California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · April 28, 2005
Student v. San Dieguito Union High School District et al.
SEHO Case No. SN 518-04 · Hearing Officer Deborah M. Cooke
San Dieguito Union and San Diego County Mental Health prevail; no reimbursement for RESCU Academy or Colorado residential placement.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Summary
The parents of a 17-year-old twelfth grader filed against San Dieguito Union High School District and San Diego County Children's Mental Health. The student is now eligible as emotionally disturbed. When the disputed offer was made, he was eligible under autism and had been diagnosed with Asperger's. In late 2002, aggressive behavior led to his removal from Balboa Secondary School. The February 20, 2003 IEP then offered Coastal Learning Academy, a small, structured special day program, with speech, occupational therapy (OT), and counseling. Mental Health added weekly outpatient individual and family therapy. The parents placed him at RESCU Academy and later at the Emily Griffith Center, a residential treatment center in Colorado, and asked to be reimbursed. The Hearing Officer found that the IEP did not state how often or how long related services would be given, as Union v. Smith requires. This did not deny a FAPE because it caused no lost educational opportunity and did not limit the parents' participation. The offer also met the student's needs in the least restrictive environment. The program's structure, low student-to-staff ratio, trained staff, and on-site psychologist, together with outpatient therapy, were enough. For 2003-2004, the district did not have to develop an IEP while the parents, through counsel, kept the student from being assessed. Once he was available in April 2004, the district held IEP meetings on time. All reimbursement claims were denied.
Why it matters
This decision shows how SEHO treated a vague written offer of services as a procedural violation that did not deny FAPE. It also shows how a parent's refusal to make a privately placed student available for assessment can suspend a district's duty to hold IEP meetings and defeat reimbursement claims.
Issues and holdings
- Procedural violation, no denial of FAPEIEP procedure
Issue 1A. Did Respondents deny Petitioner a FAPE from February 20, 2003, to the end of the 2002-2003 school year? (Procedural appropriateness: whether the February 20, 2003 IEP failed to specify the nature, frequency, and duration of related services.)
The IEP left speech, OT, and counseling amounts to providers' discretion, violating Union v. Smith, but this caused no lost educational opportunity and did not seriously infringe parent participation, so FAPE was not denied.
- District prevailedPlacement and LRE
Issue 1B. Did Respondents deny Petitioner a FAPE from February 20, 2003, to the end of the 2002-2003 school year? (Substantive appropriateness of placement at Coastal Learning Academy and the outpatient mental health services offered.)
Coastal Learning Academy's small, structured program with related services, plus weekly outpatient individual and family therapy from Mental Health, met the student's needs, was reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit, and was in the LRE; a residential placement was not required.
- District prevailedIEP procedure
Issue 2. Did Respondents deny Petitioner a FAPE during the 2003-2004 school year?
The district's duty to develop an IEP, including an annual IEP by February 2004, was suspended while the parents, through counsel, kept the student from being assessed; once he was available in April 2004, the district timely held IEP meetings and made a FAPE available.
- District prevailedUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue 3. Are Petitioner's parents entitled to reimbursement for the tuition, family therapy, and counseling costs associated with the parents' unilateral placement of Petitioner at RESCU Academy?
No reimbursement for RESCU because FAPE was offered for the 2002-2003 period of that placement.
- District prevailedUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue 4. Are Petitioner's parents entitled to reimbursement for the costs associated with the parents' unilateral placement of Petitioner at the Emily Griffith Center in Colorado, including tuition, therapy, room and board, telephone charges, and transportation?
No reimbursement for the Griffith residential placement because the district made a FAPE available during the 2003-2004 school year.
- District prevailedIndependent educational evaluation (IEE)
Issue 5. Are Petitioner's parents entitled to reimbursement for the cognitive assessment conducted at the Emily Griffith Center?
No reimbursement because the parents requested the assessment without disagreeing with any district or Mental Health assessment, and Mental Health's assessment was appropriate.
- District prevailedUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue 6. Are Petitioner's parents entitled to reimbursement for the costs of psychological counseling services provided by Mark Kammerman, Ph.D.?
Dr. Kammerman's services (January 2002 to January 2003) fell outside any period for which reimbursement could be owed, and FAPE was offered from February 20, 2003.
- District prevailedUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue 7. Are Petitioner's parents entitled to reimbursement for the costs of psychiatric services provided by Joshua Feder, M.D.?
No reimbursement because FAPE was offered for the rest of 2002-2003 and made available in 2003-2004.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- All of Petitioner's claims for relief were denied.
Key authorities
Rowley; Gregory K. v. Longview School Dist.; W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School Dist.; Union School Dist. v. Smith; Burlington; Daniel R.R. v. State Board of Education; Gov. Code § 7576; Ed. Code §§ 56321, 56344
People named in the decision
- Cheryl Zak, owner and instructor, private therapeutic program, RESCU Academy
- Sara Frampton, licensed educational psychologist, parent's consultant and witness for Student, Private
- Jacqueline (Jackie) Harrigan, student services specialist, San Dieguito Union High School District
- Joshua Feder, M.D., student's treating psychiatrist, witness for Student, Private
- Belinda Brav, educational consultant/advocate for parents, witness for Student, Private
- Derek Schmidt, mental health coordinator and equine therapy instructor, Emily Griffith Center (Colorado)
- Julie Wimberley, special education teacher, Coastal Learning Academy, San Dieguito Union High School District
- David Clark, school psychologist, San Dieguito Union High School District
- Mary Ellen Nest, coordinator of special education, San Dieguito Union High School District
- Tamara Peddie-Musser, licensed mental health clinician, AB 2726 assessor, San Diego County Children's Mental Health
- Jane Gorman, program manager, licensed clinical psychologist, San Diego County Children's Mental Health
- Mark Kammerman, Ph.D., private individual therapist, Private
- Reinzi Haytasingh, school psychologist, San Dieguito Union High School District
- Cynthia Norell, private Asperger's group facilitator, Private
- Jean Bruns, teacher, Not stated
- Los Angeles Diagnostic Center, state diagnostic assessment agency (2002 field-based assessment), California Diagnostic Center
- Emily Griffith Center, private residential treatment center (unilateral placement), Colorado
- RESCU Academy, private therapeutic program (unilateral placement), Santee, California
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Deborah M. Cooke, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), University of the Pacific’s McGeorge School of Law, in Encinitas, California, on March 1, 2, 3, 8, and 9, 2005.
Petitioner STUDENT (hereafter Petitioner or STUDENT) was represented at the hearing by attorney Eric Freedus. Also present on behalf of Petitioner was his mother, MOTHER, and stepfather, STEPFATHER. San Dieguito Union High School District (hereafter District) was represented at the hearing by attorneys Jonathan Read and Melissa Lauzardo with the Lozano Smith law firm. Also present on behalf of the District was Mary Ellen Nest, coordinator of special education for the District. San Diego County Childrens’ Mental Health (hereafter Mental Health) was represented at the hearing by Lisa Macchione, senior deputy counsel for the county of San Diego. Also present on behalf of Mental Health was Jane Gorman, program manager for Mental Health.
The following witnesses were called by Petitioner to testify: Cheryl Zak, owner of Rescu Academy; Sara Frampton, licensed educational psychologist; Jaqueline Harrigan, student services specialist for the District; Dr. Joshua Feder, M.D., STUDENT’s psychiatrist; Belinda Brav, educational consultant; Derek Schmidt, mental health coordinator at the Emily Griffith Center in Colorado; and STEPFATHER.
The following witnesses were called by the District: Julie Wimberley, STUDENT’s current special education teacher at Coastal Learning Academy; David Clark, school psychologist for the District; and Mary Ellen Nest.
Mental Health called the following witnesses: Tamara Peddie-Musser, licensed mental heath clinician at Mental Health, and Jane Gorman.
Oral and documentary evidence was received and the record was left open for the submission of a written brief by the District regarding the legal authority of a Hearing Officer to apportion liability among two public agencies named in a due process hearing, which was timely postmarked. In response to statements made by the District during its oral closing argument, the Hearing Officer received written memoranda from Petitioner regarding the responsibility of a local education agency to make a FAPE available to a privately placed student. Following receipt of these closing documents, the record was closed and the matter was submitted for decision.
ISSUES
1. Did the Respondents deny Petitioner a free appropriate public education (FAPE) from February 20, 2003, to the end of the 2002-2003 school year?
2. Did the Respondents deny Petitioner a FAPE during the 2003-2004 school year?
3. Are Petitioner’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the tuition, family therapy, and counseling costs associated with the parents’ unilateral placement of Petitioner at RESCU Academy?
4. Are Petitioner’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the costs associated with the parents’ unilateral placement of Petitioner at the Emily Griffith Center in Colorado, including but not limited to, tuition, therapy, room and board, telephone charges, and transportation for Petitioner and his parents?
5. Are Petitioner’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the cognitive assessment conducted at the Emily Griffith Center?
6. Are Petitioner’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the costs of psychological counseling services provided by Mark Kammerman, Ph.D.”?
7. Are Petitioner’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the costs of psychiatric services provided by Joshua Feder, M.D.?
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
For the time period of February 20, 2003, to the end of the 2002-2003 school year, Petitioner contends that the District and Mental Health’s offer contained in the individualized education program (IEP) dated February 20, 2003, was inadequate and was not an offer of a FAPE. Specifically, Petitioner contends that the District failed to specify in the February 20, 2003 IEP the nature, frequency, and duration of related services being offered. Petitioner also contends that due to his behavioral difficulties, he required a more restrictive placement than the District’s offer of Coastal Learning Academy (CLA), which did not include the behavioral supports that he required. Additionally, Petitioner argues that outpatient mental health services offered by Mental Health were not appropriate and that he required a higher level of care. Because of the Respondents’ failure to offer him a FAPE, Petitioner contends that his parents are entitled to reimbursement for costs associated with his parents’ unilaterally placing him at RESCU Academy in February 2003. Petitioner also seeks reimbursement for therapy services provided by Doctors Kammerman and Feder.
With respect to the 2003-2004 school year, Petitioner contends that the District failed to offer him an IEP until after he returned in June 2004 from his unilateral private placement in Colorado. Notwithstanding indications from his parents that they were interested in a District-offered placement, Petitioner contends that the District failed to convene an IEP meeting. Petitioner further contends that since his last IEP was developed on February 20, 2003, the District was obligated to hold an annual IEP meeting by February 20, 2004, and failed to do so. Therefore, according to Petitioner, even if the Hearing Officer finds that there was no denial of a FAPE up through February 20, 2004, there was an additional procedural violation as of February 21, 2004, when the District failed to hold an annual IEP meeting, which is separate justification for reimbursement for expenses incurred by the parents from February 21, 2004 to June 16, 2004. Petitioner also continued to dispute the level of mental health services offered by Mental Health. Accordingly, Petitioner argues that his parents are entitled to reimbursement for the cost of the assessment conducted at the Emily Griffith Center, tuition, and other costs associated with his unilateral placement there, which continued through June 16, 2004.
Regarding the February 20, 2003, to the end of the 2002-2003 school year time period, the District contends that its offer contained in the February 20, 2003 IEP was an offer of a FAPE. Regarding the specificity of offered related services as stated in the IEP document, the District argues that the purpose of the February 2003 IEP was to review Mental Health’s assessment and to amend Petitioner’s September 2002 IEP. The District therefore contends that when read as an addendum to the September 4, 2002 IEP, the February 2003 IEP provided all of the requisite information to enable the parents to determine the appropriateness of its offer. As to the substantive appropriateness of the February 2003 IEP, the District contends that its offer to place Petitioner at CLA with related services of speech and language, occupational therapy, and counseling, along with outpatient Mental Health services, was appropriate. According to the District, its February 2003 IEP offer was designed to meet Petitioner’s unique needs as identified in the 2002 Los Angeles Diagnostic Center’s report. The Diagnostic Center’s report was consistent with the findings in the February 14, 2003 evaluation conducted by Mental Health. According to the District, based on the information that was available at the February 2003 IEP meeting, the District’s offer addressed Petitioner’s developmental and behavioral needs and would have provided him a placement in a structured, self-contained environment with the low student-to-teacher ratio that he required.
Regarding the 2003-2004 school year, the District contends that it was not obligated to develop an IEP for Petitioner who, at that time, was a unilaterally placed private school child. Instead, the District argues that it was only required to make a FAPE available to Petitioner if he re-enrolled in the District or indicated an interest in re-enrolling in the District. The District argues that it was prepared to provide Petitioner with a FAPE should he re-enroll and that it diligently attempted to obtain Petitioner’s then-current educational information upon learning that he was attending Griffith. However, according to the District, Petitioner’s parents made no contact with the District until October 2003, did not notify the District that they were placing Petitioner out-of-state at Griffith, and also precluded the District from assessing Petitioner while he was attending Griffith. For these same reasons, the District argues that it was not required to convene an IEP meeting in February 2004.
Additionally, the District contends that Petitioner’s parents are not entitled to reimbursement for the private assessment conducted by Griffith because there was no evidence that Petitioner disagreed with any District assessment or that the District refused to conduct an assessment. Rather, the District argues that the parents refused to allow the District to assess Petitioner and therefore, reimbursement for a private assessment is not appropriate. Additionally, the District argues that Petitioner’s parents should not be entitled to reimbursement for the costs related to their unilateral placement of Petitioner at either RESCU or Griffith because the District offered him a FAPE and the parents precluded the District from assessing Petitioner once he was privately placed.
Mental Health contends that it conducted a comprehensive assessment and recommended an appropriate level of outpatient mental health services for Petitioner at the February 2003 IEP meeting. According to Mental Health, it considered all levels of mental health services, including outpatient, day treatment, and residential treatment, and found that outpatient mental health services, plus a structured school environment, would meet Petitioner’s needs. Additionally, Mental Health contends that Petitioner never truly accessed its services that were previously included in his IEPs and that the parents were unwilling to accept its February 2003 offer. Finally, Mental Health contends that Petitioner did not provide notice of his unilateral placement at Griffith, and therefore, Mental Health is not responsible for any portion of the costs associated with that placement.
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT is a seventeen-year-old twelfth-grade student who currently is eligible for special education services under the category of emotionally disturbed (ED). He also has been diagnosed as having an autistic spectrum disorder, Asperger’s. STUDENT was adopted by his parents, MOTHER and FATHER, when he was five weeks old. STUDENT’s birth mother was fifteen at the time of his birth and, reportedly abused alcohol and possibly other drugs during her pregnancy. It is reported that the birth father is not known. As a youngster, STUDENT was described as having difficulties with coordinating upper body strength and was large for his age. Additionally, from a young age, STUDENT had difficulty establishing eye contact and engaging in age-appropriate social relationships. Records indicate that cognitively, STUDENT functions in the average to above average range.
STUDENT’s parents divorced in 1991 and his mother, MOTHER, remarried in 1995. STEPFATHER is STUDENT’s stepfather. STUDENT’s adoptive parents share custody; therefore, his living schedule between his parents varies. Based upon reports from parents, communication between them is strained and household rules differ.
STUDENT has a lengthy history of school problems and multiple placements. According to reports, STUDENT was identified as having special education needs in the fourth grade. STUDENT’s previous school behaviors since approximately 1999 are described as having trouble staying on task and following directions, being disrespectful to adults, being aggressive, having difficulty with social relationships, and difficulty with pragmatics (often misreading social cues). STUDENT has a history of physical aggression and difficulty coping with stressors in the school setting. When STUDENT perceived that he was being treated unfairly, his tendency was to respond by retaliating towards others. According to Mental Health’s February 2003 assessment, these behaviors have impacted STUDENT’s education as he has received behavioral referrals and was dismissed from his last District placement at Balboa Secondary School (Balboa).
STUDENT began attending Balboa in the spring of 2000. His last annual IEP meeting while attending Balboa was held on September 4, 2002. At that time, STUDENT was eligible for special education services under the category of autistic. The District offered STUDENT continued placement at Balboa, extended school year services, and designated instruction and services (DIS), including occupational therapy (OT), speech and language, and counseling. The IEP team also agreed to remove the outpatient mental health services from STUDENT’s IEP because STUDENT had not accessed the services since March 2002. Additionally, the IEP team agreed that the Balboa staff and the parent would develop a behavior support plan for STUDENT. The parents signed the September 4, 2002 IEP, consenting to its implementation.
According to the records, STUDENT had multiple incidents while attending Balboa that reportedly involved STUDENT’s “causing/attempting or threatening to cause physical injury to another” and “disrupting/inappropriate behavior in class.” STUDENT’s last incident while attending Balboa occurred on November 7, 2002, when another student took STUDENT’s magic cards and would not give them back to him. STUDENT told the other student that if he did not give him back his cards, he would need to get forceful. When the other student did not respond, STUDENT squeezed his neck hard for about two seconds, leaving red marks on the other student’s neck. This incident resulted in STUDENT being suspended from Balboa, and ultimately to his dismissal from the school.
On November 25, 2002, an emergency IEP meeting was convened following STUDENT’s five-day suspension for assaulting another student at Balboa. The IEP team also believed that STUDENT appeared to have no remorse for his actions and did not seem to understand the significance of his actions. The IEP notes indicate that the IEP team also felt that STUDENT could not return to “a school campus” due to significant safety concerns regarding his being a danger to himself or others, and his unpredictability in controlling his behavior. STUDENT was placed on home teaching pending completion of a mental health assessment pursuant to AB 2726. At that time, the IEP team believed that STUDENT required a level of mental health care beyond outpatient services because he had been in private individual therapy for seven years and it was apparent to the team that he required more support than outpatient services could offer. In addition to his behavioral difficulties, STUDENT also was demonstrating difficulties with his schoolwork and his home life. STUDENT was refusing to do schoolwork and consequently, failing several classes at the time of his dismissal from Balboa. Additionally, STUDENT’s parents had reported that he was noncompliant with daily living activities, personal hygiene, and taking his medication. It was the opinion of the November 25, 2002 IEP team that STUDENT’s exhibited behaviors did not appear to be a result of his diagnosis of autism.
By letter dated November 25, 2002, to Dr. Jane Gorman of Mental Health, the District referred STUDENT for an AB 2726 assessment due to concerns regarding his increased oppositional behaviors, increased anger, and dangerous behaviors in the school setting. On various days during January and February 2003, Mental Health clinician Tamara Peddie-Musser conducted an assessment of STUDENT for the purpose of determining whether mental health services were necessary to assist STUDENT with his special education program, and if so, to recommend the least restrictive and most appropriate level of mental health care.
As a result of her assessment, Ms. Peddie-Musser concluded that STUDENT had a primary diagnosis of Autism, in addition to mild depression and anxiety related to psychological stressors. STUDENT’s therapist (Dr. Kammerman) and treating psychiatrist (Dr. Feder) reported to Ms. Peddie-Musser that STUDENT’s developmental issues drove his aggressive behaviors, not a primary emotional disorder. Accordingly, Ms. Peddie-Musser found that STUDENT needed to be in a calm, controlled environment with structure, consistency, and predictability, and that outside such an environment, STUDENT became very stressed and engaged in more acting-out behaviors. Ms. Peddie-Musser concluded that STUDENT needed mental health services to assist him in coping with his developmental disorder and managing stressors that he experienced within the educational setting that he would be placed. She therefore recommended that STUDENT receive mental health services at the outpatient level for a period of six months. A treatment plan was developed to help STUDENT manage his aggressive behaviors and difficulty coping with daily stressors in the school setting.
Prior to the next IEP meeting, the PARENTS retained educational consultant Belinda Brav to represent their interests with respect to STUDENT’s educational needs. Before the scheduled February 20, 2003 IEP meeting, Ms. Brav and MOTHER spoke with Ms. Peddie-Musser and learned of her assessment conclusions before going into the IEP meeting. By letter dated February 11, 2003, to District student services specialist Jackie Harrigan, Ms. Brav informed the District that the family believed that STUDENT had not received a FAPE since November 2002 and that the parents felt compelled to unilaterally place STUDENT in an educational therapeutic program commencing February 21, 2003, and seek retroactive reimbursement.
On February 20, 2003, the IEP team reconvened to review Mental Health’s assessment and discuss STUDENT’s placement. In addition to outpatient mental health services, the District offered STUDENT placement at the Coastal Learning Academy (CLA) with mainstreaming as appropriate, speech and language, and occupational therapy services, and DIS counseling. The specific amount of time for each related service was to be determined by the respective provider. STUDENT’s parents disagreed with the District’s offer, specifically, the type of program model and the intensity of mental health care services offered through that model. The parents again informed the District that they would be unilaterally placing STUDENT in a nonpublic agency effective February 21, 2003, because they did not believe that the District’s offer was appropriate. However, the parents did agree to visit CLA and indicated they were willing to explore options that would meet STUDENT’s needs. MOTHER visited CLA. Ms. Harrigan, who was scheduled to visit CLA with MOTHER, did not make the meeting because she became ill.
On February 21, 2003, STUDENT began attending RESCU Academy (RESCU) in Santee, California. STUDENT’s program at RESCU did not include an educational component; however, STUDENT did work on some essay writing while there. According to Cheryl Zak, one of the owners and instructors at RESCU, their program is a therapeutic milieu. Ms. Zak testified that a “therapeutic milieu” is a setting in which students can be provided mental health services at any time throughout the day. When a situation or issue arises that requires intervention, it is immediately addressed by a mental health professional, as opposed to waiting to address it during a counseling session. Mental health intervention is therefore incorporated into the program during the day, as the child needs it. Ms. Zak stated that RESCU’s program also includes independent study (in which STUDENT did not participate), group therapy, field trips, and physical education, which takes place at the 24-Hour Fitness near the school. At the time that STUDENT attended RESCU, most of its thirteen students had behavioral issues, most of which included school avoidance and problems with their parents. According to Ms. Zak, each day at RESCU was different and very spontaneous depending on whatever issues the students might be dealing with.
In April 2003, MOTHER hired educational psychologist Sara Frampton as a consultant to assist her with STUDENT’s educational needs. Ms. Frampton had previously worked with the family and had screened and assessed STUDENT in 1997. On April 21, 2003, Ms. Frampton met informally with Ms. Harrigan and District school psychologist Reinzi Haytasingh to discuss the District’s offered placement at CLA. Additionally, on that same day, Ms. Frampton, on behalf of MOTHER, submitted a records request to the District to obtain all pertinent medical, psychological, educational, or psychiatric information pertaining to STUDENT. On April 22, 2003, Ms. Frampton conducted a screening of STUDENT in her office, which included document review, projective testing, academic performance testing, and a clinical interview with STUDENT. Ms. Frampton did not write a report of her findings.
After not receiving any additional information from the parents regarding their acceptance or rejection of the February 20, 2003 IEP offer, on May 15, 2003, Ms. Harrigan wrote a letter to FATHER and MOTHER, requesting that an IEP meeting be scheduled to discuss educational services for STUDENT and to review any new information. In that letter, Ms. Harrigan acknowledged that the parents had indicated they were unilaterally placing STUDENT at a non-public agency (NPA) and informed the parents that NPAs were not considered educational placements and therefore, not a FAPE. There was no response from the parents or their advocate.
STUDENT’s parents had paid for six-months of attendance at RESCU; however, they removed STUDENT from that program on May 28, 2003, to unilaterally place him at the Emily Griffith Center (Griffith) in Colorado, a residential treatment center. Unbeknownst to the District at the time, on May 29, 2003, STUDENT began attending Griffith, where he received individual, group, and milieu therapy. An educational component was included in Griffith’s program for STUDENT. According to the District, a telephone call from a Griffith staff member to the District, requesting copies of STUDENT’s records, was the District’s first notice that STUDENT was attending Griffith. This telephone call prompted Ms. Harrigan to contact STUDENT’s parents again by letter dated July 21, 2003, requesting an IEP meeting to develop an evaluation plan for STUDENT’s triennial review. By letter dated July 28, 2003, MOTHER responded to the District, indicating her agreement to meet and develop an evaluation plan and instructing the District to contact Ms. Frampton to schedule an appointment. According to District coordinator of special education, Mary Ellen Nest, on August 4, 2003, the District sent out an assessment plan to the parents after attempting unsuccessfully to schedule an IEP meeting with Ms. Frampton. On August 25, 2003, the District received the parents’ consent to the proposed evaluation plan and by letter to the parents dated September 23, 2003, the District requested that the parents notify it of the dates that STUDENT was scheduled to complete a home visit so that the District could schedule the triennial evaluation.
Although Ms. Frampton continued to consult with the parents, they retained attorney Eric Freedus to serve as their legal representative regarding STUDENT’s education. By letter to the District dated October 7, 2003, Mr. Freedus, stated that STUDENT would be placed at risk if he were assessed in San Diego. Mr. Freedus informed the District that if it wished to conduct a triennial assessment, it would have to go to the Griffith Center, as he knew of no plans and/or obligation to have STUDENT return or visit California. Ms. Nest then attempted to arrange for District school psychologist David Clark to travel to Colorado to assess STUDENT at Griffith. Ms. Nest contacted Griffith staff regarding scheduling and timing of the assessment and also to confirm whether STUDENT was unable to come home for a visit. According to Ms. Nest, she believed that she was allowed to contact Griffith. However, by letter dated October 20, 2003, the parents’ attorney advised the District that no District staff should contact Griffith because it was a private placement.
Between October and December 2003, Griffith arranged for STUDENT to receive a psychological evaluation and communication assessment. On December 18, 2003, Ms. Frampton wrote to the District and informed it that the parents had just completed a telephonic triennial IEP with Griffith staff and were prepared to share with the District the IEP document. According to Ms. Nest, the parents’ representative never provided a copy of that IEP or a copy of the assessment reports during 2003. On January 6, 2004, the District sent the parents a notice of an IEP meeting to be held on January 21, 2004, with District representatives, Griffith staff, a Mental Health representative, a CLA teacher, Ms. Frampton, and STUDENT as additional invitees. MOTHER signed the notice on January 16, 2004, indicating that she planned to attend the scheduled IEP meeting.
The District then attempted to obtain the parents’ signature on a referral for STUDENT to Mental Health for reassessment. The parents’ attorney wrote to the District on January 12, 2004, informing it that the parents’ signing of the Mental Health assessment “might be interpreted as acquiescence by the parents in the inaction by the district.” Mr. Freedus therefore advised the parents to refuse to sign the Mental Health referral at that time. Additionally, Mr. Freedus indicated in the letter that they saw no reason why the forthcoming January 21, 2004 IEP telephonic meeting with the District should proceed if the District was not going to fund STUDENT’s out of state placement.
Ms. Nest indicated that Mr. Freedus’s letter confused her, so she contacted Mr. Freedus by telephone to obtain some clarity. According to Ms. Nest, Mr. Freedus told her that he just wanted a letter from the District that stated that the parents were not giving up any rights by agreeing to the Mental Health assessment. Ms. Nest then contacted the District’s attorney and asked him to respond to Mr. Freedus’s request. The District’s attorney, Jonathan Read, responded to Mr. Freedus by letter dated January 20, 2004, indicating that the District was unsure that it understood his concern. Mr. Read included with the letter a referral to Mental Health and stated that the District would “agree to postpone the IEP team meeting currently scheduled for January 21, 2004.”
Several more letters were exchanged between the parties’ attorneys, and the parties also participated in a private mediation in early March 2004, which did not resolve the dispute. Ultimately, on March 8, 2004, Mr. Freedus filed a request for a due process hearing on behalf of the parents and STUDENT, requesting a decision on whether Mental Health and the District failed to offer and/or provide STUDENT a FAPE during the 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 school years and whether Petitioner was entitled to reimbursement for the expenses incurred in connection with the private placement and related services obtained during those time frames, as well as prospective placement for the remainder of the 2003-2004 school year.
After being informed that STUDENT would be returning home on April 26-28, 2004, by letter dated March 25, 2004, to the parents’ attorney, the District again requested the parents’ signature on another referral to Mental Health, a District assessment plan, and an authorization for release of information so that the District could obtain STUDENT’s updated levels of performance from Griffith. The parents agreed to the District and Mental Health assessment that would take place in San Diego, California. On April 12, 2004, the District forwarded STUDENT’s referral packet to Mental Health for an assessment for mental health services. By letter dated April 22, 2004, to Ms. Frampton, the District indicated it had received copies of the evaluations that had been conducted at Griffith and requested their consent on a speech and language evaluation during STUDENT’s home visit. The parents would not agree to allow the District to conduct the speech and language evaluation during his April 2004 visit, as they believed it would be too overwhelming.
On April 28, 2004, the District conducted a psychoeducational assessment of STUDENT, and on April 27 and June 4, 2004, Mental Health conducted an assessment of STUDENT for mental health services pursuant to AB 2726. Based on its assessment, Mental Health recommended that STUDENT transition from the residential treatment center by receiving day treatment level of mental health services. STUDENT’s parents felt that he had exceeded their expectations in how he had adjusted to his transition and did not agree with him being placed in a day treatment program through Mental Health, which was reported to be more intensive than the program at Griffith. On May 19, 2004, the District sent a notice to the parents for an IEP meeting to be held on June 8, 2004. After IEP meetings held on June 8 and 30, 2004, with the parents, District, and Mental Health, and based on new information that Griffith provided to Mental Health, Mental Health changed its recommendation to STUDENT receiving mental health services through AB 2726 in outpatient counseling. STUDENT was released from Griffith on or about June 16, 2004.
Accordingly, on June 30, 2004, the parent agreed to the District’s modified offer for STUDENT to attend Coastal Learning Academy (CLA) for the extended school year, beginning July 2, 2004, and for the 2004-2005 school year. The parent also agreed that STUDENT would receive DIS services of speech and language and counseling, transportation, and mental health services through AB 2726 in outpatient counseling. The most recent IEP meeting was held on February 16, 2005, to review STUDENT’s progress in the program. At that time, the IEP team agreed to a thirty-day diagnostic placement in mainstreamed classes for certain subjects with special education support. DIS counseling two times each week for thirty minutes was also agreed upon. All other DIS were dropped from STUDENT’s IEP. STUDENT currently attends CLA.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Did the District deny Petitioner a free appropriate public education (FAPE) from February 20, 2003, to the end of the 2002-2003 school year?
In Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, (1982) 458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034, the United States Supreme Court addressed the level of instruction and services that must be provided to a student with disabilities to satisfy the requirements of the IDEA. The Court determined that a student=s IEP must be reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit. (Id. at 200.) According to Rowley, the IDEA does not require school districts to provide special education students with the best education available, or to provide instruction or services that maximize a student=s abilities. (Id. at 198-200.) The Court stated that school districts are required to provide only a “basic floor of opportunity” that consists of access to specialized instruction and related services that are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the student. (Id. at 201.)
To determine whether the District offered STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE), one must focus on the adequacy of the District=s program. (Gregory K. v. Longview School District, 811 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987).) If the District=s program was designed to meet STUDENT’s needs, provide some benefit, and comport with his IEP, the District offered a FAPE, even if the parents preferred another program and even if the parents’ preferred program would have resulted in greater educational benefit. (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207-208; Gregory K., 811 F.2d at 1314.) Special education law also requires that STUDENT be educated in the least restrictive environment, which means ensuring that STUDENT’s education is provided in a manner that promotes his maximum interaction with children or youth who are not disabled, and which is appropriate to the needs of both. (20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(5)(A), 1414(d)(1)(A)(iii)(III); Educ. Code § 56031.)
To summarize, under the IDEA and Rowley, the District=s proposed program must have met the following requirements to have constituted a substantively appropriate educational program: (1) been designed to meet STUDENT=s unique needs, (2) been reasonably calculated to provide him with some educational benefit, and (3) comported with his IEP. Additionally, it must have been provided in the least restrictive environment.
The analysis of whether a student has been provided a free appropriate public education (FAPE) is twofold, requiring the Hearing Officer to decide whether procedural steps have been followed and whether the proposed program and placement are substantively appropriate. (Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-207.)
A. Procedural Appropriateness
Turning first to the issue of procedural appropriateness of the February 2003 IEP, Petitioner contends that the District failed to state with specificity the nature, frequency, and duration of the related services that it was offering. The February 20, 2003 IEP states that speech and language services would be “provided as a direct service to work on pragmatics and problem solving.” However, the specific amount of time for the service would be “determined by [the] sp[eech] and lang[uage] therapist.” The occupational therapy services also were to be provided as a direct service and the amount of time was to be “on a weekly basis to address sensory issues as previously identified in assessment of 7/01.” DIS group counseling was to be provided twice a week by the school psychologist, who would also support STUDENT “during the school day in the milieu.” Individual counseling, however, was “to be determined by psychologist” and team consultations with the psychologist, teacher, occupational therapist, and speech and language therapist were to occur on a continuous basis. (Dist.’s Exh. 4, pg. 2.)
The District argues that the February 20, 2003 IEP document, when read in conjunction with the September 4, 2002 IEP to which it was an addendum, provided all the requisite information necessary to allow the parents to determine the appropriateness of the District’s offer. Moreover, according to the District, both the mother and educational consultant Sara Frampton visited the proposed placement after the February 2003 IEP meeting.
A review of the IEP dated September 4, 2002, indicates that speech and language and occupational therapy services were previously provided to STUDENT on a consult basis and individual and group counseling were each provided once each week for thirty minutes. (Dist.’s Exh. 6.)
Parents of children with disabilities are provided procedural protections under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and federal regulations implementing the IDEA. (20 U.S.C. §1400 et seq.; 34 C.F.R. § 300 et seq.) The Supreme Court noted in Rowley that “Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of participation” at every step “as it did upon the measurement of the resulting IEP.” (Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205-206.) Although the Supreme Court in Rowley has recognized the importance of procedural protections, not all procedural violations result in a denial of a FAPE. Procedural violations which result in a “loss of educational opportunity” or which “seriously infringe the parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP formulation process clearly result in the denial of a FAPE.” (W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School District No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992).) Moreover, a school district is required to make a formal offer of placement in writing in order to be in compliance with the IDEA’s procedural requirements. (Union v. Smith (9th Cir. 1994) 15 F.3d 1519, 1526, cert. denied (1994), 115 S.Ct. 428; 20 U.S.C. § (b)(3).)
A comparison of the September 2002 and February 2003 IEPs demonstrates a distinct difference with respect to the nature, frequency, and duration of the related services offered by the District. Although the February 2003 IEP is an addendum to the September 2002 IEP, when read together, they do not clarify the District’s new offer of related services. The District’s February 2003 IEP offer is vague in that it does not specify: the frequency or duration of the individual or group speech and language sessions; the nature, frequency, and duration of the occupational therapy services (i.e., individually or in a group); the duration of the group counseling sessions; and the frequency and duration of the individual counseling sessions. (Dist.’s Exh. 4, pg. 2.) Rather, these determinations were left to the discretion of the individual service providers as to the amount of direct instruction time for speech and language and occupational therapy and the frequency and duration of group and individual counseling sessions.
The District was required under Union to make a written offer of related services that was sufficiently clear to satisfy the IDEA, and it failed to do so. The Hearing Officer concludes that the February 20, 2003 IEP does not adequately specify the related services that STUDENT would receive.
Notwithstanding the February 2003 IEP document’s lack of specificity regarding the related services being offered by the District, there was no persuasive evidence that this lack of specificity in the IEP document caused STUDENT to suffer a loss of educational opportunity or that it in any way infringed on the parents’ participation in the IEP process. In fact, the District offered STUDENT more intensive related services in the February 2003 IEP than it did in the September 2002 IEP. The record indicates that STUDENT’s mother and father and their educational advocate Belinda Brav attended the February 20, 2003 IEP meeting and signed the IEP document acknowledging that they participated in the process, that the District offered to read, summarize, and highlight the procedural safeguards, and that they had no questions regarding the procedural safeguards. (Dist.’s Exh. 4, pg. 1.) There also was no showing that the parents did not understand or have the opportunity to avail themselves of the services determined to be appropriate by the District members of the IEP team. Additionally, there was no indication that the District’s lack of specificity in its offer of related services affected STUDENT’s decision to attend CLA or his parents’ decision regarding the February 2003 IEP. Moreover, the parents further participated in the IEP process, in spite of their disagreement with the District’s offer, when MOTHER and STUDENT visited CLA after the February 20, 2003 IEP meeting. (Testimonies of J. Harrigan and B. Brav.)
The Hearing Officer therefore finds that, based on the limited facts presented, there was no persuasive evidence that the District’s failure to make a specific written offer of related services caused STUDENT to lose educational opportunity or that it seriously infringed his parents’ opportunity to participate in the formulation of his IEP. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District’s failure to provide a more detailed written offer in the February 20, 2003 IEP did not result in a procedural denial of a FAPE to STUDENT.
B. Substantive Appropriateness
As previously stated, the standard for evaluating the substantive appropriateness of the District=s offer involves four factors: whether the placement and services were designed to address STUDENT=s unique needs, whether the placement and services would have provided him with educational benefit, whether the placement and services would have conformed to his IEP, and whether they would have been provided in the least restrictive environment. (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; Rowley, supra, 458 U.S. 176.)
What Were STUDENT’s Unique Needs
To determine whether the placement and services that the District and Mental Health offered STUDENT for the February 20, 2003, to the end of the 2002-2003 school year time frame would have provided him a FAPE, it is first necessary to identify STUDENT=s unique needs at the time the offer was made.
At the time of the February 20, 2003 IEP, it was undisputed that STUDENT qualified for special education and related services as autistic. The parties did not dispute that STUDENT is of average to above average intelligence and that at the time of the February 2003 IEP, he had been diagnosed as having an autism spectrum disorder, Asperger’s, which caused him to have difficulties with social skills, age and school appropriate conversation, identifying his feelings, and complying with directions. In addition, STUDENT also had behavioral difficulties, including being disrespectful to adults, being physically aggressive, and having difficulty coping with stressors in the school setting. According to reports from STUDENT’s individual therapist, Dr. Mark Kammerman, STUDENT also suffered from mild depression, self-esteem issues, and anxiety related to psychological stressors. He had difficulty adjusting to change and transition and difficulty reading social cues and understanding why things were happening. According to STUDENT’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Joshua Feder, and Dr. Kammerman, STUDENT’s aggressive behaviors (hitting and choking) were related to his developmental disorder, not a primary emotional disorder. (Footnote 1) Additionally, Dr. Kammerman reported that STUDENT had difficulty feeling empathy for others and he justified his aggressive responses towards others. (Dist.’s Exh. 20.)
Based on their March 2002 field-based assessment of STUDENT, the Los Angeles Diagnostic Center assessors concluded, and no parties disputed, that since disorganization is a frequently observed characteristic of individuals with an autistic spectrum disorder, STUDENT required an orderly environment with clearly visible structure. (Dist.’s Exh. 25.) STUDENT had demonstrated a lack of tolerance for situations that were not highly structured and predictable. (Footnote 2) Therefore, Ms. Peddie-Musser similarly concluded that STUDENT needed to be placed in a calm environment that was structured to provide consistency, close supervision, and predictability. Diagnostic Center assessors also found that necessary supports for STUDENT included the use of schedules, consistent routines, and clearly communicated expectations. (Dist.’s Exh. 25.) According to STUDENT’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Feder, STUDENT also needed help with sensory issues, interacting with others socially and emotionally, and self-regulating his emotions. Therefore, STUDENT’s placement needed to be a therapeutic milieu in which he could receive support and instruction from teachers who were knowledgeable about developmental disorders, such as Asperger’s, and trained in various behavior strategies that would help him manage stressors that he experiences in the educational setting. Dr. Kammerman reported that STUDENT’s program also needed to include individual mental health services so that he can discuss ongoing issues. The Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT’s program should also include family counseling sessions so that strategies that addressed his developmentally related difficulties could also be implemented at home with his family every day and in the community. All parties also agreed that since STUDENT’s primary diagnosis was autism and he was hypersensitive to his environment, placement in a setting with students who had severe emotional difficulties would not have been in his best interest, as it would have exacerbated his stress level and aggravated his condition. (Testimonies of J. Feder and T. Peddie-Musser; see also Dist.’s Exh. 20.)
The Hearing Officer was persuaded by the testimony provided by Ms. Peddie-Musser and Doctors Kammerman and Feder regarding the necessary components of STUDENT’s educational program. Ms. Peddie-Musser had conducted a comprehensive assessment of STUDENT that included talking with many professionals who had worked closely with STUDENT and reviewing various educational records and assessment reports. She also met with STUDENT to determine whether he had any suicidal ideation and to examine his mood presentation and found that he was not suicidal, he spoke in a “matter of fact” manner, and his desire to go back to school was stressful to him. According to Ms. Peddie-Musser, STUDENT appeared cognitively bright and made eye contact with her. Additionally, Ms. Peddie-Musser testified that Dr. Kammerman recommended that STUDENT be in an educational program that had well defined limits, structure, and consistency. Dr. Kammerman had been providing STUDENT with individual outpatient therapy services since 1996 and also had family contact with his parents, so he was familiar with STUDENT’s needs at school and at home. And Dr. Feder had provided supervision over various professionals who had treated STUDENT and he was responsible for monitoring his medications.
Considering STUDENT’s unique needs as identified above, the Hearing Officer must next determine whether the placement and services offered by the District and Mental Health in the IEP dated February 20, 2003, would have appropriately addressed those needs. The parties’ dispute involves his placement (including the restrictiveness of the educational setting) and the level of mental health services STUDENT required to address his needs. (Footnote 3)
Designed to Meet STUDENT’s Needs
Placement at Coastal Learning Academy
As stated earlier in this Decision, the February 20, 2003 IEP was an addendum to the IEP dated September 4, 2002. The February 20, 2003 IEP meeting was convened specifically to review Mental Health’s recent assessment of STUDENT pursuant to AB 2726 and its recommendation for mental health services and to discuss a placement. STUDENT had been on home instruction since November 25, 2002, pending completion of Mental Health’s assessment. In the February 2003 IEP, the District offered to place STUDENT at the Coastal Learning Academy (CLA), where he could receive direct instruction, and one-to-one instruction in the classroom as needed. STUDENT would participate in CLA’s program for his entire school day and could be mainstreamed as the IEP team deemed appropriate. Additionally, STUDENT would receive designated instruction and services (DIS) on a direct instruction basis in speech and language to work on pragmatics and problem solving and he would also participate in the social skills group on a weekly basis. The IEP indicated that the amount of time for the individual speech and language services was “to be determined” by the speech and language therapist. Occupational therapy services were also offered as direct instruction on a weekly basis to address sensory issues previously identified in STUDENT’s July 2001 assessment. Additionally, the District offered DIS counseling services by the school psychologist both individually and in a group. The group would meet twice weekly and the amount of individual counseling was to be determined by the psychologist. The District’s offer also indicated that the school psychologist supported the students during the school day in the milieu and that there would be team consultations that included the psychologist, teacher, occupational therapist, and speech and language therapist on a continuous basis. (Dist.’s Exh. 4.)
Petitioner contends that the District’s offer to place him at CLA was not restrictive enough and would not have provided him with the behavioral supports he required to modify his behavior. According to Petitioner, he needed to be placed in a residential treatment center where he could receive milieu therapy throughout the day. Additionally, Petitioner contended he needed “wrap-around” services, which Dr. Feder described as bringing in the family to discuss issues, having STUDENT participate in activities and parties during which reciprocal social interaction could be facilitated to help him develop more meaningful relationships with his peers. According to Petitioner, the District and Mental Health offered CLA and outpatient mental health services because that was all they had available, rather than because that was what he needed. (Footnote 4)
The District argues that placement at CLA would have provided STUDENT the structure, consistency, and predictability that he required to assist him with the behaviors that arose out of his developmental disorder. According to the District, STUDENT did not require placement in a residential treatment center pursuant to AB 2726, as those facilities were for children with severe emotional disorders. Placing STUDENT in such a setting would have exacerbated his condition and would not have provided him with the assistance he needed to cope with his developmental disorder and the resulting behaviors. In addition, the District argues that a residential treatment center located away from his parents would not have provided STUDENT with the connection to his parents that he required and would have been too restrictive.
Mental Health agrees that STUDENT did not require the level of mental health care that a county residential or day treatment center provides because STUDENT did not have a severe emotional disorder or exhibit behaviors that warranted such restrictive placements. Mental Health asserted that if STUDENT’s environment were calm, controlled, and predictable, his aggressive behaviors would diminish. Accordingly, Mental Health supported STUDENT’s placement at CLA.
Julie Wimberley, STUDENT’s current teacher at CLA, was also a teacher at CLA during the 2002-2003 school year when the program was housed solely on the Carmel Valley Middle School (Carmel Valley) campus. (Footnote 5) Ms. Wimberley attended the February 20, 2003 IEP meeting, at which she explained CLA’s program to the team. Ms. Wimberley testified that the CLA program generally services students in the seventh through twelfth grades with pragmatic issues such as difficulty with social interaction and difficulty communicating with peers and adults. Ms. Wimberley stated that the general concept of the CLA program has not changed since the 2002-2003 school year. During the 2002-2003 school year, the CLA program included five to six autistic students, three to four students with emotional disorders, and two students who were classified as other health impaired. The program had a very low student-to-staff ratio. There was one teacher and two instructional aides in each of the two classrooms of approximately 7 or 8 students, and the two classes were divided either by subject matter or grade level.
According to Ms. Wimberley, the CLA program was housed in two separate classrooms that were adjoined by a back hallway on the Carmel Valley campus, with access to the occupational therapy room, which was also used by the school psychologist to meet with students. Students were under constant supervision and were never left alone, unlike the less structured and more “laissez faire” environment at Balboa. (Testimonies of T. Peddie and S. Frampton.) The CLA students were placed in a group in a restricted area on campus and did not have to be exposed to the rest of the school in order to pass through the CLA classes. Ms. Wimberley testified that STUDENT would have been placed in a CLA class with high school students and would not have gone outside the CLA classrooms at the same time as the middle school students. (Footnote 6)
Petitioner’s argument that CLA would not have provided the level of behavioral and mental health support during the day that he required is not persuasive. The evidence demonstrates that CLA is a therapeutic milieu that has structure and could address STUDENT’s emotional and behavioral needs and provide him the social facilitation that Dr. Feder believed STUDENT needed. Ms. Wimberley testified very persuasively about how CLA’s pragmatics group works on social and emotional issues and problem solving. Additionally, during group sessions on Mondays, Ms. Wimberley stated that students had the opportunity to discuss issues that occurred over the weekend and frustrations they might be experiencing with their teachers and/or families. (Footnote 7) In addition, a school psychologist was located on campus to support the students during the school day in the milieu and was available for individual and group counseling. (Dist.’s Exh. 4, pg. 2; testimonies of J. Wimberley and J. Harrigan.)
Regarding Petitioner’s concern with safety on a school campus and his aggressive behaviors, according to Ms. Wimberley, the CLA program could be as restrictive as needed, so that STUDENT could spend an entire school day in the special day class, including during lunch, breaks, and passing periods. Or, depending on STUDENT’s needs, he could be mainstreamed for part of his day with regular education students. Ms. Wimberley also stated that she and the aides were trained in the “PART” technique, which involves deescalating various behavioral situations. (Footnote 8) According to Ms. Wimberley and student services specialist Jacqueline Harrigan, the school psychologist was available throughout the day by cell phone, voicemail, and email, and he spent a great deal of time in the CLA classes throughout the day. (Footnote 9)
According to District witnesses, CLA would have appropriately addressed STUDENT’s needs because it was a small, structured setting that had a routine and consistent environment. Ms. Wimberley testified that the CLA teachers and aides provide direct instruction and have intensive training in behavior strategies. She also stated that there was the possibility of one-to-one instruction to remove any distractions from the environment. The CLA teachers had specialized training in special education, including Asperger’s and reactive attachment disorders, and also were trained to address different behaviors, including aggressive behaviors. Student services specialist Jackie Harrigan credibly testified that designated instruction and services were infused into CLA’s program and STUDENT’s social/emotional goals, problem solving, and pragmatics would have been addressed through the speech and language therapy, role playing activities, and when mainstream peers were brought into the program to participate in the presentation of real life situations. (Testimony of J. Wimberley.)
The Hearing Officer finds persuasive the testimonies of Ms. Wimberley and Ms. Harrigan that the small, structured, and predictable setting of CLA with the behavioral supports and the counseling, speech and language, and occupational therapy were designed to assist STUDENT toward meeting his goals and objectives. Ms. Wimberley and Ms. Harrigan are experienced professionals with knowledge about CLA’s program and have experience working with students with developmental disorders. Additionally, each of them had the opportunity to review STUDENT’s records and discuss his educational background with other doctors and educators who had been in contact with him.
Mental Health clinician Tamara Peddie-Musser, who conducted a comprehensive mental health assessment of STUDENT in January and February 2003, testified that she spoke with the professionals treating STUDENT at that time, including Doctors Kammerman and Feder, STUDENT’s former group counselor, Dr. Norell, and his teacher, Jean Bruns. Additionally, Ms. Peddie-Musser stated that when she spoke with MOTHER and FATHER, she obtained information regarding STUDENT’s history, schools he attended, family life, current functioning, and treatments. According to Ms. Peddie-Musser, Dr. Kammerman did not see STUDENT as being malicious and did not believe STUDENT needed to be placed in a residential treatment center. (Dist.’s Exh. 20.) Based on her assessment, Ms. Peddie-Musser concluded that STUDENT appeared to need a calm, controlled environment with much structure, consistency, and predictability. (Footnote 10)
Dr. Joshua Feder, who started seeing STUDENT in January 2003 for medication management and periodic consultations, testified that he believed STUDENT was too big and volatile to be placed at CLA. (Footnote 11) According to Dr. Feder, although CLA was a more structured setting than Balboa, he believed that STUDENT might take an oppositional and aggressive stance at CLA and not have the level of mental health milieu he needed to help contain him during his aggressive moments. Dr. Feder believed that if placed at CLA, STUDENT would act out and perhaps, walk off campus. He also opined that STUDENT’s parents would have a difficult time getting him to go to school at CLA because the program was housed on a middle school campus and STUDENT was in high school at that time and opposed to going to a middle school campus. Dr. Feder testified that it was difficult for him to say whether STUDENT required a residential placement at any time; however, if he had known of an appropriate 24-hour program at the time STUDENT left Balboa he would have recommended it since STUDENT was not doing well at Balboa and was languishing at home. Dr. Feder believed that STUDENT required a placement that offered day milieu services and “wrap-around” services with his family so that they could reinforce strategies with him every day at home.
The Hearing Officer notes, however, that Dr. Feder’s involvement with STUDENT was limited in that it was through a case management model. According to Dr. Feder, he started treating STUDENT on or about July 2001, but he did not provide intensive psychiatric treatment or any ongoing counseling to STUDENT. Rather, he saw STUDENT only if a crisis or some other incident occurred and took on more of a supervisory role in STUDENT’s treatment. In fact, most of the work that Dr. Feder did regarding STUDENT during the 2002-2003 school year included collateral work with Cheryl Zak, one of the owners of RESCU Academy, which STUDENT started attending after the February 2003 IEP meeting. Dr. Feder testified that Dr. Kammerman was more involved with STUDENT’s treatment because Dr. Kammerman provided ongoing counseling to STUDENT. Additionally, the Hearing Officer notes that Dr. Feder never identified the basis on which he believed that the instructors and staff at CLA could not provide STUDENT the level of mental health assistance he needed to contain his aggressiveness and regulate his emotions. Dr. Feder also did not provide support for his opinion that CLA’s program would not provide the necessary social facilitation.
Educational consultants Belinda Brav and Sara Frampton both testified that they believed STUDENT needed to be placed in a residential program as of February 2003 because he needed a structured and predictable program on a 24-hour basis to provide support for both his school and living situations. Although Ms. Frampton is an educational psychologist and had screened STUDENT in April 2003, after the February 2003 IEP meeting, she had not seen or been involved with STUDENT or his family since 1997 and had never provided counseling services for him. Moreover, Ms. Brav has never met STUDENT and based her opinion solely on her review of the educational documents provided to her by the parents, which did not include any information from Dr. Kammerman, from whom STUDENT had received outpatient therapy services since 1996. Ms. Brav had never observed STUDENT in the classroom setting and Ms. Frampton had not observed STUDENT in school since 1997. In addition, neither Ms. Brav nor Ms. Frampton indicated that they had observed the CLA program offered by the District. (Footnote 12)
Dr. Cynthia Norell facilitated an Asperger’s group in which STUDENT had been participating for a few years up until November 2002, when he refused to return. Dr. Norell reported that the groups stopped being beneficial to STUDENT because he talked mostly about toys and electronics during group sessions. According to Dr. Norell, STUDENT appeared to have a lot of unexpressed anger, and she believed that he might need a residential placement because of his unstable home life due to his spending alternating weeks at his mother and father’s homes. As reported to Ms. Peddie-Musser, Dr. Norell essentially believed that STUDENT needed more consistency in all areas of his life, including school and home. (Dist.’s Exh. 20; Mental Health’s Exh. 1, pg. 2.) Notwithstanding Dr. Norell’s comments regarding STUDENT’s lack of progress in the group sessions, Mental Health program manager Jane Gorman credibly testified that STUDENT was likely not making progress in his groups because he was not receiving the consistency that he required at school and at home. Ms. Gorman testified that she was a part of the multidisciplinary team at Mental Health to whom Ms. Peddie-Musser presented her assessment findings. Ms. Gorman is a licensed clinical psychologist and is responsible for screening all mental health referrals from fourteen different school districts.
Considering all of the evidence, the Hearing Officer finds that the placement and related services offered in the February 20, 2003 IEP were designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs. CLA, plus the related services, would have provided small, self-contained classrooms on a middle-school campus with opportunities for mainstreaming. The program structure created a safe environment as the CLA classrooms were segregated from the rest of the campus and STUDENT would not have had access to the middle school kids unless deemed appropriate. Moreover, teachers and aides were PART trained in case any student attempted to get physically aggressive or demonstrated inappropriate behavior. The population of students at CLA had developmental disorders, including autism, and although there were a few students who had emotional disorders, they were not the aggressive “bad boys” that STUDENT’s therapists indicated he should not be around. (Testimonies of S. Frampton and J. Feder.) As discussed above, each of the two classrooms had a very low student-to-teacher ratio, which would have provided STUDENT constant supervision, consistency throughout the day, and monitoring and intervening by the instructors in the environment for behaviors. Social/emotional goals and pragmatics could be addressed in the program through the different group therapy and DIS, which was infused into the program.
Mental Health Services
The Hearing Officer next determines whether the mental health services offered in the February 20, 2003 IEP were designed to meet STUDENT’s needs. As indicated above, the Hearing Officer found that STUDENT needed individual mental health services to assist him in coping with his developmental order and managing stressors that he experiences within the educational setting. Additionally, he required family counseling so that strategies that addressed his developmentally related difficulties could also be implemented at home with his family every day and in the community.
Mental Health offered to provide STUDENT with outpatient mental health services, which would include individual therapy one time each week and family treatment and consultation one time each week. Therapy sessions would last fifty minutes. (Dist.’s Exh. 4, pg. 1.)
Petitioner argues that Mental Health’s recommendation for the outpatient level of mental health services was inadequate and that he required a higher level of service. (Footnote 13) According to Petitioner, he had been receiving outpatient mental health services through a private provider for a number of years and his behaviors had worsened, so there was no reason to believe that his behaviors would improve with more outpatient therapy. Petitioner believed he needed equine therapy, which is what he received at Griffith, or some other similar type of intensive mental health support. (Footnote 14)
Mental Health argues that Government Code section 7576 requires that it provide mental health services in the least restrictive environment. According to Mental Health, it conducted a comprehensive assessment and considered all levels of mental health services and concluded that outplacement mental health services were the least restrictive services for STUDENT and would have met his needs and allowed him to benefit from his education. Mental Health contends that STUDENT did not demonstrate the level of emotional difficulties that necessitated his placement in a residential treatment center. Moreover, Mental Health contends that STUDENT had never truly accessed Mental Health’s outpatient services and consequently, the IEP team previously removed outpatient services from his IEP in September 2002. (Dist.’s Exh. 6, pg. 2.) Mental Health also argues that STUDENT’s behavioral triggers could have been managed at CLA with outpatient mental health services; however, his parents were unwilling to try the offer. Sara Frampton testified that after reviewing STUDENT’s records and talking with his parents, she concluded that STUDENT needed at least day treatment level of mental health services, but more specifically, she believed he required the 24-hour-a-day backup support of counselors to immediately intervene with his behaviors in his living and social situations. Similarly, Dr. Feder testified that STUDENT needed more than counseling sessions once a week or month. Dr. Feder believed STUDENT needed day milieu mental health support, “wrap around” services with his family, and assistance with facilitating social interactions. As discussed further below, the February 2003 IEP offer, in total, would have provided STUDENT with just such services through the program and DIS provided at CLA and Mental Health’s outpatient therapy.
Both Ms. Peddie-Musser and Ms. Gorman testified that Mental Health’s day treatment programs were for students who had severe emotional instabilities that impacted their ability to do school work. Students placed in the county’s day treatment programs usually need intensive individual and group therapy because they are struggling with emotional issues that have become overwhelming for them. According to Ms. Peddie-Musser and Ms. Gorman, the most restrictive mental health setting is a residential treatment center. (Footnote 15) Students who are placed in the county’s residential program usually have been classified as emotionally disturbed and have chronic and severe mental health issues that make it difficult for them to learn. These students may have visual and auditorial hallucinations, have been runaways, have persistent and incapacitating moods, or may demonstrate threatening behaviors to others. Students in the residential programs have these symptoms occurring on a daily basis and are unable to function at home, in the community, or at school. They have so many difficulties that they cannot be maintained outside of a residential program. According to Mental Health, STUDENT did not have characteristics that would necessitate these levels of mental health services. (T. Peddie-Musser and J. Gorman.)
Based on her assessment, Ms. Peddie-Musser found that STUDENT’s primary diagnosis was Asperger’s, which manifested in his having difficulties engaging in social relationships, developing friendships, and reading social cues and nonverbal expressions. Ms. Peddie-Musser testified that she recommended outpatient mental health services for STUDENT because he needed assistance with managing his behavior and coping with his developmental disorder. According to Ms. Peddie-Musser, when she offered the outpatient services, she envisioned STUDENT would be in a school specializing in autism and receiving help with his sensory and social skill issues. The individual mental health treatment would then assist him with learning strategies, managing his behavior, and coping with social situations. The family counseling that was offered would address issues that STUDENT had with his family, help them structure his home environment, and teach them to intervene with STUDENT when he was exhibiting certain behaviors or having difficulty. The outpatient mental health services also included psychiatric services, which included medication monitoring. (Testimony of T. Peddie-Musser.)
Dr. Kammerman concurred that STUDENT needed outpatient mental health therapy, which he had been receiving from Dr. Kammerman for the past several years. According to Dr. Kammerman, STUDENT was making progress in outpatient therapy and he believed STUDENT needed to continue in such a structured therapy at the outpatient level. (Testimony of T. Peddie-Musser.) Dr. Kammerman reported that STUDENT was twenty times better than he was when he first started treating him. When STUDENT had initially entered outpatient therapy, he did not look at or respond to others around him and he tended to be engaged in his own fantasy world. STUDENT also would act out his fantasies. However, Dr. Kammerman reported that STUDENT was no longer engaging in those types of behaviors. STUDENT was making eye contact, showing empathy, and had an interest in making friends, which, according to Ms. Peddie-Musser, is a primary hallmark difficulty for individuals with Asperger’s. (Dist.’s Exh. 20.)
Considering all the evidence, the Hearing Officer finds that the amount and type of mental health services that the February 20, 2003 IEP recommended offers a FAPE. Although Petitioner argued that he required a higher level of mental health services than what was offered or that he required equine therapy like he received while placed at Griffith or something similar, the Hearing Officer finds that considering STUDENT’s disability, the individual outpatient mental health services would have appropriately addressed his need to manage his behaviors, control his anger, and cope with social situations. The Hearing Officer found persuasive Ms. Peddie-Musser’s opinion regarding the necessary mental health services for STUDENT because of her vast experience in assessing children with Asperger’s. Ms. Peddie-Musser stated that she has conducted assessments for twelve years and has diagnosed children with Asperger’s more than one hundred times. She also testified that has she attended numerous trainings on Asperger’s and studied and reviewed the disorder in her master’s degree program. Ms. Peddie’s educational background, combined with her experience and her knowledge of the applicability of Mental Health’s programs make her testimony most persuasive when evaluating the potential appropriateness of offered mental health services.
Additionally, Mental Health’s offer of family outpatient services would have helped the family structure the home environment to meet STUDENT’s needs and teach them how to intervene with STUDENT when necessary. Although outpatient services had previously been removed from STUDENT’s IEP in September 2002, the evidence indicates that “after repeated attempts to schedule therapy appts. [had] been unsuccessful,” STUDENT had not accessed those individual therapy services since March 2002. Moreover, there was evidence that family counseling also had not yet been tried. (Dist.’s Exh. 6, pg. 2.) The Hearing Officer also notes that the supports and services, as discussed above, that were in place at CLA, would have provided STUDENT the consistent and immediate backup he required when his behaviors were out of control in the classroom.
Reasonably Calculated to Provide Educational Benefit
The Hearing Officer finds persuasive the District witnesses’ testimony regarding STUDENT’s potential success had he been placed at CLA with the services outlined in the February 2003 IEP. For instance, Ms. Wimberley indicated that she has successfully served students who have pragmatic issues – ie., difficulties with social interaction and communicating with peers and adults. Ms. Wimberley also has successfully served students with autism and with behavioral and emotional issues similar to STUDENT’s. According to Ms. Wimberley, prior to the February 20, 2003 IEP meeting, CLA staff never had to use physical restraints on any student, no student had run away off campus, and at no time had CLA staff needed to call the police regarding any student. Moreover, prior to February 2003, CLA had not experienced any acts of physical violence by a student. According to Ms. Wimberley, the CLA students did not exhibit “acting-out” behaviors because the program was well structured and well run.
Knowledgeable and trained District personnel would provide the District’s proposed program in a coordinated and collaborative manner. Mechanisms and support systems were offered to ensure STUDENT’s successful integration and participation in the new placement. Although a specific behavioral plan was not drafted for STUDENT, program-wide behavioral supports (such as access to the school psychologist, individual and group counseling, pragmatics group, and PART-trained staff) were in place and could have been supplemented at any time. (Testimonies of J. Harrigan and J. Wimberley.) Additionally, according to Ms. Wimberley, an IEP meeting is typically scheduled to convene within 30 days after an initial placement in the CLA program, and thus, any behavioral issues could have been further addressed at that time.
The Hearing Officer also gives deference to the testimony of Ms. Peddie-Musser. On the strength of her previous experience in the mental health field and having comprehensively assessed STUDENT once in 1999 and again in 2003, Ms. Peddie-Musser testified credibly about STUDENT’s potential success if placed at CLA with outpatient-level mental health services. Moreover, the evidence demonstrated that STUDENT had previously made progress in the outpatient therapy that he received from his private therapist, Dr. Kammerman.
Given that the IEP contained the necessary components for STUDENT to learn and have meaningful access to education, the Hearing Officer concludes that the February 20, 2003 IEP was reasonably calculated to provide STUDENT educational benefit.
Comported with the IEP
There is no claim that the District or Mental Health would not have been able to provide the program and services offered in the February 20, 2003 IEP.
Least Restrictive Environment
Petitioner’s argument regarding the restrictiveness of the District’s offer is not a classic one because he did not argue that the offered placement and services would not provide him with sufficient access to nondisabled children or youth. Rather, Petitioner argued that he required a more restrictive environment than CLA and outpatient Mental Health services would have provided. Petitioner contends that he required placement in a residential facility so that he could receive 24-hour-a-day intervention and support due to his aggressive behaviors and emotional needs. The District argues that CLA provided much more structure than STUDENT’s previous placement at Balboa. According to the District, CLA has the routine and consistency necessary to keep him from engaging in the behaviors that impeded his learning and the learning of others. Mental Health argued that STUDENT’s needs did not warrant the restrictiveness of its day or residential treatment programs. Rather, Mental Health contended that outpatient mental health services were the most appropriate and least restrictive services necessary to meet STUDENT’s needs.
Special education law requires that STUDENT be educated in the least restrictive environment, which, in this case, means ensuring that STUDENT’s education is provided in a manner that promotes his maximum interaction with children or youth who are not disabled, and which is appropriate to the needs of both. (20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(5)(A), 1414(d)(1)(A)(iii)(III); Cal. Educ. Code § 56031.) The requirement that disabled children be educated to the maximum extent appropriate with nondisabled children is often referred to as mainstreaming or education in the LRE. The law demonstrates “a strong preference for ‘mainstreaming,’ which rises to the level of a rebuttable presumption.” (Daniel R. R. v. State Board of Education (5th Cir. 1989) 874 F.2d 1036, 1044-1045.)
The District’s February 20, 2003 IEP reflects the IDEA’s preference for the “least restrictive” program for disabled students. Mental Health’s 2003 assessment, corroborated by the Los Angeles Diagnostic Center’s 2002 evaluation, support the District’s concern that STUDENT have a structured, predictable learning environment and that he receive mental health services to assist him in coping with stressors in the school setting. (Dist.’s Exhs. 4, 24, and 25.) As discussed above, STUDENT’s developmental disorder and resulting frustration and oppositional and socially inappropriate behaviors make it difficult for him to learn in an environment that has many distractions and little structure and consistency. The District’s placement at CLA would have included a low student-to-teacher ratio, access to psychological counseling on-site, and small class sizes where he could receive some one-to-one and direct instruction. Additionally, a hallmark of CLA’s program was its structured environment, meaning there was a routine and consistent schedule of activities.
Additionally, STUDENT would have had interaction with regular education peers who were brought into the CLA program to work in groups on pragmatics through role-playing and the presentation of real life situations. (Testimony of J. Wimberley.) Mainstreaming STUDENT into the regular education environment also could have been provided as the IEP team deemed appropriate. (Id.; Dist.’s Exh. 4, pg. 2.) This record establishes that the District’s proposed placement and services, along with Mental Health’s offer of outpatient mental health services would have provided STUDENT the proper level of interaction with his nondisabled peers and also given him the emotional and behavioral supports he required. Accordingly, the program and services offered in the February 20, 2003 IEP were necessary to satisfy the IDEA requirements that STUDENT’s educational program be designed to meet his unique needs and provide him educational benefit in the least restrictive environment.
Conclusion
Because the District’s and Mental Health’s offered program and services were designed to meet STUDENT’s needs, reasonably calculated to provide him educational benefit, would have conformed to the IEP, and been provided in the least restrictive environment, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District and Mental Health offered STUDENT a FAPE for the time period including February 20, 2003, to the end of the 2002-2003 school year.
2. Did the District deny STUDENT a FAPE during the 2003-2004 school year?
There was no IEP drafted for STUDENT during the 2003-2004 school year until June 2004, and Petitioner does not dispute the appropriateness of the offer made in that IEP. The issue, therefore, for this time frame is whether the District made a FAPE available to Petitioner.
Petitioner argues that the District failed to hold an IEP meeting during the 2003-2004 school year. Additionally, Petitioner argues that the District committed an additional procedural violation when it did not convene an IEP meeting within one year from the date of the last IEP meeting held on February 20, 2003. Therefore, according to Petitioner, even if the Hearing Officer finds that he was not denied a FAPE up through February 20, 2004, there was a procedural denial of a FAPE from February 21, 2004, forward, which is separate justification for reimbursement for costs incurred by the parents from February 21, 2004, through June 16, 2004.
The District argues that it is not required to develop an IEP each year for a private school child but that it must make a FAPE available if the parents reenroll their child back into public school or indicate an intent to reenroll. According to the District, it offered to be prepared to provide STUDENT a FAPE if he reenrolled in the District and the District diligently attempted to obtain updated educational information for STUDENT. The District asserts, however, that the parents did not allow the District to assess STUDENT and did not contact the District until October 2003.
Mental Health argues that Government Code section 7576 provides that the County is to receive referrals for mental health assessments from a school district and absent a referral, the County does not conduct a mental health assessment. According to Mental Health, after the February 20, 2003 IEP meeting, Mental Health had no knowledge of Petitioner’s unilateral placement at Griffith, and therefore, Mental Health is not responsible for reimbursement for any portion of that placement because it did not receive notice about that placement.
Turning to the District’s obligation during the 2003-2004 school year, the overall statutory scheme of the IDEA, particularly the notice requirement for unilateral parent placements, embodies the concept that a school district is to be given a legitimate opportunity to offer a student a FAPE for the year initially at issue and every year thereafter before incurring the responsibility for reimbursing a parent for a unilateral private placement. (See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10).) Thus, a school district is not required to develop an IEP or make a specific formal offer of FAPE every year for every student who has been unilaterally withdrawn from the district by his or her parents without some indication that the parents are seeking services from the district, even where FAPE had been put in issue in the past. (34 C.F.R., Attachment 1, p. 12601 (1999).)
There is no dispute that STUDENT’s parents gave notice on February 11, 2003, of their intent to privately place him because of a disagreement regarding STUDENT’s placement since November 2002. Additionally, there is no dispute that an IEP meeting was held on February 20, 2003, wherein the District made a new offer of placement; however, STUDENT’s parents disputed the appropriateness of that placement as well, although they expressed a willingness to continue to work with the District in developing an IEP for STUDENT. Therefore, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District remained obligated to make a FAPE available to STUDENT. The evidence established that STUDENT’s continued unilateral placement at Griffith from May 29, 2003, through June 16, 2004, was not a matter of his parents simply preferring one educational facility to another. Rather, STUDENT’s parents were attempting to find an alternative to the District’s program, which they found inadequate.
On May 15, 2003, since the District had not received any additional information from the parents regarding their acceptance or rejection of its February 20, 2003 IEP offer, the District wrote the PARENTS to request an IEP meeting be scheduled to discuss educational services for STUDENT and review any new information. (Dist.’s Exh. 70.) The evidence indicates that STUDENT was due to have his triennial IEP on June 1, 2003. (Dist.’s Exh. 6.) The District received no response to its May 2003 letter. (Testimony of J. Harrigan.) On July 21, 2003, the District wrote to both the PARENTS and FATHER, indicating that the staff at the Emily Griffith Center had informed it that STUDENT had been unilaterally placed there and that the District was again requesting an IEP meeting to develop an evaluation plan for STUDENT’s triennial review. (Dist.’s Exh. 69.) By letter dated July 28, 2003, MOTHER informed the District that she wanted an IEP for STUDENT. (Dist.’s Exh. 67.) The District sent out an evaluation plan and the parents signed it on or about August 25, 2003. The District acknowledged receipt of the signed evaluation plan by letter dated September 23, 2003, and also asked the parents to notify the District of the dates when STUDENT would be home on a visit from Griffith so that it could conduct the triennial evaluation. (Testimonies of J. Harrigan and M. Nest; (Dist’s Exh. 65.) According to Ms. Harrigan, the District never heard from the parents or their advocate regarding a date when STUDENT would be home from Griffith.
Once the District received the parent’s consent to assess, it was obligated to complete its assessment and hold an IEP meeting to develop an IEP within fifty days. (Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56321, 56344.) However, on October 7, 2003, the parents’ attorney wrote the District and informed the District that it would have to go to Griffith in Colorado to assess STUDENT. (Dist.’s Exh. 64.) According to District special education coordinator Mary Ellen Nest, the District had begun making arrangements to send school psychologist David Clark to Colorado to conduct the assessment at Griffith, but their plans were halted when they received an October 20, 2003 letter from the parents’ attorney stating that the District should no longer be in contact with staff at Griffith. (Dist.’s Exh. 63.) If STUDENT’s parents wanted him to receive special education services from the District, they were obliged to permit the District to conduct its testing. (Gregory K. v. Longview School District (9th Cir. 1987) 811 F.2d 1307.) Although it had no obligation to travel out of state to assess STUDENT, the evidence indicates that the District was willing to go to Colorado to do so. However, the District’s efforts to assess STUDENT were first thwarted when the parents’ attorney told the District it would have to go to Griffith to assess STUDENT, and further delayed when their attorney instructed the District not to contact Griffith any more. Once the parents refused to make STUDENT available for the District evaluation, the District’s obligation to convene an IEP meeting was suspended.
By letter dated December 18, 2003, to the District, the parents’ advocate, Sara Frampton, indicated that the parents wanted to share with the District recent assessments and an IEP conducted at Griffith and that “STUDENT may return to California in “the next calendar year,” or in 2004. (See Dist.’s Exh. 62.) Consequently, on January 6, 2004, the District sent the parents notice of an IEP meeting to be held on January 21, 2004. (Dist.’s Exh. 8.) Additionally, in January 2004, the District requested the parents’ signatures on a referral for STUDENT to Mental Health for reassessment. However, the parents’ attorney advised the parents to refuse to sign the Mental Health referral at that time. (Dist.’s Exh. 61.)
Numerous letters were exchanged between both parties’ counsel, staff, and consultants, the District trying to schedule an evaluation of Petitioner and convene an IEP meeting, and Petitioner attempting to get a response from the District to their request for reimbursement of the private placement and agreement to fund the placement prospectively. The parents also wanted the District to “‘join’ them in seeking to have CMH change its mind regarding the level of service” it had offered in the February 20, 2003 IEP. In a letter dated January 12, 2004, the parents’ counsel, Eric Freedus, indicated to the District that whether the parents would permit the scheduled telephonic IEP meeting to proceed as scheduled on January 21, 2004, “remain[ed] to be seen.” Mr. Freedus also stated that he saw no reason why the scheduled IEP meeting should proceed if the District was not going to fund the private placement. (Dist.’s Exh. 61.) The District responded by telling the parents that it was unable to agree to the parents’ request without first evaluating STUDENT’s then-current levels of functioning. Consequently, the District cancelled the scheduled January 21, 2004 IEP meeting. (Dist.’s Exh. 58.)
The parties met in mediation during the month of March 2004; however, they were unable to resolve their dispute. (Testimony of M. Nest.) After numerous letters back and forth between counsel, District staff, and the parents’ consultant, on April 19, 2004, the parents signed the final document necessary for the District and Mental Health to conduct their respective assessments. (Dist.’s Exh. 47.) However, the parents would not agree to allow the District to conduct the speech and language evaluation during STUDENT’s April 2004 visit, as they believed it would be too overwhelming. (Dist.’s Exh. 41.) On April 27 and June 4, 2004, Mental Health conducted an assessment of STUDENT for mental health services pursuant to AB 2726, and on April 28, 2004, the District conducted only a psychoeducational assessment of STUDENT. (Mental Health’s Exhs. 4, 5, 7, 8, and 34.)
On May 19, 2004, the District sent a notice to the parents for an IEP meeting to be held on June 8, 2004. On June 8 and 30, 2004, IEP meetings were convened and an IEP was developed and agreed upon by the parents.
The Hearing Officer finds that under the circumstances described above, although the parents gave the District their consent to assess in August 2003, and Mental Health their consent to conduct its respective assessment in April 2004, the District was not required to develop an IEP for STUDENT until the parents made STUDENT available for assessment. The evidence indicates that the parents’ attorney thwarted the IEP process by advising his clients not to sign assessment plans and prohibiting the District from having further contact with Griffith. Additionally, the parents’ contingent willingness to attend an IEP meeting made it more difficult for the District to develop an IEP for STUDENT. Most significantly, however, the parents did not make STUDENT available for assessment in California until April 27, 2004. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that up until April 27, 2004, the District was relieved of its obligation to make a FAPE available to STUDENT. Since an IEP meeting was subsequently timely convened and a formal offer made by the District on June 8 and 30, 2004, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District fulfilled its mandate under the IDEA to make a FAPE available within the prescribed timelines.
3. Are Petitioner’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the tuition, family therapy, and counseling costs associated with the parents’ unilateral placement of Petitioner at RESCU Academy?
Parents may be entitled to retroactive reimbursement for services they have procured for their child when a school district failed to provide a FAPE, and the services provided by the parents are determined to be proper under the IDEA and are reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit to the child. (School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Education, 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985); 34 C.F.R. § 300.403(c).) The Hearing Officer determined above that there was no denial of a FAPE during the 2002-2003 school year. Since the 2002-2003 school year was the time during which STUDENT was unilaterally placed by his parents at RESCU, his parents are not entitled to reimbursement for the costs associated with that placement.
4. Are Petitioner’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the costs associated with the parents’ unilateral placement of Petitioner at the Emily Griffith Center in Colorado, including but not limited to, tuition, therapy, room and board, telephone charges, and transportation for Petitioner and his parents?
The Hearing Officer determined above that there was no denial of a FAPE during the 2003-2004 school year. Since STUDENT was unilaterally placed by his parents at Griffith during the 2003-2004 school year and the District made a FAPE available to STUDENT during that time frame, his parents are not entitled to reimbursement for the costs associated with that placement.
5. Are Petitioner’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the cognitive assessment conducted at the Emily Griffith Center?
Petitioner contends that Griffith insisted that it be allowed to conduct a cognitive assessment of STUDENT in order for STUDENT to participate in its program. However, the cognitive assessment for which Petitioner seeks reimbursement appears to have been conducted by Griffith on or about November 2003, some six months after STUDENT had been attending Griffith. In addition, the assessment appears to “have been completed at the request of [STUDENT’s] parents.” (Pet.’s Exhs. 92 and 2, pg. 39.) There was no indication that the parents sought the Griffith assessment because they disagreed with an assessment the District or Mental Health had performed or with a refusal by the District or Mental Health to conduct an assessment. In fact, Petitioner argued that he was not seeking reimbursement for this assessment on the basis of a disagreement with a District or Mental Health assessment.
Accordingly, the Hearing Officer concludes that Petitioner did not disagree with any District psychoeducational assessment or with Mental Health’s February 2003 AB 2726 assessment and that Mental Health conducted an appropriate assessment of STUDENT for purposes of the February 20, 2003 IEP. Consequently, the parents are not entitled to reimbursement for the cognitive assessment conducted by the Emily Griffith Center.
6. Are Petitioner’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the costs of psychological counseling services provided by Mark Kammerman, Ph.D.?
A review of the documents submitted by Petitioner reveals that the services provided by Dr. Kammerman occurred from January 16, 2002, through January 27, 2003, which is not within the time frame for which Petitioner may be entitled to reimbursement. (Pet.’s Exh. 2, pgs. 42-44.) Accordingly, since the Hearing Officer already found above that the District offered STUDENT a FAPE from February 20, 2003, to the end of the 2002-2003 school year, his parents are not entitled to reimbursement for the costs of psychological counseling services provided by Dr. Kammerman between January 2002 and January 2003.
7. Are Petitioner’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the costs of psychiatric services provided by Joshua Feder, M.D.?
A review of the documents submitted by Petitioner regarding psychiatric services provided by Dr. Feder reveals that he provided services to STUDENT from January 23, 2003, through April 28, 2003, and on November 27, 2004. Since the Hearing Officer already found above that the District offered STUDENT a FAPE from February 20, 2003, to the end of the 2002-2003 school year, and made a FAPE available to STUDENT during the 2003-2004 school year, STUDENT’s parents are not entitled to reimbursement for the costs of psychiatric services provided by Dr. Feder.
ORDER
All of Petitioner’s claims for relief are denied.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
Pursuant to California Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this requirement.
Respondents prevailed on all issues heard and decided.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this Decision. (California Education Code § 56505(i).)
Dated: April 28, 2005 __________________________________ Deborah M. Cooke, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
Dr. Joshua Feder testified that he obtained his medical degree in 1986 and is a licensed physician. He stated that he received board certification in general psychiatry in 1992 and in child and adolescent psychiatry in 1993. Dr. Feder testified that as of November 2002, he did not see STUDENT on a regular basis, but saw him approximately every month to two months for medication management.
2 For instance, there had been four incidents at Balboa where STUDENT had hit other students during lunch, which was unstructured time. (Testimony of T. Peddie.)
3 Petitioner did not dispute the substantive appropriateness of the designated instruction and services (aside from the procedural claim that the written offer for those services was not specific enough) or any other aspect of the District’s and Mental Health’s February 20, 2003 IEP offer. Therefore, the Hearing Officer will only examine the appropriateness of the placement and mental health services offered by the District and Mental Health.
4 The Hearing Officer notes that during the hearing, Petitioner withdrew his claims regarding an alleged denial of a FAPE that may have occurred during any time period before the February 20, 2003 IEP meeting.
5 CLA is still located on Carmel Valley’s campus; however, the Carmel Valley site only serves seventh and eighth-grade students and ninth through twelfth-grade students are now housed at Torrey Pines High School in the District.
6 Ms. Wimberley testified that she has a bachelor’s degree in English, a master’s degree in special education, and multiple subject and learning handicapped credentials. She stated that she routinely attends workshops in special education related to Asperger’s, reactive attachment disorders, and on various learning modalities. She has also attended various workshops to learn to help deal with different behaviors, including aggressive behaviors. Ms. Wimberley testified that she is a case manager for students enrolled in the CLA program, which requires her to keep track of students’ progress and attend IEP meetings.
7 Similar to the group counseling offered at CLA, STUDENT participated in group counseling for ninety minutes each day while he attended RESCU, and as a result, STUDENT made progress with peer interactions. (Testimonies of C. Zak and J. Feder.)
8 According to Ms. Wimberley, the PART process involves three steps: (1) intervening verbally by reasoning with the student or “talking a student down;” (2) asking the student to step outside so as to avoid confrontation; and (3) if necessary, physically restraining the student if he/she becomes violent or physically inappropriate.
9 Ms. Harrigan testified that she has a bachelor’s degree in nursing, with an emphasis on school services, a lifetime teaching credential, and a preliminary administrative credential. She stated that she has completed a significant amount of work toward earning her master’s degree in education. Ms. Harrigan testified that she has been a student services specialist for the District since 1995 and was involved with STUDENT’s IEP back in 2002. She first became of aware of STUDENT in July 1999 when he was in the seventh grade incoming from the elementary school district. Her job duties include being the coordinator of special assessments, coordinator of the student review board, and coordinator of health services.
10 Ms. Peddie-Musser testified that she has worked for Mental Health for 12 years. As a licensed mental health clinician, she stated that she provides mental health services and assessments and advises on case management. Ms. Peddie-Musser testified that she is a licensed marriage and family therapist. (Mental Health’s Exh. 73.)
11 STEPFATHER testified that STUDENT is 6 feet tall, weighs 195 pounds, and is muscular.
12 Ms. Frampton stated that she is currently employed as a licensed educational psychologist and family therapist. According to her resume, she has a bachelor’s degree in psychology, master’s degrees in special education and counseling, and a Ph.D. in psychology. (Pet.’s Exh. 101.) Ms. Brav testified that she has a master’s degree in social work and that she has been an advocate and educational consultant since 1993. According to her resume, Ms. Brav is certified in the State of Michigan as a social worker and as a school social worker. (Pet.’s Exh. 103.)
13 Petitioner conceded that Mental Health’s typical day and residential treatment programs would not have been appropriate for him because the population of students those programs serve typically have severe emotional disorders; however, he believed he still required a level of mental health support beyond what outpatient therapy would have provided.
14 Although Petitioner did not initially assert that he specifically required equine therapy, STUDENT’s instructor at Griffith, Derek Schmidt, who provided this therapy to STUDENT while placed there, provided testimony regarding equine therapy. Petitioner therefore argued in his closing that he required equine therapy or another similar type of therapy in order to meet his needs.
15 Ms. Gorman testified that she has a master’s degree in marriage and family therapy and a doctoral degree in clinical psychology. She is a licensed clinical psychologist and in her current position as regional program manager for special education assessments with the county of San Diego, she screens referrals from all fourteen school districts in the North Coastal SELPA and assigns referred cases to mental health staff under her supervision.
