California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · June 29, 2005
Student v. South San Francisco Unified School District
SEHO Case No. SN 726-05 · Hearing Officer Edwin Villmoare
South San Francisco Unified may end services to a nonresident student after the school year; no earlier duty to reassess; remaining issues settled.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Noted in the decision
The decision refers to a prior SEHO decision (SN05-00115, March 7, 2005, Hearing Officer Judith Ganz) that found the student not eligible as of the end of January 2005. The remaining issues were settled, and the case was dismissed.
Summary
A 12-year-old seventh grader at Westborough Middle School in South San Francisco Unified School District filed for due process, represented by his grandfather. An earlier SEHO decision had found him not eligible for special education as of January 2005. After an independent assessment by Dr. Richard Komm found significant depression, the District's IEP team found him eligible as emotionally disturbed on May 27, 2005. However, it offered no services for the rest of the school year.
The Hearing Officer first decided whether the father lived in the District. The address the father gave the District was a school site with no housing. Based on testimony from attendance supervisor Pat Lagiss and the father himself, the Hearing Officer found the father lived in a San Francisco studio apartment. That meant the District could stop serving the student after June 16, 2005, the last day of the regular school year. Summer and next-year services were then no longer at issue.
Second, the Hearing Officer held that a district must reassess a student previously found ineligible only when circumstances change substantially. Most of the emails and letters sent between February and May 2005 repeated information the District already had. Any duty to reassess that began on May 1 was met within legal timelines, because the IEP meeting took place 26 days later. The parties settled the remaining issues: an alleged eight-day delay, FAPE, reimbursement and compensatory education. The case was dismissed.
Why it matters
The decision shows how SEHO handled two questions. First, it decided residency under Government Code section 244 and allowed a district to finish the school year before ending services to a nonresident student. Second, it applied a "substantial change of circumstances" test to requests to reassess a student who had recently been found ineligible.
Issues and holdings
- District prevailedResponsible agency
Issue 1. Is Student's Father a resident of the District? If not, does the District's obligation to educate Student end on June 16, 2005?
The father lives in a San Francisco studio apartment, not in the District, so the District could end services on June 16, 2005, the last day of the regular school year.
- District prevailedAssessment
Issue 2A. Did the District receive information between February 22, 2005, and May 24, 2005, that warranted an immediate reassessment and eligibility determination before Dr. Komm's report and the May 27, 2005 eligibility finding?
A district must reassess a student previously found ineligible only after a substantial change of circumstances. The materials sent mostly repeated known information, and any duty arising May 1 was met within the timelines by the May 27 IEP meeting.
- Dismissed / withdrawnAssessment
Issue 2B. Even if no immediate reassessment was required, did the District unnecessarily delay the independent reassessment and subsequent determination of eligibility (an alleged eight-day delay, May 19 vs. May 27, 2005)?
Resolved by the parties' settlement and not decided.
- Dismissed / withdrawnFAPE: services offered
Issue 3. Did the District offer Student a FAPE at the IEP meeting held on May 27, 2005?
Resolved by settlement and not decided.
- Dismissed / withdrawnUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue 4. Are Student's parents entitled to reimbursement for expenses incurred on his behalf? (reimbursement sought only for the Father)
Resolved by settlement and not decided.
- Dismissed / withdrawnFAPE: services offered
Issue 5. Is Student entitled to compensatory education services?
Resolved by settlement and not decided.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- Based on the two hearing rulings and the parties' settlement agreement (incorporated by reference; its terms are not stated except that each side bears its own costs and fees), the case was dismissed.
Key authorities
Mountain View-Los Gatos Union High School District v. Student, SEHO Case No. 464-90H; Cal. Educ. Code § 48200; Cal. Educ. Code § 56381(a); Cal. Gov. Code § 244; Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56300, 56302, 56344, 56380(c)
People named in the decision
- Ruth Eaton, Director of special education, South San Francisco Unified School District
- Pat Lagiss, Supervisor of Student Attendance and Welfare, South San Francisco Unified School District
- Maria Asevedo, School psychologist, South San Francisco Unified School District
- Dr. Richard Komm, Independent assessor, Selected by father from San Mateo County SELPA independent assessors' list
- Eleanor Hertzler, LCSW, Private therapist, Private provider
- Hee Kim, Hearing Officer (prehearing conference), Special Education Hearing Office
- Judith Ganz, Hearing Officer (prior case SN05-00115), Special Education Hearing Office
- Kimberly Schulist, District counsel, Miller Brown and Dannis
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Edwin Villmoare, Chief Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), University of the Pacific’s McGeorge School of Law, at the administrative offices of South San Francisco Unified School District, 398 B Street, South San Francisco, on June 9 and 15, 2005.
Petitioner STUDENT (Petitioner or STUDENT) was represented by his grandfather, GRANDFATHER (referred to hereafter as GRANDFATHER). Attorney Kimberly Schulist of Miller Brown and Dannis represented Respondent South San Francisco School District (District). Also present on the District’s behalf was Ruth Eaton, director of special education.
Oral and written evidence was received. The Hearing Officer ruled on two issues during the hearing and the parties then settled the remaining issues. The settlement agreement is incorporated by reference.
ISSUES
In the eleven-page Prehearing Conference Order of June 8, 2005, Hearing Officer Hee Kim determined that the hearing would address the following issues:
1. Should the District have identified STUDENT as a child eligible for special education and related services under the category of emotionally disturbed (ED) between February 2005 and the present? (Footnote 1)
2. Should STUDENT be currently identified for special education and related services as a child with ED?
3. Did the District offer STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) at the individualized education program (IEP) meeting held on May 27, 2005?
4. Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for expenses incurred on his behalf?
5. Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education services?
In the prehearing conference and again at the hearing, the District asserted that Petitioner’s father, Mr. FATHER (referred to hereafter as the Father), is not a resident of the District, and that, as a matter of law, the District has no responsibility to provide STUDENT with special education after June 16, 2005, the end of the regular school year and the date after which the District determined that it would no longer serve STUDENT.
Because resolution of this issue would determine the District’s responsibility to Petitioner after June 16, 2005, through the extended school year and, possibly through the 2005-2006 school year, the Hearing Officer determined that this issue should be addressed first.
Therefore, Issue 1 became:
Is STUDENT’s Father a resident of the District? If not, does the District’s obligation to educate STUDENT end on June 16, 2005? (Footnote 2)
The District stipulated that STUDENT had been found eligible as emotionally disturbed at the IEP team meeting of May 27, 2005. This stipulation resolved what had been Issue 2.
The Petitioner specified that the period during which he claimed the District should have found him eligible before it did so on May 27, 2005, began on February 22, 2005, the day the District initially concluded that STUDENT was not eligible.
As a result, Issue 2 became:
Should the District have identified STUDENT as eligible after the IEP team meeting of February 22, 2005, but before May 27, 2005, the date on which the District found him eligible?
Issues 3, 4, and 5 remained the same.
Thus the issues for hearing were as follows:
1. Is STUDENT’s Father a resident of the District? If not, does the District’s obligation to educate STUDENT end on June 16, 2005?
2. Should the District have identified STUDENT as eligible after the IEP team meeting of February 22, 2005, but before May 27, 2005, the date on which the District found him eligible?
3. Did the District offer STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) at the individualized education program (IEP) meeting held on May 27, 2005?
4. Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for expenses incurred on his behalf? (Footnote 3)
5. Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education services?
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
In addition to addressing the issues, the Prehearing Conference Order of June 8, 2005, addressed and resolved in part or whole a number of matters including motions to dismiss and to grant a continuance, exhibits and witnesses lists, order of case presentation, subpoenas, and motions to quash subpoenas. The contents of that Order need not be set forth here. That Order is incorporated by reference.
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT is a twelve-year-old seventh grade student who is currently in the general education program at Westborough Middle School (WMS), located within the District.
By a decision in prior case, number SN05-00115, dated March 7, 2005, Hearing Officer Judith Ganz determined that STUDENT was not eligible for special education as of the end of January 2005.
The decision of March 7, 2005, noted that STUDENT was a bright student whose grades and conduct began to decline after he moved from his mother’s house to live with his father. According to the March 7 decision, the reason given by the Petitioner for the change of custody was that his mother was in an auto accident and could no longer care for him or his sister. (In the current hearing, it was established that the reason the mother no longer has custody is not the auto accident but her alcoholism and drug addiction.) STUDENT longs to return to his mother.
After moving to live with his Father, STUDENT became sad, confused, and worried and frequently asked to return to Tulare to live with his mother.
During the summer of 2004 STUDENT began to cry over trivial things. His grandfather, GRANDFATHER, concluded that STUDENT was depressed. That fall, STUDENT’s grades began to fall precipitously and his conduct became a problem. On October 28, the Father asked the District to assess STUDENT to determine whether he was eligible for special education on the basis of an emotional disturbance. The District conducted an initial assessment in January 2005. Before the IEP team met to determine eligibility, Petitioner went to hearing in SN05-00115. After the hearing concluded but before the decision was issued, the IEP team met on February 22, 2005, and concluded that STUDENT was not eligible for special education as a student with an emotional disturbance. The decision in SN05-00115 was subsequently issued March 7, 2005. It found that STUDENT was not eligible for special education as a student with an emotional disturbance. The March 7 decision did not address the period beginning February 2005.
On the same day that the IEP team met to determine eligibility, February 22, 2005, the District and the Father agreed to an independent assessment of STUDENT. The District provided the Father with the San Mateo County SELPA Independent Assessors’ List and indicated a willingness to have the Father select an assessor of his choice. The Father consulted with several assessors who turned out to be unavailable. Father then selected Dr. Richard Komm, who assessed STUDENT and issued his report May 24, 2005. Dr. Komm concluded that STUDENT suffered from depression of sufficient severity to qualify him as emotionally disturbed. Dr. Komm made a series of short-term and long-term recommendations. On May 27, 2005, the District IEP team met and found STUDENT eligible for special education as emotionally disturbed. However, in the IEP the District did not propose special education services for STUDENT. The District’s position was that the school year was nearly over and, assuming that STUDENT’s father was a resident of the District, STUDENT needed a fresh start in the coming year in an academically challenging placement.
Soon after February 22, 2005, Petitioner requested that the District immediately conduct an assessment, find him eligible, and provide him with special education services. The Petitioner requested these actions not withstanding the agreement on the independent assessment. The present case arises out of Petitioner’s request for immediate action.
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ISSUE 1. Is STUDENT’s Father a resident of the District? If not, does the District’s obligation to educate STUDENT end on June 16, 2005?
With exceptions inapplicable to this case, a school district is required to educate only those students whose parents or guardians have established residence within that district. Cal. Educ. Code § 48200.
Government Code section 244(a) defines residency (in rather archaic language) as “the place where one remains when not called elsewhere for labor or other special or temporary purposes and to which he or she returns in seasons of repose.” Section 244(b) specifies, “there can be only one residence.” (Footnote 4)
Pat Lagiss, the District’s Supervisor of Student Attendance and Welfare, testified that the Father gave his address as ADDRESS 1. Hearing Exhibit 3 confirms that Father gave that address as his residence to the District on December 12, 2003. Ms Lagiss testified that ADDRESS 1 is a District location that includes the high school where the Father is employed as a special education teacher and that it has no residential facilities.
Ms Lagiss further testified that the Father subsequently provided a lease to the downstairs premises at ADDRESS 2, dated January 26, 2005, but that during an investigation the neighbors reported that the Father and STUDENT had never lived at this address.
Most telling was the Father’s testimony concerning his residence. He initially testified that he lives at the ADDRESS 1 address. He said that his driver’s license shows this address. However, he acknowledged that ADDRESS 1 has no residential facilities and he has no permission to live there. He explained that he sometimes sleeps in his van in a public parking lot in front of ADDRESS 1. He said he spends many weekends with STUDENT and STUDENT’s sister at the family vacation home in Mariposa County, near Yosemite.
When asked to explain the recent sleeping arrangements for STUDENT, the Father testified that for the week immediately preceding the first day of hearing, STUDENT slept with him twice in a studio in San Francisco and once with GRANDFATHER (the grandfather) in GRANDFATHER’s San Francisco home.
The Father was asked why he does not have a residence in the District. He explained that he is a schoolteacher on a limited salary who cannot afford an apartment in South San Francisco after paying the $1,400 mortgage on the Mariposa house.
Almost immediately thereafter, the Father acknowledged that his studio in San Francisco is, in fact, a studio apartment, located at ADDRESS 3, for which he pays $1,000 per month. When asked again whether or not he could find an affordable apartment in South San Francisco, he acknowledged that he could. (Footnote 5)
The Father has gone to some pains to mislead the District and to withhold information on the studio apartment. The most reasonable inference is that the studio apartment in San Francisco is his residence. The Hearing Officer finds specifically that the Father resides at the studio apartment in San Francisco. (Footnote 6)
The District notified the Father as early as February 1, 2005, that he had failed to provide evidence of residence and that he should enroll STUDENT (and STUDENT’s sister) in the district where he resides. By letter dated May 8, 2005, the District notified the Father that he was not a resident and that it would not provide services beyond the end of the 2004-2205 school year. (Footnote 7) During the prehearing conference, the District stated in its proposed resolution to the claim for reimbursement that STUDENT’s Father does not reside within the District’s boundaries and that, therefore, the District has no responsibility to provide STUDENT with education past June 16, 2005, the last day of the regular school year. (Footnote 8)
On the basis of the evidence and applicable law, the Hearing Officer concluded on the beginning of day two of the hearing that the Father is not a resident of the District and that the District is entitled to end services to STUDENT on June 16, 2005. The Hearing Officer further concluded that services for the extended school year and the coming school year were no longer at issue in the case.
ISSUE 2: Should the District have identified STUDENT as eligible after the IEP team meeting of February 22, 2005, but before May 27, 2005, the date on which the District found him eligible?
This issue divides into two sub-issues:
A. Did the District receive information during the period between February 22, 2005, and May 24, 2005, that warranted an immediate reassessment and determination of eligibility of STUDENT before Dr. Komm issued his report and the District found STUDENT eligible on May 27, 2005; and
B. Even if no immediate reassessment and determination of eligibility prior to the independent assessment was required, did the District unnecessarily delay the independent reassessment and subsequent determination of eligibility?
Issue 2 (A):
This sub-issue was resolved during the second day of the hearing as explained below.
California special education law requires school districts to “actively and systematically seek out all individuals with exceptional needs.” Cal. Educ. Code § 56300. Procedures to identify students potentially eligible for special education include “systematic methods of utilizing referrals of pupils from teachers, parents, agencies, appropriate professional persons, and from other members of the public.” Cal. Educ. Code § 56302. Districts must respond to initial referrals with timely assessments and determinations of eligibility. Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56321 and 56344.
California Education Code sections 56300 and 56320 do not provide how a district should respond to frequent and repeated referrals for reassessments and determinations of eligibility. In fact, no specific provision of the California Education Code addresses the obligation of districts to reassess following an initial referral that results in a finding of ineligibility.
The provision governing reassessments requires that:
A reassessment of the pupil…shall be conducted at least once every three years or more frequently, if conditions warrant, or if the pupil’s parent or teacher requests a reassessment and a new individualized education program. Cal. Educ. Code § 56381(a).
This provision references reassessments for those already eligible. However, construing this provision as requiring that reassessment of students found previously ineligible should occur when conditions warrant or when asked for by parent or teacher is consistent with the general obligation to identify eligible students. Students undergo change; students found ineligible at one point may meet the criteria for eligibility at another. Rather than conclude that there are no standards for such reassessments, or that Districts are free to refuse to reassess a student found ineligible, the Hearing Officer concluded that this provision embodies a general standard that applies to all reassessments. (Footnote 9)
The language of California Education Code section 56381(a) raises a concern. How is the phrase “or if the pupils’ parent or teacher requests a reassessment and a new individualized education program” to be construed? If read literally, the phrase would allow parents and teachers to obtain endless reassessments for no good reason. The Hearing Office has consistently read California Education Code section 56381 (a) as requiring a substantial change of circumstances either to find that conditions warrant reassessment or to require a reassessment when requested by teacher or student. See, e.g., Mountain View-Los Gatos Union High School District v. Student, Case No: 464-90H. The Hearing Officer found no reason to depart from this requirement.
While an argument could be made that the existence of the parties’ February agreement to assess barred the need for any additional assessment, the Hearing Officer agreed with Petitioner that an emergency or comparable development could have created an obligation on the part of the District to reassess before the independent assessment was completed. Therefore, as a matter of law, the Hearing Officer concluded that the District had an obligation to reassess STUDENT if, in fact, a substantial change of circumstances had occurred.
The question, then, is whether STUDENT’s circumstances changed, or were alleged to have changed, to a substantial degree. The Hearing Officer determined that such circumstances could arise if STUDENT’s personal condition underwent a major change or if the District discovered something previously unknown that cast his condition in a significant new light.
On the question of a substantial change of circumstances, GRANDFATHER presented documents, primarily emails, sent to the District during the period in question. GRANDFATHER drew special attention to six of Petitioner’s exhibits: (Footnote 10)
1. D (f), from GRANDFATHER, with the subject identified as “For the Eyes of Ruth Eaton Only,” received by the District April 2, 2005.
2. C (b), a letter from Eleanor Hertzler, LCSW, dated March 10, 2005.
3. D (g), apparently prepared by GRANDFATHER, entitled “STUDENT’s Story” (in the Table of Contents), received by the District April 2, 2005.
4. D (h), an email from GRANDFATHER with the subject identified as the “Deteriorating Depression of STUDENT Evidenced by Vacillating Despondency, ” received by the District May 1, 2005.
5. E (m), from the Father, entitled “Re: Motion to Dismiss filed by SSUD,” dated April 7, 2005.
6. E (l), form GRANDFATHER, with the subject identified as “FATHER [the Father] noted seven new pieces of evidence demanding Ssusd [sic] stop stalling and provide immediately needed services, dated April 24, 2005.”
Exhibit D (f), sent nine days after the independent assessment was agreed to, consists of 119 numbered paragraphs some with subparagraphs. Petitioner called particular attention to items 44 and 55. Item 44 states in part that “STUDENT has not, since Thanksgiving season 2003 [the time of Mother’s alleged auto accident and loss of custody due to alcoholism and drug addiction], formed a single new friendship, nor enjoyed the companionship of a regular playmate.” While of concern, this information was known to Petitioner when he agreed to the independent assessment and is not markedly inconsistent with what the District already knew about him. Item 55 reports that STUDENT has undergone therapy for depression for a period of approximately one year. This information appeared in the prior decision. Neither item contains new information; neither constitutes a substantial change of circumstances.
In his testimony on Exhibit D (f), GRANDFATHER focused on sections that alluded to psychiatric problems of unnamed members of STUDENT’s extended family. Those individuals identified by GRANDFATHER at the hearing ranged from STUDENT’s mother to his paternal great aunt. This information, known to Petitioner well before February 22, 2005, but in part unknown to the District before the hearing in this case, has little bearing on STUDENT’s specific condition, and, in any case, does not indicate that his condition changed significantly between February 22, 2005, and May 24, 2005. Nor is it so particularized that it should have dramatically altered the District’s view of Petitioner. (Footnote 11)
Exhibit C (f), the letter from Ms. Hertzler dated March 10, 2005, states only that STUDENT’s “current treatment plan addresses issues related to his depression, separation from his mother, and his underachievement at school.” It contains no new information.
Exhibit D (h) consists of a series of questions posed to STUDENT, along with his answers to these questions. This exhibit focuses on events in December 2003 when the District removed STUDENT from Alma Loma Middle School for misbehavior and reassigned him to Westborough Middle School. These events are cited in the decision of March 7.
Exhibit D (h), an email from GRANDFATHER dated May 1, 2005, refers to changes in STUDENT’s attitude and conduct. Included are reports that STUDENT has abandoned his “stated life goal of attending M.I.T. to become a scientist and design ships for Earth-Moon and Earth-Mars travel,” that he cried after colliding with his sister as they competed for a favorite TV chair, that he has learned that his mother is in jail, that he alternates between combative behavior and feelings of helplessness, and that he has became embroiled in an altercation with a teacher over his clothing.
The information in Exhibit D (h), along with STUDENT’s declining grades, indicated that STUDENT’s condition was deteriorating. At this point in time, STUDENT’s circumstances might be viewed as having undergone a substantial change.
However, by late April 2005, Dr Komm had agreed to assess STUDENT. The assessment, originally scheduled to begin on May 2, 2005, took place on May 5 and 10, 2005. The District received Dr. Komm’s report on May 24, 2005. The District found STUDENT eligible on May 27, 2005. Assuming arguendo that this Exhibit D (h), plus other information on STUDENT, should have initiated a reassessment on May 1, 2005, the District would have had 50 days to complete the reassessment, determine eligibility and offer an IEP. Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56344 and 56380(c). Only 26 days elapsed between May 1, 2005, when the District received exhibit D (h) and May 27, 2005, when the District held the IEP meeting. Therefore, regardless of the significance of exhibit D (h), Petitioner suffered no prejudice. (Footnote 12)
In addition to GRANDFATHER’s testimony on the exhibits, Petitioner presented the testimony of Ms. Maria Asevedo, the District’s school psychologist. Ms. Asevedo testified that there was nothing significant enough in the exhibits to justify what would have been an emergency assessment. She pointed out that the letter from Ms. Hertzler did not recommend or even comment on special education. When asked about two telephone conversations with Ms. Hertzler, Ms. Asevedo said that Ms. Hertzler spoke only about dysthymia, a relatively mild form of depression.
In light of the evidence and the applicable law, the Hearing Officer determined that there was no change to STUDENT’s circumstances that required the District to act sooner than it did.
Issue 2 (B): Even if no immediate reassessment and determination of eligibility prior to the independent assessment was required, did the District unnecessarily delay the independent reassessment and subsequent determination of eligibility?
The Petitioner alleged that the actions of the District unnecessarily delayed the determination of STUDENT’s eligibility by eight days. In effect, Petitioner asserted that the IEP should have occurred on May 19, 2005, and not on May 27, 2005, and that special education services for STUDENT should have started May 19 and run through June 16, 2005, the end of the school year and the date the Hearing Officer has determined that the District’s obligation to educate STUDENT ended.
The District’s position was that the delay was caused by the Father’s difficulty identifying and selecting an assessor and by the time he consumed approving the assessment plan and authorizing the release of documents to Dr. Komm.
When the parties had clarified the dates and positions involved in this sub-issue, they engaged in negotiations and arrived at a settlement that rendered adjudication of this question and the remaining issues unnecessary.
ORDER
Based on the two rulings made at the hearing and the settlement reached by the parties, this case is dismissed.
PREVAILING PARTY
Pursuant to California Education Code section 56507(d), the decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The District prevailed on the two issue heard and decided. However, the settlement agreement states, “The parties agree to bear their own costs and advocates fees, if any, and no party shall be deemed to be a prevailing party with respect to matters through June 16, 2005.” The Hearing Officer concludes that for purposes of attorneys’ fees neither party prevailed.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties have the right to appeal the two rulings made in this matter to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of the date of this Memorandum of Decision. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i).
Dated: June 29, 2005 ___________________________________ Edwin Villmoare, Chief Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
1 Order, p. 6.
2 “The District’s obligation to educate STUDENT” refers to those services that constitute a free appropriate public education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), and not to those services provided to remediate past failures to provide a FAPE.
3 During the hearing, it became clear that Petitioner sought reimbursement only for the Father.
4 Although not directly applicable to the obligations of school districts, section 244(d) provides that “the residence of the parent with whom an unmarried minor child maintains his or her place of abode is the residence of such unmarried minor child.” Welfare and Institutions Code section 17.1 similarly defines residency for a minor as “the residence of the parent with whom the child maintains his or her place of abode or the residence of…the individual who has been given care and custody [of the child] by a court of competent jurisdiction.”
5 The question as to whether STUDENT might possibly be homeless was resolved by the identification of the studio apartment in San Francisco and the weekend use of the Mariposa house.
6 When asked where STUDENT sleeps during school nights, the Father testified that STUDENT spends the night with friends within the District. The Father could identify only one friend within the District with whom STUDENT has spent the night, a student named FRIEND. The Father could not remember FRIEND’s last name or his phone number and admitted that STUDENT had stayed with FRIEND only twice. The Father’s testimony to the effect that STUDENT sleeps frequently with friends in the District is simply not credible. While STUDENT sleeps somewhere, it is not with friends whom the Father cannot even identify. Were this otherwise, the Father may well be engaging in child neglect. The only specific locations the Father identified as residences where STUDENT has recently slept are the Father's studio apartment in San Francisco and GRANDFATHER’s San Francisco home. The most reasonable inference to draw from the Father’s testimony is that STUDENT lives with the Father but is shuttled about from time to time.
7 Once the District undertook to educate STUDENT, it arguably had a duty to continue to educate him through the school year to avoid a severe disruption in his education. There is no reason to conclude that such a duty extends beyond the regular school year.
8 Had there been any confusion about residence, the Father had more than sufficient time to clarify the matter before or during the hearing.
9 The automatic three-year requirement would not apply in instances of reassessment for eligibility.
10 The exhibits are discussed in order of presentation at the hearing.
11 The bulk of exhibit D (f) presents information unrelated to STUDENT’s condition during the period in question, including complaints about communications from the District, STUDENT’s apparent arrest for misconduct in December 2003, charges of false arrest, requests for “subpoenas of all kinds” from the Hearing Office, charges of “fraudulent action” and “unprofessional conduct” against the District’s attorneys, charges that the District has destroyed documents, and allegations of conspiracy involving District personnel and the District’s attorneys.
12 Petitioner identified no other significant documents on this issue in the two large folders of documents he presented at the hearing, and the Hearing Officer found none.
