California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · August 22, 2002

Student v. Metropolitan State Hospital (California State Department of Mental Health) et al.

SEHO Case No. SN 778-02 · Hearing Officer Hee C. Kim

Metropolitan State Hospital and LACOE denied FAPE for about three years; Hearing Officer orders 30 months of compensatory services and $5,350 reimbursement.

Split decision: student prevailed on 8 of 10 issues

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Noted in the decision

Before the decision, the Hearing Officer denied a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (minute order, June 12, 2002) and a motion to stay the hearing for judicial review. The decision notes no indication that judicial review was sought. Student's post-hearing stay put request was denied as premature (minute order, August 13, 2002). The 2002 ESY dispute was resolved informally. At hearing, Student withdrew her reimbursement request for Dr. Willis's July 1998 assessment.

Summary

A 22-year-old woman living at Metropolitan State Hospital (MSH), a state psychiatric hospital, filed for due process against MSH and the Los Angeles County Office of Education (LACOE), which ran the hospital school for part of the period. She was eligible under emotional disturbance and mental retardation and made her own educational decisions. The Hearing Officer refused to dismiss or pause the case because her claims were about education, not her hospital commitment.

The Hearing Officer found that FAPE was denied from April 11, 1999 (the limitations cutoff) through the 2001-2002 school year. The months she lived elsewhere in 2000 were excluded. Her reassessments were inadequate. No one told her or her conservator that she could be considered for programs off hospital grounds. IEP teams considered only on-grounds classes, and no one reported her progress on goals. In 2000-2001 she got no instruction and no IEP meeting, because the medical team alone decided whether she could attend school. In her final year she got paper-and-pencil work instead of the functional life skills and community transition program she needed.

Respondents must hold an IEP meeting within 20 days to adopt Dr. Thomas Willis's behavior plan and a transition plan. They must carry out the plan through a nonpublic agency within 60 days and provide 30 months of compensatory services. They must also reimburse Protection & Advocacy, Inc. $5,350 for three independent assessments, plus Willis's 2002 update. Two other reimbursement requests and a neuropsychological assessment were denied.

Go to full decision

Why it matters

This decision shows how SEHO applied the IDEA to a state hospital. The hospital could not leave school decisions to the medical team, had to give notice of the right to off-grounds programs (Ed. Code 56863), and had to hold IEP meetings. It also shows compensatory education ordered past age 22 and independent assessments reimbursed to an advocacy organization.

Issues and holdings

  1. Student prevailedAssessment

    Issue 1-I. Did Respondents fail to provide FAPE and transition services in the LRE during the 1998-1999 school year (adjudicated only from April 11, 1999, because of the three-year statute of limitations, which Petitioner conceded)?

    The May 1999 triennial was inadequate, no qualified interpreter of results attended the IEP meeting, the required Ed. Code 56863 notice of the right to off-grounds programs was never given, only the on-grounds class was considered, and Respondents did not prove an appropriate program, so FAPE was denied from April 11, 1999 through 1999 ESY.

  2. Student prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue 1-II. Did Respondents fail to provide FAPE and transition services in the LRE during the 1999-2000 school year (adjudicated through April 18, 2000, when Student was discharged from MSH)?

    No IEP meeting, reliance on the inadequate 1999 assessment, no off-grounds notice or consideration, no reports on goal progress, and no response to frequent absences or sleepiness in class denied FAPE through April 18, 2000.

  3. Student prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue 1-III. Did Respondents fail to provide FAPE and transition services in the LRE during the 2000-2001 school year?

    After Student returned to MSH in September 2000, Respondents gave her no instruction and held no IEP meeting, leaving educational decisions to the medical team. This denied FAPE for the whole year, including ESY.

  4. Student prevailedTransition

    Issue 1-IV. Did Respondents fail to provide FAPE and transition services in the LRE during the 2001-2002 regular school year (excluding the 2002 ESY, which was resolved informally)?

    Despite seven IEP meetings, Respondents assessed late, added a transition plan only on October 9, 2001, gave no off-grounds notice or progress reports, and gave paper-and-pencil instruction instead of the functional life skills and community transition program she needed. She made only minimal progress, and FAPE was denied.

  5. Issue 2-I. Are Student and/or PAI entitled to reimbursement for the behavior assessments by Thomas Willis, Ph.D. (November 1999 and January 2002 update)?

    Respondents never assessed the behaviors that kept Student out of school. Dr. Willis's assessments were educational and done by a qualified assessor, so PAI gets $3,000 for 1999 and the cost of the 2002 update on proof of payment.

  6. Issue 2-II. Are Student and/or PAI entitled to reimbursement for the supported living assessment by Deborah Callahan?

    Respondents had not assessed the independent living skills Student needed for transition. Ms. Callahan's assessment was educational, and PAI is reimbursed $1,400.

  7. Issue 2-III. Are Student and/or PAI entitled to reimbursement for the psychological study by Robert Patterson, Psy.D.?

    The 1999 triennial was inappropriate and the November 2001 assessment did not address her sleepiness, so PAI is reimbursed $950 for Dr. Patterson's assessment.

  8. Issue 2-IV. Are Student and/or PAI entitled to reimbursement for the vocational assessment by Richard Rosenberg?

    No persuasive evidence showed that LACOE career education specialist Ronald Kipp's November 2001 vocational/life skills assessment was inappropriate, so reimbursement was denied.

  9. Issue 2-V. Are Student and/or PAI entitled to reimbursement for the educational assessment by Jennifer Coots, Ph.D.?

    Reimbursement was already awarded for Dr. Patterson's assessment, which included achievement testing. The Hearing Officer found no authority to fund a second achievement-focused assessment seven months later.

  10. Student prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue 3. Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education?

    Student was awarded 30 continuous months of compensatory services past age 22. These include putting Dr. Willis's behavior plan into practice through a nonpublic agency and continued transition plans. The requested neuropsychological assessment was denied, and a separate extended school day was found unnecessary.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • Order to convene IEP meeting. Within 20 calendar days of the decision, convene an IEP meeting to plan how to implement Dr. Willis's recommendations and behavior intervention plan, write them into an IEP, and develop a transition plan (ITP) with community and vocational experiences outside the classroom, training in independent and daily living skills, and a functional skills curriculum. Respondents must invite Dr. Willis at their expense.
  • Order to provide or change services. As soon as possible after the meeting and no later than 60 calendar days from the decision, implement Dr. Willis's recommendations and behavior intervention plan, with any changes the IEP team agrees to in writing. Respondents must contract with a certified nonpublic agency for the staff, using Dr. Willis's staffing ratio (2:1, later 1:1, during waking hours) unless the IEP team agrees otherwise.
  • Compensatory education. 30 continuous months of compensatory education services, starting when Respondents begin implementing the IEP from the 20-day meeting. This continues even if Student is discharged from MSH, but it does not include funding of an apartment or other residential placement.
  • Order to convene IEP meeting. Through the end of the compensatory period, convene IEP meetings to review and revise the IEP and ITP as if Student were entitled to FAPE. Consider community activities with nondisabled peers when the treatment team finds them safe. A treatment team member with authority over leaving hospital grounds must attend when community participation is considered.
  • Arrange and pay all necessary fees and transportation costs for community participation provided under the IEP and/or ITP.
  • Reimbursement. Within 30 calendar days, reimburse Protection & Advocacy, Inc. $5,350: Dr. Willis's November 1999 behavior assessment ($3,000), Ms. Callahan's supported living assessment ($1,400), and Dr. Patterson's psychological study ($950).
  • Reimbursement. Within 30 calendar days of receiving proof of payment, reimburse Protection & Advocacy, Inc. for Dr. Willis's January 2002 behavior assessment update. The amount was not stated.
  • Metropolitan State Hospital and LACOE are jointly and severally responsible for carrying out the orders.

Total: $5,350 ordered

Go to full decision

Key authorities

Rowley; W.G. v. Target Range; Clyde K. v. Puyallup; Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup; Burlington; Union School Dist. v. Smith; Gregory K. v. Longview; Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. B.S.; Lester H. v. Gilhool; Alexopulos v. San Francisco Unified; Garro v. State of Connecticut; Walczak v. Florida Union Free School Dist.

People named in the decision

  • Thomas Willis, Ph.D., independent behavior assessor; expert witness for Student, Institute for Applied Behavior Analysis (IABA)
  • Robert Patterson, Psy.D., independent licensed educational and clinical psychologist; expert witness for Student, Private practice
  • Deborah Callahan, independent supported living assessor; witness for Student, Creative Support Alternatives; Toward Maximum Independence, Inc.
  • Richard Rosenberg, independent vocational assessor; witness for Student, Whittier Union High School District (lead vocational coordinator)
  • Jennifer Coots, Ph.D., independent educational assessor; witness for Student, California State University, Long Beach
  • Ronald Kipp, career education specialist; vocational/life skills assessor, LACOE
  • Franklin Hayman, special day class teacher, Golden Vista School, MSH
  • Louis Mendoza, on-unit classroom teacher, Golden Vista School, MSH
  • Christine Bloom, former principal, Allen Young School (LACOE at MSH)
  • David Nicholson, teacher, LACOE, Allen Young School
  • Edward Kenny, teacher; 1999 triennial assessor, Allen Young School
  • David Sponder, school psychologist; 1999 triennial assessor, LACOE
  • Anita Bauer-Hook, school psychologist; behavior intervention case manager; 2001 psychoeducational assessor, LACOE
  • Rhoushelle Bozeman, senior program specialist, LACOE, Allen Young School
  • Karla Geller, transitional services consultant, LACOE
  • Maria Romero, 1:1 educational assistant, MSH
  • Purificacion Stifter, assistant chief of education, MSH
  • Eva Casas-Sarmiento, Student's former attorney; witness
  • Lorraine Viade, former adult targeted case management clinician, Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health
  • Margaret Lopez, children's social worker, Department of Children and Family Services
  • Gail Crossen, psychiatric social worker, MSH
  • Christina Barns, senior psychiatric technician, MSH
  • Nancy Mengebier, staff mental health specialist, systems of care division, California State Department of Mental Health
  • Sue Jones, unit nurse, MSH
  • Betty Hardie, Ph.D., least restrictive environment consultant, MSH
  • Zoe Trachtenberg, program manager, AB 3632 residential placement unit, Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health
  • Gurjit Dhaliwal, M.D., staff psychiatrist, MSH
  • Robert Crane, program director, MSH
  • Doug Strosnider, chief of central program services (MSH representative at hearing), MSH
  • Marilu Tiberi-Vipraio, assistant chief of program services (MSH representative at hearing), MSH
  • Gary Levin, coordinator of client rights (LACOE representative at hearing), LACOE
  • Gamze Gurbuz, Ph.D., staff psychologist; neuropsychological screening assessor, California State Department of Mental Health / MSH
  • K. Jacques, Ph.D., psychologist; 1996 assessor
  • Caroline Jones, teacher; 1996 assessor
  • Ronetta McLean, teacher; 1996 assessor
  • Pauline Wong, program or LRE coordinator
  • Kim Stone, IEP meeting attendee (role unknown)
  • Teresa Fielder, senior clerk, LACOE (assigned to MSH)
  • Ashley Gardner, Student's social worker, MSH

Get new OAH special education decisions by email

A weekly Monday-morning digest of new California OAH due process decisions, each with a short plain-English summary from Vanaman German LLP.

You'll get an email asking you to confirm. Unsubscribe anytime. Subscribing does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Hee C. Kim, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in Norwalk, California, on June 13-14 and 18-21 and July 1-3, 2002.

Petitioner STUDENT was present during portions of the hearing and was represented by Protection & Advocacy, Inc. (PAI) through attorneys Melinda Bird, Pamila Lew, and Matthew Fishler and advocate Anne Lukito. Respondent Metropolitan State Hospital (MSH) was represented at hearing by senior staff counsel Evon Dixon-Montgomery and staff counsel Cynthia Spencer-Ayres from the California State Department of Mental Health (DMH). Also present on MSH’s behalf during portions of the hearing were Doug Strosnider, the chief of central program services, and Marilu Tiberi-Vipraio, the assistant chief of program services. Respondent Los Angeles County Office of Education (LACOE) was represented at the hearing by Kelly Rozmus, its assistant general counsel. Also present on behalf of LACOE was Dr. Gary Levin, the coordinator of client rights.

The following witnesses were called: Robert Patterson, Psy.D., a licensed educational and clinical psychologist; Thomas Willis, Ph.D., associate director of the Institute for Applied Behavior Analysis; Ronald Kipp, the LACOE career education specialist assigned to MSH; Franklin Hayman, an MSH teacher assigned to the Golden Vista School (GVS) at MSH; Richard Rosenberg, lead vocational coordinator for the Whittier Union High School District; Deborah Callahan, co-director of Creative Support Alternatives and a case management consultant for Toward Maximum Independence, Inc.; Jennifer Coots, Ph.D., an associate professor at the California State University at Long Beach, department of educational psychology, administration, and counseling; Dr. Christine Bloom, the former principal of the Allen Young School (AYS) at MSH; Eva Casas-Sarmiento, STUDENT’s former attorney; Purificacion Stifter, MSH’s assistant chief of education; Lorraine Viade, a former adult targeted case management services clinician for the Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health (LACMH); Louis Mendoza, an MSH teacher assigned to GVS; David Nicholson, a LACOE teacher formerly assigned to AYS; Anita Bauer-Hook, a LACOE school psychologist assigned to MSH; Rhoushelle Bozeman, LACOE’s senior program specialist assigned to AYS; Karla Geller, a LACOE transitional services consultant; Maria Romero, the educational assistant assigned to STUDENT at MSH; Margaret Lopez, a children’s social worker with the Department of Children and Family Services; Gail Crossen, an MSH psychiatric social worker; Christina Barns, an MSH senior psychiatric technician; Nancy Mengebier, staff mental health specialist with the systems of care division, DMH; Sue Jones, an MSH unit nurse; Betty Hardie, Ph.D., a least restrictive environment consultant for MSH; Zoe Trachtenberg, program manager for the AB3632 residential placement unit, LACMH; Gurjit Dhaliwal, M.D., an MSH staff psychiatrist; and Robert Crane, an MSH program director.

Oral and documentary evidence was received. The record was held open for the submission of written closing arguments. After the parties’ written closing arguments were received, the record was closed and the matter submitted for decision.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR HEARING

1. Did Respondents fail to provide STUDENT with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) and transition services in the least restrictive environment during the 1998-1999, 1999-2000, 2000-2001, and 2001-2002 school years (excluding the 2002 extended school year session)?

2. Are STUDENT and/or Protection & Advocacy, Inc. (PAI) entitled to reimbursement for assessments conducted by Thomas Willis, Ph.D., Deborah Callahan, Robert Patterson, Psy.D., Richard Rosenberg, and Jennifer Coots, Ph.D.?

3. Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education?

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

I. Motion to Dismiss Case

On June 5, 2002, the Hearing Office received a motion to dismiss this case with prejudice from LACOE. LACOE contended that this case should be dismissed because Petitioner raised issues outside the jurisdiction of the Hearing Office. LACOE asserted that Petitioner’s allegations concerned medical issues, including her hospitalization at MSH, that are subject to review under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPSA) due to her conservatee status but are not subject to review under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). LACOE argued that Petitioner was requesting a change of placement that was outside the scope of the IDEA, and that the LPSA process was the only process available to change a conservatee’s placement. On June 11, MSH joined in LACOE’s motion to dismiss. MSH agreed with LACOE that the issues raised by Petitioner were medical in nature and therefore outside the jurisdiction of the Hearing Office. MSH also contended that Petitioner was seeking monetary damages and that such relief was outside the Hearing Office’s jurisdiction.

Also on June 11, Petitioner filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss. Petitioner denied that she was challenging her placement at MSH. She agreed that she had been placed properly at MSH by her conservator and that only her conservator could make the decision for her to reside at a different facility. Petitioner argued that her allegations concerned the educational services she had been provided during the past three years and her need for continuing educational services. Petitioner asserted that her issues and proposed resolutions were educational in nature and therefore within the jurisdiction of the Hearing Office.

By minute order dated June 12, 2002, the Hearing Officer denied the motion to dismiss. On June 13, the first day of hearing, the Hearing Officer explained that Petitioner had raised educational issues, such as the appropriateness of the instructional and transition services that had been provided to her in the past, that were within the jurisdiction of the Hearing Office pursuant to Education Code § 56501. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). The Hearing Officer noted that should Respondents believe that any particular allegation or proposed resolution was outside the jurisdiction of the Hearing Office, Respondents remained free to present evidence and/or arguments to support their positions through the hearing process.

MSH then moved to stay the hearing process so that it could seek judicial review of the Hearing Officer’s denial of the motion to dismiss. LACOE joined in the request for a stay. Petitioner opposed the motion. After hearing the parties’ arguments, the Hearing Officer denied the motion to stay the hearing process. The Hearing Officer stated that MSH’s desire to seek judicial review of the ruling did not constitute good cause for a continuance, as required by Education Code § 56505(f). The Hearing Officer indicated that the hearing would proceed as scheduled but that Respondents remained free to seek judicial review of the denial of the motion to dismiss. There was no subsequent indication that judicial review was sought.

II. Motion for a Stay Put Order

On August 2, 2002, after the hearing in this matter had concluded, Petitioner submitted a request for a stay put order. She requested that the Hearing Officer issue a stay put order requiring Respondents to maintain her in her current educational placement with the support of a one-to-one behavioral aide until the final decision in this matter was implemented. Petitioner stated that she was concerned that Respondents might discontinue her services pending implementation of the decision.

On August 6, LACOE submitted a request that it be “dismissed” from the stay put issue because it has not been involved in providing any of the services at issue in Petitioner’s stay put motion. LACOE also argued that any stay put order issued should be effective only until a written decision was issued by the Hearing Office. On August 12, MSH filed an opposition to the stay put motion. MSH argued that the request was untimely, was inconsistent with the stay put provision, and could be viewed as conflicting with the authority of the conservator to make placement decisions for STUDENT.

On August 13, the Hearing Officer issued a minute order denying Petitioner’s request for a stay put order because the request was premature. The stay put provision entitles a child with a disability to remain in his or her then-current educational placement pending resolution of the due process hearing procedures, absent an agreement by the parties otherwise. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j); Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(d). The purpose of stay put is to ensure some stability in a disabled child’s school placement pending resolution of the due process proceedings. Stacy G. v. Pasadena Independent School Dist., 695 F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1983); Zvi D. v. Gordon Ambach, 694 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1982). The Hearing Officer noted in the minute order that STUDENT had never received year-round educational services and, although the extended school year session ended the first week of August, there was no indication that the regular school year had started yet. Therefore, maintenance of the status quo would not require Respondents to provide educational services to her when school was not in session. There was no showing that it had become necessary to issue a stay put order to address the 2002-2003 regular school year session.

BACKGROUND FACTS

STUDENT is a twenty-two-year-old student who presently is identified as eligible for special education and related services under the categories of emotional disturbance (ED) and mental retardation. She turned twenty-two on March 14, 2002, and presently is hospitalized at Metropolitan State Hospital (MSH), a licensed acute care psychiatric hospital operated by the California State Department of Mental Health (DMH). STUDENT has been civilly conserved since March 1994, when she was fourteen years old, but holds the right to make educational decisions on her own behalf.

At the age of two, STUDENT was removed from her mother’s home because of alleged physical and sexual abuse. She was subsequently placed in the home of her stepfather’s ex-wife, but was also removed from this home at the age of four because of alleged neglect. Thereafter, STUDENT was placed in various foster homes, group homes and, beginning February 1986, psychiatric hospitals. The majority of STUDENT’s young life has been spent in psychiatric hospitals.

STUDENT was first admitted to MSH on June 9, 1997, when she was transferred from Camarillo State Hospital and Developmental Center (Camarillo), because Camarillo was closing its children’s unit. At Camarillo, she had been attending the on-grounds school pursuant to an individualized education program (IEP). Upon her transfer to MSH, STUDENT was placed in the special day class (SDC) at the 4th Street Learning Center, MSH’s on-grounds school. Her diagnoses upon admission were conduct disorder, dysthymia, and personality disorder not otherwise specified (NOS) with paranoid, antisocial, and borderline traits.

STUDENT remained placed in the 4th Street Learning Center for the 1997-1998 school year, including the 1998 extended school year (ESY). Assessments performed by MSH staff that year indicated that on her unit STUDENT was engaging in severely maladaptive behaviors including frequent temper tantrums, defiance, teasing and bullying, assaultive and aggressive behaviors, verbal abuse, self-injurious behaviors, and property destruction. According to the IEPs and school reports generated that year, STUDENT was also engaging in frequent temper tantrums and assaultive and self injurious behaviors in the classroom setting. By the end of the school year, however, STUDENT’s teacher reported that her behavior and attitude in the classroom had improved greatly, as had her grades. For the fourth quarter of the 1997-1998 school year, STUDENT received B pluses in literature and math and a B in independent living skills/reading. STUDENT’s teacher noted that her absences during the fourth quarter (eleven in literature and eight in math and reading) had affected the credits she earned that quarter.

STUDENT turned eighteen years old on March 14, 1998, during the last semester of the 1997-1998 school year, and, pursuant to MSH policy, was expected to be transferred out of the adolescent unit at MSH. However, because of concerns about the appropriateness of the adult unit at MSH for STUDENT in light of her social-emotional immaturity and low cognitive functioning, her representatives from Protection & Advocacy, Incorporated (PAI) obtained a restraining order to keep her in the adolescent unit past her eighteenth birthday. On March 17, 1998, the Los Angeles County Superior Court (Court) ordered MSH to maintain STUDENT in its adolescent unit until a more appropriate placement could be found or September 15, 1998, whichever occurred first. Neither the PAI representatives nor MSH staff were able to locate another facility willing or able to take STUDENT. STUDENT eventually relented and agreed to be transferred to the adult unit at MSH on June 25, 1998.

A few days later, on June 30, the Court issued an order that the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) facilitate STUDENT’s participation in community orientation outings at least twice a week and provide her with a staff member if necessary. DCFS also was ordered to evaluate, along with MSH, whether more community orientation outings were medically necessary.

Shortly thereafter, on July 3, a behavior assessment report and proposed behavior intervention plan (BIP) were completed by Thomas Willis, Ph.D., associate director of the Institute for Applied Behavior Analysis (IABA). Dr. Willis had been asked to perform the assessment by STUDENT’s PAI attorney to devise a plan to reintegrate STUDENT into the community. Dr. Willis’s report was shared with MSH at a multidisciplinary meeting with medical and school staff present. Dr. Willis’s BIP was not adopted by MSH for implementation with STUDENT.

The transition to the adult unit was a difficult one for STUDENT. She reacted with a great deal of frustration and anger at being placed in the adult unit, exhibiting frequent self-injurious and assaultive behaviors towards peers and staff on the unit for months after the transition.

STUDENT did not attend school during most of the 1998-1999 school year. According to her IEP dated April 15, 1999, STUDENT stopped attending school in August 1998 and did not resume attending school until March 1, 1999. When she did begin attending school again, she attended only half days pursuant to her doctor’s orders. She attended the Allen Young School (AYS), another on-grounds school at MSH that served adult students. AYS was operated at the time by LACOE pursuant to a contract between LACOE and MSH. STUDENT’s April 15 IEP indicates that she was placed at AYS and received rehabilitation therapy from MSH. The IEP noted that AYS was the least restrictive environment (LRE) for STUDENT because of her high-risk behaviors, including mood swings, flight risk, uncontrollable outbursts, and self-injurious and assaultive behaviors. The IEP also noted that she frequently stated that she could not or would not do any schoolwork but with one-to-one assistance usually would work, although reluctantly, for about ten minutes before needing a change in task. Finally, the IEP indicated that STUDENT’s performance had been very sporadic because the number of absences (eight absences out of twenty-four days enrolled) and emotional behaviors.

According to a report completed a month later on May 18, 1999, by STUDENT’s teacher, Edward Kenny, STUDENT had attended school an average of three half-days per week by May 18th. An IEP prepared for STUDENT two days later on May 20, 1999, notes that STUDENT was expected by that date to attend full days of school, but that home teaching would be available to her when her doctors indicated that she could not attend school due to medical reasons. In STUDENT’s final report card for the 1998-1999 regular school year, Mr. Kenny reported that STUDENT needed to work on improving her daily school attendance and that her total time in class did not qualify for five credits in any subject. STUDENT did not receive any academic credits for the 1998-1999 school year.

For the 1999-2000 school year, STUDENT remained placed at AYS.

On November 30, 1999, at PAI’s request, Dr. Willis completed an updated assessment of STUDENT’s behavior to determine if any changes needed to be made to his proposed BIP in light of STUDENT’s transfer to the adult unit at MSH. Dr. Willis found that STUDENT’s behavioral needs had remained essentially the same and repeated the majority of his recommendations from his 1998 assessment report, including his proposed BIP. Again, the proposed BIP was not adopted by AYS or MSH.

By the conclusion of the third quarter of the 1999-2000 school year, STUDENT’s teacher, David Nicholson, reported that STUDENT was doing well and had improved her school attendance. Mr. Nicholson awarded her Bs in all subjects for the third quarter.

Shortly thereafter, on April 19, 2000, STUDENT was discharged from MSH to La Casa Mental Health Rehabilitation Center (La Casa), a locked institution for mental disease (IMD) in Long Beach, California. She had made significant progress at MSH in decreasing the incidence of behaviors that were dangerous to herself and others, and had been able to remain out of seclusion and restraints (S&R) for approximately three months. However, her stay at La Casa was to be short-lived. While at La Casa, STUDENT reportedly engaged in self-injurious and destructive behaviors that the facility was unable to manage. On August 17, 2000, STUDENT was transferred from La Casa to Penn Mar Therapeutic Center (Penn Mar). She had broken through the gates at La Casa and run into the street, and had lain under a parked truck and then in the middle of the street.

On September 12, 2000, STUDENT was readmitted to MSH from Penn Mar. She had some difficulty readjusting to the routine at MSH and displayed some acting out behaviors and required S&R on several occasions. Upon her readmission to MSH, she reportedly continued to have difficulty with impulse control, frustration tolerance, and anger management, as well as mood lability in response to external stimuli and in relation to her problems with impulse control. She also continued to be very child-like in presentation, throwing temper tantrums and banging on walls. STUDENT was diagnosed at the time with schizoaffective disorder (bipolar type), borderline personality disorder, and mild mental retardation (MMR).

STUDENT did not attend school during the 2000-2001 school year. She also did not receive any educational instruction on her treatment unit, such as home instruction on the unit, during the 2000-2001 school year. On January 18, 2001, Teresa Fielder, a senior LACOE clerk assigned to work with MSH’s assistant chief of education, wrote a note that STUDENT was not fit for school at the time and that a waiver would be obtained. On February 20, 2001, STUDENT’s doctor wrote that STUDENT was incapable of attending school. Four months later on June 6, 2001, STUDENT’s social worker, Ashley Gardner, informed the school that STUDENT was ready for school. However, this finding of school-readiness was revoked a month later on July 16, 2001, when Ms. Gardner informed Ms. Fielder that STUDENT was not school ready but that perhaps home teaching should be considered. No IEP meetings were held for STUDENT during the 2000-2001 school year.

On September 6, 2001, STUDENT’s IEP team met to discuss her placement for the 2001-2002 school year. The team agreed to placement in the off-unit SDC at Golden Vista School (GVS), an on-grounds school operated by MSH for adult students, for five hours per day “as tolerated.” The team noted that this would be STUDENT’s last year of special education services because she was turning twenty-two years old in March 2002.

In October 2001, Deborah Callahan, co-director of Creative Support Alternatives and a case management consultant for Toward Maximum Independence, Inc., conducted a supported living assessment for STUDENT at PAI’s request. Ms. Callahan described STUDENT as charming and engaging, a survivor who remained able to look forward and dream about her future. Ms. Callahan also described some of STUDENT’s many interests, including music, art, and dance, and her desire to continue with her education. Ms. Callahan noted that STUDENT longed to live in the community, preferably in her own apartment, and that STUDENT’s PAI advocates wanted to explore the option further. Ms. Callahan developed a sample budget and support configuration for someone living in the community with needs similar to STUDENT’s.

On October 9, 2001, another IEP meeting was held for STUDENT. The team noted that her placement was in the SDC at GVS with individual and group therapy. The team also noted that STUDENT’s school attendance had been limited because of her behavior on the unit–behaviors that were dangerous to self and others. According to information collected by school psychologist Anita Bauer-Hook shortly before the meeting, STUDENT had not been attending school regularly during September 2001 but her attendance recently had improved. This improvement in attendance was attributed to the fact that there had been some improvement in STUDENT’s behavior, as well as to the unit staff’s recent leniency in allowing STUDENT off the unit to attend school as long as she had one restraint-free day (as compared to the usual rule that the patient must have had at least three restraint-free days). Ms. Bauer-Hook reported that she observed STUDENT engaging in physical aggression toward others and property destruction on the unit, and that she had been informed that these behaviors were leading to a need for S&R more than one time per week. STUDENT’s teacher, Franklin Hayman, reported to Ms. Bauer-Hook that STUDENT was not demonstrating any behavioral difficulties while at school. Ms. Bauer-Hook presented to the team an individualized behavior support plan she developed for STUDENT, and recommended that the interventions contained in the plan be promoted in the unit and school settings as similarly as possible. During the October 9 meeting, the team agreed that both clinical and educational staff would work together to get STUDENT to attend school on a regular basis, and that the nursing staff assessment criteria for school attendance would look only at STUDENT’s behavior that day and not her behavior during past days. The team also agreed that home instruction would be provided to STUDENT if she were unable to attend school for more than one day and her advocate requested “more time to achieve FAPE (free appropriate public education) until she [was] ready to attend regular school.”

The third IEP meeting held during the 2001-2002 school year occurred on November 6, 2001, and was convened to address concerns raised by STUDENT’s representatives. In the IEP, STUDENT’s placement was described as the off-unit SDC at GVS with group art therapy two times per week and psychotherapy one time per week. STUDENT’s representatives requested that she be provided with a one-to-one assistant, as recommended by Dr. Willis in his reports, to help in the classroom and increase her chances of getting a job through the industrial therapy (IT) program at MSH. The team agreed to provide a one-to-one assistant to STUDENT in the classroom and in the work place. Additionally, the team agreed that a behavior-based approach was more helpful to STUDENT at the time, and that an updated functional assessment of STUDENT’s behavioral needs would be conducted. The team also agreed that home teaching would continue for those times when STUDENT was unable to make it to school and that, if the team were considering a change of classrooms, staff first would call STUDENT’s attorney to obtain consent.

Later that same month, on November 26, another IEP meeting was held. This time, the team reviewed a psychoeducational assessment conducted by Ms. Bauer-Hook and a vocational/life skills assessment by Ronald Kipp, the LACOE career education specialist assigned to MSH. At this meeting, STUDENT’s placement was described as the off-unit SDC at GVS with individual and group therapy. It was reported at the meeting that STUDENT’s school attendance in the mornings had greatly improved but that her afternoon attendance still needed improvement. The team agreed that the unit supervisor and the MSH treatment team would coordinate with school staff to assist with afternoon attendance, and that a packet of school work would go to the unit with STUDENT before lunch in case she did not make it back to school in the afternoons. Additionally, because a permanent educational assistant had not yet been identified, it was agreed that MSH nursing staff would assist STUDENT in the classroom until a permanent assistant could be identified. Finally, according to the IEP, Ms. Gardner suggested that the team make a referral for an IT assignment but the team agreed that STUDENT’s afternoon school attendance had to be improved before an IT assignment could be considered.

Shortly thereafter, on December 13, 2001, DMH staff psychologist Gamze Gurbuz, Ph.D., completed a neuropsychological assessment of STUDENT. Dr. Gurbuz concluded that there had been some improvement in problem behaviors since DMH’s psychological assessment in 1998, and that the behaviors currently seen were challenging but not nearly as disruptive as those seen in 1998.

In January 2002, a behavior evaluation update was completed by Dr. Willis. He found that STUDENT’s behaviors and their functions had remained essentially the same, and that the recommendations contained in his November 1999 report therefore continued to be valid. As with his previous assessments, Dr. Willis provided an insightful picture into the pleasant but troubled young woman STUDENT has become. He described STUDENT as charming and warm, characteristics which were apparent to the Hearing Officer during her interactions with STUDENT at hearing. STUDENT was able to readily share her thoughts and feelings with Dr. Willis, and related to him that she wanted to learn to read, write, and spell and live in her own apartment. Dr. Willis stated in his report that he continued to believe that STUDENT’s problem behaviors served a communicative function–and therefore could be addressed through behavior interventions–and that there was nothing endemic to STUDENT’s behavior that would prevent her from participating in community-based services.

Also completed during January 2002, at PAI’s request, was a psychological study by Robert Patterson, Psy.D., a licensed educational and clinical psychologist. Dr. Patterson diagnosed STUDENT with a cognitive disorder, not otherwise specified (NOS), learning disorder NOS, mood disorder NOS, psychotic disorder NOS, and mild mental retardation. Dr. Patterson found that STUDENT had the skills and training of a person who had been institutionalized for most of her life, and that she had shown a steady decline in intellectual functioning since the age of six, most likely due to repeated trauma caused by her self-injurious behaviors. He also found that STUDENT’s historical testing record failed to show even reasonable progress in achievement through the years. He attributed STUDENT’s failure to progress to the teaching methodologies that have been used with her and a failure to provide her with functional living skills, as well as to her mental illness. Dr. Patterson recommended that PAI seek compensatory services for STUDENT. He determined that STUDENT could learn to function in the real world if she was provided with appropriate staffing and positive behavioral interventions.

On January 31, 2002, yet another IEP meeting was held for STUDENT. The IEP from this meeting identified STUDENT’s placement as the GVS on-unit classroom. It was reported at the meeting that STUDENT’s school attendance had improved greatly, that she had not been sent back to the unit for any type of behavior, and that she participated in class work. It was also reported that the educational assistant was available to redirect STUDENT to more positive behavior when she was agitated, and helped STUDENT concentrate on her work. The team agreed that the one-to-one educational assistant should continue to work with STUDENT. Finally, STUDENT’s attorneys from PAI requested that STUDENT be provided with compensatory education services past her twenty-second birthday. They reported that two assessments had recommended the provision of two assistants to help STUDENT function in the community, and asked that compensatory education funds be used to pay for one of the assistants. The team agreed that the compensatory education claim would be considered by the team at the next IEP meeting.

On March 25, 2002, a speech-language screening was completed for STUDENT. This screening had been recommended by Ms. Bauer-Hook at the November 26, 2001, IEP meeting in order to “clarify” concerns regarding language processing. According to STUDENT’s January 31, 2002 IEP, the speech therapist had attempted to complete the screening on a prior occasion but STUDENT had not been having “a good day.” The speech therapist reported that on March 25 STUDENT was very uncooperative and refused to engage in testing, stating that she washaving a bad day and was hallucinating. STUDENT’s one-to-one assistant reported to the therapist that STUDENT was able to follow directions, answer questions about a story, and recall information. The therapist noted that she was able to understand STUDENT easily. The therapist concluded that STUDENT appeared to be functioning within the range of the classroom curriculum and did not qualify for speech-language services.

On March 25, 2002, STUDENT’s IEP team met again. The team noted that STUDENT remained placed in the on-unit classroom and was eligible for ESY services. The team reported that STUDENT began an IT assignment four days prior and would be participating in the program two times per week, an hour each time. STUDENT’s representatives requested that the team approve compensatory education services for STUDENT that would transition her to an outside facility and extend her education to a community-school setting. Her representatives reported to the team that they were working with DMH to transition STUDENT out of MSH and into an independent living situation. They reported that the target date for the transition was September 2002.

The day after this meeting, on March 26, PAI attorney Melinda Bird wrote a letter to Purificacion Stifter, MSH’s assistant chief of education. Ms. Bird outlined the reasons behind the request for compensatory education and argued that STUDENT was entitled to compensatory education because she had not been provided with a FAPE since she came to MSH in 1997. Specifically, Ms. Bird asserted that since 1997 MSH and/or LACOE had failed to implement the BIP developed by Dr. Willis, to provide a one-to-one behavioral aide, and to provide appropriate transition services. Ms. Bird also requested that MSH and/or LACOE reimburse the student and her representatives for the independent assessments that had been obtained on STUDENT’s behalf. On May 9, 2002, STUDENT’s seventh and final IEP meeting for the 2001-2002 school year was held. At the time, STUDENT was still placed in the GVS on-unit classroom. The team came to the following agreements with regard to the 2002 ESY program for STUDENT: she would be provided a behavior aide six hours per school day, a sixty-minute individual therapy session per week, two sixty-minute art therapy sessions per week, six hours per week of an independent living skills program, four hours per week of an IT/vocational program, one hour per day of physical education (PE) so long as she was physically cleared to participate and chose to participate in such activities, and (depending on the scheduling of her other activities) a partial day for academic instruction. Additionally, the team agreed that the criteria for determining whether to allow STUDENT to attend school would be based on her behavior during that particular day, and agreed to provide for the services of an adapted physical education (APE) consultant. The team did not come to an agreement with regard to the request for compensatory education services.

Finally, on July 5, 2002, psychologist Jennifer Coots, Ph.D., completed an educational assessment for STUDENT at PAI’s request. Dr. Coots found that STUDENT’s condition represented a complex interplay between early medical problems, abuse, a history of institutional care, and limited educational opportunities. Dr. Coots concluded that STUDENT’s records showed a pattern of limited meaningful progress in, or attention to, the development of functional and critical skills; frequent teacher and program changes; varied educational and psychiatric labels; little use of positive behavior support strategies; little opportunity to participate with nondisabled peer models; and limited access to activities in natural community environments. Dr. Coots believed that the pattern of difficulties noted in STUDENT’s records provided support for the compensatory education request. Dr. Coots reported that, for STUDENT to develop a repertoire of functional, age appropriate skills, she would need exposure to a curriculum that moves beyond classroom walls and infuses academic instruction into activities that are personally meaningful for STUDENT. In other words, STUDENT required a community-based approach or positive programming approach.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

ISSUE NO. 1: Did Respondents fail to provide STUDENT with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) and transition services in the least restrictive environment during the 1998-1999, 1999-2000, 2000-2001, and 2001-2002 school years (excluding the 2002 extended school year session)?

Pursuant to the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and State special education law, all students with disabilities are entitled to a free appropriate public education (FAPE) that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepares them for employment and independent living. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56000. A disabled student’s right to a FAPE is not abrogated or diminished because the student resides in a state hospital such as MSH. Cal. Educ. Code § 56852. The state hospital in which the student resides is responsible for ensuring that the student is provided with a FAPE. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 4011.5.

The term “free appropriate public education” means special education and related services that are available to a student at no charge to his or her parent or guardian, meet the standards of the State educational agency, include appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education, and are provided in conformity with the student’s individualized education program (IEP). 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8). An IEP is a written statement that must be developed, reviewed, and revised for each student with a disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A); Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56343, 56345. The IEP must include, among other things, a statement of the special education and related services to be provided to meet the student’s needs that result from his or her disability to enable the student to be involved in and progress in the general curriculum, and to be educated and participate with nondisabled students to the maximum extent possible. Id.; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56031, 56345. Beginning at age fourteen, the IEP must also include a statement of the student’s transition service needs. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(vii); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345.1(a).

In Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley (1982) 458 U.S. 176, 200, 102 S. Ct. 3034, the United States Supreme Court determined that a student’s IEP must be reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit to satisfy the IDEA, but that the school district is not required to provide the student with the best education available or instruction and services that maximize the student’s abilities. Id. at 198-200. The Court held that a school district is required to provide only a “basic floor of opportunity” consisting of access to specialized instruction and related services that are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the student. Id. at 201. Consequently, an appropriate public education does not mean the absolute best or “potential-maximizing” education for the student. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. B.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1996); Union Sch. Dist. V. Smith, 15 F.3d 1994, 1524 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 965 (1994). Moreover, the focus of the inquiry is not on whether the student may obtain greater benefit in the placement that is preferred by the parents but, rather, whether the school district’s proposed placement is reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit to the student. Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987).

The Supreme Court in Rowley also recognized the importance of adherence to the procedural requirements of the IDEA. Id. at 205. States are required to establish and maintain certain procedural safeguards to ensure that each student with a disability receives the FAPE to which he/she is entitled and that parents are involved in the formulation of the student’s educational program. W.G. v. Bd. of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992). Procedural flaws do not automatically require a finding of a denial of a FAPE, but procedural violations that result in loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringe on the parent’s opportunity to participate in the IEP process may constitute a FAPE denial. W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484; see also Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 994 (1st Cir. 1990).

Accordingly, the analysis of whether a child has been provided a FAPE is twofold, requiring the Hearing Officer to consider both whether procedural steps were followed and whether the proposed program was substantively appropriate. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-207. Petitioner advanced a multitude of arguments, both procedural and substantive in nature, to support her allegation that Respondents failed to provide her with a FAPE during the 1998-1999, 1999-2000, 2000-2001, and 2001-2002 school years. While the Hearing Officer found that the evidence in this case supported many of Petitioner’s claims, Respondents’ failures are too numerous for them all to be recounted in detail. This Decision will address only the most egregious of these failures.

I. The 1998-1999 School Year

During the prehearing conference held on June 10, 2002, the Hearing Officer noted that a three-year statute of limitations applied to special education due process hearing claims and that Petitioner had filed her request for a due process hearing on April 10, 2002. See Cal. Educ. Code § 56043(p); Alexopulos v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 551, 555 (9th Cir. 1987). Petitioner agreed that the statute of limitations therefore precluded the raising of any claims that arose prior to April 11, 1999. Consequently, this Decision will adjudicate Petitioner’s FAPE claim for the 1998-1999 school year only with respect to the period of April 11, 1999, to the end of the 1998-1999 school year.

A. Procedural Safeguards

Petitioner contended that among the procedural violations committed during the 1998-1999 school year was that Respondents failed to develop, review, and revise STUDENT’s IEPs based on appropriate assessment data. Prior to the initial provision of special education and related services to a student with a disability, a local educational agency (LEA) must conduct a full and individual initial evaluation of the student. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56320. Reevaluations of the student must be conducted if conditions warrant a reevaluation or if the parent or teacher requests a reevaluation, but at least once every three years. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56381(a). In developing a student’s IEP, the IEP team must take into consideration the student’s most recent evaluation. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(A)(ii); Cal. Educ. Code § 56341.1(a)(2).

Both initial evaluations and reevaluations must adhere to requirements enumerated in the IDEA and State special education law. STUDENT was initially identified as a student with a disability as early as 1993. Accordingly, this analysis will focus only on the requirements applicable to reevaluations. Reevaluations must be conducted by individuals who are both “knowledgeable of the student’s disability” and “competent to perform the assessment, as determined by the school district, county office, or special education local plan area.” Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56320(g), 56322; see 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3)(B)(ii). A psychological assessment must be performed by a credentialed school psychologist. Cal. Educ. Code § 56324. Further, the tests and assessment materials must be validated for the specific purpose for which they are used; must be selected and administered so as not to be racially, culturally or sexually discriminatory; must be provided and administered in the student’s primary language or other mode of communication unless this is clearly not feasible; and must be administered by trained personnel in conformance with the instructions provided by the producer of such tests. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2), (3); Cal. Educ. Code § 56320(a), (b). Additionally, the student must be assessed in all areas related to his or her suspected disability, and no single procedure may be used as the sole criterion for determining whether the student has a disability or an appropriate educational program for the student. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2), (3); Cal. Educ. Code § 56320(e), (f).

At the time STUDENT’s IEP team met on April 15, 1999, the most recent educational evaluation appears to have been conducted in May 1996 by psychologist K. Jacques, Ph.D., and teachers Caroline Jones and Ronetta McLean. Neither Dr. Jacques, Ms. Jones, nor Ms. McLean testified at the hearing in this matter to establish that they were qualified to assess STUDENT, that she was administered assessments in accordance with test instructions, that they assessed her in all areas related to the suspected disability, or that the assessment they conducted was otherwise appropriate. Further, none of the persons who did testify vouched for the appropriateness of the evaluation. Additionally, a review of the reports generated shows that the 1996 evaluation did not meet the requirements governing reevaluations. The resulting assessment reports were, by any measure, spare. In the reports’ sparseness, they omit critical information that is required to be included in assessment reports, such as whether STUDENT needed special education and related services; the basis for such a determination; the educationally relevant health, development, and medical findings; and because she was determined to have a learning disability, whether there was such a discrepancy between achievement and ability that it could not be corrected without special education and related services. See Cal. Educ. Code § 56327.

LACOE conducted a triennial reevaluation for STUDENT in May 1999 prior to the IEP meeting held on May 20, 1999. The 1999 reevaluation was conducted by school psychologist David Sponder and teacher Edward Kenny. As with the 1996 reevaluation, there is no evidence that the 1999 reevaluation was appropriate. Neither Mr. Sponder nor Mr. Kenny testified at the hearing to establish that they were qualified to perform the evaluation or that the evaluation was appropriate, and none of the witnesses called at hearing testified that the evaluation was appropriate. Additionally, although the IEP team was entitled to determine that no further assessment data was needed in 1999, there is no indication in the documentary evidence or witness testimony that such a determination was made or, if it was, the basis for such a determination. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(c)(1)(B); Cal. Educ. Code § 56381(b)(2). In any event, as the Hearing Officer found above, the last triennial reevaluation had been inappropriate and therefore could not have been used as a basis for relieving Respondents of the obligation to conduct a complete triennial reevaluation to obtain the necessary assessment data in 1999. Accordingly, a complete reevaluation should have been conducted in 1999. The evidence, however, shows that this was not the case.

In conducting a reevaluation, the LEA is required to use a variety of assessment tools and strategies to gather relevant functional and developmental information; may not use any single procedure as the sole criterion for determining whether a student is a student with a disability or determining an appropriate educational program for the student; and is required to use technically sound instruments that may assess the relative contribution of cognitive and behavioral factors, in addition to physical or developmental factors. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2); Cal. Educ. Code § 56320(a). LACOE’s 1999 reevaluation did not include any assessment tools or “technically sound instruments” except the Wide Range Achievement Test (WRAT), which was administered by Mr. Kenny. The assessment reports were sparse–Mr. Sponder’s assessment report consisted of four and a half pages, Mr. Kenny’s consisted of one handwritten page. Given that STUDENT was a student who tested in the borderline range of intellectual functioning, had never performed above the third-grade level in any academic area despite being nineteen years old, had been institutionalized since the age of six, carried multiple psychiatric diagnoses, had not received any educational services for almost an entire school year, and had needs in every area of development, it is astonishing that a triennial reevaluation of her could be so devoid of information vital to an IEP team when identifying a student’s needs and developing an appropriate program for the student. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that LACOE’s 1999 reevaluation failed to meet the requirements for a triennial reevaluation.

Additionally, there is no evidence that required personnel were present when the 1999 reevaluation was reviewed at an IEP meeting on May 20, 1999. The members present at the meeting on May 20 were Dr. Christine Bloom, the principal of the Allen Young School (AYS) from August 1998 to about July 2001; Mr. Kenny; Pauline Wong, a program or least restrictive environment (LRE) coordinator; Gail Crossen, STUDENT’s psychiatric social worker; Kim Stone, whose relationship to STUDENT is unknown to the Hearing Officer; and STUDENT herself. There is no evidence that any of these individuals was qualified to interpret the instructional implications of the assessment results, as required by Education Code § 56341(b)(5). As noted by the federal regulations issued that same month, the IEP team reviewing the evaluation data should include a qualified professional to ensure that the group making the eligibility and programming decisions includes an individual with the knowledge and skills necessary to interpret the evaluation data and make an informed determination as to whether the student has a disability and whether the student needs special education and related services. 34 C.F.R. Part 300, Att. A, p. 12635.

Petitioner also contended that Respondents failed to provide her or her conservator with the notice required by California Education Code § 56863. Section 56863 requires state hospitals, as part of the written parent notification of IDEA rights, to notify parents “of the right that their child can be considered for education programs other than on state hospital grounds.” Cal. Educ. Code § 56863. The section specifically defines the term “parent” to include a conservator. Id. When a student turns eighteen years old (STUDENT was nineteen years old by April 1999), the right to make educational decisions generally is transferred from a parent to the student. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(m)(1)(B); Cal. Educ. Code § 56041.5. However, the LEA’s obligation to provide notification of parental rights continues to extend to the parent, as well as to the student, past a student’s eighteenth birthday. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(m)(1)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56041.5.

None of the parents’ right notices submitted into evidence contains the notification required by Section 56863. Additionally, Dr. Bloom testified that AYS did not have a written document that informed a parent or conservator of the student’s right to be considered for placement in an off-grounds school. The significance of a failure to inform Petitioner and her conservator of her right to be considered for placement in an off-grounds school is apparent, given that the main focus of this case was whether STUDENT’s education has been provided in the least restrictive environment (LRE) and included any necessary community involvement.

Moreover, the failure to inform STUDENT and her conservator of her right to be considered for placement in an off-grounds school was compounded by the failure of the IEP team to actually consider a program other than the off-unit, on-grounds SDC. As with all other students with disabilities, students in state hospitals are to be educated in the least restrictive environment and have available to them a full continuum of educational services. Cal. Educ. Code § 56850. In fact, the legislature expressly has indicated its intent that, to the maximum extent appropriate, students residing in state hospitals be provided services in the community near the state hospital and in the LRE. Cal. Educ. Code § 56850. The only option considered by the IEP team for STUDENT’s placement during the 1998-1999 school year was the off-unit SDC at AYS. In fact, the record discloses that there was no discussion of placement in any other educational placement either on the grounds of the hospital (such as the on-grounds general education class) or off the grounds of the hospital. The only question considered by the team was whether she was ready to go back to the off-unit SDC at AYS.

Dr. Bloom testified that the AYS IEP teams did not make determinations, or even initiate referrals, with regard to whether a student at MSH could attend a full or partial school day at an off-grounds program; she testified that such a determination was in the sole province of the student’s medical team. In fact, Dr. Bloom testified that during her three years as AYS principal, she had never attended an IEP meeting where the team recommended that a student attend an off-grounds school. Given this testimony, the Hearing Officer does not find credible Dr. Bloom’s vague testimony that LRE considerations were discussed by STUDENT’s IEP team at her IEP meetings in the spring of 1999. Further, Dr. Bloom’s testimony regarding the lack of consideration of anything other than the on-grounds school by IEP teams was echoed by that of Rhoushelle Bozeman, LACOE’s senior program specialist assigned to AYS. Ms. Bozeman testified that she trained the AYS teachers and was a continuing resource for AYS teachers with regard to the IEP process. Ms. Bozeman testified that she did not train staff to consider whether a student could participate in an off-grounds school or transition program, and that a student was not considered for placement in an off-grounds school or transition program in any meetings she attended during the 1998-1999 school year. The testimony of witnesses such as Dr. Bloom and Ms. Bozeman made clear that the IEP teams convened for STUDENT during the 1998-1999 school year did not consider the LRE, as required to by law, because they wrongly believed that the only options the IEP team could consider were those located on MSH grounds.

Considered collectively, these procedural violations resulted in an IEP for STUDENT during the 1998-1999 school year, beginning April 11, 1999, that was not based on required assessment information. The Hearing Officer concludes that STUDENT and/or her conservator’s ability to participate meaningfully in the IEP process was seriously infringed. These violations negatively impacted STUDENT’s ability to obtain meaningful educational benefit during the 1998-1999 school year.

B. Substantive Appropriateness

Under the IDEA and the decision of the Supreme Court in Rowley, to be substantively appropriate, an educational program must have been designed to meet the student’s unique needs and prepare the student for employment and independent living, must have been reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit, must have provided the student with education in the least restrictive environment to the maximum extent possible, and must have conformed with the student’s IEP. The LEA has the burden of proving at the administrative hearing that it has complied with the IDEA, including that it provided an appropriate educational placement for the student. Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1994). Respondents failed to meet this burden with regard to the 1998-1999 school year.

The documentary evidence indicates that STUDENT attended only half-days of school from April 11 to May 20, 1999, pursuant to doctor’s orders; that she attended full days of school thereafter; and that she did not receive any academic credits for the 1998-1999 school year. However, no witness was presented who could offer any testimony to explain why it was determined that she could attend only half days before May 20, what instruction was provided to her when she did attend school, what behaviors might have been impacting her ability to benefit from her education, or why she was absent about thirty percent of the time after her re-enrollment. In fact, none of the school staff who directly served STUDENT during the 1998-1999 school year, including Mr. Kenny and Mr. Sponder, testified to establish the appropriateness of her program that year. The school staff who did testify with regard to the 1998-1999 school year, such as Ms. Bozeman and Dr. Bloom, were able to offer only general statements with regard to the AYS curriculum and staff training that year. None of the witnesses were able to offer cogent testimony to establish what STUDENT’s needs were that year, whether the instruction and services provided to STUDENT were designed to meet her individual needs, or whether Mr. Kenny was qualified to provide such instruction. Moreover, the Hearing Officer found above that the IEPs developed during this time were not based on appropriate assessments, meaning that the team did not have sufficient assessment information to identify STUDENT’s educational needs and to make accurate determinations as to the special education and related services necessary to meet her needs.

Additionally, even though STUDENT may have been able to attend only half days of school before May 20 and missed significant amounts of school that year, there is no indication that the IEP team attempted to consider offering her any other form of instruction, such as home-hospital instruction, prior to May 20. STUDENT’s May 20 IEP stated that she would be provided home teaching whenever her doctor indicated that she would not be able to attend school for medical reasons. However, there is no evidence that home teaching was provided to STUDENT during the 1998-1999 school year in accordance with this IEP except, as STUDENT’s former attorney (Eva Casas-Sarmiento) testified, on one or two occasions.

In short, Respondents failed to meet their burden of proving that they provided to STUDENT a substantively appropriate educational program from April 11, 1999, through the conclusion of the 1998-1999 school year, including the ESY. Taken together with the serious violations of the IDEA’s procedural safeguards noted above (i.e., the failure to assess appropriately, the failure to have appropriate personnel at IEP meetings, the failure to provide notice of the right to be considered for an off-grounds school, and the failure to consider placement at an off-grounds school), the Hearing Officer concludes that Respondents failed in their obligation to provide STUDENT with a FAPE from April 11, 1999 to the end of the 1998-1999 school year, including the ESY.

II. The 1999-2000 School Year

As mentioned previously, STUDENT was discharged on April 19, 2000, from MSH to La Casa Mental Health Rehabilitation Center (La Casa) in Long Beach, a facility offering a lower level of care. There is no dispute that neither MSH nor LACOE were responsible for providing STUDENT with a FAPE after her discharge from MSH. Because the LEA responsible for providing STUDENT with educational services after her discharge was not joined as a party to this matter, this Decision will address whether a FAPE was provided to STUDENT only from the beginning of the 1999-2000 school year to April 18, 2000.

A. Procedural Safeguards

Many of the procedural violations that occurred during the 1998-1999 school year also occurred during the 1999-2000 school year. For instance, there were no further educational reevaluations conducted after the reevaluation conducted by Mr. Sponder and Mr. Kenny in May 1999 until November 2001, and Respondents did not convene an IEP meeting for STUDENT during the 1999-2000 school year. Therefore, the IEP in effect during the 1999-2000 school year was the one developed in late 1999, which was already found to have been based on an inappropriate assessment and to have been developed at an IEP meeting where necessary personnel were not present. Additionally, Respondents failed to provide STUDENT and her conservator with notice of her statutory right to be considered for an education program not located on the hospital grounds. There was also no persuasive evidence that STUDENT’s IEP team considered her for any placement other than the SDC located on the hospital grounds.

Furthermore, there was no evidence to refute another of Petitioner’s contentions, which was that Respondents failed to document her progress on IEP goals and objectives. An IEP must include a statement describing how the parents or, in this case, the adult student will be informed regularly (by means such as periodic report cards) of the student’s progress toward the annual goals and the extent to which that progress is sufficient to enable the student to achieve the goalsby the end of the year. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(viii)(II); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(a)(10). STUDENT’s quarterly academic report cards did not include information with regard to how she was progressing on her goals and objectives. Even though the IEP form itself did include a well-organized chart to document such progress, none of the IEP charts contained in the record have been completed. While STUDENT’s teacher, David Nicholson, testified that he completed daily point sheets and monthly progress reports and that both forms contained information regarding progress on goals and objectives, the evidence does not support his testimony in this regard. Forms entitled “Interdisciplinary Notes,” which had been completed monthly by her teachers, did not provide any information with regard to whether STUDENT was making progress on her goals and objectives. Further, there was no evidence that either the point sheets or the progress reports were ever provided to STUDENT or her conservator to inform either of STUDENT’s progress throughout the year. Additionally, although STUDENT was awarded letter grades in quarterly academic report cards, some of which are in evidence, as psychologist Jennifer Coots, Ph.D., noted, grades–without some indication of how STUDENT is progressing on her goals and objectives–mean little to a student such as STUDENT. STUDENT was functioning, and continues to function, at the most elementary levels in all academic areas, which always makes it unclear what the letter grades in her academic reports signify. Respondents’ failure to document progress on goals is even more significant when considered in light of evidence indicating that STUDENT made scant progress on any of her goals and objectives during the year. In fact, the only annual goal she was able to meet was in the social-emotional area. There was no persuasive evidence that she met her other goals in reading, mathematics, or career education, or any of the milestones contained within those goal areas.

Taken together, these procedural violations evidenced that the IEP in effect for STUDENT during the 1999-2000 school year was not based on required assessment information, and that her and/or her conservator’s ability to participate meaningfully in the IEP process was seriously infringed. These violations also resulted in a loss of meaningful educational benefit to STUDENT, a conclusion which is buttressed further by the findings discussed below with regard to the substantive appropriateness of the program provided to STUDENT during the 1999-2000 school year.

B. Substantive Appropriateness

Among Petitioner’s many contentions with regard to the 1999-2000 school year were assertions that Respondents failed to address her unique needs and failed to provide her a program reasonably calculated to provide some educational benefit. The evidence supported Petitioner’s assertions in this regard.

First, in developing the IEP in effect for the 1999-2000 school year, the IEP team did not have the benefit of assessment data necessary to develop an appropriate IEP for STUDENT. The IEP team should have had available to it an evaluation that was sufficiently comprehensive to identify all of STUDENT’s special education and related service needs, whether or not commonly linked to the disability category in which she had been classified. 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(h). Had the IEP team had available to it an appropriate evaluation in developing an IEP for STUDENT, it would have been able to correctly identify her unique needs and thereby develop a program able to meet those needs. School psychologist Anita Bauer-Hook did complete a comprehensive psychoeducational assessment of STUDENT in November 2001 and was able to identify her unique needs, her strengths and weaknesses, and the specialized instructional methods required for her to learn basic reading and comprehension skills and functional life skills that she will require to function in the community. Licensed clinical and educational psychologist Robert Patterson, Psy.D., was also able to do the same in December 2001. Both assessments provided useful information for the identification of STUDENT’s needs and the development of an appropriate program for her. No such information was available to the IEP team in 1999 and, as a result, STUDENT’s IEP did not address her unique needs. For instance, Dr. Patterson found in his assessment that a multisensory approach to reading instruction was required for her to grasp more than just the beginning elements of phonemic awareness, which she had not been able to do even by late 2001. However, there is no indication in either her IEP or through Mr. Nicholson’s testimony that a multisensory approach to teaching reading was used with her.

Second, it was widely recognized by both school and unit staff that STUDENT continued to have a significant number of school absences during the 1999-2000 school year. In fact, a monthly progress note from psychiatric social worker Gail Crossen indicates that in early 2000 STUDENT missed at least a month of school. It was apparent from Mr. Nicholson’s testimony that he was not aware why STUDENT was frequently absent from his class. He testified that when a student was absent, he would call the unit but would make no further inquiry after learning that the student would not be attending class. He did not inquire as to the cause of STUDENT’s nonattendance, for example whether it was because STUDENT had chosen not to attend school or because the medical staff had determined that she was not safe to leave the unit. The substantial weight of the evidence suggests that STUDENT’s frequent absences were due to her behaviors on the unit, as well as her fluctuating interest in school. The record does not disclose either the specific frequency of her school absences, or how many of them were due to a medical determination that she could not attend school versus her choosing not to attend school. What is clear, however, is that STUDENT’s frequent absences should have been addressed by the IEP team. See 34 C.F.R. Part 300, App. A, p. 12588 (“suggestions that behavior may be exhibited that impedes learning due to a frustration over a lack of services and that the IEP team needs to examine in and out-of-school behavior to develop interventions to sustain learning are extremely important”). If a student does not attend school, that student obviously cannot benefit from the instruction that otherwise would have been provided to the student. Where a student is frequently absent from school and the IEP does not address the issue of attendance, whether by resolving the causes of the nonattendance or by providing alternate services during times of nonattendance, it is difficult to see how it can be argued that the IEP was reasonably calculated to provide the student with educational benefit.

Finally, STUDENT’s IEP also did not address the fact that she would frequently appear sleepy or sleep during class time. A student’s sleepiness in class, like nonattendance, adversely impacts her ability to be available for and benefit from education. Mr. Nicholson testified that he did not know what caused STUDENT’s sleepiness in class and that he made no effort, either on his own or through the IEP process, to determine or address the cause of STUDENT’s frequent sleepiness. The evidence suggests that STUDENT’s problems with sleepiness may have been due to issues ranging from medication, to improper blood sugar levels as a result of her diabetes, or boredom with the instruction presented in class. STUDENT had many medical issues that were not always known to her educational staff. In those instances, however, where her medical issues appeared to adversely impact her ability to benefit from her education, the IEP team should have sought input from the medical team in order to resolve or otherwise address the problem that was adversely impacting her education.

In summary, Respondents failed to meet their burden of proving that they provided to STUDENT a substantively appropriate educational program from the beginning of the 1999-2000 school year to April 18, 2000. Respondents did not provide her with a program designed to address her unique needs or reasonably calculated to provide her some educational benefit. When considered together with the serious procedural violations found above (i.e., the failure to assess appropriately, the failure to have appropriate personnel at the IEP meeting, the failure to provide notice of the right to be considered for an off-grounds school, the failure to consider placement at an off-grounds school, and the failure to provide periodic notice of progress on goals and objectives), the Hearing Officer concludes that Respondents failed in their obligation to provide STUDENT with a FAPE from the beginning of the 1999-2000 school year to April 18, 2000.

III. The 2000-2001 School Year

STUDENT was readmitted to MSH on September 12, 2000, after an unsuccessful four-month placement at La Casa and a month at Penn Mar Therapeutic Center (Penn Mar). Upon her return to MSH, STUDENT presented as angry and oppositional; the frequency and intensity of her high-risk behaviors prevented her from being allowed off the unit for months. No IEP meetings were convened for STUDENT during the 2000-2001 school year; therefore, the most recent IEP was the one developed on May 20, 1999. STUDENT did not attend school or receive home-hospital instruction at any time during the 2000-2001 school year. Petitioner alleged that MSH’s failure to convene an IEP meeting or otherwise attempt to provide any educational services to her during the 2000-2001 school year denied her a FAPE. The Hearing Officer agrees.

When a student transfers into the boundaries of an LEA from another LEA, the receiving LEA has an obligation to provide the student with an interim placement for a period not to exceed thirty days. Cal. Educ. Code § 56325(a). Unless the parent or guardian agrees otherwise, the interim placement must either be in conformity with the student’s existing IEP, implemented to the extent possible within existing resources, or a new IEP must be developed after an assessment has been conducted. Id. Before the expiration of the thirty-day period, the interim placement must be reviewed by the IEP team and a final recommendation must be made by the team with regard to the student’s IEP. Cal. Educ. Code § 56325(b).

Consequently, when STUDENT transferred back to MSH on September 12, 2000, Respondents had an obligation to provide her with an interim placement in conformity with her May 1999 IEP for thirty days. Respondents were then required to convene an IEP meeting before October 12, 2000, so that STUDENT’s IEP team could review the interim placement and make final determinations with regard to an appropriate IEP for her, which may have included a determination that circumstances had changed significantly enough to warrant a reevaluation of STUDENT’s needs. None of these things occurred. Instead, STUDENT’s educational needs fell through the chasm that existed between the medical and educational divisions at MSH.

There is no question that STUDENT resides at MSH because she is mentally disordered and has acute needs that require medical and nursing care, and that the primary purpose of MSH is to provide STUDENT with the medical and nursing care that she requires. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 4304 (“The primary purpose of a state hospital is the medical and nursing care of patients who are mentally disordered. The efforts and direction of the officers and employees of each state hospital shall be directed to this end.”). However, it is equally clear that STUDENT’s rights under the IDEA did not vaporize upon her commitment to MSH. Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56850, 56852. Further, there is no indication that STUDENT waived her entitlement to educational services during the 2000-2001 school year. In fact, Lorraine Viade, a licensed clinical psychologist and STUDENT’s former adult targeted case management services clinician, provided weekly therapeutic services to STUDENT during the 2000-2001 school year and testified that STUDENT continually expressed her desire to go back to school upon her return to MSH. Consequently, upon STUDENT’s return to MSH in September 2000, Respondents had an obligation to make educational programming available to STUDENT and to convene an IEP meeting to determine her then-present needs and devise an appropriate program to meet those needs. The obligation to convene an IEP meeting arose not only from the fact that STUDENT was transferring back into MSH from another LEA, but also because her most recent IEP at that time had been developed/revised on May 20, 1999, sixteen months earlier. A student’s IEP must be reviewed at least annually to determine whether the annual goals for the child are being achieved and to revise the IEP as appropriate to address any lack of expected progress toward the goals and the student’s anticipated needs. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56343(d).

It is evident from the record why none of these things occurred. The testimony of Purificacion (Puring) Stifter, MSH’s assistant chief of education, explains many of the reasons behind the apparent omissions. Ms. Stifter testified that educational services are provided to a student once the student’s assigned psychiatric social worker (PSW) calls her office to inform them that the student’s medical team has determined the student ready to leave the unit to attend school. Ms. Stifter stated that her office was informed by STUDENT’s PSW that unit staff had determined STUDENT unsafe to leave the unit to attend school because of the physically aggressive and volatile behaviors she exhibited upon her return. According to Ms. Stifter’s uncontradicted testimony, even the determination of whether STUDENT could benefit from home teaching was left to the discretion of the medical team–STUDENT’s medical team did not suggest that home teaching be considered for her until mid-July 2001. Thus, all the educational determinations that the IDEA requires to be made by an IEP team were instead left to the unfettered discretion of a medical treatment team. There is nothing in the IDEA that authorizes such a wholesale abdication of the LEA’s educational responsibilities, even where medical issues are impacting a student’s ability to benefit from his or her education. The IEP team should have met and taken into consideration STUDENT’s medical issues, either by inviting a knowledgeable representative from her medical team or otherwise obtaining input from her medical team, in order to develop a program for her that would address her unique educational needs while taking into account her acute medical issues.

MSH argued that its failure to convene an IEP meeting for STUDENT and failure to provide her with educational services during the 2000-2001 school year did not deny her a FAPE because her intense medical needs would not have allowed her to benefit from any educational services. To support its position, MSH cited the frequent instances of assaultive, self-injurious, and out-of-control behaviors documented in STUDENT’s voluminous medical records and testified to by unit staff, as well as the ongoing determinations of her treatment team that she was not safe to leave the confines of the unit to attend school until sometime in late spring 2001. The record supports MSH’s assertion that STUDENT had an extremely difficult period upon her return to MSH, and that she exhibited many dangerous behaviors on such a frequent basis in the months following her return that allowing her off the unit probably would have posed a danger to herself and others. However, none of the foregoing facts excused Respondents’ total failure to address STUDENT’s educational needs during the 2000-2001 school year.

First, the failure to convene an IEP meeting seriously infringed on STUDENT’s right to participate in the IEP process and to be involved in the educational decision-making process. Secondly, had Respondents convened an IEP meeting for STUDENT upon her return to its facility, the IEP team, with the assistance of the medical team, would have had an opportunity to determine a means by which to meet STUDENT’s educational needs given her then-current emotional state. The record does not support a conclusion that there were no means by which STUDENT could have been provided instruction from which she could have obtained benefit during the 2000-2001 school year. In fact, home teaching was used as a means to provide her instruction on the unit in other years.

Rather, Respondents misconstrued their obligations under the IDEA and failed to consider, or allow the IEP team to consider, any educational options other than the off-unit, on-grounds SDC. Thus, the question considered by staff was not whether a program could be developed to meet STUDENT’s educational needs, but whether she could be cleared to attend the only option being considered for her. Since she was not permitted to leave the unit for the majority of the school year based on the behavioral criteria utilized in the unit, which usually required the patient to have at least thirty restraint-free days before he/she was granted grounds privileges, the answer was no. No consideration was given to questions such as whether STUDENT could leave the unit safely with the assistance of a trained one-on-one behavioral aide, whether she could benefit from home teaching (until mid-July 2001 when STUDENT’s PSW suggested to Ms. Stifter that home teaching be considered), or whether she could attend a classroom located on the unit. Although Ms. Stifter testified that it was the policy of her staff to check to see if a home teacher was available for a student who had been declared unable to leave the unit to attend school, there is no evidence that this occurred in STUDENT’s case. There also was no evidence that STUDENT’s treatment team had determined her unable to tolerate home teaching. Additionally, MSH did not have any on-unit classes available for adult students until the 2001-2002 school year when, according to Ms. Stifter, MSH realized that an on-unit classroom was needed for those students not permitted to leave the unit to attend an off-unit class because they were still having safety issues. Because an on-unit classroom has unit staff and seclusion and restraint (S&R) facilities readily available, a student with volatile and aggressive behaviors who is not permitted to leave the unit to attend school, may attend the on-unit classroom where his/her assaultive and destructive behaviors may be adequately managed, when necessary.

For all the foregoing reasons, the Hearing Officer finds that Respondents failed to provide STUDENT with a FAPE during the 2000-2001 school year, including the ESY, because they failed to make available to her any instructional services and failed to convene an IEP meeting.

IV. The 2001-2002 School Year (excluding the 2002 extended school year)

The parties were able to resolve informally the issue of FAPE for the 2002 ESY. Therefore, this Decision will address the question of whether a FAPE was provided to STUDENT during the 2001-2002 regular school year only.

A. Procedural Safeguards

The 2001-2002 school year was markedly different for STUDENT from an educational standpoint than the previous 2000-2001 school year. Respondents convened seven IEP meetings on her behalf during the course of the year, and provided STUDENT with educational services. However, as with the previous years examined above, the 2001-2002 school year was marred by violations of STUDENT’s procedural safeguards. Some of the violations that occurred during the 2001-2002 school year were violations that persisted from previous years. For example, there again was no appropriate psychoeducational evaluation in STUDENT’s records for the IEP team to use in developing a program for her until November 26, 2001, when school psychologist Anita Bauer-Hook conducted another triennial reevaluation. Additionally, even if Mr. Sponder’s psychoeducational assessment in 1998 had been appropriate, STUDENT still should have been reassessed after the disastrous 2000-2001 school year, during which she received no educational services. An LEA is required to reassess a student if conditions warrant a reassessment–the fact that STUDENT missed an entire year of education because of her behavior certainly was a condition that warranted a reassessment. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56381(a).

Second, no notice was provided to STUDENT and her conservator of her statutory right to be considered for an education program located off the hospital grounds. Cal. Educ. Code § 56863. Third, there was no evidence that Respondents provided regular notice of how STUDENT was progressing on her goals and objectives during the course of the year. In fact, there is no documentation in any of the voluminous records entered into evidence that documents STUDENT’s progress toward her annual goals or the extent to which that progress was sufficient to enable her to achieve her goals by the end of the year. The significance of this deficiency is apparent when one considers that STUDENT had three different teachers during the course of the school year, none of whom were provided with any documentation of the extent of her progress, if any, in meeting her goals and objectives when she entered their classrooms. In fact, the educational assistant who began working with STUDENT in or around March 2002, Maria Romero, testified that STUDENT complained with some frequency that she was bored with assignments presented to her because she already knew how to do them.

Furthermore, even though the 2001-2002 regular school year was recognized to be STUDENT’s last year of IDEA eligibility, making every remaining day that more important since she was fast running out of time to be taught appropriate transition skills, her IEP did not include an individualized transition plan (ITP) until October 9, 2001, almost a month after school began. Beginning at age fourteen, and updated annually, a student’s IEP must contain a statement of his or her transition needs. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(vii)(I); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345.1(a).

The Hearing Officer finds that the foregoing procedural violations resulted in a loss of educational opportunity during the 2001-2002 school year because the IEP in effect for STUDENT was not based on required assessment information until November 26, 2001, and did not include an ITP until October 9, 2001. Additionally, the procedural violations seriously infringed on the ability of STUDENT and/or her conservator to participate meaningfully in the IEP process because they were not provided with notice of rights as required by Section 56863 and documentation of whether STUDENT was progressing on her IEP goals.

B. Substantive Appropriateness

As noted previously, the 2001-2002 school year was recognized to be STUDENT’s last year to receive special education services. STUDENT was twenty-one years old when the school year started and, by that time, had been institutionalized for the last fifteen years of her life (since the age of six). She had scant experience with anything outside the confines of a state hospital or other locked institution and, even at the best of times, was able to demonstrate only the academic skills typically expected of a third-grade student. Notwithstanding these obstacles, STUDENT continually had expressed a strong desire to live in the community, and to have a job and friends–to live like a “normal” person. These aspirations, then, were what her ITP and educational program should have addressed during this last year of her education. There is no real disagreement on this point. All of the assessments performed during the 2001-2002 school year, whether by Respondents or independent assessors, recognized that preparing STUDENT to live in the community was of primary importance at this age.

The express purpose of the IDEA is to prepare an individual with disabilities for employment and independent living. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56000. To this end, beginning at the age of fourteen, a student’s IEP is required to include an annual statement of the transition services to prepare the student for employment and independent living. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(vii)(I); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345.1(a). Transition services are described as a “coordinated set of activities” that are designed within an outcome-oriented process to promote movement from school to post-school activities, including vocational training, integrated employment (e.g., supported employment), independent living, or community participation. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(30)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345.1(c)(1). Transition services are to be based upon the student’s needs, taking into account his or her preferences and interests. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(B); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345.1(c)(2). Finally, the transition services must include instruction, related services, community experiences, the development of employment and other post-school adult living objectives, and, when appropriate, the acquisition of daily living skills and a functional vocational evaluation. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(30)(C); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345.1(c)(3).

STUDENT had a vast array of transition service needs at the beginning of the 2001-2002 school year. Her life of institutionalization had not prepared her to live independently in the community. She had extensive needs in the domains of daily living and vocational skills. She did not demonstrate an awareness of traffic safety, knew nothing about using public transportation, could not make change for ten dollars, had no experience shopping for food or preparing meals, and had never performed household chores except to keep tidy her bedroom space on a hospital unit. Her markedly depressed academic skills left her with little ability to perform the functions necessary for daily living, such as navigating streets safely, shopping for necessities, budgeting, and maintaining a home and job. Additionally, she exhibited impaired social-emotional functioning, making it difficult for her to establish and maintain friendships, interact appropriately in social situations, and read social cues. All assessors agreed that, given these considerable needs and her difficulty generalizing concepts, STUDENT required a functional or life skills curriculum with an emphasis on hands-on activities in applied or real-world settings. The evidence did not establish that she received such a program during the 2001-2002 school year.

The IEPs developed for STUDENT during the year did not include a statement of the program modifications that would be provided to STUDENT, as required, even though it was apparent that STUDENT required instruction focused on functional or life skills. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(iii); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(a)(3). As a result (as Dr. Coots found and as the evidence bore out), there was no consistent focus to the curriculum provided to STUDENT. STUDENT’s monthly progress reports describe the focus of her studies alternately as GED, pre-GED preparation, and basic skills. The testimony of assessors who observed STUDENT in the classroom and two of her teachers that year, Franklin Hayman and Louis Mendoza, in combination with the documentary evidence, revealed that the instruction provided to STUDENT in the classroom during the 2001-2002 school year remained heavily dependent on paper-and-pencil tasks. Additionally, although STUDENT’s limited remaining instructional opportunities should have focused primarily on the acquisition of daily living skills and functional living skills, she instead was given lessons on oil production and the Civil War along with the rest of the students in her SDC, some of whom were far more advanced than she academically and on the GED track. Opportunities to provide her with life skills instruction in applied settings, such as during walks around the hospital grounds, were not taken advantage of. Dr. Coots described her observation of STUDENT’s transition between programs, noting that STUDENT’s one-to-one aide simply led STUDENT without any effort to instill basic traffic safety practices, such as the practice of looking both ways before crossing a street.

Given the type of instruction provided to STUDENT, it is little wonder that there is no evidence that she made anything more than de minimus progress in her functional life skills during the course of the year. De minimus benefit or only trivial advancement is insufficient to satisfy the Rowley standard of “some” benefit. Walczak v. Florida Union Free School District, 142 F.3d 119, 130 (2d Cir. 1998); M.C. v. Central Regional School District, 81 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir. 1996). There is no dispute that STUDENT should have been able to obtain some educational benefit from instruction appropriate to meet her needs, notwithstanding her low intellectual functioning. Dr. Patterson and others testified persuasively that STUDENT has the ability to learn, that her low intellectual functioning does not preclude her from making progress. Dr. Patterson testified that he would have expected STUDENT to be performing at a higher level than she currently is, and that her achievement scores on formal measures have remained flat for the last few years. Furthermore, Respondents did not contend that the goals and objectives developed for her were inappropriate or that she could not have met them with appropriate instruction. Yet, the evidence does not contain any indication that STUDENT was meeting any of her goals and objectives, except the social-emotional goal during the 1999-2002 school year. Mr. Mendoza, who began teaching STUDENT in the on-unit classroom on January 28, 2002, testified that STUDENT made progress only in her school attendance and the “quality” of her oral responses. There was no evidence that she made meaningful progress on any of her goals and objectives.

Moreover, she was not given the opportunity for any hands-on work experience until March 21, 2002, when the school year was almost over. Although there had been earlier concerns with regard to whether she could be deemed safe enough to participate in any vocational experience, there was no consideration at that time of any supplemental supports or services which might have enabled her to participate in a vocational experience notwithstanding her behavior. In fact, although there continued to be behavioral concerns and incidences of restraint in March 2002, the IEP team determined that STUDENT could participate safely in the on-grounds vocational program (the industrial therapy program), in no small part due to the fact that she had been provided recently with a one-on-one educational assistant who helped manage her behaviors.

Respondents argued that instruction in many daily living skills was provided in groups on the treatment unit and was not necessarily reflected on STUDENT’s IEP. If the IEP team intended for STUDENT to gain IDEA-required instruction through a component of the treatment program, that fact should have been noted in her IEPs. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(iii); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(a)(3). No such intent was noted in any of her IEPs. Furthermore, while there was some general testimony that such groups were available for patients on the unit and that STUDENT may have attended some of these groups, there was no evidence that the instruction provided during those groups met her needs. STUDENT has low cognitive functioning and attentional issues which make it difficult for her to learn. STUDENT informed Dr. Patterson during his interview with her in late 2001 that the instruction provided in the treatment groups was “over her head”; the same had been communicated earlier to Dr. Willis by unit staff.

In light of the foregoing findings, the Hearing Officer finds that Respondents failed to provide STUDENT with a FAPE during the 2001-2002 school year. Respondents violated many of STUDENT’s procedural safeguards and failed to provide her a substantively appropriate educational program.

* * * *

In summary, the Hearing Officer concludes that Respondents committed procedural and substantive violations of the IDEA that denied STUDENT FAPE from the period April 11, 1999, to the end of the 2001-2002 regular school year, with the exception of the period April 19 to September 11, 2000, when STUDENT was not residing at MSH. What will be required to remedy Respondents’ denial of FAPE to STUDENT will be addressed below.

ISSUE NO. 2: Are STUDENT and/or Protection & Advocacy, Inc. (PAI) entitled to reimbursement for assessments conducted by Thomas Willis, Ph.D., Deborah Callahan, Robert Patterson, Psy.D., Richard Rosenberg, and Jennifer Coots, Ph.D.?

A parent may obtain an independent educational evaluation (IEE) performed by a qualified specialist at public expense if the parent disagrees with an evaluation obtained by the educational agency, and the educational agency is unable to show at a due process hearing that its evaluation was appropriate. 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b); Cal. Educ. Code § 56329(b). The right to have an IEE at public expense transferred to STUDENT when she turned eighteen years old. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(m)(1)(B); Cal. Educ. Code § 56041.5.

Petitioner asserted that Respondents failed to assess her appropriately during the school years at issue in these proceedings. She requested that she and/or PAI be reimbursed for expenses incurred to obtain the following assessments: a behavior assessment completed in November 1999 and an update completed in January 2002 by Thomas Willis, Ph.D.; a supported living assessment conducted by Deborah Callahan in October 2001; a psychological study completed by Robert Patterson, Psy.D., in January 2002; a vocational assessment performed by Richard Rosenberg in January 2002; and an educational assessment completed by Jennifer Coots, Ph.D., in July 2002.

LACOE argued in its closing brief that all the reimbursement requests should be denied because STUDENT never indicated disagreement with any of the assessments at issue in these proceedings. The Hearing Officer does not agree. It is clear from the allegations made during these proceedings that STUDENT, and the representatives acting on her behalf, disagreed with Respondents’ assessments and believed that Respondents’ assessments were inappropriate. “While it would be helpful for parents to explain their disagreement over a public evaluation, there is nothing in the statute which prevents parents from obtaining an IEE if they did not express their concerns first.” 34 C.F.R. Part 300, App. A, p. 12608; 34 C.F.R. §300.502(b)(4); compare with 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) (providing that reimbursement for private school placement may be reduced or denied if parents did not inform IEP team of intent to enroll child in private school prior to removal of child from public school).

I. Behavior Assessments by Thomas Willis, Ph.D.

The Hearing Officer finds that reimbursement is warranted for the behavior assessment Dr. Willis conducted in 1999. First, the evidence demonstrated that an assessment of STUDENT’s behavioral functioning, as it affected her ability to learn, was required at the time Dr. Willis undertook his assessment. The record was replete with references of behavioral issues that were significantly impacting STUDENT’s school attendance at the time. Yet, Respondents had not made any effort to assess or otherwise address her behavioral issues. In fact, the most recent assessment available to the IEP team at the time–the reevaluation conducted in May 1999–did not assess adequately how her behavior was impacting her ability to attend school and, in any event, already has been determined to have been inappropriate. An LEA is required to assess a student with exceptional needs in all areas related to the suspected disability and ensure that the evaluation is sufficiently comprehensive to identify all of the student’s special education and related services needs, whether or not commonly linked to the disability category in which the student has been classified. 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(g), (h); Cal. Educ. Code 56320(f). It is recognized that a student’s behavior may constitute a need that must be addressed in a student’s IEP if the behavior impedes the student’s learning. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i); Cal. Educ. Code § 56341.1(b)(1). Second, Dr. Willis’s 1999 assessment was an educational assessment. Although primarily focused on STUDENT’s behavior on the unit where she manifested more severe behaviors, Dr. Willis gathered educational data through an observation in the classroom and interviews with her classroom teacher. Dr. Willis’s assessment provided recommendations on how to improve STUDENT’s behavior overall and specifically how to improve her on-unit behaviors so that she would not be prohibited from attending school. Finally, the Hearing Officer is convinced that Dr. Willis was a qualified assessor. Dr. Willis has degrees in psychology and behavior and decades of experience addressing severe behavioral issues, and is the associate director for the Institute of Applied Behavior Analysis (IABA).

The record also supports a finding that reimbursement is warranted for Dr. Willis’s 2002 update. Prior to Dr. Willis undertaking this updated assessment in August 2001, Respondents had still not conducted an assessment of or otherwise addressed STUDENT’s behavior even though her behavior on the unit had prevented her from attending school for an entire year. Additionally, as with the 1999 assessment, the update was educational because it addressed behaviors that were impacting STUDENT’s ability to benefit from her education.

Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that PAI, who funded Dr. Willis’s November 1999 assessment, is entitled to reimbursement in the amount of $3,000 for the November 1999 behavior assessment, in accordance with IABA’s invoice dated November 30, 1999. The Hearing Officer also finds that PAI is entitled to reimbursement for Dr. Willis’s update, the report for which was completed in January 2002. An invoice for the update was not submitted into evidence; therefore PAI will have to submit proof of payment to Respondents to establish the amount to be reimbursed for the update.

II. Supported Living Assessment by Deborah Callahan

The evidence also established that reimbursement is warranted for Ms. Callahan’s supported living assessment conducted in October 2001, with an addendum provided in early 2002. Prior to Ms. Callahan conducting her assessment, the District had not examined adequately the skills STUDENT still needed to acquire to live independently in the community, as Ms. Callahan did in her assessment. Given STUDENT’s long history of institutionalization and the recognition that there were many skills STUDENT had to acquire before she could be discharged to a lower level of care or into the community, the Hearing Officer finds that the District should have performed such an assessment prior to October 2001. An LEA is required to conduct an evaluation that is sufficiently comprehensive to identify all of the student’s special education and related service needs, whether or not commonly linked to the disability category in which the child has been classified. 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(h). An assessment such as that performed by Ms. Callahan was required for the identification of all of STUDENT’s needs, particularly her transition service needs. Respondents had only conducted interest inventories by that time.

Further, the evidence discloses that Ms. Callahan’s assessment was an educational evaluation. The acquisition of independent daily living skills, such as those identified by Ms. Callahan in her report, is a necessary component of an IEP for a student like STUDENT, who has many transition service needs in the area. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(30)(C); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345.1(c)(3). The Hearing Officer accords little weight to Ms. Callahan’s testimony that her assessment was not an “educational” evaluation, since Ms. Callahan does not primarily work within the educational framework of IDEA. There was no real dispute that Ms. Callahan was qualified to perform an assessment of STUDENT’s daily living skills.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s request for reimbursement of Ms. Callahan’s assessment is granted. The Hearing Officer finds that PAI is entitled to reimbursement in the amount of $1,400 for the cost of Ms. Callahan’s assessment, as set forth in her invoices.

III. Psychological Study by Robert Patterson, Psy.D.

Petitioner contended that reimbursement should be awarded for the assessment conducted by psychologist Robert Patterson, Psy.D., on December 12, 2001, because the District had failed up to that time to conduct an appropriate psychoeducational evaluation of STUDENT. The Hearing Officer agrees.

As discussed above, it has been determined that the triennial reevaluation conducted for STUDENT in 1999 was inappropriate. Respondents did not conduct any further educational testing for STUDENT until on or about November 26, 2001, when school psychologist Anita Bauer-Hook conducted a psychoeducational assessment for STUDENT’s triennial reevaluation. Ms. Bauer-Hook’s assessment contained some useful information about STUDENT’s functioning, but there was no effort to address one of the fundamental obstacles to STUDENT’s ability to benefit from an educational program–her sleepiness. STUDENT’s problem with sleepiness was especially apparent in the afternoon, and resulted in drowsiness in class or absence from class. A student’s sleepiness in class and nonattendance both adversely impact her ability to be available for and benefit from education.

There was no dispute that the assessment performed by Dr. Patterson was educational in nature; it addressed STUDENT’s cognitive ability, achievement, social-emotional functioning, and other issues affecting her ability to learn. Dr. Patterson, with his decades of experience assessing students with disabilities as a school psychologist and educational psychologist in private practice, was qualified to perform the assessment.

Consequently, the Hearing Officer grants Petitioner’s request for reimbursement of Dr. Patterson’s assessment. The Hearing Officer finds that PAI is entitled to reimbursement in the amount of $950 for the cost of Dr. Patterson’s assessment, as set forth in his invoice dated February 5, 2002.

IV. Vocational Assessment by Richard Rosenberg

The Hearing Officer is not persuaded that Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement for Mr. Rosenberg’s assessment. In addition to vocational interest inventories administered in the past, LACOE’s career education specialist, Ronald Kipp, conducted a vocational/life skills assessment for STUDENT on or around November 26, 2001 as part of her triennial reevaluation. He gathered information through direct observations and interviews with STUDENT, as well as through input from Ms. Gardner, Ms. Bauer-Hook, and teacher Frank Hayman. Using guidelines provided by the Life Centered Career Education Competency Rating Scale (LCCE), the assessment involved a careful review of the domains of daily living skills, personal-social skills, and occupational guidance and preparation. While Mr. Rosenberg testified that he would have chosen different assessment procedures or come to different conclusions about STUDENT’s transition/vocation needs, no persuasive evidence was offered to refute that Mr. Kipp’s assessment was appropriate. Based on the foregoing, Petitioner’s request for reimbursement for Mr. Rosenberg’s vocational assessment is denied.

V. Educational Assessment by Jennifer Coots, Ph.D.

The Hearing Officer found above that Petitioner was entitled to reimbursement for the psychological study conducted by Dr. Patterson in December 2001. Dr. Patterson conducted achievement testing as part of his assessment. Dr. Coots’s assessment also looked to STUDENT’s achievement, but instead focused on her progress on IEP goals and objectives. Dr. Coots’s testimony and assessment report demonstrate that she took considerable care to conduct a thorough assessment of STUDENT’s educational progress and needs, and her assessment will likely prove useful to staff working with STUDENT in the future. However, Petitioner has been awarded reimbursement for an assessment that included achievement testing. The Hearing Officer finds no authority to award reimbursement for a second assessment focused on STUDENT’s achievement that was completed only seven months later. Petitioner’s request for reimbursement for Dr. Coots’s assessment is denied.

* * * *

In summary, the Hearing Officer concludes that PAI is entitled to reimbursement for the behavior assessment and update completed by Dr. Willis in November 1999 and January 2002, the supported living assessment conducted by Ms. Callahan in October 2001, and the psychological study conducted by Dr. Patterson in December 2001. Within thirty calendar days of the date of this Decision, Respondents shall reimburse PAI the amount of $5,350 for the foregoing assessments, with the exception of Dr. Willis’s 2002 update. Within thirty calendar days of receipt of proof, Respondents shall reimburse PAI for the cost of Dr. Willis’s 2002 update. All of Petitioner’s remaining requests for reimbursement are denied.

ISSUE NO. 3: Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education?

When an LEA fails to provide a FAPE to a student with a disability, the student is entitled to relief that is “appropriate” in light of the purposes of the IDEA. School Comm. of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 374, 105 S. Ct. 1996 (1985); 20 U.S.C. § 1415. Based on the principle set forth in Burlington, federal courts have held that compensatory education is a form of equitable relief which may be granted for the denial of appropriate special education services to help overcome lost educational opportunity. See, e.g., Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., 31 F.3d 1489, 1496 (9th Cir. 1994). Compensatory education does not, however, necessarily involve an obligation to provide day-for-day or session-for-session replacement for opportunity or time missed. Id. at 1497. The purpose of compensatory education is to “ensure that the student is appropriately educated within the meaning of IDEA.” Id.

The Hearing Officer concluded above that Respondents denied STUDENT FAPE from the period April 11, 1999, to the end of the 2001-2002 regular school year, with the exception of the period April 19 to September 11, 2000. In other words, Respondents denied STUDENT a FAPE for a period corresponding to three full school years. The precise harm that such a protracted deprivation of appropriate educational programming caused to STUDENT’s ability to be prepared for employment and independent living, within the meaning of the IDEA, is difficult to determine. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). Given STUDENT’s capacity for learning and her motivation to live in the community, it is certain that she would have been more prepared for post-school employment and independent living had she been provided with special education and related services to which she had been entitled during the past four school years.

As has been noted by her assessors, STUDENT is a warm and charming young woman who can be kind and affectionate to others. She bears the scars, both physical and emotional, of the trauma and abuse visited upon her in early childhood and of her long-term hospitalization, but has managed to reach adulthood with a degree of optimism and excitement about the future. She has hopes of living in the community on her own, and of having friends and perhaps a family with a husband and children. Dr. Patterson testified persuasively that with the appropriate supports and instruction, he believed that one day STUDENT could live in the community. According to Dr. Patterson, STUDENT is able to learn as long as she is provided with appropriate behavior interventions and specialized instruction. Dr. Patterson’s testimony in this regard was corroborated by the testimony of all the other witnesses who assessed STUDENT. Additionally, STUDENT relishes the few vocational experiences that she has been provided thus far, such as the Fashion Center where she folds clothes. This shows some promise for her ability to obtain gainful employment in the future. In short, STUDENT has demonstrated that she has both the willingness and the capacity to benefit from a program that would help her realize her desire to live in the community. This compensatory education award shall attempt to redress Respondents’ failure to prepare STUDENT for employment and independent living in the community, as required by the IDEA, by endeavoring to ensure that she is educated appropriately within the meaning of the IDEA, albeit belatedly. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).

Petitioner requested that Respondents be ordered to provide her with compensatory education services for three years (through the 2004-2005 school year), or more if necessary to redress Respondents’ denial of FAPE and transition services. Petitioner requested that the following orders be made with regard to a compensatory education award: (1) Respondents shall implement the behavior intervention plan developed by Dr. Willis (the IABA plan), which requires implementation across all settings; (2) Respondents shall convene an IEP meeting to determine how the IABA plan will be implemented as STUDENT’s educational and residential circumstances change; (3) Respondents shall provide STUDENT with the support of a one-on-one behavior aide, in accordance with the IABA plan; (4) Respondents shall provide STUDENT with the support of two aides for situations in which she requires the support of two aides, in accordance with the IABA plan; (5) Respondents shall provide STUDENT with an extended school day, including the foregoing support services, for her to achieve educational progress; (6) Respondents shall provide STUDENT with an appropriate transition plan, which shall include community and vocational experiences outside the classroom setting, training in independent and daily living skills, and a functional skills curriculum; (7) Respondents shall ensure that the IEP team considers STUDENT for participation with her nondisabled peers in appropriate educational, nonacademic, extra-curricular, and transition programs in community settings; (8) Respondents shall arrange and pay for all necessary fees and transportation costs for STUDENT to attend appropriate educational, nonacademic, extra-curricular, and transition programs in the community; and (9) Respondents shall pay for a complete neuropsychological assessment of STUDENT.

I. The IABA Plan

Petitioner’s requests numbered one through five above relate to the implementation of the behavior intervention plan (BIP) developed, and revised over the years, by Dr. Willis. The witnesses who testified in this case uniformly endorsed Dr. Willis’s assessments and proposed BIP as comprehensive and as an intervention that likely would be effective in improving STUDENT’s behaviors and, as a result, her ability to function on the grounds of MSH, as well as in the community outside of MSH. The only criticism of Dr. Willis’s plan came from Ms. Bauer-Hook, who is a certified behavior intervention case manager (BICUM). Ms. Bauer-Hook testified that Dr. Willis’s plan did not indicate that he had tried using any of his suggested interventions with STUDENT and that they had been successful with her. However, Dr. Willis credibly testified that “testing” the interventions with STUDENT would have required him to trigger the problem behaviors, a practice that the ethics of his profession prohibits. Additionally, there is nothing in the law that requires a trial of the proposed interventions prior to including the interventions in a BIP. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3001 et seq. In any event, BIPs must be reviewed and revised continually to reflect whether the proposed interventions have proven effective and whether there have been changes in the student’s problem behaviors. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3052(f), (g). The Hearing Officer is persuaded that Dr. Willis’s assessments were appropriate under the laws governing FAAs and BIPs.

The Hearing Officer is also persuaded that implementation of Dr. Willis’s BIP is an essential component to addressing STUDENT’s behaviors so that she can take advantage of the other services that will be provided to her in order to make up for the educational opportunities she was denied. The Hearing Officer agrees with Dr. Willis’s conclusions that STUDENT’s behavior has been the primary reason for her continued institutionalization, and that her behavior has been the main impediment to her integration and placement in the community for most of her life. As Dr. Willis recognized in his report, MSH’s treatment plan for STUDENT historically has called for school attendance to be denied contingent on her behavior, and such practices have led to poor school attendance and STUDENT’s failure to develop many of the skills necessary to be employed and live independently. However, as determined by Dr. Willis and others in their assessments, STUDENT’s problem behaviors have been learned from her long stays in institutions, where she essentially has been incarcerated with no real hope of being released. There was persuasive evidence that STUDENT’s history of institutionalization has resulted in the very behaviors that now keep her in a locked facility–a vicious cycle which can only be broken with the intervention of appropriate behavioral techniques. With the implementation of positive behavior interventions, STUDENT’s problem behaviors can be targeted and replaced with appropriate behaviors. MSH witnesses, including unit psychiatrist Gurjit Dhaliwal, M.D., and unit nurse Sue Jones, agreed that STUDENT exhibits “learned behaviors” due to her history of institutionalization and that her treatment plan must include a behavior modification system.

Therefore, the Hearing Officer grants Petitioner’s request for implementation of Dr. Willis’s BIP, and the recommendations required to implement the plan, as a component of the compensatory education award. Within twenty calendar days of the date of the Decision, Respondents shall convene an IEP team meeting to discuss the implementation of Dr. Willis’s recommended plan for STUDENT and to incorporate Dr. Willis’s recommendations into an IEP for STUDENT. Respondents shall invite Dr. Willis to attend this meeting at their expense.

As soon as possible after the meeting, but no later than sixty calendar days from the date of the Decision, Respondents shall implement Dr. Willis’s recommendations and proposed behavior intervention plan, with any changes agreed to by the IEP team at the IEP meeting. Given Respondents’ failures in the past and because there was no evidence presented to suggest that either Respondent has staff qualified to implement Dr. Willis’s recommendations, Respondents are ordered to contract with a certified nonpublic agency to provide the staff necessary to implement the plan. Respondents thereafter shall convene IEP meetings to review and revise STUDENT’s IEP in accordance with her changing needs in the same manner as they would if she was a student entitled to a FAPE until the end of the compensatory education period, even if she is discharged from MSH during that period.

With regard to the number of behavior aides required to implement the BIP, the Hearing Officer notes that Dr. Willis’s most recent update of STUDENT recommended a two-to-one staffing ratio. He stated that this recommendation was “primarily for the safety of staff and STUDENT and would be needed until STUDENT’s treatment team is able to evaluate her ongoing support needs based on empirical data and experience with STUDENT on the grounds of the hospital and in the community.” The evidence indicated that STUDENT has been provided consistent one-to-one aide services since December 2001 but has continued to engage in behaviors that have resulted in the use of restraints by the treatment unit. Consequently, there is some question as to the exact staffing ratio required initially. The Hearing Officer finds that Dr. Willis’s recommendations should be implemented in this regard absent an IEP team agreement otherwise.

With regard to the request for an extended school day, Petitioner requested that she be awarded an “extended school day” because she would benefit from more hours of support per day, which would allow her more extended and consistent support in functional skills training. The implementation of Dr. Willis’s BIP requires a specific staffing ratio, which is set forth in his reports. His report stated that in order for the plan to be effective, STUDENT had to be provided a two-to-one staffing ratio (to be decreased later to one-to-one) during her waking hours, or sixteen hours per day. Contained in the Hearing Officer’s order that Respondents implement the BIP developed by Dr. Willis is the requirement that adequate qualified staff be provided to implement the plan, in accordance with Dr. Willis’s recommendations. Therefore, an order for an extended school day is not necessary. It is expected that because the behavior aides will be working with STUDENT sixteen hours per day, she will be permitted to remain longer at her work assignment and work on other functional life skills. The final matter left for resolution with regard to the IABA plan is the amount of time Respondents shall be required to provide services under the plan. As noted previously, compensatory education does not involve necessarily an obligation to provide day-for-day or session-for-session replacement for opportunity or time missed. Parents of Student W., 31 F.3d at 1497. The purpose of compensatory education is to “ensure that the student is appropriately educated within the meaning of IDEA.” Id. Given the prolonged deprivation of appropriate educational programming STUDENT suffered and the severity of her present needs, the Hearing Officer determines that STUDENT requires a compensatory remedy totaling thirty months to offset the period of deprivation. Accordingly, Respondents shall be required to provide STUDENT with educational services, which includes implementation of the IABA plan, for a period of thirty continuous months, regardless of whether STUDENT is discharged from MSH during that period.

The Hearing Officer does not intend, however, that the compensatory education services will include funding of an apartment or any other residential placement. If, during the thirty-month compensatory education period, STUDENT’s conservator or a court determines that she should be discharged from MSH to another facility or into the community, Respondents shall continue to bear their obligation to implement the IABA plan and, as will be discussed below, ITPs. Respondents will not, however, as Ms. Callahan’s assessment might suggest, be required to bear the cost of a supported living arrangement except to the limited extent that continued support services might be required by the IABA plan.

II. Individualized Transition Plan (ITP)

The Hearing Officer agrees that STUDENT continues to require an ITP to address skills that will prepare her for employment and independent living. The express purpose of the IDEA is to prepare students such as STUDENT for employment and independent living. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). As noted in earlier discussions, Respondents have done a poor job of preparing her for either thus far.

The testimony at hearing was that the goal of both the treatment team and the educational team was to prepare STUDENT for discharge to a residential setting with a lower level of care. The record suggests that a change in residential placement may occur for STUDENT as early as September 2002. Therefore, it appears highly likely that STUDENT will be placed eventually in a setting different than that provided by MSH, such as an institute for the mentally disordered, a group home, or a sheltered workshop. Careful consideration must be given at every stage to the incremental steps that must be taken to prepare STUDENT for a transition to a lower level of care and, ultimately, into the community, as well as the pace at which she can absorb such transitions. It will be important to keep in mind, as Dr. Willis and many of the other professionals have recognized, that a gradual transition is required because behavior change does not generalize readily from one situation to another, and because STUDENT has many fears and anxieties associated with residing in a less structured setting because of her long history of institutionalization. There no doubt will be setbacks as STUDENT tries out new environments and new experiences, which is precisely the reason she needs a gradual transition with the aid of qualified staff dedicated to helping her navigate her way, accompanied by constant and careful review and revision of the behavior plan. STUDENT’s transition into a more independent life may be rocky, but she is entitled to the chance to attempt it with the appropriate supports.

Respondents shall convene IEP meetings to develop, review, and revise ITPs for STUDENT as if she were a student entitled to a FAPE until the conclusion of the compensatory education period, even if she is discharged from MSH during that period. As required by law, the IEP team shall consider STUDENT’s preferences and interests in determining her transition service needs. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(B); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345.1(c)(2). Practical goals should be developed to move STUDENT toward lesser levels of dependence and eventually into community life to the extent possible in the time provided, and to the extent she can tolerate it. The IEP team also shall consider inclusion in the ITP of opportunities for STUDENT to participate with her nondisabled peers in appropriate educational, nonacademic, extra-curricular, and transition programs in community settings, when her treatment team determines that she can safely participate in such activities in light of the support services provided pursuant to Dr. Willis’s recommendations. At least one member of STUDENT’s treatment team who is authorized to determine whether she may leave the hospital grounds, such as her unit psychiatrist, shall be a required participant at IEP meetings where participation in the community is considered.

Further, pursuant to their IEP/ITP obligations, Respondents shall arrange for and pay all necessary fees and transportation costs in relation to opportunities provided to STUDENT to participate in the community when they are provided pursuant to her IEP/ITP.

III. Neuropsychological Assessment

Dr. Willis has been recommending that a neuropsychological assessment of STUDENT be performed since 1998, when he noticed that STUDENT’s cognitive functioning test scores had decreased from scores in the above average range in 1986 to scores in the borderline range. Dr. Willis testified that this drop in scores suggested that years of repeated self-injurious behaviors (SIBs) might have resulted in organic brain injury. He stated that he recommended that a neuropsychological assessment be performed because if repeated SIBs are affecting a person’s intellectual level over time, that could affect the person’s ability to learn in certain ways. He testified that he wanted the assessment to determine whether STUDENT was neurologically intact and whether there was anything neurologically that would impede the efficacy of his proposed behavior plan.

On December 13, 2001, MSH staff psychiatrist Gamze Gurbuz, Ph.D., performed a neuropsychological assessment of STUDENT. Dr. Gurbuz administered to STUDENT the COGNISTAT, a neuropsychological screening measure. Additionally, as part of his assessment in late 2001, Dr. Patterson used another neuropsychological screening measure, the Halstead-Reitan Neuropsychological Screening Battery (Battery). Dr. Patterson found that STUDENT’s rating on the Battery was indicative of moderate organic impairment. He did not recommend that a further or more complete evaluation be conducted of STUDENT’s neuropsychological condition.

Given the foregoing, the Hearing Officer does not find support in the record for a complete neuropsychological assessment. Two neuropsychological assessments or screenings were conducted of STUDENT after Dr. Willis completed his last update of her. Although Dr. Willis continued to recommend during his testimony that a neuropsychological assessment be performed, nothing in his testimony indicated that he had seen the assessment report of either Dr. Gurbuz or Dr. Patterson, both of which were completed after Dr. Willis completed his update. Furthermore, Dr. Patterson did not indicate there was a need for a further neuropsychological evaluation of STUDENT after he completed his assessment. Therefore, Petitioner’s request that Respondents be ordered to complete a neuropsychological assessment is denied.

In conclusion, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT is entitled to compensatory education services for a period of thirty months because of Respondents’ failure to provide her a FAPE from April 11, 1999 to the end of the 2001-2002 regular school year, excluding the period April 19 to September 11, 2000. Respondents shall provide STUDENT with compensatory education services as set forth in this Decision.

ORDER

1. Within twenty calendar days of the date of the Decision, Respondents shall convene an IEP team meeting to discuss the implementation of Dr. Willis’s recommendations and proposed behavior intervention plan for STUDENT and to incorporate Dr. Willis’s plan into an IEP for STUDENT. During the meeting, the IEP team shall also develop an ITP for STUDENT that shall include community and vocational experiences outside the classroom setting, training in independent and daily living skills, and a functional skills curriculum. Respondents shall invite Dr. Willis to attend this meeting at their expense.

2. As soon as possible after the meeting described in Paragraph 1, but no later than sixty calendar days from the date of the Decision, Respondents shall implement Dr. Willis’s recommendations and proposed behavior intervention plan, with any changes agreed to in writing by the IEP team at the meeting. Respondents shall contract with a certified nonpublic agency to provide the staff necessary to implement the plan.

3. Until the conclusion of the compensatory education period, Respondents shall convene IEP meetings to review and revise STUDENT’s IEP, including her ITP, in the same manner as they would have if she was a student entitled to a FAPE, even if she is discharged from MSH during the compensatory education period. The IEP team also shall consider inclusion in the ITP of opportunities for STUDENT to participate with her nondisabled peers in appropriate educational, nonacademic, extra-curricular, and transition programs in community settings, when her treatment team determines that she can safely participate in such activities in light of the support services provided pursuant to Dr. Willis’s recommendations. At least one member of STUDENT’s treatment team who is authorized to determine whether she may leave the hospital grounds, such as her unit psychiatrist, is a required participant at IEP meetings where participation in the community is considered.

4. The compensatory education period shall consist of thirty continuous months and shall commence on the date Respondents begin implementing the IEP developed as a result of Paragraph 1 of this section.

5. Respondents shall arrange for and pay all necessary fees and transportation costs in relation to opportunities provided to STUDENT to participate in the community when they are provided pursuant to her IEP and/or ITP.

6. Within thirty calendar days of the date of this Decision, Respondents shall reimburse PAI the amount of $5,350 for expenses related to Dr. Willis’s behavior assessment conducted in November 1999, Ms. Callahan’s supported living assessment conducted in October 2001, and Dr. Patterson’s psychological study conducted in December 2001.

7. Within thirty calendar days of receipt of proof, Respondents shall reimburse PAI for the cost of Dr. Willis’s January 2002 update of his behavior assessment.

8. Respondents are held jointly and severally responsible for execution of the orders contained in this Decision.

9. All of Petitioner’s remaining requests for relief are denied.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute:

1. Did Respondents fail to provide STUDENT with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) and transition services in the least restrictive environment during the 1998-1999, 1999-2000, 2000-2001, and 2001-2002 school years (excluding the 2002 extended school year session)? Petitioner prevailed on this issue.

2. Are STUDENT and/or Protection & Advocacy, Inc. (PAI) entitled to reimbursement for assessments conducted by Thomas Willis, Ph.D., Deborah Callahan, Robert Patterson, Psy.D., Richard Rosenberg, and Jennifer Coots, Ph.D.? Petitioner prevailed on this issue, except to the extent that reimbursement was denied for the assessments completed by Richard Rosenberg and Jennifer Coots, Ph.D.

3. Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education?

Petitioner prevailed on this issue.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this Decision. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i).

Date: August 22, 2002 Hee C. Kim, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

1. Among Petitioner’s proposed resolutions were requests that she be provided an appropriate transition program that includes community and vocational experiences outside the classroom setting, and that she be considered for participation with her nondisabled peers in appropriate educational, nonacademic, extra-curricular and transition programs in community settings.

2. Her father was killed before her birth.

3. The biweekly community outings did not take place pursuant to the court’s order. In fact, the evidence at hearing suggested that STUDENT left MSH grounds only for infrequent court appearances and on a few other occasions to a bowling alley, the drive-thru at McDonald’s, and a discount store.

4. Home teaching (i.e., home-hospital instruction) is instruction provided individually, in small groups, or by teleclass to those students unable to attend a less restrictive placement. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3051.4. Home teaching provides an alternative means by which an LEA may meet its obligation to provide a student with a disability a FAPE. STUDENT resided in the treatment unit at MSH, and therefore the unit was her home.

5. La Case provides a lower level of care than is available at MSH. MSH provides the highest level of care.

6. MSH’s written policy, as contained in its handbook, dictated that staff obtain a written waiver from students under the age of twenty-two who choose not to attend school. STUDENT was twenty at the time. No such waiver has been found in her file.

7. However, the State Department of Mental Health (DMH) may contract with a local educational agency, nonpublic, nonsectarian school, or another agency to provide special education and related services on the state hospital grounds for those students whose individualized education programs do not indicate that such education and services should be provided in a program other than on state hospital grounds. Cal. Educ. Code § 56857. DMH entered into contracts with LACOE for the 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 school years which made LACOE responsible for providing special education and related services on the grounds of MSH to students under twenty-two years of age. In these contracts, both DMH and LACOE assured that individuals with exceptional needs residing in MSH would be provided programs meeting federal and state laws and regulations. In accordance with this contract, LACOE established and operated the Allen Young School (AYS) for students over eighteen years old, which STUDENT attended during the latter part of the 1998-1999 school year and the 1999-2000 school year.

8. “Special education” is defined as specially designed instruction, provided at no cost to parents, that meets the unique needs of the student. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(25); Cal. Educ. Code § 56031. “Related services” means transportation and other developmental, corrective, and supportive services as may be required to assist a student to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22). State law refers to related services as “designated instruction and services” (DIS) and, like federal law, provides that DIS services shall be provided “when the instruction and services are necessary for the pupil to benefit educationally from his or her instructional program.” Cal. Educ. Code § 56363(a).

9. These procedural rights transfer to the student when the student turns eighteen years old. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(m)(1)(B); Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56028, 56041.5.

10. Petitioner submitted a request for a due process hearing on April 8, 2002, but had provided insufficient information for her case to be opened on that date. The necessary information was not received until April 10.

11. In 1997, the IDEA was amended to allow the IEP team to forego further evaluation if sufficient data already existed to determine whether the student continues to have a disability; the student’s present levels of performance and educational needs; whether the student continues to need special education and related services; and whether any additions or modifications are needed to enable the student to meet the annual goals in the IEP and to participate, as appropriate, in the general curriculum. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(c)(1)(B); Cal. Educ. Code § 56381(b)(2). 12. A month later, the doctors completed an addendum to their assessment. However, neither the assessment nor the addendum were educational assessments. A March 1998 report indicates that STUDENT’s unit psychiatrist had asked that the psychological assessment be performed to assist with differential diagnosis, determine whether psychotic thought processes were present, and determine STUDENT’s current level of cognitive functioning. The addendum indicates that it was completed because the unit psychiatrist had requested additional testing to assist with residential placement recommendations. Nothing in either the assessment report or the addendum indicates that they were educational in nature.

13. The scores STUDENT obtained on the WRAT, however, were not included in the report. Mr. Kenny made only a vague reference to her WRAT results, stating that she scored below the third grade level in reading, spelling, and arithmetic.

14. There is no indication that a member of STUDENT’s medical team who could make such a determination was present at either of the IEP meetings held for her in the spring of 1999.

15. Respondents argued that this was not the correct forum to challenge STUDENT’s placement at MSH because her conservator had/has sole authority to determine the appropriate placement for her. The Hearing Officer agrees that Petitioner may not challenge through this proceeding her commitment to MSH. Petitioner is a resident of MSH in accordance with a determination by her conservator, and her conservator appears to be the only person with the authority to change her residential placement. Petitioner has, however, challenged the educational placement and services provided to her by Respondents over the course of the last four school years. The appropriateness of the educational placement and services provided, including the question of whether some or all of the services should have been provided off the hospital grounds, is a matter properly raised in this forum. STUDENT’s commitment to MSH by her conservator did not preclude the possibility of her attending an off-grounds school or transition program, if such was appropriate for her.

16. The Hearing Officer is not permitted to rely solely on hearsay evidence to support a finding of fact unless the evidence would be admissible over objection in a civil action. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3082(b).

17. STUDENT’s IEP dated May 20, 1999, indicates that the IEP team found her eligible for twenty-nine full days of ESY services.

18. In fact, the forms provided only very general information with regard to what subjects STUDENT was attending; what the focus of her curriculum was; whether she was doing good, fair, or poor in the areas of academics, attitude, behavior, appearance, compliance with directions, work completion, and ability to stay on task; and any additional comments the teacher wanted to provide.

19. STUDENT had to demonstrate good behavior (i.e., not require the use of restraints) in order to gain grounds privileges. A behavior assessment conducted by outside consultant Thomas Willis in September 1999 indicates that, at least at the beginning of the 1999-2000 school year, STUDENT had to be restraint-free for two weeks in order to obtain grounds privileges.

20. The evidence suggests that a significant number of STUDENT’s absences were due to the treatment team’s decision that she was not safe to leave the unit because she had not met the necessary behavioral criteria (i.e., that she had been placed in restraints sometime during the month or weeks prior). In this sense, the treatment team was acting in the place of a parent for STUDENT, determining when she could attend school and when she could not. There is no question that if a parent was obstructing a student’s ability to attend school, the parent’s input and participation in an IEP meeting would be necessary to resolve the matter of nonattendance. It seems equally clear that because the treatment team, which was under the control of MSH (giving the LEA in this case a unique amount of power to address the issue of nonattendance), a knowledgeable representative of the treatment team with decision-making authority should have been invited to STUDENT’s IEP meetings to discuss how her attendance could be improved. When in October 2001 STUDENT’s IEP team finally did discuss the issue of her attendance, as it related to the behavioral criteria imposed by her treatment team, the IEP team was able to come to a solution that did improve STUDENT’s school attendance–the treatment team agreed to change the behavioral criteria used with STUDENT and to look only at her behavior that day to determine whether she was safe to leave the unit.

21. Had STUDENT instead been a child residing with her parents, there is no doubt that in that situation the IEP team would have been expected to consult with her parents to try to determine the cause of the sleepiness or otherwise address its impact on her education. No less consideration should be given to STUDENT because she resides in a state hospital.

22. There was a persistent theme throughout the testimony of witnesses that a very clear demarcation of responsibilities existed in the minds of MSH and LACOE personnel, both medical and educational. STUDENT’s treatment team was to make all “medical treatment” decisions, while the educational team waited on word from the medical team of what STUDENT could and could not do. The educational team was not even informed of simple matters such as when a student was being considered for discharge or was being discharged from the hospital. Unfortunately, there appears no reason why MSH could not have coordinated the two halves of its enterprise so that educational decisions could be informed by the findings of the medical team, and have ensured that the two disciplines worked together cooperatively to provide services to special education students such as STUDENT. Such collaboration did not occur on STUDENT’s behalf until the 2001-2002 school year, when STUDENT’s legal team became deeply involved with her educational programming. The benefits STUDENT gained from having treatment team members involved with her educational programming were obvious–the medical and educational staff were able to discuss means by which to ensure that her educational and medical needs were met simultaneously, and were able to discuss medical issues that were impacting her ability to benefit from her educational program.

23. This may have included a determination that STUDENT needed to be reevaluated because of the significant changes in her circumstances and needs since the time of her last reevaluation in May 1999 or her discharge in April 2000. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56381(a).

24. MSH argued that homework packets were provided to STUDENT during the school year. However, there is no substantial evidence that even homework packets were provided to STUDENT during the 2000-2001 school year. The only indication that packets might have been sent to the unit for STUDENT was from unit nurse Sue Jones, who testified that it “seemed” to her that STUDENT had been provided with homework packets. This testimony comes far from establishing that homework packets were provided to STUDENT, much less that the packets were individualized to meet STUDENT’s needs, that she would have been able to benefit from such packets without the aid of a teacher or instructional assistant, or that simply providing homework packets otherwise provided STUDENT with a FAPE.

25. According to senior psychiatric technician Christina Barns, the off-unit classroom was located on the opposite side of the hospital grounds. Additionally, only one psychiatric technician generally is available to address any dangerous behaviors exhibited in the off-unit classroom, and no facilities are available at the off-unit classroom to address a need for seclusion and restraints or PRN medication.

26. The high number of IEP meetings held during the 2001-2002 school year no doubt is explained by the active involvement of her legal representatives in her program during this particular school year. STUDENT had one or more of her legal representatives present with her at each of the last six meetings.

27. STUDENT’s occasional statements that she was going to live at MSH forever and attempts to sabotage her chances of being discharged did not, as Respondents suggest, connote a desire otherwise. It is clear from the entire record that STUDENT often became despondent about her ability to meet the behavioral demands necessary to be discharged from MSH. It also was apparent that, while on the one hand STUDENT was eager to be out in the community, she was also anxious and frightened. Given STUDENT’s emotional fragility and history of trauma and institutionalization, it is difficult to imagine that she would not experience such fears.

28. The costs of the IEEs at issue in this proceeding appear to have been funded by PAI, an agency entrusted with the responsibility of safeguarding the rights of the indigent and disabled. The evidence suggests that STUDENT, who has been without any family support since the age of four and institutionalized since the age of six, had no personal funds available to advance her own cause in this matter. Given that PAI shouldered the risk of the costs of the IEEs at issue, and the IEEs were done on STUDENT’s behalf and with her consent, there appears no reason why PAI should not be reimbursed for the IEEs if reimbursement is warranted. Respondents did not argue otherwise.

29. During the hearing, Petitioner withdrew her reimbursement request for the behavior assessment completed by Dr. Willis in July 1998.

30. Respondents also argued that reimbursement should be denied because the assessment did not meet the requirements for a functional analysis assessment (FAA). Even if the assessment did not meet all the requirements set forth in the Education Code for LEA-conducted FAAs, there is no requirement that an IEE meet the same requirements applicable to LEAs when they conduct assessments. Furthermore, contrary to LACOE’s argument to the contrary, there is no requirement that a parent share the IEE with the LEA and/or IEP team at the time the IEE is obtained in order to seek reimbursement for the IEE.

31. If the LEA fails to show that it conducted an appropriate assessment, reimbursement is warranted so long as the private assessment was educational in nature and was conducted by a qualified assessor. 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b); Cal. Educ. Code § 56329(b). Nothing more is required. Arguments regarding whether sufficient data was gathered or whether the conclusions were correct may be relevant to how much weight is given to the assessment’s findings. They are not, however, relevant to determining whether reimbursement should be awarded.

32. Compensatory education may be awarded to a student over the age of twenty one in order to remedy a deprivation of the student’s right to a FAPE during a period when the student was entitled to services. Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 873 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 923, 111 S.Ct. 1317 (1991).

33. MSH argued in its closing brief that Petitioner’s proposed resolution does not constitute a request for services, but a request for funds. MSH contended that a request for funds, or monetary damages, is not recoverable under the IDEA. This argument has been made and rejected in other cases. Garro v. State of Connecticut, 23 F.3d 734, 736 (2d Cir. 1994); A.A. v. Board of Education, 196 F.Supp.2d 259, 268 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). Case law holds that claims for compensatory education, even when they require the expenditure of funds, are not viewed in the same manner as claims for general compensatory damages for Eleventh Amendment Purposes. Id. “While such claims may involve the expenditure of funds, they are characterized as prospective in nature and therefore are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Id.

MSH also contended that the cost of Petitioner’s proposed supported living arrangement was prohibitive, that it would cost the taxpayers approximately $1,886,976 each year to implement the arrangement. MSH argued that the Hearing Officer must consider the prohibitive cost of the requested arrangement in issuing a compensatory education award, in accordance with Education Code section 56505(h). Section 56505(h) provides: “In decisions relating to the placement of individuals with exceptional needs, the person conducting the state hearing shall consider cost, in addition to all other factors that are considered.” While an almost two-million-dollar-per-year arrangement would certainly raise eyebrows, the Hearing Officer notes that Nancy Mengebier, the mental health specialist with the State Department of Mental Health who initially provided the $2 million dollar figure, corrected herself during the course of her testimony and testified instead that the actual cost would be approximately $118,000. Interestingly enough, $118,000 appears to be slightly less than the amount the taxpayers spend every year to maintain STUDENT as a resident at MSH. In any event, Petitioner does not appear to be seeking specifically a supported living arrangement, as described by Ms. Callahan in her report, through this proceeding. As recognized by Petitioner, the Hearing Officer has no authority to change STUDENT’s residential placement–the authority to change STUDENT’s residential placement lies with her conservator and/or the Court.

34. Even if, as Respondents argue, they were not obligated to implement the BIP as part of STUDENT’s entitlement to FAPE, the Hearing Officer finds that implementation of the BIP is essential to STUDENT’s entitlement to compensatory education. STUDENT has suffered through years of inappropriate educational programming. There is no means by which to give those years back to her. The evidence establishes that implementation of Dr. Willis’s BIP is the most effective method of bringing STUDENT to the level of functioning she might have achieved had she been provided with appropriate educational programming since 1999.

35. There was no evidence that the one-to-one aides provided during this time have been trained in accordance with Dr. Willis’s recommendations. The lack of adequate training, and not the lack of a second aide, may explain why STUDENT’s behavior continued to be problematic.