California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · October 24, 1996
Student v. Riverside Unified School District
SEHO Case No. SN 660-96 · Hearing Officer Carin N. Crain
Riverside Unified must provide a full-time instructional aide to a student at her parochial school for 1996-97.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Summary
The parents of a six-year-old kindergartner with cerebral palsy filed this case. She was eligible for special education because of "low incidence disabilities." Both sides agreed that Riverside Unified offered her a free appropriate public education (FAPE): regular kindergarten at Alcott Elementary with a full-time instructional aide. They also agreed she needs that aide to benefit from school. The parents enrolled her at Saint Catherine's of Alexandria, a Catholic school her brothers attend. They asked the District to provide the aide there. The District refused. It argued that federal rules on parentally placed students (known as EDGAR, the Education Department General Administrative Regulations) did not require on-site services. It also said that serving 38 private schools would be unworkable and that it could not supervise staff at private sites.
The Hearing Officer reviewed conflicting federal appeals court decisions and federal guidance letters. She concluded that parentally placed students have some rights to services and that a district's discretion is open to review. The District lost on all four factors she weighed. It did not show it had done the required consultation. Its blanket refusal denied a "genuine opportunity for equitable participation," because an aide is only comparable if provided on site. There was no evidence that an aide would cost more at Saint Catherine's. The District also offered no evidence of real personnel problems. She ordered a full-time aide at Saint Catherine's for the rest of the 1996-97 school year.
Why it matters
This decision shows how SEHO handled on-site services for parentally placed students before the 1997 IDEA amendments. It rejected a district's blanket refusal to serve students at private schools. It weighed four factors: consultation, comparable benefits, cost, and personnel issues. It also declined to follow the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in K.R.
Issues and holdings
- Student prevailedFAPE: services offered
Issue 1. Must the District provide the student with the services of a full-time instructional aide at her private, parochial elementary school (under EDGAR, 34 C.F.R. §§76.651-76.662, as applied to parentally placed students)?
The District misused its discretion under EDGAR by refusing an on-site aide at the parochial school. It did not consult as required, its blanket policy denied comparable benefits and equitable participation, and it showed no added cost and no real personnel problems.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- Order to provide or change services. The District shall provide the student with the services of a full-time instructional aide at Saint Catherine's for the remainder of the 1996-97 school year.
Key authorities
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Dreher v. Amphitheater Unified School District, 22 F.3d 228 (9th Cir. 1994); K.R. v. Anderson Community School Corp., 81 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 1996); Russman v. Sobol, 85 F.3d 1050 (2d Cir. 1996); Goodall v. Stafford County School Board, 930 F.2d 363 (4th Cir. 1991); 60 F.3d 168 (4th Cir. 1995); Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982); Union School Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519 (9th Cir. 1994); Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1988); Fowler v. Unified School District No. 259, 900 F.Supp. 1540 (D. Kan. 1995); Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 907 F.Supp. 966 (M.D. La. 1995); Foley v. Special School District of St. Louis County, 927 F.Supp. 1214 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Natchez-Adams School District (918 F.Supp.); Letter to Burch, 23 IDELR 560 (OSEP 1995); 34 C.F.R. §§76.651-76.662 (EDGAR); 34 C.F.R. §§300.403, 300.451-300.452; Education Code §56026.5
People named in the decision
- Ace Atkinson, non-attorney advocate for Student
- Dr. Marilyn McCall, Special Education Director; District representative and witness, Riverside Unified School District
- Donna Bockover, Coordinator of Special Education, Riverside Unified School District
- Saint Catherine's of Alexandria, private parochial school (parental placement)
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Carin N. Crain, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office, Mc George School of Law, in Riverside, California on October 3, 1996.
Present on behalf of Petitioner were her parents. Non-attorney advocate Ace Atkinson, assisted the parents at the hearing.
Respondent Riverside Unified School District (the District)
was represented by Dr. Marilyn McCall, the District's Special Education Director. Donna Bockover, the District's Coordinator of Special Education appeared on behalf of the District.
ISSUE
Must the District provide the student with the services of a full-time instructional aide at her private, parochial elementary school?
POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
Both the parents and the District agree that the District provided and now continues to offer the student a free, appropriate, public education (FAPE), consisting of a regular education program with the services of a full-time instructional aide, at Alcott Elementary, one of its public schools. Both parties also agree that the student requires the assistance of an instructional aide to obtain educational benefit from her regular education placement. The parties disagree, however, about who must bear the cost of the instructional aide at the parochial school.
1. Petitioner's position
Noting that the District once provided and continues to offer the student a full-time aide at Alcott, the parents argue that under Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993), it should now offer and pay for the same assistance at her private, parochial school.
2. Respondent's position
The District asserts that it provided and continues to offer the student a FAPE consisting of a regular education program with a full-time aide at Alcott. Therefore, the Education Department General Administrative Regulations (EDGAR) do not require District to provide the student with a full-time aide at her parochial school. The District also argued that it would not be "feasible" to provide staff for the large number of parochial schools within its boundaries. Finally, the District asserted that could not properly supervise or evaluate staff located at a parochial school.
SUMMARY OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE
Six-year-old student lives with her parents and two older brothers within the District in Riverside, California. She qualifies for special education services because she has "low incidence disabilities" caused by cerebral palsy.
The student was born twenty weeks premature and spent the first six weeks of her life in the neo-natal units of the University of California, Irvine and Riverside Medical Centers. Doctors diagnosed the student with cerebral palsy when she was one year old.
Now in her sixth year, the student cannot walk. She relies on a manual wheelchair as her legs cannot bear her weight -- she weighs twenty six pounds. According to her mother, the student can roll on the floor and "combat crawl" and is learning to use a walker. The student has limited use of her left arm and cannot straighten either of her arms completely. The parents hope that an upcoming surgery will allow her to extend her arms.
The student's speech is limited. Her vocabulary consists of such monosyllabic words as "hey," "yes," "no," and "thank you." The student augments her oral speech with hand gestures. When she is inclined, she uses the "Alpha Talker" that the District provided to further assist with communication. The student's parents maintain that her hearing and vision are normal. Her parents have not tested her for other impairments and indicate that they have no reason to believe that others exist.
While the student is able to eat with her fingers, she often needs assistance at meal times. She is learning to use utensils, but needs assistance to properly position them and her food. The student also needs assistance during dressing. She wears diapers and requires adult help for toileting.
The student's parents enrolled her in a private pre-school when she was three-years old. Then from April through June 1995, the student attended a pre-school for non-severely disabled students at her home school, Alcott Elementary. In June 1995, she enrolled in a regular education kindergarten class at Alcott.
There were thirty three children in the class. Pursuant to the student's April 18, 1995 IEP which stated that her need "for aide assistance will be determined by Spec. Ed.," the District assigned an instructional aide to the student for three of the four hours of her school day. When necessary, the District arranged with other staff to have an aide for the student's entire school day.
While at Alcott, the District also provided the student with speech and language services twice a week, a "Ski chair" to facilitate movement and an "Alpha Talker" to help with oral communication.
The May 1996 IEP Supplement indicates that the student had "shown progress in all areas although some objectives were only partially met." This IEP also reflects that her parents requested that the student not undergo psychological evaluation because her inability to speak or write would prevent an accurate evaluation.
For the 1996-97 school year, the parents enrolled the student in Saint Catherine's of Alexandria (Saint Catherine's), a private, parochial school, which is close to their home. The student's mother testified that Catholic education is very important to the family. Both of the student's older brothers attend Saint Catherine's and the parents want to give the student the same educational opportunities that her brothers have.
Saint Catherine's is the mainstay of the family's social, educational, and religious activities. Although the student's mother believes that the student received a FAPE at Alcott, the student's mother enrolled her at Saint Catherine's so that she could attend the same school as her brothers and participate in the same social and religious activities as the rest of the family.
The student attends a regular education kindergarten class at Saint Catherine's. There are forty two children in her class, one teacher and two aides. Neither of the aides is assigned to the student, but when they can they assist her. Both parties agree that the assistance of a full-time aide would enable her to participate in the regular education program in a meaningful way. According to the student's mother, the aide would probably need to help the student with such tasks as getting and storing her school supplies, feeding herself at snack time, putting on her sweater, going to the toilet, positioning her pencil and paper, and moving around the classroom.
The District has purchased and provided the parents with the specialized equipment that the student needs to implement her IEP, such as the Alpha Talker, ski chair and swing. In addition, the May 29, 1996 IEP indicates that the District has also offered the student two thirty-minute speech and language sessions every week. These sessions "will be provided at home school." Although the District has offered the student occupational and physical therapy, she is "receiving ot/pt outside the District [by] parent choice."
The District will not offer the student an instructional aide to assist her at Saint Catherine's. According to Dr. McCall, The District does not provide direct services at private schools because it is not legally required to do so. Furthermore, Dr. McCall explained that the District would face a "logistical nightmare" if it provided direct services to disabled students at the thirty eight private schools located within its boundaries. According to Dr. McCall, it would be even more difficult to provide direct services to students residing within the District but who attend private schools outside of the District. Finally, the District doubts that it could provide and properly supervise staff working at private school sites. The District will, however, consult with and provide materials and equipment to private schools serving disabled students residing within its boundaries. When appropriate, the District also invites private school staff to its in-service trainings.
The May 29, 1996 IEP shows that the parents "requested aide assistance at the church school." While the District refuses to provide the student with an aide at Saint Catherine's, District staff consults with the private school on issues related to the student's education.
DISCUSSION
1. Must the District provide the student with a full-time aide at her private school pursuant to EDGAR?
a. Statute and regulations
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the federal government provides monetary grants to participating states for assistance in educating disabled students.
Participating states must offer all disabled students the right to a FAPE. (20 U.S.C. §1400(c); §1401(a)(16-18); §1412(1) and (2)(B).) The local school district must prepare for each disabled student an Individualized Education Plan (IEP) that identifies the special education and related services necessary to meet that child's needs, and the district must then offer to provide those services at full public expense. (20 U.S.C. §§1412(4), 1414(a)(5).) Special education means specially designed instruction to meet the needs of a child with a disability. (20 U.S.C. §1401(a)(16).) Related services are those required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education. (20 U.S.C. §1401(a)(17).)
If a disabled student has a FAPE available to her in the public schools and the parents voluntarily choose to place her in a private school, the school district is not required to pay the private school tuition. (34 C.F.R. §300.403(a).) Rather, with regard to these so-called "parentally-placed children," school districts must "make services available" in accordance with three general provisions of law. (34 C.F.R. §300.403(a); 34 C.F.R. §450-452.) First, school districts "shall" provide special education and related services designed to meet the needs of parentally-placed students residing within their jurisdiction. (34 C.F.R. §300.452.) Second, state special education plans must assure that:
[T]o the extent consistent with the number and location of children with disabilities in the State who are enrolled in private elementary and secondary schools, provision is made for the participation of such children in the program assisted or carried out under this subchapter by providing for such children special education and related services.
(20 U.S.C. §1413(a)(4)(A); 34 C.F.R. 300.451(a).) Third, the school district must comply with the Education Department General Administrative Regulations (EDGAR). (34 C.F.R. §300.451(b); 34 C.F.R. §76.651-76.662.)
Under EDGAR, states and their local school districts must provide parentally-placed students with a "genuine opportunity for equitable participation" in a manner that is consistent with the number of eligible private school students and their needs. (34 C.F.R. §76.651(a)(1-2).) EDGAR mandates that public agencies consult with appropriate representatives of parentally-placed students before determining such matters as which children will receive benefits, what benefits will be provided, and how the benefits will be provided. (34 C.F.R. §652-653.) The program benefits that are provided to parentally-placed students must be "comparable in quality, scope and opportunity for participation" to the program benefits provided to disabled students enrolled in the public schools. (34 C.F.R. §76.654(a).)
With respect to parentally-placed students, the Ninth Circuit has noted the distinction between private school tuition, on one hand, and special education and related services, on the other. Dreher v. Amphitheater Unified School District, 22 F.3d 228, (9th Cir. 1994). In this case, the parents of a profoundly hearing impaired child objected to the program that the District provided. The parents enrolled the child, who lived in Arizona, in an school for the deaf in St. Louis, Missouri and requested that the Arizona District reimburse them for the speech therapy that their child received in Missouri. The District refused to pay for the speech therapy, arguing that it had fulfilled its legal obligation by continuing to offer an appropriate program that includes speech therapy in Arizona.
In the Ninth Circuit's view, offering a FAPE relieves the school district of responsibility to pay for private school tuition, but does not relieve the school district of responsibility to provide special education and related services that are "designed to meet the needs" of parentally-placed students. (Id. at p. 234.) In Dreher, the court held that the District did not have to reimburse the student for speech therapy services because they did not conform to the services proposed in the District's IEP. But the Ninth Circuit also stated:
The regulations distinguish between the [parentally-placed] child's private school tuition, which the school district does not have to pay if it offers a FAPE, and the child's special education and related services, for which the school does have to pay. 34 C.F.R. 300.403 and 300.451. Under the latter regulation, the school district has to provide special education and related services to children in private schools in the state.
(Id. at p. 234; See also 34 C.F.R. 76.654(a).)
b. Agency interpretation of statute and regulations
The U.S. Department of Education's Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP) has consistently expressed the opinion, in policy letters, that parentally-placed students do not have an "individual entitlement" to services, but rather that EDGAR confers discretion on school authorities in this regard. OSEP's position is that:
These regulations do not confer on every parentally-placed child with a disability an individual entitlement to services. Rather, these regulations authorize State and local educational agencies to make determinations as to the number of private school children with disabilities who will be served, and about the nature and extent of services to be provided. Although a public agency is not required to serve each and every private school child residing in its jurisdiction, nor to make the full range of services available to those children whom it has elected to serve, the services that are provided must be comparable to those provided to public school students.
Letter to Burch, 23 IDELR 560, 562 (1995); Letter to Anonymous, 23 IDELR 650, 652 (1995); Letter to Graham, 22 IDELR 502, 503 (1994), Letter to Mentink, 18 IDELR 276, 279 (1991). Similarly, OSEP takes the position that a school district is not necessarily required to provide services to a parentally-placed student on the premises of the private school. Letter to McConnell, 22 IDELR 369 (1994); Letter to Anonymous, 21 IDELR 745, 746 (1994); Letter to Schmidt, 20 IDELR 1224, 1225 (1993). A public school site or a neutral site may be appropriate. Letter from Davila, 16 EHLR 1398, 1399-1400 (1990). Whether a school district would have to provide services at a private school would depend on the specific facts respecting all parentally-placed students to whom it is providing services. (Id. at p. 1400.) In short, the provisions of law and positions advanced in these letters are not entirely consistent. This apparent inconsistency perhaps triggered the array of responses from the courts.
c. Case law interpreting statute and regulations
The Fourth Circuit was the first federal circuit court of appeal to address the school district's obligation under EDGAR in factual circumstances similar to those present here -- that is, where it is agreed that the on-site service requested is one required by the student's unique needs. Goodall v. Stafford County School Board, 930 F.2d 363 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 864 (1991), further proceedings reported at 60 F.3d 168 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (1996). In Goodall, the Fourth Circuit held that a school district could properly decline to provide a deaf student with a cued speech transliterator at a private, parochial school. The court determined that the school district satisfied its obligation to the student by offering a FAPE, including a cued speech transliterator, at a public high school. The Goodall court also based its holding on the independent ground that the school district was prohibited from using public funds to pay for an educational service at a religious school.
Subsequent to the Fourth Circuit's decision in Goodall, the Supreme Court decided Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993). In Zobrest, the Court held that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution does not prohibit a public school district from providing a sign language interpreter to a deaf student unilaterally enrolled by his parents at a private, parochial school. The Court did not address whether the District could be required to do so under EDGAR. After Zobrest, further proceedings in Goodall focused on the parents' claim that the refusal to provide a cued speech transliterator at the private school imposed a substantial burden on their free exercise of religion. 60 F.3d 168 (4th Cir. 1995). The Fourth Circuit noted that, to the extent its previous holding was based on an interpretation of EDGAR, it was not overruled by Zobrest, supra, 60 F.3d at p. 173.
In Dreher v. Amphitheater Unified School District, 22 F. 3d 228 (9th Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit noted that IDEA requires that services be provided to parentally-placed students in conformity with their IEPs. (20 U.S.C. §1401(a)(18)(D).) The court denied reimbursement because the speech therapy that the student was receiving at the private school was not in conformity with the speech therapy called for in the student's IEP. 22 F.3d at 234. Dreher, however, left the present issue unresolved:
whether a district must provide a parentally-placed student with the services that she needs to benefit from her educational placement at her private school.
This year, two more federal circuit courts of appeal have addressed the issue of the school district's obligation to parentally-placed students under EDGAR. First, in K.R. v. Anderson Community School Corporation, 81 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 1996), a student with severe multiple disabilities had an IEP calling for a full-time instructional assistant. The parents unilaterally enrolled her in a private, parochial school. The school district agreed to provide her with occupational therapy, physical therapy, and speech and language therapy at a public school site, but declined to provide an instructional assistant at the private school.
The Seventh Circuit found that school districts need not provide "comparable benefits" to parentally-placed students in every instance, but rather that they have "a great deal of discretion" in determining which such students will receive benefits and what benefits they will receive. 81 F.3d at 678. The court cited cost as one example of a factor the school district can take into consideration:
[P]ublic schools may legitimately regulate the provision of expensive services, such as full-time assistants, in order to ration limited resources across more students.
81 F.3d at 679.
The court noted that the standard for determining whether the school district has properly exercised its discretion to deny benefits in a particular case is whether the student was given a "genuine opportunity for equitable participation." Id. at p. 680; 34 C.F.R. §76.651(a)(1-2). Applying this standard to the facts in K.R., the Seventh Circuit found that the student was in fact afforded such an opportunity because the school district offered to provide a full-time instructional assistant at a public school. The court concluded: We have no reason to doubt the opportunity was genuine: nothing in the record demonstrates that K.R. was prevented from attending the public school by anything other than a desire to attend private school; and nothing demonstrates that the public school would have failed to provide the instructional assistant had K.R. decided to return. Id. at p. 680.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit found significant the fact that the school district agreed to provide some related services to K.R. at a public school site. The court found this was evidence that, although the school district declined to provide the instructional assistant at the private school, it had fairly exercised its discretion as to what benefits it would provide. Id. at p. 680. The court wrote:
A complete failure to provide any services, especially those that can be provided at a neutral or public school site at flexible times, would be strong evidence that the public school had abused its discretion. Id. at p. 680.
This reading of EDGAR would force a severely disabled parentally-placed student who has been offered a FAPE a choice that seems irreconcilable with the regulations. A severely disabled child who must receive services during school hours, may either accept the FAPE at the district's school, or attend private school and forego the very protections of the IDEA which allow her to attend any private school. This reading renders meaningless for severely disabled children EDGAR's statement that children enrolled in private school must have comparable "quality, scope, and opportunity for participation" to those attending public school.
Shortly after K.R. was decided, the Second Circuit decided Russman v. Sobol, 85 F.3d 1050 (2d Cir. 1996). In Russman, a student with mental retardation had an IEP calling for the assistance of (1) a consultant teacher to work with the regular classroom teacher in modifying the academic curriculum and (2) a teaching aide to directly assist her. The parents unilaterally enrolled the student in a private, parochial school. The school district refused to provide the consultant teacher and teaching aide at the private school.
The Second Circuit held, in analyzing IDEA's phrase "to the extent consistent with the number and location of children with disabilities," that the key factor was cost:
The reference to the "number" of students suggests only that school districts have discretion to deny on-site provision of services at private schools where economies of scale in providing the services at one place exist.
With respect to the statutory reference to "location", we read the IDEA to mean only that, where the provision of services at a distant private school would entail significant additional costs, e.g., transportation, to be borne by the state, public school authorities may fulfill their IDEA obligations by offering the services at a local public school. 85 F.3d at 1056.
The Second Circuit concluded that "where the cost of special services does not vary with where they are provided, the IDEA and regulations regarding voluntary private school students make little sense if such services may be made available only in the public schools." Id. at 1056. The court noted that services required by an IEP may need to be provided during school hours to be effective. Id. at 1057. The court continued:
If public school authorities may freely refuse to provide such benefits at private schools, therefore, disabled students must either forego the IDEA benefits, bear their cost, or transfer to the public schools. This result, however, seems to be precisely what the statute and regulations seek to preclude. Indeed, the principal purpose of the statutory and regulatory commands appears to be to make a child's disability irrelevant to the family's choice of school, at least where differences in costs of provision to not exist. Id. at p. 1057.
The Second Circuit found that there was no evidence that providing the student with a teaching consultant and aide at the private school was significantly more expensive than providing her with the same services at the public school. Therefore, the court ordered the school district to provide the student with the services at the private school. Id. at p. 1057.
Two federal district courts have recently found that a school district must provide a sign language interpreter to a parentally-placed deaf student at a private school. Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 907 F.Supp. 966 (M.D. La. 1995)
(parochial school); Fowler v. Unified School District No. 259, 900 F.Supp. 1540 (D. Kan. 1995) (nonsectarian school). In each case the court reasoned that the requested service would be meaningless unless provided at the private school site. Cefalu, 907 F. Supp. at 968; Fowler, 900 F. Supp. at 1546.
d. Analysis
The first question presented is how to identify the rights, if any, that parentally-placed students have under EDGAR to receive specialized services from the school district. The Seventh Circuit in K.R. relied on the reasoning of Goodall and OSEP in finding that these students do not have an individual entitlement to services and that school districts have a "great deal of discretion" in determining which such students will receive benefits and what benefits they will receive. 81 F.3d at 678.
The Second Circuit in Russman acknowledged that IDEA does not require on-site provision of "any and all services that might be required in the context of public education," Id. at p. 1055, but disagreed with the notion of broad District discretion and found rather that the statute and regulations are, overall, "more consistent with mandatory entitlements than with discretionary authority." Id. at p. 1056. See also Dreher, supra, 22 F.3d at 234 (9th Cir. 1994) (school district has to pay for special education and related services designed to meet the needs of parentally-placed students).
The statutes, regulations and case authorities cited herein do not clearly indicate how to identify the rights of parentally-placed students. What seems more probable than not from the current law, is that parentally-placed students have some rights to services, although these rights are not necessarily as extensive as those of students enrolled in the public schools. Russman v.
Sobol, supra, 85 F.3d at p. 1056 (2nd Cir. 1996).
Further, it is clear that school districts have some discretion in deciding which students will receive benefits and what benefits they will receive. However, the appropriateness of the District's exercising its discretion in a particular case is subject to review, based on a number of factors identified by the statute, regulations and case authorities.
To determine whether the District properly exercised its discretion in deciding not to provide the student with an instructional aide, the Hearing Officer below considers three factors identified by the statute, regulations and/or case authorities: (1) whether the District engaged in the consultation process mandated by EDGAR, (2) whether the District provided the student with a "genuine opportunity for equitable participation" and "comparable benefits," and (3) whether providing an instructional aide at Saint Catherine's would be more costly to the District than doing so at Alcott Elementary. The Hearing Officer also examines one factor raised by the District: (4) whether the District could properly deny on-site instructional aide services because of personnel management issues.
1. Consultation
EDGAR mandates that public agencies consult with appropriate representatives of parentally-placed students before determining such matters as which children will receive benefits, what benefits will be provided, and how the benefits will be provided. 34 C.F.R. §652-653. As noted above, the IDEA places great importance on compliance with procedural requirements. Rowley, supra, 458 U.S. at 205-206, Union School District, Supra, 15 F.3d at 1526. At least one federal district court has found that whether a school district has complied with this consultation requirement is an important factor in determining whether it properly exercised its discretion under EDGAR. Natchez-Adams School District, supra, 918 F.Supp. at 1036; Letter to Williams, 18 IDELR 742, 744 (OSEP 1992). See also Crespo v. New Haven Board of Education, 20 IDELR 1371, page (D. Conn. 1993).
In this case, it is unclear whether the District has undertaken the legally required consultation. Dr. McCall testified that the District routinely contacts private schools with parentally-placed students to discuss what services the District will offer. Nevertheless, the evidence showed that the decision to deny the student an on-site instructional aide was not based on a process of consultation which either incorporated an equitable method of allocating educational services to children with disabilities or considered "the needs of private school children" within its boundaries. (34 C.F.R. section 300.452.) Instead, the District based the decision to deny the student an instructional aide largely on its understanding of its legal duties with respect to providing services to parentally-placed private school students.
2. "Genuine opportunity for equitable participation" and "comparable benefits"
As noted above, the focus of IDEA is on the unique, individual needs of each disabled student. 20 U.S.C. §1400(c); 1401(a)(16-18); Rowley, supra, 458 U.S. at page. See also Dreher, supra, 22 F. 3d at 234; 34 C.F.R. §300.452 (school district shall provide parentally-placed students with special education and related services "designed to meet [their] needs"). In determining whether the school district properly exercised its discretion by declining to provide an on-site instructional aide to a parentally-placed severely disabled student, one must consider that the IDEA places a priority on the education of students with the most significant disabilities. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §1412(3); 1414(a)(1)(C )(ii).
Similarly, California special education law places an emphasis on the education of students, like the student, with "low incidence disabilities," which are defined as severe disabling conditions with an expected incidence rate of less than one percent of the total statewide enrollment in grades K-12. Education Code §56026.5. Severe disabling conditions include hearing impairments, vision impairments, and severe orthopedic impairments, or any combination thereof. Id. The California legislature has found that students with low-incidence disabilities require highly specialized services, equipment, and materials. Education Code §56000.5(a)(2).
Most parentally-placed students do not require related services during regular classes or at their private school sites. Most of the services parentally-placed students require -- for example, occupational therapy, physical therapy, and speech and language therapy -- can be provided at public school sites or other neutral sites at flexible hours. See, e.g., Foley v. Special School District of St. Louis County, 927 F.Supp. 1214 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (offer to provide occupational therapy, physical therapy and speech and language therapy to parentally-placed student with cerebral palsy at public school site held appropriate).
On the other hand, a limited number of students -- those with the most significant disabilities -- require on-site related services, such as hearing-impaired students requiring interpreters, blind students requiring orientation and mobility training, and students with severe orthopedic and/or multiple disabilities requiring a one-to-one aide in the classroom. These services, of course, are essential to the student's successful participation during the school day.
In this case, an instructional aide for the student must be present on-site, at her school, throughout her school day. Neither party disputes that the student requires this service to benefit from her education. It is also undisputed that the student would receive the service on-site if she were enrolled in public school. Therefore, the only "comparable" benefit to providing an instructional aide at a public school is to provide the service on-site at the private school. (34 C.F.R. §76.654(a).)
If upheld, the District's purported blanket policy denying direct services at private schools would guarantee that in all cases in which an essential service for a parentally-placed student with a significant disability must be provided on-site to be meaningful, the student would be forced to forego the IDEA benefits, bear their cost, or transfer to the public schools. See, e.g., Russman, supra, 85 F.3d at 1057. The blanket policy is contrary to IDEA's focus on the unique, individual needs of each disabled student. The application of blanket policies in providing services to disabled students violates the requirement that students' IEP's be designed to meet their individual needs. Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 177-178 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1030 (1989).
The Seventh Circuit's finding in K.R. that the school district satisfied EDGAR's "genuine opportunity for equitable participation" requirement by offering a FAPE at the public high school -- a FAPE that the student rejected -- is not persuasive. 81 F.3d at 680. EDGAR specifically applies to those students who have enrolled in private school despite the availability of a FAPE in the public school. Thus, for purposes of analysis under EDGAR, one assumes that the school district offered the student a FAPE in the public school and that the student rejected it. While this establishes that the school district need not pay the private school tuition, it has nothing to do with whether, once the student enrolls in private school, the District provides her with a "genuine opportunity for equitable participation." In other words, conditioning the provision of specialized services on enrollment in the public schools is not an equitable opportunity for parentally-placed students to participate in program benefits at private schools.
The Seventh Circuit's finding in K.R. that the school district properly exercised its discretion because it offered some services at the public school is also unpersuasive. The school district in K.R. chose to serve the significantly, multiply disabled student but then, in deciding which services to provide, omitted the one service that was essential to her successful participation during the school day at private school -- a full-time, on-site instructional assistant. Similarly, the fact that the District here offered the student speech and language services at a public school site does not establish that the District properly exercised its discretion as to which services to provide. Without a persuasive reason, the District has failed to offer the student, a severely disabled student, the one service that is essential to her successful participation at Saint Catherine's -- a full-time, on-site instructional aide.
In conclusion, the evidence showed that by conditioning the student's right to an instructional aide on her attending a public school, the District failed to provide her with a genuine equitable opportunity to participate in a program of benefits.
3. Cost issues
Both the Seventh Circuit in K.R. and the Second Circuit in Russman referred to cost as a factor upon which a school district could base a decision not to provide on-site services. K.R., 81 F.3d at 679; Russman, 85 F.3d at 1056. Both did so without reference to any specific portion of EDGAR, which includes only one section that refers to cost. Section 76.655 states as follows:
(a) Subject to paragraph (b) of this section, a subgrantee shall spend the same average amount of program funds on:
(1) A student enrolled in a private school who receives benefits under the program; and (2) A student enrolled in a public school who receives benefits under the program.
(b) The subgrantee shall spend a different average amount on program benefits for students enrolled in private schools if the average cost of meeting the needs of those students is different from the average cost of meeting the needs of students enrolled in public schools.
At least one federal district court has held that the plain language of this regulation shows that the primary factor in determining what services to provide parentally-placed students is the need of each student, not the cost of the service. Fowler, supra, 900 F. Supp. at p. 1545. It is not clear, based on the wording of this regulation, that EDGAR in fact authorizes school districts to use cost as a factor in denying on-site services. In any event, given that two circuit courts of appeal have adopted cost as a factor, the Hearing Officer analyzes the evidence with respect to cost below.
The evidence presented at the hearing does not establish that it is more expensive for the District to provide an instructional aide to the student at Saint Catherine's than at Alcott. Dr.
McCall testified that the District tries to accommodate parentally-placed private school students by providing instructional aide services at any public school within its boundaries. When convenient for the parents, the students may receive services at District schools that are distant from their home schools. This suggests that as long as the services are offered at a public school within the District's geographical boundaries, the District is willing to provide them. In fact, Dr. McCall stated that the District did not consider cost issues when designing special educational programs. The school's character as public or private, not its location or the cost of providing services, is the determining factor.
4. Personnel management issues
EDGAR contemplates that, under certain circumstances, school district employees may provide services to parentally-placed students at their private schools. Section 76.659 states:
A subgrantee may use program funds to make public personnel available in other than public facilities:
(a) To the extent necessary to provide equitable program benefits designed for students enrolled in a private school; and (b) If those benefits are not normally provided by the private school.
The District argues that placing District employees at private schools would create personnel management problems. First, the District asserts that there could be logistical problems in observing and evaluating District employees, particularly at distant private schools either within or outside of the District.
There was, however, no clear description of the personnel management problems that the District might face if it provided on-site services to students with low-incidence disabilities attending private schools. There is no evidence that distance between a District site and Saint Catherine's is a factor. Likewise, nothing in the record reveals how may children who would need on-site assistance, i.e., those suffering from low-incidence disabilities actually attend private schools. It may well be that very few parentally-placed students qualify for services that must be provided on-site.
In short, even assuming that personnel management issues may be taken into consideration in determining whether to provide services at a private school, here, there is no evidence on the scope or nature of the problem. Therefore, there is no persuasive reason to withhold an instructional aide based on personnel matters.
e. Conclusion
The District's refusal to provide the student with an instructional aide at Saint Catherine's was incorrect, based on applicable law and the facts of this case. This is so because (1) the District did not engage in the consultation process mandated by EDGAR, (2) having chosen to serve the student, the District failed to provide the one service that was essential to her successful participation in school, (3) it is no more costly to the District to provide the instructional aide at the private school, and (4) there are no persuasive logistical and/or personnel reasons for declining to provide the service at the private school.
Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that the District must provide the student with the services of a full-time instructional aide at Saint Catherine's for the remainder of the 1996-97 school year.
ORDER
1. The District shall provide the student with the services of a full-time instructional aide at Saint Catherine's for the remainder of the 1996-97 school year.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
Pursuant to Education Code §56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this requirement: Petitioner prevailed with respect to the location of instructional aide services.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. Education Code §56505(i).
Dated: October 24, 1996 _______________________ Carin N. Crain Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
No Footnotes
