communication goals in her IEP. (Pet.’s Exh. 85-86, 90.)
With regard to the October 8, 1997 IEP, the Hearing Officer finds the District did not fulfill its obligation to identify needed transition services. There was no testimony regarding any specific transition services Petitioner believes should be provided. STUDENT was present at the IEP meeting in October 1997, but the IEP does not record her preferences and interests and only cites two informal activities that were to be performed by STUDENT herself, i.e., investigating catalogs and writing for information to select a college program. It does not reflect any active transition planning on the part of the District and does not appear to be based on STUDENT’s needs. The most current assessment available at the time, i.e., the February 1996 assessment by Ms. Bussolari, found that STUDENT was functioning significantly below grade level in all areas tested. (Pet.’s Exh. 39-40.) Whether STUDENT was going to move onto college, vocational training, or other post-school activities, it is clear that based on STUDENT’s needs she required far more extensive transition services in the eleventh grade than what the District was offering in the IEP. The Hearing Officer finds this transition plan to be inadequate. Simply stating that a student with significant learning disabilities will look into colleges herself is not providing needed transition services.
The Hearing Officer finds that the District has wholly failed to provide STUDENT with needed transition services as required by law, except for the period of May 28, 1996, to May 28, 1997.
ISSUE NO. 5: Did the District fail to assess and/or provide services within time limits following a request from STUDENT’s mother for a speech and language assessment in Spring 1994?
Petitioner alleges that MOTHER requested that the District conduct a speech and language (S/L) assessment in the spring of 1994, but that S/L services were not provided until October 10, 1995. The evidence shows that an assessment was conducted during January and February 1995, and S/L services were thereafter added to STUDENT’s IEP on April 3, 1995. (Pet.’s Exh. 44-46, 97.) There was no evidence presented during the hearing as to when MOTHER signed and returned an assessment plan giving the District permission to conduct the assessment. In any case, the Hearing Officer finds that the statute of limitations bars the consideration of this claim.
While neither state special education law nor the IDEA contains a specific statute of limitations for initiating special education due process hearing procedures, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted a three-year statute of limitations. See Alexopulos v. San Francisco Unified School District, 817 F.2d 551, 555 (9th Cir. 1987). In Alexopulos, the Court held that the three-year statute of limitations contained in Code of Civil Procedure § 338(a) applies to claims brought under IDEA in California.(Footnote 8) Alexopulos, 817 F.2d at 555. The Alexopulos Court stated:
Congress’ desire to obtain timely and appropriate education for handicapped children by conferring substantial substantive and procedural rights on parents and guardians on behalf of their children clearly indicates that it did not intend to authorize filing of claims on behalf of or by the children many years after the alleged wrongdoing occurred. It is reasonable to assume that Congress expected and intended the child’s representative to file actions and apply for hearings on his behalf near the time the contested event occurred. The child may not later come before a court and invoke the tolling provisions of state statutes.
Id. at 551.
This case was filed with the Hearing Office on April 14, 1998. Assuming that MOTHER did request a S/L assessment in the spring of 1994 as claimed, she knew or should have known by April 14, 1995, of the facts underlying her claim, i.e., that it took the District almost a year to conduct the assessment and hold an IEP meeting to add S/L services to STUDENT’s IEP. Therefore, based on the three-year statute of limitations contained in Code of Civil Procedure § 338(a), any of Petitioner’s claims regarding time periods prior to April 14, 1995, are time-barred and cannot be considered by the Hearing Officer. Petitioner presented no evidence to substantiate the second part of her claim, i.e., that STUDENT did not receive S/L services until October 1995. Petitioner has thus failed to meet her burden of showing entitlement for this time frame. For these reasons, the issue of whether or not the District timely assessed for or provided S/L services will not be considered.
Additionally, the Hearing Officer notes that Petitioner did not present this issue as an issue for hearing in either of her issue statements or at the outset of the hearing during a discussion of the issues for hearing. This issue was first raised during Petitioner’s examination of Ms. McCauley on the last day of hearing. Furthermore, Petitioner did not identify a proposed remedy for any alleged procedural or substantive violation with regard to the issue of the S/L assessment and services until she submitted a written final argument. Under the circumstances, the Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner failed to provide adequate notice that the timeliness of the S/L assessment and/or provision of services would be an issue for this hearing.
ISSUE NO. 6: Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education?
In Burlington School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts (1985) 471 U.S. 358, the Supreme Court concluded that equitable considerations are relevant in determining relief under the IDEA. Based on the principle set forth in Burlington, federal courts have held that compensatory education is a form of equitable relief that may be granted for the denial of appropriate special education services to help overcome lost educational opportunity. Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School District, 31 F.3d 1489 (9th cir. 1994). However, the Ninth Circuit has held that compensatory education does not involve an obligation to provide day-for-day or session-for-session replacement for opportunity or time missed. Id. at 1497. The purpose of compensatory education is to “ensure that the student is appropriately educated within the meaning of IDEA.” Id. Because compensatory education is an equitable remedy, equitable considerations are relevant in considering and fashioning relief. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374; W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School District, 960 F.2d 1479, 1486 (9th Cir. 1992); Parents of Student W., 31 F.3d at 1396.
Petitioner contends in her closing brief that she is entitled to compensatory education based on the following alleged violations of the duty to provide STUDENT a FAPE: (1) the District did not provide transportation as required by STUDENT’s IEP Addendum dated June 15, 1995; (2) speech and language services were not provided until one and a half years after parent’s request for assessment; (3) STUDENT did not have a placement for the first month of the 1997-98 school year; (4) the District failed to process the AB 3632 referral; (5) the District failed to provide in-hospital instruction from February to mid-May 1998; (6) the District did not hold an IEP until May 18, 1998, after the parent requests a meeting in March 1998; (7) the District and Mental Health have failed to make a formal proposal of placement; and (8) the District did not provide needed transition services. (Pet.’s Closing Brief at 25-31.) Petitioner argues that the District should be required to provide an additional two years of educational instruction (for a total of three years); two years of private speech and language services with frequency and duration to be determined by an independent private assessment paid for by the District; and two years of private vocational rehabilitation-type services to prepare STUDENT for transition from high school, independent living and pursuit of her career goals. (Pet.’s Closing Brief at 31.) Petitioner further argues that she is entitled to a stipulation that the IEP team will make a determination regarding if and when STUDENT may benefit from transition to a private boarding school for learning disabled students for preparation for college and, if appropriate, order placement at an appropriate facility at the District’s expense. (Pet.’s Closing Brief at 31.)
The Hearing Officer cannot consider the first two allegations as they were never presented as issues for hearing; the second is also barred by the statute of limitations. Therefore, Petitioner’s request for two years of private speech and language services is denied. The remaining allegations, i.e., numbers three through eight, might be viable grounds for awarding compensatory education, and are discussed below.
Allegations three and five refer to missed academic instruction. Petitioner has presented no evidence that STUDENT needs compensatory academic instruction to help overcome lost academic instruction. Despite missing the first month of the 1997-98 school year, STUDENT appeared to do well and passed all the courses that she was enrolled in for the fall semester with mostly B’s and C’s. As for the spring semester, it is undisputed that STUDENT was not given credit for any courses that semester. Thus, STUDENT is still classified as an eleventh-grader with one and a half years of school before graduation. In short, although STUDENT missed some instructional periods during the 1997-98 school year, there is no evidence that she requires academic instruction time beyond that which she is already entitled in order to make up for lost academic instruction. The purpose of compensatory education is not to punish errant school districts, but to ensure that a student is appropriately educated within the meaning of the IDEA. Parents of Student W., 31 F.3d at 1497. The awarding of additional years of schooling would not serve to repair any educational harm. Therefore, Petitioner’s request for an additional two years of academic instruction is denied.
With regard to transition services, it appears that STUDENT is notably behind that level which she should have received by age 18. Further, it is not clear that STUDENT’s needs, including her preferences and interests, were taken into account in determining the transition services she has received thus far. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT is entitled to compensatory transition services in order to make up for lost transition services. There was no testimony as to what transition services STUDENT needs to make up for lost educational opportunity. However, based on the evidence presented at hearing, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT needs, at the minimum, (1) a functional vocational evaluation in order to set practical goals for the development of employment and other post-school adult living objectives and (2) a detailed transition plan that includes, but is not limited to, further instruction in independent living skills and community and/or work experiences, as appropriate. The need for specific services is to be determined by the expanded IEP team, which should include STUDENT, based upon a review of STUDENT’s needs, taking into account her preferences and interests.
With regard to allegations four, six and seven, Petitioner has failed to present any evidence that compensatory education is needed to help overcome lost educational opportunity. The evidence demonstrates that STUDENT was receiving counseling services through school and outside personnel prior to her admittance to CPMC, despite the District’s failure to process the AB 3632 referral. Additionally, the twelve-day delay in holding an IEP meeting was de minimus, especially in light of the fact that two assessments had to be completed before the IEP team had sufficient information to make the SED determination and to recommend a 24-hour residential treatment program. Finally, Petitioner has made no showing of why compensatory education is needed to appropriately educate STUDENT within the meaning of the IDEA based upon respondents’ failure to make a timely formal offer of placement.
In conclusion, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT is entitled to compensatory education with regard to transition services, as detailed above. Petitioner’s other requests for compensatory education are denied.
ISSUE NO. 7: Is STUDENT’s mother entitled to reimbursement for the following costs:
a. attorney’s fees?
An award of attorney’s fees may only be made either (1) with the agreement of the parties following the conclusion of the administrative hearing process or (2) by a court of competent jurisdiction. Education Code §56507(b). There is no provision in special education law for the Hearing Officer to award attorney’s fees. For this reason, Petitioner’s request for reimbursement of attorney’s fees is denied.
b. educational consulting services provided by Virginia Reiss, M.S.?
Petitioner has not provided any authority, and the Hearing Officer does not know of any, which empowers the Hearing Officer to award costs for educational consulting services. Therefore, Petitioner’s request for reimbursement of the cost of educational consulting services provided by Ms. Reiss is denied.
c. expenses relating to STUDENT’s placement at KidsPeace including tuition and costs of travel for STUDENT and her mother?
Parents may be entitled to reimbursement for the placement they have procured for their child when the school district failed to provide an appropriate placement, and the placement provided by the parents was appropriate under the IDEA. School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education (1985) 471 U.S. 359. However, the Burlington rule is not so narrow as to permit reimbursement only when the placement chosen by the parent is found to be the exact proper placement required under the Act. Alamo Heights Independent School District v. State Board of Education, 790 F.2d 1153, 1161 (5th Cir. 1986). The Alamo court explained the rationale behind the Court’s decision in Burlington, stating that parents “whose judgment is wholly or in part vindicated ... should receive more than an ‘empty victory,’” and that “if ‘appropriate relief’ in the form of reasonable reimbursement is not allowed ... the child’s right to a free appropriate public education ... would be less than complete.” Id.
Under the IDEA, the provision of an appropriate education includes related services that are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the student. Board of Education v. Rowley (1982) 458 U.S. 175. The Code of Federal Regulations defines “related services” as “transportation and such developmental, corrective, and other support services as are required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.22(a) (emphasis added). California Education Code § 56363(a) similarly provides that designated instruction and services (DIS), California’s term for “related services,” shall be provided as specified in the IEP “when the instruction and services are necessary for the pupil to benefit educationally from his or her instructional program.” (Emphasis added.) Related services must be provided at no cost to the parent. Education Code § 56040.
The Hearing Officer determined above that the District and Mental Health failed to make a timely written offer of an appropriate residential placement for STUDENT for the remainder of the 1997-98 school year, including the extended school year. STUDENT’s mother seeks reimbursement for the costs of the residential program she began to provide for STUDENT on June 22, 1998, including tuition and travel costs incurred to place STUDENT. Therefore, the Hearing Officer must determine whether the program provided by STUDENT’s mother is proper under the IDEA. In Florence County School Dist. Four v. Carter (1993) 20 IDELR 532, 534, the Supreme Court specifically exempted parents from having to meet certain requirements of the IDEA in their unilateral placements. For example, parents are not required to conform their unilateral placement to the content of the student’s IEP or provide a placement that is certified by the state. Id. Although the Court has recognized that the parents’ placement does not have to meet as high of a standard as a school district’s placement, the parents’ placement must still meet other requirements of the IDEA, such as providing a placement that meets the student’s needs and provides the student educational benefit. Id.
STUDENT’s Unique Needs
The parties agree that STUDENT needs a residential treatment program that will provide intensive therapy to address her emotional needs and an educational component.
Dr. Connor, the psychiatrist who has worked most closely with STUDENT in the last few months, testified that STUDENT is very disturbed psychiatrically and needs a comprehensive, high level of care. According to Dr. Connor, the care should include constant supervision, a large therapeutic component and interaction with patients similar to her level of functioning, and should allow STUDENT to proceed with her schooling. He testified that STUDENT has the emotional developmental level of a twelve- to thirteen-year-old child and displays a high level of impulsitivity, which could lead to high-risk behavior requiring seclusion or restraints. According to Dr. Connor, STUDENT experiences random emotional storms that could trigger the need for hospitalization. He also stated that STUDENT still has feelings of wanting to run away, but that the risk of her running away would be reduced in a facility in which she felt comfortable and not confined. Dr. Connor did not indicate that a locked facility was needed. There is evidence that Ms. Gleason, the treating therapist at CPMC who worked closely with Dr. Connor, felt that STUDENT needs, not a locked facility, but a facility with a seclusion room because of her frequent need to be restrained in seclusion. (Dist.’s Exh. 6.)
Ms. Reiss, the licensed educational psychologist and certified educational planner hired by MOTHER, also testified as to STUDENT’s needs. Ms. Reiss has, inter alia, a bachelor’s degree in psychology, a master’s of science degree in clinical psychology, and a pupil personnel services credential with a designation in school psychology. She worked as a school psychologist for a county office of education and two school districts for ten and a half years before going into private practice. Ms. Reiss met with Dr. Connor and Ms. Gleason, among others, to determine the proper placement for STUDENT. Ms. Reiss testified that STUDENT needs intensive therapeutic intervention in a locked facility, due to the risk of her running away, and education in the areas of personal hygiene, independent living, and academics. Ms. Reiss testified that STUDENT also needs a normalized setting with recreation opportunities, including school dances and plays and athletics. She felt athletics was important because, as the evidence indicates, athletics offers a boost to STUDENT’s self-confidence because she excels in it.
Mental Health’s assessor, Meggy Lau, suggested in her report that STUDENT be placed in “a closely supervised, structured, milieu therapeutic setting that also has an educational component.” (Dist.’s Exh. 6.)
The Hearing Officer finds that, based on the evidence presented, STUDENT needs a 24-hour residential treatment program with an intensive level of therapeutic care; a high student-staff ratio; an educational component that would allow STUDENT to proceed in her current grade level with the special education and related services appropriate for her needs; other patients who are at her level of functioning, the resources to seclude or restrain her if needed; access to appropriate hospitalization, if needed; instruction in independent living and prevocational skills; and recreational opportunities. Having determined STUDENT’s needs, the Hearing Officer must now focus on whether the placement procured by MOTHER is designed to meet those needs.
The testimony of MOTHER and Ms. Weinstein, both of whom have visited KidsPeace, establishes that KidsPeace is a large facility located on approximately a hundred acres in a rural area of Pennsylvania. The facility consists of varying levels of care from acute to intensive to therapeutic, and is an all-inclusive campus with a school servicing grades K-12, residential housing and a hospital with its own educational program on-site. There is one staff member for every three students. The facility also has many recreational opportunities including an indoor swimming pool, a camping area, orchards, dances, and a chorus. The students range in age from twelve to seventeen, and approximately three students are over eighteen. The residential program is not locked, but the hospital is locked. MOTHER testified that she was told that KidsPeace has detailed weekly schedules and a structured treatment plan. Ms. Reiss testified that the treatment program addresses independent living, self-care and pre-vocational skills. According to Ms. Reiss, when a patient is ready for integration back into the real world, KidsPeace also offers the patients an opportunity to live in a supervised group home in the nearby town with therapeutic support and to attend the local high school.
Dr. Connor testified that he spoke with a psychiatrist at KidsPeace regarding STUDENT and that, as a result of the conversation, he felt that KidsPeace offered a comprehensive package of care for STUDENT. According to Dr. Connor, the only negative factor was that it would be preferable for STUDENT to be closer to her mother if an appropriate nearby facility could be located. Ms. Reiss agreed that KidsPeace is appropriate for STUDENT, notwithstanding that it is not a locked facility. Ms. Reiss testified that any risk of running away or suicide could be addressed by the intensive level of treatment STUDENT would receive. There was no evidence presented by respondents that KidsPeace could not meet STUDENT’s needs, apart from the testimony of Ms. Weinstein that KidsPeace did not have seclusion rooms.
The Hearing Officer determines that placement at KidsPeace is appropriate to meet STUDENT’s unique needs. The one deficit cited by respondents, i.e., the lack of seclusion rooms, is remediated by the on-site hospital and the high student-staff ratio. Dr. Connor agreed that KidsPeace could address STUDENT’s emotional needs and this testimony is given great weight for several reasons. Dr. Connor has worked closely with STUDENT in the last few months to address her emotional needs, has no prior relationship with KidsPeace, and has spoken with a psychiatrist at KidsPeace in order to assess its appropriateness for STUDENT. Although a facility closer to home would be preferable, in all other respects, KidsPeace appears very well-suited to meet STUDENT’s needs.
Educational Benefit
The evidence establishes that KidsPeace has an on-site school for grades K-12. Ms. Reiss testified that, based upon her investigation, she found that KidsPeace offers instruction in the skills and academic areas that STUDENT needs. The evidence also establishes that KidsPeace offers the intensive therapeutic treatment that STUDENT needs in order to benefit from her education.
The Hearing Officer finds that the placement procured by MOTHER does allow STUDENT to obtain educational benefit.
***
As stated above, parents may be entitled to reimbursement in cases, such as this, where the school district failed to provide an appropriate education. In the present case, the Hearing Officer has concluded that the placement procured by the parent is appropriate because it meets STUDENT’s substantial psychological needs and allows her to obtain educational benefit.
The court in Alamo provides some guidance in determining the amount of relief that is appropriate. The court stated that factors in determining “whether full or partial reimbursement is in order would include the existence of other, perhaps more suitable, substitute placements, the effort expended by [the parent] in securing alternative placements, and the general cooperative or uncooperative position of the School District itself.”
The evidence presented establishes that MOTHER expended considerable effort in securing an alternative placement for STUDENT. She retained the services of Ms. Reiss, who researched a number of in-state and out-of-state placements. On Ms. Reiss’s advice, MOTHER traveled to visit a number of out-of-state facilities before deciding on KidsPeace. MOTHER also immediately visited the placement that was orally proposed by Mental Health, where she toured the facility and spoke with the staff.
As for the cooperativeness of the District and Mental Health, Ms. Isheim testified that the District asked MOTHER for her consent to assess as soon as it knew that she was seeking a residential placement. Ms. Weinstein testified that Mental Health performed their assessment of STUDENT’s mental health needs as quickly as it could and that she personally went to visit the placement proposed by the parent. The evidence discloses that respondents held an IEP meeting the day after the necessary assessments were completed and were able to propose a placement at the meeting, albeit only orally. However, respondents have some failures in this respect, which have been noted previously. The District failed to assess STUDENT after receiving consent for a mental health assessment in October 1997; failed to reassess earlier than May 1998, even though it received information that STUDENT was in a psychiatric hospital and not returning to school for an extended period of time; and failed to hold an IEP meeting within thirty days of MOTHER’s request, as STUDENT’s conservator, for an IEP meeting. Additionally, both respondents failed to make a written offer of placement after the expanded IEP team determined that STUDENT needed a new placement. Respondents’ culpability is partially diminished by the fact that MOTHER failed time and again to share with respondents the nature and extent of STUDENT’s emotional problems, and that STUDENT was receiving outside counseling. The IDEA promotes partnership between parents and school districts in the hope that the sharing of information and cooperation will assist a child’s IEP team to make the proper decision for a child’s special education. This was clearly not accomplished here.
In balancing the equities, the Hearing Officer finds that respondents failed in a number of particulars, which resulted in STUDENT lingering for months without a placement appropriate to meet her unique and changing needs. The Hearing Officer also finds that, because respondents failed to make a timely written offer of an appropriate placement, MOTHER procured a placement that would allow STUDENT to receive therapeutic care for her emotional needs while addressing her academic needs. However, MOTHER’s failure to share information with respondents with regard to issues involving STUDENT’s educational needs also contributed not insignificantly to the delayed provision of services. Thus, the Hearing Officer concludes that the conduct of both respondents and Petitioner have shortcomings and that the equities weigh in favor of partial reimbursement. However, the Hearing Officer finds the equities against respondents to be four times greater than against Petitioner. Therefore, respondents shall reimburse Petitioner eighty percent of the costs of tuition she has incurred in placing STUDENT at KidsPeace through the remainder of the 1997-98 school year, including the extended school year.(footnote 9)
Transportation is a “related service” that must be provided when necessary to assist a disabled student to benefit from special education. Irving Independent School District v. Tatro (1984) 468 U.S. 883, 891. Transporting STUDENT to KidsPeace was clearly a necessary related service because she could not have benefitted from the placement otherwise.
Whether the travel costs for MOTHER must also be reimbursed requires a slightly different analysis. An OSE policy letter, dated September 12, 1988, EHLR 213:164, states that “when it is necessary for the safety of the child for an adult to accompany the student, round-trip transportation for the adult must be provided.” The testimony established that STUDENT is SED, functions at the maturity level of a twelve-year-old child, has run away from facilities before, and recently still had frequent thoughts of running away. Based on the testimony, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT could not have made a trip from San Francisco to KidsPeace alone. Since STUDENT needs to be accompanied when she travels, it is a necessary part of her education and falls under the definition of a “related service.”
The District must reimburse MOTHER eighty percent of the travel costs for her and STUDENT which were incurred to transport STUDENT to KidsPeace. This includes the cost of the airline tickets and any necessary lodging.
d. psychiatric treatment privately obtained for STUDENT since October 8, 1997?
In Petitioner’s closing argument, she states that she should be reimbursed for expenses incurred for STUDENT’s “psychiatric treatment since October 8, 1998.” As it is logically impossible for STUDENT to have received any treatment on or after October 1998 at this time, the Hearing Officer will presume that this was a typographical error and assume that Petitioner meant 1997.
The Hearing Officer notes that neither of the issue statements Petitioner submitted prior to hearing mentions that Petitioner sought reimbursement for psychiatric treatment. The Hearing Officer finds unpersuasive Petitioner’s argument in her final brief that a broad claim for reimbursement of “professional fees” could provide sufficient notice to the responding parties that such reimbursement was being sought, especially in light of the following facts: (1) on the first day of hearing when the Hearing Officer asked for a specific enumeration of the costs Petitioner was seeking to have reimbursed by the District, Petitioner’s attorney cited only consulting fees, attorney fees, and travel expenses for MOTHER; and (2) there was no indication throughout the five days of hearing that Petitioner was seeking to be reimbursed for the treatment STUDENT received at CPMC.
Under the circumstances, the Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner failed to provide adequate notice that reimbursement for psychiatric services would be an issue for this hearing. Respondents did not have an opportunity to present evidence regarding the adequacy of the services actually received and/or offered to STUDENT because they had no notice that reimbursement of psychiatric services was at issue. The Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner neither appropriately raised nor proved her contention relating to reimbursement for psychiatric services. The Hearing Officer must therefore deny Petitioner’s request for reimbursement for psychiatric treatment received by STUDENT since October 8, 1997.
ORDER
1. Within fifteen calendar days of the date of this decision, the District must convene a meeting with STUDENT’s expanded IEP team to discuss, identify, and offer an appropriate 24-hour residential treatment program for STUDENT for the next six months. The District is ordered to invite STUDENT to attend the IEP meeting with her conservator, MOTHER. (If logistics require, STUDENT could attend the meeting by telephone.) The program shall have, at the minimum, characteristics that are the same as or comparable to the following: a high student-staff ratio; a comprehensive and intensive level of therapeutic care; other patients who are at her level of functioning; the resources to seclude and/or restrain patients when necessary; recreational opportunities, such as track; and instruction in independent living and prevocational/vocational skills.
2. Within the first thirty calendar days of the date of STUDENT’s placement at a residential treatment facility pursuant to the IEP meeting described above, the District shall arrange and have completed a functional vocational evaluation for STUDENT. Within thirty calendar days after completion of the functional vocational evaluation, the District shall convene a meeting with STUDENT’s expanded IEP team to discuss needed transition services and develop a detailed transition plan for STUDENT based on, among other things, the findings of the vocational evaluation and STUDENT’s needs, taking into account her preferences and interests. The District is ordered to invite STUDENT to attend the IEP meeting with her conservator, MOTHER. (If logistics require, STUDENT could attend the meeting by telephone.) The transition plan should include, but is not limited to, further instruction in independent living skills and community and/or work experiences, as appropriate.
3. Within twenty calendar days of receipt of proof from MOTHER, respondents shall reimburse MOTHER eighty percent of the costs of tuition and transportation expenses incurred in placing STUDENT at KidsPeace through the end of the District’s extended school year.
4. All of Petitioner’s other claims for relief are denied.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following finding is made in accordance with this statute:
1. Did the District and/or Mental Health deny STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during the 1997-1998 school year by failing to: a. perform or cause to be performed, within the time required by law, the psychological assessment requested by STUDENT on or about October 8, 1997? b. conduct an IEP meeting until May 18, 1998, following the receipt of a written request from STUDENT’s mother on or about March 1, 1998 for an IEP meeting? c. offer an appropriate residential placement after the IEP team determined that a residential placement was necessary? d. provide any instructional services for approximately the first month of the school year? e. provide any instructional services from early February 1998 to mid-May 1998 while STUDENT was hospitalized at CPMC?
** Petitioner prevailed on this issue.
2. If the District and/or Mental Health failed to offer an appropriate residential placement, are they required to fund placement for STUDENT at KidsPeace?
** Respondents prevailed on this issue.
3. Did the District award STUDENT unearned credits toward graduation?
** The District prevailed on this issue.
4. Did the District fail to devise and implement a transition plan as required by law?
** Petitioner prevailed on this issue.
5. Did the District fail to timely assess and/or provide services following a request from STUDENT’s mother for a speech and language assessment in Spring 1994?
** The District prevailed on this issue.
6. Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education?
** Petitioner prevailed on this issue with respect to transition services.
7. Is STUDENT’s mother entitled to reimbursement for the following costs: a. attorney’s fees?
b. educational consulting services provided by Virginia Reiss, M.S.? c. expenses relating to STUDENT’s placement at KidsPeace including tuition and costs of travel for STUDENT and her mother? d. psychiatric treatment privately obtained for STUDENT since October 8, 1997?
**Respondents prevailed on this issue, except for (c) on which Petitioner prevailed.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. California Education Code Section 56505(I).
Date: August 17, 1998 Hee C. Kim, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
1. The issues listed here differ slightly in wording and content from those noticed by Petitioner before the hearing. Changes were made for purposes of clarification and appropriate analysis, and to reflect Petitioner's withdrawal of certain issues. For example, on the third day of hearing, Petitioner withdrew the issue of whether Respondents should be required to request a waiver from the state in order to place STUDENT at KidsPeace, a noncertified out-of-state residential treatment facility.2. On the first day of hearing, Petitioner withdrew the issue of whether STUDENT's current academic placement at Lincoln High School is appropriate because the IEP team recently reached such a conclusion. At an IEP meeting on May 18, 1998, the expanded IEP team agreed that STUDENT was seriously emotionally disturbed and needs residential placement. Petitioner argued that this resolution by the IEP team entitles her to a finding that she is the party prevailing on this issue for purposes of Education Code 56507(d). This argument fails. The issue was neither "heard" nor "decided" by the Hearing Officer as required by 565007(d), but resolved by and between the parties during an IEP meeting before the hearing commenced. Therefore, this issue will not be addressed in this Decision, nor will a prevailing party determination be made with respect to this issue.3. The Hearing Officer notes that the evidence indicates the District also failed to meet its obligation under Education Code 56381 to reassess a student when conditions warrant. By at least February 1998, the District knew that STUDENT was experiencing serious emotional problems resulting in psychiatric hospitalization and her absence from school. The District should have also known by that time that the October 1997 consent for a mental health referral had never been forwarded to Mental Health. Under such circumstances, the District should have taken steps to reassess STUDENT's educational needs and not waited until a legally sufficient request was made on her behalf for reassessment or review of her IEP. If the District had acted on its own initiative, STUDENT's needs could have been assessed and the appropriate placement to address her emotional disturbance could have been determined earlier than May 1998. As this was not presented as an issue for hearing, this inaction by the District will only be considered with regard to the equities of awarding compensatory education and/or other remedies.4. This includes IEPs calling for residential placement. Government Code 7572.5(c). 5.Further, there is a question as to whether Seneca could be considered an appropriate placement offer even if the offer had been in writing. The evidence establishes that Seneca is only certified to receive students up to eighteen years of age. STUDENT is currently eighteen years old and cannot be placed at Seneca absent a waiver from the State. Kevin Charles, the program director at Seneca, testified that Seneca had never applied for a waiver of the age limit for a new, incoming student. As there is no guarantee that a waiver would have been granted by the State to allow STUDENT to attend Seneca, Seneca's appropriateness and availability as a placement for STUDENT was suspect. However, this issue does not need to be addressed as respondents failed to offer Seneca as a placement in writing, as required under Smith and California law. 6. During the hearing, it became clear from Ms. Finkelstein's representations that the other teachers on Petitioner's witness list would not be available for testimony. The attorneys for Petitioner and the District apparently had a misunderstanding which caused Ms. Metcalf to believe that Ms. Finkelstein would have the teachers available. However, as the teachers were on summer vacation, some could not be reached before the record closed. Ms. Metcalf did not subpoena the teachers, and thus no remedy was requested. 7. Additionally, the act of graduating from high school does not necessarily result in a termination of a student's right to special education services. Graduation does not expunge a student's right to compensatory education if there has been a denial of FAPE.8. At the time Alexopulos was issued, the IDEA was the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA), and 338(a) of the California Code of Civil Procedure was known as 338(l).9. The expanded IEP team determined at the meeting on May 18, 1998, that STUDENT required extended school year services. None of the parties have introduced any evidence that STUDENT requires year-round educational services and, therefore, the award of reimbursement shall encompass only the remainder of the school year at issue, namely the 1997-98 school year with extended school year services.
