California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · December 5, 2001

Student v. Shasta County Mental Health et al.

SEHO Case No. SN 899-01 · Hearing Officer Suzanne B. Brown

Shasta County agencies must provide a neurological and seizure assessment; claims over medication, placements, aide and implementation denied.

Split decision: student prevailed on 1 of 8 issues (1 in part)

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Noted in the decision

None stated.

Summary

A 13-year-old boy eligible for special education under emotional disturbance and specific learning disability filed through his legal guardian. He named Shasta County Mental Health (SCMH), the Shasta County Office of Education (SCOE) and Bella Vista Elementary School District. During the hearing, SCOE was educating him in Shasta County Juvenile Hall under a juvenile court order. He claimed a denial of FAPE from July 2000 through August 2001. His claims covered a medication SCMH prescribed, his placements and safety, assessments, and how his IEPs were carried out.

The Hearing Officer found that until January 16, 2001, SCMH treated the student as a community mental health provider, not under special education law. That was the date the IEP team found him eligible for mental health services. SCMH's earlier medication decisions were therefore outside due process jurisdiction. A hospital or the juvenile court decided his hospital, group home and juvenile hall placements and his current medication, and an IEP team cannot override those decisions. He did not need a one-to-one aide in his small juvenile hall classroom. His IEPs did not call for an aide, behavior support services or a typewriter, and SCOE provided the computer access his IEP required. Earlier evaluations had covered bipolar disorder and the effects of trauma. However, evidence of possible seizure activity had never been assessed. This caused no lost educational opportunity, but the Hearing Officer still ordered Respondents to provide a neurological assessment, including for seizure disorder. All other claims were denied.

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Why it matters

This decision shows how SEHO separated a county mental health agency's community treatment from its special education duties, which began only after an AB 3632 referral and an IEP. Placements and medication ordered by the juvenile court were treated as outside due process jurisdiction. An unassessed area of suspected disability still had to be assessed.

Issues and holdings

  1. District prevailedThreshold and jurisdiction

    Issue 1. Beginning in July 2000 and continuing through August 2000, the improper prescription of and failure to monitor adequately the effects of the drug Effexor.

    SCMH treated the student as a community public health provider, not under Chapter 26.5. It received no referral until November 2000 and was not responsible until the January 16, 2001 IEP, so the summer 2000 medication decisions were outside due process jurisdiction.

  2. District prevailedPlacement and LRE

    Issue 2. The failure to assess STUDENT's safety in his placements or take the issue of his safety into account in making placement decisions, including the failure to provide him with a full-time one-to-one aide from September 2000 to the present.

    A psychiatric hospital and the juvenile court made the hospital, group home and juvenile hall placements, and the IEP team cannot override the court. Given the small staff-to-student ratio, the student did not need a one-to-one aide in juvenile hall.

  3. District prevailedAssessment

    Issue 3(a). From July 2000 through August 2001, failure to conduct a full assessment in all areas of disability: failure to conduct a neuropsychological assessment until July 2001.

    The psychological and psychiatric evaluations done in late 2000 were sufficient. The later neuropsychological evaluation confirmed earlier diagnoses, and the delay caused no loss of educational opportunity, so there was no procedural violation.

  4. Student prevailed in partAssessment

    Issue 3(b). Failure to assess and/or diagnose STUDENT in the following areas: (1) neurological disorder; (2) bipolar disorder; (3) post-traumatic stress disorder; (4) seizure disorder.

    Bipolar disorder and trauma-related emotional issues had been assessed. Neurological and seizure disorders were suspected but never assessed, so Respondents must provide that assessment. This failure caused no lost educational opportunity and was not a denial of FAPE.

  5. District prevailedThreshold and jurisdiction

    Issue 3(c). Failure to determine if current medication is appropriate.

    The probation department and juvenile court decide medication for wards in juvenile hall (Welf. & Inst. Code § 727(a)), so this claim was outside the Hearing Office's jurisdiction.

  6. District prevailedResponsible agency

    Issue 4. Failure to ensure stability in STUDENT's placements from August through October 2000.

    A psychiatric hospital and the juvenile dependency court made these placements, and neither is an LEA. SCMH and SCOE were not responsible for the student's education then, and the student raised no claim against Bella Vista.

  7. District prevailedIEP content

    Issue 5(a). Failure to provide a behavioral intervention plan in September 2000.

    SCMH and SCOE were not involved in September 2000. Bella Vista's behavioral intervention plan followed the student to Junction, but it could not be implemented once he stopped attending school and was hospitalized.

  8. District prevailedImplementation

    Issue 5(b). From August 2000 through August 2001, failure to provide the following services in conformity with the IEPs: one-to-one aide, typewriter and behavioral support services.

    Apart from the August 2000 aide and behavior plan at Junction, the IEPs did not call for a one-to-one aide, behavioral support services or a typewriter, and SCOE provided the classroom computer access required by the June 2001 IEP.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • Order to assess. Respondents shall arrange for and provide a neurological assessment of the student to evaluate him in his suspected disability areas of neurological disorder, including seizure disorder. No deadline stated.

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Key authorities

Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley (1982) 458 U.S. 176; W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School District No. 23 (9th Cir. 1992) 960 F.2d 1479; Irving Independent School District v. Tatro (1984) 468 U.S. 883; Education Code §§ 56320, 56324(b), 56500, 56501; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, §§ 60020, 60040, 60045; Welfare & Institutions Code § 727(a)

People named in the decision

  • James Norton, program specialist/school psychologist; SCOE representative at hearing, Shasta County Office of Education
  • Kathy Thompson, director of special education; SCOE representative, Shasta County Office of Education
  • Michelle Rose, resource specialist program (RSP) teacher, Shasta County Office of Education
  • Don Zoll, school psychologist (triennial assessment), Shasta County Office of Education
  • Phillip D. Mayer, juvenile hall classroom teacher, Shasta County Office of Education
  • Linda G. Young, school psychologist (1998 assessment), Bella Vista Elementary School District
  • Dr. Tim Shannon, superintendent and principal; district representative, Bella Vista Elementary School District
  • Glynn Gregory, school psychologist (December 1998 reassessment), Shasta County Office of Education
  • Carolyn Warnemunde, behavioral consultant who wrote and helped implement the behavior plan (spelled Warnemunende in the witness list), Consultant contracted by Bella Vista and Shasta County SELPA
  • Dr. Robert B. Trustman, psychologist; conducted neuropsychological testing, Shasta County Mental Health
  • John Simmons, social worker; case manager, Shasta County Mental Health
  • Dr. Donald Kingdon, deputy director/psychologist, Shasta County Mental Health
  • Dr. James Reid McKellar, psychologist; AB 3632 mental health assessor, Shasta County Mental Health referral
  • Dr. Lynne Pappas, psychiatrist; evaluated student December 2000
  • Dr. Ervina McGehee, counselor/therapist providing IEP counseling
  • Dr. David McGee-Williams, neuropsychologist; neurocognitive evaluation July 2001
  • Craig Davis, psychologist; psychodiagnostic evaluation October 2000, Shasta County Mental Health
  • Patricia Brown, psychologist; psychodiagnostic evaluation October 2000, Shasta County Mental Health
  • Arthur Alvarado, deputy director of juvenile hall, Shasta County Juvenile Hall
  • Edward Miller, probation officer, Shasta County Probation Department
  • John L. Loomis, deputy county counsel for SCMH, Shasta County
  • Joseph Kincaid, attorney for Sonoma County Office of Education (dismissed party)
  • Junction Elementary School, school attended in fall 2000 (special education consortium with Bella Vista)
  • Sierra Vista Hospital, psychiatric hospital placement
  • Shasta Psychiatric Hospital, psychiatric hospital
  • Compass Rose, level 12 group home
  • Full Circle, group home in Sonoma
  • Victor Youth Services, level 14 group home (waiting list)
  • North Valley School, nonpublic school affiliated with Victor Youth Services
  • California Forensic Medical Group (CFMG), physician group providing medical care in juvenile hall under contract with probation

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard on August 30 and 31, September 6 and 7, and October 5, 2001, in Redding, California, before Suzanne Brown, Hearing Officer, California Special Education Hearing Office, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific.

Petitioner STUDENT was represented by his great-uncle and legal guardian, UNCLE. Respondent Shasta County Mental Health (SCMH) was represented at the hearing by deputy county counsel John L. Loomis. Also present on SCMH’s behalf was Dr. Donald Kingdon, SCMH deputy director/psychologist. Respondent Shasta County Office of Education (SCOE) was represented at the hearing by James Norton, SCOE program specialist/school psychologist, and also by Kathy Thompson, SCOE director of special education. Dr. Tim Shannon, superintendent and principal of Bella Vista Elementary School, appeared on some hearing days on behalf of Respondent Bella Vista Elementary School District (Bella Vista).

The parties called the following witnesses to testify at the hearing: James Norton, SCOE program specialist/school psychologist; Michelle Rose, SCOE resource specialist program (RSP) teacher; Don Zoll, SCOE school psychologist; Kathy Thompson, SCOE director of special education; Linda G. Young, Bella Vista school psychologist; Carolyn Warnemunende, behavioral consultant; Dr. Robert B. Trustman, SCMH psychologist; UNCLE, Petitioner’s great-uncle and legal guardian; Phillip D. Mayer, SCOE teacher; John Simmons, SCMH social worker; Dr.

* Please note that the Hearing Office has recently changed its format for numbering cases. The case number now begins with the year the case was filed and is followed by a five-digit reference number.

Donald Kingdon, SCMH deputy director/psychologist; Dr. James Reid McKellar, psychologist; Arthur Alvarado, deputy director of Shasta County Juvenile Hall; and Edward Miller, Shasta County probation officer.

Oral and documentary evidence was received. Upon receipt of the written closing briefs, the record was closed on October 30, 2001, and the matter submitted for decision.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Previously, Petitioner had named Sonoma County Office of Education (Sonoma) as a Respondent. On the first day of hearing, Sonoma was represented by attorney Joseph Kincaid. Sonoma moved that it be dismissed as a party on the grounds that it could not be held responsible for STUDENT’s education because STUDENT had only been placed in Sonoma County Juvenile Hall for only a few weeks and was held in “lockdown” during that time, thus making him inaccessible for any educational services. The parties agreed to stipulate that Sonoma’s factual representation was true, and no party opposed dismissing Sonoma as a party. In light of the factual circumstances and the lack of opposition to the dismissal motion, the Hearing Officer granted Sonoma’s motion to be dismissed as a party in this case.

Respondent Bella Vista also made a motion to be dismissed as a party. Bella Vista argued that Petitioner had no dispute with Bella Vista and that Bella Vista had fulfilled all of its obligations to Petitioner. No party opposed the dismissal of Bella Vista as a party. However, after discussion of the issues and of the relief Petitioner was seeking, the Hearing Officer denied Bella Vista’s motion to be dismissed. The Hearing Officer denied the dismissal on the grounds that Bella Vista was the responsible LEA for periods at issue in this hearing, and would likely be the responsible LEA for Petitioner’s education upon his release from juvenile hall, thus requiring Bella Vista’s involvement in implementing compensatory education or prospective placement. Thus, Bella Vista remained a Respondent in this matter.(Footnote 1) However, apparently based upon Petitioner’s representation that he had no dispute with Bella Vista, Bella Vista’s representative chose not to attend most of the hearing. Bella Vista did submit a written closing argument.

When the hearing concluded on October 5, 2001, the parties agreed that they each would prepare a written closing argument and that those arguments would be sent to the Hearing Office and the other parties, postmarked no later than October 26, 2001. On October 24, 2001, the Hearing Office received from Petitioner a request for an additional two weeks to submit Petitioner’s written closing argument. After allowing Respondents the opportunity to reply, the Hearing Officer denied the motion for a two-week extension. However, due to concern that the motion may have caused confusion among the parties regarding the due date of the closing arguments, the Hearing Officer granted a four-day extension for all parties to submit their closing arguments.

ISSUES(Footnote 2 & 3)

Did Respondents deny STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) from the time he was placed on the drug Effexor on or about July 2000, to the date of the hearing, August 30, 2001, based on the following allegations:

1. Beginning in July 2000 and continuing through August 2000, the improper prescription of and failure to monitor adequately the effects of the drug Effexor;

2. The failure to assess STUDENT’s safety in his placements or take the issue of his safety into account in making placement decisions, including the failure to provide him with a full-time one-to-one aide from September 2000 to the present;

3. From July 2000 through August 2001, failure to conduct a full assessment in all areas of disability to discover the cause of STUDENT’s problems, as follows:

(a) failure to conduct a neuropsychological assessment until July 2001;

(b) failure to assess and/or diagnose STUDENT in the following areas:

(1) neurological disorder;

(2) bipolar disorder;

(3) post-traumatic stress disorder;

(4) seizure disorder;

(c) failure to determine if current medication is appropriate;

4. Failure to ensure stability in STUDENT’s placements from August through October 2000;

5. Failure to provide STUDENT with an appropriate education, as follows:

(a) failure to provide a behavioral intervention plan in September 2000;

(b) from August 2000 through August 2001, failure to provide the following services in conformity with the IEPs: one-to-one aide, typewriter and behavioral support services.

BACKGROUND FACTS

STUDENT is a thirteen-year-old boy who is currently in Shasta County Juvenile Hall. Prior to being sent to juvenile hall, STUDENT resided primarily with his great-uncle, UNCLE, who lives in Redding, California, within the boundaries of Bella Vista. STUDENT has been found eligible for special education due to an emotional disturbance (ED) and specific learning disability (SLD).

From all available information, STUDENT’s early childhood was extremely difficult. STUDENT’s mother had a substance abuse problem and may have exposed STUDENT to drugs in utero. STUDENT and his mother moved frequently and at times STUDENT was homeless. Reportedly, STUDENT suffered physical abuse by his mother’s boyfriend and was removed from his mother’s care by Child Protective Services. STUDENT became a ward of the juvenile dependency court pursuant to California Welfare & Institutions Code section 300. On or about January 1998, STUDENT moved in with UNCLE and began attending third grade at Bella Vista.(Footnote 4) Thereafter STUDENT began receiving counseling from a therapist.(Footnote 5)

In March 1998, after STUDENT had attended Bella Vista for several weeks, school psychologist Linda Young assessed STUDENT for special education eligibility. Dr. Young found that, while STUDENT manifested a severe discrepancy between cognition and academic achievement, she could not determine whether the severe discrepancy was not primarily the result of limited school experience or poor school attendance. On that basis, pursuant to Title 5 of the California Code of Regulations, section 3030(j)(5), Dr. Young concluded that she could not recommend STUDENT as eligible for special education. Instead, Dr. Young suggested that STUDENT be reassessed after he had been attending school regularly and living in UNCLE’s home for a few months. In December 1998, when STUDENT was in fourth grade, SCOE school psychologist Glynn Gregory reassessed STUDENT for special education and found that STUDENT had a “severe learning disorder with his visual motor skills.” On December 15, 1998, the individualized education program (IEP) team convened and found STUDENT eligible for special education due to an SLD. Thereafter, STUDENT began receiving special education services including RSP, although his primary placement remained in a regular education classroom. Reportedly, during his fourth-grade year, STUDENT had verbal outbursts at school.

In summer 1999, prior to the start of STUDENT’s fifth-grade year, the IEP team agreed to make an AB 3632 referral to SCMH for a mental health assessment. Pursuant to an IEP meeting held on September 1, 1999, the amount of special education services STUDENT received increased to more than 50% of his school day, and his placement changed to a special day class (SDC). In early October 1999, UNCLE decided that he no longer agreed to the AB 3632 referral and therefore informed the assessor that he revoked his consent to the mental health assessment. (Exhs. MH-4, MH-5; testimony of Dr. Reid McKellar; UNCLE.)

During the fall 1999 semester, STUDENT had several disciplinary incidents at school, including a suspension for throwing a rock at another child in STUDENT’s family. After this incident, the IEP team members met on November 10, 1999, and agreed that STUDENT should have increased supervision and a one-to-one aide. (SCOE’s Attchmt. F; testimony of Dr. Young.) Also at this time, Bella Vista proposed that STUDENT be placed in a therapeutic day school program. The IEP stated that the placement offer required a referral to SCMH to evaluate STUDENT for the Shasta County Day Treatment program. Subsequently, at STUDENT’s annual IEP meeting on November 29, 1999, the team members drafted revised goals and objectives. The IEP provided for continued placement at Bella Vista with 85% time in special education pending a then-upcoming due process hearing.

On January 29, 2000, the parties reached a mediated settlement agreement on the due process issues. In part, the agreement provided for a functional analysis assessment of STUDENT. Pursuant to this agreement, Bella Vista and Shasta County SELPA contracted with consultant Carolyn Warnemunde to create and help implement a behavior plan for STUDENT. Ms. Warnemunde attended school with STUDENT several hours a day in order to develop and implement the behavior plan. Ms. Warnemunde, the classroom teacher, and the classroom aides initially implemented the plan in March 2000, and continued to implement the plan for the rest of the school year and extended school year.

Also during the 1999-2000 school year, UNCLE took STUDENT to SCMH for treatment numerous times. In May 2000, a SCMH psychiatrist prescribed the medication Effexor for STUDENT. (Testimony of UNCLE; Petitioner’s Exhs. 84, 85.) In July 2000, the treating psychiatrist increased the medication dosage. Shortly after the increased dosage, STUDENT’s behavior worsened. (Testimony of Ms. Warnemunde, UNCLE.) During this period in August and September 2000, STUDENT engaged in aggressive and assaultive behavior, ran away from home several times, used drugs, and stole cars on multiple occasions. (Testimony of UNCLE; Petitioner’s Exhs. 5, 17.) At least one auto theft resulted in criminal charges against STUDENT in juvenile criminal court.

During this period, UNCLE would repeatedly bring STUDENT to SCMH and request that STUDENT be hospitalized. On most of these occasions, SCMH staff treated STUDENT but found that he did not qualify for an involuntary commitment. On one occasion, UNCLE left STUDENT at SCMH, telling SCMH staff that he would not take STUDENT home because he could not manage STUDENT’s out-of-control behavior. SCMH staff contacted Child Protective Services, who placed STUDENT at a respite care facility. STUDENT went to the respite care facility but ran away after a few days. Also during this time, the IEP team members agreed that STUDENT would start the new school year at Junction Elementary School, which participated in a special education consortium with Bella Vista. STUDENT attended Junction for the first few days of the school year, with the same special education program and same instructional aide that he had the previous year at Bella Vista. After a couple of weeks, STUDENT stopped attending school altogether.

On September 7, 2000, STUDENT was involuntarily committed at Shasta Psychiatric Hospital pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code section 5855.(Footnote 6) (See testimony of Dr. Robert Trustman; Dr. Kingdon.) Shasta Psychiatric Hospital transferred STUDENT to Sierra Vista Hospital in Sacramento, where he remained for two and a half weeks. (Petitioner’s Exhs. 5, 6.) Once STUDENT was discharged from the hospital and returned to Redding, the IEP team met on September 29 and agreed to temporarily place him on home-hospital instruction. (Petitioner’s Exh. 4; SCOE’s Attachment F.) During the next two weeks, STUDENT ran away from both UNCLE’s home and a foster home where CPS had subsequently placed him. On October 11, 2000, the IEP team convened again and agreed to change STUDENT’s eligibility category from SLD to emotional disturbance (ED). The team also agreed to continue the home-hospital placement for another sixty days. Thereafter Bella Vista made a referral to SCMH for an AB 3632 assessment of STUDENT’s eligibility to receive mental health services pursuant to Chapter 26.5.

In mid-October, STUDENT was hospitalized at SCMH’s inpatient unit. Thereafter the juvenile dependency court placed him at Compass Rose, a level 12 group home near Sacramento. After a short time at Compass Rose, STUDENT was removed for assaultive behavior and sent back to Redding. On November 1, 2000, the Shasta County Probation Department took STUDENT into custody. The juvenile court ordered STUDENT detained in Shasta County Juvenile Hall, where he remained for the next six months.(Footnote 7) Because SCOE is the agency primarily responsible for educating students in Shasta County Juvenile Hall, STUDENT began receiving his education from SCOE staff upon his placement there.

On November 13, 2000, SCOE staff prepared a standard form IEP for STUDENT’s educational component at juvenile hall. The form stated that during STUDENT’s temporary placement at juvenile hall, he would receive “small group and individualized instruction with a teacher, classroom aide, and probation counselor’s support, as needed.” (SCOE’s Item A.) The form also indicated that SCOE’s special education resource teacher would provide consultation and might provide limited instruction. The SCOE staff sent this IEP document to UNCLE, who signed and returned it.

On November 21, 2000, Dr. Reid McKellar assessed STUDENT pursuant to an AB 3632 referral.(Footnote 8) Dr. McKellar concluded that STUDENT had significant mental health issues that impacted his ability to benefit from his education and thus qualified him as eligible for mental health services pursuant to California Government Code Chapter 26.5 (Chapter 26.5). Shortly thereafter, psychiatrist Lynne Pappas evaluated STUDENT. In a detailed letter dated December 15, 2000, Dr. Pappas diagnosed STUDENT with bipolar disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), conduct disorder and seizure disorder. (Petitioner’s Exh. 19.)

On January 16, 2001, the IEP team convened and found that STUDENT was eligible for mental health services pursuant to Chapter 26.5. The IEP team agreed that STUDENT would receive case management by SCMH social worker John Simmons for 60 minutes per week, and counseling with Dr. Ervina McGehee for 45-60 minutes per week. The IEP document also lists medication management as a service, but states that “medication support services will be provided through Juv. Hall (CFMG program).” Additionally, the IEP document specified that STUDENT should be placed in a nonpublic school setting. The document indicates that UNCLE requested a specific nonpublic school placement, while the other IEP team members believed that the juvenile court had sole authority to determine that placement.

The IEP team reconvened on April 25 and May 1, 2001. At those meetings, the team agreed that STUDENT’s goals and objectives should remain the same as the goals and objectives from the IEP of November 29, 1999. The IEP document indicated that all team members agreed to the IEP’s educational recommendations, but that they did not all agree regarding further mental health assessments. UNCLE requested a neuropsychological examination, while the SCMH representative argued that such an assessment was not required because it was a medical issue, not an educational issue. (SCOE’s Item C.) On May 2, 2001, UNCLE filed a due process hearing request with the Hearing Office.

Pursuant to an order from the juvenile court, STUDENT was placed at Full Circle group home in Sonoma in May 2001. While STUDENT was at Full Circle, Dr. Robert Trustman conducted neuropsychological testing of him. STUDENT stayed at Full Circle for approximately ten days, until a behavioral incident caused the Full Circle staff to call the police. (See Petitioner’s Exhs. 14, 16; testimony of Edward Miller.) STUDENT was arrested and taken to Sonoma County Juvenile Hall, where he remained for approximately two weeks. During that period, STUDENT was isolated in “lockdown” most of the time and did not attend school.

After a couple of weeks in Sonoma County Juvenile Hall, STUDENT was transferred back to Shasta County Juvenile Hall in mid-June 2001. On June 27, 2001, the IEP team convened to review the services STUDENT was receiving at Shasta County Juvenile Hall. The team agreed to add four hours per week of RSP services to STUDENT’s program for the 2001 summer session, and agreed that a computer would be made available so that STUDENT would have computer access while in the classroom. The team also agreed to reconvene in a month to discuss the results of STUDENT’s upcoming triennial evaluation. (SCOE’s Item D.)

In mid-July 2001, the Shasta County Juvenile Court agreed to the Probation Department’s recommendation to place STUDENT in a level 14 group home. However, the Probation Department was not able to locate such a placement for STUDENT at that time, so STUDENT remained in juvenile hall. Subsequently, Victor Youth Services, a level 14 group home in Shasta County, agreed to accept STUDENT once an opening became available for him there. Because no opening was available, STUDENT remained at Shasta County Juvenile Hall.

In July 2001, SCOE psychologist Don Zoll administered several standardized tests as part of STUDENT’s triennial evaluation. Mr. Zoll concluded that STUDENT continued to meet the eligibility criteria for both ED and SLD. Additionally, neuropsychologist Dr. David McGee-Williams conducted a neurocognitive evaluation of STUDENT. Dr. McGee-Williams’s findings included that STUDENT has significant difficulty with attention, concentration and memory, that he appears to have a bipolar disorder, and that he may also have a low-level seizure disorder. On July 26, 2001, the IEP team reconvened to discuss the results of the triennial assessment. The IEP document indicated that UNCLE and SCMH remained in disagreement regarding the amount of mental health services STUDENT needed. The document also noted that the Probation Department was seeking a level 14 group home residential placement for STUDENT at Victor Youth Services in Shasta County.

In a document dated August 10, 2001, the Probation Department notified the juvenile court that STUDENT had been accepted by the group home, Victor Youth Services, and its nonpublic school, North Valley School. (Petitioner’s Exh. 15.) However, Victor Youth Services did not yet have an opening for STUDENT and North Valley School would not allow STUDENT to enroll until he was placed at the group home.

When this matter closed on October 30, 2001, STUDENT continued to be placed in juvenile hall. He remained on the waiting list for placement at Victor Youth Services.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Under the amended Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and state law, children with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). (20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); Cal. Educ. Code § 56000.) FAPE consists of special education and related services that are available to the child at no charge to the parent or guardian, meet the State educational standards, and conform to the child’s individualized education program (IEP). (20 U.S.C. § 1401(8).) “Special education” is defined as specially designed instruction, at no cost to the parents, that is provided to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(25); Cal. Educ. Code § 56031. ) “Related services” means transportation and other developmental, corrective and supportive services as may be required to assist the child to benefit from special education. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(22); Cal. Educ. Code § 56363( a).)

Did Respondents deny STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) from the time he was placed on the drug Effexor on or about July 2000, to the date of the hearing, August 30, 2001, based on the following allegations:

1. Beginning in July 2000 and continuing through August 2000, the improper prescription of and failure to monitor adequately the effects of the drug Effexor

Petitioner contends that his intake of the drug Effexor, as prescribed by a SCMH psychiatrist, caused his out-of-control behavior that rendered him unable to learn and eventually led to his incarceration. SCMH contends that it was not a responsible LEA for Petitioner prior to January 16, 2001, and therefore that its actions prior to that date are not within the jurisdiction of the Hearing Office. SCMH explains that it also provides services to members of the community as a public health provider and that, prior to January 16, 2001, it provided treatment to STUDENT under that auspice, not pursuant to Chapter 26.5, the California Education Code and the IDEA.

Special education due process procedures extend to the parent, to a student who has been emancipated or reached the age of age of majority, and to the public education agency involved in decisions regarding the student. (Education Code § 56501(a).) “Public education agency” is defined as a “district, special education local plan area [SELPA], or county office…or any other public agency providing special education or related services.” (Education Code § 56500.) A community mental health agency’s involvement in decisions regarding a pupil is initiated by a referral for mental health assessment. (Cal. Code Regs., tit.2, § 60040(a).) A mental health agency has fifteen days from receipt of the referral to develop a mental health assessment plan. (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 60045(b).) The ensuing mental health assessment must be completed and reviewed with the IEP team within fifty days of receipt of the consent to assess, not counting days between the student's regular school sessions, terms, or days of school vacation in excess of five school days. (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 60045(e).)

In the present case, it is clear that SCMH’s prescription and monitoring of Petitioner’s medications in July and August 2000 were not part of any special education services. (See testimony of Dr. Trustman, Dr. McKellar, Dr. Kingdon.) Indeed, it was not until November 2, 2000, that SCMH received the referral from Bella Vista and not until January 16, 2001, that the IEP team found STUDENT eligible to receive mental health services pursuant to Chapter 26.5(Footnote 9). (Testimony of Dr. Kingdon, Dr. McKellar; Petitioner’s Exh. 70; SCOE’s Item B.) SCMH’s provision of services in its role as a public health provider is not within the jurisdiction of the due process hearing process. (See Education Code § 56501.) Thus, SCMH’s provision of services to STUDENT in summer 2000 was entirely outside of special education law and is not subject to due process procedures. Accordingly, this decision will not examine the appropriateness of the Effexor prescription or any other SCMH services provided to STUDENT prior to January 16, 2001.

2. The failure to assess STUDENT’s safety in his placements or take the issue of his safety into account in making placement decisions, including the failure to provide him with a full-time one-to-one aide from September 2000 to the present

Petitioner appears to dispute his placement at Sierra Vista Hospital in September 2000, Compass Rose in October 2000, Full Circle in May 2001, his ongoing placement at juvenile hall, and the failure to provide him with a full-time one-to-one aide from September 2000 to the present. First, regarding the placements at Sierra Vista Hospital and Compass Rose, none of the present Respondents was responsible for or involved with those placements. The Sierra Vista placement was pursuant to an involuntary commitment made by Shasta Psychiatric Hospital. The Compass Rose placement was made by the juvenile dependency court. (See Petitioner’s Exhs. 5, 85; testimony of John Simmons, Dr. Kingdon.) Neither the hospital nor the juvenile dependency court was an LEA responsible for STUDENT’s education at that time, and neither is an LEA within the jurisdiction of special education due process procedures. (See Education Code § 56501.) In any event, as detailed in the previous section, neither SCMH nor SCOE was a responsible LEA at the time of these placements.(Footnote 10)

Regarding Petitioner’s placement in juvenile hall and later at Full Circle, those placements were determined by the juvenile criminal court, not by Respondents. As described previously in this decision, STUDENT was detained at the Shasta County Juvenile Hall on November 1, 2000, and was subsequently made a ward of the juvenile criminal court. The juvenile criminal court has made all determinations regarding STUDENT’s placement in juvenile hall and at Full Circle. (Testimony of Arthur Alvarado, Jim Norton, Mr. Miller, Dr. Kingdon; Petitioner’s Exhs. 16, 49.) The IEP team does not have authority to override the court’s decisions. (See Welf. & Inst. Code § 727(a).) Thus, the court’s decisions to place STUDENT at juvenile hall and Full Circle are not within the jurisdiction of special education due process procedures.

Regarding the failure to provide STUDENT with a full-time one-to-one aide from September 2000 to the present, neither SCOE nor SCMH was involved in STUDENT’s education prior to November 2000, so claims prior to that time cannot constitute a denial of FAPE.(Footnote 11) Regarding the period from November 2000 to the present, Respondents presented evidence to establish that STUDENT has not needed a one-to-one aide while in juvenile hall. Witnesses described how the classroom STUDENT attends usually has six to eight students and three adults: a teacher, an instructional aide and a juvenile hall counselor. (Testimony of Phil Mayer, Jim Norton, Michelle Rose.) Additionally, RSP teacher Michelle Rose is in the classroom for approximately one hour a day, and often works individually with STUDENT during part of that time. STUDENT’s teacher, Phil Mayer, testified that STUDENT receives lots of individual attention in the classroom and therefore would not receive any additional benefit from having a one-to-one aide. Mr. Mayer added that a one-to-one aide would be superfluous because often STUDENT refuses to work one-on-one with anyone. Similarly, SCOE school psychologist Don Zoll testified that STUDENT does not need a one-to-one aide because, given the small teacher-to-student ratio, a great deal of individual assistance is available to the students in Mr. Mayer’s classroom.

While there was evidence that STUDENT needed a “support person” with whom he could develop a strong relationship, several witnesses testified that STUDENT had developed strong relationships with both Ms. Rose and Mr. Mayer. (Testimony of Mr. Mayer, Ms. Rose, Mr. Zoll.) Thus, given the small student-to-teacher ratio in STUDENT’s classroom and witness testimony that STUDENT did not need additional individual attention beyond what was already available, the Hearing Officer concludes that STUDENT did not need and does not need a one-to-one aide in juvenile hall.

3. From July 2000 through August 2001, failure to conduct a full assessment in all areas of disability to discover the cause of STUDENT’s problems, as follows:

(a) failure to conduct a neuropsychological assessment until July 2001

Parents of children with disabilities are provided procedural protections under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.) The Supreme Court noted in Rowley that “Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of participation” at every step “as it did upon the measurement of the resulting IEP.” (Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, (1982) 458 U.S. 176, 205-206.)

Procedural violations which result in a “loss of educational opportunity” or which “seriously infringe the parents' opportunity to participate in the IEP formulation process clearly result in the denial of a FAPE.” (W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School District No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1484 (9th Cir. 1992).) Procedural flaws, however, do not automatically require a finding of a denial of a FAPE. (Id. at 1484.) Procedural violations may result in a denial of a FAPE if they result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringe on the parents’ participation in the IEP process. (Id.) Thus, the courts have created a two-prong test for determining if a procedural violation resulted in a denial of FAPE for a student: (1) whether a procedural protection has been violated, and (2) whether the procedural violation resulted in a loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringed on the parents’ participation in the IEP process.

In the present case, Petitioner alleges that the failure of SCMH and SCOE to conduct a neuropsychological assessment of STUDENT prior to July 2001 constituted a procedural violation which resulted in a loss of educational opportunity. Because SCMH and SCOE only became involved in STUDENT’s education in November 2000, this decision will examine this claim only for the period from November 2000 to July 2001.

California law defines a mental health assessment as “a service designed to provide formal, documented evaluation or analysis of the nature of the pupil’s emotional or behavioral disorder,” and requires that a mental health assessment be conducted in accordance with Education Code sections 56320 through 56329. (2 C.C.R. § 60020(g).) In particular, section 56320 requires that the student must be assessed “in all areas related to the suspected disability including, where appropriate...social and emotional status.” (Educ. Code § 56320(f).) In November 2000, Dr. McKellar evaluated STUDENT and concluded that he was eligible for mental health services pursuant to Chapter 26.5. Shortly thereafter, psychiatrist Lynne Pappas evaluated STUDENT and diagnosed him with bipolar disorder, ADHD, conduct disorder and seizure disorder. (Petitioner’s Exh. 19.) Additionally, SCMH psychologists Craig Davis and Patricia Brown conducted a psychodiagnostic evaluation of STUDENT in October 2000, in which their diagnoses included bipolar disorder, conduct disorder and ADHD. (Petitioner’s Exh. 65.) In light of the psychological evaluations conducted in late 2000, it appears that Respondents did not fail to conduct the necessary psychological evaluations. While the subsequent neuropsychological evaluation by Dr. McGee-Williams offered greater insight into STUDENT’s neurocognitive disorders, Dr. McGee-Williams’s diagnoses also confirmed the diagnoses of previous evaluators. In any event, there is no indication that the delay in conducting this evaluation led to any actual loss of educational opportunity for STUDENT. Thus, Petitioner’s claim does not constitute a procedural violation.

(b) failure to assess and/or diagnose STUDENT in the following areas:

(1) neurological disorder;

(2) bipolar disorder;

(3) post-traumatic stress disorder;

(4) seizure disorder;

As detailed in the previous section, California law requires that a student be assessed in all areas of suspected disability. Also as discussed in the previous section, SCMH conducted or contracted with other professionals to conduct assessments that diagnosed STUDENT with bipolar disorder. Regarding post-traumatic stress disorder, the various psychological and psychiatric assessments of STUDENT noted the traumatic events in STUDENT’s childhood and discussed STUDENT’s emotional difficulties. (Petitioner’s Exhs. 14, 19, 65.)

Regarding assessment of STUDENT for neurological disorders, including seizure disorder, Dr. McGee-Williams reported that, in 1998 and 1999, STUDENT had abnormal EEGs which suggested seizure activity.(Footnote 12) (Exh. MH-3.) Both Dr. McGee-Williams and Dr. Pappas concluded that STUDENT likely has some level of seizure disorder. (Petitioner’s Exh. 19.) While STUDENT apparently was assessed by a neurologist in 1998, and had another EEG taken in 1999, those evaluations occurred prior to the escalation of STUDENT’s behaviors in 2000. Given the evidence that STUDENT has neurological issues including seizure activity, these areas constitute areas of suspected disability. STUDENT’s recent triennial assessment did not include a neurological examination, nor were these areas assessed as part of STUDENT’s previous special education assessments. (SCOE’s Attachments E, F.) Given also that there remains uncertainty regarding diagnosis of a seizure disorder or other neurological disorder, the Hearing Officer concludes that Respondents have not assessed STUDENT in these areas of suspected disability. In light of all circumstances, the Hearing Officer concludes that Respondents are obligated to have STUDENT assessed for seizure disorder and other neurological disorder.

However, there is no evidence of any actual loss of educational opportunity for STUDENT due to Respondents’ failure to conduct these assessments. Thus, the claims do not constitute a denial of FAPE.

(c) failure to determine if current medication is appropriate

After a minor has been adjudged a ward of the juvenile criminal court, the court “may make all reasonable orders for the care, custody, supervision, conduct, maintenance and support of the minor, including medical treatment, subject to further order of the court.” (Welf. & Inst. Code § 727(a).) As noted in this decision’s discussion of Issue #2, the IEP team does not have authority to override the court’s decisions.

In the present case, witnesses testified that the probation department and juvenile court determine and provide for medical treatment, including medication, of the wards in juvenile hall.(Footnote 13) (Testimony of Mr. Simmons, Mr. Miller.) Because current medication is determined by the juvenile justice system and not by Respondents, this area is outside the jurisdiction of the Hearing Office and due process procedures do not apply.

4. Failure to ensure stability in STUDENT’s placements from August through October 2000

As detailed in this decision’s discussion of Issue #2, none of the present Respondents was responsible for or involved with Petitioner’s placement from August through October 2000. Petitioner’s placements at Sierra Vista Hospital and Compass Rose group home were made by Shasta Psychiatric Hospital and the juvenile dependency court, respectively. (See Petitioner’s Exhs. 5, 85; testimony of John Simmons, Dr. Kingdon.) Neither the hospital nor the juvenile dependency court was an LEA responsible for STUDENT’s education at that time, and neither is an LEA within the jurisdiction of special education due process procedures. (See Education Code § 56501.) In any event, as detailed in the previous section, neither SCMH nor SCOE was a LEA responsible for STUDENT’s education at the time of these placements.(Footnote 14)

5. Failure to provide STUDENT with an appropriate education, as follows:

(a) failure to provide a behavioral intervention plan in September 2000;

The standard for determining whether a local educational agency's offer of placement and services substantively provided a FAPE for STUDENT involves the following three factors: whether the placement and services were designed to address STUDENT's unique needs; whether the placement and services were reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit to him; and whether the placement and services conformed to his IEP. (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; Rowley, 458 U.S. 176.)

As discussed above, neither SCMH nor SCOE was involved with or responsible for Petitioner’s education in September 2000. In any event, Bella Vista had implemented Petitioner’s behavioral intervention plan in March 2000, and that plan followed Petitioner to Junction at the beginning of the 2000-2001 school year. However, given that Petitioner stopped attending school and was hospitalized in September 2000, the behavioral intervention plan could not have been implemented at that time.

(b) from August 2000 through August 2001, failure to provide the following services in conformity with the IEPs: one-to-one aide, typewriter and behavioral support services.

As detailed previously in this decision, neither SCMH nor SCOE was involved with Petitioner’s education until November 2000, and SCMH was not responsible for providing special education services to Petitioner until January 16, 2001. In any event, except for Petitioner’s one-to-one aide and behavioral plan while at Junction in August 2000, Petitioner’s IEPs did not provide for a one-to-one aide. (SCOE’s Items A, B, C, D, E.) Similarly, the IEPs did not provide for behavioral support services. (SCOE’s Items A and B, Attachment F.) Rather, Petitioner’s IEPs of April 2001 and July 2001 both referred to the behavioral intervention plan (BIP) drafted by Carolyn Warnemunde, but did not specify that the BIP would become part of Petitioner’s program. Instead, both IEP documents stated that Petitioner might require a behavior plan once he left juvenile hall, and suggested that the BIP drafted by Ms. Warnemunde could operate as a model and guideline. (SCOE’s Items C and E.) Thus, because neither a one-to-one aide nor behavioral support services were specified in the IEPs, there was no failure to conform STUDENT’s program with the IEPs regarding those services.

Regarding provision of a typewriter, no IEP document specified that STUDENT would be provided access to a typewriter. (SCOE’s Items A, B, C, D, E.) The IEP dated June 27, 2001, specified that “a computer will be made available to his Juv. Hall classroom, so that he can have access to computer for keyboard skills.” (SCOE’s Item D.) Both Ms. Rose and Mr. Mayer testified that a computer had been placed in Mr. Mayer’s classroom and was available for STUDENT to use whenever he was in class. Thus, witness testimony established that SCOE provided computer access in conformity with the IEP, and there was no failure to conform the program with the IEPs.

ORDER

Respondents shall arrange for and provide a neurological assessment of STUDENT, to evaluate him in his suspected disability areas of neurological disorder, including seizure disorder. All of Petitioner’s other claims for relief are denied.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to California Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following finding is made in accordance with this requirement:

Did Respondents deny STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) from the time he was placed on the drug Effexor on or about July 2000, to the date of the hearing, August 30, 2001, based on the following allegations:

1. Beginning in July 2000 and continuing through August 2000, the improper prescription of and failure to monitor adequately the effects of the drug Effexor;

Respondents prevailed on this issue.

2. The failure to assess STUDENT’s safety in his placements or take the issue of his safety into account in making placement decisions, including the failure to provide him with a full-time one-to-one aide from September 2000 to the present;

Respondents prevailed on this issue.

3. From July 2000 through August 2001, failure to conduct a full assessment in all areas of disability to discover the cause of STUDENT’s problems, as follows:

(a) failure to conduct a neuropsychological assessment until July 2001;

Respondents prevailed on this issue.

(b) failure to assess and/or diagnose STUDENT in the following areas:

(1) neurological disorder;

(2) bipolar disorder;

(3) post-traumatic stress disorder;

(4) seizure disorder;

Petitioner prevailed on this issue to the extent that Respondents failed to assess Petitioner for neurological disorder and seizure disorder, and must provide Petitioner with such an assessment. Respondents prevailed on the remainder of this issue.

(c) failure to determine if current medication is appropriate;

Respondents prevailed on this issue.

4. Failure to ensure stability in STUDENT’s placements from August through October 2000;

Respondents prevailed on this issue.

5. Failure to provide STUDENT with an appropriate education, as follows:

(a) failure to provide a behavioral intervention plan in September 2000;

Respondents prevailed on this issue.

(b) from August 2000 through August 2001, failure to provide the following services in conformity with the IEPs: one-to-one aide, typewriter and behavioral support services.

Respondents prevailed on this issue.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. California Education Code § 56505(i).

DATED: December 5, 2001 ___________________________________ Suzanne B. Brown Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

1. Bella Vista renewed its dismissal motion several times during the hearing, but did not state grounds warranting reconsideration. The Hearing Officer noted that the dismissal motion was continuing, and denied the renewed motions. 2. As proposed resolutions for these issues, STUDENT seeks the following remedies: case management services, a neurological evaluation, a full assessment in all areas of disability, a full-time one-to-one behaviorist, psychological counseling, assignment of trained and knowledgeable staff to work with STUDENT, name identification in IEP of staff assigned to work with STUDENT, and compensatory education. 3. This decision addresses only the issues established at the beginning of the hearing, and does not address any additional claims or potential violations outside of the issues established at the beginning of the hearing. However, the Hearing Officer knows of no reason why claims not raised in the present hearing cannot be raised in a subsequent due process hearing. 4. In 1999, UNCLE became STUDENT’s legal guardian 5. The counseling sessions were paid for by Medi-Cal and did not involve a referral from any of the Respondents. 6. Welfare & Institutions Code section 5855 authorizes involuntary commitment of a child when the child is a danger to him/herself or is a danger to others, or when the child is gravely disabled to mental disability. Section 5855 is essentially identical to Welfare & Institutions Code section 5150, which authorizes involuntary commitment of adults under the same conditions. 7. On or about February 2001, pursuant to a determination under Welfare & Institutions Code section 241.1, STUDENT’s wardship transferred from the juvenile dependency court to the juvenile criminal court. He remains a ward of the juvenile criminal court pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code section 602. 8. In a letter dated November 2, 2000, Dr. Reid McKellar wrote that he had just received the referral for mental health assessment. 9. Petitioner indicated at the beginning of the hearing that he did not have any issues against Bella Vista, and thus this decision does not address whether Bella Vista should have made the referral to SCMH earlier than November 2000. Additionally, Petitioner does not contend that UNCLE’s requests for services from SCMH in summer 2000 initiated the referral for assessment, and thus this decision does not address that issue. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 60040(a).) 10. Only Bella Vista was an LEA involved in STUDENT’s educational decisions in September and October 2000. As discussed in the Procedural Matters section of this decision, Petitioner represented at the start of the hearing that he had no issues against Bella Vista. In any event, Bella Vista had no responsibility for or control over the disputed placements. 11. In any event, STUDENT did not need a one-to-one aide in September or October 2000. In September 2000, STUDENT’s IEP provided for an instructional aide, but the aide could not be provided because STUDENT had stopped attending school. In mid-October 2000, the IEP team changed STUDENT’s placement to home-hospital instruction, during which a one-to-one aide would not be necessary because home-hospital instruction is one-on-one. 12. SCMH appears to argue that a neurological exam is outside the scope of special education because it is a medical exam conducted by a physician. (See testimony of Dr. Trustman, Dr. Kingdon.) However, special education law specifically envisions and provides for evaluations and diagnoses by physicians. (See, e.g., Irving Independent School District v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 892 (1984); Education Code § 56324(b).) 13. The probation department contracts with a physician group, California Forensic Medical Group (CFMG) to provide medical treatment to the children in juvenile hall. 14. The appropriateness of the Junction placement is not at issue, given that the issue was not raised at hearing and Petitioner represented that he had no dispute with Bella Vista.