California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · June 24, 2005

Student v. Yucaipa-Calimesa Joint Unified School District

SEHO Case No. SN 537-05 · Hearing Officer Suzanne B. Brown

Yucaipa-Calimesa Joint Unified must reimburse YouthCare residential costs at $407 per day from March 18, 2005; child find claim denied.

Split decision: student prevailed on 2 of 6 issues (2 in part)

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Noted in the decision

None noted. The decision says claims about the county's AB 2726 offer and any denial of FAPE after the May 2005 IEP meeting may be pursued in a separate due process proceeding.

Summary

A 16-year-old student's mother, assisted by advocates, filed against Yucaipa-Calimesa Joint Unified School District. In February 2005 the district found the student eligible under emotional disturbance. By then her mother had placed her at Copper Canyon Academy in Arizona and later at YouthCare, a residential treatment center in Utah. San Bernardino County Behavioral Health was dismissed as a party. Its mental health (AB 2726) assessment was still within its 50-day timeline, so no claim against it was ready to decide.

The Hearing Officer found no child find violation from September 2003 to December 2004. The student's ninth-grade failing grades came from heavy absences, and absences alone did not signal a suspected disability. The district reasonably continued the February 28, 2005 IEP meeting to resolve custody and residency questions. However, the March 18, 2005 offer of a special day class with door-to-door transportation denied FAPE. School psychologist Peggy Neumann testified that the student needed a step-down transition from residential care to avoid returning to truancy. The class alone did not provide one. The district remained responsible for a complete FAPE even though the county assessment was pending. YouthCare was appropriate, and the notice rules did not apply. The district must reimburse YouthCare costs at $407 per day from March 18, 2005, until the IEP meeting reviewing the county assessment. All other requests were denied.

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Why it matters

The decision shows how SEHO held a district responsible for offering a complete FAPE while a county mental health (AB 2726) assessment was still pending. A special day class offer alone was not enough for a student leaving residential treatment who had a history of truancy and needed transition support.

Issues and holdings

  1. District prevailedChild find

    Issue 1. From September 2003 to December 2004, did the District meet its obligation to search and serve Student pursuant to child find requirements?

    The District had an adequate child find system. The ninth-grade failing grades came from poor attendance, and absences alone or the receipt of counseling were not unique facts that should have prompted a referral.

  2. Student prevailed in partFAPE: services offered

    Issue 2. Did the District offer Student a FAPE for the 2004-2005 school year (beginning February 28, 2005, and for the remainder of the school year)?

    Continuing the February 28, 2005 IEP meeting to resolve custody and residency questions was not a procedural violation. The March 18, 2005 offer of a special day class with transportation denied FAPE because it had no transition or mental health component to move the student out of residential care and prevent truancy. The denial ran from March 18, 2005, until the IEP meeting reviewing the county mental health assessment.

  3. District prevailedPlacement and LRE

    Issue 3. Is the District required to prospectively place Student at YouthCare, a certified nonpublic school in Utah?

    Prospective placement was not ripe because the county AB 2726 mental health assessment and a resulting IEP offer were pending. The request was denied without prejudice to a new due process filing.

  4. Issue 4a. Is Student's mother entitled to reimbursement for residential placement and related transportation expenses for Student's attendance at Copper Canyon Academy in Arizona?

    No denial of FAPE occurred during the Copper Canyon placement (September to December 2004). Both sides also agreed the placement did not provide educational benefit.

  5. Issue 4b. Is Student's mother entitled to reimbursement for residential placement and related transportation expenses for Student's attendance at YouthCare?

    YouthCare was an appropriate unilateral placement and the 10-day notice rules did not apply, so the District must reimburse YouthCare costs from March 18, 2005, until the IEP meeting reviewing the county assessment. Costs before March 18, transportation, and the mother's travel costs were denied.

  6. Issue 4c. Is Student's mother entitled to reimbursement for counseling at Vista Guidance Center?

    The counseling took place in 2004, before the denial of FAPE began, so no reimbursement was owed.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • Reimbursement. Within 25 calendar days of the decision, the District must reimburse the mother for the costs of Student's attendance at YouthCare at $407 per day. The period runs from March 18, 2005, until the date San Bernardino County Behavioral Health reviewed its AB 2726 mental health assessment at an IEP meeting, which likely occurred in or about May 2005. Transportation costs are excluded.

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Key authorities

Board of Education v. Rowley; Union School Dist. v. Smith; W.G. v. Target Range School Dist.; School Committee of Burlington v. Dept. of Education; Florence County School Dist. Four v. Carter; Student W. v. Puyallup School Dist.; Alamo Heights ISD v. State Board of Education; Gregory K. v. Longview School Dist.; Capistrano Unified School Dist. v. Wartenberg; Evans v. Evans; Student v. Oxnard Union High School Dist. (SN01-2403); Student v. San Diego Unified School Dist. and San Diego County Mental Health (SN03-01146)

People named in the decision

  • Patty Metheny, District director of student services, Yucaipa-Calimesa Joint Unified School District
  • Peggy Neumann, school psychologist (psychoeducational assessor), Yucaipa-Calimesa Joint Unified School District
  • Stewart Carey, special education teacher (special day class for students with emotional disturbance), Yucaipa High School
  • Pam Cronk, assistant principal, Yucaipa High School - Ninth Grade Campus
  • Gail Lindberg, SELPA program manager; District representative at hearing, East Valley SELPA
  • Lisa Wisham, academic director, residential treatment center, YouthCare Residential Treatment Center
  • Dr. Suzanna Tillotson, licensed primary therapist, YouthCare Residential Treatment Center
  • Dr. James Carey, psychologist, YouthCare Residential Treatment Center
  • Michael Schertell, clinic supervisor and AB2726 coordinator, San Bernardino County Behavioral Health
  • Lisa McGinnis, AB2726 placement supervisor, San Bernardino County Behavioral Health
  • Cathy Proffitt-Allison, child-youth program coordinator and AB2726 coordinator, Vista Guidance Center
  • Arlys Fillman, elementary coordinator and former vice-principal (private school), Mesa Grande Academy
  • Dr. Blue, psychiatrist, Yucaipa Guidance Center (now Vista Guidance Center)
  • Jillian Bonnington, educational advocate for Student
  • Tim Runner, advocate for Student
  • YouthCare Residential Treatment Center, residential treatment center / certified nonpublic school (Utah)
  • Copper Canyon Academy, residential treatment facility (Arizona)
  • Vista Guidance Center, private mental health provider under contract with county

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard on April 19-22, 2005, in Yucaipa, California, before Suzanne Brown, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), University of the Pacific’s McGeorge School of Law. (Footnote 1)

Petitioner STUDENT (Petitioner or STUDENT) was represented by advocates Jillian Bonnington and Tim Runner. Present on behalf of STUDENT was her mother, MOTHER. Respondent Yucaipa-Calimesa Joint Unified School District (District) was represented by East Valley Special Education Local Plan Area (SELPA) program manager Gail Lindberg. Present on behalf of the District was Patty Metheny, District director of student services.

Petitioner called the following witnesses to testify at the hearing: Patty Metheny, District director of student services; Peggy Neumann, District school psychologist; Lisa Wisham, academic director at YouthCare Residential Treatment Center (YouthCare); Dr. Suzanna Tillotson, licensed primary therapist at YouthCare; Stewart Carey, special education teacher at the District’s Yucaipa High School; Michael Schertell, clinic supervisor and AB2726 coordinator at San Bernardino County Behavioral Health; and MOTHER, STUDENT’s mother.

The District called the following additional witnesses to testify at the hearing: FATHER, STUDENT’s father; Arlys Fillman, elementary coordinator at Mesa Grande Academy; Cathy Proffitt-Allison, child-youth program coordinator and AB2726 coordinator at Vista Guidance Center; and Pam Cronk, assistant principal at the District’s Yucaipa High School - Ninth Grade Campus.

Oral and documentary evidence was received at the hearing. Pursuant to a ruling issued at the hearing, the Hearing Officer also admitted as documentary evidence invoices received via facsimile (fax) from Petitioner on April 29, 2005 and May 2, 2005; those documents were admitted as Petitioner’s Exhibit 30. Subsequently, the Hearing Officer received the parties’ written closing arguments and thereafter the matter was closed and submitted for decision.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Dismissal of San Bernardino County Behavioral Health

The Hearing Office received Petitioner’s request for a due process hearing on March 4, 2005. The request named both the District and San Bernardino County Behavioral Health (SBCBH) as respondents in this matter. On March 16, 2005, the Hearing Office received from SBCBH a motion to be dismissed as a party, on the ground that SBCBH had never received any referral for mental health services from the District. On March 17, the Hearing Office received Petitioner’s opposition to SBCBH’s motion to be dismissed, arguing that SBCBH received a request for an AB2726 mental health evaluation from Petitioner’s representative at an individualized education program (IEP) meeting on February 28, 2005. On March 24, the Hearing Office issued a minute order ruling that SBCBH’s motion to be dismissed was “denied at this time” due to a factual dispute regarding whether SBCBH had received a referral for Petitioner.

Thus, SBCBH remained a party when the hearing first convened on April 19, 2005. SBCBH was represented at the hearing by clinical supervisor/AB2726 coordinator Michael Schertell. Present on behalf of SBCBH was AB2726 placement supervisor Lisa McGinnis.

After clarification of the issues, SBCBH renewed its motion to be dismissed as a party. SBCBH argued that it did not receive an AB2726 assessment referral regarding Petitioner until March 24, 2005, and did not receive the parent’s signed consent to the mental health assessment plan until April 8, 2005. Therefore, as of the date of the hearing SBCBH was still within the fifty-day assessment timelines, had not yet completed its assessment and had not yet reached any findings regarding services or placement for Petitioner.

The District did not oppose SBCBH’s motion to be dismissed. Petitioner again opposed the motion. Petitioner argued that SBCBH received an AB2726 assessment referral for Petitioner on March 19, 2005, and that therefore Petitioner could raise denial of FAPE claims against SBCBH beginning from that date.

A local educational agency (LEA), individualized education program team or parent may initiate a referral for a student’s assessment to the county mental health agency. (Cal. Gov’t Code § 7576(b); Cal. Code Regs, tit. 2, § 60040.) Within five days of receipt of the referral, the mental health agency shall review the recommendation for a mental health assessment and determine if such an assessment is necessary. If the mental health agency determines that the assessment is necessary, within fifteen days of receiving the referral from the LEA the mental health agency shall develop a mental health assessment plan and provide the plan and a consent form to the parent. (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 60045(b).) Upon receiving the parent’s written consent, the mental health agency has fifty days to complete the assessment and present the results at an IEP meeting, unless the parent requests an extension in writing. (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 60045(e).)

In the present case, SBCBH alleged that the fifty-day timeline did not begin to run until SBCBH received the parent’s signed consent on April 8, 2005, while Petitioner alleges that the timeline began to run on March 19, 2005. Relying upon Petitioner’s earlier date of March 19, SBCBH would still have been within the fifty-day assessment timeline as of the date of the hearing, April 19. Thus, Petitioner could not identify any issues against SBCBH that were ripe as of April 19, 2005. For that reason, the Hearing Officer granted SBCBH’s motion to be dismissed as a party from the present case. (Footnote 2)

Petitioner’s Motion to Disregard the District’s Closing Brief and Award Sanctions

At the close of the hearing, the Hearing Officer discussed with both parties how closing arguments would be delivered. The hearing participants agreed that the parties would submit written closing briefs no later than 5:00 p.m. on Monday, May 9, 2005. The Hearing Officer verbally instructed the parties that their written briefs could be submitted by fax, U.S. mail or overnight mail, but that the briefs should be faxed or postmarked no later than May 9, 2005. Neither party objected to those requirements.

The Hearing Office received both parties’ briefs on May 11, 2005. Petitioner’s brief was sent via U.S. mail, and appears to bear a postmark of May 9, 2005. The District’s brief was sent via fax. At the top of each page of the District’s brief, the fax machine imprinted the date of May 11, 2005. On May 12, 2005, the Hearing Office received from Petitioner a motion to exclude the District’s brief, on the ground that the District did not send its brief until May 11, two days later than the deadline set by the Hearing Officer. Petitioner also requested sanctions against the District for the late submission of its brief. On May 19, 2005, the Hearing Office received the District’s opposition to Petitioner’s motion. The District argued that the Hearing Office received both the District’s brief and Petitioner’s brief after the May 9, 2005 deadline; therefore, if lateness constituted a basis to exclude, the District argued that both briefs should be excluded. Given that both briefs were received after the May 9 deadline, the District contended that any lateness in the submission of its brief did not cause any delay in the proceedings. The District also asserted that there is no basis for an award of sanctions.

In the present case, by faxing the brief on May 11, the District’s advocate did not meet the May 9 deadline for submission. Despite the opportunity to submit an opposition to the motion to exclude, the District did not offer any explanation for its failure to comply with the deadline. Contrary to the District’s position, the deadline applied to when the parties were required to send their briefs, not when the Hearing Office would receive the briefs; it is unclear whether the District’s advocate misunderstood the deadline requirements or understood the requirements but nevertheless failed to comply.

In any event, the District’s late submission of its brief did not prejudice Petitioner or provide an advantage to the District. There is nothing in the District’s brief to indicate that the District’s advocate reviewed Petitioner’s brief before submitting the District’s brief. Moreover, because the Hearing Office received both briefs on the same day, the District’s late submission did not cause any delay in the preparation of the Decision. Given that the period between the deadline and the actual submission was very brief, and in light of the absence of prejudice to Petitioner, the Hearing Officer will allow the District’s closing brief to be part of the record in this matter. Petitioner’s motion to disregard the District’s brief is denied.

Finally, the District’s late submission of its brief does not constitute bad faith or frivolous tactics, and therefore does not warrant sanctions. (See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3088; Cal. Gov’t Code § 11455.30.) Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion for sanctions is denied.

ISSUES

(1) From September 2003 to December 2004, did the District meet its obligation to search and serve STUDENT pursuant to “child find” requirements?

(2) Has the District offered STUDENT a FAPE for the 2004-2005 school year?

(3) Is the District required to prospectively place STUDENT at YouthCare, a certified nonpublic school in Utah?

(4) Is STUDENT’s mother entitled to reimbursement for services she provided STUDENT, as follows:

(a) residential placement and related transportation expenses for STUDENT’s attendance at Copper Canyon Academy in Arizona;

(b) residential placement and related transportation expenses for STUDENT’s attendance at YouthCare;

(c) counseling at Vista Guidance Center?

BACKGROUND FACTS

STUDENT is a sixteen-year-old girl who currently attends YouthCare, a residential facility in Draper, Utah, at her mother’s expense. Currently, both her mother and father reside within the boundaries of Yucaipa-Calimesa Joint Unified School District. Prior to October 19, 2004, her parents shared joint legal custody of STUDENT; pursuant to a court order dated October 19, 2004, MOTHER has sole legal and physical custody of STUDENT. STUDENT is currently identified as eligible for special education under the category of emotional disturbance (ED).

STUDENT, her parents, and her three siblings moved to Yucaipa when STUDENT was in first grade. Beginning in second grade, STUDENT attended school at Mesa Grande Academy (Mesa Grande), a private parochial school in Calimesa, California. STUDENT attended Mesa Grande until approximately January 2001, which was the middle of her sixth grade year. At that time, STUDENT’s parents separated and STUDENT moved with her mother to Grand Terrace, California, which is outside of the boundaries of the District. During this time, MOTHER began taking STUDENT for therapy at Kaiser Permanente, but STUDENT claimed that she did not like any of the therapists there.

From January to March 2001, STUDENT attended sixth grade at Azure Hills Academy, a private school, but then switched to Terrace View Elementary, a public school in the Colton Unified School District. In September 2001, STUDENT began seventh grade at Terrace Hills Middle School. Because of violent behavior towards her mother, STUDENT returned to Yucaipa to live with her father in October 2001, although MOTHER and FATHER continued to share custody of STUDENT. (Footnote 3) (Testimony of MOTHER.) MOTHER called the police regarding STUDENT’s violent behaviors, and subsequently the juvenile court sentenced STUDENT to probation and ordered her to attend anger management classes.

In January 2002, STUDENT enrolled in seventh grade at the District’s Park View Middle School, but rarely attended school and did not earn any course credits. (Pet. Exhs. 5, 19; Dist. Exh. 6.) For eighth grade, STUDENT returned to her private placement at Mesa Grande for the 2002-2003 school year. STUDENT received grades of As, Bs and Cs for the first quarter, but her grades and attendance declined as the school year progressed. (Testimony of Arlys Fillman; Dist. Exh. 8, p. 53-54.) Over the course of the school year, STUDENT received several “discipline points” for violating the school rules. (Id.; Pet. Exh. 27.) Because of STUDENT’s accumulation of disciplinary points and failure to complete her schoolwork, in May 2003 Mesa Grande informed STUDENT and her parents that STUDENT would not be permitted to complete the school year there and would not be permitted to return for ninth grade. Arlys Fillman, who was vice-principal of Mesa Grande and also had been STUDENT’s fourth-grade teacher, recommended to STUDENT and her parents that STUDENT receive counseling.

For ninth grade, STUDENT was enrolled in the District’s Yucaipa High School - Ninth Grade Campus (YHS-9) from approximately October 7 to December 9, 2003. During that two-month period, STUDENT rarely attended school. STUDENT’s father testified that he attempted to get STUDENT to attend school, but STUDENT refused to attend. (Testimony of FATHER; see also testimony of Pam Cronk.) FATHER reported that STUDENT would usually spend her time sleeping and watching television. On November 5, 2003, the principal of YHS-9 sent written notice to FATHER that the School Attendance Review Team (SART) would meet on November 13, 2003, regarding STUDENT’s poor attendance. (Pet. Exh. 26.) STUDENT and her father both attended the meeting and signed an attendance contract. After the SART meeting, STUDENT continued to be absent from school. On December 2, 2003, the District Student Attendance Review Board (SARB) convened regarding STUDENT’s numerous absences. FATHER attended the meeting, but STUDENT refused to attend.

Early in 2004, MOTHER began taking STUDENT for therapy at Yucaipa Guidance Center. (Footnote 4) STUDENT began seeing Dr. Blue, a psychiatrist at the center, but after a while STUDENT refused to return. MOTHER testified that Dr. Blue recommended putting STUDENT on medication, but both MOTHER and FATHER felt that they could not ensure that STUDENT would take the medication.

On or about February 2004, MOTHER enrolled STUDENT in a charter school called Options For Youth, which was operated by the Upland Unified School District. After a few months, STUDENT’s teacher at Options For Youth notified MOTHER that STUDENT was not turning in her schoolwork, and therefore would be dropped from the program. MOTHER persuaded the teacher to give STUDENT another opportunity, but eventually Options For Youth terminated STUDENT’s enrollment there in April or May 2004. (Dist. Exh. 7, p. 49; testimony of MOTHER.)

In June and July 2004, MOTHER took STUDENT for tutoring at a private tutoring program called One On One Tutoring. MOTHER testified that STUDENT generally attended the tutoring on a regular basis. On one occasion when MOTHER picked up STUDENT after One On One tutoring, STUDENT became upset with her mother, hit her mother’s arms and grabbed the steering wheel, taking the car into another traffic lane. MOTHER testified that thereafter she drove them to the Behavioral Management Center in Redlands to have STUDENT evaluated there, but the Behavioral Management Center would not accept STUDENT and instead directed them to a hospital. MOTHER also reported the incident to the police.

In August 2004, STUDENT attended a summer session at another private tutoring program, Chartwell. As the beginning of the 2004-2005 school year approached, STUDENT was not yet enrolled at any school. She had expressed interest in attending Rio Lindo Academy (Rio Lindo), a private parochial boarding school that was located in northern California and was affiliated with Mesa Grande. STUDENT indicated that she wanted to attend Rio Lindo because a friend of hers from Mesa Grande was also going to attend Rio Lindo. MOTHER enrolled STUDENT at Rio Lindo using an on-line application form. However, MOTHER reported that when they drove to northern California to visit Rio Lindo, STUDENT had anxiety attacks and could not get out of the car.

MOTHER enrolled STUDENT at Copper Canyon Academy (Copper Canyon), a residential treatment facility in Arizona. On or about September 2, 2004, STUDENT’s older sister, Heather, accompanied STUDENT on the airplane trip to Arizona. STUDENT went on the trip willingly because she wanted to attend a boarding school, but reportedly was unhappy once she arrived at Copper Canyon and attempted to run away. (Testimony of MOTHER; see also testimony of Peggy Neumann.)

Prior to this time, FATHER and MOTHER were involved in marital dissolution proceedings. Because of disagreement regarding STUDENT’s placement at Copper Canyon, MOTHER sought a change in custody. On October 19, 2004, the family court ordered that MOTHER had sole physical and legal custody of STUDENT for the purpose of obtaining treatment at Copper Canyon. (Dist. Exh. 15, p. 151; Pet. Exh. 28.)

STUDENT resided at Copper Canyon from approximately September 2 to December 3, 2004. MOTHER testified that the Copper Canyon placement was not successful, and that STUDENT refused to take her medications while at Copper Canyon. (See also Pet. Exhs. 5, 25.) STUDENT’s academic records from Copper Canyon indicated that she earned grades of four Fs and one D. (Dist. Exh. 12, p. 86.)

On December 3, 2004, Copper Canyon staff took STUDENT to a hospital in Flagstaff, Arizona, where she was held in the psychiatric unit for two weeks. During STUDENT’s hospitalization, the medical staff increased STUDENT’s dosage of psychotropic medication. Hospital records indicate that Copper Canyon’s administrators would not agree to STUDENT’s return to their facility. (Dist. Exh. 13, p. 97.) STUDENT’s father drove to the Flagstaff hospital to take STUDENT home to California, but the staff would not release STUDENT to him. (Testimony of FATHER; Dist. Exh. 13, p. 97.)

On December 13, 2004, MOTHER telephoned the District regarding STUDENT’s situation, and spoke with Patty Metheny, District director of student services. MOTHER told Ms. Metheny that STUDENT was about to be discharged from a hospital in Arizona, where she had been attending a boarding school. (Pet. Exh. 20; testimony of Ms. Metheny, MOTHER.) MOTHER told Ms. Metheny that STUDENT was not a special education student, and requested that STUDENT be assessed for special education, including a mental health assessment. Ms. Metheny suggested a referral to the local school district in Arizona, and also requested proof of residency within the District. (Id.) On or about December 14, 2004, MOTHER went to the District office and showed Ms. Metheny the address on her personal checks as evidence of residency within the District. (Footnote 5)

On December 19, 2004, at MOTHER’s request, a Copper Canyon staff member escorted STUDENT to YouthCare, a residential treatment center in Draper, Utah. Upon STUDENT’s arrival, YouthCare conducted an intake assessment. YouthCare staff reported that, for the first few weeks, STUDENT was angry and verbally aggressive, although thereafter her behavior began improving. YouthCare staff also reported that STUDENT had been overmedicated when she arrived, although over several weeks the treating psychiatrist was able to reduce her medication dosage.

On December 31, 2004, educational advocate Jillian Bonnington sent the District a letter via fax requesting a psychoeducational assessment of STUDENT and a “concurrent referral to County Mental Health for an AB-3632/882 CH.26.5 assessment.” (Pet. Exh. 21.) On January 4, 2005, Ms. Metheny wrote a letter to MOTHER, with a copy to Ms. Bonnington, requesting documentation to establish STUDENT’s residency within the District. (Footnote 6) The letter also included a proposed assessment plan, which Ms. Metheny asked MOTHER to sign and return. Ms. Metheny also telephoned SBCBH and spoke with AB2726 coordinator Michael Schertell about the request for concurrent referral. Mr. Schertell told Ms. Metheny that SBCBH could not initiate a residential placement assessment for STUDENT until the District first determined that she was eligible for special education as a student with an ED. (Testimony of Ms. Metheny.)

On January 19, 2005, the District received the signed assessment plan from MOTHER. (Dist. Exh. 2, p. 20; testimony of Ms. Metheny.) Because STUDENT’s advocate had informed the District that STUDENT was unable to return to southern California for the assessment, Ms. Metheny agreed to seek approval from the District’s Board of Education to allow an assessor to travel to Utah to assess STUDENT. District school psychologist Peggy Neumann flew to Utah to conduct a psychoeducational assessment of STUDENT at YouthCare on February 17, 2005. Ms. Neumann’s assessment consisted of a review of previous test results and other records, an interview with STUDENT, discussions with YouthCare psychologist Dr. James Carey and YouthCare therapist Dr. Suzanna Tillotson, standardized testing of STUDENT, and questionnaires filled out by STUDENT’s mother and YouthCare teachers. After completing the assessment, Ms. Neumann concluded that STUDENT was eligible for special education under the category of emotional disturbance (ED), but did not qualify as a student with a specific learning disability (SLD).

On February 28, 2005, STUDENT’s individualized education program (IEP) team convened for the first time. Among those in attendance were FATHER, Ms. Bonnington, Ms. Neumann, Ms. Metheny, SELPA program manager Gail Lindberg, and two representatives from San Bernardino County Behavioral Health (SBCBH). STUDENT’s mother was not able to attend the meeting. YouthCare psychologist Dr. James Carey, YouthCare therapist Dr. Suzanna Tillotson, two of STUDENT’s teachers at YouthCare, and STUDENT herself participated in the meeting by telephone from Utah. Ms. Neumann presented the findings of her assessment and Dr. Carey also discussed the results of his testing of STUDENT. The IEP team agreed that STUDENT was eligible for special education as a student with ED. District staff suggested a special day class (SDC) at Yucaipa High School as an appropriate placement for STUDENT. Ms. Bonnington then stated that she had learned that STUDENT’s mother had sole legal custody of STUDENT. FATHER disagreed, noting that STUDENT resided with him. FATHER also stated that STUDENT’s mother was not a resident of Yucaipa. After further discussion of which parent had custody, Ms. Bonnington apparently became angry at the District staff and left the meeting. (Dist. Exh. 15, p. 156.) FATHER stated that he wanted to bring STUDENT home from the residential placement, and indicated that STUDENT was placed out of state without his permission. District staff informed FATHER that the District needed to determine who had legal custody of STUDENT and whether STUDENT was a resident of the District, and therefore the meeting would reconvene once the custody and residency issues were resolved.

In early March 2005, an investigator working on behalf of the District verified that MOTHER resided in Yucaipa within the boundaries of the District. (Dist. Exh. 14; testimony of Ms. Metheny.) In a letter dated March 4, 2005, Ms. Bonnington provided the District with a copy of the October 19, 2004 court order awarding sole custody of STUDENT to MOTHER. (Dist. Exh. 15, p. 152-153.) Thereafter the District rescheduled the IEP meeting for March 18, 2005.

On March 2, 2005, Ms. Neumann completed an AB2726 referral for mental health services for STUDENT. (Dist. Exh. 3, p. 33.) On March 8, 2005, Vista Guidance Center, which contracts with SBCBH to provide mental health services to eligible special education students, notified the District that it had received the mental health referral and would contact STUDENT’s parent.

When the IEP meeting reconvened on March 18, Ms. Bonnington and MOTHER were in attendance, but FATHER did not attend. Ms. Metheny and Ms. Lindberg again attended the meeting, but no SBCBH representatives were present. The District offered placement at the District’s Yucaipa High School in an SDC for ED students. The SDC teacher, Stewart Carey, attended the IEP meeting. Mr. Carey described the SDC and answered questions about it. MOTHER did not agree to the proposed placement and instead requested an AB2726 residential placement. The District staff responded that SBCBH would need to conduct its assessment before an AB2726 residential placement could be offered, and agreed to make that referral to SCBCH. (Pet. Exh. 1.) At the meeting, MOTHER signed an authorization for the District to release information to SBCBH for the purposes of that assessment.

In a letter dated March 18, 2005, Ms. Metheny sent the request for AB2726 residential placement to Ms. Lindberg at the East Valley SELPA. In a letter dated March 21, 2005, Ms. Lindberg forwarded that request to SBCBH. (Dist. Exh. 4, p. 34.) Thereafter, SBCBH sent STUDENT’s mother an assessment plan for the AB2726 residential placement assessment. SBCBH received the signed consent form back from MOTHER. SBCBH has initiated the residential placement assessment but, as of the hearing in mid-April 2005, the assessment had not been completed. As of the last day of hearing, STUDENT remained at her residential placement at YouthCare in Utah at her mother’s expense.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

(1) From September 2003 to December 2004, did the District meet its obligation to search and serve STUDENT pursuant to “child find” requirements?

Federal and State law impose an affirmative duty on school districts to systematically seek out all individuals with exceptional needs and ensure that those individuals are “identified, located, and evaluated.” (20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3); 34 C.F.R. § 300.125(a); Cal. Educ. Code § 56300.) This duty is not dependent on any request by parents for special education testing or referral for services. School districts must establish written policies and procedures for a continuous child find system, and the policies and procedures must include written notification to all parents of procedures for initiating a referral for assessment. (Cal. Educ. Code § 56301.) Each local educational agency (LEA) shall provide for the identification and assessment of an individual’s exceptional needs. (Cal. Educ. Code § 56302.) Identification procedures shall include systematic methods of utilizing referrals of pupils from teachers, parents, agencies, appropriate professional persons, and from other members of the public. (Id.) All referrals for special education and related services must initiate the assessment process and be documented. (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5 § 3021(a).)

Patty Metheny, the District’s director of student services, testified about the general methods the District uses to seek out students who may be eligible for special education. Ms. Metheny described how the District holds public meetings about special education eligibility, and places notices of those meetings in local newspapers and at the local library. The District also contacts some local doctors, such as pediatricians, and local private schools to educate them about making special education referrals to the District. Additionally, Ms. Metheny stated that the District trains its staff regarding identifying students for whom a special education referral may be warranted. Finally, the District collaborates with a local newspaper that regularly features stories about special education; the newspaper articles include information about how to contact the District regarding a student who may need special education.

Petitioner argues generally that the District’s efforts to search and serve special education students are inadequate. In support of this contention, Petitioner points to Ms. Metheny’s admission that the public meetings regarding special education are sparsely attended, and to Arlys Fillman’s testimony that Mesa Grande Academy had never received any information from the District about special education referrals. Moreover, Petitioner specifically contends that STUDENT’s poor grades and absences in ninth grade should have caused the District to refer her for a special education assessment.

Petitioner’s arguments are not persuasive. The District established that it made sufficient efforts to systematically seek out special education students through various outreach efforts, and there is no indication that additional efforts would have likely led to a special education referral for STUDENT. Ms. Fillman, whose roles at Mesa Grande have included teacher, vice-principal and elementary education coordinator, testified that she was familiar with the procedures for referring a student for special education assessment, but had not considered a referral for STUDENT because previously Ms. Fillman had not thought that STUDENT was disabled. Similarly, STUDENT’s parents were aware of the special education procedures and resources at public schools, but MOTHER testified that she did not request a special education assessment of STUDENT because, until December 2004, she did not believe that STUDENT had a disability. FATHER and MOTHER were both aware of the special education procedures and resources available at public schools because they are both credentialed special education providers who have worked in the special education field at California public schools for many years. Therefore, because STUDENT’s parents and Ms. Fillman were already well aware of the availability of special education procedures and resources, any additional publication or outreach activities regarding the availability of those procedures and resources would likely not have caused her parents or private school staff to have initiated an earlier special education referral. Thus, the District had a child find system in place to seek out students with exceptional needs and, in STUDENT’s case, greater publication of the District’s special education procedures and resources would likely not have led to an earlier special education referral.

Furthermore, the evidence of STUDENT’s poor attendance and resulting poor grades at Yucaipa High School’s Ninth Grade (YHS-9) campus in fall 2003 did not establish that the District should have referred her for a special education assessment. Many students are frequently absent and, as a result, often receive failing grades. As Ms. Cronk explained, a student’s poor attendance alone typically does not notify school staff that a student may have a suspected disability and requires assessment. (See 34 C.F.R. § 300.534(b)(1)(i); Student v. Oxnard Union High School District, SN01-2403 (Decision, March 18, 2002).) Thus, the question is whether there was some unique fact that was known to the District that should have prompted a further inquiry leading to a special education assessment. In the present case, there was no such distinguishing fact. YHS-9 assistant principal Pam Cronk explained that STUDENT’s failing grades were due to her extremely poor attendance, as evidenced by the reports from STUDENT’s ninth grade teachers that they could not gauge her progress because she was not present often enough to be observed. (Pet. Exh. 26.)

Hence, because of her poor attendance, teachers and other District staff did not regularly observe STUDENT in school. As a result, those District employees had no reason to suspect that STUDENT might be a student with exceptional needs who should be referred for special education assessment. Petitioner also asserts that MOTHER informed District staff that STUDENT was receiving “counseling.” Regardless of whether any District employees were aware of that information, a student’s mere receipt of some type of counseling does not indicate that the student has a suspected disability and, therefore, would not constitute a unique fact that should have prompted a special education referral.

Accordingly, there were no unique facts known to the District that should have caused District staff to initiate a referral for a special education assessment for STUDENT. Thus, the District met its obligations to search and serve STUDENT, consistent with child find obligations, for the period from September 2003 to December 2004.

(2) Did the District offer STUDENT a FAPE beginning on February 28, 2005, and for the remainder of the 2004-2005 school year?

Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and State law, children with disabilities are entitled to a free appropriate public education (FAPE) that provides them with special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for independent living. (20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); Cal. Educ. Code § 56000.) “FAPE” is defined as special education and related services that meet State standards, include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education, and that are provided at public expense and in conformity with an IEP. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(8).) The term “related services” includes transportation and other services that may be required to allow a child to benefit from special education. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(17).) California Education Code section 56363 similarly provides that designated instruction and services (DIS), California’s term for related services, shall be provided “when the instruction and services are necessary for the pupil to benefit educationally from his or her instructional program.”

The determination of whether a student has been offered a FAPE is twofold, requiring the Hearing Officer to decide whether the proposed placement is substantively appropriate and whether procedural steps have been followed. (Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson School District v. Rowley (1982) 458 U.S. 176, 200; Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1995).)

A. Substantive Appropriateness

To determine whether STUDENT was offered a FAPE, the Hearing Officer must first consider the District’s proposed program. (Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987).) The IDEA and the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson School District v. Rowley, (1982) 458 U.S. 176, state that an appropriate educational program must be designed to address the student’s unique needs, be reasonably calculated to provide her with educational benefit, and be provided in conformity with the student’s IEP. (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; Rowley, 458 U.S. 176.) The Rowley opinion explained that the IDEA does not require that a student be provided with the best available special education instruction or services, or that those services maximize a student's potential. (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200.) Moreover, as long as a school district provides an appropriate education, methodology is left up to the school's discretion. (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208.)

Additionally, special education law requires that a student be educated in the least restrictive environment (LRE) and that removal of a student from the regular education environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the student’s disability is such that education in regular education classes cannot be achieved satisfactorily. (20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.550(b); Cal. Educ. Code § 56031.) In the present case, Petitioner seeks a more restrictive placement than the one offered by the District, and thus does not contend that the District’s offer was not in the LRE. Thus, this Decision need not examine whether the District’s proposed program was in the LRE.

To summarize, under IDEA and Rowley, a substantively appropriate program for STUDENT must meet the following three requirements to constitute an appropriate placement: (1) be designed to meet her unique needs; (2) be reasonably calculated to provide her with educational benefit; and (3) comport with her current IEP. (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; Rowley, supra, 458 U.S. at 188.) In the present case, there is no dispute regarding whether the proposed program comported with the IEP, and thus that requirement need not be further analyzed in this Decision.

District’s Psychoeducational Assessment

To determine whether the program the District offered was appropriate, this Decision must first consider what STUDENT’s unique needs were. In doing so, this Decision must give due weight to the District’s February 2005 psychoeducational assessment conducted by school psychologist Peggy Neumann. In considering the evidentiary weight to give this assessment report, this Decision must first examine a claim by Petitioner that the assessment was not valid because Ms. Neumann administered the same tests that YouthCare psychologist Dr. James Carey had recently administered.

State and federal law impose some requirements on how standardized tests may be administered, such as that the tests must be administered by trained personnel in conformance with test instructions. (Cal. Educ. Code § 56320(b); 34 C.F.R. § 300.532.) The regulations also provide that the local educational agency (LEA) shall administer tests and other evaluation materials as may be needed to produce the data needed to determine the child’s disability, present levels of performance, and needs. (34 C.F.R. § 300.533(a), (c).) No single procedure may be used as the sole criterion in determining the student’s educational program. (Cal. Educ. Code § 56320(e); 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(f).)

Unbeknownst to one another, both Dr. Carey and Ms. Neumann administered the Woodcock-Johnson Tests of Achievement, Third Edition (WJ-III) to STUDENT in early 2005. Dr. Carey conducted various tests on January 15, February 5, and February 15, 2005, while Ms. Neumann conducted her testing solely on February 17, 2005. Ms. Neumann testified that she did not know that Dr. Carey had recently administered the WJ-III. Moreover, she pointed out that STUDENT obtained very similar scores on both administrations of the WJ-III. (Dist. Exh. 10, p. 77-78; Pet. Exh. 2; testimony of Ms. Neumann.) When Dr. Carey administered the WJ-III, STUDENT’s standard scores on nine subtests ranged from 86 to 109, while Ms. Neumann’s administration of eight of the same subtests resulted in standard scores from 84 to 110. Thus, even if little weight was given to Ms. Neumann’s WJ-III results, the Hearing Officer would be able to draw very similar substantive conclusions from the WJ-III scores obtained by Dr. Carey. Indeed, other than the fact that Ms. Neumann administered the WJ-III after Dr. Carey did, Petitioner has not identified any dispute with the actual results of the District’s psychoeducational assessment. (Footnote 7)

Hence, the repeat administration of the WJ-III did not invalidate the results of the District’s psychoeducational assessment. Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution, the Hearing Officer can easily rely primarily on the similar results obtained by Dr. Carey’s WJ-III administration, rather than Ms. Neumann’s.

What Were STUDENT’s Unique Needs?

To determine whether the program the District offered was appropriate, this Decision must first consider what STUDENT’s unique needs were in or about February 2005. There is no dispute that STUDENT qualified for special education due to an emotional disturbance (ED), and that she had significant social-emotional and mental health needs. While a student may qualify as ED if he or she exhibits one out of the five qualifying characteristics over a long period of time and to a marked degree, District school psychologist Peggy Neumann found that STUDENT exhibited four out of the five characteristics over a long time and to a marked degree. Ms. Neumann found that STUDENT had an inability to maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships with peers or teachers, exhibited inappropriate types of behaviors or feelings under normal circumstances in several situations, had a general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression, and displayed a tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears associated with personal or school problems. (Footnote 8) Ms. Neumann found that the areas of greatest concern regarding STUDENT were “school adjustment, social skills, inattentiveness, withdrawal, somatization, depression, and anxiety. As a result, STUDENT is unable to consistently perform in the classroom and use the academic skills she demonstrates on individualized testing.” (Dist. Exh.2, p. 27.)

Ms. Neumann’s findings were not inconsistent with the information reported by STUDENT’s current providers at YouthCare. YouthCare psychologist Dr. James Carey diagnosed STUDENT with Major Depressive Disorder without psychotic features on Axis I,pursuant to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV). Dr. Carey also found an Axis I diagnosis of dysthymia, which is depression for a long period of time. (Dist. Exh. 10, p. 81; testimony of Dr. Suzanna Tillotson.) Dr. Carey noted that STUDENT demonstrated anxiety in some situations, but he did not diagnose her with an anxiety disorder. Dr. Carey had not yet ruled out psychotic symptoms or “Cluster C” personality traits, such as obsessive-compulsive disorder or dependent personality disorder. (Id.; see also Pet. Exh. 24.)

Additionally, YouthCare staff determined that STUDENT’s emotional and psychological difficulties included aggressive outbursts, with a few instances of violent behavior towards her mother. (Dist. Exh. 10, p. 80; testimony of Lisa Wisham, Dr. Tillotson, MOTHER.) MOTHER also reported that STUDENT had talked about suicide and had reported hearing voices, although STUDENT denied these reports. STUDENT also informed Dr. Carey that she had abused alcohol from ages eleven to fifteen.

Regarding cognitive ability, testing showed that STUDENT’s cognitive level is in the low average range. STUDENT’s scores on the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Third Edition (WISC-III), administered by Dr. Carey at YouthCare, indicated a verbal intelligence quotient (IQ) of 84, a performance IQ of 87, and a full scale IQ of 84. STUDENT’s score on the Woodcock-Johnson III Test of Cognitive Abilities, administered by Ms. Neumann, produced a slightly lower IQ score, with a general intellectual ability (GIA) score of 77, although her verbal ability score was 90, her thinking ability score was 78, and her cognitive efficiency score was 82. However, it is unclear to what extent STUDENT’s emotional problems have negatively affected her cognitive functioning. Ms. Neumann testified that she believed social-emotional disturbances were negatively impacting STUDENT’s attention and concentration.

In contrast, on both Ms. Neumann’s and Dr. Carey’s testing, STUDENT’s academic achievement scores were higher than her cognitive test results, with nearly all achievement subtest scores in the average range. (Dist. Exh. 10, p. 77-79; Pet. Exh. 5.) Neither party contended that STUDENT had a specific learning disability (SLD), and the superiority of her achievement scores compared to her cognitive scores confirms that she did not have an SLD. (See Cal. Code of Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(j); Cal. Educ. Code § 56337(a).)

Petitioner contended that math was a particular area of weakness for her. The evidence on this point is mixed. YouthCare academic director Lisa Wisham testified that STUDENT had a “math disorder,” and a notation from a physician at the Flagstaff hospital stated that STUDENT had a “probable mathematics disorder.” However, there is no record of academic testing or other evidence establishing a basis for those conclusions. In Dr. Carey’s administration of the WJ-III, STUDENT’s lowest subtest standard score, an 86, was in applied math problems. However, her standard score on the “broad math” cluster was a 96, her standard score on the math calculation subtest was a 105, and her highest standard score, a 110, was on the math fluency subtest. Similarly, STUDENT’s previous performance in math was not necessarily indicative of a particular weakness in math. STUDENT’s test results on the math portions of the California Achievement Test-5, a standardized test administered at Copper Canyon, were not lower than her other scores; rather, spelling, language mechanics and science were her lowest scores. (Pet. Exh. 17.) Similarly, STUDENT’s math grades on her eighth grade report card were consistent with her other grades. (Dist. Exh. 8, p. 54.) Petitioner points to her math computation score of a 4.4 grade equivalent when she took the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS) in eighth grade at Mesa Grande. However, Mesa Grande elementary coordinator Arlys Fillman testified that this score was not indicative of a particular weakness in math because the ITBS math calculation subtest was difficult for all of the eighth graders, not just STUDENT. Based on all of the above, the Hearing Officer finds that applied math skills may have been a particular area of academic weakness for STUDENT, but math fluency and math calculation did not constitute particular weaknesses.

Finally, STUDENT has a long history of truancy, which appears to generally coincide with her history of depression. When STUDENT resided with her father, particularly during her public school years of seventh and ninth grades, she rarely attended school, resulting in a SARB hearing in ninth grade.

To briefly summarize, the evidence established that STUDENT suffered from depression and had other significant behavioral and emotional problems, including anxiety, inattentiveness, a tendency to withdraw, and difficulties with social skills. She has exhibited aggressive outbursts and on some occasions had behaved violently towards her mother. Although there was some conflicting information, STUDENT may also have abused alcohol, had suicidal ideation and/or heard voices. Cognitively, STUDENT functioned in the low average range, although it was unclear whether her emotional problems were interfering with her cognitive functioning. Academically, STUDENT’s skills were in the average range. She also has a significant history of truancy.

Was The District’s Offer Designed To Meet STUDENT’s Unique Needs?

In light of STUDENT’s unique needs as discussed above, the next step is to determine whether the District offered a program that was designed to address those unique needs. On March 18, 2005, the District offered STUDENT placement in an SDC at a general education high school campus, Yucaipa High School (YHS), with door-to-door transportation. The SDC has ten students, nine boys and one girl, all of whom have diagnoses of ED and also have behavior plans as part of their educational programs. With four adult staff members for the ten students, the class has a small teacher-to-student ratio. The SDC staff consists of one teacher, two full-time instructional aides, and a social work intern who is present in the classroom for approximately twenty hours per week. Additionally, a school counselor and the school psychologist each visit the SDC on a regular basis. All of the SDC staff have received training in behavioral strategies and are experienced in working with students who have behavioral problems.

The SDC teacher, Stewart Carey, testified that the SDC has a highly structured program with extensive behavioral supports. Each morning the SDC has a group therapy session, which is usually led by Mr. Carey and the social work intern. During the morning group session and at other times during the day, the students work on their emotional problems using dialectical behavioral therapy, essentially meaning that the staff encourage the students to express themselves and “talk out” their problems. For students who require more therapy than is available in the SDC, staff will recommend that the IEP team refer the student for AB2726 mental health services.

The SDC uses a tier program of forty-five minute and ninety-minute blocks of time to monitor a student’s behavior and performance. Academically, each student has daily assignments, and the teacher and instructional aides provide one-to-one assistance to the students throughout the day. Mr. Carey described how the staff consult with each student to identify what rewards, such as preferred free time activities, will motivate the student to complete his or her academic work and follow the classroom rules. Mr. Carey explained that the SDC utilizes a level system, wherein each student earns points for fulfilling various class requirements, such as attendance, appropriate verbal interaction, respectfulness, and academic work. As the students earn points, they can rise from Level 1 up to Level 4; at each level, the student has greater freedoms and privileges.

Mr. Carey described how the SDC program and door-to-door transportation address attendance issues. Initially, the SDC staff show a new student the IEP and classroom, and have a “special day” on the student’s first day of class, when the new student meets the other SDC students. The staff emphasizes bonding among the class, so that the students want to come to school. If an SDC student leaves the classroom unexpectedly, one of the four staff members will follow the student outside while another calls campus security. If attendance problems arise, the SDC staff will hold a meeting with the student and student’s parents, and may also get the local police and sheriff involved. Additionally, the staff promote and facilitate attendance by meeting the SDC students at the school bus each morning and walking them out to the bus each afternoon. Often a staff member will ride the bus with the students.

The evidence clearly established, and neither party disputed, that STUDENT has significant behavioral and emotional problems and needs a small, structured environment with behavioral supports, consistency, and a therapeutic component. Given STUDENT’s prior history of truancy, her program needs to have supports in place that will ensure her attendance.

The District argued that the SDC program with door-to-door transportation constitutes that type of appropriate placement for STUDENT, because it offers the small, structured program with behavioral supports and therapeutic element that STUDENT needs. Based upon the information about her in the IEP, Mr. Carey testified that the SDC is an appropriate placement for STUDENT and that STUDENT’s profile is similar to that of other students in the SDC. Ms. Neumann, who is frequently present in the SDC and is also knowledgeable about STUDENT’s needs, explained that the SDC has the structures and behavioral supports that STUDENT requires to be successful in a classroom.

In contrast, Petitioner argued that the proposed SDC placement is inappropriate for her because she needs a residential placement. Petitioner points to the recommendations from YouthCare staff that she remain at YouthCare for the foreseeable future because she needs a small, intensive residential placement that provides behavioral supports, consistency, 24-hour-per-day structure, and extensive therapy that includes group, family and individual therapies. (Testimony of Ms. Wisham, Dr. Tillotson; Dist. Exh. 10, p. 82.)

Without reaching the question of whether STUDENT needs a placement as restrictive as YouthCare, the Hearing Officer finds that the SDC placement alone, as the District offered it in the March 18, 2005 IEP, is not sufficient to meet STUDENT’s needs. Testimony describing the SDC established that it has the small student-to-teacher ratio, structure, and therapeutic aspect that STUDENT requires in a classroom placement. Like the classroom components of many residential placements and certified non-public schools, the SDC has trained, experienced staff, an intensive structure, and behavioral supports, including a level system that rewards students with greater freedom and privileges as they demonstrate compliance with the school rules. As described by Mr. Carey, Ms. Metheny, and Ms. Neumann, the SDC contains extensive supports and appears extremely well designed for a student with emotional and behavioral problems such as STUDENT’s. With door-to-door transportation, the YHS SDC would be an appropriate classroom component for STUDENT.

Nevertheless, given STUDENT’s history of truancy and her current attendance at a highly restrictive residential placement, the March 2005 IEP offer alone, without some additional component such as a transition plan or more intensive mental health services, is not sufficient to address STUDENT’s needs. For students transitioning out of residential placements, it is common for those students to have difficulty adjusting back to living at home because they lose the intensive structure of the residential placement, and have not learned how to function without such intensive supports and structure. (Testimony of Ms. Wisham.) In answering a question about how STUDENT would handle such a transition, Ms. Neumann testified that STUDENT’s transition would be “fine school-wise” because the SDC is a highly structured placement. However, Ms. Neumann explained that, in light of STUDENT’s need to adjust following the YouthCare placement, the SDC placement alone would not address STUDENT’s needs regarding home and after school; to address truancy issues and allow her to learn to function in a less structured environment, STUDENT would need some type of “step-down” transitional program. Ms. Neumann gave as an example a structured living facility such as a group home, which could ensure STUDENT’s school attendance and would provide more structure than living with a parent, but would allow her to live closer to home and have frequent contact with her family. Ms. Neumann was a thoughtful, credible witness who was knowledgeable about ED and, after conducting a thorough assessment of STUDENT, was knowledgeable about STUDENT’s needs. Ms. Neumann’s credibility was enhanced by her candor, in that she offered some opinions that diverged from the District’s position. In light of these factors, the Hearing Officer finds Ms. Neumann’s testimony persuasive.

No other evidence was provided regarding a potential group home placement, and this Decision does not reach any conclusions regarding whether STUDENT needs such a placement or any other type of residential placement. Instead, in answering the question of whether the District’s offer is appropriate, the Hearing Officer need only find that the SDC offer alone would not address STUDENT’s needs because it lacked the necessary components to transition STUDENT from a residential treatment center to living with a parent and, in light of that transition, to ensure her school attendance. Absent those necessary components, the March 18, 2005 IEP offer was insufficient to comprise an appropriate placement for STUDENT. That offer presumed that STUDENT would withdraw from YouthCare, immediately return to living at home with a parent, and thereafter attend school daily. As Ms. Wisham and Ms. Neumann both indicated, students leaving a residential treatment center tend to have difficulty returning to the lack of structure in their previous home lives, and can easily return to their prior behavior patterns. In STUDENT’s case, a return to her prior behavioral patterns would mean that she might not receive any of the educational benefits of the YHS SDC if she failed to attend. While door-to-door transportation and several of the SDC supports identified would be appropriate components of a strategy to ensure STUDENT’s school attendance, they alone are not sufficient given the anticipated transition from a residential treatment center and STUDENT’s prior history of extensive truancy, which occurred despite her parents’ best efforts to make her attend school. (See testimony of FATHER, MOTHER, Ms. Cronk.) Thus, while the District did not necessarily need to offer STUDENT a residential placement, if it offered a plan wherein she left YouthCare and no longer attended a residential treatment center, she would need some type of services or program beyond the SDC placement to facilitate her transition and avoid repetition of her truant behaviors.

It is important to emphasize that the present hearing required analysis of the District’s offer prior to SBCBH’s completion of an AB2726 mental health assessment. The Hearing Officer has no way of knowing whether an offer of mental health services from SBCBH, in combination with the District’s March 2005 IEP offer, would constitute an appropriate placement. Because the hearing did not admit any evidence from SBCBH on this point, this Decision reaches no conclusion whatsoever regarding what type of mental health services from SBCBH will be necessary to offer STUDENT a FAPE. This Decision does not require SBCBH to offer STUDENT a residential placement and does not conclude that STUDENT necessarily needs a residential placement. Rather, the Decision only finds that the offer as stated in the March 18, 2005 IEP is insufficient to meet STUDENT’s needs as she transitions from YouthCare to a less restrictive placement, and therefore does not offer a FAPE.

The District would likely contend that it was not obligated to offer mental health services because State law assigns responsibility for providing mental health services to the community mental health agency, not to the District. (Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 7572, 7587; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 60040.) While this is generally correct, the District remains ultimately responsible for making a complete FAPE available to STUDENT by the end of the fifty-day timeline pursuant to California Education Code sections 56321 and 56344. (20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(12)(B)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.142(b)(2); Cal. Educ. Code § 56340.) Even though SBCBH had not yet completed its mental health assessment by the time of the March 18, 2005 IEP, the District was still obligated to offer STUDENT a FAPE. Indeed, nothing prohibited the District from offering additional mental health services or other services pending the completion of SBCBH’s AB2726 assessment. The existence of the joint regulations implementing Chapter 26.5 of the California Government Code, including the timelines for a community mental health agency’s AB2726 mental health assessment, do not excuse LEAs from complying with the Education Code’s fifty-day timeline for conducting a special education assessment and developing an IEP after receipt of an initial special education referral. Federal and State law envision a single, thorough assessment followed by an IEP that contains a single, coherent offer of placement and services, all to be completed within a prescribed time. There is no provision in federal law or California statute that suggests the fifty-day timeline does not apply to students who need mental health services. (See 34 C.F.R. § 300.343(b); Cal. Educ. Code § 56344; see also Evans v. Evans, 818 F. Supp. 1215 (N.D. Ind. 1993); Decision, Student v. San Diego Unified School District and San Diego County Mental Health, SN03-01146 (October 6, 2003).)

Finally, the anticipated results of SBCBH’s AB2726 mental health assessment may contain an offer of mental health services and/or a new placement offer. Assuming that SBCBH complied with the fifty-day assessment timeline, then the results of the mental health assessment should have already been presented at an IEP meeting that convened after the close of the hearing but likely before the end of May 2005. The appropriateness of the District’s proposed SDC placement in combination with SBCBH’s offer has not been determined. Hence, this Decision’s finding that the District failed to offer FAPE only pertains to the time period from March 18, 2005, until the time of SBCBH’s offer.

Accordingly, because the District’s March 18, 2005 IEP did not offer a program sufficient to address STUDENT’s unique needs, the District denied STUDENT a FAPE beginning on that date. Because SBCBH’s AB2726 mental health assessment may have resulted in an offer of mental health services or placement, the denial of FAPE resulting from the District’s March 18, 2005 IEP may or may not have ended. Because the evidentiary record does not include any information about what SBCBH found or offered, this Decision cannot evaluate whether the denial of FAPE continued past the date of SBCBH’s presentation of the assessment results. Therefore, this Decision can determine only that the District’s placement offer substantively denied STUDENT a FAPE from March 18, 2005, until the IEP meeting when SBCBH presented the results of the AB2726 mental health assessment, which likely occurred on or about May 2005. (Footnote 9)

B. Procedural Appropriateness

The Supreme Court noted in its Rowley opinion that “Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of participation” at every step “as it did upon the measurement of the resulting IEP.” ( Rowley, supra, 458 U.S. at 205-206.) While procedural flaws do not automatically require a finding of a denial of FAPE, procedural violations which result in a “loss of educational opportunity” or which “seriously infringe the parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP formulation process clearly result in the denial of a FAPE.” (W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School District No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1484 (9th Cir. 1992).)

Petitioner contended that the District committed two procedural violations, as follows: (1) the District failed to make a concurrent referral to SBCBH for mental health services as requested by Petitioner’s advocate in a letter dated December 31, 2004, and (2) the District failed to offer goals and objectives or provide a clear, written placement offer pursuant to Union School District v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519 (9th Cir. 1994).

Regarding the first allegation, this Decision has already determined that the placement offer at the March 18, 2005 IEP was not substantively appropriate. Given this finding, there is no need to determine whether the District’s failure to make a concurrent referral to SBCBH constituted a procedural violation. The Hearing Officer already found a substantive denial of FAPE for the relevant time period, and so any finding of procedural violation for this allegation would not affect the resulting remedy.

However, the second allegation raises separate claims concerning a time period prior to March 18, 2005, and therefore those claims must be addressed herein. Petitioner alleges that, at the IEP meeting on February 28, 2005, the District failed to propose goals and objectives, and failed to make a clear written offer. Among the required components of an IEP are measurable annual goals, short-term objectives or benchmarks, and a formal, written offer of placement. (Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56001(e), 56345(a)(2); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3); Union School District v. Smith, 15 F.3d at 1526.)

In the present case, the IEP notes and witness testimony of IEP team members described how, during the IEP meeting on February 28, 2005, questions arose regarding which parent had custody of STUDENT and, if MOTHER had sole custody, whether she was a resident of the District. FATHER told the other IEP team members that STUDENT resided with him and that the parents shared legal custody. However, Petitioner’s advocate, Ms. Bonnington, told the team that MOTHER had sole legal and physical custody of STUDENT, while FATHER stated that MOTHER did not reside within the boundaries of the District. (Dist. Exh. 1, p. 16; testimony of Ms. Metheny, FATHER.) The IEP notes state in part that:

Advocate is stating that she has just learned that STUDENT’s mother has sole legal custody. Father states that this is not true. FATHER states that STUDENT’s mother does not live in Yucaipa. If in fact mother has sole custody, STUDENT is not a resident of YCJUSD....The team needs to know who has legal custody rights of STUDENT, needs to determine residency, and will reconvene once this information is available.

Because of the need to determine which parent had legal custody and whether STUDENT’s legal residence was within the boundaries of the District, the February 28 IEP meeting was continued. (Footnote 10) The IEP meeting subsequently reconvened on March 18, after the District determined that STUDENT’s mother had sole custody and was a resident of the District. There is no dispute that, during the continued meeting on March 18, the District proposed goals and objectives and made a clear written offer of placement.

In light of these circumstances, the District’s failure to offer a placement or goals and objectives at the February 28 IEP meeting did not in any way constitute a procedural violation. It would be absurd to hold that, when legitimate reasons cause an IEP meeting to be continued to a later date, the failure to have completed all IEP requirements during the first meeting constituted a procedural violation. (Footnote 11)

Petitioner seems to contend that the District should have already known that MOTHER was a resident of the District because MOTHER had shown a copy of her checkbook, reflecting a Yucaipa address, to the District’s director of student services in mid-December 2004. This argument is not successful. First, District staff could not reasonably have known whether FATHER was correct in his assertion that MOTHER did not reside in Yucaipa, perhaps because the Yucaipa address on MOTHER’s checks was not actually her residence or because MOTHER had recently changed her residence. Second, at the time of the February meeting the District had no information regarding which parent or parents held legal custody and, therefore, which parent had the right to make educational decisions for STUDENT. Given the conflicting information about which parent had custody and whether STUDENT was even a resident of the District, District members of the IEP team reasonably concluded that the residency and custody questions needed to be resolved before proceeding further with developing STUDENT’s IEP. (See Cal. Educ. Code § 48200; Cal. Educ. Code § 56028(a); 34 C.F.R. § 300.20.) Hence, the District’s decision to continue the February 28 meeting to a later date to allow time to resolve these issues was entirely reasonable and did not constitute a procedural violation.

Therefore, the District’s failure to complete the IEP meeting on February 28, 2005, did not violate any procedural protections, and hence the failure to make a clear written offer on that date was not a procedural denial of FAPE.

(3) Is the District required to prospectively place STUDENT at YouthCare, a certified nonpublic school in Utah?

As discussed above under Issue 2, at the time of the April 2005 hearing, SBCBH was in the process of conducting an AB2726 mental health assessment of STUDENT. SBCBH contended that it received the parent’s signed consent to this assessment on April 8, 2005. Using that date, the resulting IEP meeting to discuss the assessment results would likely have occurred by the end of May 2005. (See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 60045(d).) As this Decision explained under Issue 2, the Hearing Officer has not examined whether the District’s proposed SDC placement in combination with SBCBH’s offer constitutes an offer of FAPE. Hence, this Decision’s finding that the District failed to offer FAPE only pertains to the time period from March 18, 2005, until the time of SBCBH’s offer, which would likely have been made by the end of May 2005. In light of these circumstances, the issue of prospective placement beyond the date of SBCBH’s offer is not ripe, and therefore Petitioner’s request for an order of prospective placement at YouthCare is denied at this time. Should Petitioner disagree with the new IEP offer by SBCBH and the District, Petitioner may pursue that claim under a separate due process proceeding.

(4) Is STUDENT’s mother entitled to reimbursement for services she provided STUDENT, as follows:

(a) residential placement and related transportation expenses for STUDENT’s attendance at Copper Canyon Academy in Arizona;

Parents may be entitled to reimbursement for the costs of placement or services they have procured for their child when the school district has failed to provide a FAPE and the private placement or services were appropriate under the IDEA and replaced services that the school district failed to provide. (20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C); School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Education (1985) 471 U.S. 359, 369-370, 105 S.Ct. 2003; Student W. v. Puyallup School District, 31 F.3d 1489, 1496 (9th Cir. 1994).)

In addition, equitable considerations may be considered in granting relief, and courts have broad discretion in granting relief. (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370; Student W. at 1496.) Factors to be considered in determining whether full or partial reimbursement is appropriate include: the existence of other more suitable placements; the effort expended by the parent; and the cooperativeness of the school district and the parent. (W.G., 960 F.2d at 1486; Alamo Heights, 790 F.2d at 1161.)

In the present case, STUDENT attended Copper Canyon from September to December 2004. This Decision denied Petitioner’s claims regarding that time period and prior to that time period. Because the only denial of FAPE occurred from March to May 2005, there is no basis for an award of reimbursement for any placement occurring prior to that denial.

Furthermore, to warrant reimbursement, the parents’ placement must be proper under the IDEA. The Burlington rule of reimbursement is not so narrow as to permit reimbursement only when the placement or services chosen by the parent are found to be the exact proper placement or services required under the IDEA. (Alamo Heights Independent School District v. State Board of Education, 790 F.2d 1153, 1161 (5th Cir. 1986).) However, the parent’s placement still must meet certain basic requirements of the IDEA, such as the requirement that the placement addresses the child’s needs and provides him with educational benefit. (Florence County School District Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13-14, 114 S.Ct. 361 (1993); Alamo Heights, supra at 1161.)

Although not the basis for denying reimbursement, the Hearing Officer notes that according to both parties, the Copper Canyon placement did not meet STUDENT’s needs and did not provide educational benefit. For example, MOTHER testified that STUDENT’s Copper Canyon grades indicated a lack of educational benefit from that placement, and Petitioner’s closing brief argues that “the only progress STUDENT has made has been at YouthCare.” Therefore, even if this Decision had found a denial of FAPE during or before STUDENT’s attendance at Copper Canyon, MOTHER would likely not be entitled to reimbursement because there is no evidence that the placement met the minimum requirements for appropriateness of a parent’s unilateral placement.

(b) residential placement and related transportation expenses for STUDENT’s attendance at YouthCare;

STUDENT’s mother seeks reimbursement for STUDENT’s placement and related transportation expenses for STUDENT’s attendance at YouthCare. STUDENT traveled to Utah and began attending YouthCare on December 19, 2004, and has remained there since that date.

As discussed above, this Decision found that the District denied STUDENT a FAPE beginning on March 18, 2005. Because a new offer from SBCBH may change the LEAs’ proposed offer, this Decision determined only whether the District had offered a FAPE prior to the date of the IEP meeting regarding SBCBH’s mental health assessment, and did not consider any denial of FAPE claim beyond the actual date of that IEP meeting, which should have occurred on or before May 28, 2005.

Hence, this Decision may award reimbursement only for the costs of STUDENT’s placement during the period from March 18, 2005, until the actual date that SBCBH and the District convened the new IEP meeting in or about May 2005. Such reimbursement would be designed to reimburse MOTHER for the services she provided STUDENT during the period that the District failed to offer STUDENT a FAPE.

Given these circumstances, the parent’s request for reimbursement for related transportation expenses is denied. STUDENT traveled to YouthCare on December 19, 2004, months before the denial of FAPE began on March 18, 2005. STUDENT’s placement at YouthCare in December 2004 was entirely unrelated to the subsequent denial of FAPE is spring 2005. Given that the District was not responsible for STUDENT’s placement at YouthCare in December 2004, it was likewise not responsible for returning her to Yucaipa. Because the costs of transporting STUDENT to YouthCare and returning her back to Yucaipa are not due to the District’s denial of FAPE, STUDENT’s mother is not entitled to reimbursement by the District for those transportation costs.

Petitioner also seeks reimbursement for transportation expenses to visit STUDENT in Utah. There is no question that STUDENT and her mother need to participate in family therapy, although the evidence did not establish to what extent MOTHER needed to personally visit STUDENT to facilitate this therapy; in contrast, STUDENT’s father participated in family therapy by telephone only. In any event, while MOTHER testified that she had visited STUDENT in Utah twice and had a third trip scheduled, there was no evidence regarding whether these trips took place during the relevant time period for reimbursement that began on March 18, 2005. Additionally, despite the Hearing Officer’s repeated instructions to Petitioner’s advocates to provide evidence, such as receipts or invoices, for all items for which Petitioner sought reimbursement, Petitioner did not submit any documentary or testimonial evidence to establish what MOTHER’s reasonable transportation expenses were. For all of these reasons, Petitioner’s request for reimbursement for MOTHER’s transportation expenses to Utah is denied. Next this Decision will consider reimbursement for the tuition and other fees charged by YouthCare beginning on March 18, 2005. While a parent’s unilateral placement need not be an exact proper placement under the IDEA, the placement nevertheless must have met the child’s needs and provided educational benefit. (Florence v. Carter, supra at 13-14; Alamo Heights, supra at 1161.)

The evidence established that, to the extent required for a parent’s unilateral placement, YouthCare was an appropriate placement. YouthCare is a residential treatment center that currently serves approximately thirty students. YouthCare consists of a small, structured community where the students receive therapy sessions, weekly psychiatric sessions, academics for six hours per day, and an intensive behavioral component, including a level system wherein students earn greater privileges as they move up to the higher levels. (Testimony of Ms. Wisham, Dr. Tillotson; Pet. Exh. 7.) Students receive weekly treatment updates and progress reports regarding their progress in therapy, academics and the residential milieu. (Testimony of Ms. Wisham; Pet. Exh. 23.)

The facility has a small teacher-to-student ratio of one to four. YouthCare staff include teachers, residential advisors, therapists, a psychiatrist and a special education coordinator who supervises implementation of special education programs and modifications for students with IEPs. Academic classes are conducted in small groups of four to six students. YouthCare admits students who have previously been unsuccessful in high school and who require therapy and a structured residential placement. Eligibility for special education is not a requirement, although approximately forty percent of YouthCare students have IEPs from their respective public school districts. (Testimony of Ms. Wisham.)

As detailed previously in this Decision, STUDENT had significant behavioral and emotional problems and needed a small, structured environment with behavioral supports, consistency, and a therapeutic component. Given STUDENT’s prior history of truancy, her program needed to have supports in place that would ensure her attendance.

The structure, consistency, small teacher-to-student ratio, academic assistance, intensive therapy, and behavioral supports that STUDENT received at YouthCare all addressed her unique needs and have resulted in some educational benefit. (See testimony of Ms. Wisham, Dr. Tillotson; Dist. Exh. 10.) YouthCare therapist Dr. Suzanna Tillotson and academic director Lisa Wisham testified that, while STUDENT still has significant needs, she has demonstrated improvement while at YouthCare. Ms. Wisham described how initially STUDENT was verbally aggressive towards staff and towards her mother over the telephone, but has since developed coping skills to replace many of her “acting out” behaviors. Ms. Wisham explained that, due to STUDENT’s work in therapy, school, and behaviorally, she is better able to regulate her emotions, which has improved her ability to think clearly.

Moreover, YouthCare’s structure and behavioral requirements address STUDENT’s truancy problems. Ms. Wisham explained that the YouthCare homeroom teachers take daily class attendance, and non-attendance causes the student to lose points on the level system. Losing points on the level system causes a student to fall to a lower level, which results in restrictions and loss of privileges twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. (Footnote 12) As a result, STUDENT has attended school regularly at YouthCare and has earned grades of As, Bs, and Cs.

The District argued that the YouthCare placement is far more restrictive than STUDENT requires and is not in the LRE. As noted above, a parent’s unilateral placement need not comply with the LRE requirement, and the failure to provide a placement in the LRE is not ground to deny reimbursement. Thus, because the YouthCare placement was appropriate for STUDENT, MOTHER is entitled to reimbursement for the time period beginning when the District denied STUDENT a FAPE on March 18, 2005, until SBCBH offered the results of its mental health assessment on or about May 2005.

Next, the District contended that MOTHER is not entitled to reimbursement for the YouthCare placement because she did not provide the required ten-day notice of the unilateral placement. The District argued that it did not receive notice of STUDENT’s placement at a residential treatment center until February 2005. Reimbursement paid to a parent of a child with a disability for costs of a private school may be reduced or denied if the parent fails to do one of the following:

(aa) at the most recent IEP meeting that the parents attended prior to removal of the child from the public school, the parents did not inform the IEP Team that they were rejecting the placement proposed by the public agency to provide a free appropriate public education to their child, including stating their concerns and their intent to enroll their child in a private school at public expense; or (bb)10 business days (including any holidays that occur on a business day) prior to the removal of the child from the public school, the parents did not give written notice to the public agency of the information described in (aa).”

(20 U.S.C. § 1412 (a)(10)(C)(iii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.403(d)(1)(i); see Cal. Educ. Code § 56276.)

In the present matter, there is no basis for reduction or denial of reimbursement on these grounds because neither of the conditions described in the statute apply in this case. In the months prior to her placement at Copper Canyon, and later at YouthCare, STUDENT had not yet been found eligible for special education and was not attending public school in the District. Thus, MOTHER could not have complied with subsection (aa) because, at the time of STUDENT’s placement at the residential treatment centers, there were no IEP meetings and no placement had been proposed by the public agency. Similarly, MOTHER could not have complied with subsection (bb) because STUDENT was not attending public school prior to her placement at the residential treatment center. Moreover, the District knew of STUDENT’s placement at YouthCare at least ten days prior to the first IEP meeting on February 28, 2005, so the District had sufficient notice of the placement prior to the first IEP meeting.

Regarding equitable considerations, the Hearing Officer finds no evidence warranting limitation of the reimbursement. (See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374; Alamo Heights, 790 F.2d at 1161.) MOTHER’s testimony indicated that she had expended effort in locating a placement for STUDENT, and both MOTHER and the District were cooperative with one another.

Finally, the District argued that its reimbursement obligation is limited to the educational component of the placement and initial transportation costs, while the mental health agency would be responsible for paying the remaining costs of a residential placement. No interagency agreement between the District and SBCBH was admitted into evidence. (Footnote 13) Moreover, the District remains ultimately responsible for making a complete FAPE available to STUDENT. (20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(12)(B)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.142(b)(2); Cal. Educ. Code § 56340.) Given that obligation, the District may be held responsible for the entire reimbursement owed to MOTHER. The invoices Petitioner submitted into evidence indicate that the cost of YouthCare was $407 per day; for example, for the 30 days of April 2005, the total cost of YouthCare was $12,210, while the 31 days of May 2005 cost $12,617. (Pet. Exh. 29, 30.)

Accordingly, the District shall reimburse MOTHER for the cost of STUDENT’s attendance at YouthCare from March 18, 2005, until SBCBH presented the results of its AB2726 mental health assessment at an IEP meeting that likely occurred in or about May 2005. As stated above, this reimbursement does not include any transportation costs. As also discussed above, because the results of the AB2726 mental health assessment may have resulted in a new offer of placement and/or services, the Hearing Officer has no way of knowing if the denial of FAPE that began on March 18 continued or terminated once SBCBH presented the assessment results at the IEP meeting. Any denial of FAPE claim after the date of that IEP meeting is a separate issue, not resolved herein, but which may be pursued in a separate due process proceeding if needed.

(c) counseling at Vista Guidance Center?

STUDENT received counseling at Vista Guidance Center in 2004, long before the denial of FAPE began on March 18, 2005. Because the only denial of FAPE occurred from March to May 2005, there is no basis for an award of reimbursement for any placement or services occurring prior to that denial.

ORDER

1. Within twenty-five calendar days of the date of this Decision, the District shall reimburse MOTHER for the costs of STUDENT’s attendance at YouthCare from March 18, 2005, until the date of SBCBH’s review of the AB2726 mental health assessment at an IEP meeting, which meeting likely occurred in or about May 2005. Pursuant to the YouthCare invoices admitted into evidence, reimbursement for that time period shall be in the amount of $407 per day.

2. All of Petitioner’s other requests for relief are denied.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to California Education Code section 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this requirement:

(1) From September 2003 to December 2004, did the District meet its obligation to search and serve STUDENT pursuant to “child find” requirements?

The District prevailed on this issue.

(2) Did the District offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 2004-2005 school year?

The District prevailed on this issue for the time period prior to March 18, 2005. Petitioner prevailed on this issue for the time period from March 18, 2005, until the date of the IEP meeting for review of SBCBH’s assessment results, which meeting likely occurred in or about May 2005. This Decision did not reach the issue of whether FAPE was offered at or subsequent to that IEP meeting.

(3) Is the District required to prospectively place STUDENT at YouthCare, a certified nonpublic school in Utah?

The District prevailed on this issue.

(4) Is STUDENT’s mother entitled to reimbursement for services she provided STUDENT, as follows:

(a) residential placement and related transportation expenses for STUDENT’s attendance at Copper Canyon Academy in Arizona;

The District prevailed on this sub-issue.

(b) residential placement and related transportation expenses for STUDENT’s attendance at YouthCare;

The District prevailed on this sub-issue for the time period prior to March 18, 2005, and for all related transportation expenses. The Student prevailed on this sub-issue for the time period from March 18, 2005, until the date of the IEP meeting for review of SBCBH’s assessment results, which occurred on or about May 2005. This Decision did not reach the issue of reimbursement for the time period after that May 2005 IEP meeting.

(c) counseling at Vista Guidance Center?

The District prevailed on this sub-issue.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety calendar days of receipt of this Decision. (Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i).)

Dated: June 24, 2005 ___________________________________ Suzanne B. Brown, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

1 This footnote has been redacted to protect the privacy of the student and her family.

2 The Hearing Officer noted that SBCBH’s dismissal from the present case did not bar Petitioner from filing for due process against SBCBH in the future, should any ripe issues arise.

3 MOTHER testified that she moved back to Yucaipa in April 2002. STUDENT continued to reside with her father, FATHER.

4 Yucaipa Guidance Center has since been renamed Vista Guidance Center. (Testimony of Cathy Proffitt Allison, MOTHER.)

5 Shortly after this date, the District offices closed for winter holiday vacation. School resumed on January 3, 2005.

6 Ms. Metheny sent the letter to an address on ADDRESS in Yucaipa, which was the residence of FATHER and STUDENT’s last address of record with the District. For this reason, MOTHER did not initially receive the letter that Ms. Metheny sent.

7 Moreover, as discussed further below, the results of the District’s psychoeducational assessment were not inconsistent with the results of Dr. Carey’s psychological evaluation. Rather, Ms. Neumann’s assessment was simply narrower and more limited, because she conducted an educational assessment pursuant to California Education Code section 56320, et. seq.. In contrast, Dr. Carey’s evaluation did not consider whether STUDENT was eligible for special education under California and/or federal law, but included topics that Ms. Neumann’s evaluation did not cover, such as DSM-IV diagnoses and whether STUDENT needed a residential placement.

8 The fifth characteristic which may constitute the basis for eligibility under the category of ED is “an inability to learn which cannot be explained by intellectual, sensory, or health factors.” (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(i).)

9 Assuming that the fifty-day assessment timeline began running on April 8, 2005, as SBCBH contended on the first day of hearing, the IEP meeting would have convened on or before May 28, 2005.

10 Prior to the continuance of the February 28 IEP meeting, Petitioner’s advocate, Jillian Bonnington, walked out of the meeting in protest, before any placement or goals and objectives had been proposed. (Dist. Exh. 15, p. 156.)

11 Petitioner did not allege that the failure to complete the IEP by February 28 violated Education Code section 56344’s fifty-day timeline for conducting the assessment and developing an appropriate IEP, and therefore this Decision does not analyze that claim. However, even if Petitioner had raised such a contention, it would be unlikely to prevail, given the District’s legitimate need to determine residency and custody matters prior to developing the IEP.

12 The level system affects nearly every aspect of the students’ lives while they reside at YouthCare, from the activities they can participate in to whether they can leave the campus. (Testimony of Ms. Wisham, Dr. Tillotson.) In comparison, while the level system in the YHS SDC may nevertheless be effective, the loss of points on that system would not affect STUDENT outside of her school day and would thus likely be less meaningful to her.

13 In any event, this Decision could not order SBCBH to pay costs because it is not a current party to this proceeding. Notably, the District did not oppose SBCBH’s dismissal. Even if the District and SBCBH have a dispute regarding the reimbursement awarded against the District in this Decision, the agencies may resolve that issue between themselves or use the inter-agency dispute resolution procedures. (See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 60600 et seq.)