California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · February 1, 1999
Student v. Mt. Diablo Unified School District
SEHO Case No. SN 808-98 · Hearing Officer Van T. Vu
Mt. Diablo Unified must reimburse parents for an independent assessment after missing the IEP deadline; claims back to 1992 denied.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Summary
The parents of a 15-year-old filed for due process in June 1998 against Mt. Diablo Unified School District. They argued the district should have found their son eligible for special education as early as third grade in 1992. The district found him eligible as other health impaired, because of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), in May 1998, during ninth grade at Northgate High School. The parents sought reimbursement for years of private counseling, tutoring, learning-center programs, and independent assessments, plus compensatory education.
The Hearing Officer applied a three-year statute of limitations and rejected a "continuing violation" theory, so all claims before June 2, 1995 were barred. For 1995 through 1997, the student did not qualify under specific learning disability, other health impairment, or serious emotional disturbance. His grades were uneven but passing, and his achievement scores were high. The district did miss the 50-day deadline to develop an IEP after the parents consented to assessment in February 1998. The IEP was due March 26 but came on June 2. The Hearing Officer found this delay denied FAPE. However, summer extended school year, home-hospital services, and a nonpublic school placement at Spraings Academy had already made up for it, so no compensatory education was ordered. Because the district's psychoeducational assessment was late, it must reimburse the independent Spraings assessment. All other claims were denied. Section 504 evidence was excluded as outside the Hearing Office's jurisdiction.
Why it matters
This decision shows how SEHO used California's three-year limitations period to cut off long-running claims. It also held that a student with ADHD whose grades and test scores stayed passing was not eligible. Finally, it shows that a district's late assessment could make it pay for a parent's independent evaluation, even when compensatory education was denied.
Issues and holdings
Issue I. Are Student's claims arising prior to June 2, 1995, barred by the statute of limitations?
The three-year limitations period (Alexopulos) applies, the continuing-violation doctrine does not, and the parents knew the facts and had received their rights by 1992, so all claims before June 2, 1995 are barred.
- District prevailedEligibility
Issue II. Was Student eligible for special education because of a specific learning disability (SLD), other health impairment (OHI), or serious emotional disturbance (SED) from 1992 to 1997?
For 1995-1997, there was no severe discrepancy caused by a processing disorder, and ADHD, asthma, and anxiety did not significantly affect his performance given passing grades and high achievement scores, so he was not eligible under SLD, OHI, or SED.
- District prevailedIEP procedure
Issue III.A.1. Did the District fail to notify Student's parents of their procedural rights?
The parents received their procedural rights in 1992 and repeatedly afterward, including at a 1996 Section 504 meeting and on signed IEPs and assessment plans.
- BarredIEP procedure
Issue III.A.2. Did the District fail to convene an IEP meeting prior to providing speech and language therapy in April 1993?
Barred by the statute of limitations.
- District prevailedIEP procedure
Issue III.A.3. Did the District fail to convene an IEP meeting when one was requested by Student's parent in 1996 during Student's seventh grade year?
Because the student was not eligible in seventh grade, any failure to convene an IEP meeting on request could not have denied FAPE.
- Student prevailed in partIEP procedure
Issue III.A.4. Did the District fail to convene an IEP meeting within 50 days of the parents' giving consent to assess Student (was the May 19, 1998 IEP meeting unreasonably delayed)?
The IEP was due March 26, 1998, but was not developed until June 2, 1998, which denied FAPE. The District's summer ESY and home-hospital services made up for the lost time, so no further remedy was ordered.
- Student prevailed in partChild find
Issue III.B. Did the District fail to identify and assess Student between 1992 and 1998 as a student with exceptional needs?
There was no child find duty for 1995-1997. The District should have looked into the student's needs around January 1998, when he was failing classes. Because its assessment was untimely, it violated its duty to identify and assess.
Issue IV.A. Are Student's parents entitled to reimbursement for counseling provided by a psychologist from Kaiser Hospital between April 1992 and October 1992?
Barred by the statute of limitations.
- District prevailedUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue IV.B. Are Student's parents entitled to reimbursement for counseling provided by Dr. Wendy Ritchey from August 1992 to March 1995?
Counseling before June 1995 is time-barred. The student was not eligible in 1995-1997, and counseling after March 26, 1998 was not shown to be educationally related, because its main focus was social skills.
Issue IV.C. Are Student's parents entitled to reimbursement for Student's placement at the Sylvan Learning Center in March 1993?
Barred by the statute of limitations.
- District prevailedUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue IV.D. Are Student's parents entitled to reimbursement for Student's placement at the Quest summer program in early 1996?
Denied because the student was not eligible for special education in 1995-1997.
- District prevailedUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue IV.E. Are Student's parents entitled to reimbursement for tutoring from the Sylvan Learning Center between April 1997 and October 1997?
Denied because the student was not eligible for special education during that period.
- District prevailedUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue IV.F. Are Student's parents entitled to reimbursement for tutoring by Fred Rich between March 1998 and June 1998?
Not shown to be needed for educational benefit. The student failed five of seven classes while receiving the tutoring.
- District prevailedUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue IV.G. Are Student's parents entitled to reimbursement for tutoring by Patrick Yuh in April 1998?
Not shown to be needed for educational benefit.
Issue IV.H.1. Are Student's parents entitled to reimbursement for the independent assessment conducted by Dr. Melmed in 1992?
Barred by the statute of limitations.
- District prevailedIndependent educational evaluation (IEE)
Issue IV.H.2. Are Student's parents entitled to reimbursement for the independent assessment conducted by Dr. Melmed in 1998?
The District's academic assessment by its resource specialist was appropriate, and the parents got the private assessment before seeing the District's report, so they did not actually disagree with it.
- Student prevailedIndependent educational evaluation (IEE)
Issue IV.H.3. Are Student's parents entitled to reimbursement for the independent assessment conducted by Dr. Violet Spraings in 1998?
The District's cognitive and social-emotional assessment was finished May 5, 1998, after the 50-day deadline, so it was procedurally inappropriate. The parents are entitled to reimbursement for the Spraings assessment.
- District prevailedFAPE: services offered
Issue V. Is Student entitled to compensatory education?
The only denial of FAPE was the 1998 IEP delay. It was already made up by summer ESY, the home-hospital program, and the Spraings Academy placement, so compensatory education was denied.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- Reimbursement. The District shall reimburse the parents for the cost of the independent psychoeducational assessment conducted by Violet Spraings (Spraings Academy) in 1998. No amount or deadline was stated.
Key authorities
Rowley; Alexopulos v. San Francisco Unified School District; Wilson v. Garcia; W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range; School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education; Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School District; Pasatiempo v. Izawa (cited by Petitioner); U.S. Department of Education Joint Policy Memorandum (1991) 18 IDELR 116
People named in the decision
- Joan Alber, administrator of special education, Mt. Diablo Unified School District
- Dr. Wendy Ritchey, private clinical psychologist/therapist, witness for Student, Private practice
- Dr. Paul Melmed, independent assessor, owner and director, witness for Student, Melmed Learning Clinic
- Jeannine Upson, speech and language pathologist, Mt. Diablo Unified School District
- Laura Morlan, school administrator, Foothill Middle School
- Barbara Weil, principal, Eldorado Middle School
- Pat Hartman, student services coordinator, Northgate High School
- Sharon Hanaway-Farrow, resource specialist; conducted District academic assessment, Northgate High School
- Katie Evans, school psychologist; conducted cognitive and social-emotional assessment, Northgate High School
- Marilyn Hoffacker, eighth grade teacher, Foothill Middle School
- Monica Maddern, ninth grade teacher, Northgate High School
- Sheridan Grosjean, program specialist, Mt. Diablo Unified School District
- Annelise Mackley, school psychologist, Mt. Diablo Unified School District
- Stacy Callahan, psychological assessor (1992)
- Bunny Parrott, fourth grade teacher, Mt. Diablo Unified School District
- Dr. Levin, medical assessor (1998)
- Dr. Violet Spraings, independent psychoeducational assessor, Spraings Academy
- Spraings Academy, nonpublic school
- Fred Rich, private tutor
- Patrick Yuh, private French tutor
- Sylvan Learning Center, private learning center/tutoring provider
- Quest program, private self-esteem summer program
- Kaiser Hospital, private counseling provider
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Van T. Vu, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, in Concord, California, on October 22 and 23 and December 7, 15, and 16, 1998.
Petitioner STUDENT was represented at the hearing by attorney Kenneth Frucht. STUDENT’s father, FATHER, and mother, MOTHER, were also present at the hearing on his behalf.
Respondent Mt. Diablo Unified School District (Mt. Diablo USD or District) was represented at the hearing by attorney Laurie Reynolds. Also present on the District’s behalf was Joan Alber, administrator of special education for Mt. Diablo USD.
Petitioner STUDENT called the following witnesses to testify at the hearing: FATHER, STUDENT’s father; Dr. Wendy Ritchey, clinical psychologist; Dr. Paul Melmed, owner and director of the Melmed Learning Clinic; and MOTHER, STUDENT’s mother.
The District called the following witnesses to testify at the hearing: Jeannine Upson, speech and language pathologist for Mt. Diablo USD; Laura Morlan, school administrator at Foothill Middle School; Barbara Weil, principal of Eldorado Middle School; Pat Hartman, student services coordinator for Northgate High School; Sharon Hanaway-Farrow, resource specialist for Northgate High School; Katie Evans, school psychologist at Northgate High School; Marilyn Hoffacker, eighth grade teacher at Foothill Middle School; Monica Maddern, ninth grade teacher at Northgate High School; Sheridan Grosjean, program specialist for Mt. Diablo USD; Annelise Mackley, school psychologist at Mt. Diablo USD; and Joan Alber, administrator of special education for Mt. Diablo USD.
Oral and documentary evidence was received and the record was left open for the submission of closing arguments. Closing arguments were received on January 8, 1999. The record was closed and the matter was submitted for decision.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
During the hearing, the District objected to the admission of evidence alleging District violations of Section 504 of the federal Rehabilitation Act. Ms. Reynolds argued that issues relating to Section 504 violations are outside the jurisdiction of the California Special Education Hearing Office. She further argued that issues relating to Section 504 violations are more appropriately addressed in a forum other than a special education due process hearing.
Mr. Frucht, on behalf of Petitioner STUDENT, argued that the Hearing Officer should hear evidence regarding the District’s alleged violations of Section 504 because such evidence goes to support Petitioner’s argument that the District denied STUDENT a FAPE by violating his due process rights. Mr. Frucht contended that the court in Pasatiempo v. Herbert Izawa, 103 F.3d 796 (1996), stated that Section 504 is related to the IDEA. Thus, Mr. Frucht asserted that the Hearing Officer has the jurisdiction to hear Section 504 claims.
The Hearing Officer noted that the Hearing Office has consistently ruled that Section 504 claims are outside the jurisdiction of the Hearing Office. In the absence of direct legal authority establishing that the Hearing Office has the jurisdiction to hear Section 504 claims, the Hearing Officer ruled that no evidence regarding Section 504 issues would be heard in the present case.
ISSUES
I. Are STUDENT’s claims arising prior to June 2, 1995, barred by the statute of limitations?
II. Was STUDENT eligible for special education because of a specific learning disability (SLD), other health impairment (OHI), or serious emotional disturbance (SED) from 1992 to 1997?
III. Did the District deny STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during the 1992-1998 school years? A. Did the District commit the following procedural violations: 1. failing to notify STUDENT’s parents of their procedural rights, 2. failing to convene an IEP meeting prior to providing speech and language therapy in April 1993, 3. failing to convene an IEP meeting when one was requested by STUDENT’s parent in 1996 during STUDENT’s seventh grade year, 4. failing to convene an IEP meeting within 50 days of the parents’ giving consent to assess STUDENT, and B. Did the District fail to identify and assess STUDENT between 1992 and 1998 as a student with exceptional needs?
IV. Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the cost of: A. counseling for STUDENT provided by a psychologist from Kaiser Hospital between April 1992 and October 1992, B. counseling for STUDENT provided by Dr. Wendy Ritchey from August 1992 to March 1995, C. STUDENT’s placement at the Sylvan Learning Center in March 1993, D. STUDENT’s placement at the Quest summer program in early 1996, E. tutoring from the Sylvan Learning Center between April 1997 and October 1997, F. tutoring by Fred Rich between March 1998 and June 1998, G. tutoring by Patrick Yuh in April 1998, H. the independent assessments:
1. conducted by Dr. Melmed in 1992, 2. conducted by Dr. Melmed in 1998, and 3. conducted by Dr. Violet Spraings in 1998?
V. Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education?
POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
Petitioner STUDENT presented for hearing a number of issues relating back to 1992, when STUDENT was in the third grade. Petitioner asserts that the District denied him a FAPE when it failed to identify and assess him as a child with exceptional needs, failed to notify his parents of their procedural rights, and failed to appropriately hold IEP meetings to develop an IEP for him. Petitioner contended that he is a student with exceptional ability who has been underachieving in his education since 1992. He also asserted that he has been eligible for special education since 1992 but that the District failed to provide such special education and related services until 1998. As such, Petitioner contended that he is entitled to reimbursement for various expenses incurred for his education and that he should be awarded compensatory education.
The Respondent Mt. Diablo Unified School District asserted that STUDENT did not require special education services until 1998, when he was a freshman in high school. Respondent contended that the IDEA guarantees individuals with disabilities access to an education, but not to an education where their abilities are maximized. Respondent further contended that STUDENT’s scores on his annual achievement tests and his classroom grades show that he had been benefitting from his education without special education or related services. Consequently, Respondent argued that the District acted in compliance with the law because STUDENT’s educational needs were adequately met in a general education classroom. In regard to the remedies requested by STUDENT, Respondent argued that STUDENT’s claims accruing prior to June 2, 1995, are barred by the statute of limitations. Respondent also asserted that the District has consistently provided STUDENT a FAPE and that no reimbursement or compensatory education is warranted.
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT is a fifteen-year-old sophomore in high school. STUDENT has been diagnosed with attention deficit disorder and is qualified for special education as a student who is “other health impaired.” STUDENT developed asthma when he was a year old and now uses an inhaler to control his asthma symptoms. He currently attends a nonpublic school at Spraings Academy, his placement pursuant to his most current IEP. By all accounts, STUDENT is a bright, well-spoken, and charming individual.
STUDENT’s father, FATHER, testified that STUDENT’s problems were apparent as early as first grade. He stated that in the first grade STUDENT was frequently the target of aggression by other students. Although STUDENT received average grades, his teachers commented on his progress reports that they were having “trouble with some of his behavior,” that “he still has problems settling down and working,” and that he “continues to have problems.” FATHER stated that, by the second grade, STUDENT was having problems staying on timed tasks. STUDENT’s progress reports from the second grade contained statements that STUDENT was a “daydreamer,” that “he needs to focus,” and that he “needs to stay on task.”
According to PARENT, STUDENT’s problems escalated in the third grade. During this time, STUDENT continued to have social problems. STUDENT would often cry at school as a result of other children teasing, hitting, or pushing him on the playground. STUDENT was also failing math despite scoring very high on a standardized math exam. In April 1992, STUDENT was given a psychological assessment by Stacy Callahan.
Stacy Callahan stated in her report that STUDENT was a gifted child who should be in the school’s Gifted and Talented Education program (GATE). She also wrote that STUDENT required psychological counseling to address his problems differentiating between fantasy and reality. She described STUDENT as an imaginative child who withdraws into a fantasy world when he becomes anxious. (Pet. Exh. 4.) Between April 1992 and October 1992, STUDENT received counseling at his parents’ expense from a therapist at Kaiser Hospital. He was then referred to Dr. Wendy Ritchey, who became his therapist from August 1992 to March 1995. Two months following the Callahan report, STUDENT applied for and was accepted into the Gifted and Talented Education Program at his elementary school. STUDENT’s father testified that he and his wife spent up to five hours a night helping STUDENT with his homework.
During the fourth grade, STUDENT’s teacher Bunny Parrott recommended him for speech therapy because he was having problems making “th” sounds. STUDENT’s parents consented to the District’s proposed speech and language assessment plan on November 4, 1992, and the assessment report was completed on November 18, 1992. Jeannine Upson, speech and language pathologist for Mt. Diablo USD, testified that an IEP meeting was held on November 20, 1992. However, STUDENT’s parents testified that they never attended any IEP meeting but merely were called to the school to sign the IEP. Regardless, STUDENT was provided articulation therapy until his fifth grade year, when he was exited from special education.
In December 1992, STUDENT was assessed by Dr. Paul Melmed. In his report, Dr. Melmed stated that STUDENT had many symptoms characteristic of ADHD. Upon Dr. Melmed’s recommendation, STUDENT’s parents brought him to his pediatrician, who diagnosed him with ADD and prescribed Ritalin. FATHER testified that he gave a copy of Dr. Melmed’s report for STUDENT’s school. In March 1993, STUDENT was enrolled at the Sylvan Learning Center, where he took classes to improve his organizational skills. STUDENT earned 2 F’s, 4 D’s, 8 C’s, 7 B’s, and 5 A’s. (Footnote 1) He also scored between 96% to 98% on his achievement tests.
During his fifth grade year, STUDENT’s parents continued to assist STUDENT with his homework and STUDENT continued to receive therapy from Dr. Ritchey. FATHER testified that STUDENT also continued to cry and be anxious about school. He stated that STUDENT had a panic attack at school which required him to be pulled from school for a day. STUDENT’s grades improved in the fifth grade. He earned 2 F’s, 1 D, 2 C’s, 13 B’s, and 5 A’s. On his achievement tests, he scored 99% on the math concepts portion and 93% on the reading comprehension portion.
In the sixth grade, STUDENT’s grades improved. That year, he scored 7 C’s, 13 B’s, and 8 A’s. Additionally, on his annual achievement exams, he scored 91% on the math concepts section and 86% on the reading comprehension section. In March 1995, STUDENT’s regular therapy with Dr. Ritchie was discontinued.
When STUDENT was in the seventh grade, he had another panic attack. While in math class, he began to cry and became disoriented. STUDENT also had an asthma attack while in his physical education class. Again, STUDENT’s grades began to decline. That year, he received 1 F, 6 D’s, 7 C’s, 9 B’s, and 6 A’s. However, he scored 94% in the math section and 95% on the reading section of his achievement test that year. STUDENT’s father testified that, in the spring of 1996, he requested an IEP meeting to discuss STUDENT’s education but was told by District employees that an SST meeting was the prerequisite to convening an IEP meeting. The SST meeting convened on February 29, 1996, and a Section 504 accommodation plan was eventually developed for STUDENT. As part of his 504 plan, STUDENT was required to use a notebook to keep track of his homework assignments. With the 504 plan in place, STUDENT’s grades improved. (Testimony of FATHER.) Soon after being placed on the 504 plan, STUDENT’s parents enrolled him in the Quest self-esteem program. STUDENT was also provided private french tutoring from January 1996 to March 1996.
In the eighth grade, STUDENT received tutoring from the Sylvan Learning Center. Between April 1997 and October 1997, STUDENT received instruction from the Center on how to read, take notes, and prepare for tests. (Testimony of FATHER.) STUDENT’s grades continued to range from A’s to F’s, and his achievement scores remained high.
In the fall of 1997, STUDENT started ninth grade at Northgate High School. STUDENT’s father contends that STUDENT’s 504 plan did not follow him from middle school and that a 504 meeting was not convened until December, months after he started school. In January 1998, STUDENT resumed his therapy with Dr. Ritchey. At this time, STUDENT was failing most of his classes. On January 26, 1998, STUDENT’s parents submitted a written request for an assessment and IEP meeting to the District. MOTHER gave consent for the assessment plan on February 4, 1998.
In the months that followed, STUDENT was given a number of District and independent assessments. The District completed STUDENT’s academic assessment on February 19, 1998. One month later, Dr. Melmed completed an independent academic assessment of STUDENT. In April, Dr. Levin completed STUDENT’s medical assessment. On May 5, 1998, the District completed STUDENT’s cognitive and social emotional assessment. Two days later, an independent psycho-educational assessment of STUDENT was completed by Violet Spraings from Spraings Academy. STUDENT received tutoring from Fred Rich from March 1998 to June 1998 and French tutoring by Patrick Yuh in April 1998.
Four months after STUDENT’s parents requested the assessment, STUDENT’s IEP meetings were convened. On June 2, 1998, STUDENT’s parents requested a special education due process hearing. On June 24, 1998, the IEP team placed STUDENT at Spraings Academy, a nonpublic school.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Are STUDENT’s claims arising prior to June 2, 1995 barred by the statute of limitations?
There is no statute of limitations contained in either state special education law or the federal IDEA. Because the statutes are silent as to a statute of limitations for special education due process hearings, the courts have adopted the statute of limitations for the state cause of action most analogous to an action under the IDEA. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-267 (1985).
According to the Ninth Circuit, the state cause of action that is most analogous to an action under the IDEA is contained within the California Code of Civil Procedure section 338(a) and, thus, the Ninth Circuit adopted the three-year statute of limitations contained therein to claims brought under the IDEA in California. Alexopulos v. San Francisco Unified School District, 817 F.2d 551, 555 (9th Cir. 1987). In Alexopulos v. San Francisco Unified School District, the student requested an administrative hearing in 1985 to address issues relating to the school district’s alleged failure to provide an appropriate education in 1979, some six years earlier. On appeal of the hearing officer’s denial of the student’s claims, the Alexopulos court found that all claims under the IDEA were time-barred. The court stated that:
Congress' desire to obtain timely and appropriate education for handicapped children by conferring substantial substantive and procedural rights on parents and guardians on behalf of their children clearly indicates that it did not intend to authorize filing of claims on behalf of or by the children many years after the alleged wrongdoing occurred. It is reasonable to assume that Congress expected and intended the child's representative to file actions and apply for hearings on his behalf near the time the contested event occurred.
Id. at p. 556. The Court concluded that any cause of action which Ms. Alexopulos may have had would have accrued in 1979 when she “knew or had reason to know of the facts underlying it.”
In this case, Petitioner contended that the District’s actions formed a pattern of ongoing unlawful conduct which tolls the statute of limitations, thereby allowing the Hearing Officer to hear Petitioner’s issues relating back to 1992. In making his argument, Petitioner relied on a number of employment discrimination cases which deal with the “continuing violation doctrine.” On the other hand, the District argued that STUDENT’s parents knew or had reason to know of the facts underlying their claims at the time the claims arose. The District also argued that the “continuing violations doctrine” does not apply to cases arising under the IDEA and, thus, the three year statute of limitations bars all of Petitioner’s claims arising prior to June 2, 1995.
Petitioner did not cite, and the Hearing Officer does not know of, any cases where the Ninth Circuit has applied the “continuing violations doctrine” to IDEA related cases. None of the cases Petitioner cited relate to special education. Additionally, unlike continuing violations in the workplace which may not be apparent except over a cumulative period of time, STUDENT’s grades were available each quarter. Thus, STUDENT’s parents received information on a quarterly basis that could have been used to determine whether STUDENT needed special education. For the above reasons, the ‘continuing violation doctrine’ does not apply to toll the statute of limitations in this case.
The evidence establishes that STUDENT’s parents knew of the facts underlying their claims as early as 1992. Among the issues presented for hearing, Petitioner asserted that the District denied him a FAPE by committing series of procedural violations and by failing to identify and assess him as a special education student. FATHER testified that STUDENT’s problems in school manifested as early as 1989, when STUDENT was in the first grade. He also testified that he and MOTHER were concerned with STUDENT’s grades, anxiety, and crying at school during this time and that they continually asked District personnel for assistance for STUDENT. Additionally, FATHER testified that the assessment report they procured from Stacy Callahan in 1992 supported their contention that STUDENT required special education at that time. Moreover, STUDENT’s parents knew of his ADD diagnosis from 1993.
STUDENT’s parents claim that the District denied them equal participation in the IEP process by failing to notify them of their procedural rights under special education law. They contend that they did not learn of their rights until the spring of 1996. However, assuming, arguendo, that the District’s failure to provide STUDENT’s parents with their procedural rights tolls the statute of limitations, the evidence establishes that STUDENT’s parents were notified of their rights as early as 1992. (See Pet. Exhs. 6 and 8.) On the assessment plan dated November 4, 1992, MOTHER checked a box signifying that she had been informed of her rights. (Pet. Exh. 6.) The assessment plan also stated that the parental rights were attached to the back of the form. (Id.) Most persuasive was MOTHER’S testimony that, in 1992, she was given a “colored sheet on back” of an IEP form. MOTHER stated that the “colored sheet” contained information regarding rights related to special education, but she did not consider STUDENT to be a special education student at that time. Although she claimed that the District did not notify her of her rights, it was her testimony that established that they had. Based on the foregoing, STUDENT’s parents are found to have known of the facts underlying their claims as early as 1992 and had recieved a copy of their rights during the same year.
Because it has been found that STUDENT’s parents knew of the facts underlying their claims relating back to 1992, and that the continuing violations doctrine does not apply in this case, the statute of limitations bars all Petitioner’s claims arising prior to June 2, 1995. (Footnote 2)
II. Was STUDENT eligible for special education because of a specific learning disability (SLD), other health impairment (OHI), or serious emotional disturbance (SED) from 1992 to 1997?
Because Petitioner’s claims arising prior to 1995 are barred by the statute of limitations, only the 1995 through 1997 school years will be considered. During the 1997-1998 school year, STUDENT was found eligible for special education services.
California special education law states that individuals with exceptional needs are students who have a disability pursuant to the definitions in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 1401 of Title 20 of the United States Code, and who require instruction and/or services that cannot be provided with modification to the regular school program. Education Code § 56026(a) and (b)). Disabilities identified in federal special education law include mental retardation, hearing, speech, language, visual, orthopedic, and health impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, and specific learning disabilities.
According to STUDENT’s parents, STUDENT has been diagnosed with an attention deficit disorder with hyperactivity (ADHD). ADHD is not listed in federal or state law as one of the disabilities that establishes eligibility for special education. The United States Department of Education has stated in a policy memo that a student with an attention deficit disorder (ADD) or ADHD is eligible for special education only if by reason thereof (1) the student meets the eligibility criteria for a listed disability such as SLD, OHI, or SED; and (2) the student needs special education. U.S. Department of Education Joint Policy Memorandum, (1991) 18 IDELR 116; see also 20 U.S.C. 1401(a)(1). California law similarly states that a student whose educational performance is "adversely affected" by ADHD is eligible for special education if the student demonstrates a need for special education and related services by meeting eligibility criteria in the category of SLD, OHI, or SED. Education Code § 56339(a).
Petitioner contended that he had met special education eligibility criteria prior to being qualified in 1998 because of his asthma, ADHD and learning deficits. Petitioner also claims that his success in school is attributed in part to the services that his parents procured for him and their help in ensuring that he complete his homework each night. Accordingly, Petitioner asserts that the District should have found him eligible for special education prior to being found eligible in 1998.
The District contended that STUDENT did not meet eligibility criteria for special education at any time prior to 1998. The District asserted that STUDENT did not require special education to benefit from educational instruction. Rather, the District asserted that most of STUDENT’s grades were between A’s and C’s, that STUDENT consistently scored high on his annual achievement tests, and that he was an average student who passed successfully from grade to grade.
A. Specific Learning Disability (SLD)
California Education Code § 56337 states that the following three requirements must be met in order to satisfy eligibility criteria for a specific learning disability:
(a) A severe discrepancy exists between the intellectual ability and achievement in one or more of the following academic areas: (1) Oral expression; (2) Listening comprehension; (3) Written expression; (4) Basic reading skills; (5) Reading comprehension; (6) Mathematics calculation; (7) Mathematics reasoning. (b) The discrepancy is due to a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes and is not the result of environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantages. (c) The discrepancy cannot be corrected through other regular or categorical services offered within the regular instructional program. (Emphasis added.)
1. 1995-1996 School year
During the 1995-1996 school year, STUDENT was in the seventh grade at Foothill Middle School. Between 1995 and 1997, no special education evaluations were conducted on STUDENT. In fact, the only comprehensive assessments that were conducted on STUDENT prior to 1998 occurred in 1992. Thus, other than STUDENT’s annual achievement tests, no contemporary standardized assessments existed for the achievement and ability scores to be compared in determining whether a severe discrepancy existed.
Petitioner asserts that a discrepancy existed based on the disparity between his grades (achievement) and his achievement scores and IQ (ability). (footnote 3) In 1992, STUDENT was tested as having a 132 IQ. Among Petitioner’s exhibits were STUDENT’s achievement test scores. During the seventh grade, STUDENT scored 94% on the Math Concepts section and 95% on the Reading Comprehension section. Yet, during this time, STUDENT earned D’s in his math and English classes.
Although STUDENT’s grades may not have been what his parents expected based on his achievement scores and IQ, a closer look at his grades negate the contention that a severe discrepancy existed. STUDENT’s grades in general were scattered all over the board. In the same class, he may have received a high grade one quarter and a low grade another quarter. For example, in math, he earned a D the first quarter and B’s the rest of the year. Additionally, STUDENT initially earned a D in English. However, he improved his grades in English to a C and then to a B at the end of the year. STUDENT’s grades show that his achievement could be, and have been, commensurate with his ability. In light of STUDENT’s grades, Petitioner’s contention that a severe discrepancy exists was not established.
Even if assuming, arguendo, that STUDENT had a severe discrepancy between achievement and ability, he still would not have qualified for special education as SLD between 1995 and 1996 because the discrepancy was not caused by a problem with a psychological process. The inconsistency of STUDENT’s grades as noted above suggests that STUDENT discrepancy was not caused by a processing disorder. Had STUDENT been significantly affected by a processing disorder, his grades would have reflected his problems more consistently.
The evidence also establishes that environmental factors, rather than a problem with a psychological process, may have in part caused STUDENT’s discrepancy. During the first quarter, STUDENT earned 1 F, 2 D’s, 1 C, 2 B’s, and an A. By the second quarter, STUDENT had pulled his grades up to A’s, B’s, and C’s without being provided any services at all. STUDENT’s father testified that STUDENT’s grades began to decline during the spring quarter after an incident where a science teacher screamed at STUDENT. STUDENT’s father also testified that STUDENT often cried at school and had a number of panic, asthma, and anxiety attacks which affected his performance in school. STUDENT’s ablity to excel from time to time in each of his classes without special education services and the effect that his anxiety had on his performance does not support Petitioner’s contention that his ADHD resulted in his needing special education services. Because Petitioner’s ADHD did not result in a psychological process disorder that caused a severe discrepancy between his ability and his achievement, STUDENT was not qualified for special education as a student with an SLD during the 1995-1996 school year.
2. 1996-1997 school year
Petitioner presented no significant evidence that differed from the evidence presented for his seventh grade year to prove that STUDENT had an SLD during eighth grade. Thus, STUDENT can not be found to have had an SLD during this year for the same reasons stated above. (Footnote 4)
B. Other Health Impaired (OHI)
An ADHD student can also be eligible for special education if he has an "other health impairment" and, by reason thereof, needs special education. Title 5 California Code of Regulations Section 3030(f) states that eligibility for special education as other health impaired is established when "a pupil has limited strength, vitality or alertness, due to chronic or acute health problems...which adversely affects a pupil's educational performance. See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(b)(8).
STUDENT’s parents testified that the District has been aware of STUDENT’s asthma since early grammar school and aware of his ADHD since he was diagnosed in 1993. They also assert that the District should have qualified him for special education as OHI prior to doing so in 1998. In support of their contentions, they testified that STUDENT has difficulty finishing his homework assignments because he is easily distractable and lacks focus. Furthermore, PARENT testified that STUDENT’s teachers have commented that STUDENT “needs to focus” and “needs to stay on task.” PARENT also testified that, in the seventh grade, STUDENT had an anxiety attack which resulted in his being disoriented and confused as to where he was.
Although the evidence suggests that the ADHD and/or asthma caused STUDENT’s alertness to be limited, there was no persuasive evidence that STUDENT's educational performance has been adversely affected in any substantial way by the ADHD or asthma. STUDENT has always maintained passing or better grades and performed generally at or above grade expectancies. During the seventh grade, STUDENT had a grade point average (GPA) of 2.71. During the eighth grade, STUDENT had a GPA of 2.5. STUDENT also consistently scored well above average on academic achievement tests. During the seventh and eighth grade, his achievement scores ranged from percentages in the upper 80's to the mid 90's. Because STUDENT’s ADHD and asthma did not significantly affect his educational performance, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT did not meet eligibility criteria for special education as OHI during the 1995-1996 and 1996-1997 school years.C. Severe Emotional Disturbance (SED)
California Code of Regulations, Title 5, § 3030(i) provides that a student qualifies for special education services if, because of a serious emotional disturbance, a pupil exhibits one or more of the following characteristics over a long period of time and to a marked degree, which adversely affect educational performance:
(1) An inability to learn which cannot be explained by intellectual, sensory, or health factors.
(2) An inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships with peers and teachers.
(3) Inappropriate types of behavior or feelings under normal circumstances exhibited in several situations.
(4) A general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression. (5) A tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears associated with personal or school problems.
Of the five criteria, Petitioner presented significant evidence only on the last criteria: the tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears associated with personal or school problems. STUDENT’s parents testified at length that STUDENT suffered a great deal of anxiety over his underachieving in school and because he was constantly teased by other students. They asserted that his anxiety resulted in anxiety and panic attacks at school. PARENT testified that, in the seventh grade, STUDENT had an anxiety attack during his math class. MOTHER testified that STUDENT would often cry at school and that this occurred through his eighth grade year. STUDENT’s therapist, Wendy Ritchey, testified that STUDENT has an anxiety disorder which interferes with his ability to focus. She also stated that STUDENT would initiate self injurious behavior to keep himself from going to school.
Although the evidence suggests that STUDENT has one of the characteristics of a student with an SED, STUDENT does not qualify for special education under this category because his educational performance was not adversely affected by the apparent SED characteristic to a significant degree. As was found in the previous section, STUDENT generally performed at or above grade level and consistently scored in the high average range on his achievement tests. For the foregoing reasons, STUDENT did not qualify for special education as a student with an SED during the 1995-1996 and 1996-1997 school years.
III. Did the District deny STUDENT a free appropriate public education during the 1992 to 1998 school years?
Under both state law and the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), students with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). 20 U.S.C. § 1400; Education Code § 56000. The term “free appropriate public education” means special education and related services that are available to the student at no charge to the parent or guardian, that meet the State educational standards, and that conform with the student’s individualized educational program (IEP). 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18). “Special education” is defined as specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of the student. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16).
The term “related services” includes transportation and other services that may be required to assist a child to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17). California Education Code § 56363 similarly provides that designated instruction and services (DIS), California’s term for related services, shall be provided “when the instruction and services are necessary for the pupil to benefit educationally from his or her instructional program.”
In Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District, et al. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982), the United States Supreme Court determined that the student’s individualized educational program (IEP) must be reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit. The Court in Rowley concluded that the IDEA does not require school districts to provide special education students with the best education available or to provide instruction or services that maximize the student’s abilities. The Court stated that school districts are required to provide only a “basic floor of opportunity” that consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the student. Rowley, 458 at 207-208. In addition, special education law requires that a student be educated in the least restrictive environment (LRE) and that removal of a student from the regular education environment occurs only when the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily. 34 C.F.R. 300.550(b)(2); Education Code § 56301.
The Supreme Court in Rowley also recognized the importance of adherence to the procedural requirements of the IDEA. Procedural violations that result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringes on the parents’ participation in the IEP process may result in the denial of a free appropriate public education to the student. W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range, 960 F.2d 1479 (9th Cir. 1992).
The analysis of whether a student has been provided a free appropriate public education (FAPE) is twofold, requiring the Hearing Officer to first decide whether procedural steps have been followed, and to then decide whether the proposed placement is substantively appropriate. (Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-207.) Therefore, the Hearing Officer will first consider procedural appropriateness and then consider substantive appropriateness.
A. Procedural appropriateness
1. Did the District fail to notify STUDENT’s parents of their procedural rights?
Education Code § 56321(a) provides that a copy of the notice of parents rights must be attached to assessment plans. STUDENT's parents contend that they have been denied equal participation in the IEP process because the District failed to notify them of their special education rights. However, it has already been found that the District provided MOTHER with their procedural rights as early as 1992.
The evidence also establishes that STUDENT’s parents were given their rights at various times during the ensuing years. Jeannine Upson testified that, in 1992, a copy of the parental rights were printed on the back of an assessment plan which was given to STUDENT’s parents. Additionally, Laura Morlan, school administrator for Mt. Diablo USD, testified that she gave a copy of a booklet on parental rights to STUDENT’s parents at a 504 meeting in 1996. Furthermore, STUDENT’s parents have consistently signed IEP’s and assessment plans signifying that they were given a copy of their parental rights. (See Pet’s Exhs. 6, 8, 11, 12, 20, 30, and 35.) Based on the above, the District met their duty to provide STUDENT’s parents with such rights.
2. Did the District fail to convene an IEP meeting prior to providing speech and language therapy in April 1993?
The consideration of this issue is barred by the statute of limitations.
3. Did the District fail to convene an IEP meeting when one was requested by STUDENT’s parent in 1996 during STUDENT’s seventh grade year?
All referrals for special education and related services must initiate the assessment process and must be documented. 5 C.C.R. § 3021(a). When an oral referral is made by a parent, the staff of the school district must offer assistance in reducing the request to writing. Id. As was found earlier, STUDENT was not eligible for special education services during his seventh grade year. Accordingly, any procedural violation resulting from the District’s alleged failure to convene an IEP meeting when one was requested by STUDENT’s parents would not result in a denial of FAPE for STUDENT.
4. Was the IEP team meeting of May 19, 1998 unreasonably delayed?
Within fifteen days of a referral for a special education assessment, the parents shall be given a proposed assessment plan in writing. Education Code § 56321(a). The parents have “at least fifteen days” from receipt of the proposed assessment plan to decide whether or not to consent to the plan. Education Code § 56321(c). Unless the parents consent in writing to an extension, districts must develop an IEP in accordance with the results of an assessment within fifty days of receipt of the parents’ consent to assess. Education Code § 56344.
PARENT and MOTHER testified that STUDENT was failing all of his classes during his freshman year. As a result, they made a written request for an assessment on January 26, 1998. The assessment plan was developed on February 2nd and the consent to assess was signed on February 4th. Based on the deadlines set out in the Education Code, the District had 50 days from February 4th to develop an IEP consistent with the assessment. Thus, the IEP must have been developed by March 26, 1998. (Footnote 5)
The IEP was not developed until June 2, 1998, when the District made an offier of placement to STUDENT. An initial IEP meeting was held on May 19, 1998, when the IEP team agreed to continue the meeting due to lack of agreement on a resolution. On May 22, 1998, the IEP team met again and found STUDENT to be eligible for special education as a student who is “other health impaired” as a result of his ADHD. On June 2, 1998, the IEP convened again and the District offered STUDENT resources specialist assistance and site based counseling. STUDENT’s parents did not accept this offer of placement. Then, on June 24, 1998, STUDENT’s placement was determined to be a non-public school at Spraings Academy. Although an extension of the fifty day time line was requested by the District, no evidence was presented to establish that such consent was given.
Because the IEP was due on March 26, 1998, and the IEP was not developed until June 2, 1998, the Hearing Officer finds that the District violated its obligation to develop an IEP within fifty days of receiving the consent to conduct the assessment. Additionally, the violation resulted in a denial of FAPE. Had the IEP been developed on time and resulted in STUDENT being qualified (as he was in May), STUDENT would have had almost three months left in school to make up his failing grades in a special education placement. Rather, no specific placement offer was made until early June when school was about to adjourn for the year. For the foregoing reasons, the Hearing Officer finds that the District’s procedural violation resulted in a denial of FAPE for STUDENT. However, as will be discussed below, the District offered STUDENT a placement on extended school year and the home hospital program so that he could raise his grades during the summer months. These supplemental services compensated STUDENT for time lost during the delay in developing his IEP.
B. Substantive appropriateness
1. Did the District deny STUDENT a FAPE by failing to identify and assess STUDENT between the 1992 and 1998 school years as a student with exceptional needs?
The statute of limitations bar Petitioner’s issues prior to June 1995. As was found earlier, STUDENT did not qualify for special education during the 1995 through 1997 school years. Accordingly, he was not a student that needed to be identified and assessed for special education during this time. Also, it is undisputed that STUDENT was qualified towards the end of his freshman year in high school. Thus, the only issue that remains is whether the District should have identified and assessed STUDENT as a special education student during his freshman year prior to his being qualified for special education services.
California special education law requires school districts to actively seek out children who may be eligible for special education. Districts are required to have systems in place that ensure that individuals with exceptional needs are referred for assessment when necessary. California Education Code §§ 56300-56302. However, California Education Code § 56303 states that “a pupil shall be referred for special education instruction and services only after the resources of the regular education program have been considered and, where appropriate, utilized.”
The Hearing Officer finds that the District did not violate their duty to identify and assess STUDENT at the beginning of his ninth grade year. The evidence has established that STUDENT performed at or above grade level throughout his educational career. It was not until his freshman year in high school that his grades took a drastic decline. Petitioner presented little evidence to explain the reason for his decline during this time. STUDENT’s parents suggested that part of the reason for his decline was the District’s failure to timely implement his 504 plan when he entered high school. However, the District disputes this assertion.
As was found earlier, STUDENT’s ADHD, asthma, and anxiety appeared to affect his schooling. However, the conditions had not significantly affected his academic performance so as to require special education services. This finding was in large part determined by looking at his grades, achievement scores, and progression through each grade. Thus, without access to any other indicators, if his grades, scores, or progress dramatically declines, the District should have identified STUDENT as a student who may need special education. During STUDENT’s first quarter in high school, he received two F’s. By the end of his second quarter, he raised his grade in one class to a C, but received two more F’s in other classes. At this point, STUDENT was failing half of his classes and was below average in another class. With the knowledge of his ADHD, asthma, and anxiety problems, the District should have been on notice that STUDENT may require special education services. Thus, the District should have investigated STUDENT’s need for special education some time in January 1998. It is impossible, however, to determine whether the District failed to identify STUDENT for assessment at this point because his parents made a written request for assessment during this time. The parent’s written request initiated the assessment procedures for STUDENT. Although it cannot be determined whether the District failed to identify STUDENT, as was decided above, District failed to conduct a timely assessment of STUDENT. Because the assessment was procedurally inappropriate, the District violated its duty to identify and assess STUDENT.
III. Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for services they procured for STUDENT?
Parents may be entitled to reimbursement for the costs of placement or services they have procured for their child when the school district has failed to provide a FAPE and the private placement or services are determined to be proper under IDEA and are reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit to the child. In addition, equitable considerations may be considered in granting relief, and courts have broad discretion in granting such relief. School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education, 471 U.S. 359 (1985); Student W. v. Puyallup School District, 31 F.3d 1489, 1496 (9th Cir 1994).
A. Counseling for STUDENT provided by a psychologist from Kaiser Hospital between April 1992 and October 1992
The issue relating to reimbursement for STUDENT’s private counseling at Kaiser Hospital is barred from being raised by the statute of limitations.
B. Counseling for STUDENT provided by Dr. Wendy Ritchey from August 1992 and September 1998
Petitioner’s claims for reimbursement of counseling prior to June 1995 are barred by the statute of limitations. It was found above that STUDENT was not qualified for special education during the 1995 to 1997 school years. Thus, STUDENT’s parents are not entitled to reimbursement for the counseling expenses incurred during that time. Finally, STUDENT’s parents are also not entitled to reimbursement for counseling expenses procured after March 26, 1998 (when STUDENT should have been qualified for special education) because it has not been established that the counseling is educationally related. Although Dr. Ritchey testified that STUDENT’s anxiety affected his school performance, she also stated that the main focus of STUDENT’s therapy was to improve his social skills. Petitioner presented little, if any, evidence to establish why STUDENT’s grades declined during his freshman year and whether he required counseling to help him benefit from his education. For the above reasons, Petitioner’s request for reimbursement for counseling expenses is denied.
C. Placing STUDENT in the Sylvan Learning Center in March 1993
The issue relating to reimbursement for STUDENT’s private counseling at Kaiser Hospital is barred from being raised by the statute of limitations.
D. Placing STUDENT in the Quest summer program in early 1996 E. Tutoring from the Sylvan Learning Center between April 1997 and October 1997 F. Tutoring by Fred Rich between March 1998 and June 1998 G. Tutoring by Patrick Yuh in April 1998
It was found above that STUDENT was not eligible for special education between 1995 and 1997. Because STUDENT did not require special education services, STUDENT’s parents are not entitled to reimbursement for expenses procured during this time. Petitioner also failed to establish that STUDENT required the tuturing services from Fred Rich and Patrick Yuh to benfit from his education. According to his report card, STUDENT failed five of his seven classes while he was receiving this tutoring. Thus, STUDENT is not entitled to reimbursement for such expenses either.
I. Independent assessments:
California Education Code § 56329(b) provides that a parent may obtain an independent educational evaluation from a qualified specialist at public expense if the parent disagrees with the assessment conducted by the educational agency. However, if the educational agency establishes at a due process hearing that its assessment is appropriate, it is not required to pay for the independent evaluation. Id.
For the District’s assessment to be appropriate, it must meet the requirements of California Education Code § 56320, which states in relevant part that testing and assessment materials and procedures must be selected and administered so as not to be racially, culturally, or sexually discriminatory; provided and administered in the student’s primary language or other mode of communication; administered by trained personnel in conformance with test instructions; and validated for the specific purpose for which they are used. Additionally, pursuant to subsection (g) the assessment must be conducted by persons knowledgeable of the student’s disability. Psychological assessments must be conducted by credentialed school psychologists, and health assessments must be conducted by a credentialed school nurse or physician. Assessment and testing materials must also not measure the student’s impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills unless that is what the test purports to measure.
1. Assessment conducted by Dr. Melmed in 1992
This claim is barred from being raised by the statute of limitations.
2. Assessment conducted by Dr. Melmed in 1998
The uncontradicted evidence establishes that the District’s academic assessment of STUDENT was appropriate. The assessment was conducted by Sharon Hanaway-Farrow, the resource specialist at Northgate High School. Ms. Hanaway-Farrow testified that all the requirement for an appropriate assessment were met. She stated that she is a credentialed assessor who has knowledgeable of STUDENT’s disability, that she administered the assessments in conformity with the instructions provided by the producers of the tests, and that the tests were conducted in STUDENT’s primary language of English. Furthermore, she testified that the tests were non-discriminatory, that they tested all areas of STUDENT’s suspected disability, and that they and produced reliable results. Moreover, the results of the assessment was comparable to those of Dr. Melmed’s assessment.
Petitioner did not present any evidence to contest the appropriateness of the District’s academic assessment. Furthermore, MOTHER testified that she hired Dr. Melmed to conduct an assessment of STUDENT because she felt that the District was “slow.” She also stated that when she hired Dr. Melmed, she had not yet seen the District’s assessment. If STUDENT’s parents had not yet seen the District’s report when they asked Dr. Melmed conduct to conduct his assessment, they could not have possibly disagreed with the appropriateness of the District’s report. Because the District has established that its academic assessment was appropriate and the parents did not in fact disagree with it, STUDENT’s parents are not entitled to reimbursement for Dr. Melmed’s independent academic assessment.
3. Assessment conducted by Dr. Violet Spraings in 1998
As stated earlier, the District has fifty days from the receipt of the parent’s consent to assess to develop an IEP in accordance with the results of the assessment. Education Code § 56344. Because the development of the IEP must be based on the assessment findings, this provision of law requires that the assessment upon which the IEP is based is also completed within fifty days from the parental consent to assess.
STUDENT’s parents request reimbursement for an independent psycho-educational assessment conducted by Violet Spraings from Spraings academy on May 6, 1998. STUDENT’s parents gave the District consent to assess STUDENT on February 4, 1998. Accordingly, the District was required to complete STUDENT’s assessment by March 26, 1998 when the IEP was due. In this case, the District failed to conduct STUDENT’s cognitive and social-emotional assessment until May 5, 1998, over a month after the assessment was required to be completed. The assessment for which Petitioner seeks reimbursement was completed on May 6, 1998. Both the Spraings assessment and the District assessment investigated STUDENT’s cognitive and social-emotional functioning.
By failing to conduct the assessment within time deadlines set by law, the District’s cognitive and social-emotional assessment was procedurally inappropriate. As was stated earlier, no evidence was presented to establish that STUDENT’s parents consented to extend the fifty day time line. Furthermore, Katie Evans, school psychologist at Northgate High School who assessed STUDENT, testified that she could not conduct STUDENT’s cognitive and social emotional assessments sooner because she was busy conducting a number of “emergency” pre-expulsion hearings. Because the assessment was conducted after the fifty day timeline had lapsed, STUDENT’s parents were deprived an assessment with which they could scrutinize. As such, the assessment was both untimely and non-existent when one was required to have been produced. Accordingly, STUDENT’s parents are entitled to reimbursement for costs incurred in procuring the Violet Spraings assessment.
IV. Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education?
Appropriate relief for denial of appropriate special education services includes compensatory education. Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School District, 31 F3d 1489 (9th Cir. 1994). (See also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). Because STUDENT did not qualify for special education until spring 1998, he was not denied a FAPE for which he may be awarded compensatory education. The only basis for which STUDENT would qualifiy for compensatory education services stems from the District’s delay in developing his IEP in 1998. As a result the two month delay, STUDENT was left without special education services and continued to fail his classes. However, the District has already provided compensatory education for the two month delay in developing STUDENT’s IEP when they provided him extended school and the home hospital program during the summer of 1998. STUDENT’s parents both testified that STUDENT used this time to pass his classes and was able to progess to the tenth grade. Furthermore, Joan Alber, administer of special education for Mt. Diablo USD, testified that STUDENT’s placement at Spraings was beyond what he required and was intended as compensatory education. STUDENT’s parents testified that he is currently performing above grade level in many of his classes at Spraings academy. Because the has received services that approximates what he missed in school as a result of the District’s delay, all claims for compensatory education are denied.
ORDER
The District shall reimburse PARENT and PARENT for the cost of the assessment conducted by Violet Spraings in 1998. All Petitioner’s other claims are denied.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute:
I. Are STUDENT’s claims arising prior to June 2, 1995 barred by the statute of limitations? The District prevailed on this issue.
II. Was STUDENT eligible for special education because of a specific learning disability (SLD), other health impairment (OHI), or serious emotional disturbance (SED) from 1992 to 1997?
The District prevailed on this issue.
III. Did the District deny STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during the 1992-1998 school years? The District prevailed on this issue
IV. Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for:
A. counseling for STUDENT provided by a psychologist from Kaiser Hospital between April 1992 and October 1992, The District prevailed on this issue.
B. counseling for STUDENT provided by Dr. Wendy Ritchey from August 1992 to March 1995, The District prevailed on this issue.
C. placing STUDENT in the Sylvan Learning Center in March 1993, The District prevailed on this issue.
D. placing STUDENT in the Quest summer program in early 1996, The District prevailed on this issue.
E. tutoring from the Sylvan Learning Center between April 1997 and October 1997, The District prevailed on this issue.
F. tutoring by Fred Rich between March 1998 and June 1998, The District prevailed on this issue.
G. tutoring by Patrick Yuh in April 1998, The District prevailed on this issue.
H. the independent assessments:
1. conducted by Dr. Melmed in 1992, The District prevailed on this issue.
2. conducted by Dr. Melmed in 1998, and The District prevailed on this issue.
3. conducted by Dr. Violet Spraings in 1998?
Petitioner prevailed on this issue.
V. Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education?
The District prevailed on this issue because Petitioner obtained no relief.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. Education Code § 56505(i).
DATED: February 1, 1999 ____________________________________ Van T. Vu, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
FOOTNOTES
1. Report cards submitted into the record reflect quarterly grades, rather than semester or year-long grades.
2. As noted in the background facts, Petitioner filed a request for a special education due process hearing on June 2, 1998.
3. The District argues that STUDENT’s ability/achievement discrepancy can not be determined by his grades, achievement tests, and IQ alone. Regardless, the analysis below shows that Petitioner’s claim that he had an SLD fails even if such scores were used in the analysis.
4. Moreover, during the eighth grade STUDENT was placed on a 504 accommodations plan which his father testified improved his academic performance. Because the accommodations to the general education program were able to correct his discrepancy, STUDENT has not met the eligibility requirements to be a student with an SLD.
5. California Education Code § 56321(a) provides for a number of ways to toll the 50 day timeline. However, the District did not offer any basis at hearing why the timeline should have been tolled.
