California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · February 9, 1996
Student v. Sequoia Union High School District
SEHO Case No. SN 898-95 · Hearing Officer F. Richard Ruderman
Sequoia Union High School District must reimburse half the cost of a nonpublic school placement after failing to make an interim placement.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Summary
The student's attorney filed for due process against Sequoia Union High School District for a 16-year-old tenth grader with a specific learning disability. Another district had found him eligible in 1988 and again in 1992. He enrolled in the District in November 1994, was placed in regular classes, and failed every class. In March 1995 the District learned of his earlier eligibility. It still refused to place him in special education or hold an IEP meeting until a new assessment was done, arguing that his eligibility had lapsed because his assessment and IEP were out of date. Hearing Officer F. Richard Ruderman rejected that argument. Only an IEP team can decide that a student is no longer eligible. As a transfer student, he was entitled to an interim placement and a timely IEP review. The Hearing Officer found that the District denied FAPE in March 1995 and from September through November 8, 1995. It did not deny FAPE in earlier months, when it had little reason to suspect a disability, or while the student was in Mexico. After November 8, the District's special day class offer was appropriate, and the parties agreed to it at hearing. The mother's unilateral placement at Mary Stone School was appropriate. However, the student's truancy and absence had delayed the assessment. The District was ordered to reimburse half the tuition and transportation costs from September 22 to November 8, 1995.
Why it matters
The decision shows how SEHO treated a transfer student with outdated special education records. Eligibility did not lapse because an assessment was overdue, and the new district had to make an interim placement. The decision also shows a Hearing Officer cutting private school reimbursement in half because the family contributed to the delay.
Issues and holdings
- Student prevailed in partPlacement and LRE
Issue 1. Did the District deny STUDENT a free appropriate public education from November 1994 through November 1995?
Eligibility did not lapse because assessments and IEP were outdated. Once the District knew the student had been found eligible elsewhere, it had to make an interim placement and hold an IEP meeting (Ed. Code 56325, 56343). FAPE was denied in March 1995 and from September through November 8, 1995. It was not denied for November 1994–February 1995, April–June 1995 (student in Mexico), or after the appropriate November 8, 1995 offer.
- Student prevailed in partUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue 2. Is STUDENT's mother entitled to reimbursement for the cost of STUDENT's unilateral placement at Mary Stone School, a State-certified nonpublic school?
Mary Stone School was an appropriate placement from September 22 to November 8, 1995. Because the family's truancy and the student's trip to Mexico delayed assessment, reimbursement was cut in half on equitable grounds. Nothing was owed after the District's appropriate November 8 offer.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- Reimbursement. Within 30 calendar days of receiving proof of costs, the District must reimburse the mother for one-half of the costs of the student's placement at Mary Stone School, including one-half of transportation costs, from September 22 through November 8, 1995. No dollar amount was stated.
Key authorities
Rowley; Burlington School Committee v. Department of Education; In re Conklin; Jenkins v. Florida; Alamo Heights Independent School Dist. v. State Board of Education; Lascari v. Board of Education; Roland M. v. Concord School Committee; Education Code section 56325; Education Code section 56343; Education Code section 48204(d)
People named in the decision
- Joyce Willett, coordinator of special education, Sequoia Union High School District
- Judith Whitcomb, Ph.D., school psychologist, Sequoia Union High School District
- Jose Rodriguez, Ph.D., school psychologist (1992 evaluation), Ravenswood Elementary School District
- Barbara Conboy, speech-language pathologist, ACCESS (nonpublic agency)
- ACCESS, nonpublic agency (speech and language evaluation)
- Patricia Mittelstadt, Ph.D., private psychologist; independent evaluator and expert witness for Student
- Martha Rubin, speech and language specialist (District assessor), Sequoia Union High School District
- Rick Motylewski, resource specialist (District assessor), Sequoia Union High School District
- Elda Aghazarian, school psychologist (District assessor), Sequoia Union High School District
- Mary Stone, teacher at nonpublic school; witness, Mary Stone School
- Mary Stone School, state-certified nonpublic school (unilateral placement)
- Stanbridge Academy, nonpublic school (prior parent placement)
- Hanna Boys Center, nonpublic residential school (prior placement)
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before F. Richard Ruderman, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office, in Redwood City, California, on November 28 and 29, 1995.
Petitioner STUDENT was represented by David Giles, attorney. Also present on STUDENT's behalf were his mother, PARENT, his sister, SISTER, and his aunt, AUNT.
Respondent Sequoia Union High School District (hereafter "District") was represented by Peter Finck, attorney. Also present on the District's behalf was Joyce Willett, coordinator of special education.
Evidence was received and the record was left open for the submission of closing briefs. Petitioner's brief was received on January 16, 1996. Respondent's brief was received on January 18, 1996. Thereafter, the matter was submitted for decision.
ISSUES
(1) Did the District deny STUDENT a free appropriate public education from November 1994 through November 1995?
(2) Is STUDENT's mother entitled to reimbursement for the cost of STUDENT's unilateral placement at Mary Stone School, a State-certified nonpublic school?
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT is sixteen years old and in the tenth grade. He is eligible for special education services because of a specific learning disability. STUDENT's family speaks Spanish and English. STUDENT's primary language is English; his mother's primary language is Spanish.(Footnote 1)
From September 1985 through June 1988, in kindergarten and the first grade, STUDENT attended school in the Ravenswood Elementary School District. In the 1987-88 school year, STUDENT repeated the first grade. On June 6, 1988, an individualized education program (IEP) team found STUDENT eligible for special education services as a student with a learning disability. The IEP team recommended that STUDENT be placed in the resource specialist program for two periods per day for the following school year. (Respondent's Exhibit 3; Petitioner's Exhibit BO)
However, STUDENT did not receive special education services from Ravenswood Elementary School District at that time. In the 1988-89 and 1989-90 school years (second and third grade), STUDENT attended a nonpublic school. The placement was made by Ms. PARENT. She was not charged tuition for his attendance at the school. In the 1990-91 school year (fourth grade), STUDENT returned to the Ravenswood Elementary School District and attended Brentwood Oaks Elementary School. In March 1991, STUDENT went to Mexico and did not return for the remainder of the school year. (Respondent's Exhibit 3)
In the 1991-92 school year, STUDENT started the year at Graham Elementary School as a fifth-grade student in the Mountain View Elementary School District. In approximately January 1992, STUDENT returned to the Ravenswood Elementary School District. Ravenswood school records designated STUDENT as a sixth-grade student, but there was no explanation for the change in grade. (Respondent's Exhibit 3; Petitioner's Exhibits BK, CE) In addition, there was no indication that STUDENT received any special education services prior to the 1991-92 school year from any of the schools that served him.
On January 14, 1992, Jose Rodriguez, Ph.D., school psychologist, evaluated STUDENT. Dr. Rodriguez interviewed Ms. PARENT and administered the following tests to STUDENT: Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Revised (WISC-R), Human Figure Drawing, Bender Gestalt, the Visual Aural Digit Span Test, and Woodcock-Johnson Tests of Achievement-Revised. On the WISC-R, STUDENT obtained the following IQ scores: verbal, 80; performance, 96; and full score, 87. On the Woodcock-Johnson, STUDENT obtained the following standard scores: broad reading, 83; broad math, 85; basic writing skills, 70; and spelling, 65. Dr. Rodriguez concluded that STUDENT exhibited a severe discrepancy between ability and achievement when comparing his basic writing skills and spelling subtest achievement scores to his IQ scores. Based on the severe discrepancy, Dr. Rodriguez "suggested" considering STUDENT for special education services. In addition, Dr. Rodriguez recommended that STUDENT receive a bilingual speech and language evaluation. (Petitioner's Exhibit CE; Respondent's Exhibit B-27)
On March 9, 1992, an IEP team concluded that STUDENT was eligible for special education services as a student with a learning disability and placed him in the resource specialist program "2-3 times per week for 30 to 60 minutes." (Petitioner's Exhibit BK)
In the 1992-93 school year (seventh grade), STUDENT started the year at Stanbridge Academy, a nonpublic school. The Stanbridge placement was made by Ms. PARENT and was not funded by the Ravenswood Elementary School District. At some point during the school year, STUDENT returned to the Ravenswood Elementary School District. On April 20, 1993, the Ravenswood School District convened an IEP team meeting. The IEP stated in relevant part:
According to psychological report of 1-92, STUDENT qualifies for special ed. Past history suggests SDL [severe disorder of language] placement in a special day class. In order to get more information on language processing skills, STUDENT will be evaluated by a bilingual speech and language specialist from ACCESS. Extended year is recommended. As an interim placement, he will be in a SDC/SDL as this is most likely his final placement.
(Petitioner's Exhibit BI)
Although the Ravenswood School District referred STUDENT to ACCESS, a nonpublic agency, for a speech and language evaluation, the evaluation never took place. According to a letter from Barbara Conboy, speech-language pathologist, ACCESS unsuccessfully attempted to evaluate STUDENT on four separate occasions. On each occasion, STUDENT was not at school. Ms. Conboy's letter detailed each attempted evaluation and concluded as follows:
I have spent a great amount of time and energy trying to evaluate this student, but I have received very little cooperation from either the family or the school. If you still wish to have this student evaluated in the fall, a new approach involving greater school cooperation will be needed.
(Respondent's Exhibit B, at pp. 25-26)
In the 1993-94 school year, STUDENT attended the Hanna Boys Center, a nonpublic residential school located in Sonoma County. Hanna Boys Center was not certified to provide special education services. At some point prior to September 1993, STUDENT became involved in the juvenile justice system and his placement at Hanna Boys Center was approved by the juvenile court. In May 1994, Ms. PARENT, STUDENT's mother, moved to Sonoma and has continued to live there since that time.
STUDENT started the 1994-95 school year at Sonoma High School in the Sonoma Unified School District. STUDENT was enrolled in regular education classes at Sonoma Valley High School. The Sonoma Unified School District attempted to assess STUDENT and obtained Ms. PARENT's permission for such an assessment. However, STUDENT's attendance was "too sporadic to proceed." (Respondent's Exhibit C, at p. 27)
In late October 1994, STUDENT left Sonoma and moved in with his aunt, AUNT, who lives in Menlo Park. When STUDENT left the Sonoma Unified School District, he had four Fs and two incompletes in his classes. (Respondent's Exhibit D, at p. 13) On October 28, 1994, Ms. AUNT enrolled STUDENT at Menlo-Atherton High School in the Sequoia Union High School District. On the registration form, Ms. AUNT wrote "no," next to the question "Has student been in a special program (remedial/bilingual/Special Ed/etc.)?" (Respondent's Exhibit C, at p. 31) In November 1994, STUDENT began attending Menlo-Atherton High School. He was enrolled in regular education classes and did not receive any special education services.
By letter to Judith Whitcomb, Ph.D., school psychologist, dated February 17, 1995, David Giles asked the District to convene an IEP team meeting for STUDENT. In addition, Mr. Giles asked the District to send him copies of STUDENT's student records. Mr. Giles' letter stated in relevant part:
I request that you convene an IEPT meeting to review STUDENT's IEP as there is concern that his program is not meeting his academic, social and emotional needs. . . .
(Respondent's Exhibit C, at p. 29)
By letter dated March 7, 1995, Mr. Giles asked the District to evaluate STUDENT. (Respondent's Exhibit C, at p. 28) In a letter dated March 10, 1995, Dr. Whitcomb responded to Mr. Giles' letters. Dr. Whitcomb's letter stated in relevant part:
After an extensive search, the district has located a special education file pertaining to the above named student and the enclosed is being sent, per your request. The district is also in the process of obtaining records from Hanna Boys Center and Sonoma Valley High School, although both have indicated, by phone, that STUDENT was not in special education while attending there. Copies of these records will be forwarded when they are received.
Unfortunately, the information available to date indicates that STUDENT does not have a current IEP, has not been in a special education program since 1993, and has not been re-assessed for eligibility within the required three years. Therefore, we cannot administratively place him, nor can we develop an IEP at this time.
We can, however, assess STUDENT to determine his current eligibility for special education classes and an assessment plan . . . has been sent to his guardian. . . .
(Respondent's Exhibit C, at p. 24)
In late March 1995, the District received Ms. AUNT's signed consent to the District's proposed assessment plan. (Petitioner's Exhibit BG; Respondent's Exhibit 23, at p. 23) However, the District was unable to assess STUDENT during the 1994-95 school year because, in April, he went to Mexico to stay with family. By letter dated April 17, 1995, Mr. Giles informed the District of STUDENT's trip to Mexico and asked the District to extend the time line for completion of the evaluation. (Respondent's Exhibit 23, at p. 22) STUDENT returned from Mexico in June 1995.
In late June, STUDENT enrolled at Mary Stone School, a nonpublic school certified to provide special education services. (Testimony of Mary Stone) However, STUDENT attended only three days during the summer.
On August 5, 1995, Patricia Mittelstadt, Ph.D., private psychologist, conducted an independent psychological evaluation of STUDENT. Among other tests, Dr. Mittelstadt administered the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Third Edition (WISC-III) and the Wechsler Individual Achievement Test (WIAT). On the WISC-III, STUDENT obtained the following IQ scores: verbal, 75; performance, 83; and full scale, 77. On the WIAT, STUDENT obtained the following subtest standard scores: basic reading, 83; mathematics reasoning, 73; spelling, 62; reading comprehension, 73; numerical operations, 66; written expression, 66; reading composite, 72; mathematics composite, 66; and writing composite, 57. Based on her evaluation, Dr. Mittelstadt recommended, among other things, that STUDENT be placed in a special day class. (Petitioner's Exhibit CA)
By letter dated September 6, 1995, Mr. Giles again asked the District to evaluate STUDENT and convene an IEP team meeting. In addition, Mr. Giles asked the District to administratively place STUDENT in a special education program pending the assessment and IEP team meeting. (Petitioner's Exhibit GH)
By letter dated September 11, 1995, Dr. Whitcomb responded to Mr. Giles' letter. Dr. Whitcomb stated that a new assessment plan had been sent to Ms. AUNT for her approval. In addition, Dr. Whitcomb expressed a willingness to assess STUDENT and convene an IEP team meeting after receiving Ms. AUNT's consent to the new assessment plan. However, Dr. Whitcomb refused to place STUDENT in a special education program until an assessment had been completed and an IEP had been developed. (Respondent's Exhibit C, at p. 19)
By letter dated September 13, 1995, Mr. Giles requested a due process hearing for STUDENT. (Petitioner's Exhibit GF) On September 22, Ms. PARENT unilaterally placed STUDENT at Mary Stone School.
On October 9, 1995, the District received Ms. AUNT's signed consent to the District's new proposed assessment plan. (Respondent's Exhibit, at p. 17)
On October 13 and 18, 1995, Martha Rubin, speech and language specialist, conducted a speech and language evaluation of STUDENT. Ms. Rubin's evaluation report concluded that STUDENT qualified for special education speech and language services because his language skills were "severely depressed" in several areas. (Respondent's Exhibit B, at pp. 9-12)
On October 26, Rick Motylewski, resource specialist, administered the Woodcock-Johnson Tests of Achievement (Revised) to STUDENT. Mr. Motylewski's assessment report stated in relevant part:
In academic areas on the Woodcock-Johnson Test, STUDENT's performance ranged from well below average to the average range.
Areas of strength for STUDENT are reading comprehension, understanding, math concepts, attention, concentration and perseverance. Areas of weakness for STUDENT are spelling, dictation, written expression, academically acquired knowledge and math calculations.
(Respondent's Exhibit B, at pp. 1-3)
In late October 1995, Elda Aghazarian, school psychologist, evaluated STUDENT. Ms. Aghazarian administered the Woodcock Johnson Test of Cognitive Ability and the Cantor Background Interference Test for the Bender Gestalt (BIP). On the Woodcock Johnson, STUDENT obtained a standard score of 90. Ms. Aghazarian's psychological report, dated October 29, 1995, stated that STUDENT's performance on the BIP indicated "well developed visual motor integrations skills." Ms. Aghazarian's report did not make a recommendation regarding STUDENT's eligibility for special education services. (Respondent's Exhibit B, at pp. 4-7)
On October 31 and November 8, 1995, the District convened IEP team meetings to review the assessments, determine STUDENT's eligibility for special education, and recommend a placement. The IEP team concluded that STUDENT qualified for special education "due to severe deficits in receptive and expressive language." The District staff recommended that STUDENT be placed in a "severe disorders of language" special day class. Ms. PARENT agreed with the IEP goals and objectives, but initially did not agree with the District's proposed placement.
Subsequently, Ms. PARENT changed her mind regarding the District's proposed placement. On the first day of hearing (Thursday, November 28, 1995), prior to the receipt of any evidence, the parties agreed that the District's proposed IEP was appropriate for STUDENT and that he would start attending public school in the recommended placement the following Monday. However, the parties disputed whether STUDENT's mother was entitled to reimbursement for the cost of his placement at the Mary Stone School from September 22, 1995, through November 29, 1995.
Petitioner contends that the District should have recognized STUDENT's eligibility for special education services based on his prior eligibility in the Ravenswood Elementary School District. Petitioner asserts that the Sequoia Union High School District should have identified STUDENT as a special education student and offered him appropriate services in November 1994. Petitioner asserts that, because the District did not offer an appropriate placement until November 1995, Ms. PARENT is entitled to reimbursement for the cost of STUDENT's unilateral placement at Mary Stone School.
The District asserts that when STUDENT entered the District he had not received special education services for more than two years and his prior assessment and IEP were outdated. The District contends that STUDENT's eligibility for special education had, in effect, lapsed and that it, therefore, had no obligation to provide STUDENT with special education services until an assessment had been completed and an IEP team convened.(Footnote 2)
DISCUSSION
(1) Did the District deny STUDENT a free appropriate public education from November 1994 through November 1995?
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and State law, students with disabilities are entitled to a free appropriate public education. (20 U.S.C. § 1400(c); Education Code, § 56000.) A "free appropriate public education" is defined as special education and related services that are designed to meet the unique needs of the disabled student in a program that provides educational benefit to the student. Such services must be available to the student at no charge to the parent, must meet State educational standards, and must conform to the student's IEP. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16-18); Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley (1982) 458 U.S. 176; Education Code § 56031.)
In this case, the evidence established that STUDENT was a disabled student at all relevant time periods. On three separate occasions, STUDENT was evaluated for special education services and was found eligible for special education by public schools. STUDENT's learning disability was identified at an early age. After being retained in the first grade, STUDENT initially was found eligible for special education services in June 1988 by the Ravenswood Elementary School District, at the end of his second school year in first grade. In January 1992, the Ravenswood District evaluated STUDENT and, subsequently, again found him eligible for special education services. In November 1995, the Sequoia Union High School District evaluated STUDENT and found him eligible for special education services. Based on STUDENT's long history of meeting special education eligibility criteria, the evidence established that he was learning disabled at all relevant time periods and was, therefore, entitled to receive special education services from November 1994 through November 1995.
Although STUDENT qualified as a disabled student, he only briefly received special education services from the public schools. From June 1988 until the time of the hearing, STUDENT only received special education services in the public schools for approximately seven months, from March through June 1992, and April through June 1993. STUDENT entered the Sequoia Union School District in November 1994, but did not receive special education services from the District until approximately December 1995.
The evidence established that, at all relevant time periods, STUDENT needed to be placed in a special day class for students with severe language disorders. In November 1995, this was the placement recommended by the District at the IEP team meeting and eventually agreed to by STUDENT's mother. Furthermore, several witnesses testified that STUDENT needed to receive instruction in a class with a small student-to-teacher ratio that was taught by a teacher with training to address STUDENT's learning disability. Such a setting would enable STUDENT to receive considerable individual and small group instruction.
Moreover, the evidence overwhelmingly established that a regular education placement was inappropriate for STUDENT. STUDENT's two previous regular education placements were failures. In September and October 1994 at Sonoma High School, STUDENT was in a regular education program and obtained failing grades or incompletes in all of his classes. From November 1994 through March 1995, STUDENT was in a regular education program in the District and failed all of his classes. Although STUDENT received satisfactory grades while attending the Hanna Boys Center, this placement, while technically not a special education placement, was not a regular education placement and, in fact, more closely resembled a special education placement than a regular education placement. The Hanna Boys Center was a residential program with small class sizes. Many of the instructors held special education credentials. STUDENT's placement at the Mary Stone School was the only other placement in which he showed some progress. The Mary Stone School is State-certified to provide special education services, had a small class size, and was taught by a teacher credentialed to teach learning disabled students.
Although the District did not offer STUDENT special education services until November 1995, the District contends that it did not deny STUDENT a free appropriate education. The District asserts that STUDENT's eligibility for special education services lapsed because he did not have a recent assessment or IEP. In addition, the District asserts that STUDENT's family created the delay in his identification as being eligible for special education services.
With regard to the District's first argument, essentially the District stated that STUDENT was ineligible for special education services on procedural grounds. Dr. Whitcomb, school psychologist, testified that any student whose most recent assessment was more than three years old could not be eligible for special education services until a new assessment was completed and an IEP team convened. Dr. Whitcomb stated that "common sense" dictates such a course of action because a student cannot be appropriately placed without recent assessment information.
The District's contention that STUDENT was ineligible for special education on procedural grounds lacks merit. The procedural requirements in State and federal law are designed to protect the disabled student's rights. There is no provision in special education law allowing for a student's eligibility to cease simply because his assessment and IEP are outdated. The determination that a student, who was previously identified as disabled, is no longer eligible for special education services must be made by an IEP team. Most importantly, there was absolutely no substantive evidence that STUDENT's learning disability had somehow disappeared. Throughout his school years, STUDENT's assessments established that he had a learning disability. Therefore, the District's contention that STUDENT's eligibility for special education services ceased to exist for procedural reasons was not persuasive.(Footnote 3)
The District also contended that STUDENT's family interfered with the assessment process and, thereby, delayed his identification as a special education student. This argument has some merit and must be discussed in five relevant time periods.
November 1994 through February 1995
Petitioner contended that the District had a legal obligation to identify STUDENT as a disabled student and failed to do so in a timely manner. The District contended that it reasonably had no basis for knowing that STUDENT might need special education services until it received a letter from Mr. Giles in February 1995 requesting an IEP team meeting.
The District's argument has some merit. On October 28, 1994, when STUDENT registered in the District, AUNT, STUDENT's aunt, signed the registration form and indicated that STUDENT had not been in a special education program.(Footnote 4) The District did not have any of STUDENT's prior school records at that time. Several witnesses, including Petitioner's witnesses, testified that STUDENT makes a good first impression and that one would not have any reason to suspect that he has a disability when first meeting him. Moreover, STUDENT rarely attended school because he was truant most of the time. Thus, the District had limited information upon which to suspect that STUDENT had a disability. On the other hand, arguably, the District should have been more diligent in pursuing the reasons for STUDENT's poor attendance. There was no evidence that STUDENT was referred to a student attendance review board. Furthermore, District staff made no effort to obtain STUDENT's prior school records until such records were requested by Mr. Giles.
Based on the above, it appears that both parties could have done more to ensure that STUDENT's educational needs were met from November 1994 through February 1995. However, it is not clear that the District necessarily denied STUDENT a free appropriate public education during that time period because of the extenuating circumstances.
March 1995
After the District received Mr. Giles' letter of February 17, 1995, requesting an IEP team meeting and copies of STUDENT's school records, Dr. Whitcomb contacted Hanna Boys Center, Sonoma Unified School District, and Ravenswood Elementary School District to obtain copies of STUDENT's records.
By letter from Dr. Whitcomb to Mr. Giles, dated March 10, 1995, the District indicated that it had obtained copies of STUDENT's special education file from Ravenswood District. In the letter, the District specifically refused to administratively place STUDENT in a special education program or develop an IEP at that time. Instead, Dr. Whitcomb stated that the District could assess STUDENT and determine whether he was eligible for services.
Special education law requires that an IEP team meeting be held at least annually, or whenever a student demonstrates a lack of anticipated progress or a parent requests an IEP team meeting. (Education Code, §56343.) Furthermore, when a student transfers into a school district from another district in a different special education local plan area (SELPA), the new district is required to immediately provide an interim placement for a maximum of thirty days and to conduct an IEP review prior to the expiration of the thirty-day period. (Education Code, § 56325.)
In this case, an IEP team review had not occurred in almost two years, STUDENT demonstrated a lack of progress, and his parent requested an IEP. Under the circumstances, the District had a legal obligation to convene an IEP team meeting. Moreover, STUDENT transferred from another school district outside the SELPA and, therefore, the District should have immediately made an interim placement pursuant to Education Code section 56325 once it learned that he was disabled and, within thirty days of that placement, convened an IEP team meeting.
Dr. Whitcomb's letter of March 10, 1995, was a key piece of evidence. It established the approximate date on which the District knew that STUDENT had previously been identified as being disabled. Moreover, it established that the District refused to immediately place STUDENT in a special education program or to convene a timely IEP team meeting to develop an appropriate placement for him despite its knowledge that he had previously been identified as being disabled.(Footnote 5)
At all relevant time periods, STUDENT has been a learning disabled student in need of special education services. In March 1995, the District learned that STUDENT had previously been identified as learning disabled. Thus, the District should have immediately provided him with a special education program. Instead, the District specifically denied STUDENT special education services and insisted that he attend a regular education program until the assessment process was complete. The evidence overwhelmingly established that a regular education program was inappropriate for STUDENT. Therefore, the District denied STUDENT a free appropriate public education in March 1995.
April through June 1995
In March 1995, the District obtained Ms. AUNT's permission to assess STUDENT. However, prior to the assessment, STUDENT's family sent him to Mexico. From April through June 1995, STUDENT lived in Mexico and did not receive any educational services.
Although Petitioner contended that STUDENT's poor attendance was caused by the District's failure to offer him appropriate services, there was no persuasive evidence to support this contention. Moreover, the District had no obligation to provide STUDENT with educational services while he was in Mexico.
Therefore, the District did not deny STUDENT a free appropriate public education from April through June 1995.
September through November 8, 1995
In September, Mr. Giles again wrote the District seeking to obtain an interim placement, assessment, and IEP team meeting. The District again insisted that it had to assess STUDENT before any determination could be made regarding his entitlement to special education services.
For the same reasons discussed above with regard to STUDENT's placement in March 1995, the District's refusal in September and October 1995 to make an interim placement and convene a timely IEP team meeting constituted a denial of a free appropriate public education. STUDENT was a disabled student in need of special education services. Such services were denied by the District until November 8, 1995. The regular education placement offered by the District prior to November 8th was inappropriate for STUDENT. Therefore, the District denied STUDENT a free appropriate public education from September 1995 through November 8, 1995.
November 9 to 29, 1995
It was undisputed that the District offered STUDENT an appropriate placement at the IEP team meeting on November 8, 1995. Although Petitioner contended that Ms. PARENT needed time to observe the placement to determine whether it was appropriate, this argument was not persuasive. Ms. PARENT never actually observed the District's proposed placement. Furthermore, the IEP included provisions for transitioning STUDENT from private to public school. (Footnote 6) Moreover, Dr. Mittelstadt, an expert witness on Petitioner's behalf, testified that it was critical for STUDENT to be in a special day class "as soon as possible," and that the program offered by the District on November 8th was appropriate.
For the above reasons, it is concluded that the District offered STUDENT a free appropriate public education during the time period from November 9 to 29, 1995.
Conclusion
For all of the above reasons, it is concluded that the District denied STUDENT a free appropriate public education in March 1995, and from September through November 8, 1995.
(2) Is STUDENT's mother entitled to reimbursement for the cost of STUDENT's unilateral placement at Mary Stone School, a State-certified nonpublic school?
In Burlington School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts (1985) 471 U.S. 358, the Supreme Court held that school authorities are required to reimburse parents for their expenditures on private special education for a child if it is ultimately determined that such a placement, rather than the placement proposed in the IEP, is appropriate under the IDEA. The Supreme Court also concluded that equitable considerations are relevant in determining relief under the IDEA. Federal courts have held that hearing officers have the authority to order retroactive reimbursement. (See In re Conklin (4th Cir. 1991) 946 F.2d 306.)
In this case, the District improperly denied STUDENT special education services and his mother and aunt obtained such services for STUDENT at the Mary Stone School, a State-certified nonpublic school for learning disabled students. STUDENT's class at Mary Stone School had nine students, one teacher, and three full-time adult aides. Once enrolled at Mary Stone School, STUDENT's attendance dramatically improved. Mary Stone, STUDENT's teacher, testified that he was a "wonderful student" for the first two weeks but that, thereafter, his academic performance gradually deteriorated.
Although the Mary Stone School may not have been the best possible placement for STUDENT, it was certainly preferable to the regular education program being offered by the District, and produced better results. At Mary Stone School, STUDENT received considerable individual and small group instruction by a teacher qualified to instruct students with learning disabilities. Moreover, Ms. Stone credibly described the academic progress STUDENT made while in attendance at her school. Under the circumstances, it was an appropriate placement for STUDENT from September 22, 1995 through November 8, 1995.
Ms. PARENT is not entitled to reimbursement for the costs of STUDENT's placement at Mary Stone School from November 9 through 29, 1995, because on November 8, the District offered an appropriate placement for STUDENT.
Although the District did not offer STUDENT appropriate services until the IEP team meeting on November 8, 1995, equitable considerations weigh against granting Ms. PARENT complete reimbursement for the time period from September 22 through November 8, 1995. Federal courts have held that a partial reimbursement may be awarded based on equitable considerations. (Jenkins v. Florida (11th Cir. 1987) 815 F.2d 629; Alamo Heights Independent School District v. State Board of Education (5th Cir. 1986) 790 F.2d 1153; Lascari v. Board of Education (1989) 116 N.J. 30 [560 A.2d 1180].) A parent's obstruction of the IEP process is a basis to deny relief on equitable grounds. (Roland M. v. Concord School Committee (1st Cir. 1990) 910 F.2d 983.)
If STUDENT had remained in school during the 1994-95 school year, it is likely that the District would have completed its assessment and convened an IEP team meeting prior to June 1995. If the District had been able to complete its assessment of STUDENT in the spring of 1995, it is likely that the District would have offered him special education services prior to the start of the 1995-96 school year. While residing with his aunt from November 1994 through March 1995, STUDENT was truant from school most of the time. From April through June 1995, STUDENT lived in Mexico and did not receive any educational services. Thus, STUDENT and his family significantly contributed to delaying the assessment and IEP process.(Footnote 7)
Under the circumstances, both parties bear responsibility for the delay in STUDENT receiving appropriate services. Accordingly, they should equally share the costs of the delay.(Footnote 8) The District improperly denied STUDENT an interim special education placement pending completion of the assessments and IEP process. STUDENT and his family delayed the process by allowing him to stay out of school. Based on the above, Ms. PARENT is entitled to reimbursement for one-half of the cost of STUDENT's placement at Mary Stone School, including transportation costs, from September 22 through November 8, 1995.(Footnote 9)
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
The hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. (Education Code, § 56507, subd. (d).) The following finding is made in accordance with Section 56507(d).
(1) Did the District deny STUDENT a free appropriate public education from November 1994 through November 1995?
Petitioner prevailed in part on this issue.
Respondent prevailed in part on this issue.
(2) Is STUDENT's mother entitled to reimbursement for the cost of STUDENT's unilateral placement at Mary Stone School, a State-certified nonpublic school?
Petitioner prevailed in part on this issue.
Respondent prevailed in part on this issue.
ORDER
Within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of proof, the District shall reimburse Ms. PARENT for one-half of the costs, including one-half of the transportation costs, of STUDENT's placement at Mary Stone School from September 22 through November 8, 1995.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. (Education Code, §56505, subd. (i).)
Dated: February 9, 1996 F. Richard Ruderman Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
FOOTNOTES:
1. The hearing was interpreted in Spanish for Ms. PARENT.
2. The District also contended that STUDENT did not officially reside within the District until the date of the hearing and, therefore, the District had no obligation to pay for STUDENT's placement at Mary Stone School. The District asserted that it did not learn about STUDENT's residency situation until Ms. PARENT and Ms. AUNT testified at the hearing. Under Education Code section 48204(d), a student is deemed to reside within a school district if the student lives in the home of a "caregiving adult" within the school district. The evidence established that STUDENT lived with Ms. AUNT, his aunt, while attending school in the District. Ms. AUNT acted as STUDENT's "caregiving adult." Thus, the District's argument was without merit.
3. The District's argument, if taken to its logical conclusion, could lead to some absurd results. For example, based on the District's reasoning, if a blind student with an outdated assessment and IEP transferred into the District, the student could not receive special education services until the student was assessed and an IEP developed. Thus, the student would have to remain in a regular education program without special education services pending completion of the assessment and IEP team meeting. A process that could take up to fifty days. Surely, the IDEA does not require such a result.
4. Ms. Aunt speaks and reads English and Spanish. Thus, she understood the content of the form.
5. Dr. Whitcomb testified that it would have been impossible to develop an appropriate placement for STUDENT without new assessments. Dr. Whitcomb's testimony was not convincing. If an IEP team meeting had been held as requested prior to the assessments, STUDENT's mother, aunt, and teachers could have provided valuable information regarding his learning problems. The IEP team could have developed an appropriate interim placement pending completion of the assessments. After the assessments were completed, the IEP team would then be reconvened to develop an appropriate long-term placement for STUDENT. Although an interim placement developed in such a situation may have turned out to be somewhat different from the long-term placement, the interim placement would have allowed for consideration of STUDENT's learning needs in his interim educational program. Moreover, an interim special education placement would have been far superior to the District's regular education placement for STUDENT.
6. When appropriate, a transition plan must be developed as part of an IEP when a student is being transferred from a nonpublic school into a regular class in a public school for any part of the school day. (Education Code, § 56345, subd. (b)(6).)
7. Petitioner contends that the District improperly required STUDENT's caregiver to sign two assessment plans and, thereby, delayed the assessment process. However, it is unnecessary to address this issue because the District denied STUDENT a free appropriate public education in March and September through October 1995 by not offering an interim placement. Nevertheless, the District's possible impropriety in creating a second assessment plan does not excuse STUDENT and his family for their share in delaying the process.
8. There was no evidence presented at the hearing indicating that Ms. PARENT or Ms. AUNT had actually incurred any costs associated with STUDENT's placement at Mary Stone School. Thus, they will need to provide proof of such costs to the District prior to receiving reimbursement.
9. Transportation is a related service that must be provided when it is a necessary part of a student's education. (34 Code of Fed. Regs. §300.16(a).)
