California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · November 4, 1998

Student v. Tustin Unified School District

SEHO Case No. SN 484-98 · Hearing Officer Hee C. Kim

Tustin Unified denied FAPE in 1997-98; must provide 20 tutoring hours, a neuropsychological assessment, and half of summer program costs.

Split decision: student prevailed on 5 of 11 issues (2 in part)

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Summary

The parents of a 12-year-old sixth grader at Hewes Middle School filed for due process against Tustin Unified School District. The student had been eligible for special education since kindergarten under specific learning disability and also qualified for speech and language services. She was fully included in general education classes with two part-time aides and resource specialist support. The district finished her triennial assessment about three months late. It did not hold an annual IEP review until March 1998 and never produced a new written IEP. It also did not request a hearing when the parties could not agree. Staff did not work on her reading comprehension goal, or on most of her math goals for money and telling time, until April 1998. The Hearing Officer found that these failures together denied her a FAPE for 1997-98. The Hearing Officer rejected claims that she needed one full-time aide, after-school transportation to outside therapy, and a full-inclusion specialist. Claims about 1998-99 were not ripe because the district had not yet made an offer. The district's extended school year (ESY) offer was too vague, and the parents' Lindamood-Bell summer program was appropriate. Because of the program's length and the district's efforts, the district had to repay only 50 percent of tuition and transportation. The Hearing Officer also ordered 20 hours of tutoring and a neuropsychological assessment. Requests for a neurological exam and for payment for the parents' private assessment were denied.

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Why it matters

This decision shows how SEHO handled a district that never finished an IEP after a triennial assessment. Disagreement with the parents did not excuse the failure, and the district had to request a hearing itself. It also shows that checking a box for ESY eligibility, without program details, was not treated as an adequate written offer.

Issues and holdings

  1. Student prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue 1a. Did the District provide STUDENT a FAPE during the 1997-98 school year? (a. Procedural appropriateness: late triennial reassessment, late annual IEP review, failure to develop IEPs within 50 days of consent, failure to seek a hearing when parties could not agree on an IEP)

    District finished the triennial assessment about three months late, held the annual review three and a half months late, never developed a new IEP, and failed to seek a hearing under Ed. Code 56346(b); these violations contributed to a denial of FAPE.

  2. Student prevailed in partImplementation

    Issue 1b. Did the District provide STUDENT a FAPE during the 1997-98 school year? (b. Substantive appropriateness: number and training of aides, transportation to after-school OT and vision therapy, full-inclusion specialist, and failure to implement IEP until April 1998)

    District failed to implement reading comprehension and most math goals until April 1998, denying FAPE together with the procedural violations; two part-time aides, the transportation alternatives offered, and lack of a full-inclusion specialist were appropriate.

  3. Issue 2. Has the District offered STUDENT a FAPE for the 1998-99 school year?

    Not ripe because the IEP team had not made a formal offer for 1998-99 when the hearing ended.

  4. Issue 3a. Should STUDENT's program for 1998-99 include one trained full-time aide, instead of two part-time aides?

    Not ripe; the Hearing Officer noted the Issue 1 findings may guide the IEP team.

  5. Issue 3b. Should STUDENT's program for 1998-99 include transportation to and from related services for OT and vision therapy that are provided after school?

    Not ripe; bus routes are redetermined each year.

  6. Issue 3c. Should STUDENT's program for 1998-99 include a full-inclusion specialist, knowledgeable about STUDENT's deficits, to train her teachers about how to teach her?

    Not ripe because no 1998-99 offer had been made.

  7. Student prevailedImplementation

    Issue 4. Is STUDENT entitled to after-school tutoring in the area of math and reading comprehension as compensatory education?

    Because reading comprehension and math goals went unimplemented until April 1998 and the parents did not contribute to the errors, ten hours of reading and ten hours of math tutoring were awarded.

  8. Issue 5. Must the District reimburse STUDENT's parents for expenses relating to the summer program at Lindamood-Bell Learning Processes which STUDENT attended during the summer of 1998?

    District made no reasonably specific written ESY offer, and the Lindamood-Bell program was appropriate; reimbursement was limited to 50 percent because the program ran beyond a normal ESY period and the district had made considerable efforts.

  9. Issue 6. Must the District reimburse STUDENT's parents for the cost of the assessment performed by Michelle Majors, Ph.D.?

    Dr. Patterson's psychoeducational assessment and the district's assessment as a whole met Ed. Code 56320, so no reimbursement for the private assessment was owed.

  10. District prevailedAssessment

    Issue 7a. Must the District perform, or cause to be performed, a neurological assessment?

    A neurological (medical) exam was not needed to identify educational needs and would duplicate a neuropsychological assessment.

  11. Student prevailedAssessment

    Issue 7b. Must the District perform, or cause to be performed, a neuropsychological assessment?

    Because the district knew of a neurodevelopmental disorder affecting education and the last full evaluation was three and a half years old, a neuropsychological assessment was required.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • Order to convene IEP meeting. Within 20 calendar days of the decision, convene an IEP meeting to schedule the compensatory tutoring and to develop a neuropsychological assessment plan for parental consent.
  • Compensatory education. Twenty one-hour sessions of after-school tutoring (10 in reading comprehension, 10 in math), aligned to the student's goals, to be completed by the end of the 1998-99 school year unless the parents agree in writing to an extension.
  • Order to assess. District shall complete a neuropsychological assessment and develop an IEP within the timeframe required by Education Code 56344.
  • Reimbursement. Within 20 calendar days of receiving proof, reimburse the parents 50 percent of the tuition and transportation costs for the sixteen-week Lindamood-Bell summer program; no dollar amount stated.

Total: 20 hours of compensatory services

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Key authorities

Rowley; W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School Dist.; Union School Dist. v. Smith; Murphy v. Timberlane Regional School Dist.; Alamo Heights Independent School Dist. v. State Board of Education; School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education; Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School Dist.; Florence County School Dist. Four v. Carter; Hoeft v. Tucson Unified School Dist.; Irving Independent School Dist. v. Tatro; Morton Community Unit School Dist. v. J.M.

People named in the decision

  • Cindy Agopian, director of special education (outgoing), Tustin Unified School District
  • Susan Roice, director of special education (incoming), Tustin Unified School District
  • Michelle Majors, private psychologist who assessed Student at parents' request; witness for Student, Private practice
  • Angelica Dirtadian, clinical director, private learning center; witness for Student, Lindamood-Bell Learning Processes Center, Newport Beach
  • Denise Baecker, instructional aide (afternoon), Hewes Middle School
  • Bridget Wenner, instructional aide (morning), Hewes Middle School
  • Kathryn Blackwell, speech and language therapist/assessor, Tustin Unified School District
  • Cathy Ellis, core teacher, language arts and social studies, Hewes Middle School
  • Sheri Brown, transportation provider representative, Ryder Student Transportation Services, Inc.
  • Allan Cohen, resource specialist program teacher (1997-98), Hewes Middle School
  • Peggy Blaising, special day class teacher, Tustin Unified School District
  • Janette Moray (also spelled Morey), occupational therapist and OT assessor; director/owner, Orange County Therapy Services
  • Margaret Sepulveda, principal, Hewes Middle School
  • Kathy Bennett de Best, science teacher (1997-98), Hewes Middle School
  • Angela Brown, special day class teacher (communicatively handicapped), Columbus-Tustin Middle School
  • Cathy Anderson, resource specialist program teacher (1995-96), Tustin Unified School District
  • Kim Huynen, psychologist who conducted functional analysis assessment and trained aides; witness for District, Behavior Change Associates
  • Robert Patterson, psychologist who performed triennial psychoeducational assessment; witness for District, Private practice, retained by District
  • Dr. Sarkozi, mentioned as offering opinion on aide transitions; role not stated, Not stated

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Hee C. Kim, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), in Tustin, California, on June 16, 17 and 30 and July 1, 2 and 13, 1998. The hearing was also convened by telephone on July 22, 1998.

Petitioner STUDENT was represented at the hearing by attorney Carol Hickman Graham. Also present on STUDENT’s behalf were her father and mother, FATHER and MOTHER. Respondent Tustin Unified School District (District) was represented at the hearing by attorney John Hayashida from the law firm of Parker, Covert & Chidester. Also present on the District's behalf were Cindy Agopian, the outgoing director of special education, and Susan Roice, the incoming director of special education.

The following witnesses were called by Petitioner to testify: Michelle Majors, Psy.D., a psychologist who assessed STUDENT at her parents’ request; Angelica Dirtadian, Ed.M., the clinical director at the Lindamood-Bell Learning Processes Center; FATHER; MOTHER; Denise Baecker, STUDENT’s aide for the second half of the school day during the 1997-98 school year; Kathryn Blackwell, the District’s speech and language therapist working with STUDENT; Cathy Ellis, STUDENT’s core teacher for language arts and social studies during the 1997-98 school year; Bridget Wenner, STUDENT’s aide for the first half of the school day during the 1997-98 school year; Sheri Brown, a representative of Ryder Student Transportation Services, Inc.; Allan Cohen, STUDENT’s resource specialist program teacher during the 1997-98 school year; and Peggy Blaising, a special day class teacher within the District.

The following witnesses were called by the District to testify: Janette Moray, an occupational therapist and director/owner of Orange County Therapy; Margaret Sepulveda, the principal of Hewes Middle School; Kathy Bennett de Best, STUDENT’s science teacher during the 1997-98 school year; Angela Brown, the teacher of the special day class for the communicatively handicapped at Columbus-Tustin Middle School; Cathy Anderson, STUDENT’s resource specialist program teacher during the 1995-96 school year; Kim Huynen, Ph.D., a psychologist and director of Behavior Change Associates; Robert Patterson, Ph.D., a psychologist who assessed STUDENT at the District’s request; and Cindy Agopian.

Oral and documentary evidence was received. The record was held open for the submission of written closing arguments. After the parties' written closing arguments were received, the record was closed and the matter submitted for decision.

ISSUES(Footnote 1)

1. Did the District provide STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during the 1997-98 school year?(Footnote 2)

2. Has the District offered STUDENT a FAPE for the 1998-99 school year?

3. Should STUDENT’s program, placement and services for the 1998-99 school year include the following:

a. one trained full-time aide, instead of two part-time aides? b. transportation to and from related services for occupational therapy and vision therapy that are provided after school? c. a full-inclusion specialist, who is knowledgeable about STUDENT’s deficits, to provide training to STUDENT’s teachers about how to teach her?

4. Is STUDENT entitled to after-school tutoring in the area of math and reading comprehension as compensatory education?

5. Must the District reimburse STUDENT’s parents for expenses relating to the summer program at Lindamood-Bell Learning Processes which STUDENT attended during the summer of 1998?

6. Must the District reimburse STUDENT’s parents for the cost of the assessment performed by Michelle Majors, Ph.D.?

7. Must the District perform, or cause to be performed, the following assessments of STUDENT:

a. a neurological assessment?

b. a neuropsychological assessment?

PROCEDURAL MATTER

After the record was closed, the Hearing Office received the parties’ written closing briefs. Attached to Petitioner’s brief were exhibits containing documentary evidence. None of the exhibits had been introduced into evidence at the hearing. The Hearing Officer notes that the parties’ closing briefs are not evidence to be considered by the Hearing Officer. In any case, the record had already been closed for the submission of additional evidence. For these reasons, the only evidence that will be considered is that which was introduced by the parties at the hearing. Those portions of Petitioner’s closing brief which contain facts or other evidence not introduced into the record during the hearing will not be considered by the Hearing Officer in rendering a decision in this matter.

FACTS

STUDENT is a twelve-year-old student who has been eligible for special education since kindergarten due to a specific learning disability. STUDENT had been found to be developmentally delayed and mildly mentally retarded. From kindergarten to the third grade, she was placed in special day class settings. During the fourth grade, to promote socialization and to expose STUDENT to appropriate models, STUDENT began to be fully included in the fourth grade regular education class except for one hour of the school day (four days per week), which was spent in the resource specialist program for instruction in math. She also received the following related services: an instructional aide, speech and language therapy (S/L), adapted physical education (APE), occupational therapy/physical therapy, and daily transportation to and from school. STUDENT’s placement and services remained essentially the same during the fifth grade except that, at an individualized education program (IEP) meeting on April 24, 1997, vision therapy was added as a related service.

For the sixth grade, the 1997-98 school year, STUDENT left her elementary school and began attending Hewes Middle School within the District. Prior to this transition, the IEP team held a meeting on June 12, 1997, to prepare for the transition.(Footnote 3) The team agreed on the following at the meeting: the annual goals and objectives would remain the same as in the IEP dated November 21, 1996, until the annual review in November 1997; as a starting point for scheduling in middle school, STUDENT was to be enrolled in two periods of core classes, one period of physical education, one period of study skills to support her core classes, one period of study skills for math, and two periods of electives; STUDENT’s speech therapy would be reduced by twenty minutes per week; and occupational therapy (OT) would be provided one time per week at the clinic. This was to be the last time STUDENT’s IEP team completely agreed about her overall IEP.

At Hewes Middle School, STUDENT was assigned two instructional aides, Bridget Wenner (from 7:55 a.m. to 10:55 a.m.) and Denise Baecker (from 10:55 a.m. until 2:00 p.m.). STUDENT was enrolled in physical education, science, drama, language arts, social studies and two periods of the resource specialist program (one for math and one for study skills). Apart from her regular school day, STUDENT also attended parochial and Hebrew classes three to four times per week.

STUDENT’s annual IEP review and triennial evaluation were due on or before November 21, 1997. The District submitted an assessment plan dated October 9, 1997, to STUDENT’s parents for their consent to assess STUDENT in the areas of academic achievement, speech and language, intellectual development, social/emotional/adaptive behavior, perceptual and fine motor development, health and physical status, and OT. MOTHER signed the plan on October 13. The signed assessment plan was received by the District on October 15. Three weeks later, the school nurse completed her portion of the assessment, i.e., the medical update, finding that STUDENT was healthy overall. By December 18, the speech and language specialist completed her evaluation and concluded that STUDENT continued to qualify as a speech-impaired student in the area of pragmatics. The District had Robert Patterson, Psy.D., a licensed psychologist, perform the psychological-educational portion of the triennial evaluation. Dr. Patterson completed his evaluation of STUDENT by January 20, 1998. The OT evaluation was performed by Janette Morey, O.T.R., the owner and director of Orange County Therapy Services, who had been providing direct OT services to STUDENT. In her report dated February 16, 1998, Ms. Morey concluded that direct OT was no longer needed and recommended monthly OT consultation to the educational staff.

By letter dated March 2, 1998, MOTHER requested a functional analysis assessment and a neurological examination by a pediatric neurologist.(Footnote 4) Three days later, on March 5, the IEP team met for the first time during the 1997-98 school year. The team reviewed the results of the triennial assessment. The team agreed to meet again to develop goals and objectives. That same day, MOTHER signed an assessment plan giving the District permission to assess STUDENT in the area of gross motor development(Footnote 5) and to perform a functional analysis assessment. However, by letter dated March 12, the District denied the parents’ request for a neurological examination. The letter stated that the neuropsychological assessments performed by Dr. Patterson in January 1998 and by the state Diagnostic Center in January 1995 provided the District with sufficient information for the planning of STUDENT’s educational programs, and that a medical evaluation of STUDENT’s physical condition was not the responsibility of the District.

The IEP team reconvened on March 16 to further discuss goals and objectives, and to review the assessments that had been performed in the interim. STUDENT’s parents questioned the accuracy of the S/L assessment and requested that additional testing be performed. They signed an assessment plan that same date for S/L testing. STUDENT’s parents also requested that STUDENT’s speech goals from the 1996-97 school year be continued until the additional testing was completed. Because the meeting ended before any agreement was reached with regard to goals and objectives, the parties agreed to meet again to continue discussing goals and objectives. In the meantime, the District was to continue with the former reading and language arts goals. By letter dated the same day, PARENTS informed the District of their opinion that the OT assessment was inadequate. They requested that the District perform another OT assessment with a focus on improving STUDENT’s ability to perform tasks for independent functioning.(Footnote 6)

PARENTS wrote another letter on March 17, asking for after-school tutoring in the areas of math and reading. PARENTS reasoned that tutoring was necessary because the IEP goals in the areas of math and reading had not been implemented during the regular school year. By letter dated March 26, the District informed the parents that it felt STUDENT’s needs could be met within the school day and, therefore, after-school tutoring would not be provided. The District expressed some confusion as to what area the parents wanted STUDENT’s program to focus on, i.e., whether the focus should be on socialization, functional knowledge, or academics. The District offered the following (or a combination of the following) as placement options, depending on the focus desired by the team: full inclusion, special day class and the resource specialist program.

On April 6, the IEP team convened for the third time in a one-month period to again discuss STUDENT’s placement and develop goals and objectives. This time, the team was able to agree on the following: STUDENT would be placed in a full-inclusion setting with a modified curriculum and modified grades, the aides would be trained by Behavior Change Associates (BCA), and the OT provider would be changed. The parents again requested that one-on-one tutoring be provided after school in order for STUDENT to meet her IEP goals. The District refused to provide one-on-one tutoring but did offer tutoring before or after school, presumably in a group setting, and a Buddy Reading Program. The parents refused this offer. The parents also requested that STUDENT be transported to and from vision therapy, which she attended at 3:00 p.m. after the normal school day ended. Cindy Agopian, the District’s director of special education, said that she would look into whether this could be coordinated. The team agreed that goals and objectives would be developed after the core and science teachers submitted a list of essential knowledge and skill areas for the team to review.

Four days later, the parents filed the request for instant due process hearing with the Hearing Office. Before the hearing in this matter commenced, the IEP team held one more meeting on April 27 to develop IEP goals and objectives. At the meeting, the team agreed on a number of goals and objectives that were to be informally used until the overall IEP and placement could be agreed upon. The team also agreed that BCA would continue to work with the aides by providing support and consultation through the end of the school year for three hours per week. The parents then presented a request for summer training at the Lindamood-Bell Learning Processes Center in Newport Beach (Lindamood-Bell) and any related transportation at District expense. The District said it would review the request and respond at a later date.

On April 27, the District provided a response to the parents’ request for after-school transportation to and from vision therapy. In a letter to the parents, the District stated that the request would have to be denied because the time of 3:00 p.m. requested by the parents conflicted with the dismissal of students for all schools throughout the District. The District explained that transportation could be provided if therapy were scheduled earlier in the day, but that the transportation department could not schedule a bus for the time requested. As an alternative, the District offered to reimburse the parents for any mileage expenses incurred in transporting STUDENT themselves.

By May 8, the further S/L assessment requested by the parents was completed. The assessor concluded that STUDENT qualified as a speech-impaired student in the areas of semantics, syntax, morphology and pragmatics. It was recommended that STUDENT receive speech therapy to remediate the areas that were found notably weak in the assessment.

Another IEP was scheduled to take place on May 1, but, according to a letter from the District, it was postponed at the request of the parents. Thereafter, the parties had further disputes over the District’s refusal to fund the Lindamood-Bell summer program, as requested by the parents, or reimburse the parents for an independent neuropsychological evaluation obtained by the parents. According to the testimony, STUDENT did in fact attend the Lindamood-Bell summer program for four hours per day during the summer beginning June 22, 1998, and the parents retained Michelle Majors, Ph.D., to perform an assessment of STUDENT in the beginning of June 1998.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

Under both state law and the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), students with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); Education Code § 56000. The term “free appropriate public education” means special education and related services that are available to the student at no charge to the parent or guardian, that meet the State educational standards, and that conform to the student’s individualized educational program (IEP). 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8).

“Special education” is defined as specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet the unique needs of the student including instruction conducted in the classroom, in the home, in hospitals and institutions, and in other settings. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(25). The term “related services” includes transportation and other services, such as occupational therapy and speech-language services, that may be required to assist a child to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22). California Education Code § 56363(a) similarly provides that designated instruction and services (DIS), California’s term for related services, shall be provided “when the instruction and services are necessary for the pupil to benefit educationally from his or her instructional program.”

In Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (1982), the United States Supreme Court addressed the level of instruction and services that must be provided to a student with disabilities to satisfy the requirements of the IDEA (now IDEA 1997). The Court determined that a student’s IEP must be reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit. Id. at 200. According to Rowley, the IDEA does not require school districts to provide special education students with the best education available, or to provide instruction or services that maximize a student’s abilities. Id. at 198-200. The Court stated that school districts are required to provide only a “basic floor of opportunity” that consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the student. Id. at 201.

The Supreme Court in Rowley also recognized the importance of adherence to the procedural requirements of the IDEA. 458 U.S. at 207-208. Federal special education law requires states to establish and maintain certain procedural safeguards to ensure that each student with a disability receives the appropriate public education to which he/she is entitled and that parents are involved in the formulation of the student’s educational program. W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School District No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992). Procedural flaws, however, do not automatically require a finding of a denial of a FAPE. Id. at 1484. Procedural violations clearly do constitute a denial of FAPE where they result in the loss of educational opportunity or seriously infringe on the parent’s opportunity to participate in the IEP formulation process. W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484.

Thus, the analysis of whether a student has been provided a FAPE is twofold, requiring the Hearing Officer to decide whether procedural steps have been followed and to determine whether the FAPE provided was substantively appropriate. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-207.

1. Did the District provide STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during the 1997-98 school year?

a. Procedural Appropriateness

As noted above, the first step in an analysis of FAPE is to determine whether the District complied with the procedural requirements of the IDEA and state special education law. Petitioner alleged that the District committed a number of procedural violations during the 1997-98 school year that denied STUDENT a FAPE, including a failure to timely complete a triennial re-evaluation of STUDENT and a failure to conduct a timely IEP meeting. Based on the evidence presented at hearing, the Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner’s allegations are supported by the evidence. The District committed the following specific procedural errors: failed to reassess STUDENT within three years; failed to convene the IEP team within a year of the last annual review; and failed to develop IEPs within fifty days of receipt of the parents’ consent for the triennial assessment and the further speech and language assessment.

First, federal and state special education law provide that a reassessment of a student shall be conducted at least every three years or more frequently, if conditions warrant. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(A); Education Code § 56381. If the reassessment so indicates, a new IEP must be developed. Education Code § 56381. Here, there is no dispute that the District was required to perform a triennial assessment of STUDENT by at least November 21, 1997. The evidence shows that, despite the fact that the District received STUDENT’s parents’ consent for the triennial assessment by October 15, 1997, the District did not complete the assessment until February 16, 1998.(Footnote 7) Thus, the District clearly did not complete a reassessment of STUDENT within the three years required by law. By the time the District completed its triennial assessment, it was already three months overdue.

Second, special education law requires that a student’s IEP team review and, if appropriate, revise a student’s IEP at least annually. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A); Education Code § 56343(d). Section 56343(d) of the Education Code states: “An individualized education program team shall meet ... [a]t least annually, to review the pupil’s progress, the individualized education program, and the appropriateness of placement, and to make any necessary revisions.” Here, an annual, comprehensive review should have taken place on or before November 21, 1997. The District did not begin such a process until March 5, 1998, three and a half months later. Therefore, the evidence shows that the District failed to review and revise STUDENT’s IEP annually as required by law. By the time the District began its annual review, it was already three and a half months overdue.

Third, special education law provides that an IEP must be developed in accordance with the results of an assessment within fifty days of receipt of the parent’s consent to assess. Education Code § 56344. Section 56344 states, in pertinent part:

An individualized education program required as a result of an assessment of a pupil shall be developed within a total time not to exceed 50 days, not counting days between the pupil’s regular school sessions, terms, or days of school vacation in excess of five schooldays, from the date of receipt of the parent’s written consent for assessment, unless the parent agrees, in writing, to an extension.

(Emphasis added.) An IEP team must meet in order to revise an IEP when revisions are necessary to address the results of any assessment. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(ii)(II). Here, the District received the parent’s written consent for the triennial assessment on October 15, 1997. This means that, by December 4, 1997, the triennial assessment should have been completed, the IEP team should have met, and an IEP should have been developed. None of these events occurred by December 4. As noted above, the triennial assessment was not completed until February 16, 1998. The IEP team didn’t convene to review and/or revise STUDENT’s IEP until March 5, 1998. Moreover, a new IEP was still not developed by the time the record in this matter closed, purportedly because the parties could not come to an agreement as to what would be an appropriate IEP. As there was no evidence of a written agreement by the parents to extend the timeline, the record clearly established that the District failed to develop a new IEP to address the results of the triennial assessment within the time required by law. The District’s failure to formally offer an appropriate IEP cannot be excused by any expressed unwillingness by the parents to agree to the District’s proposed IEP. Union School District v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1526 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We find that a school district cannot escape its obligation under the IDEA to offer formally an appropriate educational placement by arguing that a disabled child’s parents expressed unwillingness to accept that placement.”).

The District also failed to meet the fifty-day timeline with regard to the further speech and language assessment. MOTHER signed the assessment plan for a further speech evaluation on March 16, 1998. The assessment plan was received sometime thereafter by the District. A notation on the plan indicated that the fifty-day timeline expired on May 11, 1998. The further assessment was completed by May 8, 1998. The findings of the May 1998 assessment differed significantly from those contained in the original assessment. The May 1998 assessment found that STUDENT continued to qualify as a speech-impaired student in the areas of semantics, syntax, morphology and pragmatics, not just pragmatics as found in the original assessment. The report from the May 1998 assessment concluded with a statement that the IEP team would convene to review the results and determine the most appropriate placement for STUDENT. No such IEP meeting took place by the time the record in this matter closed, which was approximately four months after the parent gave her consent for the assessment.

Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, the District failed to fulfill its obligation under Education Code § 56346(b) to seek administrative enforcement when the parties could not agree on an IEP. Compare with Murphy v. Timberlane Regional School District, 22 F.3d 1186, 1195-1196 (1st Cir. 1994).(Footnote 8) The evidence in this case discloses that, after the triennial assessment was completed, an IEP(Footnote 9) was not developed because the parties were unable to agree on the appropriate placement, services and program for STUDENT. The parties’ disagreement on cannot serve to excuse the District’s failure to develop an appropriate IEP and offer it to STUDENT and her parents under Education Code § 56344 and Union, supra. If the parents disagreed with all or part of the District’s proposed IEP, under Education Code § 56346(b), the District was obligated to implement those parts of the IEP the parents agreed with and initiate a due process hearing or a prehearing mediation conference in order to obtain permission to implement the remainder. Section 56346(b) states:

If the district ... determines that the part of the proposed special education program to which the parent does not consent is necessary to provide a free and appropriate public education to the pupil, a due process hearing shall be initiated ..., unless a prehearing mediation conference is held.

Therefore, the District’s failure even to develop the IEP is a clear procedural lapse that cannot be excused by the fact that the parties could not agree on an IEP.

In summary, the Hearing Officer finds that the District committed a number of significant procedural errors that affected STUDENT’s education during the 1997-98 school year. The legal consequences of those errors will be discussed below.

b. Substantive Appropriateness

Petitioner alleged that the District failed to provide STUDENT a FAPE that satisfied substantive requirements. Petitioner contended that the District failed in the following particulars: failed to provide one trained full-time aide (rather than two untrained part-time aides); failed to provide after-school transportation to and from related services for occupational therapy and vision therapy; failed to provide a full-inclusion specialist knowledgeable about STUDENT’s deficits; and failed to implement STUDENT’s IEP until approximately April 1998. These allegations will be addressed in turn.

Number and Training of Aide(s)

Petitioner argued that STUDENT required the assistance of a single aide because she becomes distracted and loses her focus when the aides transition. Additionally, Petitioner contended that STUDENT required an aide who was trained to understand her handicapping condition so that the aide could keep STUDENT on task and assist her only when appropriate. Petitioner presented the testimony of FATHER and Dr. Majors to support her position.

FATHER is a rheumatologist and internist who, despite his demanding schedule, remains highly involved with his daughter’s education. FATHER testified that, while STUDENT’s long-term memory is good, her short-term memory is very poor, and that having to transition to a second aide caused her to lose any progress made with the first aide. He contended that, because the aides were not trained in how to work with STUDENT, STUDENT was prevented from benefitting from her education. FATHER alleged that the aides did STUDENT’s work for her and told STUDENT the answers to problems without demanding that she provide the answers herself. FATHER testified that STUDENT told him that the aides were telling her the answers to problems. FATHER also testified that, when he recreated tests and worksheets at home by whiting out the answers on the copies brought home by STUDENT, STUDENT would be unable to provide the answers she had supposedly provided while at school. Finally, FATHER testified that he saw significant amounts of work done in the aides’ handwriting and that he actually saw the aides doing work for STUDENT while he was observing STUDENT in the classroom on a number of occasions.

Dr. Majors is a licensed psychologist who, at the request of STUDENT’s parents, performed an assessment of STUDENT in June 1998. Dr. Majors earned a bachelor of arts degree in philosophy and psychology in 1986, a master of arts degree in psychology in 1988, and a doctorate in clinical psychology in 1992. Dr. Majors has worked for various medical centers since 1992 and has worked in private practice on a part-time basis since 1995. For her assessment of STUDENT, Dr. Majors reviewed the assessments done by the Diagnostic Center and Dr. Patterson, and administered the following tests to STUDENT: Wide Range Assessment of Memory and Learning (WRAML), Wechsler Intelligence Scale of Children - Third Edition (WISC-III), and the Wechsler Individual Achievement Test (WIAT). Dr. Majors observed STUDENT during the testing, but did not observe STUDENT at school or talk to any of STUDENT’s teachers or aides. Dr. Majors testified that, after the parents alerted her to a syndrome known as hyperlexia, she researched it and diagnosed STUDENT with hyperlexia. Dr. Majors testified that consistency is important for hyperlexics and that it is important for a hyperlexic student to have as few transitions as possible during the day. Dr. Majors stated that STUDENT needed one consistent person as an aide because otherwise she would have to adapt to the two different styles of the aides. Dr. Majors further testified that, because STUDENT has unique learning methods, it was important for any aide working with STUDENT to be trained in STUDENT’s specific disability so as to effectively assist STUDENT with any transitions during her day.In contrast, the District offered the testimony of STUDENT’s teachers and aides, Dr. Patterson, and Kim Huynen, Ph.D., to support its position that the number and training of STUDENT’s aides were appropriate. STUDENT’s teachers and aides testified that STUDENT did not appear to have any difficulties with the transitioning of the aides, i.e., she did not exhibit any frustration, disorientation or behavior problems when the aides would transition. The aides also testified that having two aides assigned to STUDENT was a benefit, because if one aide was unable to come to work the other aide could assist STUDENT the entire day, thereby providing STUDENT with a familiar aide for the entire day. Both aides testified that they reviewed STUDENT’s IEP prior to or at the beginning of school. Bridget Wenner, the morning aide, has an associate of arts degree and had previously worked as an aide for two years for a neighboring school district. Denise Baecker, the afternoon aide, testified that she was trained by District personnel and read books about her duties as an aide before becoming STUDENT’s aide for the 1997-98 school year. Both of the aides testified that they assisted STUDENT in the classroom mainly by using prompts to keep her on task; in addition, they made sure STUDENT understood directions on tests, took notes for her when she was unable to keep up, wrote the answers provided by STUDENT during tests when appropriate, and consulted with the teachers or therapists regarding any concerns. Both aides denied ever providing STUDENT with the correct answers to any worksheets or tests. The teachers’ testimonies corroborated the aides’ statements about the methods they used to assist STUDENT in the classroom.

Dr. Patterson is the psychologist who, at the District’s request, performed STUDENT’s triennial reevaluation. Dr. Patterson has a bachelor of arts degree in education, psychology and biology; master of arts degrees in educational psychology and developmental psychology; a doctorate in psychology; teaching credentials; pupil personnel services credentials qualifying him to serve as a social worker, counselor and school psychologist; and an administrative credential. He is a licensed school psychologist and clinical psychologist. He worked for school districts for thirty-three years in roles varying from teacher to district special education coordinator to SELPA director to school psychologist. For the past six years, he has been in private practice where he performs approximately one hundred to two hundred assessments per year for school districts, group homes, regional centers and parents. Sixty to seventy percent of the assessments are done on behalf of parents.

Dr. Patterson performed the previous triennial assessment of STUDENT in October 1994 when she was attending Tustin Memorial Elementary School. In assessing STUDENT in 1998, Dr. Patterson reviewed historical data; interviewed the principal of Hewes, STUDENT’s aides, the aides in the RSP, the school counselor, and STUDENT’s regular and special education teachers; observed STUDENT in a number of settings during the course of her school day; and administered the following tests: the Peabody Individual Achievement Test - Revised (PIAT-R); the Test of Nonverbal Intelligence-2 (TONI-2); the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale; the Conners’ Rating Scale; the Burks’ Behavior Rating Scale; and the Digit-Symbol Modalities Test. He also interpreted the results obtained by Mr. Cohen on the cognitive scales of the Woodcock-Johnson Psycho-Educational Test Battery - Revised (WJ-R). With regard to the number of aides STUDENT should have, Dr. Patterson disagreed that STUDENT should have one aide for the entire day. He testified that research has shown that, where there is only one aide, a child becomes fervently attached to and dependent on the aide to his detriment and that even a trained aide would not necessarily be able to prevent this from happening. Dr. Patterson also testified that, after assessing STUDENT, he recommended that the District hire Behavior Change Associates (BCA) to assess the situation and show the aides how to be more effective in dealing with STUDENT. He found that STUDENT was being tracked too closely by the aides, which hampered her opportunity for growth in the area of socialization. Despite this, Dr. Patterson found that the assessment data showed that STUDENT had made significant growth in this area.

Dr. Huynen is the psychologist from BCA who, upon the recommendation of Dr. Patterson, performed a functional analysis in March 1998. Dr. Huynen has a bachelor of arts degree in psychology with a focus on special education and a doctorate in philosophy with an emphasis on behavioral analysis. She is a licensed clinical psychologist and the director of BCA. During the analysis, Dr. Huynen and her assistant observed STUDENT at school on numerous occasions and interviewed STUDENT’s teachers, aides and parents. Dr. Huynen also attended the IEP meetings held on April 6 and 27, 1998. She testified that STUDENT did not appear to have any problems with having two aides. The same behavior was noted with both aides and there was no difficulty transitioning between the aides. She further testified that research articles have shown that using multiple trainers promotes generalization of skills and that she always recommends a minimum of two instructional aides in order to promote generalization and to allow the aides to cover for each other during absences. Finally, Dr. Huynen testified that, although she did teach the aides some instructional strategies to promote socialization, reduce the amount of prompting required, and help keep STUDENT on task, she found that the aides had good baseline skills and interacted appropriately with STUDENT even before they received any training from BCA.

Based on the foregoing, the Hearing Officer finds that the aides provided to STUDENT during the 1997-98 school year were appropriate. Petitioner failed to provide any substantial evidence that STUDENT required one full-time aide instead of two part-time aides. Both the people working with STUDENT in the school setting and the psychologists who observed her at school for assessment purposes found that STUDENT did well with two aides. Additionally, both Drs. Patterson and Huynen agreed that research had shown that two aides are generally better than one. On the other hand, the speculation offered by Drs. Sarkozi and Major that STUDENT was “disrupted” or confused by the transitioning of the aides was not supported by any substantial evidence. With respect to the issue of the aides’ training, the weight of the evidence does not support Petitioner’s allegations that the aides had insufficient training and that this resulted in their improperly providing answers to STUDENT and being unable to keep her on task. Dr. Huynen found that, even before being trained by BCA, the aides’ strategies for redirecting STUDENT and otherwise assisting her were appropriate. Additionally, there was no showing that the aides wrote answers that were not provided by STUDENT, or inappropriately provided answers to STUDENT. The fact that STUDENT was not able to duplicate her performance at home might be explained by a number of factors, including her poor short-term memory or her mental exhaustion by the end of the day.

Transportation To and From Related Services

Transportation may be a necessary related service if it can be shown that transportation is necessary for a child to benefit from her special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22). Petitioner contended that she required after-school transportation to and from vision therapy and occupational therapy in order to access those services, but that the District failed to provide the necessary transportation. The District argued that its offer to transport STUDENT to therapy during the school day or to reimburse her parents for transporting her after school was appropriate. The District also argued that it is not the “practice” for school districts to provide bus transportation to a related service after school when the service is outside of the districts’ boundaries.

Notwithstanding any “practice” of school districts, out-of-district transportation must be provided by a school district as a “related service” when the transportation is necessary for the special circumstances of a handicapped child to benefit from her special education and is “reasonable when all of the facts are considered.” Alamo Heights Independent School District v. State Board of Education, 790 F.2d 1153, 1160 (5th Cir. 1986); Union, 15 F.3d at 1527-1528. “Unless the transportation request is shown to be unreasonable, the [IDEA] requires that such transportation be provided as a related service.” Alamo Heights, 790 F.2d at 1160. A request for transportation may be found unreasonable where the transportation would create an unfair burden on the school district or on other children being transported by, for example, creating substantial additional expense, disrupting efficient planning of school bus routes, entailing additional time to transport other children, or in any other way inconveniencing other children on the bus route. Id. There is no dispute that STUDENT requires transportation to and from vision therapy and occupational therapy to be able to benefit from these services. The question, then, is whether it was reasonable to request transportation to these services at the end of the school day at 2:20 p.m., instead of during the school day. Cindy Agopian, the District’s director of special education at the time PARENTS made their transportation request, testified that the District’s transportation provider, Ryder Student Transportation Services, Inc. (Ryder), told her that the transportation request could not be met for the 1997-98 school year unless a new route was created.(Footnote 10) This testimony was supported by the testimony of Sheri Brown, an employee of Ryder. Ms. Brown also testified that the transportation of students to and from related services is usually scheduled at times during the school day (8:30 a.m. to 1:45 p.m.), because all of Ryder’s transportation sources were otherwise engaged thereafter due to the dismissal from school of all students in the District. She represented that, for the 1997-98 school year, at 2:20 p.m. all of Ryder’s special education buses were already assigned to routes and filled to capacity. According to Ms. Agopian, because of the unavailability of transportation at the time requested by the parents, the District offered to transport STUDENT to her outside therapy during the school day or to reimburse the parents if they would provide transportation. Ms. Agopian testified that one of the specific offers called for the District to transport STUDENT to her outside therapy at 1:50 p.m., at which time she had approximately thirty minutes remaining in her RSP study skills period (where she worked on homework from her other classes) and to transport her home afterwards. Ms. Agopian testified that the parents refused all of the forementioned offers.

Based on the evidence, the Hearing Officer finds that the parents’ request for transportation was not reasonable when all of the facts are considered. Transportation at the time requested by the parents could not have been managed without creating a new route and/or acquiring new equipment. Moreover, the parents were presented with a practical and reasonable alternative that would have resulted in only a thirty-minute loss of RSP study-skill time. According to the evidence, during her RSP study-skill period, STUDENT engaged in activities that could just as easily have been performed at home, such as completing homework assigned in her other classes or reading books for pleasure. There was neither evidence nor argument that reducing STUDENT’s RSP study skills period by thirty minutes on the three days when therapy was scheduled would have denied STUDENT a FAPE or otherwise have affected the outcome of her education.(Footnote 11)

Full-Inclusion Specialist

Petitioner argued that STUDENT should have been provided with a full-inclusion specialist to instruct STUDENT’s teachers on how to teach her. Petitioner failed to present any evidence or authority to support this argument. First, there was no showing that STUDENT’s regular education teachers should have been teaching her in ways different than they were teaching her. Second, there was no showing that the work assigned to STUDENT in her regular education classes was not sufficiently modified to permit STUDENT to function appropriately in the classes. In fact, the evidence pointed to the contrary. STUDENT was taught according to the sixth grade core curriculum in her social studies, language arts and science classes. STUDENT’s teachers for these classes testified that STUDENT’s assignments were modified for her when necessary in the following ways: additional time to complete assignments; depending on the nature of the assignment, completion of only those portions that the teacher felt were appropriate for STUDENT’s present levels of performance, such as answering questions about the main points of a discussion instead of questions requiring memorization of details; elimination of abstract or global essay questions; allowing oral answers instead of requiring that they be written; having passages read to her by her aide, when appropriate; and modified grading. The teachers also testified that STUDENT was able to successfully complete some of the work with no modifications and without the assistance of her aide, especially when it was a hands-on activity.

Based on the foregoing, the Hearing Officer declines to find that the District was required to provide STUDENT a full-inclusion specialist during the 1997-98 school year.

Implementation of IEP

Petitioner contends that, during the 1997-98 school year and until April 1998, the District failed to implement the reading comprehension and mathematics goals and objectives contained in STUDENT’s IEP dated November 21, 1996.(Footnote 12) There is no dispute that reading comprehension and math are STUDENT’s greatest areas of deficit. A failure to provide all the services listed in the student’s IEP violates special education law. Education Code § 56345(c). Section 3001(b) of Title 5 of the California Code of Regulations provides that a student’s special education program and related service(s) shall be based on the goals and objectives that are specified in the IEP and that have been determined through the process of assessment and IEP planning. The evidence in this matter clearly establishes that, until April 1998, the District did not implement STUDENT’s reading comprehension goal or most of her math goals for the 1997-98 school year.

STUDENT’s IEP contained the following reading comprehension and math objectives, which were to be completed by November 1997: be able to read a fourth grade passage and answer comprehension questions with eighty percent accuracy; when presented with a clock face showing time, indicate the time shown in increments of five minutes without prompting eighty percent of the time; without prompting, be able to subtract three digits with and without regrouping with eighty percent accuracy; be able to sequence count two and three with eighty percent accuracy; be able to count out change up to $1.00 using a combination of coins with eighty percent accuracy; and be able to convert coins to coins of equal value with ninety percent accuracy.

The evidence establishes that the reading comprehension goal was not specifically addressed by any of STUDENT’s teachers during the 1997-98 school year. Both the regular education teachers who taught STUDENT in regular education academic classes (such as language arts, social studies and science) and STUDENT’s RSP teacher testified that they were not implementing STUDENT’s reading comprehension goal.

Some of STUDENT’s math goals were also not being adequately implemented until the parents complained to the District in April 1998. Specifically, there is no credible evidence that the objectives relating to counting change, converting coins, or reading a clockface were appropriately addressed until April 1998. None of these subjects was addressed by any of the RSP worksheets given to STUDENT before that time. Further, STUDENT’s RSP teacher, Mr. Cohen, testified that many of these subjects were formally addressed only at the end of the school year when STUDENT’s math group had completed the core math curriculum, which is clearly long past the November 1997 projected date for completion of the objectives. Mr. Cohen did testify that from the beginning STUDENT engaged in some hands-on activities with regard to her math goals, such as buying her own lunch in the cafeteria, selling magazines and journals, being asked to look at the clock to determine if it was time to go, and using manipulatives like the cash register till in Mr. Cohen’s classroom. However, these informal activities did not address the specific goals that were set for STUDENT by the IEP team.

Finally, the Hearing Officer does not find credible the explanation provided by Mr. Cohen for the delay in formally addressing these skills. Mr. Cohen testified that STUDENT could count change and read a clockface by five-minute increments at the beginning of the school year but was having difficulty with the concepts behind them. Mr. Cohen explained that the subjects he covered during the first part of the year (fractions, multiplication and division) were supposed to help her understand the concepts behind time and money. He testified that she had strengths in fractions, multiplication and division, and so he tried to use these strengths to teach her the basic concepts behind time and money. There was no substantial evidence, however, that STUDENT had accomplished her specific math objectives (which required no prompting and eighty to ninety percent accuracy) by the beginning of the school year or that she had the splinter skills that Mr. Cohen claimed. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary. Dr. Patterson’s report, which interpreted STUDENT’s results from the Woodcock-Johnson Psycho-Educational Test Battery - Revised (WJ-R) administered by Mr. Cohen during the triennial -assessment, found that STUDENT had difficulty reading clocks, determining change, and knowing monetary equivalents and that she was unable to solve any fractional, multiplication or long division problems (overall performing at the 1.8 grade level). Furthermore, Mr. Cohen never explained how, even assuming that STUDENT had strengths in fractions and multiplication, she could connect fractions and multiplication with counting change, converting coins or reading a clockface in five-minute increments. This is especially suspect in light of the testimony of all those who worked with her and those who assessed her that STUDENT had difficulty with abstraction and conceptualization, which renders it highly unlikely that STUDENT would be able to connect fractions or multiplication with counting change or converting coins. Furthermore, Dr. Patterson testified that STUDENT must learn money and time in a functional sense and that she could not do so in an abstract manner.

In summary, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to satisfy the substantive requirements of the IDEA when it failed to implement the reading comprehension and math goals and objectives of STUDENT’s IEP. Petitioner’s other allegations about the substantive inappropriateness of the District’s provision of services for the 1997-98 school year were not established by the evidence.

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Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed in its obligation to provide STUDENT a FAPE during the 1997-98 school year. As determined above, the District committed both procedural and substantive violations during the 1997-98 school year. Standing alone, some of the violations by the District might not have amounted to a denial of a FAPE. For example, standing alone, the failure to hold an IEP meeting within fifty days of receiving the parent’s consent to assess in order to review the further speech and language evaluation might not have constituted a denial of FAPE because of its de minimus impact. The IEP meeting, had it taken place, could have been held as late as May. From May, there was little time remaining in the school year and there is no indication that STUDENT was entitled to receive speech services during the extended school year. However, considered collectively, the District’s violations clearly resulted in a denial of FAPE as they resulted in STUDENT’s IEP remaining unchanged, for most of the 1997-98 school year, from an IEP which was developed in November 1996 while STUDENT was in elementary school and which did not take into account the current available assessment data.(Footnote 13) The District’s failures also caused STUDENT to lose valuable instruction in two of her greatest areas of deficit, math and reading comprehension.

2. Has the District offered STUDENT a FAPE for the 1998-99 school year?

Petitioner asked the Hearing Officer to rule on the issue of whether the District has offered STUDENT an appropriate program for the 1998-99 school year. At the time the hearing in this matter concluded in July 1998, the IEP team had not yet made a formal offer for a specific program for the 1998-99 school year. Therefore, it would not be appropriate for the Hearing Officer to rule on such an issue in this decision. The subject of the appropriate program for STUDENT for the 1998-99 school year must first be addressed by the IEP team during a meeting of the team, if such has not already occurred since the time the record in this matter closed. The team must review STUDENT’s present levels of educational performance, prepare appropriate goals and objectives, and then design a program necessary to accomplish those goals and objectives.

3. Should STUDENT’s program, placement and services for the 1998-99 school year include the following:

a. one trained full-time aide, instead of two part-time aides? b. transportation to and from related services for occupational therapy and vision therapy that are provided after school? c. a full-inclusion specialist, who is knowledgeable about STUDENT’s deficits, to provide training to STUDENT’s teachers about how to teach her?

For the same reasons issue number two cannot be considered in this decision, this issue also cannot be considered. However, the Hearing Officer notes that the findings of fact that were made in the analysis of issue number one may provide useful guidance to the IEP team in developing an appropriate program, placement and services for the 1998-99 school year.

4. Is STUDENT entitled to after-school tutoring in the area of math and reading comprehension as compensatory education?

In School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education, 471 U.S. 359, 374, 105 S.Ct. 1996 (1985), the Supreme Court concluded that equitable considerations are relevant in determining relief under the IDEA. Based on the principle set forth in Burlington, federal courts have held that compensatory education is a form of equitable relief that may be granted for the denial of appropriate special education services to help overcome lost educational opportunity. See, e.g., Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School District, 31 F.3d 1489, 1496 (9th Cir. 1994). However, the Ninth Circuit has held that compensatory education does not involve an obligation to provide day-for-day or session-for-session replacement for opportunity or time missed. Id. at 1497. The purpose of compensatory education is to “ensure that the student is appropriately educated within the meaning of IDEA.” Id. Because compensatory education is an equitable remedy, equitable considerations are relevant in considering and fashioning relief. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374; W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School District, 960 F.2d 1479, 1486 (9th Cir. 1992); Parents of Student W., 31 F.3d at 1496. “The conduct of both parties must be reviewed to determine whether relief is appropriate.” W.G., 960 F.2d at 1486.

The Hearing Officer determined above that the District failed to provide STUDENT a FAPE during the 1997-98 school year based on both procedural and substantive violations. One of these violations involved a failure to implement STUDENT’s reading comprehension and math goals and objectives until April 1998. Notably, reading comprehension and math are among STUDENT’s weakest areas. As for the conduct of the parents, there is no evidence that they contributed to the District’s procedural or substantive errors. For these reasons, the Hearing Officer finds that an award of compensatory education in the form of after-school tutoring in the areas of reading comprehension and math is necessary to help STUDENT overcome lost educational opportunity. Specifically, the Hearing Officer finds that ten one-hour sessions of tutoring in reading comprehension and ten one-hour sessions in math are required. Absent consent by the parents in writing to an extension, all twenty sessions must be completed no later than the end of the 1998-99 school year.

5. Must the District reimburse STUDENT’s parents for expenses relating to the summer program at Lindamood-Bell Learning Processes which STUDENT attended during the summer of 1998?

Parents may be entitled to retroactive reimbursement for the placement they have procured for their child when the school district failed to provide an appropriate placement, and the placement provided by the parents was appropriate under the IDEA. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370. However, the Burlington rule is not so narrow as to permit reimbursement only when the placement chosen by the parent is found to be the exact proper placement required under the Act. Alamo Heights, 790 F.2d at 1161. The Alamo court explained the rationale behind the Court’s decision in Burlington, stating that parents “whose judgment is wholly or in part vindicated ... should receive more than an ‘empty victory,’” and that “if ‘appropriate relief’ in the form of reasonable reimbursement is not allowed ... the child’s right to a free appropriate public education ... would be less than complete.” Id.

Petitioner seeks reimbursement for the cost of a sixteen-week summer program at the Lindamood-Bell Learning Processes Center which STUDENT began attending on June 22, 1998. According to STUDENT’s IEP dated November 21, 1996, which remained effective during the 1997-98 school year by agreement of the parties, STUDENT was entitled to extended school year (ESY) services. “Extended school year programming is educational programming which extends instruction beyond the conventional school year to prevent serious regression over the summer months.” Hoeft v. Tucson Unified School District, 967 F.2d 1298, 1301 (9th Cir. 1992). There was neither evidence nor argument that STUDENT lost her eligibility for ESY services for the summer of 1998. In fact, the evidence shows that STUDENT remained eligible for ESY services. The District sent a letter dated March 1998 to the parents stating that STUDENT’s IEP indicated that she was entitled to extended year services.

Only scant evidence was presented at the hearing about the District’s offer of ESY services for the summer of 1998. The evidence was limited to a determination in STUDENT’s IEP dated November 21, 1996, that she was entitled to ESY services and a few letters from the District that were submitted by Petitioner. The letters from the District simply provided STUDENT the option of attending a special day class program (SDC) or a regular education summer program. Neither STUDENT’s IEP nor the letters provided any detail on the location, educational program, or personnel who would be involved in providing the summer program. Further, no evidence was presented by the District at the hearing as to the specific ESY services that it offered to STUDENT. The District did present the testimony of Angela Brown, an SDC teacher for communicatively handicapped students at Columbus-Tustin Middle School. However, the purpose of Ms. Brown’s testimony was unclear as the District never established that it ever offered STUDENT, either orally or in writing, enrollment in Ms. Brown’s SDC class for the regular academic school year or the extended school year.

Education Code § 56345(b)(5) provides that where, as here, a child has been determined by his or her IEP team to be entitled to ESY services, the written IEP must include an ESY program. See also 5 C.C.R. § 3043(f). Initially, the Hearing Officer notes that STUDENT did not have a current IEP at all for the summer of 1998. A review of the IEP that was in effect for the summer of 1998 (the IEP dated November 21, 1996) shows that the District’s offer for an ESY program was not adequately described. The IEP simply had a check mark beside the “yes” line for ESY and no further mention of what the ESY services might be. The District’s offer of ESY services was also not adequately described in the letters subsequently sent to the parents about the summer programs available. The most information that the letters provided was a statement that STUDENT had the option of attending a special day class program or the regular education summer school program and that, since she was in the sixth grade, the regular education summer school option included “a variety of core and elective classes.”

Based on the foregoing, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to make an appropriate written offer for an ESY program for the summer of 1998. First, an appropriate ESY program was not included in STUDENT’s most recent written IEP. A simple determination that STUDENT is eligible for ESY services is not equivalent to including an ESY program as part of her written educational program. Second, as highlighted by the decision in Union School District v. Smith, supra, the IDEA explicitly requires written prior notice to parents when an educational agency proposes, or refuses, to initiate or change the educational placement of a disabled child. 15 F.3d at 1526; 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3). The court in Union found that this requirement served a number of important purposes, such as putting parents on notice that the District’s proposed placement should be seriously considered and allowing the parents to make an intelligent choice in accepting or rejecting the proposed placement. Union, 15 F.3d at 1526. The court concluded that, because of the important purposes served, the requirement of a formal written offer of placement should be enforced rigorously. Id. Considered together, the requirement that the ESY program be included as part of the written IEP and the purposes of a formal written offer enunciated in Union require that an educational agency make a reasonably specific offer of ESY services so that parents can evaluate the desirability of the services offered and make an intelligent choice in accepting or rejecting the proposed placement. Here, the District clearly failed to make a written offer of placement for the summer of 1998 with reasonable specificity. There was no mention of any details such as the location, facilities, personnel, or educational program involved in the District’s offers of placement. Further, there was not even a general description of the coursework or areas that the program would cover or the services that would be involved.

As the District failed to make a reasonably specific written offer of an appropriate ESY program, the Hearing Officer must now determine whether the program provided by STUDENT’s parents was proper under the IDEA. In Florence County School Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13, 114 S.Ct. 361 (1993), the Supreme Court specifically exempted parents from having to meet certain requirements of the IDEA in their unilateral placements. For example, parents are not required to conform their unilateral placement to the content of the student’s IEP or provide a placement that is certified by the state. Id. at 13-14. Although the Court has recognized that the parents’ placement does not have to meet a standard as high as a school district’s must meet, the parents’ placement must still meet other requirements of the IDEA, such as providing a placement that addresses the student’s needs and provides the student educational benefit. Id.

With regard to STUDENT’s unique needs, there was a significant amount of agreement as to her areas of deficit and the methods by which she learns best. The assessments performed by both Drs. Patterson and Majors show that STUDENT is functioning in the significantly below average cognitive range: with Dr. Patterson, STUDENT obtained a score of 75 for broad cognitive development on the WJ-R and a score of 57 on the TONI-2; with Dr. Majors, she obtained a full scale score of 47 on the WISC-III. STUDENT’s results on the PIAT-R administered by Dr. Patterson showed that STUDENT was performing at the 2.5 grade level in reading comprehension. This demonstrated weakness in reading comprehension was corroborated by the WIAT administered by Dr. Majors, on which STUDENT performed at the 2.2 grade level. Both doctors found a similar impairment in the area of mathematics, particularly calculations and applied math. All those working with STUDENT and all those who had recently assessed STUDENT testified that STUDENT had difficulty with abstract reasoning or conceptualization. According to Drs. Patterson and Majors, STUDENT requires a multi-modality or multi-sensory approach to learn. Specifically, Dr. Patterson found that STUDENT has significant difficulty with short-term memory when the material is presented just auditorally, but that her ability to memorize material is substantially increased when the auditory presentation is coupled with a visual presentation.

Beginning June 22, 1998, STUDENT began attending the Lindamood-Bell program for four hours per day, five days per week. According to Angelica Dirtadian, Ed.M., the clinical director at the center, STUDENT received one-on-one sessions with therapists in four fifty-five-minute sessions punctuated by five-minute breaks. After STUDENT had been attending the program for about a week and a half, Ms. Dirtadian testified at the hearing and said that STUDENT had shown progress and improvement. Ms. Dirtadian did not, however, describe either the quality or quantity of the progress and improvement. Prior to accepting STUDENT in the program, Ms. Dirtadian wrote a report on an assessment of STUDENT that was performed by the center. Based on the results of the assessment, Ms. Dirtadian recommended in her report that STUDENT receive intensive cognitive training for six hours per day for an initial period of sixteen weeks.(Footnote 14) During the initial period, the center would work on developing STUDENT’s five sensory-cognitive processes and then STUDENT would be re-evaluated. After the initial period and re-evaluation, the center would then make recommendations for further treatment, if necessary. Ms. Dirtadian described the center’s program as a multisensory approach to learning that is individually tailored to the functioning and progress of the individual child.

A number of the other witnesses were also very familiar with the Lindamood-Bell program. In particular, Dr. Patterson was highly familiar with the program, as he referred students to the program, received monthly print-outs from the center, and had observed the program on a number of occasions. He described the program as a multisensory reading approach linked to sound-symbol relationships (a strength for STUDENT) with a visualization component added for memorization. Although Dr. Patterson admitted that STUDENT’s reading comprehension skills might benefit from the approach utilized by the center, he disagreed that the recommended program was appropriate for STUDENT. He stated that the sessions were too long and intense for STUDENT. He also stated that the center had scant experience working with children of STUDENT’s level of cognitive functioning. He argued that STUDENT is distractable and has a short attention span and that it would be unrealistic to expect that she would be able to sit and focus for six hours per day of intensive remediation. He stated that four hours would probably also be too long for intense remediation. With regard to cognitive functioning, Dr. Patterson stated that the center had only served eight to eleven students who had I.Q. scores below seventy-eight and that, therefore, it was uncertain whether or not its program could work for STUDENT. On the record presented, the Hearing Officer finds that the parents’ private placement addressed STUDENT’s needs and was sufficiently likely to provide her with some educational benefit. There is no dispute that the approach utilized by Lindamood-Bell is appropriate for STUDENT in that, by all accounts, it is a multi-sensory approach linked to sound-symbol relationships. Further, there is no dispute that STUDENT requires remediation in the area of reading comprehension and that Lindamood-Bell’s program can provide her instruction in this area which will likely be of benefit to her. As for the length of the daily program, there was no substantial evidence that STUDENT could not benefit from a four-hour day program that provided breaks every hour. In fact, Ms. Dirtadian reported that after ten days of attending such a program STUDENT had thus far shown progress with the program. Furthermore, Ms. Dirtadian testified that the center had served approximately eight students within the past year with I.Q. scores below seventy and that they had all shown academic gain in the program. Lastly, the District presented no evidence that a child of STUDENT’s unusual cognitive profile of varying strengths and weaknesses could not benefit from the program.

Following a determination that the school district failed to provide a FAPE and that the private placement was proper under the IDEA, the next inquiry is the appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement that should be required. Florence County, 510 U.S. at 16. The court in Alamo provided some guidance in determining the amount of relief that is appropriate. See 790 F.2d at 1161. The court stated that factors in determining “whether full or partial reimbursement is in order would include the existence of other, perhaps more suitable, substitute placements, the effort expended by [the parent] in securing alternative placements, and the general cooperative or uncooperative position of the School District itself.” Id.

Initially, it is noted that the Lindamood-Bell program procured by the parents was a sixteen-week program that began on June 22. Obviously, this program will extend into the new school year and, thus, runs longer than any ordinary ESY program would. Under these circumstances, it would not be reasonable to order the District to pay for the entire duration of the program. Second, despite the fact that the District failed to meet a number of statutory timelines, the Hearing Officer notes that on the whole the District expended considerable effort to work with the parents in devising an appropriate program for STUDENT. The District held four IEP meetings in the span of two months and ordered a number of re-evaluations upon the request of the parents. Therefore, in weighing the equities, the Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement of fifty percent of the costs associated with the Lindamood-Bell program, including costs of transportation. 6. Must the District reimburse STUDENT’s parents for the cost of the assessment performed by Michelle Majors, Ph.D.?

Education Code § 56329(b) provides that a parent may obtain, at public expense, an independent educational assessment from a qualified specialist, as defined by regulations of the State Board of Education, if the parent disagrees with the assessment conducted by the educational agency. If the educational agency establishes at a due process hearing that its assessment was appropriate, it is not required to pay for the independent evaluation. Id. Petitioner contended that the District should reimburse the parents for the assessment performed by Dr. Majors, because Dr. Patterson’s assessment was inappropriate.

For the educational agency’s assessment to be appropriate, it must meet the requirements of Education Code § 56320. Section 56320 requires that the assessment be conducted by qualified persons; that tests and assessment materials and procedures be administered in a nondiscriminatory manner by trained personnel in conformance with test instructions, be validated for the specific purpose for which they are used, and include tests and other assessment materials tailored to assess specific areas of educational need; and that no single procedure be used as the sole criterion for determining an appropriate educational program. Education Code § 56320(a)-(e). Section 56320(f) requires that the student be assessed in all areas of suspected disability. Subsection (g) states: “The assessment of a pupil ... shall be conducted by persons knowledgeable of that disability.” Psychological assessments, as well as being required to meet the criteria of Section 56320, must be conducted by a credentialed school psychologist. Education Code § 56324(a). A written report detailing the results of the assessment must be prepared. Education Code § 56326. The report must contain the relevant behavior noted during the observation of the student in an appropriate setting and the relationship of that behavior to the student’s academic and social functioning. Education Code § 56326(c)-(d).

Based on the evidence presented at hearing, the Hearing Officer finds that the District did conduct an appropriate psychoeducational assessment of STUDENT. Dr. Patterson is a fully qualified credentialed school psychologist. He was trained to administer the assessment procedures he used during his assessment and there is no evidence that he administered them in a discriminatory manner. The tests he used were validated and normed to produce reliable measurements of ability and achievement. He used multiple procedures and methods to assess STUDENT, including a review of her educational records and past assessments, interviews of the school personnel working with her, observations of STUDENT during her school day, and the administration of the PIAT-R, TONI-2, various behavior rating scales, and the Digit-Symbol Modalities Test. Finally, he prepared a written report detailing his findings, conclusions and recommendations for the review of the IEP team. The report also contained an account of relevant behavior noted during his observation of STUDENT that specifically dealt with her socialization skills, an area of concern for STUDENT. At the request of FATHER, Dr. Patterson also prepared a supplemental report and graphs to provide a further explanation of some of the assessment results.

Petitioner argued that Dr. Patterson’s assessment was inappropriate because he failed to diagnose STUDENT’s condition in accordance with the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders - Fourth Edition (DSM-IV); he did not use tests that had been previously administered to STUDENT such as the WISC-III; and he made findings regarding STUDENT’s ability and achievement without further investigation into her neurological impairments. Petitioner also argued that the District’s assessment as a whole was inappropriate because it did not include a neurological or neuropsychological examination. Petitioner’s arguments are unavailing.

First, there is no requirement in special education law that a diagnosis be made under DSM-IV. Even if a diagnosis under DSM-IV were required, both the assessment report from the Diagnostic Center completed in March 1995 and the testimony of Dr. Patterson indicate that STUDENT did not fit within the criteria of mental retardation or any other condition under DSM-IV. Second, there was no evidence that the tests Dr. Patterson used were discriminatory, invalid or not tailored to assess STUDENT’s unique needs, as required by the Education Code. Although using the same tests might be preferable (when appropriate) to facilitate comparison of data, there is no requirement that an assessor use those tests that had been previously used to assess the child. According to Dr. Patterson, his selection of tests was based on concerns unique to STUDENT such as her need for prompts and her developmental delays, concerns which made certain assessment tools more appropriate than others to use. Third, Dr. Patterson performed a neuropsychological screening as part of his assessment by administering the Digit-Symbol Modalities Subtest and found the same impairments he found during his 1994 assessment of STUDENT. Petitioner did not provide any persuasive evidence that it was improper for Dr. Patterson to compare the results of the ability and achievement testing in the absence of further neurological testing.

With regard to the District’s assessment as a whole, the Hearing Officer finds that it was substantially appropriate and that, therefore, reimbursement for Dr. Majors’ assessment is not warranted. Regardless of whether the District should have followed up Dr. Patterson’s assessment with a neuropsychological or neurological assessment, as contended by Petitioner, the District’s assessment substantially assessed STUDENT in all areas related to her suspected disability that were relevant to her obtaining an appropriate education. The District performed a number of assessments which dealt with the manifestations of STUDENT’s neurological impairments in the educational setting, including occupational assessments, an adapted physical education assessment, speech and language assessments, and a psychoeducational assessment. Furthermore, the psychoeducational assessment included a neurological screening. As will be discussed later, a neuropsychological assessment should be performed but this is only to supplement the information already obtained about STUDENT’s needs in the educational setting.

Therefore, because the District’s assessment was appropriate, Petitioner is not entitled to be reimbursed for the assessment performed by Dr. Majors. The Hearing Officer notes that, to the extent appropriate, the findings and recommendations of Dr. Majors should be taken into consideration by the IEP team in formulating an appropriate IEP for STUDENT. See Education Code § 56329(b).

7. Must the District perform, or cause to be performed, the following assessments of STUDENT:

a. a neurological assessment?

b. a neuropsychological assessment?

Medical services for diagnostic or evaluation purposes must be provided to a student with exceptional needs when the services are required to assist the child to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22); Irving Independent School District v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 889, 104 S.Ct. 3371 (1984). The federal regulations implementing the IDEA define “medical services” in this context to mean “services provided by a licensed physician to determine a child’s medically related disability that results in the child’s need for special education and related services.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(b)(4). The Seventh Circuit recently noted the following about this regulation:

Read in its most natural way, the regulation seems merely a reminder that diagnostic services, even when provided by a physician, are not excluded medical services.

Morton Community Unit School District v. J.M., 152 F.3d 583, 585 (7th Cir. 1998).

Here, Petitioner contended that the District is obligated to perform a neurological(Footnote 15) assessment and a neuropsychological(Footnote 16) assessment of STUDENT. The District argued that it is not responsible for a neurological examination because a neurological examination is a medical examination and it is not necessary. The District further argued that it is not responsible for a neuropsychological examination, because Dr. Patterson performed a neurological screening and found that nothing had changed. After a careful review of the record and the governing law, the Hearing Officer finds that the District should conduct a neuropsychological assessment of STUDENT, but not a neurological assessment.

Since at least March 1995, the District has been aware that STUDENT suffered from a neurodevelopmental disorder which affected her ability to benefit from her education. Upon a referral by the District, the Diagnostic Center completed an assessment of STUDENT in January 1995 that was meant to answer five specific questions posed by the District, including what STUDENT’s “educational/medical diagnosis” was and what the appropriate medical interventions to use with her were. The Diagnostic Center’s assessment team included the staff physician, a school psychologist and a diagnostic educational specialist. In a report issued in March 1995, the Diagnostic Center concluded that STUDENT had abnormal neurodevelopment in a number of areas that affected her education. The abnormal neurodevelopment included gross and fine motor abnormalities; generalized intellectual deficiency with an uneven pattern of abilities; disorders of attention, inattention and perseveration; atypical behaviors; and atypical language usage and word finding problems. The report contained the following conclusion:

Medically, STUDENT has a stable mixed neurodevelopmental disorder with gross and fine motor abnormalities, a generalized intellectual deficiency with an uneven pattern of abilities, disorders of attention, atypical behaviors, including sniffing, pica, and shredding, unusual medical reactions and language difficulties.

The report stated that STUDENT’s abnormalities of development did not fit the pattern of a specific neurodevelopmental syndrome. The team recommended some medication options, and accommodations and components that could be incorporated into STUDENT’s educational program to help deal with her neurological impairments. Included in the team’s report was a summary chart of sensory-based experiences for STUDENT that listed her self-initiated sensory-seeking activities, sensory activities that tended to calm her, sensory activities that tended to irritate her, suggested sensory activities, and diagnostic sensory issues that needed to be further explored. For all of the sensory issues that were listed, the chart provided suggested modifications and adaptations that could be implemented in the school setting to help STUDENT cope with her sensory issues. Dr. Patterson also recognized that STUDENT had neurological impairments. In the report he issued following his January 1998 assessment, Dr. Patterson stated that STUDENT showed significant neurological impairments in a number of specific areas, but did not specify which areas.

Thus, the evidence clearly shows that the District was aware that STUDENT suffered from a neurodevelopmental disorder that affected her ability to benefit from her education. The last assessment that evaluated this area of her disability was performed three and a half years ago. In light of these facts and given that STUDENT exhibits such an unusual profile, an additional neurological inquiry should be undertaken to provide current information on the nature and extent of STUDENT’s neurological impairments and how they impact her ability to benefit from her education. However, there is no evidence that a neurological assessment is necessary to ascertain STUDENT’s educational needs. In fact, conducting a neurological examination in addition to a neuropsychological examination would prove duplicative and unnecessary, especially when all the information necessary for the IEP team to make decisions about STUDENT’s educational program could be obtained through a neuropsychological assessment.

ORDER

1. Within twenty calendar days of the date of this decision, the District shall convene an IEP team meeting in order to develop a schedule and program for STUDENT with respect to the twenty one-hour sessions of after-school tutoring awarded as compensatory education. Ten of the sessions shall focus on reading comprehension, while the other ten shall focus on mathematics. The instruction during these sessions shall be provided in accordance with STUDENT’s goals and objectives in these areas. Absent consent by the parents in writing to an extension, all twenty sessions shall be completed no later than the end of the 1998-99 school year.

2. During the IEP team meeting referenced above, the team shall also develop a plan for a neuropsychological assessment to be presented to STUDENT’s parents for their consent. The District shall then complete the assessment and develop an IEP within the timeframe required by Education Code § 56344.

3. Within twenty calendar days of receipt of proof from PARENTS, the District shall reimburse PARENTS fifty percent of the tuition and transportation costs they incurred as a result of STUDENT’s attendance of the sixteen-week summer program at the Lindamood-Bell Learning Processes Center.

4. All of Petitioner’s other claims for relief are denied.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following finding is made in accordance with this statute:

1. Did the District provide STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during the 1997-98 school year?

*** Petitioner prevailed on this issue.

2. Has the District offered STUDENT a FAPE for the 1998-99 school year?

*** Neither party prevailed on this issue. It was not considered because it was not yet ripe at the time the record in this matter closed.

3. Should STUDENT’s program, placement and services for the 1998-99 school year include the following: a. one trained full-time aide, instead of two part-time aides? b. transportation to and from related services for occupational therapy and vision therapy that are provided after school? c. a full-inclusion specialist, who is knowledgeable about STUDENT’s deficits, to provide training to STUDENT’s teachers about how to teach her?

*** Neither party prevailed on this issue. It was not considered because it was not yet ripe at the time the record in this matter closed.

4. Is STUDENT entitled to after-school tutoring in the area of math and reading comprehension as compensatory education?

*** Petitioner prevailed on this issue.

5. Must the District reimburse STUDENT’s parents for the expenses relating to the summer program at Lindamood-Bell Learning Processes which STUDENT attended during the summer of 1998?

*** Petitioner and the District prevailed equally on this issue.

6. Must the District reimburse STUDENT’s parents for the cost of the assessment performed by Michelle Majors, Ph.D.?

*** The District prevailed on this issue.

7. Must the District perform, or cause to be performed, the following assessments of STUDENT:

a. a neurological assessment?

*** The District prevailed on this sub-issue.

b. a neuropsychological assessment?

*** Petitioner prevailed on this sub-issue.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. California Education Code Section 56505(i).

Date: November 4, 1998 Hee C. Kim, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

Footnotes: 1. The issues listed here differ slightly in wording and content from those noticed by Petitioner before the hearing. Changes were made for purposes of clarification and appropriate analysis. 2. During a discussion of the issues on the first day of hearing, Petitioner stated that the issues included the appropriateness of the placement and related services provided by the District during the 1996-97 school year. However, FAPE for the 1996-97 school year was not thereafter mentioned as an issue by Petitioner, and no testimony was presented with regard to the 1996-97 school year. Further, in her closing brief, Petitioner omitted any mention of the 1996-97 school year and, instead, stated the following: "Tustin Unified School District failed to provide STUDENT with a free, appropriate public education for the 1997-98 school year. Up until the school year 1997-98, parents were satisfied with STUDENT's educational program. STUDENT was progressing year to year." For these reasons, the Hearing Officer considers the issue of whether FAPE was provided during the 1996-97 school year effectively withdrawn by Petitioner and, therefore, will not consider the issue in this decision. 3. This meeting dealt only with STUDENT's transition from elementary school to middle school. The IEP addendum that resulted from the meeting amended, but did not supplant, the IEP developed on November 21, 1996. 4. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that either party ever obtained a neurological examination by a pediatric neurologist. 5. The APE specialist completed the gross motor assessment on March 15, 1998. She found that STUDENT did have a delay in the gross motor area but recommended that STUDENT continue in the regular physical education class. Based on communications between the parties that were copied to the Hearing Office, the Hearing Officer finds that there does not appear to be a dispute about the provision of APE during the 1997-98 or 1998-99 school year. Further, neither party presented any evidence at hearing that would put the provision of APE during the 1997-98 or 1998-99 school year in dispute. For these reasons, the adequacy of APE services during these school years will not be considered in this decision. 6. The evidence shows that the District presented the parents with an assessment plan to perform another OT assessment on April 24, 1998. MOTHER signed the plan the same day. The OT assessment was completed by May 4, 1998. 7. The following reports were required for the triennial assessment: the medical update by the school nurse, completed by November 6, 1997; the speech and language evaluation by Kathryn Blackwell, completed by December 18, 1997; the psychological-educational study by Dr. Robert Patterson, completed by January 20, 1998; and the occupational therapy evaluation by Janette Morey, completed by February 16, 1998. 8. In Murphy, the First Circuit analyzed a New Hampshire regulation similar to California's Education Code  56346(b). 22 F.3d at 1195. In New Hampshire, under N.H.Code Admin.R.Ed. 1125.01(b)(3)-b, if the parents disagree with a proposed IEP and the local educational agency feels it would be in the best interest of the child to implement the IEP, the local agency is required to initiate administrative procedures to obtain permission from a hearing officer to implement the IEP. Id. The court found that, after the student's parents disagreed with his placement and did not return him to school, the local agency should have, but did not, initiate such procedures. Id. The court stated: "Under section 1125, the school district must take the initiative to ensure that intransigience and foot-dragging in the IEP process, whether bureaucratic or parental, do not indefinitely compromise the child's right to a free and appropriate public education." The court found that the local agency abdicated its responsibility to ensure the provision of a FAPE and that this resulted in the student's not receiving a FAPE for two years. 9. Education Code  56345 defines an IEP as a "written statement determined in a meeting of the [IEP] team" which lists the student's present levels of performance, annual goals and objectives, the specific special educational instruction and related services required by the student, the extent of participation in regular educational programs, the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration, and criteria and procedures for measuring progress. Despite holding four IEP meetings since the completion of the triennial assessment, the District still had not, by the time the record in this proceeding closed, produced such a document. 10. This analysis will not deal at all with the reasonableness of providing transportation, as requested by the PARENTS, during the 1998-99 school year. Apart from the issue not being ripe for adjudication (as will be discussed in Issue 3), Sheri Brown, a representative from Ryder, testified that the bus routes are redetermined every school year and thus she could not state with certainty at the time of the hearing whether the PARENTS' request could be met during the 1998-99 school year. 11. According to STUDENT's IEPs, she received vision therapy twice per week and occupational therapy once per week. 12. The parties agreed that this IEP would remain in effect for the 1997-98 school year until another IEP could be agreed upon. 13. While the Department of Education Diagnostic Center did perform a full-team assessment of STUDENT in January 1995 and a field-based assessment in January 1996, the IEP dated November 21, 1996, only referenced assessment data obtained by Dr. Patterson during his assessment of STUDENT in October 1994. 14. According to testimony provided by Ms. Dirtadian, STUDENT was receiving instruction only four hours per day because of staff scheduling issues. 15. Neurology is the branch of medical science that deals with the nervous system, both normal and in disease. Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 28th Edition, Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders Co. (1994). 16. Neuropsychology is a discipline that combines neurology and psychology in order to study the relationship between the functioning of the brain and cognitive processes or behavior, using psychological testing and assessment to evaluate central nervous system function and diagnose specific behavioral or cognitive deficits or disorders. Dorland's, supra.