California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · June 5, 2001

Student v. Sacramento City Unified School District

SEHO Case No. SN 871-01 · Hearing Officer Paul R. Gant

Sacramento City Unified may proceed with expulsion; its first manifestation meeting was flawed, but a later meeting fixed the defects.

Split decision: student prevailed on 1 of 2 issues

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Noted in the decision

The parties stipulated to bifurcate. Remaining issues, including the appropriateness of the educational program and any compensatory education, were to be heard in a later bifurcated hearing.

Summary

The parents of a 15-year-old ninth grader at Hiram Johnson High School filed for due process to challenge Sacramento City Unified School District's plan to expel him. He qualified for special education under specific learning disability, with severe difficulties in reading, written expression and cognitive processing. He was also an English learner whose primary language is Hmong. In March 2001 the district suspended him over alleged sexual misconduct toward a female student. The family denied the allegation. The parties agreed to hear only the manifestation determination. Other issues, including compensatory education, were left for a later bifurcated hearing.

The Hearing Officer found that the district's March 8 manifestation meeting was badly flawed. The parents got no written notice and did not attend. No special education or general education teacher attended. The three staff members had only vague information, and the school psychologist did not know physical contact was alleged. Because no proper determination was in place, the district had no right to keep the student out of school as discipline from March 16 through May 13, 2001. A May 14 meeting cured these defects. It had proper notice, the parents, their attorney and advocate, and both teachers. The lack of a Hmong interpreter did not substantially interfere with the parents' participation. On the merits, the evidence showed no link between the learning disability and the alleged conduct. The district may proceed with expulsion.

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Why it matters

This decision shows how SEHO applied the 1997 IDEA manifestation rules. Excluding the parents and required teachers made a determination improper, and the student could not be kept out under it after ten days. A later meeting held with proper procedures could cure the defects. The student then had to show a link between the disability and the conduct.

Issues and holdings

  1. Student prevailedDiscipline

    Issue I. Did the District commit procedural violations in determining that STUDENT's behavior dated March 5, 2001, was not a manifestation of his disability?

    The March 8 manifestation meeting was badly flawed: the parents got no notice, no teachers attended, and the team had only vague facts. No proper determination existed from March 16 to May 13, 2001. A procedurally proper May 14 meeting cured the defects, and the missing Hmong interpreter did not substantially interfere with parent participation.

  2. District prevailedDiscipline

    Issue II. Was STUDENT's behavior on March 5, 2001, a manifestation of his disability?

    No link was shown between the learning disability and the alleged conduct. The disability did not impair the student's ability to understand or control his behavior, and no emotional condition existed before the incident.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • The District may proceed with its proposed disciplinary change of the student's placement under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k). The Hearing Officer also concluded that the District was not entitled to change the student's placement for disciplinary reasons from March 16, 2001, through May 13, 2001. No compensatory remedy was ordered. Compensatory education and other program issues were reserved for a later bifurcated hearing.

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Key authorities

Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982); W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479 (9th Cir. 1992); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(4); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(6); 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)

People named in the decision

  • Greg Thomas, vice principal, Hiram Johnson High School, Sacramento City Unified School District
  • Denise McAdams, special education program specialist / resource specialist, Sacramento City Unified School District
  • Nathan Prokes, Ph.D., school psychologist (also referred to as James Prokes), Sacramento City Unified School District
  • Lewis Chang, special education (RSP) teacher, Hiram Johnson High School
  • Nathan Headstrom, general education science teacher, Hiram Johnson High School
  • Michael O'Leary, District hearing officer at pre-expulsion hearing, Sacramento City Unified School District
  • Linda Kawahara-Matsuo, supervisor, special education department, Sacramento City Unified School District
  • Kelley Ballard, Ph.D., administrator of special education, Sacramento City Unified School District
  • Kingman Tung, student's family physician, private

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Paul R. Gant, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in Sacramento, California, on May 15, 16, 17, and 18, 2001.

STUDENT (Petitioner) was represented by Steven Royston, attorney at law. MOTHER, STUDENT’s mother, and FATHER, STUDENT’s father, also appeared on STUDENT’s behalf. Sacramento City Unified School District (District) was represented by Martin Fine, general counsel for the District. Dr. Kelley Ballard, administrator of special education for the District, also appeared on behalf of the District. At various points in the proceedings, members of STUDENT’s family, prior advocates for the family, student representatives from Hiram Johnson High School in the District, and representatives of community organizations attended the hearing as observers.(Footnote 1)

Oral and documentary evidence was received, oral closing arguments were presented by the parties, and the case was submitted for decision on May 18, 2001.

ISSUES(Footnote 2)

I. Did the District commit procedural violations in determining that STUDENT’s behavior dated March 5, 2001, was not a manifestation of his disability?

II. Was STUDENT’s behavior on March 5, 2001, a manifestation of his disability?

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

The parties stipulated at the outset of the hearing that evidence should be presented solely on the procedural and substantive aspects of the District’s manifestation determination, and whether the District was therefore entitled to proceed with expulsion. At the joint request of the parties, all other issues pertaining to STUDENT’s education, including the appropriateness of STUDENT’s educational program and the nature of compensatory education to be awarded, if any, will be addressed at a bifurcated hearing to be placed on the calendar upon issuance of the decision on the above-mentioned issues.

BACKGROUND FACTS

STUDENT is a fifteen-year-old ninth-grade boy who was found eligible for special education services by the District on November 28, 1995. STUDENT currently remains eligible for special education services and supports as a student with a specific learning disability (SLD) with severe difficulties in reading, reading comprehension, written expression, and cognitive processing. STUDENT is also a student with limited English proficiency (LEP) whose primary language is Hmong. On March 6, 2001, the District suspended STUDENT from Hiram Johnson High School (HJHS) for alleged sexual misconduct involving a female student. STUDENT has not returned to HJHS since that time. Since May 9, 2001, STUDENT has been receiving his education through a home study program provided by the District.

On March 5, 2001, Greg Thomas, vice principle at HJHS, received a report from one of STUDENT’s classroom teachers that a female student had reported that STUDENT grabbed and tried to kiss her. Mr. Thomas interviewed both the female complainant and STUDENT regarding the incident. Mr. Thomas then issued an “Official Request for Early Dismissal” suspending STUDENT for the period March 6 through March 12. (Pet. Exh. 2)(Footnote 3) This notice was sent home with STUDENT on March 5, where it was received by his parents. On March 6, Mr. Thomas completed a formal “Pupil Suspension Notice” stating the following facts leading to the decision to suspend: “Sexual battery; approached a female student on two occasions. 1st) Touched Student on her buttocks, breasts, and vagina. 2nd) Grabbed her body and tried to kiss her.” The notice further indicated that the “principal [would] request an expulsion in this matter.” (Dist. Exh. A, p. 8) The District did not provide this document to STUDENT’s parents.

At the time of the suspension, Mr. Thomas was familiar with STUDENT’s status as a special education student, as well as the procedural requirement that the District conduct a manifestation determination prior to expulsion. Accordingly, on March 6, Mr. Thomas initiated his regular procedure for arranging an individualized education program (IEP) meeting, to be held on March 8, for the purpose of making a determination as to whether the alleged misconduct was a manifestation of STUDENT’s learning-related disability. Mr. Thomas accessed STUDENT’s “student demographic” information on the computer and contacted the number listed for STUDENT’s home. Mr. Thomas was given another telephone number by the person who answered the phone and was instructed to contact UNCLE, STUDENT’s uncle. Unable to speak directly with UNCLE, Mr. Thomas left a recorded message. When he had received no return call by March 7, Mr. Thomas called STUDENT’s listed home number approximately three more times on March 7 and 8, but was unable to make contact with STUDENT’s parents. Mr. Thomas did not prepare or send to the parents a written notice regarding the proposed expulsion and related IEP meeting.

On March 8 the District convened an IEP meeting for the purpose of determining whether STUDENT’s alleged misconduct was a manifestation of his education-related disability. The team consisted of Greg Thomas, Denise McAdams, special education program specialist for the District, and Nathan Prokes, Ph.D., school psychologist for the District. Neither STUDENT, any members of his family, nor any of his teachers attended the meeting. Following a discussion of approximately twenty to thirty minutes, the team determined that the alleged misconduct, as reported at the meeting by Greg Thomas, was not a manifestation of STUDENT’s disability and that STUDENT was therefore subject to expulsion proceedings. (Dist. Exh. A, p. 7)

On the afternoon of March 8, Mr. Thomas was finally able to make contact with STUDENT’s uncle, UNCLE. Mr. Thomas then faxed to UNCLE a copy of the one-page IEP addendum documenting the manifestation determination and a notice of “pre-expulsion” hearing to be held by the District on March 9. (Pet. Exh. 2). STUDENT’s parents, MOTHER and FATHER, received the fax from UNCLE on the evening of March 8, and attended the pre-expulsion hearing. Following presentation of evidence, the District’s hearing officer, Michael O’Leary, determined that further investigation was warranted regarding the facts of the underlying complaint and declined to support the District’s request for expulsion. The District nonetheless extended STUDENT’s suspension while it conducted further investigation.(Footnote 4)

During the period March 9 through March 19, Greg Thomas conducted further investigation, including interviewing other students and re-interviewing the original complainant. On March 19, the District reconvened the pre-expulsion hearing. At that time, the hearing officer, Mr. O’Leary, again determined that additional investigation was warranted prior to making a ruling regarding expulsion. Mr. O’Leary also advised the District that in his view, the ten-day period allowed under the California Education Code for disciplinary change of placement of a special education student had expired. Mr. O’Leary advised the District that, because the District’s proposal to expel STUDENT had not yet been sustained, the District was compelled by law to return STUDENT to HJHS. Nonetheless, STUDENT did not return to HJHS.(Footnote 5)

By letter dated March 21, STUDENT’s parents requested an emergency IEP meeting in order to develop a home study plan for STUDENT. STUDENT’s parents attached to the request a note from STUDENT’s primary care physician indicating that STUDENT required a psychological evaluation in order to determine whether he was suffering from depression and/or anxiety. (Dist. Exh. A, p. 6) On April 3, 2001, FATHER and MOTHER met with Lewis Chang, STUDENT’s special education teacher at HJHS, and executed an assessment plan providing that STUDENT would receive a psychological and physical examination. (Dist. Exh. A, p.234)

On April 24, an IEP meeting was held at which the District and the parents signed an IEP addendum indicating that the District would provide a home instructor for STUDENT, five hours per week, pending the outcome of STUDENT’s expulsion hearing scheduled for May 3, 2001 (but later postponed to May 30 at the request of STUDENT’s advocates). (Dist. Exh. A, p. 1)(Footnote 6)

On April 26, 2001, the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office) received from STUDENT’s parents a request for due process hearing challenging the District’s proposal to expel.

Thereafter, on May 4, James Prokes, Ph.D., the District’s school psychologist, requested that STUDENT’s parents bring him in for the psychological assessment agreed to on April 24. STUDENT’s parents did not bring STUDENT to the assessment.

On May 4, the District notified the parents that it was scheduling an IEP meeting to occur on May 14, ostensibly to review assessment results and to revisit the manifestation determination pertaining to STUDENT’s alleged misconduct. At the May 14 meeting there was no new assessment data to review because STUDENT had not attended the evaluation with Dr. Prokes. The IEP meeting therefore focused on the manifestation determination. The District participants again determined that STUDENT’s alleged misconduct was not a manifestation of his disability. STUDENT’s parents, along with Steven Royston, STUDENT’s attorney, and ADVOCATE, an advocate for the STUDENT’s family, signed the IEP addendum indicating their attendance at the meeting, but did not express agreement with the District’s manifestation determination.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

ISSUE NO. I: Did the District commit procedural violations in determining that STUDENT’s behavior dated March 5, 2001 was not a manifestation of his disability?

Petitioner contends that the District committed serious procedural violations in conducting its manifestation IEP meeting and that the resulting determination was therefore “moot.” The alleged procedural violations include (1) failure to notify STUDENT’s parents of the March 8 manifestation determination IEP meeting so as to allow their participation in the process; (2) failure to ensure the attendance of all individuals necessary to make a proper determination; and (3) failure to consider adequate information regarding the nature of the alleged conduct in order to properly consider a connection between such conduct and STUDENT’s disability.

The District contends that the District did not substantially violate STUDENT’s procedural safeguards in the manner by which it determined that STUDENT’s alleged misconduct was not a manifestation of his education-related disability. The District further contends that procedural violations, if any, that occurred in connection with the March 8 meeting were cured by a subsequent IEP meeting held on May 14, 2001, at which the District members of the team again determined that STUDENT’s alleged misconduct was not a manifestation of his disability.

Applicable Law

Both federal and State law provide procedures and standards for suspension and expulsion of students eligible for special education services and supports. However, California does not extend its procedural safeguards to students who have committed a sexual assault or battery on school grounds, unless federal law mandates such protections. California Education Code § 480915.6. In the instant matter, the District alleges that STUDENT committed sexual battery. There was no dispute at hearing that the underlying misconduct alleged by the District in this case constituted sexual battery.(Footnote 7) Accordingly, the restrictions and special procedures under California law pertaining to expulsion do not apply in this case. Therefore, federal law will provide the applicable authority for resolving the issues in this matter.

Under federal law, a disabled student may be expelled for the same reasons and in the same manner as a nondisabled student if it is properly determined that the behavior which is the subject of the discipline was not a manifestation of the student’s disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(5). Thus, where the educational agency contemplates an expulsion:

(i) not later than the date on which the decision to take that action is made, the parents shall be notified of that decision and of all procedural safeguards accorded under this section; and (ii) immediately, if possible, but in no case later than 10 school days after the date on which the decision to take that action is made, a review shall be conducted of the relationship between the child’s disability and the behavior subject to the disciplinary action. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(4)(A). This manifestation review must be conducted by the IEP team and “other qualified personnel.” 20 U.S.C § 1415(k)(4)(B). In addition, the persons making the manifestation determination are required to review all relevant information, including: (1) evaluation and diagnostic results, including such result or other relevant information supplied by the parents of the child, (2) observation of the child, and (3) the child’s IEP and placement. In order to conclude that the alleged behavior was not a manifestation of the child’s disability, the team must determine that (a) in relationship to the behavior subject to disciplinary action, the IEP and placement were appropriate and the special education supplementary aids, services, and behavioral interventions strategies were provided consistent with the IEP and placement, (b) the disability did not impair the student’s ability to understand the impact and consequences of the behavior subject to the disciplinary action, and (c) the disability did not impair the student’s ability to control the behavior subject to the disciplinary action. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(4)(C). If any of these standards are not met, then the behavior must be considered a manifestation of the disability and the District may not expel the student.

Federal law also provides that the parents of a student with a disability may request a due process hearing in order to dispute a school district’s determination that a student’s alleged misconduct resulting in proposed discipline was not a manifestation of the student’s disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(6). The IDEA states:

In reviewing a decision with respect to the manifestation determination the hearing officer shall determine whether the public agency has demonstrated that the child’s behavior was not a manifestation of such child’s disability consistent with the requirements of paragraph 4(C). 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(6)(B) (emphasis added).

As noted above Section 1415(k)(4)(C), entitled “Conduct of Review” sets out a detailed procedure that the District must follow in arriving at a manifestation determination. Furthermore, the law plainly requires that the hearing officer in a due process proceeding determine whether the District has followed appropriate procedures in making its determination. This construction of the law is consistent with established U.S. Supreme Court precedent regarding the importance that Congress has placed on the procedural protections afforded students and their parents under the IDEA. As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated:

When the elaborate and highly specific procedural safeguards embodied in Section 1415 are contrasted with the general and somewhat imprecise substantive admonition contained in the Act, we think that the importance Congress attached to these procedural safeguards cannot be gainsaid. Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (1982).

As detailed below, the evidence presented in this matter establishes that the procedures utilized by the District in determining on March 8 that STUDENT’s alleged misconduct was not a manifestation of his disability were substantially inconsistent with the requirements of the IDEA.

Notice to the Parents

Petitioner first contends that his parents were not afforded appropriate notice pertaining to the proposed expulsion and related manifestation determination of March 8. Under Section 1415(k)(4)(A)(i), the District, having made a decision on March 6 to institute expulsion proceedings against STUDENT, was obligated to notify his parents “not later than the date on which the decision to take that action is made” of the decision and of ”all procedural safeguards” pertaining to the proposed disciplinary change of placement. The parties stipulated at hearing that the District provided no written notice to STUDENT’s parents prior to the March 8 manifestation determination meeting that the District was seeking to expel STUDENT and that an IEP meeting pertaining to that proposal was scheduled to occur. Furthermore, though Greg Thomas, vice principle at HJHS, attempted to provide notification to the parents by telephone, he was not able to reach them directly. FATHER and MOTHER both testified that prior to the evening of March 8 they received no message that the District was attempting to reach them regarding STUDENT’s suspension. Nor was either parent made aware of the March 8 IEP meeting prior to receiving the written addendum containing the manifestation determination.

The District’s proffered justification at hearing for failing to provide notice to the parents was not convincing. Greg Thomas testified that it was his responsibility to notify the parents of the proposed disciplinary actions and procedures regarding STUDENT. Mr. Thomas conceded that he was aware that parent involvement is necessary in disciplinary issues. However, he indicated that the District was “fighting time lines.” Further, Mr. Thomas testified he believed it was important to move forward expeditiously due to his concern for possible risk to the female victim and STUDENT should he return to HJHS. Thus, Mr. Thomas concluded that he didn’t have time to prepare or send a written notice of the manifestation determination meeting to the parents.

The evidence established, however, that as of March 7, when Mr. Thomas was attempting to contact the parents, STUDENT was only on the second day of suspension. As the IDEA allows the school to suspend STUDENT for up to ten days before a manifestation determination must be made, the District had at least another week, under the relevant educational time lines, to notify the parents in writing prior to holding a manifestation IEP meeting. STUDENT would not have been in school during that period and, therefore, could not have constituted a safety risk at HJHS.

“Congress [has] placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of participation at every state of the administrative process, . . ., as it did upon the measuring of the resulting IEP against a substantive standard.” Rowley, supra, 458 U.S. at 206. Because they received no timely notice of the proposed discipline and manifestation determination IEP, STUDENT’s parents were denied a meaningful opportunity to participate in a decision directly affecting his opportunity to obtain a free appropriate public education (FAPE). 20 U.S.C. §1415(k)(5). The District’s failure to provide appropriate notice violated the parent’s procedural rights under the IDEA. The excuses offered by the District do not justify this procedural violation.

The IEP Team

Petitioner next contends that the manifestation determination meeting of March 8 was not proper because the required members of STUDENT’s IEP team were not present.

The manifestation determination must be made by the student’s IEP team and “other qualified personnel.” 20 U.S.C § 1415(k)(4)(B). Under Section 1414(d)(1)(B), the IEP team is to be composed of (i) the student’s parents, (ii) at least one of the student’s regular education teachers; (iii) at least one special education teacher, (iv) a representative of the District, (v) an individual qualified to interpret the instructional implications of evaluation results, who can be the same individual as one of the prior categories, and (vi) at the discretion of the parent or the District, other individuals with special expertise or knowledge regarding the student. In the instant matter, it is undisputed that the IEP team that made the manifestation determination of March 8, included neither STUDENT’s parents, a special education teacher, nor a regular education teacher.

Regarding the absence of the parents, Denise McAdams, the resource specialist for the District who attended the meeting, stated that she did not recall anyone at the meeting expressing concern regarding the parents’ absence. In fact, both Ms. McAdams and James Prokes, school psychologist, who also attended on behalf of the District, testified that they did not view the absence of the parents as a procedural violation by the District. Ms. McAdams believed that the parents’ procedural rights would be satisfied by “eventually” explaining the manifestation determination to them.

Ms. McAdams also testified that, typically, she would request that a special education teacher attend an IEP meeting. In this case, however, she did not contact Lewis Chang, STUDENT’s special education (RSP) teacher, prior to the time of the meeting. At the start of the meeting, she considered contacting Mr. Chang to attend, but because of disruption related to construction activities at the school, she did not immediately know his whereabouts. Ms. McAdams testified that had the parents attended, she would have made a greater effort to have Mr. Chang at the meeting, because she assumed that the parents would have wanted him present to provide input. Ms. McAdams, indeed all the District witnesses, admitted the absence of the RSP teacher at such a meeting was “highly unusual.” Ms. McAdams stated that she was concerned about Mr. Chang’s absence at the time of the meeting, but ultimately didn’t make further efforts to get him there because she felt he could be contacted later regarding the determination.

Regarding the absence of a regular education teacher, Ms. McAdams testified that a regular education teacher should have been present at the meeting, though she was not aware of this requirement as of March 8. Dr. Prokes testified that in general it is his practice at manifestation determination IEP meetings to get input from the regular education teacher, although in this case he did not view this as necessary because information regarding STUDENT’s conduct in his regular education classes was contained in the records and in information related by Mr. Thomas from interviews with STUDENT’s teachers.

The IDEA requires that the student’s parents, a special education teacher, and a regular education teacher be included in the IEP team. Unlike some other categories of individuals, the inclusion of parents and teachers in the team is not optional. The District presented no credible justification for failing to include the parents and the teachers. As previously noted, the District provided inadequate justification for failing to notify the parents and offer them an opportunity to attend the IEP meeting. The resulting loss of the parents’ opportunity to participate was a substantial violation of the procedural protections under the IDEA. W.G. v. Bd. Of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992). Ms. McAdam’s expectation that the parents would “eventually” be advised of the team’s decision did not cure this defect. Furthermore, it is reasonable to conclude that the student’s teachers are the persons within the school with the most direct experience with the student and are most likely to possess first-hand knowledge of his history and the ways in which his disability is manifest on a day-to-day basis in the classroom. The District presented no evidence excusing the absence of the special and regular education teachers from the March 8 meeting. The District cited no authority at hearing for the proposition that the absence of the teachers from a manifestation determination IEP meeting may be cured by information gleaned from the student’s file and from second-hand verbal information provided by the vice principle of the student’s school.

Accordingly, it is concluded that Petitioner’s procedural rights were violated by the failure of the District to arrange for the attendance of STUDENT’s parents, regular education teacher, and special education teacher at the March 8 IEP meeting.

Information Regarding the Alleged Misconduct

Finally, Petitioner contends that his procedural rights were violated by the failure of the IEP team to consider adequate information regarding the nature of his alleged misconduct at the manifestation determination meeting of March 8. The IDEA requires that the IEP team consider all relevant information “in terms of the behavior subject to disciplinary action” in making the manifestation determination. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(4)(C) (emphasis added). The weight of the evidence offered in the instant case indicates that the IEP team of March 8, was not presented with sufficient information regarding the nature of STUDENT’s alleged misconduct to conduct an appropriate manifestation review.

According to Greg Thomas, he read a short narrative at the March 8 meeting from the District’s “Pupil Suspension Notice” dated March 6. This notice stated that STUDENT was charged with sexual battery and provided background information regarding the incident. (Dist. Exh. A, p. 8) The testimony of the other two participants in the March 8, meeting is inconsistent with that of Mr. Thomas. According to Denise McAdams, Mr. Thomas indicated that the nature of STUDENT’s alleged misconduct was “sexual harassment.” She did not recall Mr. Thomas making reference to sexual battery. Her recollection is that the behavior was discussed in a “brief” manner and she did not recall reference to “explicit details” of the alleged misconduct. Furthermore, Ms. McAdams remembered only references to verbal, not physical conduct. Dr. Prokes also testified that from his recollection Mr. Thomas indicated that STUDENT was accused of “sexual harassment.” According to Dr. Prokes, Mr. Thomas did not define this term. Dr. Prokes did not recall Mr. Thomas reading the nature of the specific charge from a document, nor discussing the facts underlying the charges against STUDENT. Dr. Prokes was not aware that physical contact was alleged.

Ms. McAdams repeatedly professed vague recollection regarding the March 8, meeting during the course of her testimony. Therefore, her testimony, taken alone, does not discredit that of Mr. Thomas. However, it is noted that Mr. Thomas, Ms. McAdams, and Dr. Prokes all testified that Dr. Prokes had the largest role in making the manifestation determination on March 8. It is reasonable to conclude that Dr. Prokes would particularly focus on the nature of the alleged conduct in comparing it to STUDENT’s disability. Accordingly, Dr. Prokes’ testimony is accorded the greatest weight regarding the information given at the meeting regarding the nature of STUDENT’s alleged misconduct. Dr. Prokes’ testimony (as supported by Ms. McAdams) established that no information was provided at the March 8 meeting that STUDENT was alleged to have engaged in sexual battery or any form of nonconsensual physical contact with a female student.

Given that STUDENT has a learning disability involving expressive and receptive language (reading and writing), and a cognitive disorder, and also is an LEP student whose primary language is Hmong, information regarding whether his alleged conduct was physical or verbal in nature would appear central to any consideration regarding a nexus between his disability and his alleged behavior. The information presented regarding the nature of the alleged misconduct at the March 8, IEP meeting was simply too vague to provide adequate foundation on which to base a manifestation determination. Accordingly, it is concluded that the District also violated the IDEA’s procedures by failing to make its determination “in terms of the behavior subject to disciplinary action.”

In summary, the procedures followed by the District in determining on March 8, that STUDENT’s alleged misconduct was not a manifestation of his disability were profoundly deficient. Because no notice as required by law was provided to his parents, they were denied the opportunity to participate in the process of determining STUDENT’s educational rights. Three categories of individuals required by law to participate in the IEP meeting were not present, and the District made little, if any, effort to secure their participation. Only vague information regarding the nature of the alleged conduct was presented to the IEP team, making any meaningful analysis of the relationship between the behavior and STUDENT’s disability impossible. Such a process did not present a likelihood of yielding a reliable result and did not afford STUDENT or his parents the procedural protections deemed central to the IDEA by Congress and the Supreme Court. Accordingly, it is determined that the District did not properly determine at the March 8 IEP meeting that STUDENT’s alleged misconduct was not a manifestation of his disability.

The May 14, 2001 IEP Manifestation Determination

The District contends that even if the March 8 meeting was procedurally deficient, any inadequacy was “cured” by the subsequent manifestation determination made when an IEP team met to revisit the issue on May 14.

Linda Kawahara-Matsuo, supervisor of the District’s special education department, testified that she scheduled an IEP meeting for May 14, at the request of Kelly Ballard, PhD., administrator of the District’s special education department. Dr. Ballard had indicated that there were possible procedural errors at the March 8 IEP meeting and that the manifestation determination should be revisited. Ms. Kawahara-Matsuo also testified that one purpose of the

May 14 meeting was to allow the parents an opportunity to participate. At that meeting, the District participants again concluded that STUDENT’s alleged misconduct was not a manifestation of his disability.

It was undisputed at hearing that the procedural deficiencies related to the March 8 IEP meeting were not repeated with the May 14 meeting. Written and verbal notice was provided to the parents. A full IEP team participated in the meeting, including STUDENT’s parents, their advocates and attorney, a special education teacher, and a regular education teacher, among others. According to the undisputed testimony of Dr. Prokes, the physical and sexual nature of the alleged misconduct was explained at the May 14 meeting. The undisputed testimony also established that STUDENT’s education records, health records, and disciplinary records were reviewed, and that the teachers at the meeting discussed STUDENT’s behavioral history and classroom performance.

Petitioner contends, however, that the May 14 meeting was improper because (1) the parent was denied an opportunity to fully participate because no Hmong interpreter was present and (2) the meeting was not held within ten days of the District’s original proposal to expel STUDENT.

It was undisputed at hearing that the District was aware prior to the May 14 IEP meeting, that STUDENT and his parents are primary Hmong speakers. The testimony of STUDENT’s parents established that while STUDENT’s mother is able to speak and understand English, she is not conversant in technical English words pertaining to special education. MOTHER, however, is an employee of the District who has served on occasion as an English-Hmong interpreter for the District and the public at District disciplinary proceedings. STUDENT’s father understands some limited English, but is substantially less proficient that MOTHER.

It is also not disputed that the District failed to arrange for the attendance of a Hmong interpreter at the May 14 meeting. Furthermore, ADVOCATE, an advocate of STUDENT’s family, who attended the meeting, testified that she perceived that the family was having difficulty at the meeting understanding educational terms. Nonetheless ADVOCATE acknowledged that the family’s attorney, Mr. Royston, was present at the meeting, made comments during the course of the meeting, and was allowed to provide input. STUDENT’s father testified that although he did not “really” understand the IEP Addendum document resulting from the May 14 meeting, he believed that he and STUDENT’s mother had a full opportunity to participate in the meeting.

The evidence established that STUDENT’s mother, though a primary Hmong speaker, is reasonably proficient in the ordinary use of the English language, and had the ability to communicate her understanding to FATHER, STUDENT’s father. Furthermore, STUDENT’s family was represented at the May 14 IEP meeting by an advocate and an attorney, who were able to fully participate on behalf of STUDENT’s family. Accordingly, it is determined that the failure of the District to provide a Hmong interpreter at the May 14 meeting did not substantially interfere with the parents opportunity to participate in the process.

Finally, it is undisputed that the May 14 IEP manifestation determination did not occur within ten days of STUDENT’s alleged misconduct and the District’s decision to seek expulsion. As previously discussed, a District may not continue a disciplinary change of placement for more than ten days without making a manifestation determination. However, once a proper manifestation determination is made, the District is not precluded under the IDEA from proceeding with a disciplinary change of placement. Petitioner has presented no authority under special education law for the proposition that the District, assuming its most recent manifestation determination was correct, may not proceed with a expulsion proceeding subsequent to May 14.

In summary, it is concluded that for the period March 16, 2001, through May 13, 2001, the District was not entitled to change STUDENT’s education placement for disciplinary reasons, because no proper manifestation determination was in place during that period. The May 14 manifestation determination was not procedurally deficient. Therefore, whether the District may proceed with expulsion is dependant on whether STUDENT’s alleged misconduct was, in fact, a manifestation of his disability.

ISSUE No. II: Was STUDENT’s behavior of March 5, 2001 a manifestation of his disability?

The District contends that the evidence demonstrates that STUDENT’s alleged misconduct of March 5, was not a manifestation of STUDENT’s disability. Petitioner contends that there was sufficient evidence presented to suggest that STUDENT’s disability could be connected to the alleged misconduct.(Footnote 8)

Under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(4)(C), behavior must be considered a manifestation of the student’s disability if such disability impaired the students: (i) ability to understand the impact or consequences of his behavior, or (ii) control his behavior with respect to the alleged misconduct.(Footnote 9) In essence, to constitute a manifestation, there must be a nexus between the alleged behavior and the student’s disability. The evidence presented in this case demonstrated no such nexus.

The evidence was uncontroverted that STUDENT had no history of behavior problems that were in any sense connected with his diagnosed learning disability. Both of STUDENT’s parents testified that they did not believe that his learning disability caused him to behave improperly in any manner. In fact, STUDENT’s educational record and the testimony of STUDENT’s teachers and District administrators established that STUDENT had very little history of misbehavior of any kind. Lewis Chang, who has been STUDENT’s special education teacher since he entered HJHS in September 2001, testified that from his observation, prior to the March 5 alleged incident, STUDENT has always been a “top notch student,” always polite, always present in class, without any history of behavior problems. He never observed

STUDENT to have any difficulty controlling his behavior. He has never observed STUDENT to behave inappropriately with other students. Mr. Chang has discussed STUDENT with other teachers and they have indicated that STUDENT is respectful.

Nathan Headstrom, STUDENT’s regular education science teacher at HJHS, testified that he had some concerns regarding STUDENT’s conduct in his class. STUDENT had attentional problems, sometimes failed to do his work, and would occasionally get up and walk around the room and have to be redirected. Mr. Headstrom indicated, however, that STUDENT’s behavior was not uncommon compared to other students in his class. Mr. Headstrom did state that he had received a report prior to March 5, from a female student indicating that STUDENT was making inappropriate comments of a sexual nature. However, Mr. Headstrom did not consider this particular allegation to reflect conduct outside the range of normal adolescent misbehavior. According to Mr. Headstrom, STUDENT did not have a substantial history of harassing female students. Moreover, no witness indicated that STUDENT had a history of physical or sexual battery or assault prior to the incidents leading to the March 6 disciplinary action.

In addition, the evidence established that to the extent STUDENT did exhibit misbehavior, he had no substantial difficulty controlling his behavior or understanding the consequences of his conduct. Mr. Headstrom, the only witness who reported any behavioral problems with STUDENT, testified that STUDENT was not openly defiant, would often correct his behavior when he realized that he had been noticed by Mr. Headstrom, and would comply with Mr. Headstrom’s requests to discontinue inappropriate behavior or return his attention to his work. Mr. Headstrom reported that he never observed STUDENT to have any problem with controlling his behavior or understanding the consequences of his conduct. Likewise, Dr. Prokes testified that from his review of the educational records and the information related by the teachers at the May 14, meeting, while STUDENT had some “minor” instances of off-task behavior and distractability reported by Mr. Headstrom, there was no indication that these issues were “deviant,” severe, or constituted other than normal adolescent behavior. Dr. Prokes admitted that in some circumstances a student’s distractability can be connected with a learning disability and can affect a student’s behavior. In such circumstances, if there is an indication that the student does not modify his off task behavior when given direction, it may suggest an inability to control the behavior. In STUDENT’s case, according to Dr. Prokes, the problems that STUDENT did have seemed to be related only to one particular class. Dr. Prokes testified that it is not unusual for a student to have a dip in behavior in one class, and such problems only become a concern if the misconduct is exhibited in other classes as well.

Based on the above, it is concluded that STUDENT’s off-task behavior and misconduct in Mr. Headstrom’s science class did not establish that STUDENT suffers from a serious behavioral problem that is substantially related to his learning disability.

Finally, the evidence established that while STUDENT experienced feelings of despondency following the March 5 allegation of sexual misconduct and resulting disciplinary action, he did not have a psychological condition pre-existing the March 5 incident that related to his alleged misconduct.

None of the witnesses at hearing testified that STUDENT had any history of emotional disturbance pre-existing March 5. Mr. Headstrom and Mr. Chang both testified that they had never observed STUDENT to be despondent or emotionally upset in school. Likewise, both of STUDENT’s parents testified that they had not previously observed STUDENT to be significantly emotionally upset or “depressed” prior to being placed on suspension for the alleged sexual misconduct. On March 21, STUDENT’s family physician, Dr. Kingman Tung issued a medical note indicating that STUDENT had been experiencing “stress and anxiety from environment at school,” indicating that STUDENT stated he was “teased at school,” and recommending a psychological assessment. However, the weight of the evidence established that any emotional problems that STUDENT was experiencing were not a cause of the alleged sexual misconduct. In this regard the greatest weight is given to the undisputed testimony of STUDENT’s parents that neither of them had noticed any serious emotional issue with STUDENT prior to the suspension and that they believed the primary cause of STUDENT’s stress and anxiety was the accusation of misconduct and the subsequent suspension. There was no evidence offered by Petitioner to rebut Dr. Prokes’ opinion that STUDENT did not suffer an emotional problem prior to March 5, that related to his alleged misconduct. Thus, it is concluded that STUDENT’s possible problems with depression, stress, and anxiety were not related to his learning disability, nor did they exist to any substantial degree at the time of the alleged misconduct, nor did they contribute to such misconduct.

In summary, the evidence established that STUDENT does not suffer from a learning-related disability that impairs either his ability to control his conduct or understand the consequences of his conduct. Thus, the misconduct alleged by the District in this matter was not a manifestation of STUDENT’s disability.

ORDER

The District may proceed with its proposed disciplinary change of STUDENT’s placement in accordance with 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k).

PREVAILING PARTY OF EACH ISSUE

I. Did the District commit procedural violations in determining that STUDENT’s behavior dated March 5, 2001 was not a manifestation of his disability?

-The Petitioner prevailed on this issue.

II. Was STUDENT’s behavior dated March 5, 2001 a manifestation of his disability?

-The District prevailed on this issue.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. California Education Code §56505(j).

Dated: June 5, 2001 ________________________________ Paul R. Gant, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

Footnote 1: At the request of STUDENT’s parents, the proceedings were open to the public. Footnote 2: The issues have been framed to reflect discussions held between the parties and the Hearing Officer at the time of hearing, and for the purpose of organized discussion Footnote 3: Petitioner identified four proposed exhibits at hearing, Petitioner’s Exhibits 1 through 4. However, Petitioner did not request that Petitioner’s Exhibit 1, marked for identification purposes only, be admitted as evidence. Accordingly, Petitioner’s exhibits for hearing consisted of Petitioner’s Exhibits Nos. 2 through 4. Footnote 4: The evidence is in dispute as to whether Mr. O’Leary verbally endorsed the District’s extension of the suspension. Footnote 5: There was conflicting testimony regarding whether the District refused to allow STUDENT to return to HJHS, or whether the parents simply failed to return him to the school. This issue need not be resolved for purposes of the expedited decision but may be addressed in the subsequent bifurcated proceeding. Footnote 6: According to MOTHER’s unrebutted testimony, the home study did not start until May 9. Footnote 7: Petitioner does dispute, however, that the conduct, as alleged, in fact occurred. Footnote 8: As noted previously, however, STUDENT and his parents steadfastly denied that STUDENT had engaged in any of the alleged misconduct. Footnote 9: Petitioner stipulated that he does not dispute the appropriateness of his IEP at the time of the alleged incident.