California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · December 2, 1999

Student v. Poway Unified School District

SEHO Case No. SN 745-99 · Hearing Officer Hee C. Kim

Poway Unified cannot expel student over knife incident; must fund Moyers Center, compensatory services, and a behavior plan.

Split decision: student prevailed on 5 of 5 issues (2 in part)

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Noted in the decision

Earlier interim orders: the Hearing Office denied Petitioner's stay-put request for Moyers and set stay put as the March 19, 1998 IEP (an SDC with 33% mainstreaming plus weekly counseling). An order dated September 21, 1999 denied the District's request for reconsideration and clarified that stay put was at Mount Carmel High School. The decision itself notes no appeal or remand.

Summary

The student, an 18-year-old eleventh grader, filed against Poway Unified School District after it moved to expel him for bringing a knife to Mount Carmel High School in April 1999. Long eligible under specific learning disability, he was reclassified as other health impaired (ADHD) in June 1999. Hearing Officer Hee C. Kim found the district denied a FAPE in the periods between May 1996 and April 1999 when he was not in court-ordered placements. The district transferred him to another high school for discipline without an IEP meeting or parent consent. It never did a functional analysis assessment or behavioral intervention plan despite serious, recurring behavior problems. It offered only a generic transition plan, and it skipped required counseling in spring 1999. Because his IEP and placement were inappropriate, the knife incident had to be treated as a manifestation of his disability. The district therefore could not expel him or use a 45-day interim setting. While he was in court school through summer 1999, the district owed him no services. It denied FAPE from the start of 1999-2000 by offering only the interim setting. The Hearing Officer ordered reimbursement and funding for the Moyers Center for Learning through fall 1999, a new IEP, a behavior assessment and plan, and compensatory counseling, transition services, and 40 hours of tutoring. Claims for speech therapy and required one-on-one instruction failed.

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Why it matters

This decision shows how SEHO applied the 1997 IDEA discipline rules. Where a district's IEP and placement were inappropriate, such as having no behavior plan for a student with serious ongoing behavior problems, the misconduct was treated as a manifestation of disability, which blocked expulsion. It also addresses written delegation of an adult student's educational rights to his parents.

Issues and holdings

  1. Student prevailedIEP content

    Issue 1. Did the District provide STUDENT a FAPE from May 19, 1996, to April 19, 1999, during the periods in which STUDENT was not receiving services from the San Diego County Juvenile Court Schools?

    The District denied FAPE in the 1996-97 school year, spring 1998, and Feb. 23–Apr. 19, 1999. It made a disciplinary transfer to Poway High without an IEP meeting or parent consent, never did a functional analysis assessment or BIP despite serious behavior problems, gave him only a generic transition plan, and did not provide IEP counseling Feb. 23–Apr. 13, 1999.

  2. Student prevailedDiscipline

    Issue 2. May the District proceed with its recommendation that STUDENT be expelled for having a knife at school on April 20, 1999?

    State law defers to federal law for knife offenses. Because the IEP and placement were not appropriate (no BIP, inadequate transition services), the conduct had to be treated as a manifestation of disability, so the District cannot expel him or place him in a 45-day interim setting. The Hearing Officer rejected Student's alternate arguments about misdiagnosis, speech-language therapy, and required one-on-one instruction.

  3. Student prevailed in partFAPE: services offered

    Issue 3. Did the District offer and/or provide STUDENT a FAPE from April 20, 1999, through the date of the hearing?

    There was no denial of FAPE from April 20, 1999, through the 1999 ESY period, because the student was in a court-ordered placement and no ESY need was shown. The District denied FAPE from the start of 1999-2000 by offering only a 45-day interim setting and not fixing the IEP. Moyers was appropriate for reimbursement but was not ordered as his placement because it is not the LRE.

  4. Student prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue 4. Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education for any failures of the District to provide a FAPE from May 19, 1996, through the date of the hearing?

    The student is entitled to compensatory counseling, transition services, and 40 hours of one-on-one instruction for the denials of FAPE, with the details to be set by the IEP team.

  5. Student prevailed in partIEP procedure

    Issue 5. Are STUDENT's parents authorized to make educational decisions on his behalf based on an oral authorization by STUDENT?

    An adult student may delegate educational decision-making to his parents under agency law. The District does not have to honor the delegation unless it is a written, voluntary, and knowing authorization. The decision says neither party prevailed.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • The District cannot expel the student or place him in a 45-day interim alternative educational setting for having a knife at school on April 20, 1999.
  • Reimbursement. Within 10 calendar days of the parents' proof, reimburse tuition and related expenses for the Moyers Center for Learning from the first day of the 1999-2000 school year through the decision date (December 2, 1999). No amount stated.
  • Prospective funding of private placement. The District must immediately take over funding of the Moyers Center for Learning placement and continue it until the end of the 1999 fall semester.
  • Order to convene IEP meeting. Within 15 calendar days, convene an IEP meeting to develop and offer an appropriate IEP for the 2000 spring semester.
  • Order to assess. At that IEP meeting, develop a proposed assessment plan for a functional analysis assessment. Unless consent is refused, conduct the assessment within 20 calendar days of the student's first day in the District's spring 2000 program, then convene an IEP meeting to review it and add a behavioral intervention plan to the IEP.
  • Compensatory education. At least eight 30-minute counseling sessions with a school psychologist on impulse control during the 2000 spring semester, once per week unless the parties agree otherwise.
  • Compensatory education. At least 30 minutes of transition services and consultation every other week during the 2000 spring semester; the IEP team decides the nature of the services.
  • Compensatory education. 40 hours of one-on-one instruction by a special education-credentialed teacher on academic deficits chosen by the IEP team, to be completed by December 1, 2000.

Total: 44 hours of compensatory services

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Key authorities

Rowley; W.G. v. Target Range Sch. Dist.; Union School Dist. v. Smith; Burlington; Alamo Heights v. State Bd. of Educ.; Cleveland Heights-University Heights v. Boss; Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup; Seattle Sch. Dist. v. B.S.; Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm.; Lenn v. Portland Sch. Comm.; Alexopulos v. San Francisco USD; Landgraf v. USI Film Products; 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k); Cal. Educ. Code § 48915.6

People named in the decision

  • Joann Murphy, Director of special education and SELPA director, Poway Unified School District
  • Theresa Kurtz, Assistant director of special education, Poway Unified School District
  • Mark Miller, Director of student discipline and support, Poway Unified School District
  • Thomas Hacker, Special education (SDC) teacher, Mount Carmel High School, Poway Unified School District
  • Jeff Ladd, SDC teacher; conducted achievement testing, Poway Unified School District
  • Janet Speer, R.N., District resource nurse; health assessment, Poway Unified School District
  • Martha Ingham, Ph.D., School psychologist; 1999 triennial and pre-expulsion assessment, Poway Unified School District
  • Steve Lerner, School psychologist; 1996 triennial assessment, Poway Unified School District
  • Steve Ely, Resource specialist; achievement testing, Poway Unified School District
  • Scott Fisher, Principal, Mount Carmel High School, Poway Unified School District
  • Kurt Christopher, Special education teacher, Sara Anthony Court School, San Diego County Juvenile Court Schools
  • Jorge Ley, School psychologist; cognitive and educational evaluation, San Diego County Juvenile Court Schools
  • Robert Metcalf, Ph.D., School psychologist; functional analysis assessment, San Diego County Juvenile Court Schools
  • Michael Stewart, Ph.D., Licensed clinical psychologist, AB 2726 care coordinator, San Diego County Department of Mental Health Services
  • Joan Landguth, Educational consultant/parent advocate, Tower Program
  • Ron Plotts, Interviewed for mental health assessment, Tower Program
  • Maleia Christian, Volunteer parent advocate
  • Meghan Hammond, Student's case manager, Moyers Center for Learning (nonpublic agency)
  • Moyers Center for Learning, Certified nonpublic agency; parents' unilateral placement
  • Miriam Sherman, M.D., Private physician who diagnosed ADHD, Child Guidance Center
  • David Kaufman, M.D., Private psychiatrist
  • Patrick Lyden, M.D., Private neurologist; neurological evaluation
  • Summit School, District-proposed 45-day interim alternative educational setting, Poway Unified School District

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Hee C. Kim, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, in Poway, California, on September 2, 3, and 22, 1999.

Petitioner STUDENT was present for portions of the hearing and was represented by attorney Michael Cochrane. Also present on STUDENT's behalf were MOTHER, his mother; FATHER, his stepfather; Joan Landguth, an educational consultant from the Tower Program; and Maleia Christian, a volunteer parent advocate.

Respondent Poway Unified School District (District) was represented at the hearing by educational advocate G. Robert Roice from G.R. Roice & Associates. Also present on the District's behalf was Joann Murphy, the District's director of special education and special education local planning area (SELPA) director. Theresa Kurtz, the District's assistant director of special education, briefly substituted for Ms. Murphy on the final day of hearing.

The following witnesses were called by Petitioner to testify: Kurt Christopher, a special education teacher with the San Diego County Juvenile Court Schools (Court Schools); MOTHER; Joan Landguth; FATHER; Robert Metcalf, Ph.D., a school psychologist with the Court Schools; and Meghan Hammond, STUDENT's case manager at the Moyers Center for Learning, a certified nonpublic agency.

The following witnesses were called by the District to testify: Mark Miller, the District's director of student discipline and support; Thomas Hacker, a special education teacher at Mount Carmel High School (MCHS) who taught STUDENT in the tenth and eleventh grades; Janet Speer, R.N., the District's resource nurse; Theresa Kurtz; Jorge Ley, a school psychologist with the Court Schools; Michael Stewart, Ph.D., a licensed clinical psychologist employed by the San Diego County Department of Mental Health Services as an AB 2726 care coordinator; and Martha Ingham, Ph.D., the District's school psychologist.

Oral and documentary evidence was received. At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties presented oral closing arguments. Thereafter, the record was closed and the matter submitted for decision. (Footnote 1)

ISSUES (footnote 2)

1. Did the District provide STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) from May 19, 1996, to April 19, 1999, during the periods in which STUDENT was not receiving services from the San Diego County Juvenile Court Schools? (Footnote 3)

2. May the District proceed with its recommendation that STUDENT be expelled for having a knife at school on April 20, 1999?

3. Did the District offer and/or provide STUDENT a FAPE from April 20, 1999, through the date of the hearing?

4. Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education for any failures of the District to provide a FAPE from May 19, 1996, through the date of the hearing?

5. Are STUDENT's parents authorized to make educational decisions on his behalf based on an oral authorization by STUDENT?

BACKGROUND FACTS

STUDENT is an eighteen-year-old eleventh-grade student who was first found eligible for special education and related services in the fifth grade. From the time of his initial eligibility to June 1999, STUDENT's primary disability has been identified as a specific learning disability (SLD). On June 16, 1999, his primary disability category was changed from SLD to other health impaired (OHI) during an individualized education program (IEP) team conducted by the San Diego County Juvenile Court Schools (Court Schools), where STUDENT was then placed because he violated the terms of his probation, (footnote 4)but not personnel from the Poway Unified School District (District). The IEP produced on that date indicates that the team believed that STUDENT suffered from an unspecified neurological deficit and that the OHI categorization was based on a history and diagnosis of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). The team accepted the OHI category pending a thorough neuropsychology evaluation to determine or rule out possible traumatic brain injury (TBI). Although not a participant at the IEP meeting held on June 16, 1999, the District has never disputed the change in disability categories and later acknowledged that STUDENT's IEP specifies OHI as the handicapping condition and indicates that STUDENT has been diagnosed with ADHD. (Footnote 5)

To understand the team's concerns regarding neurological deficits and possible TBI, it is necessary to offer a brief overview of STUDENT's life from birth. MOTHER, STUDENT's mother, became pregnant with STUDENT while she was living in Vietnam with her husband and two small children. When MOTHER was two months along in her pregnancy, the family escaped Vietnam and lived for a short period in a refugee camp in Indonesia. MOTHER described the escape from Vietnam as very traumatizing. MOTHER also described several physical insults she received while pregnant with STUDENT, including a fall from a three-foot high platform and several instances in which her husband hit her in the abdomen. MOTHER gave birth to STUDENT while the family was still living in the refugee camp. STUDENT was born two months premature with the umbilical cord wrapped around his neck. There was no medical care available at the camp, but STUDENT appeared to do fine until a few weeks later when he ran a very high fever. The family was finally able to move to the United States when STUDENT was approximately three months old.

According to MOTHER, STUDENT has had problems with hyperactivity and distractibility from a very young age. For example, MOTHER reported that STUDENT was retained twice in kindergarten because the staff felt that he was not mature enough and that he had difficulty following instructions and staying in his seat. STUDENT attended private Catholic schools from the first through fourth grades. In approximately 1992, on the advice of a private psychologist, MOTHER requested that the District assess STUDENT for special education.

STUDENT was found eligible for special education and began receiving services in the fifth grade. MOTHER testified that, at about the same time, STUDENT was diagnosed with ADHD and started on Ritalin. A letter dated March 21, 1994, which was addressed to the District from Miriam Sherman, M.D., from the Child Guidance Center, confirmed this. Dr. Sherman stated in the letter that, after an evaluation on January 5, 1993, it was her diagnostic impression that STUDENT suffered from ADHD and that she had prescribed a regimen of Ritalin (10 milligrams) to be taken twice per day. Dr. Sherman also reported that results obtained from an administration of the Achenbach Questionnaire revealed clinically significant scores in areas such as aggressive behavior, attention, and social interaction.

Although Ritalin improved STUDENT's behavior at first, MOTHER found that it caused loss of appetite and severe headaches, and decided to take STUDENT off Ritalin in the eighth grade. STUDENT was then placed on Wellbutrin. Despite the medications, STUDENT has had a history of behavior and acting-out problems since at least the eighth grade, including verbal and physical harassment of and altercations with other students, truancy, possession and/or use of tobacco at school, attempted intoxication by inhaling air fresheners, and conflicts with authority figures. As a result of these problems, STUDENT was frequently suspended and assigned after-school and Saturday detentions, and twice transferred to other schools. During his eighth-grade year, STUDENT was transferred from Black Mountain Middle School (BMMS) to Meadowbrook Middle School (MMS) because he was involved in a number of fights at BMMS. In March 1997, during his tenth-grade year, he was transferred from Mt. Carmel High School (MCHS) to Poway High School (PHS) for the remainder of the spring semester and for the following fall semester because he attempted to become intoxicated by inhaling an air freshener at school. STUDENT was also frequently placed in juvenile hall during this time because of two convictions -- auto theft and assault and robbery -- and for violations of probation terms. STUDENT spent the following periods attending facilities operated by the Court Schools: the summer of 1997 (the summer following ninth grade); the fall semester 1997 (the first semester of tenth grade); the summer of 1998 (the summer following tenth grade); the fall semester 1998 until February 1999 (the first semester of eleventh grade); and April 21 to June 25, 1999 (the conclusion of eleventh grade).

The triennial assessment the District conducted in January 1996 during STUDENT's eighth-grade year found that there were no "overt" behavior or emotional problems, but that STUDENT was experiencing undefined "school related" problems. Steve Lerner, the school psychologist who conducted the assessment, also found that STUDENT's scores on the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test (KBIT) indicated an overall level of ability in the below average range in both verbal and nonverbal reasoning. (Footnote 7) On the KBIT, STUDENT earned the following standard scores: 72 (below average) on the vocabulary subtest, which measures verbal, school-related skills such as language development, understanding of verbal concepts, fund of information, and word knowledge; 77 (below average) on the matrices subtest, which measures nonverbal skills including the ability to solve problems, to understand relationships among pictures and designs, and to reason by analogy; and 72 (below average) for the composite intelligence quotient (IQ). On the Woodcock-Johnson Test of Achievement - Revised (WJTA-R), which was administered by Steve Ely, the resource specialist, STUDENT received a broad reading standard score of 83 (below average) and a broad written language standard score of 77 (well below average). The broad scores were composed of the following standard scores: 90 in letter-word identification (average); 77 in passage comprehension (well below average); 72 in calculation (well below average); 69 in dictation (lower extreme); 86 in writing samples (low average); 94 in word attack (average); and 84 in reading vocabulary (below average). Comparing the ability and achievement scores STUDENT obtained, Mr. Lerner concluded that there was not a statistically significant discrepancy between STUDENT's level of intellectual ability and achievement. (Footnote 8)

Mr. Lerner noted that STUDENT did, however, have processing delays in all areas. According to the scores STUDENT obtained on the Test of Auditory-Perceptual Skills (TAPS) (auditory quotient of 65) and the Test of Visual-Perceptual Skills (TVPS) (perceptual quotient of 52), Mr. Lerner determined that STUDENT's short-term auditory and visual-semantic memory skills were in the below average range, which indicated delays in recall and retention of verbal and visual information. Mr. Lerner also determined that STUDENT's visual-motor skills were not age-appropriate and indicated delays in perceptual-motor development based on STUDENT's results on the Developmental Test of Visual-Motor Integration (VMI-3R). STUDENT obtained a standard score of 76 on the VMI-3R, which was equivalent to a child eight years and seven months old (he was fourteen years and five months old at the time). Because of the processing delays and below average achievement skills, Mr. Lerner recommended that the IEP team find STUDENT eligible for special education as a SLD student under the alternative criteria found in section 3030(j)(4)(C) of Title 5 of the California Code of Regulations. (Footnote 9)

Based on the information gathered by the assessment and information provided by his special education teacher, the IEP team agreed that STUDENT continued to qualify for special education as an SLD student pursuant to the alternative criteria found in section 3030(j)(4)(C). The team also agreed that STUDENT had below average auditory processing, visual processing, and visual-motor skills, all of which impeded his learning in math, reading, and written language. STUDENT was continued in RSP on a pull-out basis and began to receive thirty minutes of special education counseling services one time per week.

During the ninth grade, STUDENT's placement was changed from RSP to a special day class (SDC) with limited mainstreaming opportunities. The SDC placement was continued into the tenth and eleventh grades. An IEP dated March 19, 1998, indicates that in the tenth grade STUDENT was placed in an SDC with mainstreaming during thirty-three percent of the school day through elective classes and was eligible for one thirty-minute individual counseling session per week to improve impulse control.

Near the end of March 1999, during STUDENT's eleventh-grade year, STUDENT underwent another triennial assessment. (Footnote 10) Martha Ingham, Ph.D., the school psychologist who conducted the majority of the assessment, found STUDENT uncooperative and frequently distracted during the testing sessions due to apparent lack of motivation. Dr. Ingham noted in her report that STUDENT put forth very little effort, made minimal eye contact with the test stimuli, appeared unenthusiastic about the testing, and generally was minimally engaged in the testing process. For these reasons, Dr. Ingham concluded that the results from her testing (which included the KBIT, the Wide Range Assessment of Memory and Learning (WRAML), and the Bender-Gestalt Test of Visual-Motor Integration (VMI)) were not valid or reliable indicators of STUDENT's ability and processing skills. Notwithstanding these concerns about reliability, STUDENT's performance was remarkably similar on the vocabulary subtest of the KBIT to his performance on the same test in 1996, with a score of 73, but was much weaker on the matrices subtest, with a score of 51. No evidence was presented regarding the reliability of the achievement testing conducted by Jeff Ladd, one of STUDENT's SDC teachers, but the results showed improvement in almost all areas. Additionally, most of STUDENT's achievement scores were significantly higher than his cognitive scores. Dr. Ingham concluded that a significant discrepancy did not exist between STUDENT's current achievement results and the intellectual ability previously identified by Mr. Lerner in 1996 and that, if the team wanted to continue STUDENT in special education, it would have to document that STUDENT was functioning in a range significantly discrepant from his previously identified IQ or consider an alternative handicapping condition. (Footnote 11) Dr. Ingham was not able to discern whether there continued to be any deficits in the areas of visual or auditory memory or visual-motor integration, but noted that STUDENT likely continued to have some memory deficits. Finally, based on the input Thomas Hacker, one of STUDENT's SDC teachers, provided on the Behavior Assessment System for Children - Teacher Report (BASC-T), Dr. Ingham concluded that the results of the BASC-T indicated clinically significant conduct or behavior problems.

The District convened an IEP team meeting to discuss the results of the triennial assessment and STUDENT's progress in school on April 14, 1999. The team reviewed the assessment results and STUDENT's progress in school, but did not determine questions of eligibility. Instead, the team decided to have the school resource nurse compile a health history to determine if the category of other health impaired (OHI) was a more appropriate handicapping condition for STUDENT than was SLD. Dr. Ingham asked the parents at the meeting if STUDENT could benefit from special education counseling, but FATHER, STUDENT's stepfather, declined counseling for the time being. FATHER felt that STUDENT would be overwhelmed if special education counseling were added to his schedule because he was currently receiving outside counseling. The team then agreed to reconvene after the school nurse performed the health assessment to review eligibility and discuss transition services with the Workability Program representative. On April 16, Janet Speer, R.N., the school resource nurse, was asked to complete a health history and physical assessment to determine if STUDENT qualified for special education on the basis of ADHD.

However, before Ms. Speer could complete her assessment, STUDENT was found in possession of a knife at school. On April 20, 1999, other MCHS students reported seeing STUDENT with a knife during the school day. STUDENT was brought to the office for questioning by two assistant principals. During questioning, STUDENT produced a fixed-blade knife with a 3¼-inch blade from his left back pants pocket. He was promptly suspended for five days while the school determined whether he should be expelled for the offense. Because the possession of a knife at school also violated the terms of his probation, STUDENT was immediately placed back in the Juvenile Hall detention center and began attending Sara Anthony Court School.

Two days later, Dr. Ingham conducted a pre-expulsion assessment to determine whether STUDENT should be expelled for the knife offense. Dr. Ingham gathered information about STUDENT's educational history and past test results. She reasoned that, since the IEP team had not come to a conclusion regarding STUDENT's continued eligibility for special education services at the most recent IEP meeting, the team should defer to the past documentation of eligibility on the basis of a SLD with auditory processing, visual processing, and visual-motor integration delays impeding learning in reading, writing, and math in making its manifestation determination under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(4) of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). (footnote 12) Dr. Ingham declined to make any recommendations regarding the manifestation determination in her report.

Ms. Speer also completed her health assessment at this time. She interviewed FATHER and David Kaufman, M.D., a private psychiatrist who had recently evaluated STUDENT to determine if psychotherapy would be effective to deal with his anger and antisocial behavior. According to Ms. Speer, Dr. Kaufman diagnosed STUDENT as having a significant conduct disorder (CD), drug-related issues, and oppositional defiant disorder (ODD), and found that, while STUDENT had characteristics of attention deficit disorder (ADD), the ADD characteristics were not the primary reason for STUDENT's behavior. Ms. Speer testified that Dr. Kaufman was not surprised to hear that STUDENT had been suspended for bringing a knife to school and stated to her that STUDENT was probably too dangerous to continue at a comprehensive high school such as MCHS. Ms. Speer concluded from her assessment that STUDENT was an angry and frustrated adolescent who carried a diagnosis of ADD, but that the ADD had been overtaken by more serious issues arising from CD, ODD, and drug-related issues.

On April 23, 1999, the IEP team met to determine whether the knife incident was a manifestation of STUDENT's disability. The team reviewed the facts surrounding the April 20 incident and Dr. Ingham's and Ms. Speer's assessments. District staff determined that STUDENT was appropriately placed and receiving services consistent with his IEP at the time of the incident, and that the incident was not a manifestation of STUDENT's SLD. The parents agreed with the determinations that STUDENT was receiving services consistent with his IEP and that the incident was not a manifestation of the SLD, but disagreed with the District's determination that STUDENT was appropriately placed at the time of the incident.

On May 6, Scott Fisher, the principal of MCHS, met with the parents and informed them he was recommending that STUDENT be expelled from the District because of the knife incident. The next day, Mr. Fisher extended STUDENT's suspension pending an expulsion hearing and until such time as the District's governing board rendered a decision regarding the recommended expulsion.

On May 18, STUDENT's parents filed the instant due process hearing request to challenge the appropriateness of STUDENT's placement and services and the legality of the expulsion proceedings.

Shortly thereafter on May 24, Patrick Lyden, M.D., conducted a neurological evaluation of STUDENT. His evaluation report indicates that the evaluation consisted of separate interviews with the parents and STUDENT and a physical and mental status examination of STUDENT, but did not include a review of educational or medical records. Dr. Lyden came to the following conclusions:

I believe that STUDENT is suffering from marked cognitive impairment, but I do not have direct evidence for this. He does poorly on those items of the mental status examination that would be expected to be abnormal [sic]. (Footnote 13). . . On the other hand, there is no evidence of a gross motor, sensory, visual or coordination disorder. There is no evidence of cerebral palsy whatsoever. By history, there is no evidence of seizures. Whether or not he has attention deficit disorder remains to be seen. At the moment, he is not hyperkinetic or hypervigilant in any way, and his attention appeared to be entirely normal. He is on appropriate medication at this time.

Dr. Lyden stated that he wanted to obtain an MRI scan and an EEG to complete the evaluation.

A day later, Jorge Ley, a school psychologist with the Court Schools, conducted a cognitive and educational evaluation. Mr. Ley concluded that no significant discrepancy existed between STUDENT's cognitive ability and achievement. Based on results obtained from the Woodcock-Johnson Psycho-Educational Battery - Revised (WJ-R), Tests of Cognitive Ability, Mr. Ley found that STUDENT's overall cognitive ability was in the very low range. Mr. Ley reported that STUDENT's score on the broad cognitive ability - extended scale (BCA-ES) was 59. Mr. Ley described the BCA-ES as a measure of overall intellectual functioning based on an average of seven different cognitive abilities, including short-term memory, comprehension-knowledge, visual processing, auditory processing, long-term retrieval, fluid reasoning, and processing speed. Based on results obtained on the WJ-R Tests of Achievement, Mr. Ley determined that STUDENT was functioning in the average range in broad reading and in the low average range in broad math and broad written language, all of which were higher than STUDENT's results on the Tests of Cognitive Ability.

On June 16, an IEP meeting was convened by personnel from the Court School to review Mr. Ley's assessment and determine eligibility and placement issues. As previously mentioned, the IEP team, which did not consist of District personnel, agreed that the handicapping condition was no longer SLD but OHI based on a history and diagnosis of ADHD. The team agreed that OHI would be the designated category pending a thorough neuropsychiatric evaluation to determine or rule out possible TBI. Additionally, the team agreed that a functional analysis assessment (FAA) should be performed to develop a behavior intervention plan (BIP) to address STUDENT's difficulties interacting appropriately with authority figures; ability to participate effectively with peers, including the ability to use appropriate judgment in engaging in activities; and ability to conceptualize and use appropriate sequences when given transitions or new tasks. Finally, the parents requested that a speech and language evaluation be performed to address STUDENT's auditory processing delays and determine if it was hindering STUDENT's ability to participate in group and/or classroom activities.

On June 25, at a disposition hearing, the San Diego Juvenile Court (Juvenile Court) continued STUDENT's status as a ward of the court but released him to his parents for him to complete sixty days of home supervision. During the period of home supervision, STUDENT was not to leave the house unless accompanied by a parent, was not to receive any visitors at the house, and was not to use the telephone unless it was to call the Home Supervision Office.

By July 5, an FAA was completed by Robert Metcalf, Ph.D., a school psychologist with the Court Schools. Dr. Metcalf reviewed some of STUDENT's educational and medical records; interviewed Kurt Christopher, a special education teacher at the Sara Anthony Court School, Mr. Ley, and FATHER; and observed STUDENT in the Court School classroom on the morning of June 23. Dr. Metcalf concluded that STUDENT's maladaptive behaviors stemmed from a variety of causes and that the BIP should include, inter alia, regular drug screens, small-group instruction with encouragement to ask for repetition of auditory directions and/or information and an emphasis on effective participation with peers, individual and group counseling, anger management instruction, and individual tutoring to supplement classroom instruction.

Over a month later, on August 13, Michael Stewart, Ph.D., a licensed clinical psychologist employed by the San Diego County Department of Mental Health Services (Mental Health) as an AB 2726 care coordinator, assessed STUDENT to determine whether he qualified for mental health services under AB 2726 based upon a referral by the parents. His evaluation consisted of interviews with STUDENT, his parents, Mr. Ley, and Ron Plotts from the Tower Program, and a review of some educational and medical records. Dr. Stewart concluded that no mental health services were "indicated" at the time. Dr. Stewart reported that STUDENT's drug involvement and low to very low cognitive functioning likely negatively impacted his functioning in the community and at school, and that it did not appear that mental health issues of an emotional or behavioral nature interfered with his ability to progress in his educational goals.On August 16, STUDENT's parents enrolled him in the Moyers Center for Learning (Moyers), which STUDENT continues to attend. At Moyers, STUDENT receives one-on-one instruction in reading, spelling, reading comprehension, and auditory memory and processing. He attends four fifty-minute sessions at Moyers from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. Moyers is a California-certified nonpublic agency.

Two days later, on August 18, the District convened an IEP meeting to review Dr. Stewart's mental health assessment. Dr. Stewart reported that it was his impression that polysubstance abuse, conduct disorder, and low cognitive ability were, in combination, affecting STUDENT's functioning in the educational setting, and that he did not believe that these areas could be remediated through mental health services. The District supported Dr. Stewart's finding that STUDENT was not eligible for mental health services, but the parents disagreed. When Joan Landguth, the parent's advocate, requested that the team also discuss placement issues, the District informed the parents that it intended to pursue a 45-day interim alternative educational setting (IAES) for STUDENT if the parties were unable to agree on an alternative educational setting (AES). When the parties were unable to agree, the District informed the parents that the IAES was Summit School. The parents requested that STUDENT be placed at Moyers, and indicated that they would place STUDENT at Moyers and request reimbursement from the District.

On August 27, the Hearing Office received from Petitioner a request for an order determining that STUDENT's stay put placement was Moyers. After receipt of the District's response on August 30, the Hearing Office issued an order denying Petitioner's request for stay put at Moyers. Instead, the order determined that STUDENT's stay put placement was in an SDC class with mainstreaming in elective classes during thirty-three percent of the school day and one thirty-minute special education counseling session per week in accordance with his IEP dated March 19, 1998. By order dated September 21, 1999, the Hearing Office denied the District's subsequent request for reconsideration and clarified that the IEP was to be implemented during the stay put period in the same location that it had previously been implemented, namely at MCHS.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

ISSUE NO. 1: Did the District provide STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) from May 19, 1996, to April 19, 1999, during the periods in which STUDENT was not receiving services from the San Diego County Juvenile Court Schools?

Under both state law and the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), students with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). (Footnote 14) 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (1997) (former version at 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1994)); Cal. Educ. Code § 56000 (Deering 1987). The term "free appropriate public education" means special education and related services that are available to the student at no charge to the parent or guardian, that meet the State educational standards, and that conform to the student's individualized education program (IEP). 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8) (1997) (former version at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18) (1994)).

"Special education" is defined as specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet the unique needs of the student. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(25) (1997) (formerly 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16) (1994)). The term "related services" includes transportation and other developmental, corrective, and supportive services as may be required to assist a child to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22) (1997) (former version at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1994)). Education Code § 56363(a) similarly provides that designated instruction and services (DIS), California's term for related services, shall be provided "when the instruction and services are necessary for the pupil to benefit educationally from his or her instructional program." Included in the list of possible related services are psychological services other than for assessment and development of the IEP, parent counseling and training, specially designed vocational education and career development, and counseling and guidance. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22) (1997) (former version at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1994)); Cal. Educ. Code § 56363(b) (Deering 1987).

In Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982), the United States Supreme Court addressed the level of instruction and services that must be provided to a student with disabilities to satisfy the requirements of the IDEA. The Court determined that a student's IEP must be reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit, but that the IDEA does not require school districts to provide special education students with the best education available or to provide instruction or services that maximize a student's abilities. Id. at 198-200. The Court stated that school districts are required to provide only a "basic floor of opportunity" that consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the student. Id. at 201.

The Supreme Court in Rowley also recognized the importance of adherence to the procedural requirements of the IDEA. Id. at 205. Federal special education law requires states to establish and maintain certain procedural safeguards to ensure that each student with a disability receives the FAPE to which he/she is entitled and that parents are involved in the formulation of the student's educational program. W.G. v. Bd. of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992). The procedural rights that extend to parents include the right to be informed in writing when the educational agency proposes to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child; the right to participate in the development of the child's IEP; the right to examine all relevant educational records; and the opportunity for mediation and a due process hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1997) (amending 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1994)). Procedural flaws do not automatically require a finding of a denial of a FAPE, but procedural violations that result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringe on the parent's opportunity to participate in the IEP process do result in the denial of a FAPE. W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484; see also Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 994 (1st Cir. 1990).

Thus, the analysis of whether a student has been provided a FAPE is twofold, requiring the hearing officer to determine whether the procedural safeguards of the IDEA have been violated and to determine whether the FAPE provided was substantively appropriate. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-207.

Scant evidence was presented regarding the placements and services that the District provided STUDENT from May 19, 1996, to April 19, 1999. However, the evidence that was provided made it clear that the District committed a number of procedural and substantive violations which resulted in the denial of a FAPE during at least the 1996-97 school year, the 1998 spring semester, and the period February 23, 1999, to April 19, 1999 (or, in other words, during those periods when STUDENT was not in a Juvenile Court-ordered placement).

First, the District transferred STUDENT from Mount Carmel High School (MCHS) to Poway High School (PHS) in March 1997 without ever convening an IEP team meeting or otherwise seeking the consent of the parents for the change in placement. A form entitled "Administrative Student Placement," which was submitted into evidence by the District, shows that the District implemented the transfer because STUDENT violated the District's rule against possessing, using, consuming, or being under the influence of a controlled substance, alcohol, or other intoxicant. The transfer was for the remainder of the 1997 spring semester and the 1997 fall semester, although it was actually effective only for the remainder of the 1997 spring semester since STUDENT was thereafter placed in the Court Schools until January 1998. FATHER testified that the transfer to PHS was effectuated without an IEP meeting and without the input of the IEP team. The record supported FATHER's testimony in this regard, and the District did not present any evidence to refute his testimony. Such a transfer, without a meeting of the IEP team, was clearly a violation of STUDENT's procedural rights under the IDEA and State special education law for the following reasons.

The specific special education and related services to be provided to a special education student must be included in his or her IEP. 34 C.F.R. § 300.346(a)(3) (1996); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(a)(3) (Deering Supp. 1999). The responsible LEA has the obligation to provide special education and related services, including the listed educational placement, in accordance with the student's IEP. 34 C.F.R. § 300.350 (1996); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(c) (Deering Supp. 1999). In California, this obligation takes on special meaning since California law specifically defines "educational placement" as "that unique combination of facilities, personnel, location or equipment necessary to provide instructional services to an individual with exceptional needs, as specified in the individualized education program." Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3042(a) (italics added). Thus, a particular school, location, or facilities available at a site may be an intrinsic component of the student's placement. Accordingly, a change in the location in which the student receives services would generally constitute a change of placement in California. Because of the special protections afforded disabled students, a special education student's placement generally may be changed only through a meeting of the IEP team and only with the consent of the parents. (Footnote 15) 34 C.F.R. § 300.343(a) (1996); Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56340, 56341(a), 56342, 56346(a), 48911(h) (Deering Supp. 1999). There is no evidence that an exception existed in STUDENT's case in March 1997 that allowed the District to change STUDENT's placement from MCHS to PHS for disciplinary reasons without a meeting of or input from the IEP team and without the parents' consent. Thus, the District's action in this regard violated STUDENT's procedural rights under the IDEA and state special education law. Additionally, the District's unilateral decision to transfer STUDENT without seeking the input or consent of the parents seriously infringed on the parents' opportunity to participate in the IEP process (by failing to hold the required IEP meeting) and was, therefore, a procedural violation that resulted in the denial of a FAPE. W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484.

Second, the District has never conducted a functional analysis assessment (FAA) or developed a behavior intervention plan (BIP) for STUDENT, even though his disciplinary records and classroom performance clearly indicated that one was required. An LEA is required to conduct an FAA and develop a BIP satisfying the requirements of State law whenever a special education student exhibits "serious behavior problems" which significantly interfere with the implementation of the goals and objectives contained in the student's IEP. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3001(h) (1999). The phrase "serious behavior problems" is defined as behaviors that are self-injurious, assaultive, or cause serious property damage and other severe behavior problems that are pervasive and maladaptive for which instructional and/or behavioral approaches specified in the student's IEP are found to be ineffective. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3001(ah) (1999).

According to Dr. Ingham's pre-expulsion report, STUDENT's IEPs have included a thirty-minute special education counseling session one time per week since at least early 1996 to address impulsitivity issues. The counseling sessions addressing impulsitivity were, however, ineffective in addressing the serious maladaptive behaviors that STUDENT was exhibiting during the ninth, tenth, and eleventh grades. For example, the District submitted discipline records which established that from the beginning of the ninth grade until the transfer to PHS in March 1997, STUDENT physically and verbally harassed other students on at least three separate occasions and was involved in at least two fights. These altercations resulted in numerous detentions and at least two suspensions, but no BIP. The record also shows that STUDENT was often disruptive in class, defiant and disrespectful with most authority figures, frequently skipped classes or left school without a pass, was often distracted during lessons, and had difficulty completing assignments. Contrary to the District's assertion, all of these behaviors were school-related and significantly interfered with the implementation of the IEP goals and objectives. (Footnote 16) This is reflected in the failing grades STUDENT obtained while placed in the District's public schools. When considered together, these behaviors should have prompted the District to conduct an FAA and develop a BIP. Despite this, according to FATHER's unrefuted testimony, the District never offered to conduct an FAA or develop a BIP for STUDENT. While there was vague testimony about the use of some behavior contracts with STUDENT, none was introduced into the record. Further, behavior contracts do not serve the same purposes as BIPs or contain the behavior modification techniques that BIPs contain and, therefore, cannot substitute for the implementation and development of a BIP. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, §§ 3001, 3052 (1999). The District's failure to consider and address the maladaptive behaviors that STUDENT exhibited in developing and implementing his IEP constituted a denial of FAPE. 34 C.F.R. Part 300, App. A, Q. 38 (1999).

Third, STUDENT has not been provided with necessary transition services, as required by the IDEA and State special education law. The IDEA requires that, starting by at least age sixteen, a student's IEP include a statement of the transition services needed by the student. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20)(1994) (current version at 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(vii) (1997)); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345.1 (Deering Supp. 1999). The phrase "transition services" means a coordinated set of activities for a student designed with an outcome-oriented process that promotes movement from school to post-school activities, including postsecondary education, vocational training, integrated employment, continuing and adult education, adult services, independent living, or community participation. 34 C.F.R. § 300.18 (1996) (now codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(30)(A) (1997)); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345.1 (Deering Supp. 1999). The coordinated set of activities must be based on the student's needs, taking into account his or her preferences and interests, and include instruction, community experiences, the development of employment and other post-school adult living objectives, and, if appropriate, acquisition of daily living skills and a functional vocational evaluation. 34 C.F.R. § 300.18(b) (1996) (now codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(30)(B)-(C) (1997)). The goal of transition services is to provide the student with planned movement from secondary to adult, which provides opportunities to maximize economic and social independence in the least restrictive environment. Cal. Educ. Code § 56460(e) (Deering Supp. 1999).

STUDENT turned sixteen years old on August 28, 1997, but, by March 1998, his IEP contained only the barest of transition plans. The IEP dated March 19, 1998, included an individual transition plan (ITP) consisting of the following goals and activities: pass all classes, attend summer school during the summer of 1998 to make up credits, sign up for the Rise & Shine Program, sign up for the Hire-A-Youth Program during the summer of 1998, and apply to the Transition Partnership Program upon his seventeenth birthday. No evidence was presented to explain what the Rise & Shine, Hire-A-Youth, or Transition Partnership Programs were or the services they were intended to provide STUDENT. In short, there was no evidence that the IEP provided a "coordinated set of activities" to promote movement from school to postschool activities, taking into account STUDENT's preferences and interests, as the IDEA requires. Instead, it was a generic transition plan which did not take into account his needs or preferences and interests, and which provided inadequate support for a student with disabilities that were known to inhibit his ability to independently prepare himself for postsecondary education or postschool employment. By the time the IEP dated March 1998 was written, STUDENT was almost a junior in high school, yet there had been no determination of the specific type of instruction or community experience he might need to pursue his interests. According to the unrefuted testimony of STUDENT's parents, STUDENT lacked necessary basic independent living skills, such as being able to count change correctly, but the ITP developed by the District failed to contain any instruction to remedy STUDENT's lack of daily living skills. Additionally, the District made no effort to assist STUDENT in gaining work experience. According to the unrefuted testimony of the parents, STUDENT tried since the age of sixteen to get a job with no assistance from the District, but was unsuccessful until a week before the first day of hearing when he finally landed his first job. It is not surprising that the District has not provided STUDENT any assistance in this regard, since the ITP developed by the District for STUDENT did not obligate the District to provide any transition services. The only services the ITP obligated the District to provide were summer school services, something routinely available to all students who, like STUDENT, fail classes necessary for graduation. The Hearing Officer therefore finds that the District failed in its obligation to provide STUDENT with necessary transition services since the age of sixteen.

Fourth, FATHER testified that STUDENT did not receive any counseling services during the 1998-99 school year even though his IEP dated March 19, 1998, stated that he was to receive one thirty-minute counseling session per week to improve impulse control. The District did not present any evidence to refute this. While under some circumstances a failure to provide counseling services in accordance with an IEP might be inconsequential, in this case, where the student was having serious problems with impulse control, such a failure is significant. Since STUDENT was placed in a Court School from the beginning of the 1998-99 school year until February 23, 1999 (when he returned to MCHS), he was not being served by the District during most of the school year. Additionally, at the IEP meeting held on April 14, 1999, the parents refused the District's offer of counseling services on the ground that STUDENT was receiving sufficient outside services. Therefore, the evidence establishes that the District failed to provide STUDENT with counseling services in accordance with his IEP from only February 23 to April 13, 1999.

Based on the foregoing, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District committed a number of prejudicial procedural and substantive errors that resulted in the denial of a FAPE during at least the 1996-97 school year, the 1998 spring semester, and the period February 23, 1999, to April 19, 1999 (or, in other words, during those periods when STUDENT was not in a Juvenile Court-ordered placement). The appropriate remedy for the denial of a FAPE will be discussed in Issue Number 4.

ISSUE NO. 2: May the District proceed with its recommendation that STUDENT be expelled for having a knife at school on April 20, 1999?

To receive federal funds for educating handicapped children, states must comply with the provisions of the IDEA. W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992). State standards that impose a greater duty to educate handicapped children, if not inconsistent with federal standards, are also enforceable in federal court under IDEA. Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1524 (9th Cir. 1994). Generally, then, special education students in California are subject to discipline in accordance with federal special education due process requirements and the California Education Code. The protections for special education students contained in the IDEA and state special education law with regard to discipline matters were designed to prevent the type of often speculative and subjective decision-making by school officials that, in the past, led to widespread abuses of the rights of children with disabilities to an appropriate education. 64 Fed. Reg. 12414 (1999). These protections do not, however, prevent school officials from maintaining a learning environment that is safe and conducive to learning for all children. Id.

Before the appropriateness of the District's disciplinary actions in this matter may be examined, the Hearing Officer must first determine the statutory expulsion procedures that apply to Petitioner's case. (Footnote 17) Here, the District is proposing to expel STUDENT for his possession of a fixed-blade knife with a 3¼-inch blade on school grounds during school hours. California does not extend its procedural safeguards to students, like STUDENT, who have been found to possess a knife on school grounds unless federal law mandates the same procedural safeguards. Cal. Educ. Code § 48915.6 (Deering Supp. 1999). Education Code § 48915.6 provides, in pertinent part:

The restrictions and special procedures provided in Section 48915.5 for the expulsion of a pupil with exceptional needs shall not apply when the pupil possessed a ... knife ... or other dangerous object of no reasonable use to the pupil ... at school ..., unless for these acts the restrictions and special procedures in Section 48915.5 are mandated under federal law, including Section 1415 of Title 20 of the United States Code.

California law defines the term "knife" in this context to mean a dirk, dagger, or other weapon with a fixed, sharpened blade fitted primarily for stabbing, a weapon with a blade fitted primarily for stabbing, a weapon with a blade longer than 3½ inches, a folding knife with a blade that locks into place, or a razor with an unguarded blade. Cal. Educ. Code § 48915(g) (Deering Supp. 1999). Having examined pictures of the knife found in STUDENT's possession, the Hearing Officer concludes that the knife in question fit the description of "knife" found in Section 48915(g). The knife found in STUDENT's possession had a sturdy, wide handle affixed to a metal blade consisting of a sharpened edge and a serrated edge. The blade itself ended in a sharpened point. This knife was obviously designed to be able to pierce (e.g., stab) the surface of an object with the end of the sharpened, pointed blade. No persuasive evidence was offered to the contrary. Therefore, because State law did not impose a greater duty to educate STUDENT in this instance, State law defers to federal law with regard to the restrictions and procedures applicable in the expulsion process. See Cal. Educ. Code § 48915.6 (Deering Supp. 1999).

Here, the District attempted to expel STUDENT immediately after he was found with a knife at school on April 20, 1999, and then, after his release from the Juvenile-Court ordered placement in the summer of 1999, attempted to place him in a 45-day interim alternative educational setting (IAES) under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(A)(ii). The evidence demonstrated that the District's attempt both to expel STUDENT and to place him in a 45-day IAES was contrary to the law, because the District incorrectly concluded that STUDENT's IEP and placement were appropriate.

Pursuant to federal law, before a student such as STUDENT may be expelled or have his placement changed for more than ten school days for disciplinary reasons, the following requirements must be met: (1) upon making the decision to pursue expulsion, the LEA must immediately, but no later than the date on which the decision is made, notify the parents of the decision and of all the procedural safeguards accorded to them; (2) immediately, but no later than ten school days after the date the decision is made, the LEA must convene a meeting of the IEP team to review the relationship between the student's disability and the misconduct subject to the disciplinary action; and (3) the team must consider all relevant information and determine (a) that the misconduct was not a manifestation of the student's disability, (b) that, in relationship to the behavior subject to disciplinary action, the IEP and placement were appropriate and the special education services, supplementary aids and services, and behavior intervention strategies were provided consistent with the IEP and placement, (c) that the disability did not impair the student's ability to understand the impact and consequences of the behavior subject to disciplinary action, and (d) that the disability did not impair the student's ability to control the behavior subject to disciplinary action. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(4), (5) (1997); see Cal. Educ. Code § 48915.5 (Deering Supp. 1999). Petitioner argued that the District's conclusion that the behavior at issue was not a manifestation of STUDENT's disability was incorrect. The Hearing Officer agrees.

As discussed in Issue Number 1, the District improperly failed to conduct an FAA and develop a BIP despite the seriously maladaptive behaviors STUDENT exhibited in the school setting since at least the ninth grade, and failed to provide appropriate transition services and to include appropriate transition goals and objectives in the IEP. As a direct result, STUDENT's maladaptive behaviors escalated. While it is always difficult to determine whether a specific intervention would have prevented a particular event from occurring, it requires no stretch of the imagination to find that STUDENT's flagrant disregard for the school rule concerning possession of a knife on school premises could reasonably be expected to have been prevented had a BIP been in place for the last few years to control the stem of maladaptive behaviors and replace them with positive behaviors. Because STUDENT's IEP and placement were not appropriate at the time the incident occurred, the behavior at issue must be considered a manifestation of his disability. 34 C.F.R. § 300.523(d) (1999). Therefore, the District cannot expel STUDENT or place him in a 45-day IAES. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(5)(A) (1997). Instead, the District must identify the deficiencies existing in STUDENT's IEP and placement and take immediate steps to remedy those deficiencies. 34 C.F.R. § 300.523(f) (1999).

The Hearing Officer now turns to several alternate arguments raised by Petitioner. The Hearing Officer does not find persuasive Petitioner's arguments that STUDENT was inappropriately diagnosed, that he should have been provided speech and language therapy, and that he required more individual academic instruction than his IEP afforded him. First, Petitioner provided no persuasive evidence that STUDENT is mentally retarded, has traumatic brain injury (TBI), or suffers from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). STUDENT has never been found to be mentally retarded by any qualified personnel. While Petitioner's attorney made much of the low cognitive scores STUDENT obtained on various tests, the experts who testified all agreed that low cognitive scores, standing alone, do not translate into a diagnosis of mental retardation and that none of the other indicators for mental retardation were present. In fact, such a diagnosis was contraindicated when viewed in light of the higher achievement scores STUDENT was often able to achieve, often average adaptive skills he displayed, and the doubtful validity of most IQ scores obtained because of the variable effort STUDENT displayed during testing. Additionally, while there was much speculation about the presence of a TBI, no persuasive evidence was presented to establish that STUDENT suffered from TBI or that the District had an obligation to further investigate the presence of a TBI. Moreover, no persuasive evidence was presented that STUDENT suffers from ADHD. Petitioner presented only the testimony of the parents that STUDENT had been diagnosed with ADHD a number of years ago. Neither of the recent psychiatric evaluations by Dr. David Kaufman or Patrick Lyden concluded that STUDENT suffered from ADHD. While there is no dispute that STUDENT suffers from symptoms of ADHD, including impulsitivity and distractibility, there is no evidence that the District should have "diagnosed" STUDENT with ADHD or investigated the possibility of ADHD further. The District's assessments investigated the medical opinions of STUDENT's treaters and noted how ADHD symptoms affected STUDENT's ability to attend in the educational setting.Second, there was no evidence that STUDENT required speech and language therapy as a related service in order to benefit from special education. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22) (1997); Cal. Educ. Code § 56363(b) (Deering 1987). Apart from the vague testimony of some witnesses, none of whom were qualified to offer an expert opinion on the question of whether STUDENT required speech and language therapy to benefit from special education, no evidence was presented to support Petitioner's contention in this regard.

Third, while the evidence demonstrated that STUDENT is able to benefit from one-on-one instruction, as most children will, there was no persuasive evidence presented that STUDENT required one-on-one instruction in order to benefit from special education. STUDENT has processing deficits and has historically performed poorly in his academic classes, but this indicates the need for specialized instruction and behavior management, rather than one-on-one instruction. For example, the slower processing speed that was cited by Jorge Ley, the Court School psychologist, can be accommodated through instruction in a special day class or resource specialist program where the instructional pace is slower. Further, requiring one-on-one instruction for a student such as STUDENT, whose ability and processing deficits do not preclude instruction in a structured group setting, would run contrary to the IDEA's mandate that students be educated in the least restrictive environment (LRE). 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (1997); Cal. Educ. Code § 56031 (Deering Supp. 1999). The evidence established only that STUDENT required more individualized and specialized instruction for those academic subjects with which he has particular difficulty in order to receive a FAPE, not that he required isolation through one-on-one instruction.

ISSUE NO. 3: Did the District offer and/or provide STUDENT a FAPE from April 20, 1999, through the date of the hearing?

As determined in Issue Number 2, the District's manifestation determination was incorrect. This did not necessarily result, however, in a failure to provide STUDENT a FAPE from April 20, 1999, through the date of the hearing. After STUDENT was found with the knife in his possession, he was immediately placed back in a Juvenile Court-ordered placement in the Sara Anthony Court School and, thus, was not in the District's jurisdiction. STUDENT remained in the Court School until June 25, 1999, when the Juvenile Court released STUDENT back to his parents to complete sixty days of home supervision. The District's summer school program had ended two days earlier on June 23 and, therefore, STUDENT was also not in the District's jurisdiction during the time when he might have been receiving extended school year (ESY) programming. Moreover, the IEP in effect at that time, which had been developed by the Court School on June 16, 1999, and with which the parents consented, indicated that STUDENT was not eligible for ESY programming. Additionally, no evidence was presented that STUDENT required ESY programming during the summer of 1999 in accordance with Section 3043 of Title 5 of the California Code of Regulations. (Footnote 18 ) In sum, there was no evidence that the District was obligated to provide STUDENT a FAPE from April 20, 1999, through the 1999 ESY.

The District's obligation to provide STUDENT a FAPE began again, however, when the 1999-2000 school year commenced. The District, relying on its assumption that it could change STUDENT's placement to a 45-day IAES, failed to meet its FAPE obligation by the beginning of the school year. As discussed earlier, the District did not have authority to change STUDENT's placement to a 45-day IAES because the misbehavior was a manifestation of STUDENT's disability. (Footnote 19) In light of this, the District should have corrected the deficiencies that existed in STUDENT's IEP and placement, namely the lack of a BIP, necessary transition services, and appropriate transition goals and objectives using the IEP process and allowing for proper parent participation. The District has thus far failed to correct the deficiencies in the IEP. In fact, the District has not offered STUDENT placement in any educational setting for the 1999-2000 school year other than the Summit School as a 45-day IAES. Under these circumstances, the District has clearly failed to provide STUDENT with a FAPE since the beginning of the 1999-2000 school year.

Moreover, while personnel from the Court School conducted an FAA during STUDENT's Court-ordered placement in the summer of 1999, no BIP was thereafter developed and included in his IEP. Further, even if the FAA was appropriate for the behaviors that STUDENT was exhibiting in the Court School, the Court School's FAA, standing alone, cannot serve as an appropriate foundation for a BIP in the public school setting of MCHS, as recognized by Drs. Ingham and Metcalf. Because of this, the District should have drafted an assessment plan for the parents' approval to allow it to conduct an FAA in the public school setting as soon as STUDENT was returned to the public school setting. Additionally, as discussed previously, the District should have drafted an IEP that included necessary transition services and appropriate transition goals and objectives. While STUDENT's ITP was improved by Court School personnel at the IEP meeting held on June 16, 1999, it still lacked the necessary transition services for a student with STUDENT's recognized difficulties, such as employment assistance and instruction in independent living skills.

In light of the foregoing, the Hearing Officer finds that the District did not deny STUDENT a FAPE from April 20, 1999, to the end of the ESY, but that it has denied STUDENT a FAPE since the beginning of the 1999-2000 school year. Because of the District's failure to provide STUDENT a FAPE from the beginning of the 1999-2000 school year, the Hearing Officer must next determine whether the parents are entitled to reimbursement for their unilateral placement at Moyers Center for Learning (Moyers) and whether STUDENT should be placed at Moyers for the remainder of the school year, as Petitioner requested.

When a school district denies a student a FAPE, the student is entitled to relief that is "appropriate" in light of the purposes of the IDEA. School Comm. of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369, 105 S. Ct. 1996 (1985); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (1997). Thus, parents may be entitled to retroactive reimbursement for the services they have procured for their child when the school district failed to provide an appropriate placement or services and the services provided by the parents were appropriate under the IDEA. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370. However, the Burlington rule is not so narrow as to permit reimbursement only when the placement or services chosen by the parent are found to be the exact proper placement or services required under the Act. Alamo Heights Independent Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1161 (5th Cir. 1986). The Alamo court stated the following about the rationale behind the Court's decision in Burlington:

The rationale behind Burlington's holding is that parents who elect to risk shouldering the costs of what they perceive to be a more appropriate placement, and whose judgment is wholly or in part vindicated by the district court, should receive more than an ‘empty victory.' [Footnote omitted.] As stated by the Court, if ‘appropriate relief' in the form of reasonable reimbursement is not allowed, ‘the child's right to a free appropriate public education, the parent's right to participate fully in developing a proper IEP, and all of the procedural safeguards would be less than complete.' [Footnote omitted.]

Id.

STUDENT has been attending Moyers at his parents' expense since August 16, 1999. Moyers is a California-certified nonpublic agency that offers one-on-one instruction with the goal of teaching students the skills necessary to be successful in the classroom or workplace so that they can transition back to a less restrictive environment. At Moyers, STUDENT receives one-on-one instruction in reading, spelling, reading comprehension, and auditory memory and processing. He attends four fifty-minute sessions at Moyers from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. The testimony of Meghan Hammond, STUDENT's case manager at Moyers, established that the instruction STUDENT has been receiving at Moyers is designed to address his unique needs and has provided him with educational benefit. Moyers administered a number of tests to gauge STUDENT's level of functioning even before accepting him into its program. Thereafter, the instruction was tailored to address those areas of deficit that were shown to exist through the testing and was provided by mostly special education-credentialed staff. The environment at Moyers was conducive to learning for STUDENT, and he had no behavior or attendance problems at Moyers. While Moyers was certainly not the LRE for STUDENT, the parents' right to reimbursement is not precluded by the failure to meet the mainstreaming requirement imposed on public agencies. Cleveland Heights-University Heights City Sch. Dist. v. Boss, 144 F.3d 391, 399 (6th Cir. 1998). As the Sixth Circuit recently noted, "It will commonly be the case that parents who have not been treated properly under the IDEA, and who exercise the right of parental placement, will place their child in a school that specializes in teaching children with disabilities and thus will not satisfy the mainstreaming requirement. Adopting such a limitation on parental placements would therefore effectively vitiate that remedy." Id. at n7; accord Warren G. v. Cumberland County Sch. Dist., 1999 WL 643168 (3d Cir. 1999). Their right to reimbursement is also not barred by the fact that, had the District provided STUDENT a FAPE, it would not have been necessary for it to provide one-on-one instruction. STUDENT does not require one-on-one instruction to benefit from his education, but it is nevertheless appropriate instruction for him.

Consequently, because the District failed to provide STUDENT a FAPE from the beginning of the 1999-2000 school year and the parents provided appropriate services, the parents are entitled to reimbursement for expenses related to the Moyers placement from the beginning of the 1999-2000 school year to the date of this decision. However, the parents are not entitled to reimbursement for the Moyers instruction provided before the 1999-2000 school year began, i.e., from August 16, 1999, to the beginning of the regular school year, when the District had no obligation to provide STUDENT a FAPE.

Petitioner requested that the Hearing Officer place STUDENT in Moyers for the remainder of the 1999-2000 school year. This request must be denied. The Moyers placement cannot, by itself, provide an appropriate program for STUDENT. As discussed earlier, Moyers does not provide STUDENT an education in the LRE and, therefore, cannot constitute STUDENT's educational placement under the IDEA.

As neither of the placements proposed by the parties at the hearing constitutes an appropriate placement for STUDENT for the 1999-2000 school year, the District must immediately, but no later than fifteen calendar days from the date of this decision, convene an IEP meeting to develop and offer STUDENT an appropriate IEP for the 2000 spring semester. Because stability in a student's program is an important consideration, the District shall fund STUDENT's placement at Moyers until the end of the 1999 fall semester.

ISSUE NO. 4: Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education for any failures of the District to provide a FAPE from May 19, 1996, through the date of the hearing?

As previously noted, when a school district denies a special education student a FAPE, the student is entitled to relief that is "appropriate" in light of the purposes of the IDEA. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374; 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (1997). Based on the principle set forth in Burlington, federal courts have held that compensatory education is a form of equitable relief that may be granted for the denial of appropriate special education services to help overcome lost educational opportunity. See, e.g., Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., 31 F.3d 1489, 1496 (9th Cir. 1994). However, compensatory education does not necessarily involve an obligation to provide day-for-day or session-for-session replacement for opportunity or time missed. Id. at 1497. The purpose of compensatory education is to "ensure that the student is appropriately educated within the meaning of IDEA." Id.

The Hearing Officer concluded above that the District committed a number of procedural and substantive errors that resulted in the denial of a FAPE during at least the 1996-97 school year, the 1998 spring semester, and the period February 23, 1999, to April 19, 1999 (or, in other words, during those periods when STUDENT was not in a Juvenile Court-ordered placement). STUDENT is clearly entitled to compensatory education because of these denials of FAPE. The only remaining question, then, is the appropriate type and amount of compensatory education.

The parties provided little information upon which a detailed award of compensatory education can be made. Petitioner requested compensatory education but offered no specific details on what services or instruction he was seeking. Therefore, while the Hearing Officer can make some determinations regarding the proper type and amount of compensatory education necessary based on the information presented, the details will have to be worked out by the IEP team.

First, the District shall provide STUDENT with at least eight thirty-minute counseling sessions with a school psychologist to make up for its failure to implement the counseling portion of STUDENT's IEP upon his return to MCHS on February 23, 1999. The counseling sessions should focus on improving STUDENT's impulse control in accordance with his IEP dated March 19, 1998. The sessions should be provided one time per week, unless the parties agree otherwise.

Second, because the District failed to provide STUDENT with necessary transition services during the 1998 spring semester, from February 23 to April 19, 1999, and from the beginning of the 1999-2000 school year to the date of the decision, the District shall provide STUDENT a minimum of thirty minutes of transition services and consultation one time every other week during the remainder of the 1999-2000 school year. This intensity of services should provide STUDENT with the transition information and assistance he failed to receive in the past. The specific nature of the services shall be determined by the IEP team at the IEP meeting previously ordered and be documented in STUDENT's IEP.

Finally, because the District failed to develop a BIP to address STUDENT's serious maladaptive behaviors in the past and, instead, allowed the maladaptive behaviors to interfere with STUDENT's ability to benefit from his education, it shall provide as compensatory education a total of forty hours of one-on-one instruction by a special education-credentialed teacher to address STUDENT's academic deficits. (Footnote 20) This amount of one-on-one instruction should be sufficient to make up for the educational opportunity that was lost during the last few years while STUDENT was in the District's jurisdiction, as found in Issue Number 1. The specific academic deficits to be addressed by the one-on-one instruction shall be determined by the IEP team, as shall the frequency and duration of the instruction. All fifty hours must be completed no later than December 1, 2000.

ISSUE NO. 5: Are STUDENT's parents authorized to make educational decisions on his behalf based on an oral authorization by STUDENT?

In California, when a student with a disability reaches the age of eighteen, (footnote 21) all rights accorded to parents under the IDEA and State special education law, including the right to make educational decisions, transfer to the student, unless the student has been deemed incompetent or been conserved. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(m) (1997); Cal. Educ. Code § 56028 (Deering Supp. 1999). Since STUDENT's eighteenth birthday, a dispute has arisen over whether the District must honor an oral authorization by STUDENT for his parents to make educational decisions on his behalf in the IEP process.

The Hearing Officer finds that, unless determined incompetent by a court of law, STUDENT may, under general agency law, delegate his power to make educational decisions to an agent (in this case, to his parents). The District is not, however, obligated to honor this delegation of authority unless STUDENT and his family provide it with written authorization for the parents to act on his behalf. The authorization must indicate that it is a voluntary and knowing delegation of authority, i.e., that STUDENT is making the authorization voluntarily and with full knowledge of the rights he is transferring to his parents and the consequences of such a transfer. A written authorization is necessary since it protects the student and the school district. STUDENT is assured that his parents may make decisions on his behalf only so long as the District has his written authorization; the District is assured that STUDENT made the authorization voluntarily and with full knowledge of his rights.

ORDER

1. The District cannot expel STUDENT or place him in a 45-day interim alternative educational setting for having a knife at school on April 20, 1999.

2. Within ten calendar days of the parents' presentation of proof, Respondent Poway Unified School District (District) shall reimburse the parents for tuition and related expenses for STUDENT's placement at the Moyers Center for Learning beginning the first day of the 1999-2000 school year through the date of this decision.

3. The District shall immediately assume funding for STUDENT's placement at the Moyers Center for Learning and shall continue funding the placement until the end of the 1999 fall semester.

4. Within fifteen calendar days from the date of this decision, the District shall convene an individualized education program (IEP) team meeting to develop and offer STUDENT an appropriate IEP for the 2000 spring semester. In addition to developing an IEP at the meeting that meets the requirements of federal and State special education laws, the following shall also be accomplished at the meeting:

a. The IEP team shall develop a proposed assessment plan to obtain consent to perform a functional analysis assessment.

b. The District shall offer a program that includes at least eight thirty-minute counseling sessions with a school psychologist as compensatory education during the 2000 spring semester. The counseling sessions shall focus on improving STUDENT's impulse control in accordance with his IEP dated March 19, 1998. The sessions shall be provided one time per week, unless the parties agree otherwise.

c. The District shall offer a program that includes at least thirty minutes of transition services and consultation every other week as compensatory education during the 2000 spring semester. The specific nature of the services shall be determined by the IEP team.

d. The District shall offer a program that includes a total of forty hours of one-on-one instruction by a special education-credentialed teacher to address STUDENT's academic deficits. The specific academic deficits to be addressed by the one-on-one instruction shall be determined by the IEP team, as shall the frequency and duration of the instruction. All forty hours shall be completed no later than December 1, 2000.

5. Within twenty calendar days of STUDENT's first day attending the District's program for the 2000 spring semester, the District shall conduct a functional analysis assessment and convene an IEP meeting to review the assessment findings and recommendations, unless consent was not given for the District to assess. At the IEP meeting, the IEP team shall develop and incorporate into STUDENT's IEP a behavioral intervention plan.

6. Petitioner's remaining claims for relief are denied.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following finding is made in accordance with this statute:

1. Did the District provide STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) from May 19, 1996, to April 19, 1999, during the periods in which STUDENT was not receiving services from the San Diego County Juvenile Court Schools? * Petitioner prevailed on this issue.

2. May the District proceed with its recommendation that STUDENT be expelled for having a knife at school on April 20, 1999? * Petitioner prevailed on this issue.

3. Did the District offer and/or provide STUDENT a FAPE from April 20, 1999, through the date of the hearing? * Respondent prevailed with regard to the period April 20, 1999, through the end of the 1999 extended school year, and Petitioner prevailed with regard to the period from the beginning of the 1999-2000 school year through the date of the hearing.

4. Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education for any failures of the District to provide a FAPE from May 19, 1996, through the date of the hearing? * Petitioner prevailed on this issue.

5. Are STUDENT's parents authorized to make educational decisions on his behalf based on an oral authorization by STUDENT? * Neither party prevailed on this issue.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i) (Deering Supp. 1999).

Date: December 2, 1999 Hee C. Kim, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

1. The Hearing Office thereafter received a letter from FATHER dated November 15, 1999, but, as the parties were informed, the letter was not considered in the rendering of this decision because it was not submitted until after the evidentiary record was closed.

2. Petitioner initially presented eight issues. However, after discussion, it was agreed that many of the issues identified by Petitioner were factual allegations supporting his contention that the District had failed to provide a free appropriate public education rather than separate legal issues. Petitioner's issues are therefore restated in this decision as agreed upon by the parties.

3. Petitioner did not dispute that a three-year statute of limitations applies in California to claims brought under the IDEA (see Alexopulos v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 551, 555 (9th Cir. 1987); Cal. Educ. Code § 56043(p) (Deering Supp. 1999)) and that, accordingly, he was barred from raising any claims that arose on or before May 18, 1996. Petitioner indicated that he was therefore not seeking adjudication of any claims that arose on or before May 18, 1996.

4. STUDENT was on probation because he had been convicted of assault and robbery, his second conviction. STUDENT's mother testified that, according to STUDENT, the assault and robbery conviction arose out of an incident in which STUDENT attempted to wrest a baseball bat from another boy, and in the struggle STUDENT let go of the bat, resulting in the bat hitting the other boy on the forehead. His first conviction was for being an accomplice to an auto theft. STUDENT was reportedly the passenger in a car stolen by a friend. It is unclear from the record when these convictions occurred.

5. This was confirmed through a letter written by Theresa Kurtz to the parents on August 24, 1999.

6. MOTHER was not married at this time to FATHER. FATHER is MOTHER's second husband and has been STUDENT's stepfather for the last seven years.

7. Mr. Lerner indicated in his report that, because STUDENT was cooperative during testing and appeared motivated to do well, he considered the scores he obtained to be valid indicators of STUDENT's functioning at the time, but suggested that STUDENT would have scored higher on the verbal portion of the KBIT if it had not been for his relatively weak vocabulary skills. Mr. Lerner noted that his weak vocabulary skills might have been due to some language confusion between English and Vietnamese. STUDENT was exposed to Vietnamese primarily for the first four years of his life, and then began learning English through exposure to day care at the age of four. He continues to have adequate receptive Vietnamese language skills for basic concepts and speaks Vietnamese with his mother at home, but speaks primarily English with his siblings and English-speaking stepfather.

8. The evidence indicated that this continued to be a consistent pattern with STUDENT in the following years. In fact, STUDENT's achievement scores were often significantly higher than his ability scores which, according to the testimony of the experts, is highly unusual since a person should not be able to achieve higher than his or her potential. Testimony indicated that this anomaly in STUDENT's testing results was likely due to the variable effort and motivation STUDENT displayed during testing, although no one was able to provide a conclusive reason as to why it kept recurring.

9. Section 3030(j)(4)(C) provides that where standardized testing does not reveal a severe discrepancy between ability and achievement, the IEP team may nevertheless find that a severe discrepancy exists if the team documents in a written report that the severe discrepancy exists as a result of a disorder in or more basic psychological processes. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(j)(4)(C).

10. This was performed a month after STUDENT's return on February 23, 1999, from a Juvenile Court-ordered placement in a Court School.

11. Dr. Ingham recommended that the school resource nurse prepare a health assessment report to assist the team in determining whether or not health factors might be adversely affecting learning.

12. Section 1415(k)(4) provides that where a local educational agency (LEA) contemplates a disciplinary action involving a change of placement for a child with a disability to an appropriate alternative educational setting, the LEA must immediately, but no later than ten days from the date on which the decision is made, conduct a review of the relationship between the child's disability and the behavior subject to the disciplinary action.

13. Dr. Lyden reported that STUDENT scored twenty-five out of a possible thirty on the Mini-Mental Status Examination. Dr. Lyden also reported the STUDENT had deficits in repeating words backwards, did not know what floor of the building he was on, was not aware of the name of the community, and had difficulty retrieving short-term memorized objects.

14. In 1997, the IDEA was amended (IDEA ‘97). Most of the provisions of IDEA ‘97 became effective on June 4, 1997; others became effective January 1, 1998, or July 1, 1998. Thereafter, changes were made to a number of State code provisions, and new federal regulations were issued to reflect the mandates of IDEA ‘97. Senate Bill No. 1686, which became effective January 1, 1999, amended various State statutes relating to special education. The Department of Education issued new regulations to accompany IDEA ‘97 on March 12, 1999. Petitioner's claims relating to the end of the 1995-96 school year and the 1996-97 school year arose prior to the enactment of IDEA ‘97. While IDEA ‘97 did not alter the general standards reflected in the IDEA, the Hearing Officer will apply the law and regulations that were in effect at the time the disputed events occurred, in compliance with the general rules against the retroactive application of laws. Landgraff v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994).

15. A change of placement may also result from the issuance of a court order where the special education student has been deemed to be "truly dangerous." Cal. Educ. Code § 48911(h) (Deering Supp. 1999).

16. For instance, the assaultive behaviors resulted in STUDENT's being suspended from school and seriously impacted his ability to interact appropriately with peers. An IEP is an educational package which must target all of a student's unique educational needs, whether academic or nonacademic. Lenn v. Portland Sch. Comm., 998 F.2d 1083, 1089 (1st Cir. 1993). The term "unique educational needs" is to be broadly construed and includes the student's academic, social, health, emotional, communicative, physical, and vocational needs. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. B.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 410, 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2088, 2106). Accordingly, this requirement is not limited only to deficits that appear to directly impact a student's ability to progress academically. Id.

17. This is not an issue that is settled because of the prior ruling with regard to Petitioner's stay put request, as Petitioner asserted. Stay put obligations come into effect only when a due process hearing is requested and remain in effect only during the pendency of the due process proceeding. This decision, on the other hand, will adjudicate whether the District's actions following STUDENT's misconduct were proper and whether the District may proceed with its proposed expulsion after the due process proceedings have been completed.

18. Section 3043 defines those students who require ESY programming in the following manner:

Such individuals shall have handicaps which are likely to continue indefinitely or for a prolonged period, and interruption of the pupil's educational programming may cause regression, when coupled with limited recoupment capacity, rendering it impossible or unlikely that the pupil will attain the level of self-sufficiency and independence that would otherwise be expected in view of his or her handicapping condition. The lack of clear evidence of such factors may not be used to deny an individual an extended school year program if the individualized program team determines the need for such a program and includes extended school year in the individualized education program ... .

(Italics added.) There was no evidence that STUDENT met these requirements.

19. Additionally, if, for the sake of argument, the District's proposed IAES was considered to be its offer of FAPE for the 1999-2000 school year outside of a disciplinary context, it would fall far short of what is required to offer STUDENT a FAPE. The IAES proposed by the District -- the Poway Summit School special day class -- is a class of one, possibly two, students. This alone would constitute a denial of a FAPE since it violates the IDEA's mandate that a student be educated in the least restrictive environment. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (1997); Cal. Educ. Code § 56031 (Deering Supp. 1999).

20. Although one-on-one instruction is not required for STUDENT to receive a FAPE, it is the most efficient delivery method for providing remediation of academic skills and the best way not to consume too much of STUDENT's day in trying to make up for past denials of FAPE.

21. California law defines an adult as a person eighteen years of age or older. Cal. Family Code § 6501.