California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · March 5, 2001

Student v. Auburn Union Elementary School District

SEHO Case No. SN 823-00 · Hearing Officer Mary L. Cote

Auburn Union Elementary must reimburse private speech therapy to make up missed kindergarten services; request for after-school therapy denied.

Split decision: student prevailed on 3 of 5 issues

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Summary

A mother filed for her six-year-old son, who qualified for special education because of expressive language delays and had severe articulation and oral-motor difficulties. She claimed Auburn Union Elementary School District failed to provide the speech therapy he needed in kindergarten (1999-2000). She also asked that his first-grade therapy be scheduled outside class time. The Hearing Officer first ruled that an earlier California Department of Education compliance finding did not bar the speech claims, because the compliance process is not a judicial-type hearing. She dismissed a request to remove an occupational therapy report from the student's file because records disputes fall outside the hearing office's jurisdiction.

The Hearing Officer found that the March 1999 IEP did not state how often, how long, or what kind of speech services the student would get. She held that the district should have continued the preschool level of services. That level came to 56 hours from July 1999 through March 2000. The district kept no attendance records, so she relied on the mother's estimate that the student received about 4.3 hours. After credit for 7.5 hours of make-up sessions and earlier reimbursement, a 44.2-hour shortfall remained. She rejected the district's argument that a stronger first-grade program had made up the loss. As a compensatory remedy, she ordered the district to reimburse the parents for weekly half-hour private sessions at Auburn Speech and Hearing Center during 2000-2001. She denied the request to move therapy out of class time because the pull-out sessions were providing educational benefit.

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Why it matters

The decision shows how SEHO dealt with an IEP that did not state service frequency and duration and a district that kept no service logs. The Hearing Officer relied on the parent's estimate of services provided. She also held that a compliance complaint finding did not prevent a due process hearing on the same services.

Issues and holdings

  1. Issue Motion A. District motion to dismiss all issues regarding past speech and language services as resolved through the CDE compliance complaint process and the May 31, 2000 IEP.

    Motion denied: the CDE compliance investigation was not judicial in nature, so neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel applied, and neither the compliance order nor the May 31, 2000 IEP resolved all kindergarten speech claims.

  2. Dismissed / withdrawnRecords

    Issue Motion B. Whether the District should be required to remove an October 27, 2000 OT assessment report from Petitioner's cumulative educational file.

    Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; removal or amendment of records is governed by separate federal and state record procedures, not due process.

  3. Student prevailedImplementation

    Issue 1. Did the District provide Petitioner with appropriate speech and language services during the 1999-2000 kindergarten school year?

    The March 1999 IEP failed to state frequency, duration and nature of services; Student was entitled to 56 hours of speech services but received about 4.3 hours, denying FAPE.

  4. Issue 2. If not, is the Petitioner entitled to compensatory speech and language services or reimbursement for missed services?

    After crediting 7.5 hours of make-up and reimbursed services, a 44.2-hour deficit remained; a richer first-grade program did not cure it, so the District must reimburse ongoing private speech sessions for 2000-2001.

  5. District prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue 3. To benefit from his education during the 2000-2001 school year, must the District provide Petitioner's speech and language therapy at a time other than during his regular school day?

    No requirement that services be given outside class time; pull-out sessions provide educational benefit under Rowley and Education Code section 56363(a).

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • Reimbursement. As a compensatory education remedy, the District shall reimburse the parents for the costs of weekly one-half hour private speech sessions at Auburn Speech and Hearing Center during the 2000-2001 school year, including sessions when Student is off track, within 20 calendar days after the parents present the provider's invoice.

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Key authorities

Rowley; School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education; Student W. v. Puyallup School District; Clyde K. v. Puyallup School District; Lucht v. Molalla River School Dist.; People v. Sims; Hollywood Circle, Inc. v. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control; Lester H. v. Gilhool; Miener v. State of Missouri; Alamo Heights Independent School District v. State Board of Education

People named in the decision

  • Vincent Pastorino, Hearing Officer (observer), Special Education Hearing Office
  • David Swart, Assistant superintendent of instructional services, Auburn Union Elementary School District
  • Pamela Jean Culp, Speech-language pathologist, independent assessor (District witness), American River Speech and Hearing
  • Claudia Malin, Special education coordinator, Auburn Union Elementary School District
  • Susan Quail, Kindergarten and first-grade general education teacher, Skyridge Elementary School
  • Doris Chandler, Vice-principal, Skyridge Elementary School
  • Eleanor Aldridge, District speech-language pathologist, Auburn Union Elementary School District
  • Karen Cardoza, Speech-language pathologist, preschool speech provider and assessor, Auburn Union Elementary School District (Rock Creek PPPIP)
  • Jill Cress, Preschool classroom teacher, Rock Creek PPPIP
  • Cindy Levesque, Speech therapy provider, Auburn Union Elementary School District
  • Auburn Speech and Hearing Center, Private speech therapy provider
  • American River Speech and Hearing, Independent speech-language assessment agency

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Mary L. Cote, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, on January 4 and 5, 2001, in Auburn, California.

Petitioner STUDENT (Petitioner or STUDENT) was represented at the hearing by his mother. Respondent Auburn Union Elementary School District (District) was represented by attorney Sherianne Laba from the law firm of Girard & Vinson. David Swart, assistant superintendent of instructional services, also was present on behalf of the District. Hearing Officer Vincent Pastorino was present as an observer.

PARENT testified on behalf of the Petitioner. The District called the following witnesses: Pamela Jean Culp, speech and language pathologist from American River Speech; Claudia Malin, special education coordinator for the District; Susan Quail, Petitioner’s kindergarten and first grade teacher at Skyridge Elementary School; Doris Chandler, vice-principal of Skyridge Elementary School; and Eleanor Aldridge, District speech and language pathologist.

Oral and documentary evidence was received. The record was left open for written closing briefs. Upon receipt of closing briefs, the record was closed and the matter submitted for decision.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

At the beginning of the hearing, the District made motions to (a) dismiss all issues regarding past speech and language services, claiming those issues had been resolved through the compliance complaint process with the California Department of Education (CDE), and (b) dismiss for lack of jurisdiction the Petitioner’s request for removal of an occupational therapy (OT) report from the Petitioner’s cumulative educational file maintained by the District. The Hearing Officer denied the motion to dismiss issues regarding speech and language services and granted the motion to dismiss the issue related to removal of an OT report from Petitioner’s cumulative education file. Each motion is addressed separately below.

Issues regarding speech and language resolved by the compliance report.

The District contended that all issues surrounding the District’s alleged failure to provide speech and language services required by Petitioner’s individualized educational program (IEP) dated March 23, 1999, should be dismissed. The District asserted that all such issues were fully and finally resolved through the compliance complaint procedures and by agreement of the parties at an IEP meeting on March 31, 2000. Petitioner disputed the District’s assertion that the compliance finding resolved all issues concerning the District’s provision of speech services. Petitioner asserted that compliance findings were limited to the period from January to March 2000. Petitioner contended that throughout his kindergarten year the District failed to provide the level of speech services called for by his IEP dated March 23, 1999. Petitioner additionally asserted that he has raised issues for the instant hearing regarding the appropriateness of speech services provided by the District during the current school year, which were not raised in the compliance complaint.

Complaints alleging failure to comply with the requirements of special education law are governed by procedures set forth in Chapter 5.1, Title of the California Code of Regulations. Cal. Educ. Code Section 56500.2; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, Section 46101(b)(vii). The compliance unit of the CDE is required to conduct an investigation, make a determination as to whether a violation of special education requirements has occurred, and issue a written decision that includes findings of fact, conclusions, and the reasons for the decision. Cal. Educ. Code Sections 56043(n)(1)-(3); 34 C.F.R. Section 300.661(a).

The compliance complaint filed with the CDE by PARENT on April 11, 2000, resulted in findings by the compliance unit that: a) the District failed to implement Petitioner’s IEP dated March 23, 1999, in regard to speech and language therapy and b) a substitute teacher who provided Petitioner’s speech therapy did not possess the appropriate credentials to provide the services. (Petitioner’s Exhibit G)

The corrective action ordered was to: a) convene an IEP meeting within 15 days to determine how the missed services would be made up based on the Petitioner’s current needs, and b) within 30 days provide evidence the IEP meeting was held and how the missed services would be made-up. Following the compliance report, the District convened an IEP meeting on May 31, 2000.

The IEP dated May 31, 2000, states that the team discussed “a plan to determine the best steps to prepare for July 2000 IEP and make up services.” Five extra speech sessions were recommended as make up sessions. Additionally, reimbursement to Petitioner’s parents for $400.00 was recommended for private speech sessions they provided Petitioner from February 25 to April 19, 2000. In fact, the District reimbursed this amount to PARENT and the District provided additional speech sessions to remedy its failure to provide speech therapy from an appropriately credentialed person from January to March 2000.

Neither State nor federal special education law specifically address whether Petitioner is precluded from raising the appropriateness of speech services where, as here, the CDE has issued a decision after investigating a complaint regarding speech services during the same time period. Referring to a Policy Letter dated July 28, 1995, issued by the federal Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP), a federal District Court stated that according to the OSEP Policy Letter, “a party aggrieved by a [state educational agency or SEA] decision following a complaint investigation under a state’s [complaint resolution procedure] is permitted to pursue a due process hearing on the same issues, with that hearing decision prevailing over a conflicting SEA decision. (Lucht v. Molalla River School Dist., 57 F.Supp.2d 1060, 1065 (D. Ore. 1999; See also Letter to Lieberman, 23 IDELR 351.) In Lucht, the District Court noted that although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has not decided this issue, the implication of other circuit court decisions was that after an administrative complaint procedure determination had been made, a due process hearing could be held on the same issues. The court stated that this implication arose in the context of the requirement that administrative remedies must be exhausted before filing a court action under the predecessor statute to the IDEA.

As to whether the CDE compliance report is entitled to res judicata or collateral estoppel effect, the California Supreme Court held in Hollywood Circle, Inc. v. Dep’t. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 55 Cal.2d 728, (1961) that res judicata applied to the decision of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board where the function of the administrative agency was a “purely judicial one” of reviewing another agency’s decision to determine conformity with the law and support by the substantial evidence. (Emphasis added.) In People v. Sims, 32 Cal.3d 468 (1982), the California Supreme Court analyzed factors that would be determinative of whether the administrative agency’s function was “purely judicial.” The court stated “collateral estoppel may be applied to decisions made by administrative agencies ‘[w]hen an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate. . .’” 32 Cal.3d at 479 (quoting United States v. Utah Constr. Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966).) In determining whether a Department of Social Services hearing (DSS) was “judicial” in nature, the Sims court analyzed the following factors: whether the parties could call and cross-examine witnesses and compel the testimony of witnesses by subpoena, whether testimony was submitted under oath or affirmation, and whether a verbatim record was maintained of the hearing.

In contrast to the DSS hearing, the CDE compliance complaint procedure consists entirely of a review of documents and interviews of the complainant and District personnel by an investigator. The compliance decision made in this case was not based on sworn testimony and cross-examination of witnesses nor was there a hearing on the issues raised by the complainant. Thus, it could not be concluded that the parties had the opportunity to fully litigate the issues. Therefore, the Hearing Officer found that the CDE was not acting in a “judicial” capacity when it made a determination of the issues raised by the compliance complaint filed on behalf of Petitioner. Accordingly, neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel applied to preclude Petitioner from raising at the due process hearing issues related to speech and language services provided by the District.

Moreover, the compliance complaint findings and order made no attempt to quantify the level (frequency and duration) of services the District was required to provide to Petitioner during his kindergarten year nor did compliance quantify the services provided by an unqualified person. The IEP dated May 31, 2000, also does not quantify missed speech services. PARENT signed her consent to this IEP as to goals and objectives/benchmarks, program placement meeting/process, and participating in the IEP. There is no statement or indication in the May 31, 2000 IEP that it was intended to fully resolve any reimbursement issue except for private sessions procured by Petitioner’s parent from February 25 to April 19, 2000.

Therefore, the Hearing Officer concluded that neither the compliance order nor the IEP dated May 31, 2000, resolved all issues arising from the Petitioner’s assertion that the District failed to provide appropriate speech services that he required during kindergarten. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer denied the District’s motion to dismiss issues for hearing regarding speech and language services.

Issue regarding removal of OT report from Petitioner’s cumulative educational files.

The Petitioner identified as an issue for hearing whether the District should be required to remove from Petitioner’s cumulative educational file an OT assessment report dated October 27, 2000. The IEP team had referred Petitioner for an OT assessment. (Petitioner’s Ex. B). Following receipt of the report of the assessment, PARENT expressed her concerns related to certain information contained within the report to the District in a detailed letter dated November 20, 2000. (Petitioner’s Ex. B) The District asserted that the removal of documents from a student’s educational records falls outside the jurisdiction of the Hearing Officer.

A due process hearing may be requested when there is a proposal or a refusal to initiate or change the identification, assessment, or educational placement of a student, and regarding the provision of a free appropriate public education (FAPE). Education Code § 56501(a). The process for requesting removal or amendment of a pupil’s school records is set forth in 34 C.F.R 300.567 et seq., 34 C.F.R. 99.21 et seq., and Cal. Educ. Code Section 49070. None of those sections confer jurisdiction on the Hearing Office to resolve this issue.

Therefore, the Hearing Officer concluded that removal of a report of an assessment from a student’s cumulative educational file falls outside the issues that may properly be brought at a due process hearing. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer dismissed the issue requesting the Hearing Officer to order the District to remove an OT report from the Petitioner’s cumulative educational file.(Footnote1)

Consistent with the rulings above, this decision only addresses the issues set forth below.

ISSUES(Footnote 2)

1. Did the District provide Petitioner with appropriate speech and language services during the 1999-2000 kindergarten school year?

2. If not, is the Petitioner entitled to compensatory speech and language services or reimbursement for missed services?

3. To benefit from his education during the 2000-2001 school year, must the District provide Petitioner’s speech and language therapy at a time other than during his regular school day?

BACKGROUND FACTS

Petitioner STUDENT is a six-year-old student in the first grade at Skyridge Elementary School in the District. Petitioner has severe articulation and oral motor difficulties. He has difficulty with production of several phonemes and severely distorts the articulation of others. The District presently provides two hours weekly of speech therapy for three out of every four weeks. Petitioner’s parents provide an additional one-half hour weekly of private speech therapy.

Petitioner was born with micropthalmia on the left side and has a prosthesis for the left eye. Motor and language development was somewhat delayed. He started walking at about 15 to 16 months and started speaking in sentences at about two-and-a-half to three years of age. At about three years of age Petitioner suffered trauma to his tongue which affected the tongue musculature and left scarring of the anterior one-third of the tongue. This greatly diminished Petitioner’s ability to have his speech understood. Petitioner has made good progress with speech therapy. His academic performance has been above average (Petitioner’s Ex. D).

The IEP team initially determined Petitioner met special education eligibility because of expressive language delays on November 21, 1997. At that time Petitioner’s parents elected not to have Petitioner participate in the parent participation preschool program (PPPIP). Petitioner’s parents stated that they were “comfortable with the quality of language stimulation” he was receiving at his then-current daycare/preschool site. Petitioner’s parents later enrolled him in the PPPIP at Rock Creek for the 1998-99 school year. While in the PPPIP, Petitioner participated in a 15-minute small-group speech session with Karen Cardoza, CCC-SLP, and a 15-minute small-group language activity with Jill Cress, the preschool classroom teacher, on each Tuesday and Thursday.

In February 1999, Ms. Cardoza performed a speech and language evaluation of Petitioner on behalf of the District. Commencing on February 22, 1999, Cindy Levesque provided an additional 45 minutes of individual or small-group speech therapy after each PPPIP class. Petitioner’s therapy focused on improving his oral motor and articulation skills. The speech and language services provided by the District from February 1999 to the end of the PPPIP program totaled 1.25 hours per day on two days per week for a total of 2.5 hours per week. (Petitioner’s Ex. U)

Petitioner’s IEP dated March 23, 1999 (Petitioner’s Ex. U) includes a goal to improve articulation by improving oral-motor skills and reducing phonological processes. The IEP notes that Petitioner was already attending the PPPIP program two days per week and, in addition, had recently begun seeing Cindy Levesque twice weekly for additional speech therapy. The IEP states “STUDENT’s receiving K [kindergarten] speech and language specialist will review this IEP and speech and language services will continue at STUDENT’s home school when he enters kindergarten.”

Much of the controversy in this case arises from the first page (hereafter “Page A”) of the IEP dated March 23, 1999. Page A of the IEP states under DIS (designated instruction and services) “Rock Creek PPPIP starting March 23, 1999 at one to two times per week with a projected duration of one year.” If strictly interpreted, the language on Page A required between 30 minutes and one hour per week of PPPIP speech and language therapy, with no provision for continuing the one and one-half hours per week of therapy Petitioner had been receiving from Ms. Levesque. This would have reduced the total services the District provided Petitioner from two and one-half hours per week to either 30 minutes or one hour per week. However, following the IEP meeting on March 23, 1999, the Petitioner continued to receive two and one-half hours of speech and language therapy per week until at least May 13, 1999 (Petitioner’s Ex. U).

Ms. Cardoza updated her assessment on May 5, 1999. The May 5, 1999, report of the assessment states the Petitioner exhibited “severe articulation difficulties and oral motor difficulties.” Language skills appeared to be fairly well developed as observed during classroom activities. Ms. Cardoza also stated that Petitioner was “stimuable” for improved speech skills but required “intensive intervention” for observable gains. Speech therapy goals were focused on improving oral motor skills as necessary for improved speech, articulation, and intelligibility. (Respondent’s Ex. 12)

The District operates a year-round school program. Hence, Petitioner was “off-track” in June 1999, awaiting commencement of kindergarten in July 1999. No IEP was developed prior to Petitioner’s entering kindergarten. Petitioner was placed in the regular education kindergarten class taught by Sue Quail. The District provided Petitioner with two weekly sessions of 20 minutes each of speech therapy at the beginning of his kindergarten school year. The therapy was provided with four other students.

In a letter dated September 23, 1999, to the District, PARENT expressed concern regarding Petitioner’s speech therapy. PARENT explained that while attending the PPPIP, Petitioner had received speech and language therapy in the classroom as well as with Ms. Levesque following the PPPIP. PARENT stated that the services provided by Ms. Levesque were either one-to-one or with one other student. PARENT further stated her understanding that the IEP dated March 23, 1999, required the District to continue to provide Petitioner’s speech and language therapy at the level he was receiving while participating in the PPPIP, namely, two hours and one-half per week. (Petitioner’s Ex. U).

During Petitioner’s kindergarten year, the District experienced personnel problems, which impacted Petitioner’s receipt of speech and language therapy. The extent those services were impacted is in dispute. Identifying and quantifying missed speech and language sessions is compounded due to the lack of speech therapy attendance records by the District.

Because of her concerns regarding the amount of speech therapy the District was providing Petitioner, PARENT sought private speech therapy from the Auburn Speech and Hearing Center. Beginning on February 25, 2000, Auburn Speech and Hearing provided weekly speech sessions of 30 minutes each for Petitioner.

Petitioner’s IEP dated April 10, 2000 (Petitioner’s Ex. K), calls for Petitioner to receive through the end of July 2000, twice weekly “speech and language” therapy delivered in 30-minute sessions. The IEP team also recommended that speech and language services continue during “off-track” periods to the extent the services could be arranged with a speech therapist.(Footnote 3)

On April 11, 2000, PARENT filed a compliance complaint with the California Department of Education. The complaint alleged the District had failed to provide Petitioner’s speech therapy by a qualified teacher since mid-November 1999 and that from July 7, 1999 to April 10, 2000, the District failed to provide speech therapy at the level called for by Petitioner’s IEP dated March 23, 1999. The compliance unit found that the District failed to implement speech and language therapy called for by Petitioner’s IEP dated March 23, 1999, during some portions of the relevant period. The compliance unit also concluded that the substitute teacher providing speech therapy did not posses the appropriate credential. On May 16, 2000, the compliance unit ordered the District to convene an IEP meeting within 15 days to determine missed speech/language services and how those services would be made-up based on the Petitioner’s current needs (District Ex. 7, 8, 9).

On May 31, 2000, the IEP team agreed that through July 2000, Petitioner would receive “speech and language” at Skyridge on four days per week for 30 minutes each session. (District Ex. 6). The IEP team also recommended the following: that an independent assessment be undertaken; that the District provide speech therapy during off-track sessions; and that Petitioner was entitled to five additional “make up” sessions of 30 minutes each. The make-up sessions were to be provided during lunch or outside of the regular school day. The District also agreed to reimburse the parent for a total of $400.00 for private speech sessions from February 25 to April 19, 2000. Finally, the District was required to convene an IEP meeting in July 2000, to determine a “rich” speech therapy schedule to include two pull-out sessions in small group and two one-on-one outside-school-day or mutually agreed upon sessions.

An addendum to the IEP dated May 31, 2000, was executed on July 20, 2000. (District Ex. 4) District members of the IEP team proposed that for the first grade, the District would continue to provide Petitioner with speech and language services during off-track periods through August 18, 2000, and that goals and objectives from the prior IEP would continue pending an assessment from American River Speech and Hearing. PARENT did not sign her consent to this plan.

On August 22, 2000, following an assessment of Petitioner’s speech and language skills, Pamela Culp, CCC-SLP, American River Speech and Hearing, issued a report. (District Ex. 3) The report describes Petitioner’s connected, spontaneous speech as 79% intelligible to an unfamiliar listener with the specific context unknown. The report also stated that Petitioner is aware of and frustrated by his current speech deficits. It was recommended that Petitioner receive “intense intervention at the rate of 1-2 hours per week.”

A new IEP was drafted on September 20, 2000. (District Ex. 2) The IEP calls for speech therapy four days per week for 30 minutes each session on three weeks out of four, including off-track times. In reference to missed sessions during the Petitioner’s kindergarten year, the IEP states “make up sessions are not an issue at this time.” At the IEP meeting, PARENT expressed her concerns regarding classroom time Petitioner misses for speech therapy. The percentage of instructional time outside regular class for special education was listed as eight percent. PARENT proposed that speech therapy be provided at a time that would not require Petitioner to miss instruction in his regular classroom. Petitioner’s first-grade teacher, Susan Quail, told the IEP team that Petitioner’s missing class time did not concern her because anything he missed was made-up or addressed later. Due to the provision calling for Petitioner to receive speech therapy during regular class time, PARENT did not consent to the IEP.

The IEP team met again on November 20, 2000, to continue its discussions from the prior meeting. The supplemental IEP page (District Ex. 1) states PARENT’s continuing concerns about speech therapy being provided during class time. Specifically, PARENT expressed concern that Petitioner was missing social interactions with his regular class. The IEP team decided to do a “circle of friends” for the Petitioner. Speech services remained at four sessions weekly of 30 minutes each. PARENT agreed to meet regularly with the therapist regarding oral motor training at home. However, she disagreed with the recommendation of speech therapy to be provided at school, apparently due to the pull-out issue.

Petitioner’s parents have continued to provided private speech therapy for Petitioner through the Auburn Speech and Hearing Center. PARENT continues to dispute the level of speech therapy provided to Petitioner during his kindergarten year and also the appropriateness of speech therapy provided during the current school year.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

ISSUE NO. 1: Did the District provide Petitioner with appropriate speech and language services during the 1999-2000 kindergarten school year?

Under State and federal law, individuals with disabilities have the right to a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE). 20 U.S.C. Section 1400(d), Cal. Educ. Code Section 56000. The term “free appropriate public education” means special education and related services that are available to the Petitioner at no charge to the parent or guardian, that meet the State educational standards, and that conform with the Petitioner’s individualized education program (IEP). 20 U.S.C. Section 1401(8).

“Special education” is defined as specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of the Petitioner. 20 U.S.C. Section 1401(25). The term “related services” includes transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services that may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C. Section 1401(22). California Education Code Section 56363(a) similarly provides that designated instruction and related services (DIS) as specified in the IEP shall be available when the instruction and services are necessary for the pupil to benefit educationally from his or her instructional program.

The parameters for adequacy of a Petitioner’s IEP are set forth in Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson School District, et al. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.176 (1982). The United States Supreme Court determined that the Petitioner’s IEP must be reasonably calculated to provide the Petitioner with some educational benefit. The Court in Rowley concluded that the IDEA (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act) does not require school districts to provide special education students with the best education available or to provide instruction or services that maximize the student’s abilities. The Court stated that school districts are required to provide only a “basic floor of opportunity” that consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide some educational benefit to the Petitioner. Rowley, at 207-208.

There is no dispute that Petitioner needs speech therapy to address articulation and oral motor deficits. The Petitioner contends that the speech and language services provided by the District during his kindergarten year did not comport with the services called for by his IEP dated March 23, 1999, and for this reason, failed to provide him with a free appropriate public education. Petitioner asserts that the IEP required the District to provide him with two and one-half hours of speech and language services per week. However, he received a total of only 4.3 hours of therapy for the entire period from July 1999 to March 23, 2000. The District contends that the IEP only required it provide Petitioner 30 minutes to one hour of speech therapy per week. The District also asserts that Petitioner’s estimate of the speech therapy it actually provided is too low and that it has already made-up whatever services were not previously provided to Petitioner during the 1999-2000 school year.

Analysis of this issue begins with the level of speech therapy required by Petitioner’s IEP dated March 23, 1999. Cal. Educ. Code Section 56345 lists the required components of a written IEP. Among the requirements are statements showing the specific special educational instruction and related services to be provided to the pupil, the projected date for the beginning of those services, and the anticipated frequency, location, and duration of those services. Section 56345(a)(3)(6).

Frequency, Duration, and Nature of Services Required in the Kindergarten Year

Because a new IEP was not developed prior to Petitioner’s entering kindergarten in July 1999, the IEP dated March 23, 1999, remained in effect. The IEP states that “STUDENT’s receiving K [kindergarten] speech and language specialist will review this IEP and speech and language services will continue at STUDENT’s home school when he enters kindergarten.” However, the IEP dated March 23, 1999, fails to set out the speech services with sufficient clarity to allow the receiving speech and language therapist (or the parent) to determine the frequency, duration, and nature of services Petitioner was entitled to during kindergarten. Page A of the IEP dated March 23, 1999, states that Petitioner’s DIS/related services consist of PPPIP at Rock Creek starting on March 23, 1999, at a frequency/duration of 1-2x per week with PPPIP personnel responsible for the program. The terms stated in the IEP are both curious and problematic for the following reasons:

a) PPPIP is by definition a pre-school program; thus, services received through the PPPIP would not necessarily be available in kindergarten.

b) Petitioner would not be attending Rock Creek when he started kindergarten. For the kindergarten year, Petitioner would attend Skyridge.

c) Regarding the frequency of sessions, the statement 1-2x per week is vague.

d) Regarding the duration of each session, no statement is made in the IEP.

e) The IEP language on Page A is silent as to the nature of services to be provided (ie. speech therapy v. language therapy; delivered in a small group v. individually.) Page A does not include the 45 minutes of speech therapy provided twice weekly by Ms. Levesque.

Taken on its face, the IEP is deficient under Section 56345 because it does not specify the frequency, nature, or duration of Petitioner’s speech services. The IEP also is deficient for purposes of determining what the IEP team intended to require as to Petitioner’s speech and language services for his kindergarten year.

Goals and objectives contained in Petitioner’s March 29,1999 IEP were to improve articulation by improving oral motor skills and reducing phonological processes. The PPPIP schedule included a 15 minute small-group language activity led by Jill Cress, the preschool classroom teacher. Ms. Cardoza report of her evaluation of Petitioner states “language skills appear to be fairly well developed as observed during classroom activities.” Petitioner’s IEP does not include goals and objectives to develop language skills. Thus, it has not been shown that the15 minutes of small-group language activity in a pre-school setting administered by a pre-school classroom teacher, was designed to address Petitioner’s goals and objectives. For this reason, it is concluded that Petitioner did not require the 15-minute language session pursuant to benefit from his education or to comport with his IEP.

The PPPIP schedule also included a 15 minute small-group speech activity with Karen Cardoza, the same speech and language pathologist who evaluated Petitioner in February and May 1999 (Petitioner’s Ex. U). The speech activities were provided by a qualified speech pathologist and were designed to address speech production. Although the IEP calls for one to two PPPIP sessions weekly, PARENT’s undisputed testimony establishes that Petitioner attended two sessions of PPPIP weekly. Therefore, it is concluded that Petitioner received 15 minutes of speech therapy two times weekly while attending PPPIP to address his IEP goals and objectives and to provide him with educational benefit.

While attending the PPPIP, Petitioner also received two additional weekly speech sessions of 45 minutes each. Ms. Levesque provided these speech sessions to Petitioner either one-to-one or with one other student. There is no dispute that the therapy provided by Ms. Levesque was designed to meet Petitioner’s goals and objectives and to provide him with educational benefit. In summary, following the IEP dated March 23, 1999, the District provided Petitioner on a weekly basis two 15-minute group speech sessions and two 45-minute speech sessions that were provided either one-to-one or with one other student.

There is no discussion in the IEP document about reducing services as a result of the IEP meeting on March 23, 1999, for either the remainder of the PPPIP school year or when Petitioner entered kindergarten. Given the District’s speech and language evaluation, performed in February 1999, updated on May 5, 1999, and referenced in the March 23, 1999 IEP, which states “intensive intervention” would be required for observable gains, there is no indication that Petitioner had made sufficient improvement in the area of speech production to warrant a reduction in speech services once he entered kindergarten. The speech and language evaluation states Petitioner requires “intensive intervention.” There was no justification for eliminating services equivalent to the twice weekly 45-minute speech sessions that were being provided by Cindy Levesque or the twice weekly fifteen-minute speech sessions provided by Ms. Cardoza.

Moreover, the evidence establishes that following the IEP dated March 23, 1999, until the end of the preschool program, the District continued to provide Petitioner’s speech services at the same level it provided Petitioner prior to the March 23, 1999 IEP, notwithstanding the fact that the 45-minute twice weekly sessions with Cindy Levesque were not specified as DIS or related services on Page A of the IEP. This is confirmation the IEP team intended for those services to continue, despite their omission from Page A. Petitioner’s IEP was drafted to cover a period of one year. There was no IEP meeting convened prior to Petitioner’s entering kindergarten. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that when Petitioner entered kindergarten in July 1999 the District was required to provide him with speech services equivalent to the twice weekly 45-minute sessions being provided by Cindy Levesque and the twice weekly15-minute sessions being provided by Ms. Cardoza.

Total Hours of Services Required in the Kindergarten Year

The Petitioner (Petitioner’s Ex. U and testimony of PARENT) and the District (Closing Brief) each provided calculations of the speech days or sessions Petitioner should have received in kindergarten. The Petitioner’s calculation is based on his position that he was entitled to two speech sessions per week from July 1999 through March 22, 2000 (53 sessions) plus off-track services (8 sessions), for a total of 61 sessions. The off-track sessions are not itemized by the Petitioner.

The District calculated “maximum” and “minimum” figures based on its position that the IEP gave a range of required PPPIP services at one to two per week. The District also computed the sessions as ending on March 17, 2000. Using those assumptions, the District computed a maximum figure of 48 speech and language sessions (at two sessions per week) and a minimum of 28 sessions (at one session per week). Other variations in their method of calculation are apparently due to differing computations of holidays, minimum days, and school days.

Because of its accommodation for holidays and minimum days, the Hearing Officer will use the District’s computation of sessions. It has been concluded above that Petitioner received two sessions of speech therapy each week while in the PPPIP (15 minutes in class and 45 minutes after class). It has also been concluded that there was no basis for reducing the amount of speech therapy Petitioner required while in kindergarten. Thus, the Hearing Officer concludes that there were 48 possible sessions, or “speech days,” during the regular kindergarten school term until a new IEP was developed in March of 2001.

Next to be considered is whether off-track sessions should be added. Off-track periods in the Petitioner’s kindergarten year were in August and December 1999 (District’s Closing Brief, page 11 and Exhibit A; Petitioner’s Ex. U). The March 23, 1999 IEP did not specifically use the term “off-track services.” However, page A of the IEP recommended an “extended school year.” In PARENT’s letter to David Swart (assistant superintendent of instructional services) dated November 20, 1999, PARENT expressed concern that her son would not receive speech therapy while off track the following week. In his reply letter dated December 14, 1999, David Swart stated: “you requested speech services for both of your boys during off-track times in December. In reviewing your request I found that STUDENT's IEP indicated the need for extended year services . . . ” The letter continued: “If these services have not been provided please let me know.” The clear implication of David Swart’s letter is that he understood the March 23, 1999 IEP to require off-track speech services for Petitioner.

The Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner was entitled to speech services during while off-track and, for this reason, adds PARENT’s calculation of eight off-track speech sessions to the other 48 sessions, for a total of 56 speech sessions that were required. At one hour per session (15 minutes plus 45 minutes), it is concluded that Petitioner was entitled to 56 hours of speech services from July 1999 to March 23, 2000.

Services Received

Regarding services Petitioner actually received in kindergarten through March 2000, PARENT computes that only 13 sessions at an average of 20 minutes per session were provided to the Petitioner from July 1999 to March 22, 2000. The District has produced no records of the services actually rendered. The District asserts in its closing brief that because the speech and language therapist did not keep records, neither the District nor PARENT can accurately establish whether the Petitioner received all the speech and language services required by his IEP. The District claims it is entitled to a presumption under California Evidence Code Section 664 that it regularly performed its duties, and that such a presumption places the burden of proof on the Petitioner.

The District has the burden of proof to show it provided a FAPE. Clyde K. v. Puyallup School District, No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1994). See discussion in Christopher Stephen Orr v. Long Beach Unified School District SN 184-00 (2000). Even if a presumption shifting the burden of proof did arise under Section 664 of the Evidence Code, comparison of the evidence regarding services provided weighs in favor of the Petitioner.

It is undisputed that the Petitioner’s speech and language program included a combination of therapists who missed therapy sessions, did not keep attendance logs, or were not appropriately credentialed to provide speech therapy.

The District’s special education coordinator, Claudia Malin, testified that some speech and language sessions took place during the applicable period, but she does not know how many. The Petitioner’s kindergarten teacher, Susan Quail, testified there were inconsistencies in provision of speech and language sessions during kindergarten. Neither witness quantified the services. No attendance log was kept.

PARENT testified her computation of services was based on various information such as her questioning of the Petitioner on speech days regarding whether he had attended speech, her observation of a “frog” in the Petitioner’s backpack given to him at speech sessions, knowledge of Petitioner’s activities while volunteering in his classroom, and her communications with the Petitioner’s kindergarten teacher.

PARENT’s computation of services provided is only an estimate, but the estimate is based on PARENT’s observations and her questioning of competent sources when they had fresh knowledge of the facts. By contrast, the District has not produced evidence to support a useful estimate, despite having been responsible for administration of the services. In her letter to the District dated November 20, 1999, PARENT clearly expressed concern about the school’s failure to keep an attendance log of time actually spent in speech by the Petitioner (Petitioner’s Ex. U). The District was in the best position to keep records on sessions provided, but none have been produced. For purposes of determining services provided, the Hearing Officer will use PARENT’s figures of 13 sessions at 20 minutes each, or a total of 4.3 hours of therapy through from July 1999 through March 22, 2000.(Footnote 4)

Services Required Compared to Services Received

Fifty-six hours of speech services were either required or should have been required by the March 23, 1999 IEP from July 1999 through March 23, 2000. Using PARENT’s estimate, the District provided 4.3 hours to the Petitioner through March 23, 2000, a deficit of 51.7 hours. The Hearing Officer finds the District did not provide a free appropriate public education to the Petitioner in the 1999 to 2000 kindergarten year.

ISSUE 2: Is the Petitioner entitled to a compensatory education or reimbursement remedy for missed services?

Parents may be entitled to reimbursement for the costs of placement or services they have procured for their child when the school district has failed to provide a free appropriate public education (FAPE) and the private placement or services are determined to be appropriate under IDEA. In addition, equitable considerations may be weighed in granting relief and courts have broad discretion in granting such relief. School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education (1985) 471 U.S. 358; Student W. v. Puyallup School District (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 1489, 1496. Moreover, parents need not procure the best possible private placement or services in order to be entitled to reimbursement. Alamo Heights Independent School District v. State Board of Education (5th Cir. 1986) 790 F.2d 1153, 1161.

Court decisions subsequent to Burlington also have extended relief in the form of compensatory education to students who have been denied a FAPE. (See, e.g. Lester H. v. K. Gilhool and the Chester Upland School District (3d. Cir. 1990) 916 F.2d 865; Miener v. State of Missouri (8th Cir. 1986) 800 F.2d 749.) Compensatory education is an equitable remedy. There is no obligation to provide day-for-day or hour-for hour compensation for the 51.7 hours in missed services. “Appropriate relief is relief designed to ensure that the Petitioner is appropriately educated within the meaning of the IDEA.” Puyallup, 31 F.3d at 1497.

Before determining what remedy is appropriate in this case, it is necessary to consider whether the District is entitled to credit for the services and compensation it provided to remedy some of the speech services missed in the Petitioner’s kindergarten year. The District is entitled to credits for the cost of 10 private speech sessions reimbursed to the parents, plus five “make-up” sessions (30 minutes each), as mandated in the May 31, 2000 IEP. Each reimbursed private session was 30 minutes (Petitioner’s Ex. U, page 9 of May 7, 2000 letter). This is equivalent to 15 sessions at 30 minutes each, or 7.5 hours. Adding those 7.5 hours of credits to the 4.3 hours previously provided yields the sum of 11.8 hours of services applicable to the period from July 2000 to March 23, 2000. The above figures, subtracted from 51.7 hours, leave a deficit of 44.2 hours in services required during the kindergarten year through March 23, 2000.

The District asserts that compensatory services due to the Petitioner, if any, were either: a) provided through previous services and reimbursement, or b) made-up or will be made-up through the level of services in first grade, because those services are meeting the Petitioner’s current level of need. In either case, the District argues, the Petitioner has been or is being appropriately educated within the meaning of the IDEA.

Regarding compensation through previous services and reimbursement, the May 31, 2000 IEP specified 7.5 hours of compensatory services. As discussed and quantified above, 7.5 hours of services, when added to previous services, still left a deficit of 44.2 hours in the kindergarten year. There is no basis for finding that the missed services have been adequately made-up through reimbursement and make up sessions called for by subsequent IEP’s.

The alternative assertion by the District is that missed services in kindergarten have been or will be made-up through the level of services in first grade because those services are meeting the Petitioner’s current level of need. Restated, the argument is that if missed services in kindergarten elevated the Petitioner’s “current level of need” in first grade, and if the Petitioner’s elevated “current level of need” is being met in first grade, then compensatory education is already being administered and has probably been completed.

The Hearing Officer finds the District’s arguments unavailing. The District initiated the deficiency in services by failing to properly identify their nature, frequency, and duration on Page A of the March 23, 1999 IEP. The District compounded the problem when attempting to implement the IEP. The District choose to rely on the vague and inadequate language of Page A. That language was interpreted as allowing a reduction of services from 2.5 hours per week to 30 minutes per week, with no explanation or justification. The District then failed to provide even 30 minutes of services per week. The District kept no records of the services provided. To its credit, however, the District has followed the independent assessment recommendation of American River Speech (District Ex. 3) by providing two hours per week of services when the assessment recommended one to two hours per week. However, the District cannot deny FAPE one year and then claim to be making it up by providing a “rich” program the following year.

In fashioning an appropriate remedy, equitable principles apply. PARENT recognized the problems with kindergarten services and took appropriate action. She expressed her concerns orally and in writing to the District in the fall of 1999. Perceiving a need to compensate for deficient services being provided by the District, she enrolled the Petitioner in a supplementary private program in February 2000 at Auburn Speech and Hearing Center. Reimbursement is appropriate when the District failed to provide services and the services procured by the parent are appropriate. However, the District already reimbursed PARENT for the costs of services she procured from the Auburn Speech and Hearing Center during Petitioner’s kindergarten year. PARENT testified the Petitioner has continued to receive those private services in addition to what he receives at Skyridge. The evidence establishes that the services provided at the Auburn Speech and Hearing Center are designed to address Petitioner’s greatest area of need, namely, articulation. The progress Petitioner made, thereby demonstrating that he received benefit from the speech sessions, is documented in Petitioner’s Exhibit R. According to PARENT, Petitioner has continued to benefit from the services he receives at the Auburn Speech and Hearing Center.

The speech and language experts, Pamela Jean Culp and Eleanor Aldridge, who testified at the hearing both stated they did not believe the Petitioner would benefit from more than the two hours per week being received at Skyridge due to the “burn out” factor. However, they were not specifically asked whether they thought the 30 minutes per week of private services at Auburn Speech and Hearing Center were beneficial. They did not state the Petitioner shows signs of saturation or burnout with speech services at Skyridge; to the contrary, the Petitioner’s speech therapist, Eleanor Aldridge, testified the Petitioner appears to enjoy his speech class. All the witnesses were in agreement that the Petitioner has made excellent progress in intelligibility compared to his kindergarten year. PARENT has been paying $40.00 for each 30-minute session and has been consistently involved in the education of her son. She would seem to have both motivation and sufficient knowledge to assess whether those private services have been beneficial. Therefore, it is concluded that the services procured by the parent at the Auburn Speech and Hearing Center were appropriate.

Given the District’s failure to provide appropriate speech services and the fact that Petitioner is entitled to additional hours of speech therapy to remedy the lack of speech services during his kindergarten year, it is concluded that an equitable remedy is to reimburse PARENT for the costs of the speech services she has continued to provide Petitioner through the Auburn Speech and Hearing Center. The Hearing Officer has considered that the figures regarding missed services are the best estimates available and they cannot be considered exact. Also, it is probable the “rich” IEP programs being administered to the Petitioner in his first-grade year have had some compensatory benefit. Therefore, as a compensatory education remedy, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District shall be responsible for reimbursing Petitioner’s parents for the costs of the weekly one-half hour private sessions at Auburn Speech and Hearing Center they have procured for Petitioner during the 2000-2001 school year, including services provided when Petitioner is “off track.”

ISSUE 3: To benefit from his education during the 2000-2001 school year, must the District provide Petitioner’s speech and language therapy at a time other than during his regular school day?

During the present school year, Petitioner receives speech therapy during the regular school day. PARENT claims the pull-out sessions are interfering with the Petitioner’s social progress by taking him away from certain interactive portions of his regular class. She requests that speech services be provided outside of the regular class time.

Analysis of whether pull-out speech sessions are better for the Petitioner than a placement outside of regular class time is not necessary. The FAPE standards set forth in Rowley, supra, do not require school districts to provide special education students with the best education available or to provide instruction and services that maximize the Petitioner’s abilities. Cal. Educ. Code Section 56363(a) states designated instruction and services as specified in the IEP shall be available when the instruction and services are necessary for the pupil to benefit educationally from his or her instructional program. There is no statutory requirement that designated instruction and services be provided outside of regular class time.

The Petitioner has difficulty with social interactions due to his speech impairments. He has difficulty keeping his classmates’ attention due to his slow speech, his speech is not always intelligible (although reported to be much improved this school year), and he often declines invitations by classmates to join in their games at recess (Testimony of PARENT, Susan Quail, Doris Chandler).

The Petitioner’s first grade teacher, Susan Quail, testified she adjusts the class schedule so the Petitioner does not always miss the same activities. She devotes extra time to him for make up work that may have been missed while at speech. A “circle of friends” was started for social interaction. The Petitioner’s speech therapist, Eleanor Aldridge, testified the Petitioner is very interactive socially in his speech class, which is good for his confidence. The Petitioner’s regular education performance is above-average, and testimony of Susan Quail and Eleanor Aldridge indicates the Petitioner’s speech intelligibility has dramatically improved compared to his intelligibility in kindergarten. Thus, Petitioner is benefitting from his education.

The Rowley standard is not undermined by the pull-out sessions. Furthermore, the pull-out sessions satisfy Cal. Educ. Code Section 56363(a). Speech and language services are necessary for the Petitioner to benefit from his instructional program and the pull-out format is providing that benefit. The Hearing Officer finds there is no basis for discontinuing the pull-out sessions or requiring the speech and language services to be supplied outside of the school day or through private services.

ORDER

1. The District shall reimburse Petitioner’s parents for the costs of weekly one-half hour private speech sessions at Auburn Speech and Hearing Center during the 2000-2001 school year, including sessions when Petitioner is “off track.” Reimbursement shall be paid within 20 calendar days after presentation to the District by the Petitioner’s parents of an invoice from the service provider.

2. Petitioner’s remaining claims for relief are denied.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to Cal. Educ. Code Section 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this requirement:

Issue 1: The Petitioner prevailed on this issue.

Issue 2: The Petitioner prevailed on this issue.

Issue 3: The District prevailed on this issue.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. Cal. Educ. Code Section 56505(i).

Date: March 5, 2001 ________________________ Mary L. Cote, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

Footnote 1: At the hearing, the District provided PARENT with a copy of the District’s established procedures for requesting removal of documents from a student’s educational records. There was no evidence that PARENT had previously followed these procedures and that her request to remove the OT report had been denied.

Footnote 2: The issues listed here differ in numbering and content from those listed by the parties prior to the hearing. Changes were made for purposes of clarification and appropriate analysis. These issues reflect the discussion, evidence, and argument presented by the parties.

Footnote 3: PARENT testified she was coerced into signing the April 10, 2000 IEP because the District told her the prior IEP had expired and no services could be provided until she signed an IEP.

Footnote 4: The compliance unit found the substitute providing Petitioner’s speech therapy was not appropriately qualified, and the Hearing Officer will give deference to that conclusion. The facts as presented at the due process hearing and summarized in the District’s closing brief do not demonstrate the substitute came within one of the exceptions listed in Cal. Educ. Code Section 56061. Therefore, any therapy provided by the substitute has not been included in the 11.8 hour total.