California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · April 24, 1997
Student v. Manhattan Beach Unified School District
SEHO Case No. SN 950-96 · Hearing Officer Mary L. Cote
Manhattan Beach Unified wins: student with ADHD is not eligible for special education, and reimbursement for CEDU and private costs is denied.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Noted in the decision
The District filed a separate due process request on assessment (SN 1344-96), which was resolved through mediation. A footnote notes an ongoing separate dispute over further assessment; no finding was made on it. The parents' post-hearing motion for reconsideration to exclude the CEDU records (District Exhibit 7) was denied.
Summary
The parents of a 15-year-old ninth grader requested a hearing against Manhattan Beach Unified School District. The student had a diagnosis of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) but had never qualified for special education. He attended regular classes in the District until early eighth grade. After a disciplinary incident and an expulsion recommendation, his parents placed him at CEDU, a residential nonpublic school. The parents argued that he qualified for special education with a specific learning disability (SLD) or an other health impairment (OHI). They sought CEDU costs and about $76,000 for private assessments, therapy, advocacy and other expenses since 1992.
Hearing Officer Mary L. Cote found that he was not eligible. Neither the District's 1993 testing nor a 1995 private assessment by Dr. Teri Solochek showed the severe gap between ability and achievement that California required for SLD. His grades were generally C or better. For OHI, the Hearing Officer found that ADHD was a chronic health problem that limited his alertness. However, it did not adversely affect his educational performance. Because he was not eligible, the parents could not recover the CEDU costs. The District's 1993 assessment was appropriate, and the District had no duty to reassess him before the later referral. The private reports were mostly treatment summaries obtained to respond to the expulsion proposal. The Hearing Officer had no authority to award advocacy fees. All relief was denied.
Why it matters
The decision shows how SEHO applied California's severe-discrepancy formula for learning disability and the "adverse effect" element for other health impairment to a student with ADHD and passing grades. It also shows that reimbursement for a private placement and private services depended on first establishing eligibility.
Issues and holdings
- District prevailedEligibility
Issue 1. Is STUDENT eligible for special education because of a specific learning disability (SLD) or other health impairment (OHI)?
Not eligible: neither the 1993 District testing nor the 1995 private testing showed a severe ability-achievement discrepancy for SLD. ADHD limited his alertness but did not adversely affect his educational performance, so he did not qualify as OHI, and he did not need special education.
- District prevailedUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue 2. Are Respondents required to fund STUDENT's costs at CEDU, a nonpublic school (NPS)?
The student was not eligible for special education, so the parents were not entitled to reimbursement for CEDU.
- District prevailedIndependent educational evaluation (IEE)
Issue 3. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for other expenses they have incurred since 1992 in procuring assessments and services for STUDENT?
The District's 1993 assessment was appropriate and it had no duty to reassess before the later referral. The private reports were treatment summaries or were obtained to respond to the expulsion proposal. Services were not reimbursable because the student was not eligible. Advocacy fees were beyond the Hearing Officer's authority, and no facts or authority supported lost wages or incidental costs.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- All of Petitioner's requests for relief are denied.
Key authorities
School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education (1985); U.S. Department of Education Joint Policy Memorandum (1991) 18 IDELR 116; Education Code § 56337; 5 CCR § 3030(j); 5 CCR § 3030(f); Education Code § 56339; Education Code § 56329(b); Education Code § 56320; Education Code § 56381; Education Code § 56507
People named in the decision
- Linda Jones, Director of pupil personnel services / director of special education, Manhattan Beach Unified School District
- Bob Farran, SELPA director, Southwest SELPA
- Kathleen Peterson, Hearing Officer (present on first day), Special Education Hearing Office
- John Passalacqua, Hearing Officer who issued subpoenas duces tecum, Special Education Hearing Office
- Teri Solochek, Ph.D., Licensed psychologist and educational consultant; private psychoeducational assessor, Private
- Stephen L. Parker, Ph.D., Marriage, family, and child counselor; private therapist, Private
- Selig A. Cynman, M.D., Private psychiatrist, Private
- CEDU, Nonpublic residential school, Running Springs, California
- Reading Center, Private provider of reading therapy, Private
- Andrea Tytell, Attorney who formerly represented the student, Private
- Scott Kester, Ph.D., Contract assessor for District, Loyola Marymount University
- Sharon Grandinette, Program specialist and RSP teacher, Manhattan Beach Unified School District
- Bonnie Petrusky, School psychologist (District witness), Manhattan Beach Unified School District
- Janet Schwabe, Principal, Manhattan Beach Intermediate School, Manhattan Beach Unified School District
- Carol Coordt, Former principal, Pennekamp elementary school, Manhattan Beach Unified School District
- Ms. Perez-Osorio, Assessor who conducted 1993 District psychoeducational assessment, Manhattan Beach Unified School District
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Mary L. Cote, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office, McGeorge School of Law, in Manhattan Beach, California, on January 16, February 18, and March 3, 1997.(Footnote 1)
Petitioner was represented by George Mason and Francine McDermott-Mason, administrative law consultants. Also present on behalf of STUDENT were his parents. Respondent Manhattan Beach Unified School District (hereafter District) was represented by attorney Sharon A. Watt. Also present on behalf of the District was Linda Jones, director of pupil personnel services. Bob Farran, director of the Southwest SELPA, appeared briefly on the second day of the hearing.(Footnote 2) Hearing Officer Kathleen Peterson was present on the first day of hearing.
Oral and documentary evidence was received. The record was held open to allow the parties to submit written closing briefs. The District's closing brief was received on March 18, 1997. Petitioner's closing brief was received on March 20, 1997. Thereafter, the case was closed and the matter was submitted for decision.
ISSUES
(1) Is STUDENT eligible for special education because of a specific learning disability (SLD) or other health impairment (OHI)?
(2) Are Respondents required to fund STUDENT's costs at CEDU, a nonpublic school (NPS)?
(3) Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for other expenses they have incurred since 1992 in procuring assessments and services for STUDENT?
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
On December 30, 1996, the District requested a subpoena duces tecum (SDT) to compel production of records regarding Petitioner by Teri Solochek, Ph.D., and Stephen L. Parker, Ph.D., marriage, family, and child counselor (M.F.C.C.), who provided therapy to Petitioner, and by CEDU, the nonpublic school Petitioner currently attends. The District asserted that attempts to procure the documents from the parents were unsuccessful. On January 3, 1997, Hearing Officer John Passalacqua found reasonable necessity to issue the requested SDTs. On January 3, 1997, Petitioner objected to the District's request for SDTs on the grounds that the information requested is confidential and the right to confidentiality had not been waived by the parents.(Footnote 3) The Hearing Officer concluded that any right to confidentiality regarding the requested records was waived by the parents placing Petitioner's psychological condition at issue in the special education due process hearing. Specifically, the parents requested a hearing to determine whether Petitioner is eligible for special education and whether they are entitled to reimbursement for Petitioner's placement at CEDU, as well as for services from Dr. Solochek and Dr. Parker.
At the hearing, Petitioner objected to admitting the District's Exhibit 7, which contains the following records produced in response to the SDT served by Respondent on CEDU: application for admission to CEDU; immunization records; CEDU medical examination records; achievement test results; CEDU quarterly report cards; CEDU Individual Plan for Success; and CEDU Middle School Parent/Professional Communication Record.(Footnote 4) Petitioner again asserted that information from CEDU is confidential and that neither parent waived the right to maintain confidentiality. Petitioner also asserted that consideration of the information from CEDU by the Hearing Officer would be prejudicial to Petitioner and would destroy his therapeutic relationship with CEDU. Petitioner did not, however, explain with any specificity the way in which he would be prejudiced or that his therapeutic relationship with the school would be harmed. The District asserted that the information is relevant to Petitioner's issues for hearing, namely, whether he is eligible for special education and whether his parents are entitled to reimbursement for the costs of his placement at CEDU and other services. The Hearing Officer found that information from CEDU is relevant to the issues for hearing and that any right to confidentiality had been waived by raising as issues for hearing Petitioner's eligibility for special education services and by requesting reimbursement for services provided by CEDU. The District's Exhibit 7 was then admitted as evidence in the special education due process hearing.(Footnote 5)
On March 14, 1997, after the close of the evidentiary portion of the hearing, the Hearing Office received Petitioner's request for reconsideration to suppress the District's Exhibit 7, STUDENT's records from CEDU. In addition to issues previously raised regarding confidentiality, Petitioner asserted that admission of the District's Exhibit 7 has caused "irreversible injury to the Complainants/Petitioners: MOTHER, FATHER and STUDENT by compromising all fiduciary, confidential, therapeutic relationships as they may apply, to include but not limited to the Hearing Officer allowing recent mediated assessment testimony by Dr. Scott Kester...." The District responded once more that the information from CEDU is relevant to the issues for hearing and that confidentiality had been waived. Petitioner's request for reconsideration raised no new logical basis for excluding the District's Exhibit 7, the documents from CEDU. Accordingly, the motion for reconsideration is denied.
BACKGROUND FACTS
Petitioner is a fifteen-year-old student in the ninth grade. He attended regular education classes in the Manhattan Beach Unified School District until the eighth grade. In November 1995, STUDENT was suspended for possession of marijuana on the Manhattan Beach Middle School campus.(Footnote 6) Following his suspension, STUDENT did not return to school in the District and, in January 1996, STUDENT's parents enrolled him in CEDU, a nonpublic school located in Running Springs, California. STUDENT continues to attend CEDU. According to STUDENT's mother, CEDU is a "personal growth school" that offers a structured residential program. STUDENT is in the regular education program at CEDU and receives group therapy three times a week. STUDENT has been diagnosed with an attention deficit disorder with hyperactivity (ADHD); however, he has never been found eligible for special education.
While in the fifth grade, during the 1992-1993 school year, STUDENT was referred to a Student Study Team (SST) because of difficulties in the areas of written language and organizational skills. Difficulty focusing and staying seated were also noted by his teacher. The SST referred STUDENT for a special education assessment in November 1992. The results of the District's psycho-educational testing found that STUDENT's intellectual abilities fell within the average range and his academic achievement was commensurate with his cognitive ability. STUDENT scored at the beginning of the seventh grade in reading, at the end of the sixth grade in math, and at the fifth grade range in written language. Weaknesses were identified in visual perception of abstract information and visual-motor skills. (District's Exhibit 5) The IEP team met on January 21, 1993, to review the results of the District's assessment. STUDENT's parents attended the meeting and signed the IEP, indicating that they concurred with the conclusion of the team that, because there was no discrepancy between cognitive and achievement, STUDENT did not meet special education eligibility criteria as learning disabled.
In November 1992, STUDENT's parents contacted Stephen L. Parker, Ph.D., marriage, family, and child counselor, to provide counseling to STUDENT. In a letter dated December 9, 1995, Dr. Parker stated that the major area of concern in the fall of 1992 was STUDENT's acting-out behavior at home. Dr. Parker stated that STUDENT was exhibiting signs of an ADHD and an obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), which was causing him difficulty ordering his environment, and controlling impulses. (Petitioner's Exhibit C)
STUDENT's parents also obtained an assessment of STUDENT by Selig A. Cynman, M.D., in March 1993. According to Dr. Cynman's report, he diagnosed STUDENT with an ADHD, an oppositional defiant disorder (ODD), and an anxiety disorder. He treated STUDENT with Tenex and Dexedrine. Dr. Cynman continued to treat STUDENT from March 1993 through September 1995. (Petitioner's Exhibit D)
At the beginning of the eighth grade, STUDENT was found in possession of marijuana at school. The SST met on November 27, 1995, and recommended that STUDENT be expelled. An agreement in principle was reached between the District and attorney Andrea Tytell, who then represented STUDENT, whereby the District would not expel STUDENT if his parents procured a nonpublic school placement for him. STUDENT's placement at CEDU began on January 3, 1996. Sometime following the SST meeting, STUDENT's mother and Ms. Tytell requested that the District assess STUDENT for special education. The District's assessment plan is dated January 4, 1996. Apparently the assessment plan was never signed by the parents and the assessment did not take place.(Footnote 7)
On May 27, 1996, STUDENT's parents requested an "emergency IEP." In a letter dated June 4, 1996, Ms. Jones, the District's director of special education, stated to the parents that she was treating their request for an "emergency IEP" as a referral for special education. Ms. Jones also stated that, because the request was received by the District on May 30, 1996, 20 days prior to the end of the school year, the assessment would take place when school resumed in the fall, as allowed for by special education law. Ms. Jones stated that the assessment would be completed by October 10, 1996. (Petitioner's Exhibit K) According to Petitioner, the request for an "emergency IEP" was sent to the District via facsimile on May 22, 1996, prior to the last 20 days of the school year. The assessment did not take place.
On September 6, 1996, the Hearing Office received a request for a special education due process hearing on behalf of Petitioner regarding the issues of eligibility and the parents' entitlement to reimbursement for private services they had provided for STUDENT. On December 12, 1996, the District requested a separate hearing on the issue of assessment. (Case No. SN 1344-96) The parties resolved the assessment issue through mediation, and an assessment plan was agreed to by the parents. The District obtained the services of Scott Kester, Ph.D., professor at Loyola Marymount University, to assess STUDENT. On January 30, 1997, Dr. Kester and Sharon Grandinette, District program specialist and RSP teacher, attempted to assess STUDENT at CEDU. Dr. Kester was able to administer the WISC-III and several other measures; however, STUDENT's administrative law consultants did not allow Dr. Kester to complete his assessment. They also did not allow Ms. Grandinette to begin the academic achievement portion of STUDENT's assessment because they asserted that she did not conform with the person agreed to by the parties to conduct the assessment. At the time of the hearing, the assessment had not been completed.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ISSUE NO. 1: Is STUDENT eligible for special education because of a specific learning disability (SLD) or other health impairment (OHI)?
California special education law states that individuals with exceptional needs are students who have a disability pursuant to the definitions in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 1401 of Title 20 of the United States Code, and who require instruction and/or services that cannot be provided with modification to the regular school program. Education Code § 56026(a) and (b)). Disabilities identified in federal special education law include mental retardation, hearing, speech, language, visual, orthopedic, and health impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, and specific learning disabilities.
According to MOTHER, STUDENT has been diagnosed with an attention deficit disorder with hyperactivity (ADHD). ADHD is not listed in federal or state law as one of the disabilities that establishes eligibility for special education. The United States Department of Education has stated in a policy memo that a student with an attention deficit disorder (ADD) or ADHD is eligible for special education only if by reason thereof (1) the student meets the eligibility criteria for a listed disability such as SLD, OHI, or SED; and (2) the student needs special education. U. S. Department of Education Joint Policy Memorandum, (1991) 18 IDELR 116; see also 20 U.S.C. 1401(a)(1). California law similarly states that a student whose educational performance is "adversely affected" by ADHD is eligible for special education if the student demonstrates a need for special education and related services by meeting eligibility criteria in the category of SLD, OHI, or SED. Education Code § 56339(a).
Specific Learning Disability (SLD)
California Education Code § 56337 states that the following three requirements must be met in order to satisfy eligibility criteria for a specific learning disability:
(a) A severe discrepancy exists between the intellectual ability and achievement in one or more of the following academic areas: (1) Oral expression; (2) Listening comprehension; (3) Written expression; (4) Basic reading skills; (5) Reading comprehension; (6) Mathematics calculation; (7) Mathematics reasoning. (b) The discrepancy is due to a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes and is not the result of environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantages. (c) The discrepancy cannot be corrected through other regular or categorical services offered within the regular instructional program.
Title 5 California Code of Regulations § 3030(j) states that a student with specific learning disability has:
a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes involved in understanding or in using language, spoken or written, which may manifest itself in an impaired ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or do mathematical calculations, and has a severe discrepancy between intellectual ability and achievement in one or more of the academic areas specified in Section 56337(a) of the Education Code.
For purposes of this section, basic psychological processes include "attention, visual processing, auditory processing, sensory-motor skills, cognitive abilities including association, conceptualization and expression." 5 CCR § 3030(j)(1).
Section 3030(j) goes on to state the following:
(2) Intellectual ability includes both acquired learning and learning potential and shall be determined by a systematic assessment of intellectual functioning.
(3) The level of achievement includes the pupil's level of competence in materials and subject matter explicitly taught in school and shall be measured by standardized achievement tests.
(4) The decision as to whether or not a severe discrepancy exists shall be made by the individualized education program team.... No single score or product of scores, test or procedure shall be used as the sole criterion for the decisions of the individualized education program team as to the pupil's eligibility for special education.
A severe discrepancy can be established either through a formula using standardized tests (5 CCR § 3030(j)(4)(A)), by alternative means when standardized tests are considered invalid (Title 5 CCR § 3030(j)(4)(B)), or through a determination by an IEP team that such a discrepancy exists (Title 5 CCR § 3030(j)(4)(C)).
California Code of Regulations § 3030(j)(4)(A) sets forth the method by which to establish a severe discrepancy for students for whom standardized tests are considered to be valid. There was no credible testimony that the use of standardized tests is invalid in assessing STUDENT's ability or achievement. Therefore, to determine if a severe discrepancy exists, STUDENT's scores on standardized intellectual testing can be compared with his scores on achievement testing. When standardized tests are considered valid, a severe discrepancy is established by the following:
First, converting into common standard scores, using a mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15, the achievement test score and the ability test score to be compared; second, computing the difference between these common standard scores; and third, comparing this computed difference to the standard criterion which is the product of 1.5 multiplied by the standard deviation of the distribution of computed differences of students taking these achievement and ability tests. A computed difference which equals or exceeds this standard criterion, adjusted by one standard error of measurement, the adjustment not to exceed 4 common standard score points, indicates a severe discrepancy when such discrepancy is corroborated by other assessment data which may include other tests, scales, instruments, observations and work samples, as appropriate.
(5 CCR § 3030(j)(4)(A)
Thus, a severe discrepancy is established when the difference between standard scores on academic achievement and standard scores on measures of ability meets or exceeds 18.5 points. This number is obtained by first multiplying the standard deviation of 15 points by 1.5, which equals 22.5 points, and then subtracting 4 points, the standard error of measurement. The final step in establishing a severe discrepancy is to determine whether the discrepancy is supported by other data.
Petitioner contends that because of an ADHD and learning deficits, he meets special education eligibility criteria. Petitioner asserts that the District should have found him eligible for special education as early as 1992. In support of his claim of special education eligibility, Petitioner relied on testimony by his mother and reports from the following: Stephen L. Parker, Ph.D., M.F.C.C., (Petitioner's Exhibit C); psychiatrist Selig A. Cynman, M.D. (Petitioner's Exhibit D); and Teri Solochek, Ph.D., (Petitioner's Exhibit E). Each of these reports was completed following STUDENT's suspension and the District's recommendation for expulsion.
In a letter dated December 9, 1995, Dr. Parker stated that the primary area of concern in November 1992 was STUDENT's acting out at home. He stated that, because of ADHD and OCD, impulse control was a constant struggle for STUDENT. Dr. Parker also stated that "while attending Pennekamp school Carol Coordt established an informal yet flexible structure that met STUDENT's needs. She provided the one on one and external structure when he began to experience internal chaos. The result was that STUDENT was able to maintain behaviorally and therefore experience much more success." The only mention of any learning problems STUDENT may have was in social contexts. Dr. Parker stated that STUDENT is "learning disabled when it comes to understanding social subtlety." In his letter, Dr. Parker concluded that STUDENT was a special education student with "obvious deficits in the social/emotional areas." Dr. Parker stated that STUDENT needed clear and constant boundaries to contain his emotions and recommended that STUDENT be placed in a resource program or a special day class. (Petitioner's Exhibit C)
Dr. Cynman's report dated December 11, 1995, lists the following diagnostic impressions upon STUDENT's discharge from his care in September 1995: ADHD, ODD, and anxiety disorder, not otherwise specified.(Footnote 8) Dr. Cynman did not make a diagnosis of a learning disability. (Petitioner's Exhibit E)
In November 1995, Teri Solochek, Ph.D., licensed psychologist and educational consultant, conducted an independent psycho-educational assessment of STUDENT at the request of his parents. On the WISC-III, STUDENT obtained a verbal score of 104, a performance score of 86, and a full scale score of 95. On the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-Revised, STUDENT obtained a standard score of 93, which is in the average range. On the Woodcock-Johnson Tests of Achievement-Revised (WJ-R), STUDENT obtained the following standard scores: word identification - 99; word attack - 88; passage comprehension - 96; reading vocabulary - 100; dictation - 84; proofing - 84; punctuation and capitalization - 78; spelling - 90; usage - 93; writing samples - 105; calculation - 88; and applied problems - 101.
Dr. Solochek drew the following conclusions in her report of the assessment:
STUDENT is currently functioning within the average range of intelligence. His strengths lay in his strong verbal skills, including his ability to comprehend and express himself with language. STUDENT also has a good ability to perform practical mathematical calculations in his head. Areas of weakness are STUDENT's perceptual organizational skills, his auditory attention and concentration, his paper-pencil skills, his rote learning skills and his difficulty with foresight and planning....
Academically STUDENT's skills are primarily within the average range and consistent with expectancy. He has solid reading and writing skills.
(Petitioner's Exhibit E)
The District contends that Petitioner did not meet eligibility criteria for special education in 1992 or any time thereafter. The District asserts that there is not a significant discrepancy between STUDENT's ability and achievement and that he does not require special education to benefit from educational instruction. STUDENT received the following scores on the District's 1993 administration of the WISC-III: verbal-102; performance-90; and full scale-96. STUDENT obtained the following standard scores on the WJ-R: letter-word identification-102; passage comprehension-108; calculation-99; applied problems-111; dictation-91; writing samples-106; proofing-100; basic writing skills-95; broad reading-106; broad math-106; and broad written language-95. (District's Exhibit 5)
At the hearing, Bonnie Petrusky, school psychologist, reviewed the results of the District's testing in 1993. She testified that a comparison STUDENT's scores on the WISC-III with his academic achievement scores does not result in a difference of 22.5 points or greater, which is necessary to establish a significant discrepancy. Moreover, Ms. Petrusky testified that during the fourth and fifth grades, STUDENT primarily received "A," "B," and "C" grades and passed successfully from grade to grade. Additionally, in the report of her 1993 assessment, Ms. Perez-Osorio stated that teachers reported to her that STUDENT's academic skills fell within the fifth grade range. (District's Exhibit 5)
Ms. Petrusky testified that the results of testing by Dr. Solochek in 1995 also did not establish a severe discrepancy between STUDENT's ability as measured by the WISC-III and his academic achievement as measured by the WJ-R.
Janet Schwabe, principal of Manhattan Beach Intermediate School, testified that STUDENT did very well in the seventh grade. She recalled that STUDENT was referred to her on two occasions and that he was on homework "monitoring" to ensure that he recorded all of his homework assignments before leaving school. Ms. Schwabe testified that in the two months that STUDENT attended school during the eighth grade, he was earning "C" and "D" grades because of his failure to turn in assignments. She stated that homework monitoring was re-instituted to address STUDENT's failure to turn in assignments.
As set forth above, a severe discrepancy is established when the differential between standard scores on measures of ability and achievement meets or exceeds 22.5 points, adjusted by a standard error of measurement of no more than four. Turning to results of testing in 1993, comparisons of STUDENT's verbal, performance, or full scale standard scores on the WISC-III, (a measure of ability), with STUDENT's standard scores on any area of achievement on the WJ-R, (a measure of achievement), do not result in a severe discrepancy. The largest discrepancy is 11 points, which does not meet or exceed 22.5, even when adjusted by the standard error of measurement. Therefore, in 1993 there was no severe discrepancy between STUDENT's ability and achievement on standardized measures.Dr. Solochek's assessment in 1995 also did not establish a severe discrepancy between STUDENT's ability and achievement. The lowest score STUDENT received on any of the WJ-R subtests--78--was in punctuation and capitalization. The next two lowest scores were in dictation and proofing. California Education Code § 56337 does not include punctuation, capitalization, dictation, or proofing as areas which qualify as a learning disability for purposes of special education eligibility. All of STUDENT's scores on other academic achievement subtests, as measured by Dr. Solochek, fall between 88 (calculation and word attack) and 105 (writing samples). Comparing the lowest of these scores of academic achievement (88) with any of the three scores of ability on the WISC-III (verbal-104/performance-86/full scale-95) does not result in a discrepancy that meets or exceeds 22.5 points, even when adjusted by the standard error of measurement. The largest discrepancy when applying a four point standard error of measurements is 14. There was no evidence, had Dr. Kester and Ms. Grandinette been able to complete their assessment of STUDENT, that more contemporary test results would reveal a severe discrepancy.
There also was no corroborating data presented at the hearing, such as other tests, scales, observations, or work samples, to support that STUDENT has a learning disability. Ms. Petrusky, who reviewed the assessment data on behalf of the District, testified that there is not a severe discrepancy between STUDENT's ability and achievement. Ms. Petrusky has 25 years of experiencing as a school psychologist and, during that time, has assessed many children and has interpreted their test data. Petitioner did not call any witnesses to rebut her testimony. He also did not call any of his treating doctors or psychologists or any of his current teachers or therapists from CEDU to testify. Moreover, neither Dr. Parker nor Dr. Cynman diagnosed STUDENT with a learning disability. (Petitioner's Exhibits C and D) In the report of Dr. Solochek's assessment, which was submitted by Petitioner, Dr. Solochek concluded that STUDENT's academic skills were consistent with expectancies. (Petitioner's Exhibit E) Except for the few weeks of the eighth grade, STUDENT received passing or better grades. He has continued to generally receive "C" or better grades at CEDU where, according to his mother, he is placed in regular education classes. (Respondent's Exhibit 7) Therefore, there is no evidence that STUDENT has required in the past, or presently requires, instruction or services that cannot be provided with modification to the regular school program. Because there is no evidence of a severe discrepancy between STUDENT's ability and achievement, and no evidence that STUDENT requires special education, the Hearing Officer concludes that STUDENT does not meet special education eligibility for a specific learning disability.
Other Health Impaired (OHI)
A student is eligible for special education if he has an "other health impairment" and, by reason thereof, needs special education. Title 5 California Code of Regulations Section 3030(f) states that eligibility for special education as other health impaired is established when "a pupil has limited strength, vitality or alertness, due to chronic or acute health problems...which adversely affects a pupil's educational performance. See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(b)(8).
MOTHER testified that, since 1992, the District has been aware that STUDENT has an ADHD and should have qualified him for special education as OHI. MOTHER testified that STUDENT's fourth grade teacher described STUDENT as fidgety, distractible, and lacking focus. MOTHER testified that during the fifth and sixth grades, STUDENT's teachers told her that STUDENT lacked organizational skills, had missing assignments, could not sit still, had a limited attention span, and was constantly wiggling. MOTHER stated that STUDENT did better after medication for ADHD was initiated. MOTHER testified that, during the seventh grade, STUDENT was disruptive in class and had a number of detentions.
Both Dr. Cynman and Dr. Parker described STUDENT as having an ADHD, and Dr. Solochek's report of STUDENT's assessment in November 1995, described STUDENT as excessively hyperactive. (Petitioner's Exhibit E) Several District witnesses also described STUDENT's difficulty paying attention. For example, Carol Coordt, who was principal at Pennekamp, testified that STUDENT had attentional difficulties and difficulty following directions in class, particularly during the sixth grade. On the Connors Rating Scale, which was completed by STUDENT's teacher in 1993, hyperactivity, daydreaming, and emotionality were elevated. (District's Exhibit 5)
Ms. Petrusky, school psychologist, testified that by using subtest scores from the District's administration of the WISC-III in 1993, she calculated STUDENT's "freedom from distractibility." The score she obtained was 104, which falls within the average range and indicates that STUDENT was not then exhibiting significant attentional problems. Ms. Petrusky did the same calculation using the results of Dr. Solochek's testing in 1995. STUDENT's freedom from distractibility score was 98, which also falls within the average range. Ms. Petrusky testified that it is atypical for a student with ADD or ADHD to score in the average range on the freedom from distractibility scale. Ms. Petrusky testified that STUDENT's grades have always been acceptable and, even with Dr. Cynman's diagnosis of ADHD, STUDENT would not qualify for special education because the ADHD was not negatively affecting his educational performance.
In order to determine whether STUDENT qualifies for special education services under the category of other health impaired, it must be determined whether STUDENT has limited strength, vitality, or alertness that is due to a chronic or acute health problem that adversely affects educational performance. There are references throughout testing and by STUDENT's teachers that he is distractible and fidgety. STUDENT's mother reported similar behavior. Based on this information, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT suffers limited alertness. Dr. Cynman diagnosed STUDENT with an ADHD and prescribed medication to alleviate its affects. The Hearing Officer finds that ADHD is a health problem. STUDENT's attentional problems have been described by teachers in elementary and middle school and are also present at the NPS he currently attends. The evidence therefore establishes that STUDENT's limited alertness is due to a health problem that is chronic in nature.
There was no persuasive evidence, however, that STUDENT's educational performance has been adversely affected in any substantial way by the ADHD. As discussed above, STUDENT has always maintained passing or better grades, performs generally at or above grade expectancies, and, over time, has continued to demonstrate at least average academic achievement on standardized measures. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT does not meet eligibility criteria for special education as OHI.
ISSUE NO. 2: Are Respondents required to fund STUDENT's costs at CEDU, a nonpublic school (NPS)?
Under both state and federal law, students with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education. Pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18), "free appropriate public education" means special education and related services that conform with the student's individualized educational program. "Special education" is defined as "specifically designed instruction, at no cost to the parent or guardian, to meet the unique needs of a disabled child...." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16).
In School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education. (1985) 105 S.Ct. 2003, the United States Supreme Court determined that when the proposed public school placement is inappropriate, parents of a student eligible for special education may be entitled to reimbursement for expenses which they incur in educating their child.
In January 1996, STUDENT's parents enrolled him in CEDU, a nonpublic school. The parents claim that Respondents are responsible for the costs associated with STUDENT's attending CEDU because they failed to address STUDENT's needs while he attended school in the District. However, the IEP team did not find STUDENT eligible for special education. Based on the information provided at the hearing, the Hearing Officer also did not find STUDENT eligible for special education. Therefore, because STUDENT is not eligible for special education, his parents are not entitled to reimbursement for the costs of STUDENT's attending CEDU.
ISSUE NO. 3: Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for the costs of other expenses they have incurred since 1992 in procuring assessments and services for STUDENT?
Petitioner's administrative law consultants requested reimbursement in the amount of $76,000. They did not specify for which services they were seeking reimbursement or their related costs. With some reluctance and only after encouragement from the Hearing Officer, MOTHER testified that she is seeking reimbursement for the following services she obtained for STUDENT: assessment and services provided by Dr. Cynman from March 30, 1993, to November 29, 1995; assessment and counseling by Dr. Parker from January 31, 1993, to November 29, 1995; therapy from the Reading Center from October 5, 1995, to November 29, 1995; Dr. Solochek's assessment in November 1995; services from attorney Ms. Tytell; educational consultant services from Mr. Mason and Ms. McDermott-Mason; lost wages; and phone calls and other incidental expenses, less insurance reimbursements and SSI payments.
Assessments
Petitioner contends that his parents are entitled to reimbursement for the costs of assessments they procured because the District's initial assessment of him in 1993 was inadequate and the District failed thereafter to assess him in response to on-going problems at school and referrals made by his parents.
A parent may obtain an independent educational evaluation from a qualified specialist at public expense if the parent disagrees with the assessment conducted by the educational agency. If the educational agency establishes at a due process hearing that its assessment is appropriate, it is not required to pay for the independent evaluation. Education Code § 56329(b).
For the District's assessment to be appropriate, it must meet the requirements of California Education Code § 56320, which states in relevant part that testing and assessment materials and procedures must be selected and administered so as not to be racially, culturally, or sexually discriminatory; provided and administered in the student's primary language or other mode of communication; administered by trained personnel in conformance with test instructions; and validated for the specific purpose for which they are used. Assessment and testing materials must also not measure the student's impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills unless that is what the test purports to measure.
Subsection 56320(f) requires that the student be assessed in all areas of suspected disability including, where appropriate, health and development, vision, hearing, motor abilities, language function, general ability, academic performance, self-help, orientation and mobility skills, career and vocational abilities and interests, and social and emotional status. Pursuant to subsection (g), the assessment must be conducted by persons knowledgeable of the student's disability. Psychological assessments must be conducted by credentialed school psychologists, and health assessments must be conducted by a credentialed school nurse or physician. These assessors must be trained and prepared to assess cultural and ethnic factors appropriate to the pupil being assessed. Education Code § 56324(a) and (b).
In this case, STUDENT was first referred for a special education assessment on November 20, 1992. On November 25, 1996, MOTHER consented to the District's proposed assessment plan. On the signed assessment plan, MOTHER indicated that she did not have any assessments from other agencies that she would like considered. MOTHER also indicated that she did not believe that STUDENT needed to be assessed in areas other than those identified by the District.
Pursuant to Education Code § 56344, an IEP must be completed within 50 days from the date of receipt of the parent's consent for the assessment. Days between the student's regular school sessions, terms or vacation in excess of five school days do not count toward the 50 days for completing the assessment. On January 21, 1993, within the required time lines, the IEP team met to review the assessment. The District assessed STUDENT's cognitive ability, academic achievement, social and emotional development, health and development, and visual-perceptual functioning and visual-motor skills. The assessment was conducted by a school psychologist, and she employed assessment instruments commonly used to assess students of STUDENT's age. The assessment also included information and checklists completed by STUDENT's teacher and mother. (District's Exhibit 5) There was no credible evidence presented at the hearing that the District's assessment of STUDENT in 1993 was inappropriate or that it failed to conform to the requirements of Education § 56320(a) and (b).
According to Education Code § 56381, a District must reassess a special education student every three years or more frequently, if conditions warrant, or if the student's parent or teacher requests an assessment and a new IEP to be developed. As to whether the District was obligated to conduct an assessment of STUDENT after 1993, there was no evidence that STUDENT was receiving failing grades or was not performing as expected, given his age and ability during the fifth through seventh grades. In his letter, Dr. Parker described STUDENT's elementary school experience as "positive," and Dr. Cynman's letter dated December 11, 1995, stated that STUDENT's ADHD symptoms improved from his initial assessment in March 1993 to April 1994, and then again when mediation was started in February 1995. (Petitioner's Exhibits C and D) Ms. Petrusky testified that STUDENT continued to receive "C" or better grades. Ms. Schwabe, principal of Manhattan Beach Intermediate School, testified that STUDENT did well in the seventh grade. The biggest problem she recalled was that STUDENT had some trouble turning in homework and that a monitoring system was initiated to address his failure to turn in assignments.
During STUDENT's brief time in the eighth grade, there was some evidence that STUDENT was having difficulty turning in assignments and that he was disciplined for having cigarettes at school. To meet his needs, Ms. Schwabe resumed homework monitoring for STUDENT and scheduled an SST meeting. Drug use was suspected and, shortly thereafter, STUDENT was found in possession of marijuana at school. (Petitioner's Exhibit E) Pursuant to Education Code §§ 56302 and 56303, a District is required to consider regular education and make modifications to the regular education program prior to referring a student for special education. In this case, by re-instituting the homework monitoring and scheduling an SST meeting, the District was taking appropriate steps to modify the existing program to meet STUDENT's recent needs. Additionally, no one had made a referral for an assessment of STUDENT since his initial assessment in 1993. Based on all of the above discussion, the Hearing Officer finds that the District was not obligated to assess STUDENT between the time of its initial assessment and the subsequent referral following the District's expulsion recommendation. (Education Code § 56381)
The evidence establishes that the reports by Dr. Cynman and Dr. Parker, and the psychoeducational assessment by Dr. Solochek were undertaken prior to any subsequent referrals for an assessment of STUDENT and prior to the District's obligation to assess STUDENT. Moreover, the reports submitted by Petitioner appear to have been obtained to rebut the District's proposal to expel STUDENT for his possession of marijuana at school rather than to disagree with any assessment conducted by the District or to correct a perceived failure on the part of the District to conduct an assessment. The Hearing Officer notes that there were no assessments undertaken by the District during this time period and, therefore, the parents' assessments could not have been procured because of a disagreement with an assessment conducted by the District. Dr. Cynman's so-called assessment is actually a summary of his treatment and observations of STUDENT over the period of time that he treated him up until September 9, 1995. (Petitioner's Exhibit D) The report by Dr. Parker dated December 9, 1995, is also more of a summary of his treatment of STUDENT beginning in 1993 rather than an assessment. There is no information in either report that Dr. Parker or Dr. Cynman administered any standardized tests to STUDENT or conducted any other form of assessment. Dr. Parker's report, much like Dr. Cynman's report, appears to have been drafted at the request of STUDENT's parents following the District's proposal to expel STUDENT. For all of the reasons discussed above, the Hearing Officer concludes that the Respondents are not obligated to reimburse STUDENT's parents for the costs of summaries prepared by Dr. Cynman or Dr. Parker. Respondents are also not required to reimburse Petitioner for Dr. Solochek's assessment.(Footnote 9)
Services
As discussed above, STUDENT is not eligible for special education. For this reason, his parents are not entitled to reimbursement for the services of Dr. Cynman, Dr. Parker, or the Reading Center, and their request for reimbursement is denied.
Advocacy Fees
The costs of advocacy and attorney's fees may only be awarded to the prevailing party by agreement of the parties following the hearing or by a court of competent jurisdiction. Education Code § 56507(b). Therefore, Petitioner's requests for the costs of advocacy is beyond the authority of the Hearing Officer and is denied.
Other Expenses
Petitioner did not present either facts or authority regarding his request for reimbursement for lost wages, phone calls, and other incidental expenses incurred by his parents. Therefore, Petitioner's request for reimbursement for these items is denied.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute:
Issue No. 1: Is STUDENT eligible for special education because of a specific learning disability (SLD) or other health impairment (OHI)?Respondents prevailed on this issue.
ISSUE NO. 2: Are Respondents required to STUDENT's costs at CEDU, a nonpublic school (NPS)?
Respondents prevailed on this issue.
ISSUE NO. 3: Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for other expenses they have incurred since 1992 in procuring assessments and services for STUDENT?
Respondents prevailed on this issue.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. Education Code § 56505(i).
ORDER
All of Petitioner's requests for relief are denied.
DATED: April 24, 1997 _____________________________ Mary L. Cote, Hearing Officer California Special Education
FOOTNOTES:
1. During preliminary discussions at the hearing on January 16, 1997, the parties agreed to continue the hearing to allow them to mediate their dispute. They did not resolve the dispute and the hearing reconvened on February 18, 1997.
2. Mr. Farran stated that the SELPA took the same position on the issues for hearing as the District and waived the right to be present during the hearing.
3. Because Petitioner's opposition to the SDT was received after the SDT was issued, the Hearing Office treated Petitioner's request as a motion to quash.
4. At the hearing Petitioner did not raise any further objections regarding documents from Dr. Solochek and Dr. Parker.
5. Curiously, the District's Exhibit 7, turned out to be the only information from CEDU since Petitioner, for unexplained reasons, did not call any witnesses from CEDU and also did not provide any documents
6. STUDENT attended Pennekamp for elementary school and Manhatten Beach Intermediate School for seventh and eighth grades.
7. MOTHER did not recall ever receiving an assessment plan from the District in 1996.
8. Dr. Cynman relocated out of state.
9. There is an on-going dispute regarding any further assessment of STUDENT. This dispute became the basis for another due process hearing and the Hearing Officer makes no finding as to the District's obligation or right to further assess STUDENT.
