California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · December 7, 1999
Student v. Glendale Unified School District (consolidated)
SEHO Case No. SN 692-98, SN 135-99 · Hearing Officer Van T. Vu
Glendale Unified must provide 80 hours of Lindamood-Bell reading instruction and a social-emotional assessment; nonpublic school request denied.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Summary
The student's mother filed for hearing in May 1998. Glendale Unified filed its own case in January 1999 to defend its December 1998 offer, and the two cases were consolidated. The student was 11 and in sixth grade. She had been eligible for special education with a specific learning disability since February 1997 and was being home-schooled. Hearing Officer Van T. Vu barred claims before May 20, 1995 under a three-year statute of limitations. He found she was not eligible before February 1997. Testing in 1994 showed no severe gap between ability and achievement, and her grades were satisfactory. For 1997-1998, the reading goals carried over from February 1997 did not target her core weakness in phonemic awareness, which is the ability to hear and tell apart sounds. She made little progress, so she was denied FAPE. A challenge to her resource teacher's emergency permit failed. For 1998-1999, the Hearing Officer found the special day class offer mostly appropriate, in the least restrictive environment, and made by a properly composed IEP team. However, the district failed to assess social/emotional functioning despite signs of school-related anxiety. The IEP also lacked a goal addressing her frequent absences and tardies. The request for a nonpublic school was denied. The district was ordered to provide 80 hours of Lindamood-Bell reading instruction and to complete a social/emotional assessment within 30 days. No compensatory services were awarded for 1998-1999, because the mother's withdrawal of the student and refusal of home instruction mainly caused that lost time.
Why it matters
This decision shows how SEHO handled several issues. Goals carried over unchanged that miss a student's core reading weakness denied FAPE. Signs of school anxiety and chronic absences triggered duties to assess and to write a goal. A parent's refusal of all services, including home instruction, weighed against compensatory education. Late evidence was excluded under the five-business-day rule.
Issues and holdings
Issue I. Are the student's claims arising prior to May 20, 1995, barred by the statute of limitations?
Applying a three-year limitations period (Alexopulos), claims before May 20, 1995 were time-barred because the mother knew the underlying facts by June 1994.
- District prevailedEligibility
Issue II. Was the student eligible for special education and related services prior to becoming eligible on February 3, 1997?
1994 testing showed no severe ability-achievement discrepancy, grades were satisfactory, and language disorder criteria were not met, so the student was not eligible before February 1997.
- District prevailedFAPE: services offered
Issue III.A. Did the District deny the student a FAPE during the 1995-1996 school year?
Because the student was not eligible during this period, the District owed her no FAPE under the IDEA.
- District prevailedFAPE: services offered
Issue III.B. Did the District deny the student a FAPE during the 1996-1997 school year?
No FAPE was owed before February 3, 1997, and math services were not needed afterward; the findings say failing to give written language services after eligibility denied FAPE, but the prevailing-party section names the District as prevailing for this year.
- Student prevailed in partIEP content
Issue III.C. Did the District deny the student a FAPE during the 1997-1998 school year?
Reading goals carried over from February 1997 did not address phonemic awareness or aim to close the gap, and progress was de minimis, which denied FAPE; the challenge to the RSP teacher's emergency permit failed.
- Student prevailed in partAssessment
Issue III.D. Did the District deny the student a FAPE during the 1998-1999 school year?
Failing to assess social/emotional functioning and to write a goal on absences and tardies denied FAPE; the neurological assessment, IEP team, phonemic awareness goals, present levels, and SDC/LRE claims failed.
- Student prevailed in partPlacement and LRE
Issue IV. Is the student entitled to a placement at a nonpublic school as compensatory education?
A nonpublic school placement was denied as unnecessary; 80 hours of Lindamood-Bell services were awarded for 1997-1998, but no compensatory services were awarded for 1998-1999 because the mother's actions mainly caused the loss.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- Order to assess. District to assess the student in the area of social/emotional development within thirty days of the order; mother ordered to make the student available; any services found needed to be included in the IEP.
- Compensatory education. District to provide 80 hours of Lindamood-Bell services from a Lindamood-Bell specialist of the District's choice.
Total: 80 hours of compensatory services
Key authorities
Rowley; Alexopulos v. San Francisco Unified School Dist.; W.G. v. Target Range School Dist.; Gregory K. v. Longview School Dist.; Daniel R. v. State Board of Education; Walczak v. Florida Union Free School Dist.; Mrs. B. v. Milford Board of Education; Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School Dist.; Todd v. Andrews; Moubry v. Independent School Dist. No. 696; Landgraf v. USI Film Products
People named in the decision
- Susan Melly, special education coordinator, Glendale Unified School District
- Sandra Mele, teacher specialist / special education teacher and program specialist, Glendale Unified School District
- Deborah Dole, speech and language pathologist and consultant, Center for Developing Kids (CDK)
- Judy Yager, school psychologist, Glendale Unified School District
- Colleen Anglin, assistive technology specialist, Foothill SELPA
- Susan Trautman, occupational therapist and owner; conducted OT assessment, Center for Developing Kids (CDK)
- Cynthia Ferreira, teacher specialist; co-author of psychoeducational assessment, Glendale Unified School District
- Bill Takeshita, optometrist (testified by telephone)
- Sasha Borenstein, director/teacher who assessed the student; witness for Student, Kelter Center
- Carla Walker, general education teacher (fourth grade), Monte Vista Elementary School
- Karen Carlson, therapist providing school-based therapy, Monte Vista Elementary School
- Dr. Christine LoPresti, expert witness for Student; assistant clinical professor of psychiatry, University of California at Los Angeles
- Glenn Fait, SEHO Hearing Officer who granted the earlier continuance and consolidation, Special Education Hearing Office
- Robin Kaufman, school psychologist (1994 assessment), Glendale Unified School District
- Enid Kohn, academic achievement assessor, Glendale Unified School District
- Angela Hardee, first grade general education teacher, Monte Vista Elementary School
- Craig Thompson, RSP teacher (fourth grade) holding emergency specialist permit, Monte Vista Elementary School
- Patricia Trautwein, central auditory processing evaluator
- Dr. Arnold Starr, neurologist who performed District-funded neurological evaluation, University of California at Irvine
- Michelle Finn, special day class teacher (offered placement), Monte Vista Elementary School
- Crescenta Valley Adventist, private school attended in second and part of third grade
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Van T. Vu, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, in Glendale, California, on June 15 and 16, August 31, and September 1, 9 and 10, 1999.
Glendale Unified School District (District or Glendale USD) was represented at the hearing by attorney Karen Gilyard. Also present on the District's behalf was Susan Melly, special education coordinator for Glendale Unified School District.
STUDENT was represented at the hearing by attorney Stephen Wyner. STUDENT's mother, MOTHER, was also present on her behalf.
The District called the following witnesses to testify at the hearing: Sandra Mele, teacher specialist at Glendale USD; Deborah Dole, speech and language pathologist and consultant for the Center for Developing Kids (CDK); Judy Yager, school psychologist for Glendale USD; Colleen Anglin, assistive technology specialist for Foothill SELPA; Susan Trautman, occupational therapist and owner of CDK; Cynthia Ferreira, teacher specialist for Glendale USD; Bill Takeshita, optometrist; and Susan Melly, special education coordinator for Glendale USD.
STUDENT called the following witnesses to testify at the hearing: Sasha Borenstein, teacher at the Kelter Center; GRANDMOTHER (Footnote 1), STUDENT's grandmother; Carla Walker, teacher at Monte Vista Elementary School; Karen Carlson, therapist; MOTHER, STUDENT's mother; Dr. Christine LoPresti, assistant clinical professor of psychiatry at the University of California at Los Angeles; and Susan Melly, special education coordinator for Glendale USD.
Oral and documentary evidence was received and the record was left open for the submission of closing arguments. The Student's closing brief was received on October 29, 1999, and the District's brief was received on November 1, 1999. The record was closed and the matter was submitted for decision.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
The hearing regarding the District's case (SN 135-99) convened on May 18, 1999, before Hearing Officer Glenn Fait. At the hearing, the Student requested a continuance, contending that her mother could not attend the hearing because she had to care for her ailing grandmother. Thus, the student argued that, because of a family emergency, her mother could not represent her at the hearing. Out of an abundance of caution, and to enable the student's mother to represent STUDENT at hearing, Hearing Officer Fait granted the request for a continuance. Additionally, Hearing Officer Fait consolidated the District's case (SN 135-99) with the Student's case (SN 692-98), as the two cases involved the same parties, facts, and issues. The parties did not object to the consolidation of the two cases, which were then scheduled for the next available hearing dates.
The hearing then convened on June 15, 1999, before the current Hearing Officer. At the start of the hearing, the Student made the first of her four motions to continue during the six-day hearing, which spanned a five-month period. The Student requested a continuance with regard to the Student's case (SN 692-98) on the grounds that she was not prepared to present her case in chief and that she did "not have enough evidence" to proceed with the hearing. The Student asserted that she was waiting for the completion of a neurological evaluation by Christine LoPresti from the University of California at Los Angeles, which was expected to be completed in July 1999, and could not present her case without such information. Because the Student's case and the District's case had been previously consolidated, the Student also asked that the cases be bifurcated so as to allow the Student's case to be continued to a later date.
Pursuant to Education Code Section 56505(f), a motion for continuance may be granted upon a showing of good cause. Neither federal nor State special education law addresses the issue of bifurcation of due process hearings. The Hearing Officer turned to the California Code of Civil Procedure for guidance. Section 1048(b) states generally that a court may bifurcate issues "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy."
In this case, the District was required to present its case first and, therefore, at the time of the motion the Student was not yet required to present her case. Because of this, and because the Student's lack of preparedness to put on her case was not good cause to continue the hearing, the Hearing Officer denied the Student's motion. With regard to the student's motion to bifurcate the District's case from the Student's case, the Hearing Officer noted that both cases involved the same issue as to whether STUDENT was offered or provided an appropriate placement for the 1998-1999 school year. Thus, the bifurcation of the cases would be judicially inefficient because it would require duplicative presentations with regard to common issues of law and fact. Furthermore, there was no indication that the bifurcation would promote the convenience of witnesses or the ends of justice. Because the District and the Student raised the same issue, by bifurcating the cases and allowing the District to present its case first, the Student might have been barred by the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel from raising the same issue in the future. Therefore, the motion to bifurcate the hearings was denied. (Footnote 2)
Even had the Hearing Officer were to treat the Student's motion to bifurcate as a motion to reconsider the order to consolidate the cases, the Student's request would still be denied. As with the bifurcation of due process hearings, there is no State or federal special education law that addresses the reconsideration of a Hearing Officer's order. As guidance, California Code of Civil Procedure § 1008(a) states that a party affected by an order may move for reconsideration of the order within ten days after service of the order "based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law." Here, the Student's motion was not only untimely (raised one month after the consolidation), but also failed to allege new or different facts, circumstances, or law which would warrant the reconsideration of the consolidation order. Because the student's motions to continue and bifurcate were denied, the parties were ordered to proceed with the hearing as scheduled.
The District then made a motion to allow one of its witnesses, Dr. Takeshita, to testify by telephone. The District asserted that Dr. Takeshita was unavailable to testify in person because, were he to leave his private practice to appear for hearing, he would loose part of his patient base and suffer financial hardship. The Student objected to the District's motion, stating that she "prefer[red] live testimony." The Student also stated that Dr. Takeshita was referred to the District by the Student and that he was so "impressive" that he should be viewed in person. California Code of Regulations Section 3082 states that the hearing officer may conduct all or part of a hearing by telephone "if each participant in the hearing has an opportunity to participate in and to hear the entire proceeding while it is taking place and to observe exhibits." As there was no issue as to the witness's credibility or any other reason to compel Dr. Takeshita to testify in person, the Hearing Officer granted the request for telephonic testimony.
During the afternoon of June 15, 1999, the Student made a second motion to continue the hearing. The student contended that she had not been provided the test protocols that accompany her evaluations when she was given a copy of her school records. Thus, she argued that she required a continuance to obtain those test protocols and to have time to consider that information in the preparation of her case. The District objected to the continuance, asserting that the test protocols to which the Student referred were not in existence when the Student requested her educational record. The Hearing Officer ruled that, based on the Student's asserted grounds for continuance, good cause did not exist to continue the hearing. The student received her school records months prior to the hearing and could have requested the test protocols at an earlier date.
On the morning of August 31, 1999, the student made her third motion for a continuance. At the start of the continued hearing, the District indicated that it planned to call only two additional witnesses before resting its case. The Student then requested that the hearing be adjourned and continued after the District rested its case because she was not prepared to call her witnesses during the scheduled hearing on August 31 and September 1. The Student then stated that she had understood that the District would require both days of hearing to present the remainder of her case and, thus, did not schedule any of her witnesses to appear. The District objected to adjourning the hearing early, contending that the Student had a duty to be prepared to present her case. The Hearing Officer reserved ruling on the motion until the District had rested its case, when it would be clearer how much time remained during the hearing for the Student to present her case. The Hearing Officer then allowed the Student a break to arrange for witnesses to appear. The Student was also allowed an extended lunch break to arrange for her witnesses. Because the Student was able to arrange for her witnesses to appear on August 31 and September 1, 1999, the student's motion was moot.
On September 1, 1999, the Student sought to admit at hearing her exhibits numbered 45 through 67. The District objected to the exhibits, arguing that the Student had not provided it with notice of the exhibits within five business days of the hearing as is required by Education Code Section 56505(e)(7). The Student responded that she intended to use the exhibits for the purpose of rebuttal and was not required to provide the District notice of those exhibits. She also contended that she was not required to guess the District's strategy for hearing or to include in her packet all information that would rebut the District's evidence. Thus, according to the student, she should be entitled to admit her supplemental exhibits at hearing. Although the Hearing Officer found the Student's arguments to be completely unpersuasive, the Hearing Officer admitted the Student's exhibits numbered 45 through 67, except exhibits 47 and 56. The Hearing Officer noted that exhibits 45 through 67, except exhibits 47 and 56, were correspondence between the District and the Student's mother. Because the District had copies of such correspondence in its records and had presented evidence regarding the subject matter of the correspondence, there was no unfair surprise in the Student's presenting such evidence. The Hearing Officer excluded exhibit 47 because it was a confidential mediation agreement between the parties. Exhibit 56 was excluded because the District asserted that it had never seen the document and because the student had failed to lay the proper foundation for the document.
On September 9, 1999, the District objected to the admission of the Student's Exhibits 68 through 74. Exhibits 68 through 72 were various neurological evaluation reports of STUDENT. (Footnote 3) Exhibits 73 and 74 were email correspondence between the Student's attorney and the California Teaching Commission. The District also objected to the testimony of the witnesses on the Student's amended witness list dated September 2, 1999. The District contended that the evidence and witness lists were not provided to the District within five business days of the continued hearing. The Hearing Officer noted that the evidence and the amended witness list were in fact not presented to the other party within the required timeline. (Footnote 4) Additionally, because the exhibits were composed of evaluations and other exhibits that the District had never seen, the admission of such evidence would constitute unfair surprise to the District. Moreover, the Student's attorney was well aware of the five day rule for the submission of evidence. Therefore, the Hearing Officer excluded the admission of exhibits 68 through 74 and the testimony of the witnesses on the September 2, 1999 witness list.
The Student then made her fourth motion to continue the hearing. She asserted that the hearing should be continued so that she could correct her procedural error so as to allow the admission of Exhibits 68-74. The District objected, contending that the Student had months to obtain the evaluation reports contained in Exhibits 68 through 72, and should not be rewarded for her failure to present her case appropriately. The Hearing Officer found that, based on the grounds asserted by the Student, good cause did not exist to continue the hearing. As such, the Student's motion to continue was denied.
ISSUES (Footnote 5)
I. Are STUDENT's claims arising prior to May 20, 1995, barred by the statute of limitations?
II. Was STUDENT eligible for special education and related services prior to becoming eligible on February 3, 1997?
III. Did the District deny STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during the 1995-1996, 1996-1997, 1997-1998, and 1998-1999 school years?
IV. Is STUDENT entitled to a placement at a nonpublic school as compensatory education?
POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
The Student, who is currently a sixth-grader, asserted that she has been denied a free appropriate public education (FAPE) since her kindergarten year. (Footnote 6) She claimed that she suffered an injury to her head while on school grounds at the beginning of kindergarten that resulted in her developing learning disabilities that would qualify her for special education and related services. However, according to the Student, the District failed to appropriately assess and find her eligible for such services. The Student also argued that, despite being found eligible for special education services in February 1997, the District failed to offer her an educational program that would meet her needs and that was reasonably calculated to provide her with educational benefit. Among her arguments, she asserted that the District failed to adequately address her language and math computation deficits, her fear of school, and her frequent absences. Thus, the Student argued that the District's inappropriate educational placements resulted in her lack of educational progress throughout her history with the District. Based on the above denials of FAPE, the Student requested a complete neurological evaluation and compensatory education in the form of a placement at a nonpublic school.
The District disputed that it ever denied STUDENT a FAPE. The District argued that STUDENT was not eligible for special education and related services until she was found to be qualified in February 1997. Additionally, the District asserted that it provided her with a FAPE while she attended the District school during the 1997-1998 school year. The District also contended that it offered STUDENT a FAPE for the 1998-1999 school year, but her mother refused the placement and retained her at home for home schooling. Finally, the District argued that it fully and appropriately assessed STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability and is not required to provide her with a neurological evaluation. Thus, the District argued that it should not be required to provide STUDENT with compensatory education or a neurological assessment.
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT is a eleven-year-old sixth-grader who has been eligible for special education and related services as a student with a specific learning disability since February 3, 1997. STUDENT has not attended school, either public or private, since June 1998. She is currently being home-schooled by her mother and grandmother.
STUDENT entered kindergarten at Monte Vista Elementary School during the fall of 1993. During the second week of school, STUDENT fell and hit her head on the concrete steps in front of her school. STUDENT's mother, MOTHER, contended that, following the injury, STUDENT began to have difficulties in school. During the last week of kindergarten, STUDENT's teacher notified MOTHER that STUDENT was having more difficulty with her work than were the other students in the class. On the same day, MOTHER requested that STUDENT be assessed for special education eligibility.
STUDENT was assessed during the fall of her first grade year in the areas of pre-academic/academic achievement, psychomotor/perceptual skills, intellectual/cognitive ability, social/emotional development, self-help skills, pre-vocational, and health and development. An IEP meeting convened on October 3, 1994, where the IEP team considered the assessments and STUDENT's special education eligibility. STUDENT's scores on the various subtests of the Woodcock Johnson - Revised achievement test ranged from the 5th percentile to the 47th percentile, placing her skills between the below average to the average range. Additionally, on the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children - III, STUDENT scored within the low average to average range. Robin Kaufman, the school psychologist who assessed STUDENT, concluded that STUDENT did not have a severe discrepancy between her ability and achievement. Ms. Kaufman also wrote in her report that STUDENT's low scores were due in part to her lack of motivation. At the IEP meeting, the District members of the IEP team found that STUDENT was not eligible for special education services as a student with a specific learning disability.
Although MOTHER did not agree with the assessment results and outcome of the IEP meeting, she did not obtain independent assessments or request a special education due process hearing to resolve the disagreement. Accordingly, STUDENT was kept in Angela Hardee's regular education first grade class for the rest of the school year. On STUDENT's report card, Ms. Hardee indicated that STUDENT's work in the areas of language arts, mathematics, history/social science, and science/health was "satisfactory." However, Ms. Hardee commented that STUDENT's "academic progress [was] an area of concern" in the area of language arts and mathematics. She also noted that STUDENT was "working below grade level" in these areas. Despite STUDENT's academic difficulties, Ms. Hardee recommended that STUDENT be advanced to the second grade.
For her second grade year, STUDENT's mother withdrew STUDENT from Monte Vista and placed her at Crescenta Valley Adventist, a private school. According to her mother, STUDENT was placed at Crescenta School because she felt that STUDENT needed to be taught reading through the use of phonics and that Monte Vista did not have a phonics program. While at Cresenta , STUDENT did not receive special education services other than brief vision therapy. STUDENT remained at Crescenta school throughout her second grade year (1995-1996), and from the beginning of the fall semester until October 5, 1996, of her third grade year (1996-1997).
On December 5, 1996 (Footnote 7), STUDENT's mother returned STUDENT to Monte Vista Elementary School to attend the third grade. Upon STUDENT's return, MOTHER made another request for a special education assessment for her daughter. On her speech and language evaluation, STUDENT scored in the first percentile on an expressive language subtest that tested her ability to formulate sentences. Based on this finding, and because STUDENT had difficulties on an informal language sample, the speech and language therapist concluded that STUDENT met the eligibility criteria as a student with a language disorder. On her Woodcock Johnson - Revised achievement test, STUDENT scored "significantly below her grade level in Letter-Word Identification, Passage Comprehension, Dictation, and the Writing Samples." An IEP meeting convened on February 3, 1997, where the IEP team found STUDENT eligible for special education services as a student with a specific language disorder. Pursuant to her IEP, STUDENT was provided speech and language therapy and placed in a resource specialist program (RSP) for reading. Although STUDENT's mother signed the IEP in agreement with STUDENT's special education eligibility and services for reading and speech, she disagreed with the decision that no services were to be provided to STUDENT to assist her with "math and language."
For the 1997-1998 school year, STUDENT attended the fourth grade at Monte Vista School. Prior to starting school, STUDENT was assessed to determine her need for occupational therapy. In her occupational therapy assessment report, Susan Trautman wrote that STUDENT had visual perception and motor planning difficulties. As a result, Ms. Trautman recommended that STUDENT be provided school-based occupational therapy. On November 13, 1997, the IEP team convened to determine STUDENT's services for the 1997-1998 school year. The IEP team increased STUDENT's services to include RSP assistance for reading, speech, math, and written expression. STUDENT also was to receive occupational therapy to work on her psychomotor/perceptual goal in her IEP.
According to her mother and grandmother, STUDENT became increasingly frustrated during the fourth grade about not being able to read at the level of her peers. She was also distressed about attending school and embarrassed about having to attend her resource specialist class (RSP class). Thus, she would often hide in the restroom so that other students would not see her going to the RSP class. Due to her anxiety about school, STUDENT began to wet her bed and to have nightmares, stomachaches, and diarrhea. Additionally, she would often cry about having to attend school and would require "pep talks" from her grandmother and mother before she was able to go to school each day. While at school, STUDENT met with Karen Carlson, a therapist who provided therapy services to the students at Monte Vista, to work through her school anxieties. Ms. Carlson stated that STUDENT became increasingly confident about school but that she sometimes manifested her anxiety as physical symptoms. During her fourth grade year, STUDENT was absent approximately thirty times and was tardy to her RSP classes approximately sixty times.
During the spring semester of STUDENT's fourth grade year, the District attempted to schedule another IEP meeting for STUDENT to discuss her placement for the 1998-1999 school year. However, MOTHER indicated that she was in the process of obtaining counsel and would be unable to attend the IEP meetings scheduled for March 31 and April 20, 1998. The IEP meeting finally convened on May 4, 1998, where MOTHER attended with her attorney, Stephen Wyner. At the meeting, MOTHER disagreed that the IEP goals and objectives were appropriate for STUDENT. MOTHER and her representative also requested additional assessments for STUDENT. Although the parties did not settle on what assessments were to be completed, the team agreed to reconvene when the assessments were completed. As a result of the disagreement over the assessments and the appropriateness of STUDENT's IEP, MOTHER filed for a special education due process hearing on May 20, 1998.
Dissatisfied with STUDENT's special education placement and slow progress in school, MOTHER decided not to enroll STUDENT at Monte Vista during the fall of her fifth grade year. Because she was unable to find and fund an appropriate private school placement, MOTHER allowed STUDENT to remain at home to be schooled by her and STUDENT's grandmother. The District was not notified about MOTHER's decision to home-school STUDENT until months later.
Then, on December 7, 1998, an IEP meeting convened to discuss STUDENT's assessments and educational placement for the 1998-1999 school year. At the IEP meeting, the District offered to place STUDENT in Ms. Michelle Finn's special day class (SDC) at Monte Vista School with occupational and speech therapy. However, MOTHER and Mr. Wyner declined to provide consent to the IEP and its goals until the IEP could be reviewed by their experts. Because neither MOTHER nor Mr. Wyner notified the District as to whether they consented to the IEP, the District cross-filed for a due process hearing on January 29, 1999.
After numerous continuances by both parties, the consolidated hearing finally began on June 15, 1999. As of the dates of the hearing, STUDENT continued to be home-schooled by her mother and grandmother.FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Are STUDENT's claims arising prior to May 20, 1995, barred by the statute of limitations?
Pursuant to Education Code § 56505(j), any request for a due process hearing "shall be filed within three years from the date the party initiating the request knew or had reason to know of the facts underlying the basis for the request." Prior to the provision going into effect on January 1, 1999, the three year statute of limitations for actions arising under the IDEA was adopted by the courts. In Alexopulos v. San Francisco Unified School District, a student requested an administrative hearing in 1985 to address issues relating to the school district's alleged failure to provide an appropriate education in 1979, some six years earlier. Alexopulos v. San Francisco Unified School District, 817 F.2d 551, 555 (9th Cir. 1987). On appeal of the hearing officer's denial of the student's claims, the Alexopulos court found that all claims under the IDEA were time-barred. The court stated that:
Congress' desire to obtain timely and appropriate education for handicapped children by conferring substantial substantive and procedural rights on parents and guardians on behalf of their children clearly indicates that it did not intend to authorize filing of claims on behalf of or by the children many years after the alleged wrongdoing occurred. It is reasonable to assume that Congress expected and intended the child's representative to file actions and apply for hearings on his behalf near the time the contested event occurred.
Id. at p. 556. The Court concluded that any cause of action which Ms. Alexopulos may have had would have accrued in 1979 when she "knew or had reason to know of the facts underlying it."
In this case, the Hearing Office received Petitioner's request for a special education due process hearing on May 20, 1998. If a three-year statute of limitations were to apply, all claims arising prior to May 20, 1995 would be barred. At hearing, the student presented issues relating to her 1993-1994 and 1994-1995 school years, a period more than three years prior to the date Petitioner filed for hearing. The evidence established that STUDENT's mother received notice of her special education parental rights as early as June 16, 1994, when she signed the assessment plan. MOTHER received notice of her parental rights again on October 3, 1994, when she attended STUDENT's IEP meeting, and again on October 26, 1994, when a copy was included in a letter from STUDENT's school principal. MOTHER also exercised her rights when she requested a special education assessment for STUDENT in June 1994 and attended the October 1994 IEP meeting scheduled to discuss STUDENT's eligibility for special education. Because MOTHER knew of or had reason to know of the facts underlying STUDENT's claims as early as June 16, 1994, all claims arising prior to May 20, 1995, are time-barred.
Although the statute of limitations would not bar any claims arising between May 20, 1995, and the end of the 1994-1995 school year, the Student did not allege any specific claims with regard to this time period. Additionally, the Student did not allege any basis for why the statute of limitation would be tolled for any claims arising as of May 20, 1995. Thus, this decision will only address issues arising during the 1995-1996, 1996-1997, 1997-1998, and 1998-1999 school years.
II. Was STUDENT eligible for special education and related services prior to being found eligible on February 3, 1997?
It is the Student's position that the District should have found her eligible for special education and related services prior to February 3, 1997, when the IEP team determined that she was qualified for such services. Because it was found above that STUDENT's claims prior to May 20, 1995, are barred by the statute of limitations, and because STUDENT has not asserted any claims specific to the period between May 20, 1995, and the beginning of the 1995-1996 school year, the following analysis will address only the period from the fall of 1995 to February 3, 1997, when STUDENT was found eligible for special education services. With regard to this specific time period, STUDENT asserted that the District was responsible for providing her special education services while she attended Crescenta School, a parochial school. Because STUDENT has only asserted her deficits in reading, written language, and mathematics as possible bases for special education eligibility, only the eligibility categories of specific learning disabilities and language disorders will be considered.
B. Specific Learning Disability (SLD)
The Student argued that her need for special education resulted from her fall on school grounds at the beginning of her kindergarten year in 1993. According to the Student, her need for special education is evidenced in part by her scores on the Woodcock Johnson - Revised (WJ-R) and on the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children - III (WISC-III), which indicated generally that she was working below her ability level. She also asserted that her teacher's comments on her first and second grade report cards indicate that she was working below grade level and needed tutoring in reading and math. Although this evidence supports that STUDENT would have benefited from special education services, it did not support her argument that she was qualified for special education as a student with a learning disability during this time under the requirements of the law.
California Education Code § 56337 states that the following three requirements must be met in order to satisfy eligibility criteria for a specific learning disability:
(a) A severe discrepancy exists between the intellectual ability and achievement in one or more of the following academic areas:
(1) Oral expression;
(2) Listening comprehension;
(3) Written expression;
(4) Basic reading skills;
(5) Reading comprehension;
(6) Mathematics calculation;
(7) Mathematics reasoning.
(b) The discrepancy is due to a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes and is not the result of environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantages. (c) The discrepancy cannot be corrected through other regular or categorical services offered within the regular instructional program.
A severe discrepancy can be established either through a formula using standardized tests (5 C.C.R. § 3030(j)(4)(A)), by alternative means when standardized tests are considered invalid (5 C.C.R. § 3030(j)(4)(B), or through a determination by an IEP team that such a discrepancy exists (5 C.C.R. § 3030(j)(4)(C)).
California code of Regulations § 3030(j)(4)(A) sets forth the method by which to establish a severe discrepancy for students for whom standardized tests are considered invalid. There was no credible testimony that the use of standardized tests is invalid in assessing STUDENT's ability or achievement. Furthermore, as will be discussed below, STUDENT's standardized assessment scores were valid and could have been appropriately used to determine whether she qualified for special education services. Therefore, to determine if a severe discrepancy existed, STUDENT's scores on standardized intellectual testing can be compared with her scores on achievement testing. When standardized tests are considered valid, a severe discrepancy is established by the following:
[F]irst, converting into common standard scores, using a mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15, the achievement test score and the ability test score to be compared; second, computing the difference between these common standard scores; and third, comparing this computed difference to the standard criterion which is the product of 1.5 multiplied by the standard deviation of the distribution of computed differences of students taking these achievement and ability tests. A computed difference which equals or exceeds this standard criterion, adjusted by one standard error of measurement, the adjustment not to exceed 4 common standard score points, indicates a severe discrepancy when such discrepancy is corroborated by other assessment data which may include other tests, scales, instruments, observations and work samples, as appropriate.
5 C.C.R. § 3030(j)(4)(A).
In this case, STUDENT did not have a severe discrepancy between ability and achievement that would have qualified her for special education and related services as a student with a specific learning disability. In September 1994, STUDENT was provided a cognitive evaluation by Robin Kaufman and an academic achievement evaluation by Enid Kohn. STUDENT's cognitive evaluation comprised of the WISC-III. On her WISC-III, STUDENT had a verbal intelligence quotient (IQ) of 80 (prorated to 88), a performance IQ of 75, and a full scale IQ of 76 (prorated to 80). On the WJ-R, STUDENT's achievement assessment, STUDENT obtained the following scores: letter-word identification-76; passage comprehension-98; broad reading-84; calculation-92; applied problems-79; broad math-81; dictation-94; writing samples-99; and broad written language-97. A comparison of STUDENT's verbal, performance, or full scale standard scores on the WISC-III (a measure of ability) with STUDENT's standard scores on any area of achievement of the WJ-R (a measure of achievement), do not result in a severe discrepancy. The largest discrepancy is twelve points (using the prorated verbal IQ score).
The Student asserted that her scores on the WISC-III were invalid because the assessor prorated her scores, which overestimated her actual ability, and that, therefore, she should not have precluded her from special education. According to Robin Kaufman's report of STUDENT's WISC-III scores, STUDENT's score on the arithmetic subtest was prorated from a scaled score of one to a score of eight. Because the assessor prorated STUDENT's arithmetic score, STUDENT's verbal IQ rose from 80 to 88. The Student contended that her scores should have been much lower, therefore establishing her qualification for special education services. In support of her argument, the Student offered the testimony of Dr. Christine LoPresti, who indicated that some of STUDENT's scores may be invalid because the assessor prorated her scores. (Footnote 9) However, Dr. LoPresti also stated that STUDENT's scores would not have shown a severe discrepancy even if the assessor had not prorated STUDENT's scores. Specifically, had the original verbal score of 80 been considered by the IEP team, STUDENT would only have a four point discrepancy between her ability and achievement. (Footnote 10) Accordingly, based on STUDENT's 1994 scores, there was no severe discrepancy between STUDENT's ability and achievement. Therefore, STUDENT did not have a severe discrepancy that would have qualified her for special education services during this time.
Although the Student asserted that the scores from the evaluations performed in January 1997 indicate that she should have been found eligible for special education and related services during the preceding year and a half, such scores do not reliably reflect her needs prior to being found eligible for special education services on February 3, 1997. When STUDENT was evaluated in January of her third grade year, she had been out of school for most of the preceding six months. STUDENT's second grade year at Crescenta School ended in May or June of 1996. She was out of school during the summer months and then enrolled in class at Crescenta School from August 24 to October 1, 1996. STUDENT was then absent from school for two months from October 2 through December 4, when she enrolled at Monte Vista School. STUDENT only attended Monte Vista for two weeks before the winter break. When STUDENT returned from the winter break in January 1997, her assessments began. Because STUDENT's third grade assessments reflect an extended absence from school, they do not reliably reflect her needs prior to such absence. Furthermore, no evidence was presented which gave insight into when STUDENT's functioning worsened. STUDENT was not assessed during the period between September 1994 and January 1997. Additionally, her grades do not reflect that her school functioning deteriorated during this time, which might have indicated a need for further assessments. Thus, no evidence substantiated that the January 1997 scores reflected STUDENT's functioning during the prior year and a half. As a result, such assessments were not considered in determining whether STUDENT qualified for special education during the second grade and fall of the third grade.
In addition to the lack of a severe discrepancy, there was no corroborating data presented at the hearing, such as other tests, scales, observations, or work samples, to support that STUDENT had a learning disability at this time. On her first grade report card, STUDENT earned all "satisfactory" grades. Similarly, and more directly relevant to whether STUDENT was eligible for special education during this time, STUDENT's scores on her second grade report card were primarily "E's" (i.e., "Doing very well") and "S's" (i.e., Making acceptable progress"), with a mark of "N" (i.e., More progress needed") only in the area of spelling. Specifically, although STUDENT's WJ-R scores indicated a weakness in math and language, STUDENT was able to maintain high grades in English, reading, and mathematics. According to her second grade teacher's comments on her report card, STUDENT's "lower" scores were attributable to her frequent absences and failure to turn in her work assignments. According to MOTHER, STUDENT did not receive special education services during the second grade. Based on the foregoing, such evidence established that STUDENT was able to perform in the regular education program during this time despite any discrepancy between ability and achievement
Because STUDENT did not have a severe discrepancy between ability, and because it has not been established that her difficulties could not be corrected with services in the regular education program, she was not qualified for special education as a student with a specific learning disability before February 3, 1997.
C. Language and Speech Disorder
Title 5 of the California Code of Regulations Section 3030(c) states, in relevant part, that a student shall qualify for special education as a student with an expressive or receptive language disorder if she meets one of the following criteria:
(1) The pupil scores at least 1.5 standard deviations below the mean, or below the 7th percentile, for his or her chronological age or developmental level on two or more standardized tests in one or more of the following areas of language development: morphology, syntax, semantics, or pragmatics, OR (2) The pupil scores at least 1.5 standard deviations below the mean or the score is below the 7th percentile for his or her chronological age or developmental level on one or more standardized tests in one of the areas listed in subsection (1) and displays inappropriate or inadequate usage of expressive or receptive language as measured by a representative spontaneous or elicited language sample of a minimum of fifty utterances.
The evidence did not establish that STUDENT met either eligibility criteria and, thus, she was not qualified for special education as a student with a language and speech disorder. First, STUDENT's scores on her assessments did not reflect scores below the seventh percentile on two or more standardized tests in the areas of language development. On her WJ-R performed during her first grade year, STUDENT scored below the seventh percentile on only one subtest, the letter-word identification subtest. Although STUDENT was also assessed with the WISC-III, only "scaled scores" were provided and not her percentile scores. Thus, the Hearing Office does not have sufficient information to determine if any of her WISC-III scores in the area of language fell below the seventh percentile. Furthermore, no evidence was received at hearing with regard to the standard deviation of STUDENT's language development scores. Moreover, as was discussed above, STUDENT was appropriately assessed during the time at issue and her scores on the WJ-R and WISC-III were, at worst, an underestimation of her ability. Because the evidence did not reflect scores below the 1.5 standard deviation or the seventh percentile on two or more tests in the areas of language development, STUDENT did not qualify as a student with a language and speech disorder under this criterion.
With regard to the second eligibility criterion, in addition to the lack of percentile or standard deviation scores, no evidence was offered that a language sample of a minimum of fifty of STUDENT's utterances was collected or that indicated that STUDENT had a problem with receptive or expressive language. However, all witness testimony was consistent that STUDENT was good "orally" and that she did not have problems with her language comprehension. Based on the above lack of support for the Student's contentions, the Hearing Officer is unable to find STUDENT eligible under this criterion either. For the foregoing reasons, STUDENT did not qualify for special education as a student with a language and speech disorder at any period.
In summary, because STUDENT did not have an SLD or a speech and language disorder, she was not qualified for special education and related services prior to February 1997.
III. Did the District deny STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during the 1995-1996, 1996-1997, 1997-1998, and 1998-1999 school and extended school years?
Under both state law and the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), students with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). (Footnote 11) 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (1997) (former version at 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1994)); Education Code § 56000 (Deering 1987). The term "free appropriate public education" means special education and related services that are available to the student at no charge to the parent or guardian, that meet the State educational standards, and that conform with the student's individualized educational program (IEP). 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8)(1997) (former version at 20 U.S.C. §1401(a)(18)(1994)).
"Special education" is defined as specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of the student. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(25)(1997) (formerly 20 U.S.C. 1401(a)(16)(1994)). The term "related services" includes transportation and other services that may be required to assist a child to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22)(1997) (formerly 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1994)). California Education Code § 56363 similarly provides that designated instruction and services (DIS), California's term for related services, shall be provided "when the instruction and services are necessary for the pupil to benefit educationally from his or her instructional program."
To determine whether the District provided STUDENT a free appropriate public education, one must focus on the adequacy of Respondents' program. Gregory K. v. Longview School District, 811 F. 2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987). In Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District, et al. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982), the United States Supreme Court determined that the student's individualized educational program (IEP) must be reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit. The Court in Rowley concluded that the IDEA does not require school districts to provide special education students with the best education available or to provide instruction or services that maximize the student's abilities. The Court stated that school districts are required to provide only a "basic floor of opportunity" that consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the student. Rowley, 458 at 207-208.
Additionally, special education law requires that a student be educated in the least restrictive environment (LRE). 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) specifically provides:
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, including children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular education environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aides and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
The requirement that disabled children be educated to the maximum extent appropriate with nondisabled children is often referred to as "mainstreaming," or education in the "least restrictive environment" (LRE). The law demonstrates a "strong preference for ‘mainstreaming' which rises to the level of a rebuttable presumption." Daniel R. v. State Board of Education, 874 F.2d 1036, 1044-45 (5th Cir. 1989).
The Supreme Court in Rowley also recognized the importance of adherence to the procedural requirements of the IDEA. Federal special education law requires states to establish and maintain certain procedural safeguards to ensure that each student with a disability receives the appropriate public education to which he or she is entitled and that parents are involved in the formulation of the student's educational program. W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School District No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992). Procedural flaws, however, do not automatically require a finding of a denial of a FAPE. Id. at 1484. Procedural violations may result in a denial of a FAPE if they result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringe on the parents' participation in the IEP process. Id. Thus, the courts have created a two prong test for determining if a procedural violation resulted in a denial of FAPE for a student: (1) whether a procedural protection has been violated, and (2) whether the procedural violation resulted in a loss of education opportunity to the student or seriously infringed on the parents' participation in the IEP process.
Thus, the analysis of whether a student has been provided a FAPE is twofold, requiring the hearing officer to determine whether the procedural safeguards of the IDEA have been violated and whether the FAPE provided was substantively appropriate. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-207.
A. Fall 1995 through February 3, 1997
As was discussed above, STUDENT did not qualify for special education services prior to being found eligible on February 3, 1997. Because STUDENT did not qualify for special education services during this time, the District was not required to offer or provide STUDENT with a FAPE under the IDEA.
B. February 3, 1997 through the end of the 1996-1997 school year
During latter part of the 1996-1997 school year, STUDENT attended the third grade at Monte Vista School. With regard to the time period after being found eligible for special education on February 3, 1999, she contended that she was denied a FAPE because the District failed to provide her with services to address her deficits in math and written language. She argued that her then-current assessment scores, which fell within the average to low average range, were not a true indication of her ability in the area of mathematics. Rather, she argued that her true level of functioning was reflected more accurately in her WJ-R scores from two years prior. She also contended that her assessment scores, which fell between the fifth and eighth percentile on the dictation and broad written language subtests and on the writing sample, indicated that she required services to address her written language. Moreover, she argued that her scores on the WJ-R from her fifth grade year, two years after the period at issue, established that she did not make significant academic progress in math and written language during this time. Thus, it is the Student's position that the District should have provided services in the area of mathematics and written language during her third grade year. As indicated above, for the District to have provided STUDENT with a FAPE, STUDENT's educational placement must have been designed to meet her unique and individual needs. Therefore, the following analysis will address whether STUDENT had a unique need for math and written language services, and whether the District's failure to provide these services resulted in a denial of a FAPE.
With regard to a need in the area of mathematics, the evidence established that STUDENT did not require special education services in this area. On her 1997 WJ-R, STUDENT scored well within the average range. Her scores on the calculations, applied problems, and broad math subtests fell within the 44th, 28th, and 34th percentile, respectively. In the assessment report, assessor Enid Kohn wrote that STUDENT was working at grade level on "calculations" and at seven months below grade level in the area of "applied problems." (It is important to note, as was discussed above, that prior to being given the 1997 WJ-R assessment, STUDENT had missed months of school which likely affected her academics and assessments.) In comparison, STUDENT received marks of satisfactory or better in the subject of math. Although MOTHER testified at hearing that STUDENT's third grade teacher stated that she believed STUDENT required services to address STUDENT's deficits in areas of math and written language, no evidence was offered regarding the context of her statement or the basis on which STUDENT's teacher would have based such a statement. Furthermore, the Student provided no significant evidence to warrant more consideration of her older first grade test scores than her current test scores. Moreover, although services for mathematics and written language were added to STUDENT's educational program in November 1997, no reasonable inference can be made from such changes because no information was provided regarding the circumstances involved in the decision to add those services. Based on the foregoing, STUDENT cannot be found to have required services in the area of mathematics as part of her special education program during this time.
With regard to a need in the area of written language, the evidence established that STUDENT had a need for special education services in this area. According to the 1997 WJ-R, STUDENT scored in the 5th percentile on the dictation subtest and in the sixth percentile on the broad written language subest. Additionally, Ms. Kohn wrote in her report that STUDENT was two years below her grade level based on her writing sample. Although no evidence was offered to explain why STUDENT was not determined to have a need in this area, significant evidence exists which shows that STUDENT required additional help on written language. In her second grade report card, STUDENT was consistently graded as requiring improvement on her spelling. Additionally, a student study team report from the fall of 1996 indicated that STUDENT had difficulty with written language. Based on the above, and in the absence of contradictory evidence, it is found that STUDENT had a need for special education services in the area of written language during this time. Thus, the District did not provide STUDENT a FAPE to the extent that it failed to provide her services to address her deficits in written language.C. 1997-1998 school year
1. Designed to meet STUDENT's unique and individual needs
The first step in this analysis is to determine what STUDENT's unique and individual needs were during the 1997-1998 school year. It is undisputed, and clear from the record, that STUDENT is a student who has overall average intellectual ability, but who has deficits which affect her academic achievement in the area of reading, written language, expressive language, and mathematics. On her January 1997 WJ-R, STUDENT scored about two years below her grade level in the areas of reading, passage comprehension, letter-word identification, dictation, written language, and on her writing sample. Additionally, according to her January 1997 speech and language assessment, STUDENT's ability to verbalize her thoughts and to formulate grammatically correct sentences was poor. Although her scores on the mathematics and calculations subtests of the WJ-R were in the average to low average range during her third grade year, her difficulties in math were apparent to her teacher in the classroom environment and, thus, mathematics was identified as an area of need on her fall IEP for the 1997-1998 school year. Moreover, following an occupational therapy assessment during the end of August 1997, occupational therapy services were added to STUDENT's fall 1997 IEP.
With regard to STUDENT's deficits in reading, the parties are also in general agreement that STUDENT required services to improve her phonemic awareness. Sasha Borenstein, the director of the Kelter Center and a person who assessed STUDENT, explained in her report that phonology deals with the "set of skills that enables a person to learn sound/symbol correspondences, to discriminate, sequence, segment and blend sounds to form words to be read or spelled." Phonemic awareness deals with a person's ability to distinguish sounds that are heard from spoken language, not a person's ability to correlate a sound to a symbol that is read in print. Thus, as Ms. Borenstein describes it, phonemic awareness is a "listening exercise." Ms. Borenstein testified that STUDENT scored at the first grade level on the Lindamood Auditory Conceptualization (LAC) test, which tests phonemic awareness. The results of the tests indicated that STUDENT had difficulties discriminating, manipulating, and shifting sounds, which indicated a "significant phonemic awareness deficit." On STUDENT's December 1998 IEP, the team wrote that STUDENT had "difficulties" and "needs help" in phonemic awareness. Additionally, Dr. Christine LoPresti testified that a review of STUDENT's educational record indicated that STUDENT had phonemic awareness problems.
Although the parties agree as to STUDENT's general areas of need, they disagree as to whether the District provided her with an educational program that met her unique needs. Specifically, the Student argued that the District failed to develop appropriate goals and objectives to address her problems with phonemic awareness. In support of her argument, the Student offered Ms. Borenstein's testimony, which stated that STUDENT's reading goals and objectives on her February 1997 IEP were inappropriate because they were general and broad and did not indicate the strategies or other means of achieving the objectives. Ms. Borenstein added that, had she written the goals, they would have included the specific methods and programs that would be used to achieve the specific goals.
The Student's argument, that the goals were inappropriate because they did not include specific methodologies to achieve the goals, is unpersuasive. The IDEA does not require that the IEP include the specific methods, activities, and materials that will be used to accomplish the objectives. 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. C. Q. 39 (1996). Furthermore, Ms. Borenstein's testimony related specifically to STUDENT's December 1998 goals and objectives and not those from February 1997. Accordingly, the Student's argument for finding her goals and objectives inappropriate is not consistent with the requirements of the IDEA and is not supported by the evidence.
However, the Hearing Officer finds that the February 1997 goals and objectives are inappropriate for other reasons. Goals and objectives should focus on offsetting or reducing the problems resulting from a child's disability that interfere with learning and educational performance in school. 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. C, Q. 40 (1996). For a child with a learning disability who is functioning several grades below his or her indicated ability in reading, such as STUDENT, the IEP goals and objectives should be directed to (1) closing the gap between the child's indicated ability and current level of functioning, and (2) helping the child improve the specific skills that are contributing to the discrepancy between ability and functioning. Id. As stated above, STUDENT's difficulties reading revolved around her problems with phonemic awareness. Although STUDENT's goals addressed her difficulties blending sounds she read, they did not address her fundamental problem with identifying sounds and differentiating sounds she heard. Thus, the goals did not address the specific skill necessary to address STUDENT's low functioning in reading. Moreover, the goals were not directed toward closing the gap between her ability and achievement. Between the second semester of her third grade year and the end of her fourth grade year, STUDENT had the same reading goals. STUDENT's goals in reading were initially developed in February 1997, when she was found eligible for special education, and were continued for her entire fourth grade year. Additionally, goals that were proposed during the end of her fourth grade year to continue into her fifth grade year were almost identical to the goals from February 1997. Based on the above, the goals were not designed to, and in fact did not, offset or reduce her problems with reading.
2. Reasonably calculated to provide some educational benefit
As stated above, to be appropriate under the IDEA, the District's proposed program must have been reasonably calculated to provide STUDENT with some educational benefit. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200. While this requires a school district to provide a disabled child with meaningful access to education, it does not mean that the school district is required to guarantee totally successful results. Walczak v. Florida Union Free School District, 142 F.3d 119, 133 (2d Cir. 1998). De minimis benefit or only trivial advancement, however, is insufficient to satisfy the Rowley standard of "some" benefit. Id. at 130. Rather, a child's academic progress must be viewed in light of the limitations imposed by his or her disability and must be gauged in relation to the child's potential. Mrs. B. v. Milford Board of Education, 103 F.3d 1114, 1121 (2d Cir. 1997).
It was found above that the District failed to develop appropriate goals and objectives to adequately address STUDENT's deficits in reading. Because a student's ability to read impacts her ability to progress in other academic areas, it is found that the District's program was not reasonably calculated to provide STUDENT with educational benefit. STUDENT has been tested and consistently determined to have average intellectual ability. However, STUDENT's scores on her third and fifth grade WJ-R indicate that she made little academic progress during her fourth grade year. On her dictation and broad written language subtests, STUDENT's scores actually dropped between one and two percentile. Additionally, her scores on the calculation and broad math subtests dropped between twenty-fourth and fortieth percentile. Although her scores on the letter-word identification, passage comprehension and broad reading subtests improved slightly, such scores remained in between the second and the sixth percentiles. Furthermore, her reading skills continued to be two grade levels below her current grade level. Moreover, MOTHER testified that STUDENT's fourth grade teacher, Mr. Thompson, assigned STUDENT the same assignment of writing her name and address each week because she could not perform the assignment. The District did not call any witnesses or provide any evidence to explain whether STUDENT had been benefiting in the classroom during this time. Although Mr. Thompson provided STUDENT with all of her RSP services, he did not testify at hearing.
Because the District's provided program did not appropriately address STUDENT's substantial needs in the area of reading, the program was not reasonably calculated to provide STUDENT with educational benefit. Additionally, STUDENT did not make more than de minimis progress during this time.
3. Comport with STUDENT's IEP
The Student argued that STUDENT's educational placement did not comport with her IEP because her resource specialist program (RSP) teacher, Mr. Thompson, was not a credentialed RSP teacher. Specifically, the Student asserted that Mr. Thompson did not hold any special education credential from the beginning of the school year in September 1997 to October 1, 1997. Furthermore, the Student contended that, although Mr. Thompson held an "emergency specialist instruction permit in special education" from October 1, 1997 to June 30, 1998, this permit did not allow him to teach in an RSP classroom.
According to the California Education Code § 56362, a resource specialist program "shall be under the direction of a resource specialist who is a credentialed special education teacher, or who has a clinical services credential with a special class authorization, who has had three or more years of teaching experience, and who has demonstrated the competencies for a resource specialist." Additionally, California Education Code §§ 56061 and 56062 authorizes a District to employ a regular education teacher in a special education classroom for up to forty cumulative school days until the teacher receives an emergency specialist permit in special education.
In this case, Mr. Thompson held the required permits and credentials to teach STUDENT's RSP classroom throughout the 1997-1998 school year. Mr. Thompson held valid teaching credentials in both single subject and multiple subjects since 1996. Although Mr. Thompson did not have a special education credential or an emergency specialist permit in special education from the beginning of the 1997-1998 school year until October 1, 1997, Mr. Thompson could have been authorized to teach STUDENT's RSP class as a substitute teacher under California Education Code §§ 56061 and 56062. Considering that this period of time lasted only about a month, Mr. Thompson was well within the time period that he was allowed to teach as a substitute teacher in a special education classroom as specified under the law. With regard to the period from October 1, 1997, through the end of the 1997-1998 school year, Mr. Thompson's emergency specialist permit in special education allowed him to teach in a resource specialist program classroom. According to the Student's Exhibit 75, the California Commission on Teacher Credentialing allows the holder of such a permit to teach in "special day classes, special schools, home/hospital settings, correctional facilities, nonpublic schools and agencies, and resource rooms." (Emphasis added.) As such, the Student's claim that Mr. Thompson required a specific "emergency resource specialist permit," rather than an "emergency specialist permit in special education," to teach a resource specialist class is unsupported by the evidence. Furthermore, unpersuasive were the Student's contentions that Mr. Thompson was unqualified to "provide information and assistance to MOTHER; to provide consultation, resource information, and material regarding STUDENT to MOTHER or STUDENT's teachers; to coordinate special education services with the regular school programs for STUDENT; to monitor STUDENT's progress [and]; to participate in the review and revision of STUDENT's IEP" because he did not have an emergency resource specialist permit. As was found above, Mr. Thompson held a valid permit to teach the RSP class, and, logically, would have been able to perform the duties of a resource specialist. (Footnote 12)
It is undisputed that STUDENT received all other services as were set forth in her IEPs. Additionally, the evidence supports that STUDENT did in fact receive such services set forth in her IEP.
4. Least restrictive environment
There was no dispute that the District's program was in the least restrictive environment. Additionally, no significant evidence was offered that the District's program was not in the least restrictive environment based on STUDENT's needs.
*****
In summary, the District failed to develop goals and objectives that adequately addressed STUDENT's phonological deficits which affected her ability to read. Because the District did not provide STUDENT a program for the 1997-1998 school year that was designed to meet STUDENT's unique needs and that was reasonably calculated to provide her with educational benefit, it failed to provided STUDENT a FAPE during this time.
D. 1998-1999 school year
For the 1998-1999 school year, MOTHER withdrew STUDENT from school at Monte Vista and provided her home-schooling instead. As a result, STUDENT never attended the fifth grade at Monte Vista and never received any special education during this time. Furthermore, MOTHER refused the District's offer to provide STUDENT with home-instruction services pending the resolution of the due process proceeding.
1. Procedural appropriateness
With regard to the 1998-1999 school year, the Student asserted that the District committed two procedural violations that resulted in her denial of FAPE. First, the Student asserted that the District failed to appropriately assess her in the areas of social/emotional and neurological functioning. Second, the Student asserted that the District failed to convene an appropriate IEP team because no regular education teacher was included on the team. Each of these contentions will be addressed in turn.
a. Failure to assess
California law imposes detailed and demanding requirements on school districts to ensure that students who may be disabled are promptly and appropriately assessed. School districts must systematically seek out all individuals with exceptional needs. Education Code § 56300. Districts must establish written policies and procedures for a continuous child-find system, and the policies and procedures must include written notification to all parents of procedures for initiating a referral for assessment. Education Code 56301. If a referral for assessment is made, California Education Code § 56320 and Section 1414(b) of the IDEA states that the student must be assessed in all areas related to the suspected disability.
With regard to the social/emotional assessment, the evidence established that the District failed to assess STUDENT in this area. STUDENT's mother and grandmother testified that STUDENT suffered extreme anxiety and frustration regarding school which caused her to be frequently absent from and tardy to class. Ms PARENT testified that STUDENT's absences from school were mostly due to stomachaches, nausea, headaches, and other manifestations of her anxiety. STUDENT's mother and grandmother stated that her anxiety was exacerbated by being teased by other students and that she was embarrassed about having to attend special education classes. Additionally, STUDENT would come home from school crying and would need "pep" talks each morning before she was emotionally ready to attend school.
On STUDENT's September 1998 assessment, Judy Yager and Cynthia Ferreira wrote that MOTHER was concerned about STUDENT's low self-esteem and frustration level. They also wrote that STUDENT was "very aware of her academic limitations and some emotional overlay shows up when STUDENT attempts academic types of school work." Furthermore, they indicated that STUDENT demonstrated a "low frustration tolerance when trying to deal in her weak areas of visual memory and working with symbols and numbers along with visual perceptual problems." Similarly, in STUDENT's central auditory processing evaluation performed in November 1998, Patricia Trautwein wrote that school had become "stressful" for STUDENT and that peer pressure had negatively affected her self-esteem. In STUDENT's September 1994 assessment report, Robin Kaufman wrote that STUDENT's scores were impacted by her "lack of interest" and "low self confidence." Finally, Karen Carlson, who provided STUDENT with therapy services while she attended Monte Vista School during the third and fourth grade, testified that STUDENT would manifest her anxiety and emotional problems as stomachaches. She also testified that STUDENT struggled in school and had low frustration and self-confidence. In light of the above, the District had ample notice of STUDENT's social/emotional difficulties. Because the District had enough information to suspect that STUDENT's social/emotional problems were an area of disability, and because the District did not assess STUDENT in this area, the District failed in its responsibility to assess STUDENT appropriately and completely.
With regard to the neurological assessment, the evidence established that the District was not required to assess STUDENT further in this area. The Hearing Officer notes that the District provided STUDENT with a neurological evaluation in November 1998. The neurological evaluation was performed by Dr. Arnold Starr from the University of California at Irvine. In his evaluation, Dr. Starr examined STUDENT's mental status, cranial nerves, deep tendon reflexes, and plantar responses. Additionally, Dr. Starr conducted motor and sensory exams of STUDENT. At STUDENT's December 1998 IEP meeting, Mr. Wyner, STUDENT's attorney, requested a "full, independent neurological examination/assessment." It is unclear whether the Student is requesting a second neurological evaluation or for the District to further fund an MRI and EEG of STUDENT.
In either situation, the District is not required to fund additional complete neurological assessments of STUDENT. First, the Student has not provided any basis for an additional neurological assessment to be conducted. In fact, she has not alleged that Dr. Starr's assessment was inappropriate in any way. Second, the Student has also not provided any educational basis why STUDENT requires an MRI or EEG. Dr. Star only stated that the EEG would "help to define if there is a seizure focus in the temporal lobe." Although Dr. Starr mentioned possible seizure activity, no evidence was presented that STUDENT's education was affected by such seizures. Ms. Ferreira indicated also that MOTHER was not concerned that STUDENT's education was impacted by seizures. For the foregoing reasons, the District was not required to provide STUDENT a neurological assessment subsequent to Dr. Starr's evaluation.
b. Incomplete IEP team
Federal law mandates the inclusion of the following individuals in the IEP team: (1) the student's regular education teacher, if the child has one, and (2) at least one special education teacher, or if appropriate, (3) one of the child's special education providers. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B). Similarly, California Education Code § 56341(b)(2) defines the IEP team as including the "the pupil's present teacher." Additionally, the same California provision states that, "[i]f the pupil does not presently have a teacher, this representative shall be the teacher with the most recent and complete knowledge of the pupil who has also observed the pupil's educational performance in an appropriate setting... If no teacher is available, this representative shall be a regular classroom teacher referring the pupil, or a special education teacher qualified to teach a pupil of his or her age." As noted above, the Student argued that the December 1998 IEP team was inappropriate because it did not include a regular education teacher.
The Student's argument is unpersuasive. First, the law does not specifically require that a regular education teacher always be present at the IEP meeting. Rather, the law requires that the student's present teacher, or a similar representative, be present at such meetings. At the time of the December 1998 IEP meeting, STUDENT was being home-schooled by her mother and grandmother. Because STUDENT was being home-schooled when the IEP team convened, she did not have a "present teacher" from the District. (Footnote 13) It is clear from the record that none of STUDENT's former teachers attended the December 1998 IEP meeting. However, the team did include Sandra Mele, a special education teacher and program specialist for the Glendale USD. Ms. Mele testified that she holds credentials which enable her to teach learning handicapped children and children at the elementary school level. She also testified that she has worked as a resource specialist in the past and has taught in a special day class. Because the law allows for the a special education teacher to attend the IEP meeting in place of the student's present teacher, and because Ms. Mele is a special education teacher qualified to teach students of STUDENT's age level, Ms. Mele's presence at the IEP meeting satisfied the legal requirements for the composition of an IEP team.
2. Substantive Appropriateness
1. Designed to meet STUDENT's unique and individual needs
It is undisputed that STUDENT's needs from the previous year continued into the 1998-1999 school year. STUDENT continued to receive services to address her deficits in reading, mathematics, written language, expressive language, and handwriting. To address these deficits, STUDENT was offered an educational placement in a special day class with services that included speech and language therapy in a group setting twice a week for thirty minutes each session, occupational therapy once a week for an hour, and extended school year with all of the listed services. With regard to her deficits in reading, STUDENT also continued to require instruction to improve her phonemic awareness.
Again, despite general agreement on STUDENT's needs, the parties disagree about whether the District's offered program was designed to meet her needs. The Student argued three bases for why the District's offered educational program did not meet her unique and individual needs.
a. Failure to appropriately address phonemic awareness
First, the Student asserted that the District failed to develop proper goals and objectives to address her phonological processing deficits. On the December 1998 IEP, the District proposed six goals to address STUDENT's problems with phonemic awareness. The Student offered the same evidence as was noted above for the prior school year. As indicated earlier, the Student's argument that the goals and objectives were inappropriate because they were vague is unpersuasive. Moreover, the evidence established that the District's offered goals and objectives in the December 1998 IEP were developed to appropriately address STUDENT's difficulties with phonemic awareness. Specifically, one of STUDENT's reading goals states that "STUDENT will identify awareness of sounds in mouth, lips, tongue, and throat with 70% accuracy by 3/99." This goal, which also deals with articulation, works on STUDENT's sensitivity to sounds from spoken words. As is stated on the IEP, the goal was intended to address STUDENT's difficulties with vowel shifting sounds and to increase her knowledge of sound/symbol relationships. Unlike with the previous year, the December 1998 IEP addresses STUDENT's auditory deficits in the context of teaching her to read.
b. No goals and objectives to address STUDENT's absences
The Student's second contention was that the December 1998 IEP was inappropriate because the District failed to develop goals and objectives to address her frequent absences. According to the Student, her absences affected her academic progress and should have been considered in developing her IEP. It is clear from the record that STUDENT has been frequently absent from school throughout her educational career. STUDENT had 25 absences during kindergarten, 20 absences during the first grade, and 26.5 absences during the second grade. During the third grade, STUDENT was absent 5 times from August or September 1996 to October 1, 1996. STUDENT did not attend school from October 2 through December 4, 1996. From December 5 through the end of her third grade year, she was absent an additional 9 times. Then, during her fourth grade year, STUDENT was absent approximately 30 times and tardy approximately 60 times. STUDENT's educational record is also full of notations that indicate that her absences and tardies have affected her academic progress. Namely, in STUDENT's September 1998 academic assessment, Judy Yager and Cynthia Ferreira summarized at length STUDENT's history of attendance and tardiness problems. Additionally, according to Ms. Yager and Ferreira, STUDENT's RSP and general education teachers have indicated that her ability to succeed in the classroom was affected by her "absences and tardies." STUDENT's May 1998 IEP states that "frequent absences and tardies have worked against her progress." Furthermore, the December 1998 IEP indicates that the "District team feels STUDENT needs to attend school on a more regular basis for any program to work." Based on the above, the District had knowledge that STUDENT'a academic progress was hindered by her school attendance. Thus, the District should have developed a goal and objective to address STUDENT's attendance problems.
The Hearing Officer notes that MOTHER's explanation for STUDENT's history of frequent absences was not consistent with the other evidence. MOTHER explained that STUDENT's absences were primarily due to illnesses such as vomiting, diarrhea, and stomachaches, which were caused by her anxiety surrounding school. However, MOTHER and STUDENT's grandmother both testified that STUDENT's school anxieties became a problem during her fourth grade year. As was noted above, STUDENT had been consistently absent in excess of twenty days each year since her kindergarten year. Furthermore, MOTHER kept STUDENT from school for over two months, without explanation, during the fall of her third grade year. Moreover, STUDENT was absent for 26.5 days during her second grade year, even though she attended Crescenta School, where MOTHER testified that STUDENT was happy. Although STUDENT's absences during her fourth grade year appear, in part, due to her school anxiety, her poor attendance during prior years cannot be similarly explained.
The determination that STUDENT required an attendance goal for the fifth grade is made in light of the effect that her school anxiety had on her attendance during the prior fourth grade year. As was stated above, STUDENT was absent from class 30 times and tardy to class on 60 occasions during the fourth grade. Both the Student's and the District's witnesses testified that most of STUDENT's tardies were to her resource specialist class. According to MOTHER, STUDENT was self-conscious about her learning difficulties and was embarrassed about having to receive special assistance. Thus, she would hide in the bathroom so that other students would not see her entering the resource specialist classroom. Furthermore, STUDENT's academic record is filled with statements from assessors and educators that STUDENT lacked self-confidence and was sensitive about her academic deficits. Despite a paper clock being placed on STUDENT's desk to remind her when to attend her RSP class, such intervention did not lessen her tardiness. Furthermore, the District's inquiries into the reasons behind STUDENT's absences proved to be only superficial. Because STUDENT's absences and tardies resulted, in part, from her school-related anxiety, and because the absences and tardies were clearly affecting her education, STUDENT's absences needed to be addressed in a goal and objective.
c. No information on STUDENT's progress during the fourth grade
Lastly, the Student contended that the District's proposed goals and objectives in the area of math, reading and written expression are inappropriate because they were developed without information regarding her progress during the fourth grade. According to the Student, the IEP team was composed of persons who did not have any information as to what strategies were implemented during the fourth grade and without information on her rate of learning. Thus, the goals and objectives in these areas were developed without the requisite information to develop appropriate short term objectives.
According to special education law, a school district is required to initiate and conduct meetings at least annually to review a student's IEP and, if appropriate, revise its provisions. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A) (1997); Cal. Educ. Code § 56343(d) (Deering Supp. 1999). School districts are also required to include in the IEP appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules for determining, at least annually, whether instructional objectives were being achieved. 34 C.F.R. § 300.346(a)(5) (1996); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(a)(6) (Deering 1987) (amended 1998). Additionally, IEPs must include the child's present levels of educational performance. Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(a)(1).
The evidence established that the District met its obligation to review STUDENT's progress. At the end of STUDENT's fourth grade year, the IEP team convened to review STUDENT's educational program and to make recommendations for the following year.Both STUDENT's regular education and RSP teachers, Carla Walker and Craig Thompson, attended the IEP meeting. Sandra Mele, teacher specialist for the District, also attended the meeting. Included in the May IEP were pages of notes regarding STUDENT's then current performance and level of functioning. According to notes in the IEP, MOTHER did not agree to the IEP, and the team agreed to reconvene after additional assessments were conducted of STUDENT. In December 1998, the IEP team reconvened.
Although the Student argued that the educational members of the December IEP team did not have an understanding of STUDENT's progress during the prior years, the team reviewed and considered the May IEP. According to the December IEP, "Ms. Ferreira distributed the IEP developed at STUDENT's 5/4/98 IEP team meeting and the goals and objectives dated 11/13/97 which MOTHER did not approve." Additionally, Sandra Mele, who had knowledge of the discussions regarding STUDENT's fourth grade progress at the May IEP meeting, was present at the December IEP meeting. The December IEP team also had information derived from interviews with STUDENT's prior teacher which was included in STUDENT's psycho-educational assessment from September 1998. Ms. Yager and Ms. Ferreira, who wrote the report, were present at STUDENT's IEP meeting. Finally, STUDENT's progress and level of functioning were derived from numerous assessments conducted during the fall prior to the December IEP meeting. These assessments included a speech and language evaluation, a psycho-educational assessment, a vision therapy assessment, a central auditory processing evaluation, and a neurological evaluation. Finally, each of STUDENT's prior IEPs included assessment scores and statements regarding her current level of performance. Thus, the IEP team had STUDENT's past information to compare with her current assessment results and information to determine whether STUDENT had made academic progress. Based on the above, the IEP team had adequate information to determine STUDENT's progress and current level of functioning in order to develop her goals and objectives. Although the Student argues that the team should have had information regarding the specific strategies that were implemented during the fourth grade and STUDENT's rate of learning, no evidence was presented to establish that the team required such information, or any other information above the information that it already had, to develop STUDENT's goals and objectives.
In summary, the District failed to develop a goal to address the effect that STUDENT's absences and tardiness had on her education. Based on the foregoing, the District's placement was not designed to meet STUDENT's unique and individual needs.
2. Reasonably calculated to provide some educational benefit
As indicated above, the District failed to appropriately assess STUDENT in the area of social/emotional development to address her high anxiety regarding school. STUDENT's grandmother and mother testified that, by the end of her fourth grade year, STUDENT had developed physical symptoms due to this anxiety and was frequently ill as a result. Because the District failed to assess STUDENT in this area, significant information is lacking regarding whether STUDENT's anxiety was in fact affecting her schooling and whether STUDENT required counseling services to address her anxiety.
It was also found above that the District failed to develop goals and objectives to address frequent absences and tardiness. The evidence is filled with information that STUDENT's absences and tardiness affected her schooling and her ability to benefit from her special education services. Additionally, such absences and tardiness affected STUDENT's entire educational program. Because the District failed to address STUDENT's absences and tardiness in the IEP, the District's educational program was not designed to provide STUDENT with educational benefit.
Other than these two deficiencies, the District's program was designed to meet STUDENT's needs. STUDENT has severe deficits in reading, mathematics, written language, expressive language. Because STUDENT's progress had been slow during the previous year, the District offered STUDENT a placement in a special day class, where she would receive more intensive services than in an RSP class. STUDENT was to be placed in Ms. Michelle Finn's special day class. This class was comprised of twelve students of STUDENT's age range who had similar learning difficulties. Additionally, District witnesses described the class environment as "academically centered." Ms Yager testified that STUDENT was overwhelmed by demands of a regular education classroom combined with services from the RSP teacher. Thus, she stated that the SDC was appropriate because STUDENT would be able to work consistently on her academics and on her weaknesses. Based on the above, and as will be discussed below, such placement was necessary to address STUDENT's significant academic deficiencies. Moreover, the parties generally agreed as to the amount of DIS services STUDENT needed. In the December IEP, STUDENT was to receive speech and language therapy in a group setting twice a week and occupational therapy once a week. Additionally, to address her low functioning, the District offered STUDENT extended school services with all of the DIS services listed above. Therefore, other than the two deficiencies already noted, the District's offered placement was reasonably calculated to provide STUDENT academic benefit.
3. Comport with STUDENT's IEP
This standard was designed to determine if the student's IEP was appropriately implemented. Because STUDENT was not available for the District's offered educational placement, this standard is irrelevant to determining whether the District offered a FAPE.
4. In the least restrictive environment (LRE)
As was stated above, special education law requires that a student must be educated in the least restrictive environment. The Student contended that the District offer of placement was not in the least restrictive environment. She asserted that the placement in the SDC class would have caused her to be more "stigmatized" than she would have been if she had been placed in an RSP class. Additionally, she asserted that she would not have received any more services in an SDC class than she would have in an RSP environment. Thus, she argued that the SDC class was too restrictive based on her needs. (Footnote 14)
The Student's arguments are unpersuasive and not supported by the evidence. Although the Student asserted that she would have been more "stigmatized" in an SDC class than in an RSP setting, she provided no evidence to support her argument. Additionally, Susan Melly, special education coordinator of special education for the District, testified that STUDENT received RSP services during her third and fourth grade year, but her slow progress indicated that she required more individual services to address her learning deficits. Thus, the educational members of the IEP team recommended that STUDENT be placed in a special day class, where she would receive increased assistance. Sandra Mele, Cynthia Ferrreira, and Susan Melly all testified that students receive more special education instruction in an SDC than in an RSP class because the RSP class is structured for students who receive special education services during less than half of their educational day. In contrast, students in the SDC environment receive special education services during more than half of their day. Moreover, Sandra Mele testified that, although each individual goal and objective could be achieved in an RSP setting, all of STUDENT's needs "collectively" required a more intensive educational environment. Because STUDENT required more services than she could be provided in an RSP environment, the educational members of the team offered STUDENT an SDC placement. Because the District has attempted a continuum of services and placement options, and because the RSP setting is found to no longer be appropriate for STUDENT, the District's SDC placement offer was the least restrictive environment for STUDENT for the 1998-1999 school year.
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In summary, the District failed to appropriately assess STUDENT in the area of social/emotional functioning. Additionally, the District's offer of placement did not provide for a goal and objective to address her related frequent absences and tardiness and, therefore, was not designed to meet STUDENT's substantial needs. Because of the District's failure to assess STUDENT and develop goals to address her absences, the District's offered program lacked elements which were required to provide her with educational benefit. Accordingly, the District's placement offer was not an offer of FAPE.
IV. Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education?
The Student requested that she be provided compensatory education in the form of a non-public school placement for any past denials of FAPE. Courts have consistently held that the authority to award compensatory education is derived from 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)92)(B)(iii), which authorizes a court to grant such "relief as it determines is appropriate." "The purpose of compensatory education is to replace lost educational services." Moubry v. Independent School District Number 696, 951 F.Supp. 867 (8th Cir. 1996). Compensatory education may be an appropriate equitable remedy when the responsible educational authority has failed to provide a disabled child with an appropriate education as required by the IDEA. Todd v. Andrews, 933 F.2d 1576 (11th Cir. 1991). There is, however, no obligation to compensate the child by providing a day of education for each educational day lost. "Compensatory education is not a contractual remedy, but an equitable remedy, part of the Court's resources in crafting appropriate relief...Appropriate relief is relief designed to ensure that the student is appropriately educated within the meaning of the IDEA." Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School District, 31 F3d 1489 (9th Cir. 1994). Equitable considerations are therefore appropriate when fashioning compensatory remedies. An application of equitable principles requires that the actions of the parties themselves must be considered when evaluating the circumstances surrounding the child's lost educational opportunity and in creating an adequate remedy. Id. Thus, when considering a request for compensatory education, it is first necessary to determine whether a school district failed to provide a FAPE. If that issue is answered in the affirmative, the subsequent question is not what precise services were missed but, rather, what compensatory services are necessary to provide an appropriate education under the law.
As was found above, the District failed to provide STUDENT with a FAPE through the 1997-1998 school year because it did not offer her a program that addressed her phonological processing deficits. Additionally, the District denied STUDENT a FAPE for the 1998-1999 school year because it failed to assess her in the area of social/emotional development and it failed to develop goals and objectives to address her frequent absences and tardiness. Based on these denials, STUDENT is entitled to compensatory education.
The only question that remains is what compensatory education is appropriate. The Student argues that the District's denial of FAPE resulted in her slow progress and low functioning in all academic areas, particularly reading. Additionally, she claims that she and her mother no longer have confidence in the District's ability to provide her with a proper education. Thus, she claims that she requires a placement in a nonpublic school (NPS) to enable her to progress towards her current grade level. However, she provided no evidence that an NPS would be better able to provide her with the services she requires or that the District's offered placement with additional services would be inadequate to provide her with educational benefit. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that a nonpublic school placement is not necessary to provide STUDENT with educational benefit.
Currently, STUDENT has significant difficulties with reading. Although STUDENT is at the sixth grade age level, she is reading at the first grade level. STUDENT's slow progress with reading is due in part to the District's failure to develop appropriate goals and objectives for her during the 1997-1998 school year. Thus, STUDENT requires compensatory services to address her deficits in reading. To address STUDENT's deficits in reading, the District is ordered to provide STUDENT with 80 hours of the Lindamood-Bell services from a Lindamood-Bell specialist of the District's choice. According to Ms. Borenstein, the Lindamood Bell program contains all required components to teach students to read. The program systematically deals with phonemic awareness, the integration of phonemic awareness with sound/symbol correspondence, the expectancies of spelling, the learning of site vocabulary, and the practice for fluency. Additionally, Ms. Borenstein testified that STUDENT would require at least 80 hours of services to be able to progress in reading. Such compensatory education remedy will provide STUDENT lost educational opportunity during the 1997-1998 school year.
With regard to the 1998-1999 school year, the District failed to assess STUDENT in the area of social/emotional development and failed to develop goals and objectives to address her absences and tardies. To remedy its failure to assess STUDENT, the District is ordered to assess in the area of social/emotional functioning to determine whether she requires services to address her anxiety and frustration regarding school. Any services that STUDENT requires shall be included in her IEP.
Although the District failed to develop goals to address STUDENT's absences for the 1998-1999 school year, STUDENT is not entitled to compensatory education for the District's failure. Any loss of educational opportunity during STUDENT's fifth grade year was greatly attributable to the actions of MOTHER. As was indicated above, the District's offered placement during the 1998-1999 school year was predominantly appropriate. Yet, MOTHER withdrew STUDENT from school entirely and did not notify the school of such withdraw in a timely fashion or request additional services to enable STUDENT to attend school. In fact, what STUDENT needed most during the 1998-1999 school year was to be brought to school.
MOTHER also refused any educational services from the District, even home-hospital services which would enable a special education teacher to instruct STUDENT in her home. MOTHER and STUDENT's grandmother both testified that STUDENT's school anxiety was exacerbated due to her embarrassment with having to attend RSP class. They also testified that STUDENT was self-conscious about receiving assistance from the classroom aide and was upset by students teasing her. Finally, MOTHER testified that she refused the District's services solely because she wanted nothing further to do with the District. Despite MOTHER's feelings towards the District, STUDENT seriously required educational services. At the very minimum, STUDENT could have received instruction in the home from a home-hospital instructor. There, STUDENT would not have been singled out from her classmates, embarrassed to attend RSP class, or teased by other students. By refusing any academic services and keeping STUDENT from school, MOTHER kept STUDENT from much needed educational services, thereby contributing to STUDENT's low functioning. Because it was MOTHER's actions, rather than the District's, that predominantly resulted in STUDENT's loss of educational opportunity, STUDENT is not entitled to compensatory education here.
In summary, the Student's request for a nonpublic school placement as compensatory education is denied. Rather, the District is ordered to provide STUDENT with 80 hours of Lindamood-Bell services and to assess STUDENT in the area of social/emotional development.
ORDER
I. The District shall assess STUDENT in the area of social/emotional development within thirty days of the date of this order. MOTHER is ordered to make STUDENT available for such assessment. Any services STUDENT is determined to need as a result of the assessment shall be included in her IEP.
II. The District shall provide STUDENT with 80 hours of the Lindamood-Bell services from a Lindamood-Bell specialist of the District's choice.
III. All other requests for relief are denied.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute:
I. Are STUDENT's claims arising prior to May 20, 1995, barred by the statute of limitations? -The District prevailed on this issue.
II. Was STUDENT eligible for special education and related services prior to becoming eligible on February 3, 1997? -The District prevailed on this issue.
III. Did the District deny STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during: A. the 1995-1996 school year?
-The District prevailed on this issue.
B. the 1996-1997 school year?
-The District prevailed on this issue.
C. the 1997-1998 school year?
-The Student prevailed to the extent that the District failed to develop appropriate goals and objectives for STUDENT in the area of phonemic awareness.
D. the 1998-1999 school year?
-The Student prevailed to the extent that the District failed to develop appropriate goals and objectives to address STUDENT's absences and the District failed to assess STUDENT in the area of social/emotional development.
IV. Is STUDENT entitled to a placement at a nonpublic school as compensatory education? -The Student prevailed only to the limited extent that Lindamood-Bell services, as arranged by the District, were awarded.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. Education Code § 56505(i).
DATED: December 7, 1999 ____________________________________ Van T. Vu, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
1. STUDENT's mother and grandmother are both named MOTHER/GRANDMOTHER. All references below to MOTHER will be to STUDENT's mother, unless otherwise stated.
2. If she did not want to proceed with her case, the Student could have simply withdrawn her case and refiled for hearing on the same issues at a later date. However, had she done so, the issue as to whether the District provided her with a FAPE during the 1998-1999 school year may have been barred by the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel. Furthermore, her claims prior to 1996 may have been barred by the statute of limitations.
3. The Student's Exhibit 72 was the neuropsychological evaluation performed by Christine LoPresti. In May and June 1999, the Student requested continuances until July 1998 so that she could obtain this evaluation and present it at hearing. Although the continuance motions were denied, the hearing dates spanned from May until September 1999, and the Student did not begin her case in chief until August 31, 1999. The Student did not offer the report until the last two days of hearing in September 1999.
4. The Student's Exhibits 68 through 71 and the amended witness list were provided to the District three business days prior to the hearing, Exhibit 72 was provided two business days prior to hearing, and Exhibits 73 and 74 were provided the day before the hearing. The following computations were made in light of the September 6, 1999, Labor Day holiday. Moreover, the Student's amended witness list did not set forth the areas about which the witnesses would testify as is required under Education Code Section 56505(e)(7).
5. The issues listed here differ in numbering and content than those noticed by Petitioner at the hearing. Changes were made for the purposes of clarification and appropriate analysis.
6. Although STUDENT is currently a sixth-grade student, no issues were raised as to her sixth grade educational program. The hearing first convened in May 1999, prior to STUDENT beginning the 1999-2000 school year. Thus, the decision will not address any issues related to the 1999-2000 school year.
7. STUDENT attended Crescenta School until October 1, 1996, and MOTHER returned STUDENT to Monte Vista School on December 5, 1996. It appears from the record that STUDENT did not attend school between October 2 and December 4, 1996.
8. The Student made no specific allegations that the District failed to assess her in all areas of suspected disability during this time. Although the Student made a general allegation that the District failed to assess and identify her as a student eligible for special education services, she offered no significant evidence why or whether additional assessments were required or that anyone made a request or referral for additional testing. The Student did, however, question appropriateness of the WISC-III that was conducted prior to the statute of limitations period. Although such issue is barred by the statute of limitations, it is discussed below in determining whether such scores could validly be used to determine if STUDENT qualified for special education prior to being found eligible on February 3, 1997.
9. Dr. LoPresti also indicated that, if the test were administered properly, STUDENT's scores would be valid. At hearing, no evidence was offered that the assessor failed to administer the test properly.
10. According to Ms. Kaufman, STUDENT was functioning in the low average to average range and her low scores were attributable in part to her lack of motivation. Ms. Kaufman's findings were supported by her observation of STUDENT's behavior during testing and reports from STUDENT's teachers, who stated that STUDENT exhibited low self-confidence and a lack of interest in school. Given STUDENT's scores, Ms. Kaufman's findings, and evidence that STUDENT was cognitively sound, there was no indication that STUDENT should have been qualified for special education services under any other category than has been considered in this decision.
11. In 1997, the IDEA was amended (IDEA'97). Most of the provisions of IDEA'97 became effective on June 4, 1997; others became effective January 1, 1998, or July 1, 1998. Thereafter, changes were made to a number of State code provisions, and new federal regulations were issued to reflect the mandates of IDEA '97. Senate Bill No. 1686, which became effective January 1, 1999, amended various State statutes relating to special education. The Department of Education issued new regulations to accompany IDEA '97 on March 12, 1999. The Student's claims relating to the 1995-1996 and 1996-1997 school year arose prior to the enactment of IDEA '97. While IDEA '97 did not alter the general standards reflected in the IDEA, the Hearing Officer will apply the law and regulations in effect at the time the disputed events occurred in compliance with the general rules against the retroactive application of laws. Landgraff v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
12. The Student also asserted that Mr. Thompson was not qualified to participate in STUDENT's IEP meetings as her special education teacher. For the same reasons stated above, the Student's argument is unpersuasive and unsupported by the evidence.
13. MOTHER testified at hearing that she was providing STUDENT academic instruction through the use of materials and books supplied by "Excellence in Education," a support service for parents who home-school their children. Thus, theoretically, if STUDENT was being home-schooled, her present teacher would be her mother, who was present at the meeting.
14. Despite her arguments here, the Student requested a placement in a nonpublic school as compensatory education, a placement she concedes is more restrictive than the District's offered placement in an SDC classroom.
