California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · June 21, 2001

Student v. Huntington Beach City Elementary School District

SEHO Case No. SN 929-01 · Hearing Officer Hee C. Kim

Huntington Beach City Elementary did not deny FAPE by inviting its due process attorney to a preschooler's IEP meeting.

District prevailed on all issues

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Noted in the decision

At the hearing, the District said it wanted to seek a writ challenging the Hearing Officer's ruling that she had jurisdiction. The hearing was not continued for that purpose. The decision does not mention any later history.

Summary

The parents of a four-year-old boy eligible for special education under autism filed for due process against Huntington Beach City Elementary School District. The father represented the student. The District had invited its outside attorney, Caroline Zuk, to a May 11, 2001 IEP meeting, and the parents objected in writing. Ms. Zuk was also representing the District against the family in another due process case that was still going on. The parents argued that she lacked the knowledge or special expertise about the child required of invited IEP team members. They also argued that her presence made the meeting adversarial and showed the meeting had a purpose other than the child's education.

Before the hearing, a separate claim about an alleged ex parte communication in the other case was dismissed. The Hearing Officer then rejected the District's argument that its choice of IEP invitees could never be reviewed. On the merits, she found no clear abuse of discretion. Before becoming a lawyer, Ms. Zuk had worked in schools for at least fourteen years, mostly with special education students, and she knew the student's history. An audiotape showed she arrived about 40 minutes late, said little, and was not adversarial. The parents participated fully, and the team agreed on most extended school year services. The District prevailed, and all relief was denied.

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Why it matters

This decision shows how SEHO reviewed a district's choice to bring its attorney to an IEP meeting. The Hearing Officer held that such choices can be reviewed but found no violation on these facts. She stressed that the ruling was limited to this case and noted federal guidance strongly discouraging attorneys at IEP meetings.

Issues and holdings

  1. Dismissed / withdrawnThreshold and jurisdiction

    Issue Pre-hearing. Whether the District denied STUDENT a FAPE during the 2000-2001 school year and 2001 extended school year by engaging in an ex parte communication in an earlier-filed, ongoing due process matter between the same parties (SN 2034-00).

    A May 25, 2001 minute order dismissed this claim before the hearing because it was not a proper issue for hearing under Education Code section 56501(a).

  2. District prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue 1. Did the District deny STUDENT a FAPE during the 2000-2001 school year and 2001 extended school year by having attorney Caroline Zuk attend the IEP meeting held for him on May 11, 2001?

    The District's choice of IEP invitees can be reviewed for clear abuse of discretion. Here there was none: the attorney had special education experience and knew the student, her few comments were not adversarial, the parents participated fully, and the meeting was held only to make educational decisions.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • All of Petitioner's requests for relief were denied, including the request that the attorney be barred from future IEP meetings.

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Key authorities

Rowley; W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School Dist. No. 23; Roland M. v. Concord School Committee; Medford v. District of Columbia; Student v. Calaveras Unified School Dist. (SEHO 1998); Heckler v. Chaney; Helgeson v. Bureau of Indian Affairs; 34 C.F.R. Part 300, Appendix A, Question 29; Education Code section 56341(c)(2) and (h)

People named in the decision

  • Caroline Zuk, District attorney; invited IEP meeting participant; witness, Miller, Brown, & Dannis
  • John Conniff, Director of administrative services; witness, Huntington Beach City Elementary School District
  • Woollard, Hearing Officer presiding over the related case SN 2034-00, California Special Education Hearing Office

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Hee C. Kim, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in Huntington Beach, California, on May 30, 2001. Petitioner STUDENT was represented at the hearing by his father, FATHER. Also present on Petitioner’s behalf was his mother, MOTHER. Respondent Huntington Beach City Elementary School District (District) was represented by attorney Caroline Zuk from the firm of Miller, Brown, & Dannis. Also present on the District’s behalf was its director of administrative services, John Conniff. The following witnesses were called to testify: PARENTS, Ms. Zuk, and Mr. Conniff.

Oral and documentary evidence was received. The District presented oral closing arguments at the conclusion of the hearing. The record was held open for the submission of Petitioner’s written closing arguments. After Petitioner’s written closing arguments were received, the record was closed and the matter submitted for decision.

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR HEARING(Footnote 1)

Did the District deny STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during the 2000-2001 school year and 2001 extended school year by having attorney Caroline Zuk attend the individualized education program (IEP) meeting held for him on May 11, 2001?

PROCEDURAL MATTER

On May 22, 2001, a week before the first scheduled day of hearing, the District filed a motion to dismiss this matter in its entirety. At the time, Petitioner had identified the following two issues for hearing: (1) whether the District denied STUDENT a FAPE during the 2000-2001 school year and 2001 extended school year by engaging in an ex parte communication in an earlier-filed and ongoing due process matter involving the same parties, the matter of STUDENT v. Huntington Beach City Elementary School District (SN 2034-00); and (2) whether the District denied STUDENT a FAPE by “insisting” on having an attorney at STUDENT’s IEP meeting. The District argued that the second issue regarding Ms. Zuk’s participation at an IEP meeting should be dismissed because the District was entitled to have representation at the IEP meeting notwithstanding the parents’ objection. Petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss.

On May 25, the Hearing Office issued the following minute order dismissing the first issue and denying the motion to dismiss as to the second issue of Ms. Zuk’s participation at the IEP meeting:

The District’s motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. Petitioner’s first issue concerning ex parte communication in SN 2034-00 is not a proper issue for hearing in accordance with Education Code section 56501(a) and therefore is dismissed. Petitioner’s second issue alleges a violation of the student’s procedural rights and is an appropriate issue for hearing. However, further inquiry will be made at hearing to determine whether the second issue should have been raised in SN 2034-00. Consequently, the motion to dismiss the second issue is denied at this time and the hearing will convene as scheduled on May 29, 2001.

On the first and only day of hearing, May 30, the District again asserted that the matter of Ms. Zuk’s attendance at the IEP meeting was not a proper issue for hearing.(Footnote 2) This time, the District argued that the Hearing Officer was without jurisdiction to review its exercise of discretion in inviting Ms. Zuk to the IEP meeting pursuant to Section 56341(c)(2) of the Education Code. The District did not present any authorities to support its argument.

The Hearing Officer did not find the District’s argument persuasive. The Hearing Officer noted that the right to FAPE of an individual with exceptional needs includes the right to certain procedural protections, one of which is the attendance of specific required persons at meetings convened to develop and/or review an IEP. Related to this procedural protection is the requirement that any additional persons invited by a school district must meet the criteria enumerated in section 56341(c)(2) of the Education Code, i.e., the person must possess expertise or knowledge necessary for the development of the IEP. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(vi); 34 C.F.R. § 300.344(a)(6). The Hearing Officer noted that a school district has the discretion to determine whether a person possesses the requisite expertise or knowledge. However, like other procedural protections, the right to have additional persons invited to IEP meetings only when they possess special expertise or knowledge would mean little if the school district’s exercise of discretion in this regard was never reviewable.

The District then indicated that it wished to file a writ in order to challenge the Hearing Officer’s finding that jurisdiction existed to hear the case. The Hearing Officer stated that while the District remained free to attempt to obtain a writ on this issue, the hearing would not be continued or delayed because of the District’s desire to obtain a writ. The District had known since May 7, 2001, when Petitioner filed his request for hearing, that he would be raising as an issue Ms. Zuk’s attendance at STUDENT’s IEP meeting. Despite this, the District waited until May 22, one week before the first scheduled day of hearing, to make its motion to dismiss. Additionally, there was at least one full business day between the Hearing Officer’s partial denial of the District’s motion to dismiss and the first day of hearing during which the District could have made efforts to obtain a writ. Finally, the Hearing Officer noted that a party’s disagreement with a hearing officer’s ruling and the party’s desire to obtain a writ to challenge the ruling did not constitute good cause to continue a hearing pursuant to Education Code Section 56505(f). The hearing proceeded as scheduled and was completed the same day.

BACKGROUND FACTS

STUDENT is a four-year-old student who has resided within the jurisdictional boundaries of the District since October 2000. He is identified as eligible for special education and related services under the category of autism.

On November 14, 2000, STUDENT’s parents filed a request for a due process hearing and named the District as the respondent (SN 2034-00). The hearing in SN 2034-00 convened on January 25, 2001. Since that time, a number of hearing days have been held in front of Hearing Officer Woollard. To date, that hearing has not concluded. The issues in SN 2034-00 include whether the District denied STUDENT a FAPE during the 2000-2001 school year, whether the District timely performed an appropriate assessment of STUDENT, whether the parents are entitled to reimbursement for assessments they obtained privately, and whether STUDENT is entitled to compensatory education. Attorney Caroline Zuk has represented the District throughout the proceedings in SN 2034-00.

On or about April 5, 2001, STUDENT’s parents filed a second request for a due process hearing naming the District (SN 688-01). Case SN 688-01 was resolved by the parties through a final mediation agreement that same month. Ms. Zuk also represented the District in the proceedings arising out of SN 688-01.

On or about April 26, 2001, the District sent to the parents a notice that an IEP meeting was scheduled for May 8, based upon the parents’ request for a meeting. The notice indicated that the District would invite Ms. Zuk, among other persons, to attend the IEP meeting “to assist in the formulation of an IEP.”

By letter dated April 27, 2001, Mr. FATHER informed John Conniff that he and his wife would be unable to attend an IEP meeting on May 8 and requested that the meeting be rescheduled for another time. In the letter, FATHER also stated that he and his wife strongly objected to Ms. Zuk’s presence at the IEP meeting. He asserted that Ms. Zuk was not a person who possessed expertise or knowledge with regard to STUDENT which was necessary for the development of the IEP pursuant to Education Code Section 56341(c)(2). He also asserted that Ms. Zuk was not “educational personnel,” as indicated on the IEP notice. Additionally, he contended that he and his wife would regard Ms. Zuk’s presence at the IEP meeting as a violation of Education Code Section 56341(h), which required IEP meetings to be nonadversarial and convened for the sole purpose of making educational decisions for the good of the individual with exceptional needs. FATHER indicated that, should the District insist on having Ms. Zuk attend the IEP meeting, he and his wife would nevertheless attend. However, he also indicated that, unless he was informed by Mr. Conniff within five days that Ms. Zuk would not be attending the IEP meeting, he would file a compliance complaint with the California Department of Education.

On or about May 3, 2001, the District sent to the parents a notice that an IEP meeting would be held on May 11. It continued to list Ms. Zuk as a person expected to be in attendance at the meeting. No response was made to the parents’ specific concerns regarding Ms. Zuk’s attendance.(Footnote 3) On May 7, the parents filed a request for the instant due process hearing (SN 929-01).

On May 11, the IEP team met at 1:00 p.m. as scheduled. Ms. Zuk arrived at approximately 1:40 p.m. and was present for the remainder of the meeting, which terminated less than an hour later. The District thereafter provided the parents with a written IEP, accompanied by a letter dated May 15. On or about May 19, the parents returned the IEP to the District. The parents indicated agreement with most of the provisions for the 2001 extended school year contained in the IEP and expressed disagreement with certain other issues, including the amount of speech and language services being offered for the regular school year, the comprehensiveness of related services and goals and objectives, and the omission of the word “trained’ in describing the shadow aide.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

ISSUE: Did the District deny STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during the 2000-2001 school year and 2001 extended school year by having attorney Caroline Zuk attend the individualized education program (IEP) meeting held for him on May 11, 2001?

Pursuant to the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and State special education law, children with disabilities have the right to a FAPE. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); Cal. Educ. Code § 56000. FAPE consists of special education and related services that are available to the child at no charge to the parent or guardian, meet the State educational standards, and conform to the child’s IEP. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8). In Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200, 205, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982), the United States Supreme Court recognized the importance of adherence to the procedural requirements of the IDEA in providing a child with FAPE. Id. at 205.

Federal special education law requires states to establish and maintain certain procedural safeguards to ensure that each student with a disability receives the FAPE to which he/she is entitled and that parents are involved in the formulation of the student’s educational program. W.G. v. Bd. of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992). The procedural rights that extend to parents include the right to be informed in writing when the educational agency proposes to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child; the right to participate in the development of the child’s IEP; the right to examine all relevant educational records; and the opportunity for mediation and a due process hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1997) (amending 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1994)). Procedural flaws do not automatically require a finding of a denial of a FAPE, but procedural violations that result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringe on the parent’s opportunity to participate in the IEP process do result in the denial of a FAPE. W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484; see also Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 994 (1st Cir. 1990).

Here, Petitioner alleged that the District denied STUDENT a FAPE by having Ms. Zuk attend STUDENT’s IEP meeting even though the parents lacked legal representation at the meeting and objected in writing to her attendance. Petitioner objected to Ms. Zuk’s presence at the IEP meeting on May 11, 2001, on three grounds. First, Petitioner contended that the District lacked the authority to invite Ms. Zuk to STUDENT’s IEP meeting because she is not a person with knowledge or special expertise regarding STUDENT, as required by Education Code Section 56341(c)(2). Second, Petitioner asserted that, in light of Ms. Zuk’s representation of the District in due process proceedings involving STUDENT, her presence at the IEP meeting created an adversarial atmosphere, in violation of Education Code Section 56341(h). Finally, Petitioner argued that Ms. Zuk’s presence at the IEP meeting established that the District convened the meeting for purposes other than making educational decisions for the good of the individual with exceptional needs, in violation of Education Code § 56341(h). Petitioner requested that Ms. Zuk not be allowed to attend any further IEP meetings convened for STUDENT.

The District asserted that it properly exercised its discretion in inviting Ms. Zuk to the IEP meeting because she is a person with knowledge or special expertise regarding special education and her presence did not create an adversarial atmosphere. The District also argued that the Hearing Office was without jurisdiction to review the District’s exercise of discretion in this regard.

Among the most basic of the procedural protections under the IDEA is the right to have specified persons present at meetings convened to develop, review, and revise the IEP. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B); Cal. Educ. Code § 56341(b). In addition to the persons required to be at IEP meetings, parents and a public agency may, in their discretion, invite other individuals who possess expertise or knowledge regarding the child. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(vi); Cal. Educ. Code § 56341(c)(2). The determination of whether the invited individual has knowledge or special expertise is to be made by the parents or the public agency inviting the individual to be a member of the IEP team. 34 C.F.R. § 300.344(c). However, “the parent’s and public agency’s right to bring other individuals to the IEP meeting at their discretion must be exercised in a manner that ensures that all members of the IEP team have the knowledge or special expertise regarding the child to contribute meaningfully to the IEP team.” 34 C.F.R. Part 300, Attachment 1, § 300.344 (64 Fed. Reg. 12585 (1999)).

As mentioned in the Procedural Matter section of this decision, the Hearing Officer is not persuaded by the District’s argument that a school district’s exercise of its discretion in inviting individuals to a child’s IEP meeting is never reviewable. A school district may not exercise its discretion in a manner that would, for example, seriously infringe on a parent’s right to participate in the IEP process. See W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484. Where, for example, a school district’s choice of a specific member of an IEP team results in a serious infringement of a parent’s right to participate, whether or not through the fault of that member, hearing officers should and have reviewed the school district’s selection in light of a parent’s right to participate. STUDENT v. Calaveras Unified Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 1099 (Ca. SEHO 1998); In the Matter of a Child with Disabilities, 19 IDELR 86 (NH 1992); compare with Board of Educ. of Community Consolidated Sch. Dist. No. 21 v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 938 F.2d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding it appropriate to consider parental hostility to proposed placement in evaluating expected educational benefits).

Moreover, “‘[t]he mere fact that a statute contains discretionary language does not make agency action unreviewable.’” Helgeson v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 153 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1066 (9th Cir. 1994)). Generally, there is a strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action. Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 542, 108 S.Ct. 1372, 99 L.Ed.2d 618 (1988). The presumption is overcome if there is “clear and convincing” evidence of a contrary congressional intent. Helgeson, 153 F.3d at 1003. Additionally, administrative agency decisions are not reviewable in those rare instances where a statute is drawn in such broad terms that, in a given case, there is no law to apply. Socop-Gonzalez v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 208 F.3d 838, 843 (9th Cir. 2000). The discretionary exception to judicial review applies if “the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985). There appears no reason why such standards should not apply in reviewing the exercise of discretion by a school district charged with administering the IDEA. Here, the statute in question contains meaningful standards against which to judge a school district’s exercise of discretion. Further, there is no indication that Congress intended to preclude judicial review of a school district’s exercise of discretion in this regard. Therefore, judicial review of the District’s exercise of discretion in inviting Ms. Zuk to the IEP meeting is available.

However, where a duty is imposed by law upon an officer of a school district to act within his or her discretion, the hearing officer’s discretion will not be substituted for the discretion of the officer of the school district. See Bedke v. Quinn, 154 F.Supp. 370, 371 (D.Idaho 1957). A reviewing court is without power to interfere with or set aside the action of a government officer unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion or a clear failure to exercise discretion. See United States v. Shaughnessy, 183 F.2d 371, 372 (2d Cir. 1950). The Hearing Officer finds that neither occurred in this case. Mr. Conniff’s testimony established that he invited Ms. Zuk to STUDENT’s IEP meeting on May 11, 2001, in part because of her substantial educational experience and involvement in issues regarding STUDENT’s education. Additionally, according to Mr. Conniff, his invitation to Ms. Zuk arose out of his desire to have support at the IEP meeting in developing STUDENT’s IEP and ensuring that the legal requirements of the IDEA were followed. Ms. Zuk’s testimony supported Mr. Conniff’s in this regard. Ms. Zuk’s testimony established that, prior to becoming an attorney in 1998, she had worked in school systems for at least fourteen years and that the majority of that time was spent working with special education children. Further, the record indicated that Ms. Zuk has been the attorney representing the District with regard to due process hearing matters concerning STUDENT since his entry into the District in October 2000 and, in that role, has become familiar with STUDENT’s educational history and program. Thus, the evidence established that Mr. Conniff did not exercise his discretion arbitrarily or without thought to the requirement that an invited individual have special expertise or knowledge regarding the child.(Footnote 4)

The finding that Mr. Conniff properly exercised his discretion in inviting Ms. Zuk to attend the IEP meeting is not negated by the fact that she is an attorney who has been retained to represent the District. Neither the IDEA nor its implementing regulations prohibit the presence of counsel at IEP meetings. Medford v. Dist. of Columbia, 691 F.Supp. 1473, 1481 (D.C. 1988); 34 C.F.R. Part 300, Appendix A, Question 29 (1999). Rather, the determination of whether an attorney possesses sufficient knowledge or special expertise regarding the child should be made on a case-by-case basis by the parent or public agency inviting the attorney to be a member of the team. 34 C.F.R. Part 300, Appendix A, Question 29 (1999). Here, as determined earlier, Mr. Conniff made such a determination when he invited Ms. Zuk. The fact that Ms. Zuk was the attorney representing the District in STUDENT’s ongoing due process hearing did not mean that Mr. Conniff improperly exercised his discretion. Nowhere in the IDEA, its implementing regulations, or in State law is there a prohibition, express or implied, that an attorney may not be invited to an IEP meeting simply because he or she is representing the school district in an ongoing due process case.

The Hearing Officer also finds unpersuasive Petitioner’s second argument that in light of Ms. Zuk’s representation of the District in due process proceedings involving STUDENT, her presence at the IEP meeting created an adversarial atmosphere, in violation of Education Code Section 56341(h). Subsection (h) of Section 56341 of the Education Code states, “It is the intent of the Legislature that the individualized education program team meetings be nonadversarial and convened solely for the purposes of making educational decisions for the good of the individual with exceptional needs.” Initially, it is acknowledged that some ill feelings exist between the PARENTS and Ms. Zuk because of Ms. Zuk’s representation of the District in due process hearing matters involving STUDENT. MOTHER’s testimony established that it is her perception that Ms. Zuk is engaging in activities designed to stall the completion of the due process proceedings and thwart the delivery of appropriate services to her son. However, the mere fact that participants at an IEP meeting may have a personal dislike for other meeting participants does not create by itself an adversarial atmosphere. A review of the audiotape of the IEP meeting submitted by Petitioner, as well as the specific comments cited by Petitioner, showed that Ms. Zuk made few comments at the meeting and that the comments she did make were not adversarial in tone or content.

Additionally, the comments made and questions posed by Ms. Zuk were related to issues regarding STUDENT’s educational needs and program. For example, when Ms. Zuk inquired whether persons other than the occupational therapist were also seeing an increase in inappropriate behaviors, her inquiry was a necessary attempt to determine in what environments the inappropriate behaviors occurred and under what circumstances so that the behaviors could be properly addressed. Further, the evidence indicated that Ms. Zuk’s presence at the meeting did not hamper the parents’ ability to fully participate in the IEP meeting, since they were as involved in the IEP process after Ms. Zuk’s late entry into the meeting as they were before she appeared. The parents were, at all times during the meeting, expressive of their concerns and opinions about the educational issues discussed. Moreover, the parents and District were able to come to agreement on significant aspects of STUDENT’s educational program for the extended school year at that meeting. In short, there is no evidence that Ms. Zuk’s presence at the IEP meeting held on May 11, 2001, created an adversarial atmosphere.(Footnote 5)

Finally, Petitioner asserted that Ms. Zuk’s presence at the IEP meeting on May 11, 2001, denied STUDENT a FAPE because her presence established that the District convened the meeting for purposes other than making educational decisions for the good of the individual with exceptional needs, in violation of Education Code § 56341(h). The evidence did not support Petitioner’s argument in this regard. A review of the audiotape made by the parents of the IEP meeting demonstrated that the discussions at the meeting were strictly confined to issues related to making educational decisions for STUDENT. There were extensive discussions regarding issues such as STUDENT’s need for increased occupational therapy and the adequacy of the goals and objectives written by the occupational therapist and speech and language therapist. Nothing in the record indicates that the District convened the meeting for any purpose other than to make educational decisions for the good of STUDENT.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Hearing Officer finds that the District did not deny STUDENT a FAPE by inviting Ms. Zuk to the IEP meeting held on May 11, 2001.

ORDER

All of Petitioner’s requests for relief are denied.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following finding is made in accordance with this statute: Respondent Huntington Beach City Elementary School District prevailed on the only issue heard and decided.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i).

Dated: June 21, 2001 Hee C. Kim, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

Footnote 1: The issue listed here differs slightly in wording from that noticed by Petitioner. Changes were made for purposes of clarification and to facilitate proper analysis. Footnote 2: During the morning of May 29, the parties agreed to continue the first day of hearing scheduled for May 29 because of FATHER’s illness. Footnote 3: Subsequently, by notice dated May 7, 2001, the District provided notice of another IEP meeting scheduled for June 1. It continued to list Ms. Zuk as a person expected to be in attendance at the meeting. Footnote 4: While Petitioner argued that Ms. Zuk did not have knowledge or expertise because any teaching credentials she previously held have since expired, the Hearing Officer notes that there is no requirement that the individual being invited to an IEP meeting hold any credentials or even have a background in teaching. Consequently, the fact that Ms. Zuk’s credentials are currently expired does not, standing alone, render her a person without sufficient knowledge or expertise to be invited to STUDENT’s IEP meetings. Footnote 5: There are certainly times, however, when the presence of an attorney may very well create an adversarial atmosphere at an IEP meeting. See 34 C.F.R. Part 300, Appendix A, Question 29 (1999). The Department of Education had the following to say with regard to the presence of attorneys at IEP meetings:

The presence of the agency’s attorney could contribute to a potentially adversarial atmosphere at the meeting. The same is true with regard to the presence of any attorney accompanying the parents at the IEP meeting. Even if the attorney possessed knowledge or special expertise regarding the child (§ 300.344(a)(6)), an attorney’s presence would have the potential for creating an adversarial atmosphere that would not necessarily be in the best interests of the child. [¶] Therefore, the attendance of attorneys at IEP meetings should be strongly discouraged.

34 C.F.R. Part 300, Appendix A, Question 29 (1999).

While the Hearing Officer found that the presence of the school district’s attorney at an IEP meeting did not rise to the level of a procedural violation and a denial of FAPE in this case, this finding is limited to the facts of this case. It is not in any way intended to speak to the effect of an attorney’s presence at IEP meetings held in any other instance, either for STUDENT or another child with a disability. It is entirely possible that the presence of an attorney at an IEP meeting could rise to the level of a procedural denial of FAPE. School districts in general should remember that parents often view attorneys retained to represent the school district as threatening and that it therefore may be unwise to have attorneys attend IEP meetings. In any case, the choice to have an attorney present at an IEP meeting is not one that should be undertaken lightly, but should be exercised carefully and thoughtfully with the best interests of the child in mind.