California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · May 31, 2001
Student v. San Diego Unified School District
SEHO Case No. SN 681-00 · Hearing Officer Lawrence E. Mendel
San Diego Unified and County Mental Health need not repay a father's child support charged for his son's residential placement.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Summary
A father filed for due process against San Diego Unified School District, San Diego County Mental Health, and the county child support bureau. His son had been eligible for special education since age 4 as a student with emotional disturbance. Under AB 3632, Mental Health placed the student in a residential group home under his IEP. In 1997 a court gave the father custody and ordered him to pay $5,000 in back child support for May 1994 through July 1997. He was told the money repaid the county for his son's "placement." He argued the IEP placement should have cost the family nothing.
The Hearing Officer denied the District's motions to dismiss. The case was filed within three years of when the father learned the key facts in 1997, so it was not time-barred. The Hearing Officer agreed that a county may not use child support to recover the cost of a residential placement made under an IEP. But the father lost on the merits. The support order did not say it covered the placement. The $5,000 did not match any placement charges, which ran over $4,000 a month. The county may also seek support for other things it provided. No evidence showed that the District or Mental Health failed to pay for any services. The Hearing Officer also had no power to change a Superior Court support order. The claim was denied.
Why it matters
This decision shows how SEHO handled a parent's claim that county child support charges repaid an IEP residential placement. The Hearing Officer recognized that such placements must be free to parents. But relief required proof that the support order covered IEP placement costs and that an agency failed to pay. Changing a support order was left to the courts.
Issues and holdings
- District prevailedResidential placement for mental health
Issue 1. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for child support he has been charged by San Diego County that is due to placement costs that should have been paid by the District and/or Mental Health?
No evidence showed the $5,000 retroactive child support order repaid IEP placement costs or that the District or Mental Health left any costs unpaid; the Hearing Office cannot change a Superior Court support order.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- Petitioner's claim for relief denied.
Key authorities
County of Los Angeles v. Smith, 74 Cal.App.4th 500 (1999); 34 C.F.R. § 300.302; 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8); Education Code § 56043(p); Education Code § 56501; Education Code § 56000
People named in the decision
- Joe Concellosi, program manager; witness, San Diego County Mental Health
- Cindy Goodall, certified sign language interpreter, Interpreter for stepmother at hearing
- Peggy Kennedy, certified sign language interpreter, Interpreter for stepmother at hearing
- New Alternatives #17 Boys and Girls, residential group home placement (AFDC rate-approved), Private provider
- New Alternatives Day Treatment, day treatment program, Private provider
Get new OAH special education decisions by email
A weekly Monday-morning digest of new California OAH due process decisions, each with a short plain-English summary from Vanaman German LLP.
You'll get an email asking you to confirm. Unsubscribe anytime. Subscribing does not create an attorney-client relationship.Full text of the decision
Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Lawrence E. Mendel, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in Bakersfield, California, on April 5, 2001.
STUDENT was represented by STEPMOTHER and FATHER. Respondent San Diego Unified School District (District) was represented by attorney Ricardo Soto. Respondent San Diego County Mental Health (Mental Health) was represented by attorney Lisa Macchione. Also present on Mental Health’s behalf was Joe Concellosi, program manager. Respondent San Diego Bureau of Child Support Enforcement did not appear at the hearing. Also present at the hearing were Cindy Goodall and Peggy Kennedy, certified sign language interpreters, to interpret for STEPMOTHER.
The parties called the following witnesses: FATHER, STEPMOTHER and Joe Concellosi.
Oral and documentary evidence was received. The record was held open to allow the Petitioner to submit addition documents and to allow the Respondents to submit comments on those documents. After the additional documents and comments were received, the record was closed and the matter submitted for decision.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
Three prehearing telephone conferences were held in this case. The first was on May 26, 2000. At that time, the District raised a statue of limitations issue. The District was instructed to file a written motion on this issue. On July 18, 2000, the District filed a motion to dismiss the case. The Hearing Office denied this motion by order dated August 10, 2000. At the subsequent conferences on August 14, 2000, and September 18, 2000, the issues were clarified and the location for the hearing was discussed.
At the commencement of the hearing, the District made a new motion to dismiss the case. The District’s motion was based on the argument that Petitioner is seeking reimbursement for child support and that the Hearing Officer lacks the jurisdiction to hear this issue or order the relief requested. This was essentially the same argument raised in the District’s first motion to dismiss. The District argued that is was appropriate to revisit this issue because Petitioner had further clarified the issue for hearing at the various prehearing telephone conferences and at the beginning of the due process hearing. The District’s motion to dismiss was denied for the same reasons set forth in the August 10, 2000, order of the Hearing Office(Footnote 1).
The District also made a motion regarding the statute of limitations. The District argued that California Education Code § 56043(p) requires that any request for a due process hearing must be filed within three years from the date that the party initiating the request knew or had reason to know of the facts underlying the basis for the request. Petitioner had filed his due process hearing request on April 11, 2000. The District argued that Petitioner could only seek reimbursement for costs actually incurred by the County after April 11, 1997, in order to comply with Section 56043(p). Petitioner claimed that he had filed for a due process hearing prior to April 2000, but that his earlier request had not been acted on. Decision on this motion was deferred and the record held open to allow Petitioner to submit any additional documents he had regarding earlier filings for a due process hearing. Petitioner submitted two handwritten letters, one dated September 27, 1997, and one dated October 1, 1997. The September 27, 1997, letter from FATHER was addressed to the California Department of Education and was a “complaint” against the San Diego District Attorney, Mental Health, and the District. The complaint related to Petitioner’s being charged child support for the period of time in which he was in a residential facility under AB 3632. The October 1, 1997, letter from FATHER was addressed to McGeorge School of Law and was a due process hearing request against the San Diego District Attorney, Mental Health and the District. This request also related to child support charges for time periods when Petitioner was in residential facilities. The Hearing Office has no record of having received this letter.
Section 56043(p) states that the three-year limitation begins to run when the party filing for a hearing knew, or had reason to know, of the facts underlying the basis for the request. In this case, the final act that gave rise to Petitioner’s hearing request was the issuance of a retroactive child support order on September 25, 1997. The support order was issued on the same day FATHER was awarded custody of Petitioner. FATHER testified that he received notice of the custody/child support hearing in July 1997. FATHER stated that on the day the child support order was entered, he was told that the order was for money the County had spent on Petitioner’s “placement.” FATHER stated that that was the first time he became aware that San Diego County had been paying for Petitioner’s placement. Although the child support order was for the time period May 1994, through July 1997, FATHER had no prior knowledge that Petitioner was in a County-funded placement during that time period. Two basic facts underlie this case: (1.) San Diego County funded Petitioner’s placement, and (2.) FATHER was ordered to reimburse the County for the cost of Petitioner’s placement. The date when FATHER first knew of both of these facts was September 25, 1997. The earliest date that FATHER might be assumed to have had knowledge would have been July 1997, when he received notice of the child support hearing. Both of these dates are within the three year time limitation. Section 56043(p) does not bar this case, nor does it limit consideration to costs that were actually incurred after April 11, 1997.
ISSUE(Footnote)
Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for child support he has been charged by San Diego County that is due to placement costs that should have been paid by the District and/or Mental Health?
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT was first found eligible for special education in 1989, at the age of 4. His eligibility was based on emotional disturbance (ED). An Individualized Education Plan (IEP) dated May 1993, recommended that STUDENT be placed in residential treatment at an AFDC rate-approved facility. In June 1993, STUDENT was placed in New Alternatives #17 Boys and Girls (Boys and Girls), a group home. The placement was made by Mental Health pursuant to AB 3632/882. The initial cost of placement was $4091.00 a month(Footnote 3). On July 24, 1993 STUDENT was struck by a car and suffered a severely broken leg. On release from the hospital, he required a wheelchair, which made his return to Boys and Girls impossible. STUDENT lived with his mother and received day treatment services during his recovery. He returned to Boys and Girls on December 13, 1993. STUDENT remained at Boys and Girls until August 30, 1996. He then returned to living with his mother and began attending New Alternatives Day Treatment. Between March 1997 and May 1997, STUDENT was repeatedly in and out of the Polinsky Center, a placement operated by Child Protective Services. He was hospitalized at Charter/API in March and April, 1997. On May 4, 1997, STUDENT was hospitalized at the University of California, San Diego CAPS (UCSD). He was discharged on May 27, 1997, but was re-admitted on July 10, 1997. On August 14, 1997, he was discharged into the custody of Child Protective Services. STUDENT was officially discharged from the day treatment program on October 3, 1997.
FATHER, has lived in Bakersfield at all times relevant to this case. FATHER went to San Diego in August 1997, for a paternity test to prove he is STUDENT’S father. FATHER returned to San Diego in September 1997 for a paternity and custody hearing. On September 25, 1997, FATHER was awarded custody of STUDENT and ordered to pay $5,000 in retroactive child support, covering the period May 1994, to July 1997. At the hearing, FATHER stated he was given a court-appointed attorney. FATHER said he was told that the child support was to reimburse the County for costs it had spent on STUDENT’s placement. The amount of the arrearage appears to have been arrived at somewhat arbitrarily. FATHER testified that the judge turned to him and asked, “How about $5000?” FATHER agreed, and that amount was listed in the order as “per stipulation.”
FATHER testified that he did not learn that STUDENT had been in special education until several months later. FATHER has since discovered a great deal about STUDENT’s history by talking to STUDENT’s grandparents. Since September 1997, FATHER has tried repeatedly to obtain some accounting or detail relating to the child support he was ordered to pay. FATHER has written to his court-appointed attorney, the San Diego County District Attorney, and the San Diego Bureau of Child Support. FATHER has not received any response to his inquiries.
Mr. Concellosi, program manager for Mental Health, testified regarding the process involved when Mental Health pays for a placement. First the placement is identified. The child is admitted and a “Start Pay” authorization and Group Home Agreement are submitted. AFDC is the agency that actually cuts the checks. Mr. Concellosi also testified regarding Petitioner’s case. He stated that he had reviewed STUDENT’s file and that all the paperwork for the payment of STUDENT’s placement at Boys and Girls appeared to be in order. There was no indication that any placement costs had not been paid.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for child support he has been charged by San Diego County that is due to placement costs that should have been paid by the District and/or Mental Health?
FATHER contends that STUDENT’s residential placement during the period he owed child support, May 1994 through July 1997, was pursuant to STUDENT’s IEP. Therefore, the placement should have been paid for by the District and Mental Health as part of STUDENT’s education under the IDEA.
California Education Code §56000 states that all individuals with exceptional needs have a right to participate in a free appropriate public education (FAPE). The IDEA defines FAPE as special education and related services that have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge. (20 U.S.C. §1401 (8)). This provision of FAPE extends to the parents of a seriously emotionally disturbed child who is placed in a private residential program. The United States Department of Education regulations provide: "If placement in a public or private residential program is necessary to provide special education and related services to a child with a disability, the program, including non-medical care and room and board, must be at no cost to the parents of the child." (34 C.F.R. §300.302). Furthermore, the County may not seek reimbursement from the parent, in the form of child support, for money it has expended on the placement of a child, when that placement was pursuant to an IEP. County of Los Angeles v. Smith, 74 Cal.App.4th 500 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1999).
Applying the law set forth above to this case, FATHER should not have been charged child support by the County of San Diego for money expended by the County on a placement that was made pursuant to an IEP. However, there is no evidence that the child support order was, in whole or in part, intended to reimburse the County for Petitioner’s placement pursuant to an IEP. On its face, the support order simply states it was for retroactive child support for the period May 1994 to July 1997. FATHER testified that he was told the order was for “placement.” However, FATHER did not receive any detail or accounting showing what monies that the County had expended on behalf of STUDENT during the relevant time period. The amount of the order ($5,000) does not correspond to any known charges relating to placement. If the support order was intended to reimburse the County for STUDENT’s placement at Boys and Girls, it can best be described as a token amount. FATHER was ordered to pay a total of $5,000. The placement at Boys and Girls was over $4,000 a month. STUDENT was in that placement for 28 months during the time period covered by the support order. This calculates out to an amount well over $110,000. Furthermore, it cannot be assumed that the child support order was for placement alone, much less for placement pursuant to an IEP. The County has the same right to initiate an action to collect child support as an individual obligee. The County may seek reimbursement for any support it has furnished to a child. See 10 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1989) P & C, § 76, p. 122. With the information available, it would be pure speculation to try to determine what support the County might have furnished STUDENT during the time period in question.
Even if it is assumed that the child support order was intended to reimburse the County for STUDENT’s special education placement, FATHER would still not be entitled to recovery from the District or Mental Health. For FATHER to recover from the District or Mental Health, there must be evidence that one or both of them failed to pay for some portion of STUDENT’s special education and related services. There was no evidence that any services went unpaid for. In fact, FATHER testified that from his review of the records, both the District and Mental Health appeared to have paid for everything they were supposed to pay for.
It is possible that FATHER has been charged child support in error. It may be that the child support order relates to services that were already paid for by the District and Mental Health pursuant to STUDENT’s IEP. However, the Hearing Office has no jurisdiction to correct this potential problem. The Hearing Office has the authority to hear cases involving the identification, assessment and educational placement of a child, and the provision of a free, appropriate public education to the child. California Education Code § 56501. The Hearing Office has no authority to amend or revoke a child support order entered by the Superior Court.
CONCLUSION
There was no evidence that the retroactive child support order was intended to reimburse the county for STUDENT’s special education and related services. Even if the order so intended, there was no evidence the either Mental Health or the District had failed to pay for any of STUDENT’s special education and related services during the time period in question. The Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner is not entitled to reimbursement from the San Diego Unified School District or San Diego County Mental Health for the retroactive child support he was charged by the County of San Diego.
ORDER
Petitioner’s claim for relief is denied.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute: Respondent prevailed on the issue heard and decided.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. Education Code § 56505(j).
Dated: May 31, 2001 ____________________________________ Lawrence E. Mendel, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
Footnote 1: In the August 10, 2000 order the Hearing Officer made two findings that relate to the renewed motion to dismiss: (1.) If STUDENT’s placement was based on his disabilities and pursuant to an IEP, then either the District or Mental Health or both, may have been responsible for that placement. If those costs are the same costs that are being attributed to FATHER, then that is an issue that falls into those listed in Education Code § 56501(a) since it concerns whether a free appropriate public education had been provided to STUDENT. (2.) Should FATHER prevail on this issue, he would be entitled to relief. That relief might consist of reimbursing FATHER for support payments he has already made, or making payments directly to the County for support payments he still owes. Footnote 2: The issue listed here differs slightly from that noticed by the Petitioner before the hearing. Changes were made for the purpose of clarification. Footnote 3: The monthly cost of this placement went up over time. By 1996 the monthly cost was $4,423.00.
