California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · October 10, 2003

Student v. Anaheim City School District

SEHO Case No. SN 577-03 · Hearing Officer Van T. Vu

Anaheim City School District prevails as Hearing Officer denies all relief on procedural, assessment, and FAPE claims for 2000–2003.

Split decision: student prevailed on 1 of 27 issues

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Noted in the decision

A footnote states the decision was amended to correct the hearing dates; the changes do not affect its substance.

Summary

A 12-year-old student filed for due process against Anaheim City School District. He challenged his education from March 2000 through the 2002-2003 school year, when he finished sixth grade at Sunkist Elementary School. He was eligible under other health impairment because of agenesis of the corpus callosum, a congenital brain condition. Earlier, he had been eligible for autistic-like behaviors and a specific learning disability. The family raised eight procedural claims, many assessment claims, and claims that his programs denied a FAPE. They sought reimbursement for Dr. Lynn Paul's private neuropsychological evaluation, new assessments, and a year of services from the Reading and Language Center.

Hearing Officer Van T. Vu found two procedural flaws. The August 2000 IEP did not say how long therapy and assistive technology consultations would last, and a 2002 IEP meeting was held four days late. Neither caused harm, so neither denied FAPE. The district offered a neuropsychological assessment several times. The parents refused consent unless Dr. Paul did it, and the district did not have to accept that condition. The Hearing Officer upheld the district's assessments and its decision to end direct occupational therapy. The 2001 language goals were not measurable, but this did no harm, and the student made progress each year. The district did not prove it provided two weekly speech sessions after the May 2003 IEP. The record was too thin to support a remedy, so all relief was denied.

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Why it matters

This decision shows how SEHO handled parents who refused consent to a district neuropsychological assessment unless their chosen private expert did it. Because the district could choose a qualified assessor, its repeated offers defeated the claim that it failed to assess. The parents' reimbursement request for the private evaluation was also denied. Procedural flaws without proven harm did not deny FAPE.

Issues and holdings

  1. Procedural violation, no denial of FAPEIEP content

    Issue I.A. Failing to indicate duration of occupational therapy/physical therapy and assistive technology services in the August 17, 2000 IEP

    The IEP omitted how long the services would last, but the services were provided, the parent consented, and no harm was shown.

  2. Procedural violation, no denial of FAPEIEP procedure

    Issue I.B. Failure to conduct IEP meetings within statutory timelines (50-day post-assessment IEP; annual IEP due July 2002)

    The post-assessment IEP was held four days late with no harm shown; the parent agreed to move the annual IEP to September 2002, so that delay was not improper.

  3. District prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue I.C. Failure to respond to parents' request for information on qualifications of District neuropsychologist Dr. Proud

    No law required the district to provide the assessor's curriculum vitae; the district decides who is competent to assess.

  4. District prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue I.D. Failure to include parent comments and concerns in the September 2002 IEP

    The parent's notes and documents were attached to the IEP before the meeting ended, so there was no harm.

  5. District prevailedAssessment

    Issue I.E. Failing to obtain parental consent to conduct the SCAN assessment in October 2002

    The September 2002 assessment plan the mother signed listed the SCAN, so the second SCAN was given with consent.

  6. District prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue I.F. Failure to document the November 5, 2002 IEP meeting

    The November meeting continued the September 2002 IEP, which contained all required parts, and the meeting was documented in agenda and notes.

  7. District prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue I.G. Failure to ensure attendance of appropriate persons at IEP meetings and to consider independent evaluations obtained by parents

    The district had to ensure only the required team members attended; qualified staff reviewed the private reports, and the team considered them.

  8. District prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue I.H. Failure to provide prior written notice of refusal of multisensory teaching, refusal of neuropsychological assessment, and changes of eligibility category

    Multisensory teaching was already provided, the assessment was offered rather than refused, and requesting consent at IEP meetings satisfied the notice requirement for eligibility changes.

  9. District prevailedAssessment

    Issue II.A. District's January 2000, August 2000, and September/October 2002 OT assessment reports make inappropriate findings and recommendations

    Disagreeing with the assessors' professional recommendations does not make an assessment inappropriate.

  10. District prevailedAssessment

    Issue II.B. OT assessment necessary prior to discontinuation of direct OT services in August 2000

    No law requires an assessment before ending OT, and the therapist's progress report supported ending direct services.

  11. District prevailedAssessment

    Issue II.C.1. Failure to assess in areas of gross and fine motor abilities after November 2000 AT screening

    Recent private and district motor assessments were current, and the AT screening raised no new concerns.

  12. District prevailedAssessment

    Issue II.C.2. Failure to assess receptive vocabulary in July 2000 speech and language assessment

    The district gave the PPVT-III, which assesses receptive vocabulary.

  13. District prevailedAssessment

    Issue II.C.3. Failure to conduct speech and language assessment in July 2001

    A speech-language assessment had been done a year earlier, and nothing showed conditions warranted another.

  14. District prevailedAssessment

    Issue II.C.4. Failure to assess in areas of central auditory processing and memory

    The CTOPP, TAPS, SCAN-C, and audiology testing assessed auditory processing; services also addressed the weaknesses found.

  15. District prevailedAssessment

    Issue II.C.5. Failure to conduct visual spatial assessment

    No evidence showed a visual spatial need that would trigger an assessment.

  16. District prevailedAssessment

    Issue II.C.6. Failure to conduct adapted keyboard assessment recommended by April 2002 private OT report

    A keyboard assessment had been done in fall 2000; the student's hand use was functional and his typing speed was average, so another was not needed.

  17. District prevailedAssessment

    Issue II.D. Failure to conduct neuropsychological assessment

    The district offered the assessment several times, but the parents refused consent unless their chosen private psychologist did it.

  18. Issue III.A. FAPE from March 2000 through the end of the 1999-2000 school year

    The student made no specific substantive claim for this period, so the Hearing Officer did not address it.

  19. District prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue III.B. FAPE for 2000-2001 school year (direct OT services, August 2000 goals, conformity with IEP)

    Direct OT was not needed after the student's progress, the goals were measurable, the student gained some benefit, and OT consultation was provided.

  20. Procedural violation, no denial of FAPEIEP content

    Issue III.C. FAPE for 2001-2002 school year (hand-strengthening program, July 2001 goals, benefit, conformity with IEP)

    The language and communication goals were not measurable as written, but this caused no harm; a hand-strengthening program was not needed, and the student made progress.

  21. District prevailedIEP content

    Issue III.D.1. 2002-2003: whether September 2002 and May 2003 IEPs were designed to meet unique needs (goals measurability, missing goal areas)

    The goals were clear, measurable, and based on assessment data; the student did not show needs in the other areas he raised.

  22. District prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue III.D.2. 2002-2003: whether the offered programs were calculated to provide some educational benefit

    The September 2002 offer was reasonably calculated to provide benefit, and the student made progress under the May 2003 IEP.

  23. Student prevailedImplementation

    Issue III.D.3. 2002-2003: whether District provided speech and language services agreed to in May 2003 IEP

    The district did not carry its burden to prove it gave the two weekly speech sessions after May 2003, but the record was too thin to support a compensatory remedy.

  24. Issue IV.A. Reimbursement for the cost of the independent evaluation conducted by Dr. Lynn Paul

    The district's assessments were appropriate, so no reimbursement was owed.

  25. District prevailedAssessment

    Issue IV.B. Order requiring District to assess need for assistive technology and in sensory integration, speech and language, central auditory processing, and vision development

    The student had been appropriately assessed, so no order to assess was warranted.

  26. District prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue IV.C. One year of unspecified compensatory education

    No unassessed areas of need existed to compensate, so the request was denied.

  27. District prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue IV.D. Intensive services for one year from the Reading and Language Center, a nonpublic agency

    The Hearing Officer found the district provided FAPE, so no compensatory nonpublic agency services were ordered.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • All of Petitioner's claims for relief are denied.

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Key authorities

Rowley; W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist.; Gregory K. v. Longview School District; Ms. S. v. Vashon Island Sch. Dist.; Adams v. Oregon; Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School District; Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm.; Walczak v. Florida Union Free School District; Houston Independent Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R.; Mrs. B. v. Milford Board of Education; Andress v. Cleveland Independent School District

People named in the decision

  • Sherry Blakely, director of special education, Anaheim City School District
  • Dr. Susan Burnett, educational advocate for Student; licensed clinical psychologist, Student
  • William Marquis, attorney present on Student's behalf, Student
  • Michele Herkimer, physical therapist providing assistive technology consultation, Anaheim City School District
  • Lynn Gold, speech and language pathologist, Anaheim City School District
  • Lori Ebright, resource specialist teacher, Anaheim City School District
  • Charles Rogers, II, regular education teacher, Anaheim City School District
  • Dr. Lynn Paul, licensed clinical psychologist; private neuropsychological evaluator, Private
  • Milton Irvine, school psychologist; licensed educational psychologist, Anaheim City School District
  • Rene Sorrentino, licensed child therapist; witness for Student
  • Barbara Pliha, licensed speech pathologist and special education teacher, Reading and Language Center (nonpublic agency)
  • Aarti Shah, occupational therapist; private OT assessor, Orange County Therapy Services
  • Julie Bissell, coordinator of occupational therapy and physical therapy, Anaheim City School District
  • Kelly King, curriculum specialist, Anaheim City School District
  • Sarah Flores, school nurse, Anaheim City School District
  • Christine Fletcher, District employee who facilitated part of the September 2002 IEP meeting, Anaheim City School District
  • Dr. Proud, District neuropsychologist proposed to assess, Anaheim City School District
  • Rima Arsenault, occupational therapist, Anaheim City School District
  • Ms. Knox, fifth grade general education teacher, Anaheim City School District
  • Dr. Muhonen, pediatric neurologist who diagnosed ACC, Private
  • Dr. Iverson, psychologist who assessed Student in 1999, Private
  • Reading and Language Center, nonpublic agency (requested provider)
  • Orange County Therapy Services, private occupational therapy provider

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Van T. Vu, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), University of the Pacific’s McGeorge School of Law, in Anaheim, California, on July 29-31, and August 1 and 4, 2003.

Petitioner STUDENT (Petitioner or STUDENT) was represented at the hearing by attorney Tania Whiteleather. Also present on his behalf were MOTHER, STUDENT’s mother; educational advocate Dr. Susan Burnett; and attorney William Marquis. Respondent Anaheim City School District (District) was represented at the hearing by attorney Lauri Lafoe from the law firm of Lozano Smith. Special education director Sherry Blakely was also present on the District’s behalf.

The Petitioner called the following witnesses to testify at the hearing: Michele Herkimer, physical therapist; Lynn Gold, speech and language specialist; Lori Ebright, resource specialist teacher; Charles Rogers, II, regular education teacher; Lynn Paul, licensed clinical psychologist; Milton Irvine, school psychologist; Rene Sorrentino, licensed child therapist; Barbara Pliha, licensed speech pathologist and special education teacher for the Reading and Language Center; and Aarti Shah, occupational therapist for the County of Orange. MOTHER and Dr. Barnett also testified on STUDENT’s behalf.

The District called as witnesses: Julie Bissell, coordinator of occupational therapy and physical therapy; Kelly King, curriculum specialist; and Sherry Blakely, the director of special education.

Oral and documentary evidence was received and the record was left open for the submission of written closing arguments. The closing briefs were received on August 18, 2003. The record was closed and the matter was submitted for decision.

ISSUES (Footnote 2)

I. Did the District commit procedural violations from March 2000 through the end of the 2002-2003 school year that resulted in a denial of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to STUDENT?

II. Did the District appropriately assess STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability from March 2000 through the end of the 2002-2003 school year?

III. Did the District provide STUDENT a FAPE from March 2000 through the 2002-2003 school year?

IV. Is STUDENT entitled to the following remedies:

A. Reimbursement for the cost of the independent evaluation conducted by Dr. Lynn Paul; B. Intensive services for one year from the Reading and Language Center, a nonpublic agency; C. An order requiring the District to assess STUDENT’s need for assistive technology and in the areas of sensory integration, speech and language development, central auditory processing, and vision development; and D. Compensatory education?

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

STUDENT is a twelve-year-old seventh-grader who has been eligible for special education and related services since August 1997, when he was in the first grade. Although he was initially eligible for special education services due to his autistic-like behaviors, STUDENT has subsequently also been identified as having a specific learning disability and an other health impairment. STUDENT is currently eligible for special education as having an other health impairment due to his diagnosis of agenesis of the corpus callosum (ACC). (Footnote 3) Additionally, STUDENT has been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactive disorder (ADHD), and he has a congenital deformity in his right hand in which two of his fingers were attached and that required surgical separation. (Footnote 4) STUDENT entered the Anaheim Union High School District as a seventh-grader during the fall of 2003.

During all time periods at issue in this hearing, STUDENT attended school at Sunkist Elementary School within the Anaheim City School District. STUDENT entered the fourth grade at the beginning of the 1999-2000 school year. According to his December 1999 IEP, STUDENT had difficulty with communication, written language, and motor planning on verbal command. As of March 2000, STUDENT attended general education classes for part of his school day, and he received ninety minutes per day of resource specialist program services the remainder of his day. (Pet. Exhs. Q and S.) Additionally, STUDENT received speech and language and occupational therapy each, twice per week for thirty-minute sessions, and occupational therapy consultation to the classroom one time per week for thirty minutes. Moreover, STUDENT received assistive technology in the form of a keyboard and word processor.

During July and August 2000, STUDENT’s triennial evaluation was completed. His triennial evaluation included an educational assessment, an occupational therapy and physical therapy assessment, a medical summary, and a speech and language assessment. (Pet. Exhs. U and V, Dist. Exhs. 11-14.) On August 17, 2000, STUDENT’s IEP team convened to review his triennial evaluation. At that meeting, STUDENT’s speech and language services were reduced to one thirty-minute session per week, his direct occupational therapy services were discontinued, and his occupational therapy consultation was reduced to one time per month. Additionally, STUDENT’s IEP called for services from an assistive technology specialist one time per month. STUDENT’s mother consented to the implementation of the IEP.

On November 1, 2000, STUDENT’s IEP team convened, at the request of MOTHER, to discuss her concerns regarding STUDENT’s medications schedule at school and about classroom management techniques. At that meeting, the school nurse agreed to “provide rating scales to better evaluate” the effectiveness of STUDENT’s medications. STUDENT’s parents also presented to the team a list of guidelines from Dr. Iverson, a psychologist who assessed STUDENT in 1999, regarding instructional strategies to implement with STUDENT. Additionally, MOTHER signed the IEP addendum, affirming her consent to STUDENT’s placement and services as previously set forth in the August 2000 IEP.

The next time STUDENT’s IEP team convened was on July 26, 2001. (Pet. Exh. Z.) At that IEP meeting, the team agreed to place STUDENT in a general education classroom for 1450 minutes per week and to provide him resource specialist program services for 180 minutes per week and speech and language services twice per week for a total of 60 minutes. STUDENT’s IEP team convened again four days later to discuss the provision of assistive technology, his behavioral interventions, and his fine motor skills. The team agreed that STUDENT would be provided with modified pencil grips for handwriting, an AlphaSmart word processor to complete longer writing assignments, typing software for his computer, and assistive technology consultation services as needed. Additionally, the team agreed to provide “daily journaling,” apparently to monitor STUDENT’s work completion.

On January 7, 2002, STUDENT’s IEP team convened again, at the request of the PARENTS, to discuss STUDENT’s homework and classroom assignment completion. According to the IEP notes, MOTHER was frustrated that STUDENT’s homework was not being sent home. After discussing strategies to improve his work completion, the IEP team agreed that a homework folder and homework chart would be maintained, that peers would assist STUDENT in ensuring that his homework assignments were written down and placed in his homework folder, and that he would receive a set of text books for home use.

In April 2002, the PARENTS obtained a private occupational therapy assessment from the Orange County Therapy Services to assess STUDENT’s use of adaptive keyboards and computers for school. Occupational therapist Aarti Shah conducted the assessment. Ms. Shah found that STUDENT was within normal limits in muscle tone, fine motor control, and daily living skills. Having no expertise in the assessment of adapted keyboard use, Ms. Shah referred STUDENT to the District to obtain the assessment. Additionally, Ms. Shah recommended a hand strengthening program for STUDENT to be implemented in his home.

On June 14, 2002, STUDENT was given an academic assessment pursuant to a request for the assessment from MOTHER. As part of the assessment, STUDENT was given the Woodcock Johnson Revised, the San Diego Quick, and the Classroom Reading Inventory. STUDENT’s assessments indicated that STUDENT’s academic achievement generally fell within the average to low average range, with the exception of writing and dictation, which were well below average.

On July 11, 2002, STUDENT’s RSP teacher, Lori Ebright, wrote the PARENTS a letter requesting permission to increase STUDENT’s RSP services from 180 minutes per week to 420 minutes per week. According to Ms. Ebright, the increase in RSP services was geared toward accelerating STUDENT’s academic growth. Ms. Ebright testified that MOTHER consented to the implementation of the additional services.

On September 5, 2002, in anticipation of STUDENT’s annual IEP meeting, STUDENT’s educational advocate, Dr. Susan Burnett, wrote the District to inform the District that STUDENT recently had been diagnosed by Dr. Muhonen, a pediatric neurologist, with agenesis of the corpus callosum. Dr. Burnett requested that the District ensure the attendance at the IEP meeting of “professionals who are knowledgeable in developing appropriate interventions for a child like” STUDENT. Additionally, Dr. Burnett attached to her letter a copy of Dr. Muhonen’s report. In light of the information provided by Dr. Burnett, and to prepare for STUDENT’s IEP meeting, school nurse Sarah Flores called Dr. Muhonen’s office to discuss his report. Additionally Lori Ebright researched ACC on the internet and made copies of the information she discovered for the IEP team.

STUDENT’s annual IEP meeting convened on September 12, 2002. MOTHER attended the IEP meeting with her educational advocate, Dr. Susan Burnett. During the course of the meeting, the team discussed STUDENT’s needs, progress, and new diagnosis of ACC. The District offered STUDENT for the 2002-2003 school year a regular education placement with 540 minutes per week of RSP services and one thirty-minute session of speech and language services per week. The District also offered from September 12 through October 25 five two-hour sessions of speech and language instruction through the use of the Fast ForWord program. Although MOTHER never signed the IEP consenting to the implementation of the IEP, Ms. Gold testified that MOTHER consented to the implementation of the Fast Forward program.

Also during the meeting, Dr. Burnett requested additional educational assessments of STUDENT. In response, the District developed an assessment plan requesting consent to assess in the areas of academic/preacademic achievement, psychomotor development, language/speech/communication development, health/adaptive behavior, development/health, and an alternative assessment. Although Dr. Burnett requested, and the District agreed to conduct, a neuropsychological assessment of STUDENT, the PARENTS refused consent for the District to conduct the assessment by anyone but private clinical psychologist Dr. Lynn Paul. MOTHER and Dr. Burnett indicated that Dr. Paul was an expert in ACC. Additionally, Dr. Burnett requested that the District provide her with the curriculum vitae of its neuropsychologist, Dr. Proud, before the PARENTS would provide consent. This information was never provided. The IEP team was then continued pending the completion of the District’s assessments.

The District’s academic, occupational/physical therapy, speech and language, and assistive technology assessments were completed during September and October 2002. Because the District did not have permission to conduct the neuropsychological assessment, the District wrote letters to the PARENTS on October 4 and October 16, 2002, again requesting their consent. Additionally, the District was unable to obtain the Test of Oral Reading Fluency that was requested by Dr. Burnett, and it requested permission to substitute for that test the Gray Oral Reading Test. The consent the District requested was never provided. The District never conducted the neuropsychological assessment, but conducted the Gray Oral Reading Test as part of its speech and language assessment. At about the same time, the PARENTS obtained a private neuropsychological assessment from Dr. Paul during the latter part of September 2002.

After various scheduling problems, STUDENT’s IEP team reconvened on November 5, 2002. At that meeting, the team discussed the District’s assessments. MOTHER and Dr. Burnett also informed the team that Dr. Paul’s assessment was completed but the report was not yet given to MOTHER. Eventually, the team agreed to continue the IEP meeting again, pending the release of the assessment report from Dr. Paul. Although Dr. Paul completed a draft of her report by December 2002, a final version of the report was not provided to the PARENTS until the spring of 2003. In the meantime, the PARENTS requested from the Hearing Office on March 24, 2003, a special education due process hearing in order to resolve disputes pertaining to STUDENT’s education. Due to difficulties with scheduling, STUDENT’s IEP team did not reconvene until May 16, 2003. (Footnote 5)

The May IEP meeting was also attended by representatives from the Anaheim Union High School. The expanded IEP team again reviewed STUDENT’s progress and needs and discussed Dr. Paul’s assessment report. At that meeting, the District offered for the remainder of the 2002-2003 school year placement in special education for part of his school day with 480 minutes per week of RSP support. Additionally, the District offered STUDENT two thirty-minute sessions per week of speech and language therapy and five two-hour sessions per week of instruction in the Fast ForWord Program. MOTHER consented to the implementation of the IEP “as written,” but disagreed with the wording of some of the goals and objectives. The team also made recommendations regarding STUDENT’s placement in the seventh grade for the 2003-2004 school year at the high school district.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I. Did the District commit procedural violations between March 2000 through the end of the 2002-2003 school year that resulted in a denial of a FAPE to STUDENT?

Under both state law and the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), students with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). 20 U.S.C. § 1400; Education Code § 56000. The term Afree appropriate public education@ means special education and related services that are available to the student at no charge to the parent or guardian, that meet the State educational standards, and that conform with the student=s individualized educational program (IEP). 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(8).

The right to a FAPE also includes the important entitlement to certain procedural protections during the process of developing an individualized education program for a disabled child. W.G. v. Bd. of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992); Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205 (1982). Federal special education law requires states to establish and maintain certain procedural safeguards to ensure that each student with a disability receives the FAPE to which he/she is entitled and that parents are involved in the formulation of the student’s educational program. W.G., 960 F.2d at 1483 (9th Cir. 1992). In Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, the Supreme Court recognized the importance of adherence to the procedural requirements of the IDEA as part of the provision of FAPE. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205 (1982).

The procedural rights that extend to parents under the IDEA include the right to participate in the development of the child’s IEP and the opportunity for mediation and a due process hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1997). Procedural flaws do not automatically require a finding of a denial of a FAPE, but procedural violations that result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringe on the parent’s opportunity to participate in the IEP process do result in the denial of a FAPE. W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484; see also Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 994 (1st Cir. 1990).

Petitioner alleges that the District committed eight procedural violations that resulted in the denial FAPE. Each of those allegations will be addressed in turn below.

A. Failing to indicate duration of occupational therapy/physical therapy, and assistive technology services in the August 17, 2000 IEP

California Education Code Section 56345(3) states that IEPs must include a statement of the special educational instruction and related services and supplementary aids and services to be provided to the pupil. Additionally, subsection (6) states that the IEP must also indicate the projected date for the beginning of the services and the anticipated location, frequency, and duration of those services. Petitioner claims that his August 2000 IEP does not indicate the duration of occupational therapy/physical therapy and assistive technology services.

On the face of the August 2000 IEP, no duration is indicated for STUDENT’s occupational therapy/physical therapy and assistive technology consultation services. The only information provided is that each of the services would be provided once per month. Thus, the District committed a procedural violation by omitting this information. However, Petitioner has failed to establish that he was denied educational opportunity or that his parents’ right to participate in the IEP process was infringed.

Although the IEP lacked this information, MOTHER signed the IEP consenting to the implementation of the IEP. According to Michelle Herkimer, the physical therapist who was responsible for providing the assistive technology consultation services, she provided the consultation services once each month for approximately one hour per session to address STUDENT’s difficulty with hand fatigue from writing with his congenitally deformed hand. Ms. Herkimer testified that, as part of her consultation services, she would evaluate STUDENT’s needs and determine what assistive technology services could be provided to meet those needs. During the course of the school year, STUDENT was provided a modified pencil grip, a tape recorder for dictation, an Alphasmart word processor, a CoWriter software program to assist with the composition process, and access to a computer. Additionally, Ms. Herkimer testified that she met with STUDENT’s teacher and the PARENTS to discuss STUDENT’s use of assistive technology and whether his needs were being met. There is no indication from the record that the PARENTS ever objected to the level or adequacy of the assistive technology consultation services provided.

Similarly, Julie Bissell, the District’s coordinator of occupational and physical therapy, testified undisputedly that a District occupational therapist provided STUDENT consultation services on the playground once each week for thirty-minute sessions. Ms. Bissell testified that the therapist would help STUDENT initiate interactions and engage in playing games. The therapist also spent time consulting with STUDENT’s teachers and STUDENT’s speech therapist to work on other skills such as speech pragmatics. Petitioner made no allegation that STUDENT required more occupational therapy services than were provided or that he was otherwise prejudiced by the District’s failure to include the duration of services in the IEP. In conclusion, because no prejudice has been established, the Hearing Officer finds that the District’s failure to state the duration of OT, PT, and AT services in the August 2000 IEP did not result in a denial of FAPE.

B. Failure to conduct IEP meetings within statutory timelines

Petitioner argues next that the District failed to timely convene an IEP meeting to review assessments conducted pursuant to the September 12, 2002 assessment plan. Additionally, Petitioner contends that the District was required to hold his annual IEP meeting in July 2002, but failed to do so until September 2002.

With regard to Petitioner’s first contention, California Education Code Section 56344 states that, unless the parents consent in writing to an extension, districts must develop an IEP in accordance with the results of an assessment within fifty days of receipt of the parents= consent to assess. Because the District received the signed assessment plan on September 12, 2002, it was required to develop an IEP by November 1, 2002. The District acknowledges that it was required to convene STUDENT’s IEP meeting on November 1, 2002, but did not do so until November 5, 2002. (Footnote 6) Although the meeting was delayed four days, there is no evidence that STUDENT was denied any educational opportunity or that his parents’ right to participate in the IEP process was infringed due to the short delay in holding the meeting. (Footnote 7) Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that, although the meeting was held outside of the fifty-day timeline, no prejudice resulted from this minor delay.

With regard to Petitioner’s second contention, Petitioner’s annual IEP for 2002 was due on or before July 26, 2002. (See Pet. Exh. Z.) However, the annual IEP was not held until September 12, 2002. The evidence establishes that MOTHER consented to the extension of the timeline for holding the IEP meeting. In a letter from MOTHER to the District dated July 15, 2002, MOTHER acknowledged that the District had scheduled an IEP meeting at the end of July 2002. (Dist. Exh. 33.) Also in the letter, MOTHER requested that the meeting be rescheduled so that her advocate, Dr. Susan Burnett, could attend the meeting. According to the notes from the September 2002 IEP meeting, the IEP meeting was ultimately rescheduled to September 2002 by agreement of the District and MOTHER because of staff unavailability and because STUDENT’s school went off-track during the month of August. Because MOTHER cancelled the meeting scheduled by the District in July 2002 and she agreed to the scheduling of the IEP meeting in September, the District did not inappropriately delay the convening of the annual IEP meeting.

C. Failure to respond to request for information by parents

Petitioner claims next that the District denied him a FAPE by failing to respond to his parents’ request for information on the qualifications of its neuropsychologist, Dr. Proud, whom the District intended to conduct the neuropsychological assessment requested by his parents at the September 2002 IEP meeting. While there is no dispute that the District never provided this information, Petitioner has not provided any legal support for the proposition that a district was required to respond to this request. To the extent that Petitioner is alleging that this information was necessary for his parents to consent to the District’s offer to conduct the assessment, as noted above, there is no legal requirement for the District to agree to parentally imposed restrictions on assessments, including the qualifications of an assessor. Rather, California Education Code section 56322 states that districts have the discretion to determine the competency of persons performing the assessments. From the above, the Hearing Officer finds that the District’s failure to provide such information did not result in a denial of FAPE.

D. Failure to include parent comments and concerns in the September 2002 IEP

Petitioner claims that his parents and advocate were denied an opportunity to participate in the IEP process because they requested that their notes and other documents be included in the September 2002 IEP but that request was refused. California Education Code § 56341(a) requires that a child=s IEP team conduct meetings during which the child=s IEP will be developed, reviewed, or revised. In convening an IEP meeting, a school district is required to take steps to ensure that one or both of the parents of the individual with exceptional needs are present at each IEP meeting or are afforded the opportunity to participate in the IEP process. 34 C.F.R. § 300.345(a); Cal. Educ. Code § 56341.5(a).

MOTHER testified that her request to include her notes and documents with the IEP was refused by District employee Christine Fletcher, who facilitated part of the September 2002 IEP meeting. However, the testimony of school psychologist Milton Irvine establishes that the District did in fact include the notes and attachments with the IEP. According to Mr. Irvine, Ms. Fletcher left the IEP meeting early, at which point he took over the responsibility of facilitating the IEP meeting. While he was facilitating the meeting and before the meeting ended, he granted MOTHER’s request to have her notes and documents attached to the IEP. Because the notes were ultimately attached to the IEP during the meeting, no prejudice resulted from any initial refusal to include MOTHER’s documents. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that MOTHER was not denied the opportunity to participate in the IEP process on this basis.

E. Failing to obtain parental consent to conduct the SCAN assessment in October 2002

Parental consent for an evaluation of a child is required before a school district can assess the child. California Education Code ' 56321(c) and U.S.C. ' 1414(a)(1)(A)(i). Petitioner contends that the District failed to obtain parental consent prior to its conducting the second SCAN assessment on him in October 2002. This contention is not supported by the evidence. Contained in Petitioner’s Exhibit II is an assessment plan signed by MOTHER in September 2002. By signing that assessment plan, MOTHER consented to the District’s assessing STUDENT in the area of speech, language, and communication. Listed in the assessment plan is the SCAN assessment. Ms. Gold testified that the SCAN assessment was administered twice in order to obtain a baseline and information on STUDENT’s progress after taking the Fast ForWord program. Because MOTHER had consented to the District’s assessing STUDENT in the area of speech and language and the District conducted the second SCAN assessment within the fifty day timeline allowed by law, the Hearing Officer finds that the District had consent to assess STUDENT.

F. Failure to document November 5, 2002 IEP meeting.

Petitioner contends that the District failed to document the November 5, 2002 IEP meeting. California Education Code section 56341.5(i) states that the district “shall give the parent a copy of the individualized education program.” An IEP is a written statement that must be developed, reviewed, and revised for each student with a disability. The IEP must include a statement of the goals and objectives, of the special education and related services, and of the program modifications or supports for school personnel that are to be provided to enable the student to be involved in and progress in the general curriculum, and to be educated and participate with disabled and nondisabled peers in extracurricular and other nonacademic activities. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.347; Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56343 and 56345.

Contained in Petitioner’s own Exhibit ZZ is a document that Petitioner describes in the table of contents as “Agenda and IEP, 11-5-02.” That six-page document includes the agenda for the meeting, detailed notes of the meeting, and the signatures of persons attending the meeting. Although the November 2002 document did not include a statement of the items required by federal and State law as noted above, the notes indicate that the IEP meeting was continued from the September 12, 2002 IEP meeting. That September 2002 IEP, on its face, contains the required statements required by federal and State law. Because there is no requirement that an IEP meeting must be completed on the day it first convenes, and because the September 2002 IEP from which the November meeting was continued contains the necessary components of an IEP document, the Hearing Officer finds that the November 2002 IEP was not defective for failing to include the statements required by law.

G. Failure to ensure attendance of appropriate persons at IEP meetings and to consider independent evaluations obtained by parents

Petitioner contends that the District failed to ensure the attendance of persons at the September 2002 and May 2003 IEP meetings who were “knowledgeable in developing appropriate interventions” for a child with ACC and who could address the independent evaluations of Dr. Muhonen and Dr. Paul that were obtained by the PARENTS. (See Pet. Exh. HH-3.) Petitioner argues that, because no one at the IEP meetings was qualified to review Dr. Muhonen’s and Dr. Paul’s assessments, the District failed to adequately consider those assessments. The District contends that the assessments were appropriately considered.

California Education Code section 56341(f) states that parents of disabled children have the right to present information to the IEP team in person or through a representative and the right to participate in meetings relating to eligibility for special education and related services, recommendations, and program planning. Among the people who must be included in the IEP team are the student’s parents and/or representative, one regular education teacher, one special education teacher or special education provider, a representative of the district, and an individual who conducted an assessment of the pupil or who is knowledgeable about the assessment procedures used to assess the pupil and is familiar with the assessment results or recommendations. (Cal. Educ. Code § 56341(b).) Additionally, the pupil may be included in the IEP team when appropriate and, at the discretion of the parents or district, other individuals who have knowledge or special expertise regarding the pupil may be included in the team. (Id.) If the parent obtains an independent educational assessment at private expense, the results of the assessment shall be considered by the public education agency with respect to the provision of free, appropriate public education to the child. Cal. Educ. Code § 56329(b); 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b) (emphasis added).

With regard to Petitioner’s allegation that the District failed to ensure the attendance of persons the PARENTS requested, the Ninth Circuit has held that while parents may invite people to the IEP meeting, nothing in the law requires the district to invite the people that the parents request or to ensure their attendance. Ms. S. v. Vashon Island Sch. Dist., et al., 337 F.3d 1115, 1136 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating the law does “not allow the parent to demand that the district bring a non-enumerated individual, or vice versa.) The Court went on to say that districts are only required to ensure the attendance of those persons enumerated by law as essential IEP team members. There is no dispute that the September 2002 and May 2003 IEP teams included STUDENT’s regular education teacher, special education teacher, a district representative, and the District personnel who assessed him.

To the extent that the District was responsible for ensuring the presence of persons knowledgeable of the assessment tools used in Petitioner’s independent assessments, the evidence establishes that those persons attended the meetings. With regard to the September 2002 IEP meeting, that meeting was attended by school nurse Sarah Flores. Prior to the meeting, Ms. Flores contacted Dr. Mulhonen’s office to discuss his one- and one-half-page report. From the face of Dr. Mulhonen’s report, no assessment tools were indicated and the report set forth STUDENT’s diagnosis and the symptoms of ACC. According to RSP teacher Lori Ebright, Ms. Flores was able to explain the medical terms Dr. Mulhonen used in his report. With regard to the May 2003 IEP meeting, that meeting was attended by Milt Irvine. Mr. Irvine is a school psychologist and a licensed educational psychologist who also teaches graduate level courses in school psychology. Mr. Irvine testified that he was able to understand the assessment information contained in Dr. Paul’s report and he is competent to interpret the assessment scores contained in Dr. Paul’s report. Furthermore, Dr. Paul herself testified that a doctor or nurse is not necessary to review her report. She also testified that a school psychologist would be appropriate to review her report, although the presence of a neuropsychologist would be “optimal.” (Footnote 8) Thus, although the District did not ensure the attendance of the persons requested by the PARENTS, the evidence establishes that Ms. Flores and Mr. Irvine were knowledgeable of the assessment tools used by Dr. Muhonen and Dr. Paul and, thus, the IEP meeting met the requirements of California Education Code section 56341. (Footnote 9)

To the extent that Petitioner claims that the District failed to consider the reports of Dr. Muhonen and Dr. Paul, those contentions are not supported by the evidence. Despite Petitioner’s general allegation, Petitioner failed to allege any specific instances when his parents’ information was not considered by the IEP team or to describe how Petitioner was prejudiced by this failure. Additionally, no information was offered to establish that the PARENTS were denied the right to present information to the IEP team or that Petitioner’s parents or representatives were denied the opportunity to participate during the IEP meeting.

Rather, the evidence establishes that both reports were discussed at STUDENT’s IEP meetings. As stated above, Ms. Flores sought information from Dr. Muhonen regarding his report to discuss with the team. Additionally, RSP teacher Lori Ebright obtained information from the internet regarding ACC and contacted specialists in ACC by email to inquire about the educational implications of the disorder. Ms. Ebright provided the September 2002 IEP team with the information she researched. (Pet. Exh. KK.) Moreover, Dr. Burnett, who is a licensed clinical psychologist with significant training in neuropsychology, was present at the both IEP meetings on behalf of the Petitioner. At the September 2000 meeting, she presented a document she created on ACC, and that document was subsequently included in the IEP. Dr. Burnett was also present at the May 2003 IEP meeting when the team discussed Dr. Paul’s report. Dr. Burnett testified that she reviewed Dr. Paul’s report and that she understood the report and what educational needs needed to be addressed in the educational setting. Dr. Burnett also testified that she spoke with Dr. Paul about her assessment prior to the IEP meeting and Dr. Paul discussed with her areas of concern for STUDENT to discuss with the IEP team. From the above, the Hearing Officer finds that the District met its legal requirement to consider the information and private assessments provided by the PARENTS.

H. Failure to provide prior written notice of District’s actions

Petitioner contends that the District failed to provide him with prior written notice of its intent (1) to refuse his parents’ request at the September 2002 IEP meeting that he be provided multisensory teaching, (2) to refuse his parents’ request at the September 2002 IEP meeting for a neuropsychological assessment, and (3) to change his eligibility category during the August 2000 and May 2003 IEP meetings. The District responds that it is not required to provide prior written notice because it has provided Petitioner with multisensory teaching and has offered to conduct a neuropychological assessment of STUDENT but consent for the assessment has been withheld by his parents. Additionally, the District contends that it is not required to provide prior written consent to change STUDENT’s eligibility category because the change was discussed at the IEP meetings where consent for the change was requested, which satisfies the notice requirement.

Federal law requires that districts provide parents with written notice a reasonable period of time before the public agency proposes or refuses to change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child or the provision of FAPE to the child. 24 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3), (4), (C); 34 C.F.R. § 300.503. If the action contemplated by the districts also requires parental consent, the agency may give notice at the same time it requests parental consent. 34 C.F.R. § 300.503(a)(2).

The law and the undisputed evidence supports the District’s contentions. With regard to Petitioner’s first allegation, STUDENT’s teachers and service providers during the 2002-2003 school year testified that they applied a multisensory approach to teaching him. Ms. Lori Ebright, STUDENT’s resource specialist teacher, testified that she taught him using a kinesthetic approach, she exposed him to verbal information with visual supports, and she paired his exposure to word chunks with tapping. Similarly, STUDENT’s regular education teacher, Mr. Rogers, testified that he taught STUDENT using an overhead projector for visual support, and STUDENT had access to a computer and listening center for additional reinforcement of what he was taught. Because Petitioner was already receiving the multisensory teaching requested by the PARENTS, there was no proposal or refusal to initiate or change STUDENT’s services for which prior written notice was necessary.

With regard to Petitioner’s second contention, the undisputed evidence establishes that the District offered to conduct the neuropsychological assessment requested by the PARENTS at the September 2002 IEP meeting. In fact, Dr. Burnett, Petitioner’s educational advocate, testified that consent for the assessment was withheld because she wanted more information regarding the District’s assessor. The District requested consent again in writing on at least two other occasions following the September 2002 IEP meeting, but consent was again refused. (Footnote 10) Because the District did not refuse to conduct the assessment requested by the PARENTS and stood ready and willing to conduct such assessment, there was no refusal of the PARENTS’ request for which to provide prior written notice.

Finally, with regard to Petitioner’s third contention, federal law as stated above expressly provides that the notice requirement is satisfied if it is provided at the same time consent is requested for the proposed action. In this case, each of the changes in STUDENT’s eligibility category was made with the involvement of STUDENT’s IEP team. Because consent to the IEP is necessary prior to its being implemented, the District’s request for consent to changing STUDENT’s eligibility category at the IEP meeting satisfied the notice requirement pursuant to federal law.

In summary, the Hearing Officer found above that the District was not required to provide Petitioner with prior written notice relating to the PARENTS’ requests for multisensory teaching and a neuropsychological assessment. Additionally, the District’s request for the changing of STUDENT’s eligibility category during the IEP meetings was appropriate to satisfy the prior written notice requirement.

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In conclusion, it was found above that the District did not commit procedural violations, as alleged by Petitioner, that resulted in STUDENT’s loss of educational opportunity or that infringed on the PARENTS’ ability to participate in the IEP process. (Footnote 11) Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds the District did not commit procedural violations that resulted in a denial of a free appropriate public education to STUDENT.

I. Did the District appropriately assess STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability from March 2000 through the end of the 2002-2003 school year?

Reassessment of a student with disabilities must be conducted at least once every three years, or more frequently, if conditions warrant a reassessment. Cal. Educ. Code § 56381; 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (a)(2)(A). For assessments to be appropriate, they must meet the statutory requirements set forth in California Education Code sections 56320 et. seq. California Education Code § 56320 states, among other things, that testing and assessment materials and procedures must be validated for the purpose for which they are used; administered by trained personnel in conformance with test instructions; and tailored to assess specific areas of need. Additionally, subsections (e) and (f) require that a student be assessed in all areas of suspected disability and that no single procedure is used as the sole criterion for determining an appropriate educational program for an individual with exceptional needs.

Following the assessments, districts must prepare a written assessment report that meets the requirements of California Education Code § 56327. Section 56327 requires that written assessment reports include, among other things, an indication of whether the student may need special education and related services, the basis for the determination that the student continues to need special education and related services, and the educationally relevant health and medical findings, if any. Petitioner presents four contentions regarding the District’s alleged failure to appropriately assess him between March 2000 and the end of the 2002-2003 school year. The District contends generally that it appropriately assessed Petitioner during the time period at issue. Each of Petitioner’s contentions is addressed in more detail below.

A. Assessment reports make inappropriate findings and recommendations

First, Petitioner contends that the District’s January 2000, August 2000, and September/October 2002 occupational therapy assessments are inappropriate because the reports include inappropriate findings and recommendations. Specifically, Petitioner contends that the January 2000 occupational therapy assessment is inappropriate because the assessor noted his difficulty with throwing, use of his hands, and postural stability, but the assessor only recommended consultation services rather than direct services. Petitioner claims that the August 2000 assessment is inappropriate because the assessor determined that he had fine motor difficulties but she did not make recommendations for direct occupational therapy services to address his fine motor needs. Similarly, Petitioner contends that the September/October 2002 assessment report is inappropriate because he was noted to have balance, strength, dexterity, and other difficulties, but no direct services were recommended to address those deficits.

First, Petitioner’s allegation that the January 2000 OT assessment report only included recommendations for consultation services and not direct services is incorrect. Rather, the assessment report includes a recommendation that “STUDENT participate in a program of occupational therapy to further influence postural control.” (Pet. Exh. R-2.) Additionally, the OT assessor’s recommendation was accepted by the January 2000 IEP team, which agreed to provide STUDENT three thirty-minutes sessions per week of direct OT services. (Pet. Exhs. S-1 and V-1.) Petitioner made no allegation and presented no evidence that the level of OT services provided pursuant to the January 2000 IEP was inappropriate.

The Hearing Officer notes that Petitioner does not challenge how the assessments were conducted or whether they complied with all legal requirements. Additionally, Petitioner provided no evidence to support his general allegations that the District assessors’ recommendations were not supported by the assessment results. Rather, Petitioner simply disagrees with the professional judgments of the District assessors’ as contained in the various occupational therapy reports. Nothing in the law allows for the parents to challenge district assessments on the basis of a difference of opinion regarding the recommendations. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner’s challenges to the appropriateness of the District’s January 2000, August 2000, and September/October 2002 assessments are not supported by the law.

B. OT assessment necessary prior to discontinuation of services

Second, Petitioner contends that the District discontinued his occupational therapy services in August 2000 without first conducting an assessment and that the District had a legal obligation to conduct such assessment. (Footnote 12) Petitioner does not cite, and the Hearing Officer is unaware of, any legal support for his contention that districts must always conduct assessments prior to discontinuing occupational therapy services. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner’s contention is not based in the law. (Footnote 13)

Additionally, the evidence established that the District had sufficient information to determine that STUDENT no longer required direct OT services. By way of background, STUDENT’s direct OT services were recommended during his January 2000 IEP meeting based on the OT reports from the Orange County Therapy Services (OCTS) in November 1999 and the District in January 2000. The OCTS report recommended direct services once per week for a period of three months. The District’s report also recommended some direct OT services. The services were provided by District OT specialist, Rima Arsenault, who issued a progress report at the end of the therapy period. That report described STUDENT’s progress and explained the basis for the discontinuation of direct services. Additionally, Ms. Arsenault was a member of the August 2000 IEP team and was available to respond to questions regarding STUDENT’s need, or lack thereof, for OT therapy.

C. Failure to assess in all areas of suspected disability

Petitioner claims that the District failed to assess him in all areas of suspected disability, particularly in the areas of gross and fine motor abilities, speech and language, central auditory processing and memory, and visual spatial abilities. Additionally, Petitioner contends that the District was required to conduct an adapted keyboard assessment but failed to do so.

1. Failure to assess in areas of gross and fine motor abilities

The Petitioner contends that the District failed to assess him in all areas of suspected disability because it conducted an assistive technology screening in November 2000 that identified needs in gross and fine motor abilities that subsequently should have been assessed by an occupational therapist, but were not. Petitioner appears to base his contention on general statements in the AT screening report that noted concerns in “fine and gross motor coordination” and difficulty with writing. The AT screening report did not indicate the source of the information reported, whether the information resulted from an interview or some assessment tool, or provide any significant detailed information about the nature of the fine and gross motor coordination problems.

The Hearing Officer finds that the information contained in the AT screening report alone would not trigger an occupational therapy assessment. STUDENT’s fine and gross motor abilities were assessed privately by the OCTS in November 1999, just nine months prior to the AT screening. The OCTS assessment, which was considered by STUDENT’s IEP team in December 1999, evaluated STUDENT’s overall hand skills, fine motor dexterity and manipulation skills, sensory processing, bilateral coordination, balance/equilibrium, range of motion, and attention to tasks. Petitioner does not dispute the appropriateness of the OCTS assessment. Additionally, as noted above, in January 2000 STUDENT’s gross motor skills were assessed by the District. As part of that assessment, the District assessed STUDENT’s ability to climb, jump, play on play equipment, walk on a balance beam, and play catch. The assessor also examined STUDENT’s use of trunk rotation and postural stability. There is no information in the AT screening report that indicates any additional concerns that were not already addressed by the OCTS and District assessments that were conducted only months earlier. Because STUDENT had current assessments in gross and fine motor, the Hearing Officer finds that no additional assessments in these areas were needed as a result of the AT screening report.

2. Failure to assess in area of receptive vocabulary

The Petitioner contends that the District inappropriately assessed his speech and language needs in July 2000 because it failed to assess his receptive vocabulary (despite its conducting the Expressive One-Word Picture Vocabulary Test to assess expressive vocabulary). The evidence does not support Petitioner’s contention. According to the District’s speech and language assessment report, the District conducted the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test –III (PPVT-III), which assesses receptive vocabulary for Standard American English. There is no evidence that Petitioner had difficulties with receptive vocabulary that were not already assessed with the PPVT-III. Because the evidence establishes that the District assessed STUDENT in the area Petitioner contended was not assessed, the Hearing Officer finds that the District appropriately assessed STUDENT’s speech and language needs in July 2000.

3. Failure to conduct speech and language assessment in July 2001

The Petitioner contends that the District failed to assess him in all areas of suspected disability because it failed to conduct any speech and language assessment in July 2001. As noted above, reassessment of a student with disabilities must be conducted at least once every three years, or more frequently, if conditions warrant a reassessment. Cal. Educ. Code § 56381; 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (a)(2)(A). Also noted above, STUDENT’s speech and language needs were appropriately assessed at the triennial evaluation in July 2000, the prior year. From that assessment, speech and language goals and objectives were developed in STUDENT’s August 2000 IEP. Additionally, STUDENT’s progress on his speech and language goals was recorded in a progress report from the District. (Pet. Exh. Y-2.) Thus, the District had information regarding STUDENT’s speech and language needs in July 2001 as it relates to his progress on his goals and objectives. There was no evidence presented to indicate that STUDENT’s needs changed substantially to warrant another speech and language assessment in 2001. Because the District had just conducted an assessment the year before and because there is no evidence that conditions warranted another assessment, the Hearing Officer finds that the District was not required to conduct another assessment in July 2001.

4. Failure to assess in areas of central auditory processing and memory

The Petitioner asserts generally that the District has never assessed his central auditory processing and memory from March 2000 through the end of the 2002-2003 school year. In support of his contention, Petitioner offered only the testimony of his advocate, Dr. Susan Burnett. Dr. Burnett, who is a licensed clinical psychologist, testified that her review of his educational records in June 2002 indicated that he was not assessed for auditory processing and memory.

The evidence does not support Petitioner’s contention. According to Lynn Gold, the District’s speech and language pathologist, the District appropriately assessed STUDENT’s auditory processing and memory at various times and in various ways during the time period at issue. Ms. Gold testified specifically that, in order to assess STUDENT’s auditory processing, the District conducted during the fall of 2002 the Comprehensive Test of Phonologic Processing (CTOPP), the Test for Auditory Perceptual Skills (TAPS), the SCAN-C test for auditory processing disorders for children, and audiology testing. (Pet. Exh. VV.) The CTOPP assesses phonology, the TAPS assesses the functioning of auditory processing and auditory memory, the SCAN-C assesses functional auditory abilities in everyday listening situations, and the audiology testing assesses hearing acuity. (Id. And Test. of Lynn Gold.) Based on the assessments conducted by the District, Ms. Gold testified that STUDENT’s overall auditory processing skills are within normal limits with a few splinter strengths and weaknesses. She further elaborated that, while STUDENT has some problems hearing two words at the same time, he is able to process two sentences at the same time when provided with context. Petitioner presented no evidence to establish that any of the assessments conducted were not designed to assess or were inappropriate to assess STUDENT’s auditory processing and memory. Moreover, the Hearing Officer finds Ms. Gold’s testimony credible and persuasive. Ms. Gold is a licensed speech pathologist, is credenitialed to teach students with communication disorders, and has approximately 35 years of experience teaching at public schools. Additionally, Ms. Gold exhibited detailed knowledge of STUDENT’s needs, the assessments used to assess his auditory processing needs, and his progress within the classroom. From the above, the Hearing Officer finds that the District did appropriately assess STUDENT’s auditory processing and memory. Even assuming that the District failed to appropriately assess STUDENT in this area, the uncontested evidence establishes that the District provided STUDENT with educational services that addressed auditory processing deficits. For example, STUDENT’s September 2002 IEP contained a goal to improve his listening abilities. Additionally, STUDENT’s score on the SCAN indicates that he has some difficulty hearing words in an earphone and repeating the words. Accordingly, STUDENT was provided with the FastForWord software program, which addresses difficulties with hearing rapidly occurring sounds, to teach STUDENT to distinguish and hear sounds. As described above, Mr. Rogers testified that STUDENT was also allowed to use the classroom listening station to listen to materials and books on tape using a earphones, and his classroom lessons were reinforced with visual supports. Because the District provided services to STUDENT that addressed his splinter weaknesses in auditory processing, the Hearing Officer finds that no prejudice resulted from any failure to assess STUDENT in this area.

5. Failure to conduct visual spatial assessment

The Petitioner contends that the District failed to assess him in all areas of suspected disability because it has never conducted visual spatial assessments on him. Although Petitioner makes the general allegation that he required an assessment in this area, he provided no evidence to indicate that STUDENT has needs related to his visual spatial ability. Additionally, Petitioner failed to explain why he requires visual spatial assessments. Without such information, the Hearing Officer cannot determine whether the District was obligated to conduct such assessments.

6. Failure to conduct adapted keyboard assessment

The Petitioner contends that the District failed to assess him in all areas of suspected disability because the April 2002 Orange County Therapy Services OT assessment privately procured by the PARENTS recommended an adapted keyboard assessment but the District did not conduct such an assessment. Aarti Shah, who conducted the OCTS assessment, testified that STUDENT is right-hand dominant and that he can use his hands for almost anything functionally. She also stated that STUDENT had difficulty with maintaining his hand position on a keyboard and tended to turn his hands outward, but his difficulty was due to his being unfamiliar with the keyboard she used. With instruction from Ms. Shah, he was able to position his hands appropriately. Ms. Shah testified that the PARENTS were interested in an adapted keyboard for STUDENT, but she does not have expertise in keyboarding and does not conduct keyboarding assessments. Thus, she made the referral to the District to conduct the adapted keyboard assessment.

The evidence establishes that, although the District did not conduct an adapted keyboard assessment on STUDENT pursuant to the OCTS report recommendations, the District had conducted such an assessment earlier and the Hearing Officer concludes that another assessment was not warranted. Ms. Bissell, the District’s coordinator of OT, testified that an adapted keyboard assessment was conducted during the fall of 2000. In that assessment, a District OT therapist conducting timed trials of STUDENT’s use of various keyboards to determine which keyboard was most efficient and economical for him. (See also Pet. Exh. V-2.) The assessor found that STUDENT functioned best with a standard keyboard and use of the hunt-and-peck method of typing. Michele Herkimer, the OT therapist who provided STUDENT assistive technology assistance, testified that STUDENT was subsequently provided instruction in computer class with software to teach him typing and keyboarding skills, that his typing was of average speed for his age, and that STUDENT was able to keep up with his modified assignments using the standard keyboard and the hunt-and-peck method of typing. Because the evidence establishes that STUDENT’s hand-use abilities are functional and that he has average typing abilities, no further adapted keyboard assessment was necessary.

D. Failure to conduct neuropsychological assessment

Finally, Petitioner claims that his IEP team agreed that a neuropsychological assessment was needed as early as September 12, 2002, but the District failed to conduct such assessment. As described above, the evidence established that the District offered to conduct a neuropsychological assessment on at least three occasions in September and October 2002, but the PARENTS refused consent. (Footnote 15) Approximately two weeks after refusing consent for the District to conduct the assessment, the PARENTS obtained an independent evaluation from Dr. Paul. Because the District was unable to conduct the assessment without the PARENTS’ consent, the Hearing Officer finds unpersuasive Petitioner’s contention that the District failed in its obligation to assess him in all areas of suspected disability.

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In summary, none of Petitioner’s contentions was supported by the evidence and/or the law. As found above, Petitioner’s disagreement with the professional conclusions contained in the District’s various OT assessments is insufficient alone to challenge the appropriateness of those assessments. Additionally, contrary to Petitioner’s contentions, the law does not require the District to conduct a formal occupational therapy assessment prior to recommending the cessation of direct services. It was also found above that the District was not required to conduct additional receptive vocabulary testing in July 2000, fine and gross motor testing in November 2000, or another formal speech and language assessment in July 2001. Moreover, the District appropriately assessed STUDENT in the area of auditory processing, there was insufficient information to determine whether STUDENT required visual spatial assessments, and the evidence established that STUDENT did not require an adapted keyboard assessment. Lastly, the District offered to conduct the neuropsychological assessment requested by the PARENTS, but consent for the assessment was never provided. In conclusion, the Hearing Officer finds unpersuasive all of Petitioner’s challenges to the appropriateness of the District’s assessments, and concludes that the District appropriately assessed STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability during the time periods at issue. (Footnote 16)

III. Did the District provide STUDENT a FAPE from March 2000 through the 2002-2003 school year?

As stated above, students with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education in the form of special education and related services that conform to the student’s individualized education program. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(8). “Special education” is defined as specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of the student. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16). The term “related services” includes transportation and other services that may be required to assist a child to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17). California Education Code Section 56363 similarly provides that designated instruction and services (DIS), California’s term for related services, shall be provided “when the instruction and services are necessary for the pupil to benefit educationally from his or her instructional program.”

To determine whether the District substantively provided STUDENT a free appropriate public education, one must focus on the adequacy of the District’s offered and proposed programs. Gregory K. v. Longview School District, 811 F. 2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987). In Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District, et al. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982), the United States Supreme Court determined that the student’s individualized educational program (IEP) must be reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit. While this requires a school district to provide a disabled child with meaningful access to education, it does not mean that the school district is required to guarantee successful results. Walczak v. Florida Union Free School District, 142 F.3d 119, 133 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court in Rowley concluded that the IDEA does not require school districts to provide special education students with the best education available or to provide instruction or services that maximize the student’s abilities. De minimis benefit or only trivial advancement, however, is insufficient to satisfy the Rowley standard of “some” benefit. Walczak v. Florida Union Free School District, 142 F.3d at 130 (2d Cir. 1998). Rather, a child’s academic progress must be viewed in light of the limitations imposed by his or her disability and must be gauged in relation to the child’s potential. Mrs. B. v. Milford Board of Education, 103 F.3d 1114, 1121 (2d Cir. 1997).

To summarize, under the IDEA and Rowley, the District’s proposed program must have been designed to meet STUDENT’s unique and individual needs, have been reasonably calculated to provide him with some educational benefit, and comported with his IEP. (Footnote 17) Petitioner contends that the District failed to provide him with an appropriate educational program during the 2000-2001 to 2002-2003 school years.

A. March 2000 through the end of the 1999-2000 school year

Although Petitioner alleged generally that the District substantively denied him a FAPE beginning in March 2000, Petitioner made no specific allegation regarding a denial of FAPE for the time period from March 2000 through the end of the 1999-2000 school year other than the procedural and assessment violations alleged above. Therefore, the Hearing Officer will not address the appropriateness of the District’s provided program during this time period.

B. 2000-2001 School Year

Petitioner challenged the District’s provision of a FAPE for the 2000-2001 school year on three grounds. First, Petitioner contends that he had gross and fine motor difficulties that required direct occupational therapy services, but the District failed to offer any direct OT services. Second, Petitioner asserts that his goals and objectives in the August 2000 IEP did not meet his needs because they were vague or unmeasurable. Third, Petitioner contends that the District’s provided program did not comport with his August IEP because he did not receive some of his occupational/physical therapy services.

1. Designed to Meet STUDENT’s Unique Educational Needs

In order to determine whether the District’s program was designed to meet STUDENT’s unique educational needs, it is first necessary to identify those needs. The parties generally do not dispute what STUDENT’s deficits were during the 2000-2001 school year. According to the August 2000 psychoeducational assessment, STUDENT’s overall cognitive ability was within the “low normal” range, with relative weaknesses in general knowledge, abstract verbal reasoning, and social awareness. (Pet. Exh. U.) Additionally, STUDENT exhibited difficulties in the area of pragmatic language, which relates to the social and functional use of language. (Pet. Exh. U.) STUDENT also has “windswept” fingers that were surgically separated and required tendon transfer surgery after birth, and his condition affected the precision with which he used his hands and his ability to write. (Pet. Exh. R-1.)

In light of STUDENT’s needs listed above, the parties agree that STUDENT required an educational program that included resource specialist program support to develop his basic academic skills, speech and language services to address his pragmatic language and social skills, and assistive technology to assist his writing. Specifically, the parties agree that STUDENT required at least the services and placement offered in the August 2000 IEP, which included placement in a regular education classroom for 260 minutes per day, resource specialist program support for 90 minutes per day, speech and language services once per week for thirty minutes, and assistive technology and occupational/physical therapy consultation services once per month.

However, the parties dispute whether STUDENT had fine and gross motor deficits that required direct occupational therapy services in August 2000 for the 2000-2001 school year. In support of his position that he required direct OT services, Petitioner relies on the November 1999 Orange County Therapy Services OT assessment report that found that “STUDENT demonstrates a deficiency in his fine motor coordination affected by his weakness in his intrinsic musculature affecting finger isolation and dexterity.” (Pet. Exh. P-3.) Additionally, the OCTS assessor found that the deficit interfered with his ability to “complete self-c[a]re activities such as manipulation of fasteners, opening containers, etc., in a timely and sequential manner.” The OCTS assessor went on to recommend “a short course of occupational therapy on a one time weekly basis for three months” to “facilitate an exercise program that will enhance overall fine motor dexterity as well as strength skills.” Petitioner also relies on the District’s January 2000 OT assessment report, which found that STUDENT had decreased overall postural stability which required direct OT services. Additionally, Petitioner relies on MOTHER’s testimony that STUDENT continued to exhibit difficulty maneuvering buttons and fasteners and opening small packages.

Although there is no dispute that STUDENT exhibited the deficits described in the OCTS November 1999 report and the District’s January 2000 OT assessment report during the time the assessments were completed, those reports do not reflect the progress STUDENT made in fine and gross motor abilities through the five months of three thirty-minute sessions per week of direct OT therapy services provided in accordance with the OCTS and District reports. (Pet. Exh. S.) As was described above, in August 2000, STUDENT’s occupational therapist issued a progress report based on STUDENT’s therapy. That progress report indicated that STUDENT had increased his use of his trunk rotation and that his postural control had improved and was within functional limits. (Pet. Exh. V.) Additionally, she found that STUDENT’s fine motor deficits had improved, that he was able to quickly and efficiently use a modified pencil grasp to handwrite, and that he was a functional hunt-and-peck typist. That therapist, Rima Arsenault, recommended in her report STUDENT’s discharge from direct OT services, and she was present at STUDENT’s August 2000 IEP meeting when the OT therapy was discontinued. Moreover, Ms. Bissell, the District’s coordinator of OT/PT services, testified that she agrees with Ms. Arsenault’s recommendations. Ms. Bissell has known STUDENT since he was in the first grade, when he received OT services through her office. Since then, Ms. Bissell supervised the District staff that provided STUDENT OT services, and she was regularly informed of his progress.

Petitioner presented no expert testimony or report from a qualified OT therapist to dispute Ms. Arsenault’s recommendations for discharge from OT services in August 2000 or Ms. Bissell’s testimony. Although MOTHER testified that she continued to observe STUDENT’s difficulty with manipulating buttons and fasteners, such observations alone do not warrant continuing services that were determined by a professional occupational therapist to be unnecessary. Because the great weight of the evidence establishes that STUDENT’s fine and gross motor abilities had improved to the extent that he did not require direct services in August 2000, the Hearing Officer finds that the District was not required to provide such services to meet his educational needs.

Petitioner alleges next that the goals and objectives contained in the August 2000 IEP were not appropriate. The August 2000 IEP contained two goals: one to make one year’s progress academically in the area of language arts, and the other to improve his pragmatic language by demonstrating appropriate social interactions, topic maintenance, and conversational turn-taking. Petitioner alleges that the academic goal did not meet his needs because it is vague as to what academic area the goal addressed and how progress would be measured, and because the goal was not objectively measurable. Petitioner alleges also that the language goal failed to meet his needs because the goal cannot be measured due to the lack of a baseline resulting from the “vague” present levels of performance.

State and federal law requires that an IEP document must include measurable annual goals, including benchmarks or short-term objectives related to meeting STUDENT’s needs to enable him to be involved in and progress in the general education curriculum. (20 U.S.C. §1414(d)(1)(A)(ii); Cal. Educ. Code §56345(a).) Petitioner’s contentions regarding his academic goal are not supported by the evidence. Contrary to Petitioner’s allegation, the goal states clearly on its face that the academic area to be addressed is language arts. Additionally, the goal states that STUDENT’s progress will be measured by the Woodcock Johnson assessment. The IEP also includes the Woodcock Johnson scores from STUDENT’s recent academic assessment. Because the goal seeks to measure STUDENT’s progress in language arts using a standardized assessment tool, the Hearing Officer finds that that goal is objectively measurable. With regard to the pragmatic language goal, although the IEP present level of performance does not indicate a descriptive score from his then-recent speech and language assessment, the language of the present level of performance mirrors the language used in the assessment report. Thus, it is clear that the IEP team developed the goal with the assessment results in mind. Given that the August 2000 speech and language assessment report contains the descriptive scores that were the baseline for the goal, the goal had a starting point from which to objectively measure STUDENT’s progress. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that the goals and objective were designed to meet STUDENT’s unique educational needs, were clear and measurable, and met the requirements of State and federal law.

In summary, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT’s educational program for the 1999-2000 school year, was designed to meet his unique needs in the area of speech and language.

2. Calculated to Provide Some Educational Benefit

Petitioner argues generally that the District “inflated” his progress on his IEP. (Footnote 18) Petitioner provided no persuasive evidence to establish that he failed to receive some educational benefit for the 2000-2001 school year. STUDENT’s report card for that year indicate his increased proficiency in virtually all of his academic subjects. (Pet. Exh. Y.) Additionally, STUDENT’s speech and language progress report indicates that, while he did not meet his language goal, he made progress toward meeting that goal and was expected to meet the goal. Although STUDENT’s progress was slow, the law does not require districts to guarantee certain results or that the student must progress at the same rate as his peers. (See Houston Independent Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d, 341 (5th Cir., 2000). Considering the specific evidence of meaningful progress, the Hearing Officer finds that the District’s program provided him with some educational benefit.

3. Conforms to his IEP

Petitioner contends that the District failed to provide him with occupational/physical therapy consultation services one time per month as agreed to in his August 2000 IEP. He provides no evidence to establish when the services were missed or that the services were not provided at all. However, the undisputed testimony of Julie Bissell, the District’s coordinator of OT and PT, established that STUDENT received his agreed-upon consultation services. As coordinator of OT and PT, Ms. Bissell supervises the occupational therapy staff. She testified that the District OT staff assisted STUDENT with initiating games and social interactions on the playground, consulted with STUDENT’s teachers and speech and language therapists, and participated in weekly OT meetings in which STUDENT’s needs were discussed. From Ms. Bissell’s uncontested testimony, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT received the OT services provided for in his August 2000 IEP and that his educational program comported with that IEP.

****

In summary, the program provided by the District and agreed to by the PARENTS was designed to meet his unique educational needs, was reasonably calculated to (and did) provide him with some educational benefit, and was in conformity with his IEP. Thus, the District provided STUDENT a FAPE for the 2000-2001 school year.

C. 2001-2002 School year

For the 2001-2002 school year, Petitioner claims that the District failed to meet his occupational therapy needs because it did not implement the recommendation of the private Orange County Therapy Services assessment for the development of a home hand-strengthening program. Additionally, Petitioner contends that all of the goals and objectives contained in his July 2001 IEP were vague and not objectively measurable and that the July IEP did not contain goals and objectives to address his difficulty with “completion of writing, fine motor fatigue, [and] difficulty holding a pencil.” (Pet. Closing Brief at pg. 6.) Petitioner also contends again that the District inflated its reporting of his progress on the goals and objectives and that he did not benefit from his education. Petitioner also asserts that the program provided by the District did not comport with his IEP.

1. Designed to Meet STUDENT’s Unique Educational Needs

STUDENT’s needs for the 2001-2002 school year did not substantially change from the prior school year. STUDENT continued to have delayed expressive language and conversational skills related to his pragmatics deficit and weak complex language skills. Additionally, he continued to have difficulty with peer relationships and social interactions, and his hand deformity continued to impact his ability to handwrite. The parties do not dispute that STUDENT required at least the type and amount of services agreed to in his July 26, 2001 IEP. Specifically, the IEP provides for placement in a general education classroom for 1450 minutes per week, resource specialist program services for 180 minutes per week, and speech and language services twice per week for a total of 60 minutes. Additionally, the parties agree that STUDENT required the accommodations set forth in the July 31, 2001 IEP addendum and the January 2002 IEP addendum. Those addenda provided for the implementation of a daily homework log, the provision of a homework folder and chart, the provision of a computer software program to teach STUDENT to type, the provision of modified pencil grips to assist STUDENT with handwriting, the provision of an AlphaSmart word processor for STUDENT to use for longer writing assignments, the provision of assistive technology consultation services, and the provision of an extra set of text books for home use.

The Petitioner contends that the District’s program for the 2001-2002 school year was not designed to meet his unique educational needs for two reasons. First, Petitioner asserts that STUDENT required a hand-strengthening program as recommended in the OCTS occupational therapy report to address his deficits related to his deformed hand. The District responds that the OCTS recommendations related to the provision of medically necessary services to be provided by the California Children Services (CCS) and were not educationally necessary services required to be provided by the District.

The Hearing Officer notes first that nothing in the law requires districts to adopt the recommendations of every private assessment provided by parents. The law only requires the districts to consider those private reports in the development of the student’s IEP, as noted above. (Footnote 19) In this case, although there is no dispute that STUDENT has a hand abnormality that impacts his ability to write, both District assessments and the OCTS report indicate that STUDENT’s hand use is functional in virtually all areas. These findings were supported by the testimony of Ms. Herkimer, Ms. Bissell, and Ms. Shah, all of whom assessed and/or provided therapy services to STUDENT. Additionally, as discussed above, STUDENT is able to type at the same speed as his peers and is able to complete his assignments using his assistive technology devices. Therefore, while a hand-strengthening program could benefit STUDENT, the program was not necessary for him to benefit from his education. Moreover, the OCTS report included a recommendation for the hand-strengthening program for implementation in the home, not at school. (See Pet. Exh. EE-3.) Furthermore, the OCTS recommendation was for implementation by CCS and not the District. Therefore, there was no recommendation for the District to implement. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District was not required to implement a hand-strengthening program to meet STUDENT’s educational needs.

Second, Petitioner challenged the appropriateness of the goals and objectives. STUDENT’s July 2001 IEP contained approximately fourteen goals, broken down into a total of fifty incremental objectives. The goals and objectives target skills such as effective listening, interpreting gestures and facial expressions, participating in discourse, understanding jokes and riddles, using social judgment, initiating and maintaining socially acceptable conversations, participating in group discussions, understanding others’ perspectives, problem solving, using appropriate sentence structure, developing vocabulary and concepts, demonstrating literal comprehension, and demonstrating interpretive comprehension. Each goal and objective also indicates the percentage of target achievement to be met by certain reporting periods at which point STUDENT’s progress would be reviewed.

The Petitioner contends that the District failed to address his unique educational needs because all of the goals and objectives recommended in the July 2001 IEP were vague and unmeasurable. Specifically, Petitioner contends that the IEP contained present levels of performance (PLP) that lacked any specific score or a description of the clear baseline for which the goals and objectives could be measured. The Hearing Officer notes that some of the present levels of performance only indicate areas where STUDENT has difficulty but do not indicate specifically where STUDENT’s skills are within each of those areas. Specifically, in the area of communication development, the IEP states “STUDENT’s speech and language is characterized by delayed expressive language and delayed conversational skills, related to a pragmatics deficit and weak complex language skills.” Without a more detailed description, the IEP on its face is unclear about the extent of STUDENT’s language and communication needs. Thus, the Hearing Officer finds that the language and communication goals and objectives, with unclear present levels of performance, are not written in a manner that is objectively measurable.

However, the PLP pertaining to STUDENT’s reading, writing, and vocabulary goals and objectives are sufficiently clear and the goals and objectives are objectively measureable. The IEP indicates that STUDENT can read and comprehend at an instructional level of third grade. Additionally, the IEP indicates specifically where STUDENT is functioning with regard to spelling and use of vowels. The goals and objectives written to address STUDENT’s reading, writing, and vocabulary also indicate the grade level in which he is functioning in those areas. For example, STUDENT’s writing and spelling goals were drafted at the third grade level, and his reading and vocabulary goals were drafted at the fourth grade level. In light of the information provided, the IEP provided sufficient information regarding STUDENT’s current functioning level with which his goals and objectives in these areas could be measured.

Although it was found above that the language and communication goals were not objectively measureable on the face of the IEP, the evidence establishes that there was no prejudice that resulted from this defect. There is no dispute that STUDENT’s present levels of performance were discussed at length at the IEP meeting, and no significant dispute over the nature and extent of STUDENT’s educational needs or that the IEP team members were unknowledgeable of STUDENT’s needs. Additionally, Ms. Gold, who implemented STUDENT’s language and communication goals and objectives, testified that she understood the nature and extent of STUDENT’s needs in July 2001, when she drafted the goals objectives. Ms. Gold also testified that she started at Sunkist School in 2000 and she reviewed some of his educational documents at that time, and that she had the opportunity to observe his use of language use with other children. Thus, Ms. Gold understood STUDENT’s then-current functioning how to measure his goals and objectives. Moreover, as discussed below, Ms. Gold implemented the goals and objectives and STUDENT progressed in the area of language and communication. The Hearing Officer also notes that the IEP team had access to information regarding STUDENT’s communication needs when goals and objectives were discussed and any questions could have been presented to Ms. Gold at the time.

The Petitioner also claims that the IEP lacked any goals to address his difficulty with writing completion, fine motor fatigue, and difficulty holding a pencil. With regard to STUDENT’s “writing completion,” the IEP does include goals to assist STUDENT with writing composition. Specifically, STUDENT has a goal to recognize sentence structure and to write complete simple and compound sentences. Additionally, although there is no dispute that STUDENT has fine motor fatigue and difficulty holding a pencil, the evidence established that those difficulties did not require goals and objectives. STUDENT’s hand deficits impacted his education by slowing his physical ability to write. (Testimony of Ms. Herkimer, Ms. Shah, and Ms. Bissell.) As Ms. Bissell testified, STUDENT’s difficulty with hand use was a factor of his hand abnormality and those problems would not likely be remediated with therapy. Rather, STUDENT’s deficits would most appropriately be addressed through the provision of assistive technology and instruction on alternative ways to do things. In this instance, STUDENT’s fine motor fatigue and difficulty holding a pencil was addressed through assistive technology and accommodations such as a modified pencil grip and the provisions of word processors. In light of Ms. Bissell’s uncontested testimony that STUDENT’s fine motor weakness and difficulty holding a pencil would not likely be remediated through therapy, there is no goal or objective to measure STUDENT’s improvement in this area. In summary, the Hearing Officer finds that the IEP in fact included goals on writing and STUDENT did not require goals and objectives for his hand difficulties.

2. Calculated to Provide Some Educational Benefit

Petitioner claims that the progress reported is inflated and that he did not benefit from his education. In support of his contention, he presented the testimony of his educational advocate, Dr. Burnett. Dr. Burnett testified that her review of his educational records in June 2002 indicated that he made little growth in the area of speech and language, that he regressed in the area of adaptive skills, and that he regressed in the area of written composition. She also based her opinion on her two-hour observation of STUDENT about that same time.

The evidence establishes that STUDENT received some educational benefit from his education. The progress reports filled out by STUDENT’s RSP teacher and Ms. Gold, his speech and language pathologist, indicate that STUDENT made progress towards his IEP goals and objectives. (Pet. Exh. DD.) Ms. Gold wrote in the report that STUDENT had made “good progress, demonstrating more confidence in his social and verbal skills in speech class and on campus.” Additionally, Ms. Gold testified that STUDENT had met some of his objectives, although he had not met some of his annual goals. According to his fifth grade report card filled out by Ms. Knox, his general education teacher, STUDENT was “making social and academic progress.” She elaborated that STUDENT “was more social than at the beginning of the 5th grade,” and that progress had been “slow but steady.” Although the report card indicated many areas in which STUDENT was below grade level, Ms. Knox wrote that STUDENT’s progress is not “ readily discernible using this grading system.”

Although Dr. Burnett testified that his progress was slow or regressing, Dr. Burnett’s opinion was based on a review of the records and a brief observation. On the other hand, the testimony, progress reports, and report card were offered by teachers and service providers who worked with STUDENT directly over the course of the entire school year. Those persons would have the most first-hand information about how STUDENT actually performs at school. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds such evidence more persuasive than Dr. Burnett’s testimony regarding STUDENT’s educational progress. Accordingly, the evidence established that STUDENT benefited from his education.

3. Conforms to his IEP

Petitioner asserts that the District’s provided program did not comport with the January 2002 IEP recommendations for the implementation of homework logs. Regarding the homework logs, Ms. Herkimer’s uncontested testimony establishes that she implemented a daily planner to track STUDENT’s homework and that accommodation was successful for STUDENT. Additionally, it was noted in STUDENT’s September 2002 IEP that “STUDENT is able to independently write assignments in his student planner, completes homework, and is able to quickly locate needed materials in his work environment.” (Pet. Exh. II-4.) Petitioner presented no persuasive evidence that the homework logs were not implemented. From the evidence presented, and because Petitioner made no other significant allegation of nonconformity, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District’s program did comport his IEPs. (Footnote 20)

****

In summary, it was found above that STUDENT did not require a hand-strengthening program or goals and objectives to address his fine motor fatigue or difficulty holding a pencil to meet his unique educational needs. Additionally, although it was found that his language and communication goals and objectives were objectively unmeasureable, no prejudice resulted from this as the IEP team had adequate time to discuss the goals and objectives and the implementer of the goals and objectives was able to implement them. Additionally, the District’s program provided him with some education benefit and comported with his IEPs. Thus, the District provided STUDENT a FAPE for the 2001-2002 school year.

D. 2002-2003 School Year

For the 2002-2003 school year, Petitioner claims that the District failed to meet his needs because the goals and objectives contained in his September 2002 IEP were vague and not objectively measurable, and that the District did not offer goals and objectives to address his difficulty with reading fluency and “auditory processing.” (Pet. Closing Brief at pg. 15.) Petitioner also contends again that the District inflated its reporting of his progress on the goals and objectives and that he did not benefit from his education. Petitioner also asserts that the program provided by the District did not comport with his IEP.

1. Designed to Meet STUDENT’s Unique Educational Needs

Just prior to the beginning of the 2002-2003 school year, STUDENT was medically diagnosed as having agenesis of the corpus callosum. Even in light of his new diagnosis, STUDENT’s areas of need did not change significantly from previous years. He continued to have difficulty with pragmatic language (now impacting expressive language and conversational skills), writing composition, math skills that are vocabulary-driven or that involve problem solving and abstract reasoning, and social interaction and interpreting nonverbal social cues. To address STUDENT’s needs, the District made two educational offers, one in September 2002 (with November 2002 addenda) and one in May 2003.

a. September 12, 2002 IEP

In its September 2002 IEP, the District offered STUDENT for the 2002-2003 school year a regular education placement with 540 minutes per week of RSP services and one thirty-minute session of speech and language services per week. The District also offered from September 12 through October 25 five two-hour sessions of speech and language instruction through the use of the Fast ForWord program to work on his auditory skills. No consent was ever provided by the PARENTS to implement this IEP. The IEP also includes eight goals, broken down into twenty-three short-term objectives, to address STUDENT’s ability to listen effectively, to interpret gestures and facial expressions, to participate in discourse, to initiate and continue socially acceptable conversations, read with fluency, to ask questions about what he reads, to develop a multi-sentence paragraph, and to perform math calculations. Apparently, revised written language goal and objectives were offered to STUDENT during the November 2002 IEP meeting, to reflect his recent WIAT assessment. (Footnote 21)

Petitioner claims first that the goals and objectives in the September 2002 IEP relating to communication and pragmatics are inappropriate because the goals are vague and unmeasureable. Petitioner takes issue with the clarity of the wording of the goals indicating “effective listening,” “interpret gestures and facial expressions,” “participating in discourse” and initiating and continuing “socially acceptable conversations.” Petitioner presented no persuasive evidence to support his allegation that the goals are vague or unmeasureable. On the contrary, the evidence establishes that the goals are sufficiently clear and are measurable.

The goals Petitioner challenges were developed with significant involvement from Lynn Gold, STUDENT’s speech and language pathologist for the past year. Ms. Gold testified that “effective listening” means “understanding what you hear” and this is measured partly through STUDENT’s progress on a computer software called “Fast ForWord” that measures this skill. Additionally, Ms. Gold testified that “interpret gestures and facial expressions” relates to the ability to determine what a gesture or facial expression means, such as what emotion is related to the gesture or facial expression. Ms. Gold stated that the interpretation of gestures and facial expressions is a component of the social pragmatic rules of language that have been defined by speech and language pathologists. Moreover, Ms. Gold testified that “participating in discourse without tangential statements” means participating in conversations on topic. She measures this by counting off-topic remarks and cueing STUDENT to get back on topic. Furthermore, Ms. Gold testified that the “socially acceptable conversations” goal was aimed at teaching STUDENT to follow the rules of social pragmatics pertaining to conversations. There is no question that Ms. Gold, who is the person implementing STUDENT’s communication and pragmatics goals, understood the goals and how to measure them.

The short-term objectives also provided information to define the terms used in the annual goals. For example, the short-term objective for the “effective listening” goal focuses on STUDENT’s ability to listen to and to follow directions. Similarly, the short-term objectives for the goal regarding the interpretation of “facial expressions and gestures” concentrates on STUDENT’s responses to smiles, frowns, and puzzled expressions. The other language and communication goals are similarly explained through their short-term objectives. From the undisputed testimony of Ms. Gold and the clarifying information provided from the short-term objectives, the Hearing Officer finds that the goals challenged by Petitioner are sufficiently clear and measureable the way they are written.

Petitioner also claims that the District’s offered math goal was not identified by STUDENT’s teacher and assessments as an area of need, although he does not dispute that he has difficulty in math. (Pet. Exh. II-11.) The evidence establishes that the goal was based on assessments on STUDENT’s progress in math. Specifically, the “baseline” information of the goal indicated that STUDENT’s weaknesses in math were based on his performance in the math standards test. The present levels of performance on page four of the IEP indicate that STUDENT scored at the 54th percentile on a comprehensive math standards test at the fourth grade level. In light of this information, the evidence establishes that the goal is based on assessment information or other information of STUDENT’s present levels of performance and was not simply a “generic” goal as Petitioner contends.

Lastly, Petitioner contends that the November 2002 revised writing composition goal is not objectively measureable because it did not have a grade level indicator. However, the face of the document containing the goal indicates that the goal’s baseline is Petitioner’s written language score on his recent WIAT assessment. That score places STUDENT at the 3.0 grade level in written expression. This information is sufficient to describe STUDENT’s then-current functioning level and can appropriately be used as a baseline with which his goals and objectives could be measured. Thus, the goal Petitioner challenged did have an objectively measureable baseline.

In summary, the evidence establishes that the goals offered by the District in the September 2002 IEP and November 2002 addenda were measureable and appropriate for STUDENT.

b. May 15, 2003 IEP

Pursuant to the May 16, 2003 IEP, the District offered for the remainder of the 2002-2003 school year placement in special education for part of his school day, with 480 minutes per week of RSP support. Additionally, the District offered STUDENT two thirty-minute sessions per week of speech and language therapy and five two-hour sessions per week of instruction in the Fast ForWord Program. The District also offered five goals, broken down into fifteen objectives, to address STUDENT’s reading comprehension, pragmatic language relating to his ability to follow directions and interpret facial expressions and gestures, writing composition, and math skills.

Petitioner contends that the goals are inappropriate because they were not measureable, did not incorporate Dr. Paul’s assessment results, and because they lacked goals in articulation, morphology, semantics, auditory processing, gross and fine motor needs, assistive technology needs, adaptive physical education, and social skills. Petitioner presented no specifics regarding his general allegations, such as why the goals are not measureable, what part of Dr. Paul’s assessment report needed to be incorporated into a goal but was not, and what type of goals within the areas listed above was required. With regard to Petitioner’s first contention, the goals in the May 2003 IEP are clear on the face of the document and were written similarly to the goals described in the section immediately above. Thus, for the same reasons stated above, the goals in the May 2003 IEP are also clear and measurable.

As for Petitioner’s remaining allegations, it was found above that Dr. Paul’s report was discussed extensively at the IEP meeting and by persons appropriate to review the results. Petitioner did not state specifically how Dr. Paul’s assessment findings should have been incorporated, and presented no evidence to clarify or support her position. The same problem is also found with Petitioner’s last contention. Without the Petitioner’s presenting evidence to support his allegations, the Hearing Officer cannot determine the validity of Petitioner’s arguments.

To the extent that Petitioner claims he had an educational need in articulation, Ms. Gold’s testimony disputed this contention. Ms. Gold testified uncontrovertedly that, while STUDENT has an unusual speech pattern, he does not have an articulation problem that requires special education services. Ms. Gold also testified that STUDENT does not have educational needs in the area of syntax and morphology. With regard to Petitioner’s claims that he required goals for fine motor and gross motor skills, there is also no evidence that he had educational needs in these areas. Both the District’s reports and the OCTS report, and the testimony of district occupational therapists, indicate that STUDENT’s skills are functional. Petitioner did not elaborate on what educational needs resulting from any auditory processing weaknesses required goals and objectives. Moreover, for the same reasons stated above, there is no requirement that STUDENT have goals and objectives for “assisstive technology.” Furthermore, regarding social skills, the IEP did include goals and objectives to address his interpretation of facial expressions and gestures in a small-group setting. From the above, the Hearing Officer concludes that STUDENT’s IEP appropriately addressed his educational needs.

2. Calculated to Provide Some Educational Benefit a. September 2002 IEP

As noted above, the PARENTS did not consent to the September 2002 IEP or addendum, therefore, the IEP was never implemented. Additionally, Petitioner makes no specific allegation that the IEP was not designed to provide him with some educational benefit. (Footnote 22) As described above, there was no significant dispute over the type and level of services provided. Additionally, the goals and objectives addressed STUDENT’s educational needs. Witnesses including Ms. Gold and Ms. Ebright testified that the goals were developed based on STUDENT’s needs and what he could reasonably accomplish. No persuasive evidence to the contrary was presented. Hence, the evidence establishes that the September 2002 IEP and addendum were reasonably calculated to provide STUDENT with some educational benefit. (Footnote 23)

b. May 2003 IEP

With regard to the time period from May 16, 2003, through the end of the school year at the end of June 2003, the evidence establishes that STUDENT made progress. According to STUDENT’s progress reports, STUDENT met many of his IEP goals. The testimony of Ms. Gold and Ms. Ebright support this fact. Additionally, during this time, STUDENT was provided the Fast ForWord program to work on his listening skills. When STUDENT completed the program, a report was issued that tracked his progress. The completion report and Ms. Gold’s testimony establish that STUDENT made “amazing” progress in this area with the program. From the above, the Hearing Officer concludes that STUDENT received some educational benefit during this time.

3. Conforms to his IEP

Finally, Petitioner contends generally that the District failed to provide him with the some of the speech and language services identified and agreed to in his May 2003 IEP. That IEP states that STUDENT was to receive two thirty-minutes sessions per week of speech and language therapy. Petitioner provided no information regarding specifically how much of the services the District allegedly failed to provide. (Footnote 24) Lynn Gold, STUDENT’s speech and language therapist, testified that STUDENT received one half-hour session of speech and language therapy per week after the September 2002 IEP meeting. It is unclear from Ms. Gold’s testimony how long the services were provided and whether the speech and language services provided increased after May 2003, when the IEP team agreed to an additional thirty-minute session of therapy per week. Because there is no evidence regarding what services were provided from the May 2003 IEP meeting through the end of the 2002-2003 school year, the Hearing Officer cannot determine whether the District’s program comported with his IEP. Because the District has the burden of proving compliance with the IDEA at the administrative hearing level, the District has not met its burden to establish that these services were provided. (Footnote 25)

**** In conclusion, it was found above that the District’s offered and provided programs were designed to meet his educational needs and were reasonably calculated to provide him with educational benefit. However, the District did not meet its burden of establishing that the program comported with the May 2003 IEP pertaining to some of the speech and language services during STUDENT’s final two months in the District.

IV. Is STUDENT entitled to the following remedies:

A. Reimbursement for the cost of the independent evaluation conducted by Dr. Lynn Paul.

Pursuant to special education law, a parent has the right to obtain an independent educational assessment of the student if the parent disagrees with an assessment obtained by a district. If a request for such an independent assessment is made, a district must either agree to pay for the assessment, or it must file for a due process hearing requesting a determination that its assessment was appropriate. However, if the educational agency establishes at a due process hearing that its assessment is appropriate, it is not required to pay for the independent evaluation. In such a situation, the parent still has the right to an independent educational assessment, but not at public expense. If the parent obtains an independent educational assessment at private expense, the results of the assessment shall be considered by the public education agency with respect to the provision of free, appropriate public education to the child, and may be presented as evidence at a due process hearing pursuant to Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 56500) regarding the child. Cal. Educ. Code § 56329(b); 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b).

It was found above that the District appropriately assessed STUDENT during all time periods at issue. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to reimbursement for Dr. Paul’s neuropsychological assessment. Accordingly, Petitioner’s request for reimbursement for the assessment is denied.

B. An order requiring the District to assess STUDENT’s need for assistive technology and in the areas of sensory integration, speech and language development, central auditory processing, and vision development.

It was found above that the District appropriately assessed STUDENT during all time periods at issue. Therefore, no order requiring the District to conduct the assessments requested by Petitioner is necessary or warranted. Accordingly, Petitioner’s request is denied.

C. Compensatory education.

The Petitioner contends that he is entitled to one year of unspecified compensatory education services to address all areas of suspected disability not assessed by the District since March 2000. Additionally, the Petitioner requests that he be provided compensatory education in the form of intensive services for one year from the Reading and Language Center, a nonpublic agency.

Courts have consistently held that the authority to award compensatory education is derived from 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)92)(B)(iii), which authorizes a court to grant such “relief as it determines is appropriate.” “The purpose of compensatory education is to replace lost educational services.” Moubry v. Independent School District Number 696, 951 F.Supp. 867 (8th Cir. 1996). Compensatory education may be an appropriate equitable remedy when the responsible educational authority has failed to provide a disabled child with an appropriate education as required by the IDEA. Todd v. Andrews, 933 F.2d 1576 (11th Cir. 1991). There is, however, no obligation to compensate the child by providing a day of education for each educational day lost. “Compensatory education is not a contractual remedy, but an equitable remedy, part of the Court’s resources in crafting appropriate relief...Appropriate relief is relief designed to ensure that the student is appropriately educated within the meaning of the IDEA.” Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School District, 31 F3d 1489 (9th Cir. 1994). Equitable considerations are therefore appropriate when fashioning compensatory remedies. An application of equitable principles requires that the actions of the parties themselves must be considered when evaluating the circumstances surrounding the child’s lost educational opportunity and in creating an adequate remedy. Id. Thus, when considering a request for compensatory education, it is first necessary to determine whether a school district failed to provide a FAPE. If that issue is answered in the affirmative, the subsequent question is not what precise services were missed but, rather, what compensatory services are necessary to provide an appropriate education under the law.

With regard to Petitioner’s request for one year of unspecified compensatory education services, it was found above that the District appropriately assessed STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability. Therefore, there are no areas of need that the District failed to identify that must be addressed with compensatory education services. Accordingly, the Petitioner’s request for unspecified compensatory education services is denied.

D. Intensive services for one year from the Reading and Language Center, a nonpublic agency.

Petitioner also requests intensive services from the Reading and Language Center for one year as a form of compensatory education for any denials of FAPE. As was found above, the District provided STUDENT with a FAPE during all times periods at issue. Therefore, STUDENT is not entitled to compensatory education and Petitioner’s request is denied.

ORDER

All of Petitioner’s claims for relief are denied.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following finding is made in accordance with this statute: The District substantially prevailed on all of the issues heard and decided. (Footnote 26)

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. Education Code § 56505(i).

DATED: October 10, 2003 ____________________________________ Van T. Vu, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

This decision was amended to correct the dates on which the hearing convened. The changes do not affect the substance of this decision.

2 The issues listed here differ in numbering and content from those noticed by Petitioner prior to the hearing. Changes were made in light of the clarification of issues at the beginning of hearing and for the purposes of organization and appropriate analysis. This Decision will not address issues not raised by Petitioner in his ten-day issue statement and during the issue clarification at hearing, but that were raised for the first time during the course of the hearing or in his closing brief.

3 According to Dr. Lynn Paul, a licensed clinical psychologist, ACC is a congenital condition in which a person is born without the corpus collosum, i.e., the band of fibers connecting the right and left hemispheres of the brain. Dr. Paul states that persons with ACC tend to have difficulty extracting information from the environment, learning new tasks, generalizing information, and higher-order thinking.

4 STUDENT’s November 1999 occupational therapy report describes STUDENT’s congenital hand condition as “windswept fingers.” (Pet. Exh. P.1.)

5 Petitioner made no allegation regarding the scheduling of the May 2003 IEP meeting.

6 According to the undisputed testimony of Mr. Irvine, the District scheduled an IEP meeting on October 24, 2002, but MOTHER cancelled that meeting. MOTHER wanted five days prior to the IEP meeting to review the assessment reports but the District had not provided the reports to MOTHER in time for the October meeting. Thus, the meeting was rescheduled in order to accommodate MOTHER’s request.

7 The Hearing Officer notes that November 1, 2002, fell on a Friday. Therefore, although the meeting was held four calendar days late, two of the four days were weekend days.

8 Although she testified that the psychologist should consult with her or someone with expertise in ACC first and that no District person did this, Dr. Burnett was present at the IEP meeting and did consult with Dr. Paul about the report as discussed below.

9 It appears that Petitioner wanted the attendance at the IEP meeting of someone with expertise in agenesis of the corpus callosum. According to Dr. Paul, only she and one other person in the world has expertise in this area.

10 There is nothing in either California or federal law that requires districts to agree to parentally imposed conditions of assessment. A school district has the legal authority to choose who will conduct an assessment as long as the person is qualified to conduct the assessment under the law. Similarly, a school district has discretion to determine how the assessment will be conducted. (See: SN 1549-99; Doe. v. Phillips, 20 IDELR 1150, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Andress v. Cleveland Independent School District, 64 F.3d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1995); Vander Malle v. Ambach, 673 F.2d 49, 53 (2nd Cir. 1983).) Thus, the District’s failure to provide the information on the curriculum vitae of the District’s assessor as requested by MOTHER and Dr. Burnett is not equivalent to the District refusing to conduct the assessment.

11 Petitioner also contended that the District committed procedural violations by failing to review his goals and objectives during his August 2000, July 2001, and November 2002 IEP meetings. However, Petitioner does not allege any prejudice that resulted from the alleged denial. Because Petitioner makes specific substantive challenges to his goals and objectives, the Hearing Officer finds it unnecessary to rule on Petitioner’s procedural allegation when Petitioner’s substantive allegations will be addressed below.

12 During the clarification of issues at the beginning of the hearing, the Petitioner alleged that his direct occupational therapy services were discontinued in 2001 rather than 2000. However, the evidence indicates that Petitioner’s direct occupational therapy services were discontinued during August 2000 and not during the 2001 calendar year.

13 It is determined below that the STUDENT’s August 2000 IEP team appropriately discontinued STUDENT’s direct OT services based on the information available, such as information provided by STUDENT’s OT therapist and her report of STUDENT’s therapeutic progress in August 2000.

14 Although Ms. Gold acknowledged that only a licensed audiologist can diagnose a central auditory processing disorder, there is no indication that a formal diagnosis is required to address STUDENT’s educational needs. Rather, Ms. Gold’s uncontested testimony established that the District’s assessments were appropriate to identify the manifestations of auditory processing deficit that would need to be addressed in the educational environment. Additionally, there is no dispute that the District personnel were qualified to conduct the assessments listed above.

15 Parental consent for an evaluation of a child is required before a school district can assess the child. California Education Code § 56321(c) and U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(A)(i).

16 During the course of the hearing, Petitioner alleged that the District during October 2002 inappropriately conducted the Test of Oral Reading Fluency, when it should have conducted the Grey Oral Reading Fluency Test as agreed to on the September 2002 assessment plan. Because the Petitioner did not raise this challenge when the issues were clarified on the first day of hearing, that issue was not appropriately raised for hearing. Nevertheless, although the “Grey Oral Reading Fluency” was handwritten into the September 2002 assessment plan, the plan clearly states that the consent “may include, but are not limited to” the assessment tools listed on the plan. Therefore, the District had discretion to choose the assessment tools for the assessment, and its choice not to conduct the Gray Oral Reading Fluency Test was an appropriate exercise of that discretion.

17 Federal and State law also requires that districts educate disabled children in the least restrictive environment, with removal form the regular education environment occurring only when the nature and severity of the children’s disabilities is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aides and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily. (20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56301.) Petitioner does not dispute that his educational placements have been in the least restrictive environment as required by law.

18 Petitioner’s allegation that the District inflated his progress appeared to be directed at the entire time period at issue (i.e., from March 2000 through the end of the 2002-2003 school year). Petitioner did not explain how measurement of his progress was inflated for each school year at issue.

19 There is not dispute here that the District failed to consider that OCTS assessment report.

20 Petitioner also argued that the District failed to provide STUDENT his medications on a consistent basis. Even assuming that this contention is true, no evidence was presented to indicate how this failure specifically denied Petitioner a FAPE under the IDEA.

21 Writing on the goal document indicates that the goal was offered to the PARENTS at the October IEP meeting. However, as discussed above, the originally scheduled IEP meeting for October was rescheduled to November 2002.

22 Although Petitioner makes the same general contention that the District inflated his progress, because the IEP was never implemented, the question at hand is whether the offered program was reasonably calculated to provide him with educational benefit, and not whether the program actually provided him with that benefit. Therefore, the Hearing Officer will not address that generic allegation. Additionally, although the May 2003 was consented to, that IEP was implemented just over a month before the end of the school year and STUDENT’s exit from the Anaheim City School District. (See Adams v. Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that review must focus on adequacy of proposed program at time it was drafted).)

23 Apparently, STUDENT was receiving services pursuant to his prior July 2001 IEP, except his RSP services, which were increased during the fall of 2002, and the FastForWord program, implemented by agreement of the PARENTS. The Hearing Officer notes that there was substantial evidence presented at hearing that established that STUDENT did make significant progress during the 2002-2003 school year, despite the fact that District never implemented the September 2002 IEP. This progress is established by the progress reports, report card, and testimony of the teachers and service providers working directly with STUDENT.

24 The notes from the PARENTS that are attached at the end of the May 2003 IEP indicate that the PARENTS believed that the District had only been providing STUDENT one thirty-minute session per week of speech and language services when two sessions were required. Given that Petitioner’s issue relates to the time period after the May IEP meeting through the end of the 2002-2003 school year, the note is not relevant to this issue and there was no information in the record about what was provided after the May IEP meeting.

25 Because there is no evidence of what services were provided after May 2003, the Hearing Officer has insufficient information to fashion a compensatory education remedy for this denial.

26 During the clarification of issues at the beginning of hearing, Petitioner raised approximately ten allegations regarding how the District failed to appropriately assess him, fourteen allegations regarding why the goals and objectives were inappropriate, nineteen procedural allegations, and four requests for remedies. Even with the Hearing Officer's reorganization and consolidation of the issues for appropriate analysis, this decision involved a multitude of issues. As was found above, Petitioner presented no evidence to support many of his allegations. Additionally, many of Petitioner’s issues had no nexus with and would not have resulted in the remedies Petitioner sought. Thus, Petitioner would have been better served to narrow his case to those issues of real disagreement and substance, rather than utilize a kitchen sink approach to litigation.