California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · October 15, 1999
Student v. Long Beach Unified School District et al.
SEHO Case No. SN 974-98 · Hearing Officer Hee C. Kim
Long Beach Unified and LA County Mental Health must reimburse $81,795.79, including Little Keswick School costs, after years of FAPE denials.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Noted in the decision
Procedural ruling: the District's motion to disqualify the Hearing Officer, which was based on mediation information in a stay put motion decided by another hearing officer, was denied, and so was its request for a continuance to seek a writ. The decision assumes no writ was sought. No remand, vacatur, or correction is noted.
Summary
The parents of a 14-year-old boy filed for due process against Long Beach Unified School District and the Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health. He had attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and processing deficits. He was first eligible under specific learning disability and then, from 1997, under other health impairment. He attended District schools with resource specialist support from 1995 to 1998. His parents then placed him at Little Keswick School, a residential school in Virginia.
Hearing Officer Hee C. Kim found that the District never assessed his social-emotional, fine motor, or behavioral needs. Its 1997 triennial assessment was cursory, and Mental Health's AB 3632 assessment was late and lacked any assessment plan. The District denied FAPE in each year from 1995-96 to 1997-98. Its IEPs left out needed modifications, and teachers did not know or carry out the IEPs. Behavioral consultation was never provided. Mental Health delayed counseling for months, offered no group therapy, and wrote no objectives. The District offered no real ESY program for summer 1998. Its menu of several placements for 1998-99 was not the clear written offer that Union v. Smith requires. The Hearing Officer rejected the arguments based on LRE and parent notice.
The order requires reimbursement of $81,795.79. This covers Dr. Teresa Doyle's and Dr. Julie Griffith's evaluations, private therapy and tutoring, and Little Keswick School tuition and travel. Later therapy bills are payable on proof. Claims for school-search travel, occupational therapy, consultants, and 1999 ESY were denied.
Why it matters
This decision shows how SEHO handled several issues. A district could not offer parents a menu of placements in place of one specific written offer. A finding that a student is ESY-eligible did not count as an ESY program. A parent's residential placement did not have to meet LRE. Mental Health could share reimbursement liability for late or incomplete AB 3632 assessments and services.
Issues and holdings
- Student prevailedAssessment
Issue 1a. Did the District fail to assess or appropriately assess STUDENT in all areas of suspected need during the 1995-96 school year?
The District could rely on its 1994 assessment and a private assessment, but it failed to assess social-emotional functioning and fine motor development despite clear signs of need.
- Student prevailedAssessment
Issue 1b. Did the District fail to assess or appropriately assess STUDENT in all areas of suspected need during the 1996-97 school year?
The District failed to assess social-emotional functioning, fine motor development, and behavior; a Hughes Bill functional analysis was not required, but behavior should have been at least minimally evaluated.
- Student prevailedAssessment
Issue 1c. Did the District and/or Mental Health fail to assess or appropriately assess STUDENT in all areas of suspected need during the 1997-98 school year?
The District's October 1997 triennial was cursory, missed most areas of need, and its reports lacked required content; Mental Health's AB 3632 assessment had no assessment plan, was two months late, and used no validated measures.
- Not reachedAssessment
Issue 1d. Did the District and/or Mental Health fail to assess or appropriately assess STUDENT in all areas of suspected need during the 1998-99 school year?
No assessments were done or attempted while STUDENT was at Little Keswick School, so there were no evaluations to review for 1998-99.
- District prevailedIndependent educational evaluation (IEE)
Issue 2a. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for assessments they obtained during the 1995-96 school year?
There was no evidence that Dr. Baren's visits or Ms. Carlton's testing were diagnostic or educational evaluations, so reimbursement was denied.
- District prevailedIndependent educational evaluation (IEE)
Issue 2b. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for assessments they obtained during the 1996-97 school year?
The evidence did not show what services Drs. Baren and Noyes or Ms. Carlton provided, or that they were educational evaluations, so reimbursement was denied.
- Student prevailed in partIndependent educational evaluation (IEE)
Issue 2c. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for assessments they obtained during the 1997-98 school year?
Dr. Doyle's neuropsychological assessment was appropriate. Its cost and her IEP attendance fee ($3,500) are reimbursed jointly by both respondents; travel, attorney and therapist consults, the blood test, and Dr. Noyes's charges were denied.
- Student prevailed in partIndependent educational evaluation (IEE)
Issue 2d. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for assessments they obtained during the 1998-99 school year?
The District must reimburse Dr. Griffith's neurologic examination ($1,516.72, excluding travel and unrelated lab tests) and Ms. Woodford's speech-language evaluation ($104); Dr. Camperlengo's examination was treated as part of her treatment.
- Student prevailedFAPE: services offered
Issue 3a. Did the District fail to provide appropriate programs, services, accommodations, and modifications to meet STUDENT's needs during the 1995-96 school year?
FAPE was denied. The IEP ignored social-emotional and fine motor needs and had no modifications; no team member had observed STUDENT; band was not accommodated; and RSP began about a month late.
- Student prevailedFAPE: services offered
Issue 3b. Did the District fail to provide appropriate programs, services, accommodations, and modifications to meet STUDENT's needs during the 1996-97 school year?
FAPE was denied. The IEP did not address social, emotional, or behavioral needs; teachers did not know the IEP; modifications were inadequate; and audio tapes were never provided.
- Student prevailedImplementation
Issue 3d. Did the District and/or Mental Health fail to provide appropriate programs, services, accommodations, and modifications to meet STUDENT's needs during the 1997-98 school year?
Both respondents denied FAPE. The District did not implement modifications or behavioral consultation. Mental Health delayed services to late May 1998, provided no group therapy, and wrote no counseling objectives.
- Student prevailed in partUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue 4. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for educational, mental health, and consulting services they obtained during the 1995-96, 1996-97, and 1997-98 school years?
Ms. Carlton's psychotherapy ($7,562.50) and Ms. Gillman-Day's tutoring ($8,180) are reimbursed for the school years and the 1998 ESY; summer services before ESY eligibility were denied.
- Student prevailedIEP content
Issue 5. Did the District fail to offer and/or provide an appropriate program and services to meet STUDENT's needs for the 1998 extended school year?
STUDENT was found eligible for ESY, but no ESY program was written into the IEP. The late offer of regular summer school with an unnamed aide was not shown to be appropriate.
- Student prevailed in partUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue 6. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for all expenses related to their search for an appropriate placement and all costs related to STUDENT's placement at the Little Keswick School during the 1998 extended school year session?
Little Keswick School's summer tuition, counseling, and travel ($8,412.80) are reimbursed; LRE is not a bar, and notice was substantially given. School-search costs ($5,171.08) and supplies were denied.
- Student prevailedIEP procedure
Issue 7. Did the District and Mental Health fail to offer and/or provide an appropriate program and services to meet STUDENT's needs during the 1998-99 school year?
The District's 'smorgasbord' of several divergent placements was not a clear, specific written offer under Union v. Smith. This denied meaningful parent participation, and so denied FAPE.
- Student prevailed in partUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue 8. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for all expenses for program and services provided by the Little Keswick School and for mental health services obtained during the 1998-99 school year and 1999 extended school year?
1998-99 tuition, psychiatric services, speech therapy, and travel ($52,519.77, plus later bills on proof) are reimbursed. The occupational therapy, consultant, and 1999 ESY claims were denied for lack of evidence.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- IEE at public expense. Reimbursement of $3,500.00 for Dr. Teresa Doyle's neuropsychological assessment and her attendance at the May 8, 1998 IEP meeting; District and Mental Health jointly and severally liable.
- IEE at public expense. Reimbursement of $1,516.72 for Dr. Julie Griffith's neurologic examination, record review, and related lab tests; District solely liable.
- IEE at public expense. Reimbursement of $104.00 for Lee Woodford's speech-language evaluation; District solely liable.
- Reimbursement. $7,562.50 for psychotherapy, parent consultation, and IEP preparation and attendance by Lucyann Carlton (1995-96 through the 1998 ESY): District solely liable for $5,737.50; District and Mental Health jointly and severally liable for $1,825.00.
- Reimbursement. $8,180.00 for tutoring by educational therapist Deborah Gillman-Day (1995-96 through 1997-98 and the 1998 ESY); District solely liable.
- Reimbursement. $8,412.80 for the Little Keswick School summer 1998 program ($4,995 tuition, $580.44 for Dr. Camperlengo's counseling, $2,837.36 travel); jointly and severally liable.
- Reimbursement. $52,519.77 for 1998-99 at Little Keswick School ($47,404 tuition, $1,333.50 Dr. Camperlengo through Nov. 18, 1998, $208 Ms. Woodford through Dec. 16, 1998, $3,574.27 travel); jointly and severally liable.
- Reimbursement. Total of $81,795.79 to be paid within 30 calendar days of the decision; District solely responsible for $15,538.22 and District and Mental Health jointly and severally responsible for the remainder.
- Reimbursement. Upon proof, reimbursement for Dr. Camperlengo's psychotherapy and consultation from Nov. 19, 1998, and Ms. Woodford's speech-language therapy from Dec. 17, 1998, through the end of the Little Keswick School 1998-99 calendar; jointly and severally liable; due within 30 calendar days of either respondent's receipt of proof.
Total: $81,795.79 ordered
Key authorities
Rowley; Union School Dist. v. Smith; Burlington; Florence County School Dist. Four v. Carter; W.G. v. Target Range; Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. B.S.; Lenn v. Portland Sch. Comm.; Cleveland Heights-University Heights v. Boss; Alamo Heights v. State Bd. of Educ.; Warren G. v. Cumberland County; Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist.
People named in the decision
- Maryann Feo, program facilitator, Long Beach Unified School District
- Marlene Daniels, program specialist, Long Beach Unified School District
- Parisima Shahidi, acting assistant director of special education, Long Beach Unified School District
- Paul McIver, program head (representative), Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health
- Deborah Smith, program head (representative and witness), Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health
- Lucyann Carlton, private psychotherapist (licensed marriage, family, and child counselor), Private
- Nancy Wahlstrom, fifth-grade social studies teacher, Buffum Elementary School
- Kathryn Goria, behavioral specialist, Long Beach Unified School District
- Barry Quick, school psychologist, Long Beach Unified School District
- Andria Davidson, special education program facilitator, Long Beach Unified School District
- Barry Neel, fourth-grade teacher, Buffum Elementary School
- Lanedra Munson, elementary school counselor, Long Beach Unified School District
- Sharon Lahr, fifth-grade teacher, Buffum Elementary School
- John Navarro, sixth-grade physical education teacher, Stanford Middle School
- Susan Buckley, resource specialist teacher and case manager, Buffum Elementary School
- Gail Brooks, counselor and learning director, Stanford Middle School
- Martin Van Dine, sixth-grade science teacher, Stanford Middle School
- Carolyn Wilson, sixth-grade social studies teacher, Stanford Middle School
- Joyce Shinn, speech specialist (assessor), Long Beach Unified School District
- Gerry Cox, adapted physical education teacher (assessor), Long Beach Unified School District
- Terri (Terry) Boykins, AB 3632 assessor, licensed clinical social worker, Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health
- Marcelina Roussos, school psychologist (triennial assessor, behavior consultant), Long Beach Unified School District
- Deborah Gillman-Day, private educational therapist/tutor, Private
- Judy Knapp, sixth-grade resource specialist teacher and case manager, Stanford Middle School
- Teresa Doyle, clinical psychologist, independent neuropsychological assessor, Private
- Julie Griffith, pediatric neurologist, independent assessor, Private
- James Mathieson, former academic coordinator, Little Keswick School
- Lee Woodford, speech-language pathologist consultant, Little Keswick School
- Michelle Mathieson, teacher, Little Keswick School
- Vanessa Camperlengo, psychiatrist consultant, Little Keswick School
- Jack Schnel, expert witness for District (school psychologist), Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified School District / private practice
- Carol Levine, sixth-grade reading advancement teacher, Stanford Middle School
- Laurence D. Becker, private psychologist (prior evaluator), Private
- Martin Baren, developmental pediatrician, Private
- Linda Lifur-Bennett, private clinical and educational psychologist (prior evaluator), Private
- Teresa Lundh, school psychologist (1994 assessor), Long Beach Unified School District
- Darrilyn Shaw, speech-language assessor (1994), Long Beach Unified School District
- Tom Noyes, private psychiatrist and neurologist, Private
- Anne Welty, psychiatrist (AB 3632 medication management), Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health
- Joyce Hofeling, private school teacher, Prentice Day School
- D. Lael Van Dyke, District pediatrician, Long Beach Unified School District
- Lorna Christenson, occupational therapist, Little Keswick School
- Community Family Guidance Center, Mental Health contract provider, Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health contractor
- Professional Boundary Conditions, Inc., private consultant, Private
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Hee C. Kim, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, in Long Beach, California, on January 21 and 22, March 30 and 31, April 1, May 4, 5, 20 and 21, and June 29, 1999.
Petitioner STUDENT was represented at the hearing by attorney Kathleen Loyer from the Law Offices of Kathleen M. Loyer. Also present on STUDENT’s behalf were his mother, MOTHER, and (during portions of the hearing) his father, FATHER.
Respondent Long Beach Unified School District (District) was represented at the hearing by attorneys Cynthia Yount and Nancy Finch-Heuerman from the law firm of Parker, Covert & Chidester. Maryann Feo, the District’s program facilitator, was also present on the District’s behalf during the hearing, except on January 22, when Marlene Daniels, the District’s program specialist, was present and on May 21 and June 29, when Dr. Parisima Shahidi, the District’s acting assistant director of special education, was present.
Respondent Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health (Mental Health) was represented at the hearing by Paul McIver and Deborah Smith, Mental Health program heads.
The following witnesses were called by Petitioner to testify: MOTHER; Lucyann Carlton, a licensed marriage, family, and child counselor and registered psychology assistant; Nancy Wahlstrom, STUDENT’s fifth-grade social studies teacher at Buffum Elementary School (Buffum); Kathryn Goria, the District’s behavioral specialist; Barry Quick, a District school psychologist; Andria Davidson, the District’s special education program facilitator; Barry Neel, STUDENT’s fourth-grade teacher at Buffum; Lanedra Munson, a District elementary school counselor; Sharon Lahr, STUDENT’s fifth-grade teacher at Buffum; John Navarro, STUDENT’s sixth-grade physical education teacher at Stanford Middle School (Stanford); Susan Buckley, STUDENT’s resource specialist teacher and case manager during the fourth and fifth grades at Buffum; Gail Brooks, the counselor and learning director at Stanford; Martin Van Dine, STUDENT’s sixth-grade science teacher at Stanford; Carolyn Wilson, STUDENT’s sixth-grade social studies teacher at Stanford; Joyce Shinn, Ed.D., a District speech specialist; Gerry Cox, an adapted physical education teacher; Terri Boykins, a Mental Health supervising psychiatric social worker who was formerly an AB 3632 assessor; Marcelina Roussos, a District school psychologist; Deborah Smith, a Mental Health program head; Deborah Gillman-Day, an educational therapist; Judy Knapp, STUDENT’s sixth-grade resource specialist teacher at Stanford; Teresa Doyle, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist; Julie Griffith, M.D., a pediatric neurologist; James Mathieson, the former academic coordinator at Little Keswick School (LKS), the nonpublic residential school in Virginia which STUDENT attended during the 1998-99 school year; Lee Woodford, a speech therapist consultant for LKS; Michelle Mathieson, STUDENT’s teacher at LKS; and Vanessa Camperlengo, M.D, a psychiatrist consultant for LKS.
The District presented the bulk of its case by questioning the witnesses called by Petitioner. The District also called the following witnesses to testify: Jack Schnel, Ed.D., a school psychologist for the Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified School District and psychologist in private practice; and Carol Levine, STUDENT’s sixth-grade reading advancement teacher. Mental Health did not call any witnesses to testify, but presented its case by questioning a number of the witnesses called by Petitioner and the District.
Oral and documentary evidence was received. The record was held open for the submission of written closing arguments. After the parties' written closing arguments were received, the record was closed and the matter submitted for decision.
ISSUES
1. Did the District and/or Mental Health fail to assess or appropriately assess STUDENT in all areas of suspected need during the 1995-96, 1996-97, 1997-98, and 1998-99 school years?
2. Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for assessments they obtained during the 1995-96, 1996-97, 1997-98, and 1998-99 school years?
3. Did the District and/or Mental Health fail to provide appropriate programs, services, accommodations, and modifications to meet STUDENT’s needs in accordance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) during the 1995-96, 1996-97, and 1997-98 school years?
4. Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for educational, mental health, and consulting services they obtained during the 1995-96, 1996-97, and 1997-98 school years?
5. Did the District fail to offer and/or provide an appropriate program and services to meet STUDENT’s needs for the 1998 extended school year?
6. Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for all expenses related to their search for an appropriate placement and all costs related to STUDENT’s placement at the Little Keswick School during the 1998 extended school year session?
7. Did the District and Mental Health fail to offer and/or provide an appropriate program and services to meet STUDENT’s needs during the 1998-99 school year?
8. Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for all expenses for program and services provided by the Little Keswick School and for mental health services obtained during the 1998-99 school year and 1999 extended school year?
PROCEDURAL MATTER
On March 26, 1999, the Hearing Office received from the District a motion to disqualify the Hearing Officer. The District contended that the Hearing Officer could not continue to preside over the hearing because, in the course of ruling on a stay put motion filed by Petitioner on March 22, 1999, the Hearing Officer had allegedly received confidential information divulged during mediation between the parties. The mediation had taken place after the first two days of hearing but before the hearing was reconvened on March 30. The District’s motion was filed before the parties received a ruling on the stay put motion, and the District had erroneously assumed that the Hearing Officer presiding over the instant matter would rule on the stay put motion. In fact, another hearing officer ruled on the stay put order and the presiding Hearing Officer had not read either Petitioner’s stay put motion or the District’s opposition to the motion.
On March 30, when the hearing was reconvened, the District indicated that because the stay put order was issued by another hearing officer, it wanted to expand its motion to disqualify to include the hearing officer who ruled on the motion (to prevent that hearing officer from being assigned as the presiding hearing officer should its motion be granted) and to include a motion to expunge from the file any references to information disclosed during the course of mediation. Petitioner argued that no confidentiality protections were breached because the District had agreed to disclose the information for purposes of implementation and enforcement. Mental Health stated that, as a co-respondent with the District, it stood united with the District in its motion.
After hearing the District’s argument and the other parties’ responses, the Hearing Officer denied the District’s motion to disqualify. The Hearing Officer did not read either the moving or opposition papers filed with regard to the stay put motion and, therefore, did not receive any information disclosed during mediation, confidential or otherwise. Further, the Hearing Officer is an attorney trained in administrative adjudicative procedures and special education law, and is readily able to distinguish between evidence properly presented into the record during the course of the hearing and other information which is not to be relied upon in adjudicating the disputed issues. In response, the District requested a continuance in order to seek a writ enjoining the Hearing Officer from continuing to preside over the instant matter. The Hearing Officer denied the District’s request to continue because it did not constitute good cause to continue a hearing under Education Code § 56505(f), especially since the hearing was not expected to conclude in the three days then scheduled and the District remained free to seek the writ notwithstanding the fact that the hearing was going to proceed. No further mention was made during the course of the proceedings about the District’s intent to seek a writ and, as the hearing concluded as scheduled, it is assumed that no writ was sought.
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT is a fourteen-year-old student whose residence is located within the boundaries of the District. STUDENT attended private schools at his parents’ expense from preschool through the end of the 1994-95 school year, when he was in the fourth grade. He attended Cal Heights Methodist Preschool for two years, Grace Brethren Elementary School for kindergarten, and Prentice Day School (Prentice) for the 1991-92, 1992-93, 1993-94, and 1994-95 school years. STUDENT was first determined eligible for special education and related services (as a student with a specific learning disability) by the District on June 23, 1994, near the end of his third-grade year at Prentice, but his parents declined the public school placement offered for the 1994-95 school year. A year later, STUDENT’s parents enrolled him in public school as a special education student. He attended Buffum Elementary School (Buffum) during the 1995-96 and 1996-97 school years and Stanford Middle School (Stanford) during the 1997-98 school year. After the end of the 1997-98 school year, STUDENT’s parents unilaterally placed him at the Little Keswick School (LKS) in Keswick, Virginia, for the summer of 1998 and the 1998-99 school year.
Before entering the public school system in 1995, STUDENT had already been evaluated by Laurence D. Becker, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist, in September 1990; Martin Baren, M.D., a developmental pediatrician, in April 1991; Linda Lifur-Bennett, Ph.D., a licensed clinical and educational psychologist in May 1991 and May 1995; Lucyann Carlton, M.S., on behalf of Prentice, in June 1991; and Teresa Lundh, a District school psychologist, in May 1994. The evaluators concluded that STUDENT was functioning in the average range of cognitive ability (with stronger verbal skills than nonverbal skills) and that he had a number of processing and other difficulties that interfered with his ability to learn. By 1991, both Drs. Becker and Baren found that STUDENT had attention difficulties which were probably the result of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Later, in May 1995, Dr. Bennett diagnosed STUDENT with ADHD (in the moderate to severe range) and oppositional defiant disorder (ODD) (in the mild to moderate range as evidenced primarily in the home environment). STUDENT has been on stimulant medication for ADHD since at least 1995. STUDENT’s early history also included problems with anxiety, which manifested in early separation anxiety with school phobia and encopresis with withholding.
Ms. Lundh’s psychological assessment in May 1994 found that STUDENT’s cognitive ability was in the average range, but that there was a severe discrepancy between his ability and achievement in the areas of basic reading, arithmetic, and written language. She concluded from her testing that the discrepancy appeared to be related to a disability in the basic psychological processes of attention to task, auditory processing, visual processing, and visual-motor integration. In June 1994, a speech and language assessment was performed by the District, which found that STUDENT was functioning appropriately in all areas of speech and language. At individualized education program (IEP) team meetings held on June 21 and 23, 1994, the team agreed that STUDENT had a severe discrepancy between ability and achievement in the areas of reading, math, and written expression and that he qualified for special education and related services as a student with a specific learning disability (SLD). The District offered STUDENT a program that included thirty to ninety minutes per day in the resource specialist program (RSP) during three to five days per week for reading, math, and written expression and participation in regular education for the remainder of the school day. The program did not include extended school year (ESY) services. This is the program for the 1994-95 school year that was declined by the parents.
After the parents decided a year later to place STUDENT in the public school system, an IEP meeting was held on June 7, 1995. At the meeting, the team noted that a severe discrepancy also existed in the areas of oral expression and listening comprehension, in addition to reading, math, and written expression. The District again offered a program that included RSP services for reading, math, and written language, but the amount of RSP was increased to one hundred twenty minutes per day, five days per week. Again, no ESY services were included. The parents accepted the program and STUDENT began attending Buffum in the fall of 1995.
STUDENT’s programs throughout his years in the public school system always consisted of RSP, although the amount of RSP time varied. On April 3, 1996, near the end of STUDENT’s fourth-grade (retention) year, program modifications were added to his IEP; thereafter, modifications and accommodations were consistently included in his IEPs. On June 4, 1997, near the end of STUDENT’s fifth-grade year, behavior consultation services and nursing services were added to the IEP due to escalating behavioral problems in the classroom and STUDENT’s need to take medication for his attentional difficulties during the school day. Beginning with STUDENT’s IEP dated September 18, 1997, when STUDENT was in the sixth grade, ESY services were also included in the IEP. Additionally, in September 1997, STUDENT’s eligibility category was changed from SLD to other health impaired (OHI). The IEP noted that STUDENT had been diagnosed by Tom Noyes, M.D., a psychiatrist and neurologist, with ADHD, combined type, secondary to a delayed neurological disorder with evidence of pervasive developmental disorder (PDD). The IEP also noted that a referral would be made for an AB3632 assessment.
During the 1997-98 school year, numerous assessments were performed on behalf of the District, Mental Health, and the parents. In October 1997, the District evaluated STUDENT in the areas of gross motor, speech and language, academic functioning, intellectual ability, processing skills, and social-adaptive skills through its adapted physical education teacher (Gerry Cox), speech specialist (Joyce Shinn, Ed.D.), and school psychologist (Marcelina Roussos). In December 1997, Terry Boykins, a licensed clinical social worker (LCSW), completed an AB3632 assessment for Mental Health. In February 1998, Teresa Doyle, Ph.D., performed a neuropsychological assessment at the request of the parents. In May 1998, STUDENT was examined by Anne Welty, M.D., a psychiatrist, for purposes of medication management under AB3632.
As a result of the District’s assessments, the IEP team determined that STUDENT was eligible for special education as an OHI student but not for APE or speech and language services. Ms. Roussos reported that STUDENT had average ability in the areas of basic reading, reading comprehension, mathematics calculation, and written expression, with relative weaknesses in applied mathematics and spelling. Ms. Boykins’ assessment found that STUDENT had behavioral and emotional deficits, which had been responsive to medication and individual psychotherapy, but that he had significant deficits in social skills. Ms. Boykins diagnosed STUDENT with ADHD, ODD, and obsessive-compulsive traits. She concluded that STUDENT was eligible for AB3632 services in the form of individual and/or group therapy, family therapy, and ongoing medication evaluation and monitoring by a psychiatrist.
Dr. Doyle concluded from her assessment that STUDENT qualified for special education and related services under the categories of OHI and SLD (in written language and written math), and that he had significant neuropsychological impairments including attentional impairment, visual-spatial processing deficits, executive processing problems, and memory deficits that significantly interfered with his ability to carry out complex tasks independently (in spite of well-remediated reading skills) and his ability to handle stress. Dr. Doyle diagnosed STUDENT with the following: cognitive disorder NOS, anxiety and depressive disorder NOS, ADHD, disorder of written expression, disorder of mathematics (written math), and disorder of reading (remediated). Dr. Doyle concluded that, due to STUDENT’s deficits in the areas of memory and executive functioning, he needed constant repetition of routines to develop basic living skills and community living skills and that, in order to benefit from his educational placement, he required a twenty-four-hour milieu approach. Dr. Doyle stressed that STUDENT was at a critical juncture of his development and that he needed the intense intervention, because his amenability to education and intervention would diminish as he advanced into adolescence and his current behaviors would become more entrenched without appropriate intervention. While not recommending a specific placement, Dr. Doyle recommended placement in a highly structured and well-integrated treatment program that could provide intensive remediation of his written language skills, cognitive remediation and training in the development of organization and strategic thinking skills, remediation of math skills, modifications in the classroom, social skills training, continued individual psychotherapy, ongoing psychiatric assessment and medication monitoring, and transitional services aimed at assisting him in developing independent living skills. Dr. Doyle also recommended that the following assessments be performed: a sophisticated speech and language assessment to include a description of STUDENT’s pragmatic language skills, a neurological evaluation to determine whether structural damage is present, and an occupational therapy assessment with a therapist with specific training in sensory-motor integration work.
The IEP team met five times during the 1997-98 school year, including on November 6, 1997, to review the District’s triennial assessment; on January 12, 1998, to review Mental Health’s assessment; and on May 8, 1998, to review Dr. Doyle’s assessment and discuss placement for the 1998-99 school year. The team was unable to reach a consensus about the appropriate placement for the 1998-99 school year during the meeting on May 8. Thereafter, the parents unilaterally placed STUDENT at LKS for the summer of 1998 and for the 1998-99 school year.
Finally, it should be noted that the parents privately provided support services for STUDENT during the years he attended public school. STUDENT received tutoring services from Deborah Gillman-Day, an educational therapist, during the 1995-96, 1996-97, and 1997-98 school years, as well as during the summers of 1995, 1996 and 1997. He also received individual psychotherapy from Lucyann Carlton, a licensed marriage, family, and child counselor (MFCC), from April 1996 until July 1998.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the District and/or Mental Health fail to assess or appropriately assess STUDENT in all areas of suspected need during the 1995-96, 1996-97, 1997-98, and 1998-99 school years?
a. the 1995-96 school year
Petitioner contended that the District failed to conduct an assessment of STUDENT before making program and placement recommendations for the 1995-96 school year and, instead, relied on a privately obtained assessment, even though no one from the District spoke with the private assessor and the private assessor was not included as part of the IEP team. Petitioner also contended that the District failed to assess in all areas related to the suspected disability despite the parents’ expressed concerns about social-emotional functioning, auditory processing deficits, language skills, diagnosed ADHD, and visual-motor planning deficits, and failed to include assessors with expertise in STUDENT’s disabilities. The District argued that its assessments were appropriate and that it assessed STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability.
Before any action is taken with respect to the initial placement of a child with a disability in a program providing special education and related services, a full and individual evaluation of the child’s educational needs must be conducted. 34 C.F.R. § 300.531 (1996) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(A) (1997)); Cal. Educ. Code § 56320(f) (Deering Supp. 1999). The local educational agency (LEA) conducting the assessment must ensure that, at a minimum, the assessment meets the standards enumerated in Education Code § 56320. See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.532 (1996) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2) (1997)). Section 56320 of the Education Code requires, in relevant part, that the assessment be conducted by qualified persons who are knowledgeable of the student’s disability. Cal. Educ. Code § 56320(g) (Deering Supp. 1999). Section 56320 also requires that the student be assessed in all areas related to the suspected disability including, where appropriate, health and development, motor abilities, language function, and social and emotional status. Cal. Educ. Code § 56320(f) (Deering Supp. 1999).
The Hearing Officer does not find persuasive Petitioner’s argument that the District failed to conduct an evaluation of STUDENT before his initial placement in a special education program during the 1995-96 school year. The District fully evaluated STUDENT a year earlier in May and June 1994 when he was first referred for an assessment to determine eligibility. Further, the District did not err when it relied on the findings of a privately obtained assessment conducted by Dr. Bennett in May 1995. LEAs are required to take into consideration the results of privately obtained educational assessments when making decisions about the provision of a free appropriate public education (FAPE). 34 C.F.R. § 300.503(c)(1) (1996) (current version at 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(c)(1) (1999)); Cal. Educ. Code § 56329(b) (Deering Supp. 1999). It would have been error for the District not to have taken Dr. Bennett’s assessment into consideration in making program decisions for STUDENT. There is, however, no corresponding requirement that the District speak with the private evaluator or invite the private evaluator to the IEP team meeting.
As for Petitioner’s argument that the District failed to assess in all areas related to the suspected disability, the Hearing Officer finds that the District appropriately assessed in all areas except for social-emotional functioning and fine motor development. The other areas cited by Petitioner were addressed through Ms. Lundh’s assessment and through a speech and language assessment performed by Darrilyn Shaw in June 1994. For example, Ms. Lundh assessed STUDENT’s auditory processing skills using the Test of Auditory Perceptual Skills, found that he had a disability in this area, and made recommendations to address and/or accommodate STUDENT’s auditory processing disability (e.g., she suggested that a multisensory approach be used to strengthen reading skills). In the area of social-emotional functioning, however, the District failed to adequately assess STUDENT in light of the information available at the time the team met to determine the appropriate program for the 1995-96 school year.
At the time Ms. Lundh performed her assessment in 1994, there were no indications that STUDENT was having difficulties in the area of social-emotional functioning to the extent that further investigation was required by the District. However, by the time the team was determining the appropriate placement for the 1995-96 school year, there were several indications that STUDENT was having significant difficulties in the area of social-emotional functioning which should have prompted the District to assess further in this area. STUDENT’s mother testified that she told the team at the IEP meeting held on June 7, 1995, that STUDENT was having significant difficulty with social relationships. The mother’s concerns were confirmed by a report filled out by his then-current teacher at Prentice, Joyce Hofeling, on May 31, 1995. The testimony of Barry Quick, the school psychologist present at the meeting, and the IEP document itself confirm that the team received Ms. Hofeling’s report by the time the team met on June 7, 1995. Ms. Hofeling consistently rated STUDENT’s ability to interact with peers and adults, as well as his ability to cope with conflict and stress, as low average or weak. The evidence revealed that STUDENT’s problems with social interaction and emotional functioning were related to his learning disabilities. For instance, Lucyann Carlton, the therapist who counseled STUDENT and his family from April 1996 to July 1998, testified that STUDENT’s recognized difficulties in visual-spatial processing affected his ability to appropriately interact with his peers because he was unable to read visual information that is normally heavily depended on to provide social cues, such as eye contact, facial expressions, and body signals. The testimony of Teresa Doyle, Ph.D., the clinical psychologist who conducted a comprehensive neuropsychological assessment of STUDENT in February 1998, confirmed this. Dr. Doyle also testified that STUDENT’s anxiety escalated because he was unable to meet increased educational demands because of the limitations imposed by his learning disabilities.
The District’s failure to assess STUDENT in the area of social-emotional functioning, despite clear indications that he was having significant problems in these areas, resulted in the District’s failure to properly identify and address STUDENT’s social-emotional issues through the IEP process. The evidence demonstrated that, at a minimum, STUDENT should have been receiving some support in developing peer and adult interactions, as well as with emotional issues such as anxiety. STUDENT’s mother testified that he became very socially isolated during his fourth-grade year at Buffum, had no friends, and developed a high level of anxiety and fear about school and school work. STUDENT’s mother testified that the increased anxiety led to a recurrence of the encopresis STUDENT had earlier suffered from in kindergarten, but this time to such a severe degree that by the beginning of the second semester it required thirty days for his bowel to regain its elasticity, according to his doctor. Ms. Carlton confirmed through her testimony that STUDENT was experiencing a variety of symptoms of anxiety, including encopresis and trichotillomania, by the end of his fourth-grade year due to school issues, such as the extensive handwriting required in the resource specialist program (RSP). The District did not present any persuasive evidence to refute this. Susan Buckley and Barry Neel, the only fourth-grade teachers who testified, testified only that STUDENT did not appear to have any major problems or difficulties with peers during the fourth grade and that he showed no apparent signs of anxiety. This testimony did not refute the otherwise clear evidence that STUDENT had significant problems interacting appropriately with peers and that he was suffering emotionally from the demands placed on him at school. The Hearing Officer finds persuasive the testimony of Dr. Doyle and Ms. Carlton in this regard. Both testified that STUDENT strived to hold himself together emotionally during the school day because of his desire to please and to appear like other students, but that his mental energy and emotional reserves were exhausted by the end of the school day, resulting in obvious signs of anxiety and behavioral problems at home.
Fine motor development was a recognized area of deficit for STUDENT, yet no assessments have ever been performed by the District in this area. Ms. Buckley and Mr. Neel both readily testified that STUDENT had difficulty with the physical act of writing. STUDENT’s difficulty with handwriting was extensively discussed at the IEP team meeting on April 3, 1996. Further, there is no dispute that STUDENT has always had visual-motor integration difficulties and visual-spatial processing deficits. All of these factors should have prompted the District to assess STUDENT’s fine motor development to determine the nature and extent of STUDENT’s deficit and whether related services and/or IEP modifications and accommodations were necessary. When asked if she ever thought of referring STUDENT for an assessment because of writing difficulties, Ms. Buckley testified that her role was more to figure out how to deal with the problems in the classroom and that, while she could talk to the school psychologist about the problem, she usually does not refer students for an assessment because school psychologists have so many things to do. This indifferent approach is certainly not consistent with the intent and the spirit of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and state special education law. What should be of utmost concern to a teacher is whether a student is appropriately assessed and adequately supported in his or her program.
Finally, Petitioner contended that the District failed to appropriately assess STUDENT because it failed to include on the assessment team individuals with expertise in STUDENT’s disability. Petitioner argued that the team should have included individuals with expertise in communication/language, motor skills, anxiety disorder, and medical expertise in the area of encopresis. As mentioned previously, an LEA must ensure that an assessment is conducted by persons knowledgeable of the student’s disability. Cal. Educ. Code § 56320(g) (Deering Supp. 1999). Here, the evidence showed that the assessment team included a person knowledgeable in communication and language, i.e., the speech and language assessor. However, as the remaining areas reflect those which the Hearing Officer earlier found the District erred by failing to assess, Petitioner’s argument regarding the knowledge of the assessment team need not be further explored as the question is moot.
Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to assess STUDENT in all areas related to the suspected disability. The District failed to assess STUDENT in the area of social-emotional functioning and fine motor development despite clear indications that he was having significant problems in these areas. The District’s failure to assess STUDENT’s social-emotional functioning and fine motor development resulted in its failure to properly identify STUDENT’s deficits in these areas.
b. the 1996-97 school year
Petitioner argued that the District failed to assess in all areas related to the suspected disability because it did not assess STUDENT’s mounting behavioral and emotional problems during the 1996-97 school year. The District contended that it assessed STUDENT in all areas related to the suspected disability.
Initially, the Hearing Officer concludes that the findings made with respect to the appropriateness of assessments during the 1995-96 school year apply with equal force for the 1996-97 school year. No new assessments were performed during the 1996-97 school year, either by the District or on behalf of the parents, but STUDENT’s difficulties with social interaction, anxiety, and fine motor development continued into the 1996-97 school year. STUDENT’s continuing difficulties in these areas were established by the testimony of the parents, teachers, and Ms. Carlton and teacher reports from the fifth-grade year, including report cards, behavioral rating scales, and comments made at IEP team meetings. For example, STUDENT’s fifth-grade teachers consistently rated him in the below average range when reporting on the appropriateness of his interactions with peers and testified that he had difficulty with the mechanics of writing (especially in cursive). MOTHER testified that STUDENT continued to suffer from extreme anxiety during the fifth-grade year around issues of school performance and work completion, and that he experienced a “full-blown” anxiety attack in December 1996 that involved an increased heart rate, profuse sweating, and shortness of breath. MOTHER also testified that she shared this information with the school’s principal, but that the only action taken was a subsequent discussion with the school nurse regarding what should be done if STUDENT should suffer a panic attack in school. The testimony offered by the fifth-grade teachers that STUDENT had interactions with peers and some friends does not lead to a contrary finding. While STUDENT have had some relationships with peers, the evidence established that none of the relationships were significant and that STUDENT continued to have difficulty interacting appropriately with peers and functioning in a large class, such as a regular education class, because, inter alia, he did not know how to read social cues.
The evidence also established that STUDENT began to have significant behavioral problems at school during the 1996-97 school year. The testimony of his teachers established that he became increasingly argumentative with teachers, frequently talked out of turn in group situations, had difficulty sustaining his attention on tasks, frequently engaged in disruptive behaviors (such as incessantly tapping a pencil on his desk and refusing to stop when directed to), and was often uninterested in and unwilling to complete assignments. The evidence showed that a number of these behaviors arose out of disabling conditions that the District was already aware of, such as ADHD, and that some were the result of the District’s failure to meet some of STUDENT’s recognized disabling conditions and processing deficits. For instance, Ms. Carlton and Dr. Doyle testified that much of STUDENT’s frustration and acting-out behaviors resulted from his inability to meet the increasing educational demands imposed on him because of his processing deficits. As will be more fully discussed later in Issue No. 3, the District did not provide proper and necessary modifications and accommodations that would have allowed STUDENT to participate equally in the general education curriculum despite his limitations. STUDENT’s behavior problems were not so severe that the District should have performed a functional analysis assessment under the Hughes Bill. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, §§ 3001(h), 3052(a)(3) (1999). However, the problems did interfere with the implementation of STUDENT’s IEP goals and objectives and his ability to benefit from his education to the extent that the nature and frequency of the maladaptive behavior should have at least been evaluated, if only minimally, in order for the team to develop appropriate instructional and/or behavioral approaches to address the behavior problems.
Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to assess STUDENT in all areas related to the suspected disability because it failed to assess in the area of social-emotional functioning, fine motor development, and behavior. The District’s failure to appropriately assess STUDENT resulted in a failure to properly identify his deficits.
c. the 1997-98 school year
Petitioner contended that the District’s triennial evaluation of STUDENT in October 1997 failed to assess in all areas of suspected need, failed to include persons with expertise in STUDENT’s disabilities, and failed to produce appropriate evaluation reports. Petitioner also contended that Mental Health’s evaluation of STUDENT in December 1997 failed to meet applicable procedural requirements and was not conducted by appropriately qualified personnel. The District and Mental Health deny that their assessments were inappropriate and argued that any procedural violation that might have occurred did not result in the denial of a FAPE.
A reassessment of a pupil must be conducted at least once every three years. Cal. Educ. Code § 56381 (Deering 1987) (current version at Cal. Educ. Code § 56381(a) (Deering Supp. 1999)). As with the initial assessment, the reassessment must have assessed STUDENT in all areas related to the suspected disability, including, where appropriate, health and development, motor abilities, language function, and social and emotional status. Cal. Educ. Code § 56320(f) (Deering Supp. 1999). STUDENT’s reassessment must also have been conducted by qualified persons who were knowledgeable of his disability. Cal. Educ. Code § 56320(g) (Deering Supp. 1999).
Petitioner contended that the District’s reassessment was inappropriate because it failed to assess STUDENT in the following areas: social-emotional functioning, auditory processing, language, attention deficit, and visual-motor planning (fine motor integration and processing). Petitioner also contended that the assessment failed to address or further investigate a recent diagnosis of pervasive developmental disorder (PDD) and depression by psychiatrist Tom Noyes, M.D., a diagnosis which had been shared with the District prior to the assessment. The Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner’s contentions are substantially supported by the evidence.
While there was no evidence that Dr. Noyes diagnosed STUDENT with PDD or depression, in a letter dated August 15, 1997, Dr. Noyes did state that there was evidence to suggest a diagnosis of PDD. Dr. Noyes diagnosed STUDENT with ADHD, combined type, secondary to delayed neurological development. Additionally, Dr. Noyes reported the following:
STUDENT demonstrates symptoms of poor impulse control, anger, oppositional behavior, poor social interaction skills, decrease [sic] alertness, inattention, and poor concentration. This has resulted in poor functioning at home and at school. Peer interaction is a significant problem for him especially in large groups such as on field trips, bus rides, and in the school cafeteria.
This letter was given to the District and, according to the IEP document, was relied on by the IEP team to change STUDENT’s eligibility category from SLD to OHI in September 1997. Despite the District’s receipt of this and other reliable information regarding STUDENT’s myriad conditions, the District performed only a cursory triennial assessment of STUDENT. The assessment consisted of only one standardized measure and a heavy reliance on reports from teachers who had known STUDENT for no more than a month, a report from Ms. Carlton which summarized past assessment findings with regard to only a few key areas, and comments made by the parents at one IEP meeting. From the paucity of this effort, it is easy to discern why so many areas of suspected need were wholly neglected or inadequately assessed by the District.
Marcelina Roussos testified that the parents and Ms. Carlton consistently expressed concerns about STUDENT’s social-emotional functioning, and that she was aware from parent reports that STUDENT was exhibiting problems with anxiety. Ms. Roussos also testified that she reviewed STUDENT’s past report cards, which should have revealed to her the Buffum teachers’ concerns about STUDENT’s ability to interact appropriately with peers. Yet Ms. Roussos evaluated the social-emotional area only through brief observations of STUDENT in two classroom settings and discussions with two of his recently assigned teachers, which was inadequate based on the level of concerns that had been expressed by the parents and that was present in STUDENT’s record. Additionally, the triennial assessment failed to assess STUDENT in the area of fine motor development even though Ms. Roussos testified that she was aware that STUDENT had difficulties in this area and the assessment plan indicated that fine motor was an area that would be assessed during the triennial evaluation. Further, STUDENT’s auditory processing skills, which had consistently been recognized as an area of deficit for STUDENT, was wholly ignored by the District in its assessment. Attention deficit, which was also a well-known area of concern, was noted only through a statement that STUDENT had been diagnosed with ADHD, but no information was obtained by Ms. Roussos regarding how the condition presented itself in the classroom or how it otherwise affected STUDENT’s ability to benefit from his education. Finally, even though presented with a psychiatrist’s finding that STUDENT was evidencing symptoms of PDD, the District failed to investigate how such symptoms might manifest themselves in the educational setting or otherwise affect STUDENT’s ability to benefit educationally. There was no evidence that District personnel ever spoke with Dr. Noyes or asked for an explanation of his finding, much less assessed STUDENT themselves with respect to possible PDD.
The speech-language evaluation conducted by Joyce Shinn was similarly inappropriate. Among other things, Ms. Shinn failed to appropriately assess the one area that the parents and Ms. Carlton had consistently expressed to be of concern, the area of pragmatics. This concern was clearly reflected in the IEP document, which stated that the District’s speech and language assessment would include an analysis of STUDENT’s functional speech and ability to deal with language in context. Yet Ms. Shinn used only one assessment tool to specifically assess the area of pragmatics (i.e., the Assessment of Pragmatic Skills (APS)), the validity of which was not established by the evidence. Ms. Shinn herself was quite unfamiliar with the APS. She testified that she used the APS upon the recommendation of the District’s speech and language director, whom she called when someone asked her to administer a pragmatics test for STUDENT. Ms. Shinn described the APS as a checklist test performed in a one-on-one situation, but did not know whether it was a standardized test. Lee Woodford, a speech-language pathologist with LKS who evaluated STUDENT in December 1998, testified that Ms. Shinn’s assessment consisted of only broad-based language tools that were not designed to tap into any of STUDENT’s deficit areas, such as semantic knowledge or other pragmatic skills. No evidence was introduced which established otherwise. Further, the parents and Ms. Carlton often expressed concerns to the IEP team that STUDENT’s pragmatic difficulties were especially apparent during peer interactions (because children provide less structure than adults in their communication) and in unstructured settings, such as during lunch or recess. These concerns were corroborated by the findings of Dr. Doyle and Ms. Woodford. There was no evidence, however, that Ms. Shinn’s evaluation included an assessment of STUDENT’s language functioning during interaction with peers or in an unstructured setting, such as during lunch or recess. Thus, there was no evidence that Ms. Shinn’s assessment met the requirements of state law (e.g., that it included assessment measures tailored to assess the specific areas of educational need). See Cal. Educ. Code § 56320 et al. (Deering Supp. 1999).
In short, the District’s triennial assessment was deficient in almost all areas of suspected need. Ms. Roussos’ testimony that she did not assess further in some areas of suspected need because STUDENT was doing well in the classroom (evidenced apparently, according to Ms. Roussos, by the receipt of passing grades) did not excuse her failure to conduct an appropriate assessment in all areas related to the suspected disability. Such a narrow concept of the areas that should be evaluated through a formal assessment fails to take into account, among other things, the amount of help that a student might be receiving outside of the classroom, what factors the teachers based their grades on, and how the student is progressing in areas other than academics. See Lenn v. Portland Sch. Comm., 998 F.2d 1083, 1089 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that IEP must target all of a student’s educational needs, whether academic or nonacademic). Here, STUDENT was receiving substantial amounts of assistance from a private tutor whom he saw an average of ten times per month and from his parents, who spent approximately two to three hours per night assisting him by reteaching material and modifying assignments.
Furthermore, the District’s assessment reports failed to meet the requirements set forth in state law. None of the reports generated for the triennial assessment included a statement regarding whether STUDENT needed special education or the basis for the determination. Cal. Educ. Code § 56327(a), (b) (Deering Supp. 1999). Additionally, although Ms. Roussos included in her report a brief summary of the behavior she saw in the classroom during her observation, she failed to explain how the observed behavior related to STUDENT’s academic and social functioning. Cal. Educ. Code § 56327(d) (Deering Supp. 1999). Thus, the written assessment reports also failed to comply with the requirements of law.
Based on the foregoing, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to conduct an appropriate triennial evaluation of STUDENT in October 1997.
Mental Health’s evaluation of STUDENT in December 1997 also failed to meet the requirements of law. State law requires that, where the local mental health program determines that a mental health assessment is needed, the local mental health agency develop a mental health assessment plan for the parent’s consent within fifteen days of receipt of a referral for assessment. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 60040(d)(1) (1996) (current version at Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 60045(b) ( 1999)). There is no evidence that a mental health assessment plan was developed for the parents’ consent in this case. In fact, MOTHER testified that she never received such a plan, nor was she ever asked for her consent for anything but the referral to Mental Health. This procedural violation was significant in that it deprived the parents of the opportunity to have any input on the assessment procedures used to investigate the state of their son’s mental health and his need for mental health services. W.G. v. Bd. of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1484 (9th Cir. 1992). Additionally, state law requires that a mental health assessment be completed within the same time constraints that a school district’s assessment must be completed, i.e., completed and reviewed with the IEP team within fifty days of receipt of the consent to assess, not counting days between the student’s regular school sessions, terms, or days of school vacation in excess of five schooldays. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 60040(d)(2) (1996) (current version at Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 60045(e) (1999)). Here, the assessment was not completed and reviewed until four months after the referral was made. The District’s referral was dated September 19, 1997, and was stamped as received on September 23, 1997. Terry Boykins, the Mental Health assessor, completed her assessment and her report on December 3, 1997. An IEP meeting was held to review the results of the assessment with the team on January 12, 1998. There was neither evidence nor argument that the parent consented to an extension, and no explanation provided as to why the assessment process was so delayed. Under the applicable time frames, Mental Health should have completed its assessment and presented its findings at an IEP team meeting by at least November 12, 1997. Thus, the meeting was held two months late.
Finally, state law requires that the local mental health agency’s assessment meet the same requirements that a LEA’s assessment must meet, e.g., the assessment must be completed in accordance with Section 56320 of the Education Code and the assessor must provide the IEP team with a written assessment report in accordance with Section 56327 of the Education Code. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, §§ 60020(b), 60040(e) (1996) (current versions at Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, §§ 60020(g), 60045(g) (1999)). Mental Health’s assessment report failed to meet the requirements of Sections 56320 and 56327 for several reasons. First, Ms. Boykins did not use any validated testing instruments to determine the nature and extent of STUDENT’s social and emotional issues even though serious concerns had been raised by the parents and Ms. Carlton, as well as through documentation of past diagnoses of ADHD, anxiety disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, and pervasive developmental disorder, and symptoms of compulsive thought disorder and compulsive trichotillomania. See Cal. Educ. Code § 56320(b)(2) (Deering Supp. 1999). Ms. Boykins also failed to include assessment materials tailored to assess the specific areas of educational need presented and failed to observe STUDENT in the educational setting, even though such an observation would have been appropriate to determine the nature and extent of social-emotional issues present in the educational setting. See Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56320(c), 56327(c) (Deering Supp. 1999). Instead, Ms. Boykins, who had no prior involvement with STUDENT and no prior knowledge of his mental health needs, relied exclusively on a review of a limited amount of records and interviews with MOTHER, Ms. Carlton, and STUDENT to make her findings about STUDENT’s mental health issues and her treatment recommendations. As a result, Ms. Boykins’ findings were vague and conclusory, and showed no real exploration or understanding of the underlying causes of STUDENT’s social-emotional difficulties or anxiety.
Based on the totality of the violations, the Hearing Officer finds that Mental Health also failed to conduct an appropriate assessment of STUDENT in late 1997.
d. the 1998-99 school year
For the 1998-99 school year, STUDENT’s parents unilaterally placed him in LKS. Neither the District nor Mental Health conducted any assessments or attempted to conduct any assessments of STUDENT while he was placed at LKS. Consequently, there are no evaluations to consider with respect to the 1998-99 school year.
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In summary, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District failed to appropriately assess STUDENT during the 1995-96, 1996-97, and 1997-98 school years. The Hearing Officer also concludes that Mental Health failed to appropriately assess STUDENT during the 1997-98 school year.
ISSUE NO. 2: Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for assessments they obtained during the 1995-96, 1996-97, 1997-98, and 1998-99 school years?
Petitioner contended that the District failed to assess or inappropriately assessed STUDENT during the 1995-96, 1996-97, 1997-98, and 1998-99 school years and that, consequently, the parents are entitled to reimbursement for evaluations that they obtained during those school years. Petitioner submitted an expense summary listing all the expenses for which reimbursement is sought. The District and Mental Health argued that their assessments were appropriate and that Petitioner is not entitled to reimbursement for any assessments privately obtained.
A parent may obtain at public expense an independent educational evaluation (IEE) that was performed by a qualified specialist if (1) the parent disagrees with an evaluation obtained by the educational agency and (2) the educational agency is unable to show that its evaluation was appropriate at a due process hearing. 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b) (1999) (former version at 34 C.F.R. § 300.503(b) (1996)); Cal. Educ. Code § 56329(b) (Deering Supp. 1999). The Hearing Officer found above that the District failed to appropriately assess STUDENT during the 1995-96, 1996-97, and 1997-98 school years, and that Mental Health failed to appropriately assess STUDENT during the 1997-98 school year. However, a closer review of the expenses claimed by Petitioner is necessary in order to determine whether the claimed expenses are properly reimbursable.
a. the 1995-96 school year
For the 1995-96 school year, Petitioner claimed reimbursement for three visits with Dr. Baren and for “testing” by Ms. Carlton on April 30, 1996. Dr. Baren did not testify at the hearing, but the record indicates that he is a pediatrician who has treated STUDENT since at least 1991. In April 1991, Dr. Baren diagnosed STUDENT with probable ADHD and began managing STUDENT’s stimulant medication. However, there is no evidence of what services Dr. Baren provided STUDENT on the three visits cited by Petitioner, and no indication that they might have been for anything but medication management or other medical treatment. As the District correctly points out, an LEA is required to provide medical services only for diagnostic or evaluation purposes and only when such services are required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1994) (current version at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22) (1997)). “Medical services” is defined as services provided by a licensed physician to determine a student’s medically related disability that results in the student’s need for special education and related services. 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(b)(4) (1996) (current version at 34 C.F.R. § 300.24(b)(4) (1999)). Because there is no evidence to suggest that Dr. Baren’s services on the three visits during the 1995-96 school year were for either diagnostic or evaluation purposes, much less that it was for educational purposes, Petitioner is not entitled to reimbursement for the visits to Dr. Baren. Similarly, there was no evidence presented with regard to the “testing” performed by Ms. Carlton on April 30, 1996. Thus, it was not established that Ms. Carlton’s testing was educationally related and that it was necessary within the meaning of the IDEA. Consequently, there is no basis upon which to award reimbursement for Ms. Carlton’s testing.
Therefore, Petitioner’s claims for reimbursement for assessments for the 1995-96 school year are denied.
b. the 1996-97 school year
For the 1996-97 school year, Petitioner claimed expenses for three visits to Dr. Baren, two “testing” sessions and a “scoring” session with Ms. Carlton, a “special report” prepared by Ms. Carlton, three visits to Dr. Noyes, and a report prepared by Dr. Noyes. As with the 1995-96 school year, there is a complete lack of evidence about the nature of the services provided by Dr. Baren and Ms. Carlton. Similarly, there is a lack of evidence with regard to the expenses claimed for Dr. Noyes. Dr. Noyes did not testify at the hearing. The only evidence introduced with regard to Dr. Noyes was a letter he wrote summarizing his understanding of STUDENT’s symptoms and diagnoses in August 1997, Dr. Noyes’ billing statements, and MOTHER’s testimony that Dr. Noyes diagnosed STUDENT with PDD. This is insufficient to support an award of reimbursement for the services claimed by Petitioner. There is insufficient evidence of what services Dr. Noyes actually provided STUDENT on the visits cited by Petitioner, and no indication that Dr. Noyes performed an educational evaluation of STUDENT or of Dr. Noyes’ qualifications to conduct such an assessment. Based on the foregoing, Petitioner’s request for reimbursement of the above expenses is denied.
c. the 1997-98 school year
For the 1997-98 school year, Petitioner claimed expenses for a diagnostic blood test, and expenses related to Dr. Doyle’s neuropsychological evaluation and visits to Dr. Noyes. Reimbursement for expenses relating to Dr. Noyes’ services and the diagnostic blood test are denied for the same reasons set forth above. No evidence was presented about either Dr. Noyes’ services or the blood test to establish that they were related to an educational evaluation for which the parents might be entitled to reimbursement. In contrast, a substantial amount of evidence was introduced with regard to Dr. Doyle’s neuropsychological assessment in February 1998.
The Hearing Officer found in Issue No. 1 that the District and Mental Health failed to conduct appropriate assessments of STUDENT in late 1997. The District and Mental Health argued that, regardless of whether their assessments were found appropriate, Petitioner is not entitled to reimbursement for Dr. Doyle’s assessment because it did not include either interviews with any of STUDENT’s teachers or an observation of STUDENT in his school or home setting. The District also argued that Dr. Doyle was not familiar with the requirements for conducting psychological assessments and had limited knowledge regarding the legal requirements for conducting assessments for purposes of IEP development. While Respondents did not provide any authority to support their arguments, the Hearing Officer assumes that they contended that Dr. Doyle’s assessment failed to meet the criteria imposed on evaluations conducted by LEAs. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.503(e) (1996) (current version at 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(e) (1999)) (“Whenever an [IEE] is at public expense, the criteria under which the evaluation is obtained ... must be the same as the criteria which the public agency uses when it initiates an evaluation.”). State law does not impose such a requirement on independent assessments for them to be reimbursable. See Cal. Educ. Code § 56329 (Deering Supp. 1999). However, even if independent assessments were required to meet the same criteria as public agencies’ assessments in California, the evidence showed that Dr. Doyle’s assessment did meet those criteria.
First, the Hearing Officer notes that while Dr. Doyle did not speak personally with any District staff working with STUDENT, she did gather information about STUDENT’s functioning in the educational setting through a review of educational records and school questionnaires filled out by Deborah Gillman-Day, the educational therapist who had been tutoring STUDENT since June 1995, and five of STUDENT’s sixth-grade teachers who, by the time they were asked to fill out the questionnaires in January 1998, had taught STUDENT for half the school year. Further, Dr. Doyle observed STUDENT during four two-hour evaluation sessions in her office while he was engaged in a variety of educationally related tasks and activities, as required by Education Code § 56327(c). In her report, Dr. Doyle noted the relevant behavior she observed during the sessions and explained the relationship of the behavior to STUDENT’s academic and social functioning, in accordance with Education Code § 56327. For example, Dr. Doyle stated in her report that STUDENT worked extremely slowly on paper-and-pencil tasks requiring him to apply selective attention and coordinate visual-motor output and that, resultingly, STUDENT is at greater and greater disadvantage as the writing and production demands of school increase. Thus, Dr. Doyle’s evaluation was clearly for educational purposes even if she did not observe STUDENT in the school setting or talk with District staff, since she was able to gather information about STUDENT’s actual functioning in the school setting through records and teacher questionnaires.
Second, while a school observation and teacher interviews may have strengthened the persuasiveness of Dr. Doyle’s findings regarding STUDENT’s functioning in the educational setting, it was not required by the Education Code. Furthermore, in addition to observations of STUDENT and interviews of STUDENT and his parents, Dr. Doyle administered an extensive battery of standardized, projective, and other test measures tailored to assess STUDENT’s specific areas of educational need and assessed in all areas related to the suspected disability in conformance with Education Code § 56320. The evidence, therefore, clearly established that Dr. Doyle performed an assessment that complied with Education Code § 56320 et seq. Any unfamiliarity Dr. Doyle may have had with the requirements for conducting psychological assessments for purposes of IEP development apparently did not affect her ability to conduct an assessment that met the criteria imposed on LEAs.
For all the foregoing reasons, Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement for expenses properly related to Dr. Doyle’s assessment of STUDENT. Petitioner claimed the following expenses in relation to Dr. Doyle’s assessment:
Date Description Amount Comments
1. 2/7/98 Neuro testing $562.50 Diagnostic 2. 2/8/98 Diagnostic interview $187.50 Diagnostic 3. 2/8/98 Neuro testing $437.50 Diagnostic 4. 2/9/98 Travel - Airline $338.00 Diagnostic - T Doyle Evaluation 5. 2/9/98 Travel - Airline $172.00 Diagnostic - T Doyle Evaluation 6. 2/9/98 Travel - Car rental $120.22 Diagnostic - T Doyle Evaluation 7. 2/9/98 Travel - Lodging $227.48 Diagnostic - T Doyle Evaluation 8. 2/9/98 Diagnostic interview $250.00 Diagnostic 9. 2/9/98 Diagnostic consult $375.00 Diagnostic 10. 3/21/98 Consult/therapist $ 62.50 Diagnostic 11. 3/21/98 Neuro test report $750.00 Diagnostic 12. 3/23/98 Consult/Antoniadis $ 62.50 Diagnostic 13. 4/29/98 Neuro test report $250.00 Diagnostic 14. 4/28/98 Consult/attorney $ 93.75 Diagnostic 15. 5/8/98 Consult/attorney $250.00 Diagnostic/IEP 16. 5/8/98 Consult/IEP $625.00 Diagnostic/IEP 17. 5/8/98 Consult/therapist $125.00 Diagnostic/IEP 18. 5/8/98 Travel to IEP $385.00 Diagnostic/IEP
The Hearing Officer finds that item numbers one through three, eight through eleven, and thirteen are recoverable because they were shown to be necessary and reasonable expenses related to Dr. Doyle’s assessment. Dr. Doyle testified that she met with STUDENT and his parents for two days of testing and interviews in her Oakland office in February 1999. Dr. Doyle also testified that she interviewed Ms. Carlton for purposes of the assessment and prepared an assessment report, which was introduced into evidence by the parties.
Petitioner failed to establish his entitlement to recover reimbursement for item numbers four through seven and twelve. Items four through seven are travel expenses incurred for the parents and STUDENT to travel from Long Beach to Oakland to Dr. Doyle’s office for testing and interviews. Reasonable travel expenses may be reimbursed when required to obtain an appropriate assessment and/or service. Union School District v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1527-1528 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 115 S.Ct. 428 (1994); see also Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1161 (5th Cir. 1986). Petitioner presented no evidence to suggest that the travel expenses incurred here were either reasonable or necessary to obtain an appropriate assessment. While Dr. Doyle’s qualifications and experience are quite impressive, there was no evidence to suggest that a psychologist geographically closer to the FAMILY’S home in Southern California could not also have performed an appropriate neuropsychological assessment of STUDENT. Because the necessity and reasonableness of the travel expenses was not substantiated by the record, Petitioner’s claim for travel expenses related to Dr. Doyle’s assessment must be denied. Additionally, reimbursement for item number twelve, which was described by Petitioner as a consultation with a person named Antoniadis, must be denied. There was no information presented to substantiate how a consultation with Antoniadis was related to the assessment (Antoniadis was never mentioned during the hearing or in any documents submitted into evidence, except in Petitioner’s expense list above and Dr. Doyle’s billing statement).
As for item numbers fourteen, fifteen, and seventeen, Petitioner has provided no authority, and the Hearing Officer is not aware of any, which entitles the parents to reimbursement for expenses related to Dr. Doyle’s consultation with the attorney and therapist after the assessment was completed. Therefore, reimbursement for such expenses is denied.
Finally, the Hearing Officer finds that the parents are entitled to reimbursement for Dr. Doyle’s fee for attending the IEP team meeting on May 8, 1998, item number sixteen. There is no dispute that an IEP team meeting was convened on May 8 expressly to review the results of Dr. Doyle’s assessment, and that Dr. Doyle attended the meeting to explain her findings and recommendations to the team. Since the Hearing Officer found above that the District and Mental Health both failed to complete appropriate assessments and that Dr. Doyle’s assessment was appropriate, it is proper under the circumstances to award reimbursement for expenses necessary for Dr. Doyle to present her findings to the IEP team. School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369, 105 S.Ct. 1996 (1985) (finding that courts may award relief that is “appropriate” in light of the purposes of the IDEA). When an IEP team convenes to review an assessment for purposes of developing, reviewing, or revising an IEP, the LEA must ensure that a person is present at the meeting who has conducted an assessment of the student or who is knowledgeable about the assessment procedures used to assess the student and is familiar with the results of the assessment. Cal. Educ. Code § 56341(d) (Deering Supp. 1999). Here, the evidence established that Dr. Doyle was the only person present at the meeting who both (1) conducted the assessment and (2) was knowledgeable about the assessment procedures used and was familiar with the results of the assessment. Ms. Roussos’ presence at the meeting did not fill this requirement because her familiarity with the assessment procedures used was not established by the evidence, she was not present for the entire meeting, and she was not present when Dr. Doyle’s assessment was reviewed with the team. Additionally, Ms. Roussos testified that she did not review the results of the assessment before the meeting and thus was not familiar with the results of the assessment by the time the meeting convened. Petitioner did not, however, establish entitlement to the travel expenses incurred for Dr. Doyle to attend the meeting because, as with item numbers four through seven, Petitioner did not present any evidence to suggest that there was no qualified psychologist available in the Southern California area who could have performed an appropriate assessment.
Based on the foregoing, the Hearing Officer awards Petitioner reimbursement for expenses related to Dr. Doyle’s completion of the neuropsychological assessment and her attendance at the IEP team meeting on May 8, 1998, i.e., item numbers one, two, three, eight, nine, ten, eleven, thirteen, and sixteen above. Petitioner is therefore entitled to reimbursement from both Respondents in the sum of $3,500.00 for assessments privately obtained during the 1997-98 school year. Because Dr. Doyle’s assessment dealt with a considerable number of mental health issues in addition to issues related to learning disabilities, the Hearing Officer finds that the Respondents are jointly and severally liable for the reimbursement award. All other claims for reimbursement for assessments obtained during the 1997-98 school year are denied.
d. the 1998-99 school year
For the 1998-99 school year, Petitioner claimed assessment expenses for the following: a psychiatric examination by Vanessa Camperlengo, M.D., in July 1998; a diagnostic evaluation by Julie Griffith, M.D., a pediatric neurologist, in September 1998; a series of diagnostic blood and other laboratory tests from September to December 1998; travel and parking expenses in September and November 1998 to visit Dr. Griffith and to obtain laboratory testing; and a speech-language evaluation by Lee Woodford in December 1998.
Dr. Camperlengo’s psychiatric diagnostic examination
The District argued that reimbursement for Dr. Camperlengo’s assessment is not warranted because the District and Mental Health offered appropriate services to address STUDENT’s social-emotional needs. Because Dr. Camperlengo’s psychiatric examination was a component of the overall treatment (i.e., it simply allowed her to learn about STUDENT’s history and current needs in order to treat him) rather than a special education assessment, Petitioner’s entitlement to reimbursement for the $150.00 charged for the examination will be determined later when Petitioner’s entitlement to reimbursement for Dr. Camperlengo’s treatment is analyzed.
Dr. Griffith’s neurologic examination and related laboratory tests
The District argued that Petitioner is not entitled to reimbursement for expenses relating to Dr. Griffith’s services and the lab tests because they were medical expenses that were not shown to be educationally related. As noted earlier, an LEA is required to provide medical services for diagnostic or evaluation purposes when such services are required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22) (1997) (former version at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1994)). To qualify as a medical service under the IDEA, the service must be provided by a licensed physician and must be to determine a student’s medically related disability which results in the student’s need for special education and related services. 34 C.F.R. § 300.24(b)(4) (1999) (former version at 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(b)(4) (1996)). The Hearing Officer finds that Dr. Griffith’s neurologic examination and the related laboratory tests were necessary related services that should have been provided by the District.
Dr. Griffith testified that, based on a referral by Dr. Doyle, she evaluated STUDENT to determine whether a brain injury was the cause of his learning disabilities. This was consistent with Dr. Doyle’s report, which recommended that a neurology examination be performed to determine whether structural damage was present and that laboratory tests be conducted to rule out whether a metabolic disorder might be contributing to STUDENT’s symptoms of anxiety. Dr. Doyle found from her assessment that STUDENT had a number of significant cognitive and sensory processing impairments that were neuropsychological in etiology and that the preponderance of neuropsychological data and clinical history suggested that STUDENT’s impairment included an anterior component, as well as frontal lobe impairments, a disruption of subcortical systems, and more involvement of the right hemisphere than the left. Dr. Doyle’s findings suggested that STUDENT’s condition was similar to that found with traumatic brain injuries, in that he likely had multiple factors which caused brain injury, a finding that was confirmed by Dr. Griffith.
From an interview with the parents and a review of STUDENT’s birth records, both Drs. Doyle and Griffith concluded that STUDENT likely suffered a number of insults while in utero, including hypoxia (strangulation of the mother during the pregnancy) and abuse of multiple drugs by the mother during the pregnancy. Dr. Griffith found that, while some of STUDENT’s injuries were irreversible, a number of the injuries needed to be treated, including ones that impacted STUDENT’s ability to function in the educational environment. No persuasive evidence was offered by the Respondents to the dispute these findings. In fact, the testimony of Jack Schnel, Ed.D., a part-time school psychologist with another school district and the District’s expert witness, confirmed that a neurological examination was necessary in this case. Dr. Schnel testified that a referral for a neurology exam is appropriate where a conclusive determination about the presence of an organic brain injury is needed because of a history of serious trauma, such as a major accident, or because initial testing produced very unusual responses. Both factors were present in this case. Furthermore, D. Lael Van Dyke, M.D., a District pediatrician who attended the IEP meeting on May 8, 1998, at the request of Ms. Davidson, indicated agreement, both at the meeting and in a subsequent memorandum, with Dr. Doyle’s recommendation that STUDENT receive neurological testing.
Based on the foregoing, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT required a neurologic examination to assist him to benefit from special education. Because the District failed to obtain the necessary and appropriate assessments, the parents are entitled to reimbursement from the District for expenses related to Dr. Griffith’s examination. The evidence showed that the following expenses were related to Dr. Griffith’s examination: $510.00 for the initial examination with STUDENT; $898.00 for other services related to the examination, such as a review of records; $108.72 for lab tests ordered by Dr. Griffith; and $567.61 for travel expenses ($348.00 for airfare, $66.71 for a rental car, and $152.90 for lodging), for a total of $2,084.33. However, as with Dr. Doyle’s examination, there was no evidence to suggest that the expenses incurred for STUDENT and his parents to travel to see Dr. Griffith at her office in Greenbrae, California, in Northern California were necessary or reasonable. Further, the parents’ entitlement to reimbursement for the remaining lab tests was not established because they were conducted based on referrals by physicians other than Dr. Griffith, and there was no showing as to how they were related and/or necessary to Dr. Griffith’s evaluation. Petitioner is therefore entitled to reimbursement only for the expenses directly related to the examination, i.e., $510.00 for the initial examination, $898 for a review of records and other assessment services, and $108.72 for lab tests ordered by Dr. Griffith, for a total of $1,516.72. Accordingly, the District is responsible for reimbursing the parents the amount of $1,516.72 for Dr. Griffith’s assessment.
Ms. Woodford’s speech-language evaluation
Finally, the District argued that Petitioner is not entitled to reimbursement for the speech-language evaluation performed by Ms. Woodford because the District performed an appropriate speech-language assessment in October 1997, and because Ms. Woodford’s assessment did not include any interviews with District staff and was not based on California eligibility requirements for speech and language services. First, it was determined in Issue No. 1 that the District’s speech-language evaluation in October 1997 was not appropriate. Second, the Hearing Officer finds that, even if independent assessments are required to comply with the same criteria as those performed by public agencies, as discussed earlier, Ms. Woodford’s assessment met the standards for a reimbursable independent assessment. The District’s contentions otherwise are without merit. There was no reason offered why Ms. Woodford’s assessment should have included interviews with District staff. By the time Ms. Woodford began her assessment in late November 1998, STUDENT had been in LKS for six months and had not been in a District program for at least that amount of time. There is no support in the evidence for the proposition that Ms. Woodford’s assessment, which was aimed at assessing STUDENT’s language functioning at the time of the assessment, should have included interviews with District persons who last served STUDENT six months before when Ms. Woodford had at her disposal LKS staff who were currently serving STUDENT and had been serving him for the past six months. Additionally, the District presented no authority, and the Hearing Officer is not aware of any, that required Ms. Woodford’s assessment to determine STUDENT’s need for speech-language therapy based on “California eligibility requirements.” It is unclear which eligibility requirements the District was referring to in its argument. For example, the District could have been referring to the eligibility requirements for special education as a language impaired student or the eligibility requirements for the receipt of related services, such as speech-language therapy, both of which involve distinct and separate criteria. Further, state law simply requires that an assessment report document the student’s need for special education and related services, which Ms. Woodford did in her assessment. See Cal. Educ. Code § 56327(a) (Deering Supp. 1999). Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the parents are entitled to reimbursement from the District for the cost of Ms. Woodford’s speech-language assessment in the amount of $104.00.
Consequently, Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement from the District in the amount of $1,516.72 for Dr. Griffith’s assessment and $104.00 for Ms. Woodford’s assessment. Petitioner’s entitlement to reimbursement for the $150.00 charged for Dr. Camperlengo’s psychiatric examination will be determined later when the appropriateness of Dr. Camperlengo’s treatment is evaluated.
*****
To summarize, Petitioner is entitled to costs related to independent assessments performed during the 1997-98 and 1998-99 school years by Dr. Doyle ($3,500), Dr. Griffith ($1,516.72), and Ms. Woodford ($104), which total $5,120.72. Respondents are jointly and severally liable for the cost of Dr. Doyle’s assessment. The District is solely liable for the cost of Dr. Griffith’s and Ms. Woodford’s assessments. Petitioner is not entitled to reimbursement for any assessments performed during the 1995-96 and 1996-97 school years. All of Petitioner’s remaining assessment expense claims are denied.
ISSUE NO. 3: Did the District and/or Mental Health fail to provide appropriate programs, services, accommodations, and modifications to meet STUDENT’s needs in accordance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) during the 1995-96, 1996-97, and 1997-98 school years?
Under both state law and the federal IDEA, students with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (1997) (former version at 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1994)); Cal. Educ. Code § 56000 (Deering 1987). The term “free appropriate public education” means special education and related services that are available to the student at no charge to the parent or guardian, that meet the State educational standards, and that conform to the student’s individualized education program (IEP). 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8) (1997) (former version at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18) (1994)).
“Special education” is defined as specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet the unique needs of the student. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(25) (1997) (formerly 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16) (1994)). The term “related services” includes transportation and other developmental, corrective, and supportive services as may be required to assist a child to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22) (1997) (former version at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1994)). Education Code § 56363(a) similarly provides that designated instruction and services (DIS), California’s term for related services, shall be provided “when the instruction and services are necessary for the pupil to benefit educationally from his or her instructional program.” Included in the list of possible related services are psychological services, parent counseling and training, specially designed vocational education and career development, and counseling and guidance. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22) (1997) (former version at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1994)); Cal. Educ. Code § 56363(b) (Deering 1987).
In Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982), the United States Supreme Court addressed the level of instruction and services that must be provided to a student with disabilities to satisfy the requirements of the IDEA. The Court determined that a student’s IEP must be reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit, but that the IDEA does not require school districts to provide special education students with the best education available or to provide instruction or services that maximize a student’s abilities. Id. at 198-200. The Court stated that school districts are required to provide only a “basic floor of opportunity” that consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the student. Id. at 201.
The Supreme Court in Rowley also recognized the importance of adherence to the procedural requirements of the IDEA. Id. at 205. Federal special education law requires states to establish and maintain certain procedural safeguards to ensure that each student with a disability receives the FAPE to which he/she is entitled and that parents are involved in the formulation of the student’s educational program. W.G., 960 F.2d at 1483. The procedural rights that extend to parents include the right to be informed in writing when the educational agency proposes to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child; the right to participate in the development of the child’s IEP; the right to examine all relevant educational records; and the opportunity for mediation and a due process hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1997) (amending 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1994)). Procedural flaws do not automatically require a finding of a denial of a FAPE, but procedural violations that result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringe on the parent’s opportunity to participate in the IEP process do result in the denial of a FAPE. W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484; see also Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 994 (1st Cir. 1990).
Thus, the analysis of whether a student has been provided a FAPE is twofold, requiring the hearing officer to determine whether the procedural safeguards of the IDEA have been met and to determine whether the FAPE provided was substantively appropriate. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-207.
a. the 1995-96 school year
After a careful review of the evidence, the Hearing Officer finds that the District committed a number of procedural and substantive violations during the 1995-96 school. First, it was determined in Issue No. 1 that the District failed to conduct an appropriate assessment of STUDENT prior to his initial placement in a special education program and thereby failed to identify all his special education needs. Without the necessary information about STUDENT’s disability and resulting needs, the District was unable to develop an educational program for STUDENT that addressed his unique educational needs. See W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1484-1485 (9th Cir. 1992). To be appropriate, an educational program must, inter alia, be designed to meet the student’s unique needs. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207-208. The IEP developed for STUDENT failed to mention, much less address, issues of social-emotional functioning and fine motor difficulties. An IEP is an educational package that must target all of a student’s unique educational needs, whether academic or nonacademic. Lenn, 998 F.2d at 1089. The term “unique educational needs” is to be broadly construed and includes the student’s academic, social, health, emotional, communicative, physical, and vocational needs. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. B.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 410, 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2088, 2106). Accordingly, this requirement is not limited only to deficits that appear to directly impact a student’s ability to progress academically. Id. Having failed to evaluate or address STUDENT’s established social-emotional and fine motor needs, the District failed to provide STUDENT with a program designed to address his unique needs, as required by the IDEA.
Second, the District failed to include the necessary personnel at the IEP meeting held on June 7, 1995, which was held to develop STUDENT’s program for the 1995-96 school year. Where an IEP team meets to develop an educational program for a student with a suspected learning disability, state law requires that the IEP team include at least one member, other than the student’s regular teacher, who has observed the student’s educational performance in an appropriate setting. Cal. Educ. Code § 56341(e) (Deering Supp. 1999). The evidence disclosed that none of the participants at the IEP meeting held on June 7, 1995, had observed STUDENT’s educational performance in any setting, much less in a school setting. Even though Barry Quick, a school psychologist, was present at the meeting, he had not assessed STUDENT or observed him. Mr. Quick acknowledged during his testimony that the District usually had a staff member observe a child entering public school for the first time from a private school, but could offer no explanation as to why such an observation did not take place for STUDENT. There was also no evidence that the District even invited one of STUDENT’s then-current private school teachers to participate in the meeting. Observation of STUDENT’s educational performance or participation by a then-current teacher would have provided the team with invaluable information about how STUDENT performed in the educational setting given his ADHD, social-emotional issues, impaired ability to interact appropriately with peers, and processing deficits. Without the participation of a person knowledgeable about STUDENT’s educational performance, the team was without the information necessary to develop an appropriate program for STUDENT. See W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484.
Third, no modifications to the regular education program were included in STUDENT’s IEP, despite the fact that the parents specifically requested that modifications be included in the IEP, and there was no dispute that modifications were necessary for STUDENT to participate in the regular education program given his numerous processing deficits, diagnosed ADHD, and fine motor difficulties. In fact, modifications were not even proposed by the District until the end of the school year at an IEP meeting held on April 3, 1996. If modifications to the regular education program are necessary to ensure the student’s participation in that program, the modifications must be identified and described in the student’s IEP. 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. C, Q. 48 (1996) (now codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(iii) (1997); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(a)(3) (Deering Supp. 1999)). Since the IEP is the only available vehicle through which most teachers of a RSP student will learn of the modifications that were determined necessary by the IEP team, this is an important requirement that helps to ensure consistent implementation of an appropriate program for the student. Where, as here, modifications are not described in the IEP, there is a lack of consistency in a student’s program and the necessity and/or appropriateness of modifications are determined by one person (either the case manager or the teacher) instead of by the IEP team, as required by the IDEA. This is likely to lead to either the use of inappropriate modifications or a failure to implement necessary modifications. The evidence established that both occurred in this case. For example, Barry Neel, one of STUDENT’s fourth-grade regular education teachers, testified that one of the modifications he made to STUDENT’s program was to allow STUDENT’s parents to decide when STUDENT had had enough practice with his math work. This modification was not appropriate in that it placed on the parents the responsibility of determining the appropriate work load for STUDENT (which responsibility should have been borne by the District staff trained to make such determinations), failed to ensure that STUDENT learned the material, and failed to accommodate any of his processing deficits.
Additionally, the evidence showed that STUDENT required modifications to enable him to participate in band, which he attempted for approximately thirty days before pulling out. However, no modifications were provided to allow STUDENT to continue participating in band. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.306 (“Each public agency shall take steps to provide nonacademic and extracurricular services and activities in such manner as is necessary to afford children with disabilities an equal opportunity for participation in those services and activities.”). MOTHER testified that STUDENT was unable to participate in band because the sessions were held in a large auditorium with a large group of kids, and that the acoustics prevented STUDENT from being able to follow the teacher’s directions given his auditory processing deficit. The IEP, which failed to even identify STUDENT’s processing deficits, much less specify modifications needed to address them, failed to alert the band teacher that an accommodation was necessary to allow STUDENT to participate in band. Further, even though the testimony showed that MOTHER told the principal about STUDENT’s problems in band and that Ms. Buckley (STUDENT’s RSP teacher and case manager) knew that STUDENT had tried to participate in band, no District personnel attempted to modify the band program to allow STUDENT an equal opportunity to participate.
Finally, according to MOTHER’s testimony, the RSP services designated in STUDENT’s IEP were not provided until three or four weeks into the school year, even though the IEP provided that the RSP services would begin with the coming school year. RSP instruction was the only special education designated in STUDENT’s IEP; hence, without RSP, STUDENT was receiving no special education and no support in his regular education classes. An LEA must provide a student with special education and related services in accordance with his or her IEP. 34 C.F.R. § 300.350 and Pt. 300, App. C, Q. 45 (1996); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(c) (Deering Supp. 1999). Failure to do so constitutes noncompliance with the IDEA. 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. C, Q. 45 (1996). The District offered no evidence to rebut MOTHER’s testimony and no explanation as to why there was a one-month delay in the implementation of STUDENT’s IEP.
In light of the totality of the procedural and substantive violations committed by the District during the 1995-96 school year, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to offer or provide STUDENT a FAPE during the 1995-96 school year.
b. the 1996-97 school year
The evidence established that the District also committed a number of procedural and substantive violations during the 1996-97 school year. Some of the violations were similar to those discussed with regard to the 1995-96 school year. For example, the Hearing Officer determined in Issue No. 1 that the District failed to assess in all areas related to the suspected disability during the 1996-97 school year. Consequently, as with the 1995-96 school year, the District did not have the information necessary to develop a program designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs for the 1996-97 school year. See W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484-1485. In fact, the District’s program did not address either STUDENT’s social issues or emotional issues (e.g., peer interaction and anxiety), despite repeated concerns expressed by the parents and by the private providers brought by the parents to IEP meetings to help explain some of STUDENT’s disabilities, and the teachers’ consistently poor rating of STUDENT’s functioning in these areas.
Additionally, STUDENT exhibited increasing behavior problems in the classroom during the year, but his IEP failed to address any behavioral issues. The evidence indicated that STUDENT became increasingly frustrated with school at this time because of the increased educational demands placed on him and his limited ability to meet those demands without the proper assistance. As mentioned in Issue No. 1, during the 1996-97 school year, STUDENT became increasingly argumentative with teachers, frequently talked out of turn in group situations, had difficulty sustaining his attention on tasks, frequently engaged in disruptive behaviors (such as incessantly tapping a pencil on his desk and refusing to stop when directed to), and was often uninterested in and unwilling to complete assignments. But, rather than convening an IEP meeting to allow the team to develop instructional and/or behavioral approaches to address STUDENT’s behavior problems, the teachers used behavioral management techniques that they used with all students, not taking into account STUDENT’s unique deficits and needs. For example, Sharon Lahr, one of STUDENT’s fifth-grade teachers, testified that when STUDENT misbehaved she seated him at a desk in the hallway outside the classroom where he could hear the lesson but not disturb the other students. This was a consequence that, according to Ms. Lahr, she had used with disruptive students for a long time. However, its appropriateness as a behavioral intervention technique for STUDENT is suspect. State law provides that when behavioral interventions are used, they must be used in consideration of the student’s physical freedom and social interaction and be administered in a manner that, among other things, ensures a student’s right to placement in the least restrictive educational environment. Cal. Educ. Code § 56520(b)(1) (Deering Supp. 1999). Isolating STUDENT at a desk outside the classroom did not take into consideration his ability to interact socially, his right to placement in the least restrictive environment, or his anxiety. Furthermore, there was no evidence that any of the behavioral interventions used by STUDENT’s teachers, including the one described above, were effective with STUDENT. In fact, the evidence points to the contrary. STUDENT performed significantly poorer academically in his fifth-grade year than he did during his fourth-grade year. To illustrate, STUDENT substantially met his listed goals and objectives during his fourth-grade year, but met only two out of five goals and objectives during the fifth-grade year.
Further, while only three of STUDENT’s fifth-grade teachers were called to testify, it was apparent from their testimony that STUDENT’s teachers were not all knowledgeable of the content of his IEP, as required by state law. State law provides that, prior to the placement of a student with exceptional needs, an LEA must ensure that the student’s regular education teachers, among others, are knowledgeable of the contents of his or her IEP. Cal. Educ. Code § 56347 (Deering 1987). This requirement is obviously meant to ensure that a special education student’s IEP is consistently implemented throughout the school day and that the necessary specialized instruction and/or support services are provided to allow the student to progress in the regular education program. These did not occur in STUDENT’s case. For instance, Nancy Wahlstrom, STUDENT’s fifth-grade social studies teacher, testified that although she was aware that STUDENT was a special education student, she was not made privy to his IEP. It was apparent from Ms. Wahlstrom’s testimony that she had only limited knowledge about STUDENT’s need for special education and the modifications provided in his IEP. She was aware only that STUDENT was a resource specialist (RS) student and that he had learning disabilities, although she did not know specifically what learning disabilities he had. She testified that she did not do anything different for STUDENT in her class than she did for the other RS students (regardless of their disability) and, apart from recalling that he had ADHD and problems with handwriting, she did not see his needs as any different from those of her other students. In fact, Ms. Wahlstrom testified that she did not modify STUDENT’s work even though FATHER told her that STUDENT had visual-spatial integration problems, because STUDENT never complained and just worked along with the other students. While it is not surprising that STUDENT was not eager to advertise his learning deficits in front of his classmates, previous testing had consistently shown that STUDENT had a number of visual problems, including a visual-spatial integration deficit, that required modification of assignments and tests. A child’s need for specialized instruction and modifications is not dependent on his or her ability to ask for the specialized instruction or modifications. The teachers’ failure to provide STUDENT with the specialized instruction and modifications found necessary by the IEP team resulted in a failure to implement the IEP and a failure to provide STUDENT with an appropriate program.
On a related matter, the evidence established that the District failed to include necessary modifications and accommodations in STUDENT’s IEP for the 1996-97 school year. For example, the evidence showed that STUDENT had significant visual-spatial integration problems that required modification of any assignments or tests that were visually busy. The IEP, however, offered modification for only math assignments and tests. Other tests, “as appropriate,” were also subject to possible modification by the RS, but assignments in subjects other than math were not included at all. Additionally, there were no accommodations made for his ADHD symptoms despite the fact that it was a long-recognized diagnosis for STUDENT and the symptoms interfered at times with his ability to benefit educationally. Moreover, the few modifications and accommodations that were included in the IEP were not all properly implemented. For instance, the IEP provided that STUDENT be given audio tapes of fifth-grade texts so that he could read along while listening to a tape of the assigned story as needed. MOTHER testified that no tapes were provided by the District. The District did not provide any persuasive evidence to rebut MOTHER’s testimony. As mentioned earlier, an LEA is obligated to provide a student with special education and related services in accordance with his or her IEP. 34 C.F.R. § 300.350 and Pt. 300, App. C, Q. 45 (1996) (stating that an IEP is a commitment to provide services); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(c) (Deering Supp. 1999). The District failed to fulfill this requirement.Based on the totality of the District’s procedural and substantive violations, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to offer or provide STUDENT a FAPE during the 1996-97 school year.
d. the 1997-98 school year
Having reviewed the evidence with regard to the 1997-98 school year, the Hearing Officer finds that the District committed a number of procedural and substantive violations during the 1997-98 school year. The Hearing Officer found in Issue No. 1 that the District failed to conduct an appropriate triennial assessment of STUDENT during the 1997-98 school year. The District’s assessment in October 1997 failed to meet the requirements of Education Code Sections 56320 and 56327 in that it did not assess in all areas related to the suspected disability, did not include proper assessment measures, and did not produce appropriate assessment reports. The Hearing Officer also found that Mental Health’s AB 3632 assessment in December 1997 failed to meet the requirements of state law because it did not comply with procedural time lines and did not include proper assessment measures. Consequently, as with the prior years, the LEAs involved failed to appropriately assess STUDENT, which resulted in their not having the information necessary to develop a program designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs for the 1997-98 school year. See W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484-1485. In fact, while the IEP for the 1997-98 school year was generally improved from prior years (e.g., it included more extensive modifications and accommodations than prior IEPs), the District’s program still failed to address all of STUDENT’s unique educational needs. For instance, even though STUDENT’s emotional and behavioral problems continued into the 1997-98 school year, the IEP did not address emotional issues at all until January 1998 and failed to include specific behavioral approaches and/or interventions.
Moreover, the information that the District did have, which had been provided over and over by the parents and the private treaters or confirmed through past teachers’ experience with STUDENT, was not properly shared with the new staff working with STUDENT at Stanford, as required by his IEP dated September 18, 1997. The Hearing Officer does not find credible the testimony of Andria Davidson, the District’s program facilitator, that she explained STUDENT’s disabilities and needs to the teachers working with him at faculty meetings held at Stanford, as explicitly required by his IEP. None of the five teachers who testified could recall Ms. Davidson ever attending a staff meeting, and none recalled receiving any training or information about STUDENT and his disabilities, except perhaps informally through discussions with Judy Knapp, STUDENT’s RS teacher and case manager, and Gail Brooks, the counselor and learning director at Stanford, and by receiving a copy of STUDENT’s IEP. The District’s failure to share the information in accordance with the IEP led to a number of significant misunderstandings and the use of inappropriate approaches. These included the use of inappropriate interventions, such as using handwriting as a punishment tool (STUDENT was required to repetitively write “My work was late because I was lazy”), and the teachers’ inability to recognize and effectively deal with the symptoms of STUDENT’s myriad conditions, including the symptoms of anxiety he exhibited in the classroom.
Additionally, even though STUDENT’s IEPs for the 1997-98 school year included a substantial amount of modifications and accommodations to assist him in benefiting from the regular education program, most of the modifications and accommodations were not implemented. For example, a “homework buddy” was not assigned to STUDENT in each of his classes so that he would have someone to call in the evening if uncertain of class assignments or the schedule of exams, as provided in his IEP dated September 18, 1997, and continued in his IEP dated November 6, 1997; he did not receive books on tape in accordance with his September and November IEPs until April 1998, and then only for one book; he did not receive additional support whenever tasks required that he put together materials in a special array such as for grouping or mapping, or when he was required to cut and paste and develop a visual organization of material, as provided in both his IEPs; and spelling lists were not coordinated between Ms. Knapp and Ms. Levine, as required by the November IEP. Even when the parents continued to provide private tutoring so that STUDENT would have additional academic support, the modifications that the team agreed to in order to facilitate this were not implemented. For instance, the team agreed on September 18, 1997, that Ms. Gillman-Day would receive information regarding STUDENT’s social studies lessons from his social studies teacher in advance of the units being presented in the classroom. However, Ms. Gillman-Day testified that she never received any information about the social studies lessons from the school staff, and there was no persuasive evidence presented otherwise. In sum, the evidence clearly established that the District did not provide STUDENT special education in accordance with his IEPs as required by state and federal law (34 C.F.R § 300.350 and Pt. 300, App. C, Q. 45, (1996); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(c) (Deering Supp. 1999)), even though there was no dispute that these modifications were required for STUDENT to benefit from the regular education program in which he was placed for a majority of the school day.
The evidence also established that the District failed to provide STUDENT with the related services designated on his IEPs. STUDENT’s September and November IEPs indicated that he was to receive behavioral consultation services from the school psychologist two times per month. Both IEPs included a behavioral consultation provision that required the school psychologist to (1) consult with the classroom teacher to develop behavior plans and (2) consult with STUDENT to support positive interpersonal relationships in structured and unstructured environments. The evidence showed that neither occurred. Ms. Roussos, the school psychologist assigned to perform this function, testified that she received all information about STUDENT’s behavior in the classroom from Ms. Knapp, and that from Ms. Knapp’s reports she determined that a behavior plan was not necessary and so did not develop one. Because Ms. Roussos did not interact with STUDENT’s teachers directly, a number of the teachers had no idea that there was a behavioral consultant assigned to STUDENT’s case and Ms. Roussos remained ignorant of the behavioral issues that did arise during the course of the school year. Further, the teachers who had the most problems with STUDENT behaviorally did not consult with Ms. Knapp about the behavior issues, most probably because they were unaware that they were supposed to consult anyone about these issues. For example, Martin Van Dine, STUDENT’s science teacher, testified that he was not aware that a behavioral consultant was assigned to STUDENT and that, while he spoke about STUDENT occasionally with Ms. Knapp or Ms. Brooks, he did not consult anyone with regard to STUDENT’s behavior problems. STUDENT was eventually removed from Mr. Van Dine’s science class because of the way Mr. Van Dine handled STUDENT’s behavior issues. Additionally, it was clear from Ms. Roussos’ testimony that she did not consult with STUDENT directly with regard to behavior or socialization issues, even though the IEP required that she do so. According to her testimony, she believed that STUDENT was not having any problems with his behavior or peer or adult interaction based on the fact that she was not receiving reports of problems from Ms. Knapp. From this, she independently determined that consultation with STUDENT was unnecessary and consequently did not provide direct consultation to STUDENT, despite the fact that such consultation was a required part of the IEP.
Finally, Mental Health committed similar violations during the 1997-98 school year. Apart from the failure to conduct an appropriate assessment, which was noted above, Mental Health also did not provide the services required by STUDENT’s IEP. There is no dispute that STUDENT was entitled to services from Mental Health during the 1997-98 school year. At the IEP meeting held on January 12, 1998, Mental Health offered STUDENT one sixty-minute psychotherapy session per week and ongoing medication evaluation and monitoring by a psychiatrist. However, in addition to the already two-month unexcused delay in providing services (which was discussed in Issue No. 1 with regard to untimeliness of Mental Health’s assessment), the mental health services delineated in STUDENT’s IEP were not provided as soon as possible following the meeting, as required by state law. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3040(a) (1999). STUDENT did not receive any Mental Health services until approximately May 26, 1998, when he was finally seen by psychiatrist Anne Welty, M.D., for medication evaluation and management. It is clear that the way in which Mental Health made the services available to STUDENT was a significant contributor to the delay in the provision of services. At the IEP meeting, STUDENT’s father was told that the assigned contract provider, the Community Family Guidance Center (CFGC), would contact the parents in about five days to discuss starting STUDENT’s treatment. When the parents were not contacted by anybody with regard to the mental health services, MOTHER contacted CFGC and was told on February 5 that there was a thirty- to ninety-day wait until a therapist could be assigned to STUDENT, that STUDENT could not see a psychiatrist for medication management until a therapist was assigned, and that no social skills groups were available. According to Ms. Boykins’ testimony, Mental Health was made aware of these problems by MOTHER shortly thereafter. However, the problems were not resolved expediently by Mental Health and STUDENT failed to receive any services until May. Thus, although Mental Health services should have begun for STUDENT in late November 1997, services did not begin until late May 1998.
Additionally, the evidence established that STUDENT required services beyond those actually made available by Mental Health. While there is no dispute that Mental Health’s offer of psychotherapy services included individual and/or group therapy, group therapy was not made available to STUDENT. Ms. Boykins and Deborah Smith, a Mental Health program head, testified that they were aware that no social skills group therapy was available at STUDENT’s assigned clinic at the time, but there was no evidence that Mental Health personnel made any effort to check whether group therapy might be available for STUDENT elsewhere. Ms. Carlton testified that STUDENT did not have the psychological capacity to raise his socialization issues in individual therapy sessions in order to work on them, and that they could only be effectively addressed in a group setting where he could get direct feedback and direction. This was supported by the testimony of Dr. Camperlengo, who had worked with STUDENT for one year on at least a weekly basis at LKS. Dr. Camperlengo testified from her experience with STUDENT that he had tremendous difficulty verbalizing his problems in order to get the proper interventions, and that it required constant communication between all staff members at LKS and frequent observations to discern the true source of STUDENT’s problems in order for her to provide the necessary interventions. No persuasive evidence was presented by Respondents to refute the testimony of Ms. Carlton and Dr. Camperlengo, yet no group therapy or other more comprehensive services were made available by Mental Health.
Moreover, the IEP developed by Mental Health (in conjunction with District staff) on January 12, 1998, did not include objectives necessary to address the mental health issues for which STUDENT was to receive counseling. When mental health services are to be provided, the goals and objectives of the mental health services, with appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures (to determine whether the objectives are being achieved), must be included in the IEP. Cal. Code Reg. tit. 2, § 60050(a)(2) (1999). Short-term instructional objectives (i.e., IEP objectives) are measurable, intermediate steps between the child’s present levels of educational performance and the annual goals that are established for the child. 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. C, Q. 39 (1996). The objectives should be developed based on a logical breakdown of the major components of the annual goals and should be projected to be accomplished over an extended period of time, such as a school quarter or semester. Id. IEP objectives are necessary in order to provide general benchmarks for measuring the student’s progress toward meeting the annual goals and otherwise gauging the efficacy of the services provided. Id.; see also Cleveland Heights-University Heights City Sch. Dist. v. Boss, 144 F.3d 391, 399 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that omission of appropriate objective criteria in IEP was significant violation that “went to the heart of the substance of the plan”). While Mental Health’s assessment report and the IEP contained general goals related to counseling, objectives were not proposed for inclusion in the IEP. Apart from not providing a means by which the IEP team could measure STUDENT’s progress in this area, this violation also denied the parents the right to participate in the formulation of objectives and a voice in determining the direction that the counseling should take and the needs it should address. Ms. Boykin’s testimony that it was her intent that the treatment team would develop the goals and objectives once therapy was underway does not excuse Respondents’ failure to develop goals and objectives at the IEP team meeting. Goals and objectives are to be developed at an IEP team meeting by the IEP team, which includes the parents, not independently by a provider. There is no doubt that had Ms. Boykins conducted an appropriate assessment, she would have had the information necessary to propose appropriate goals and objectives at the IEP meeting.
Given the significant procedural and substantive violations committed by the District and Mental Health during the 1997-98 school year, the Hearing Officer finds that both the District and Mental Health failed to offer or provide STUDENT a FAPE during the 1997-98 school year.
*****
To summarize, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to provide STUDENT a FAPE during the 1995-96 and 1996-97 school years, and that both the District and Mental Health failed to provide a FAPE during the 1997-98 school year.
ISSUE NO. 4: Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for educational, mental health, and consulting services they obtained during the 1995-96, 1996-97, 1997-98 school years?
When a school district denies a student a FAPE, the student is entitled to relief that is “appropriate” in light of the purposes of the IDEA. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (1997) (former version at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (1994)). Thus, parents may be entitled to retroactive reimbursement for the services they have procured for their child when the school district failed to provide an appropriate placement and/or services, and the placement and/or services provided by the parents were appropriate under the IDEA. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370; 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C) (1997). However, the Burlington rule is not so narrow as to permit reimbursement only when the placement or services chosen by the parent are found to be the exact proper placement or services required under the Act. Alamo Heights Independent Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1161 (5th Cir. 1986). The Alamo court stated the following about the rationale behind the Court’s decision in Burlington:
The rationale behind Burlington’s holding is that parents who elect to risk shouldering the costs of what they perceive to be a more appropriate placement, and whose judgment is wholly or in part vindicated by the district court, should receive more than an ‘empty victory.’ [Footnote omitted.] As stated by the Court, if ‘appropriate relief’ in the form of reasonable reimbursement is not allowed, ‘the child’s right to a free appropriate public education, the parent’s right to participate fully in developing a proper IEP, and all of the procedural safeguards would be less than complete.’ [Footnote omitted.]
Id.
It was determined above that the District did not offer or provide STUDENT a FAPE during the 1995-96, 1996-97, and 1998-99 school years and that Mental Health did not offer or provide STUDENT appropriate counseling services during the 1997-98 school year. Among the conclusions reached were findings that the District’s program failed to include necessary modifications during the 1995-96 and 1996-97 school years, that the District failed to implement necessary modifications listed in STUDENT’s IEP during the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years, and that the District failed to address social-emotional issues during the 1995-96, 1996-97, and 1997-98 school years. Consequently, because Respondents denied STUDENT a FAPE, STUDENT’s parents are entitled to reimbursement for services they procured so long as the services were appropriate under the IDEA and replaced services that the public agencies failed to provide. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370; 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (1997).
Petitioner claimed that STUDENT’s parents should be reimbursed for psychotherapy services provided by Ms. Carlton and tutoring provided by Ms. Gillman-Day. The District argued that reimbursement for Ms. Carlton’s services is not warranted because the parents never requested psychotherapy and Mental Health offered appropriate counseling services once STUDENT’s need for counseling became an issue. The District also argued that reimbursement is not warranted for Ms. Day’s services because the IEP team never recommended outside tutoring for STUDENT, the parents never requested outside tutoring, and STUDENT achieved his goals and objectives and received educational benefit from the District’s program.
The Hearing Officer finds that the parents are entitled to reimbursement for psychotherapy services provided by Ms. Carlton during the 1995-96, 1996-97, and 1997-98 school years, including the beginning of the 1998 extended school year (ESY) session. Regardless of whether the parents ever requested psychotherapy, the evidence showed that STUDENT had social-emotional issues as early as the 1995-96 school year that affected his functioning in the educational setting and that should have been addressed by the District. The District had an obligation to provide an IEP that addressed all of STUDENT’s unique needs, and this obligation was not dependent on the parents’ ability to request such services. Further, as discussed in Issue Nos. 1 and 3, the evidence established that Mental Health did not appropriately assess STUDENT or offer and provide appropriate mental health services.
In contrast, the evidence demonstrated that Ms. Carlton’s services did address STUDENT’s social-emotional, as well as processing deficit, issues and that they were appropriate under the IDEA. There is no dispute that Ms. Carlton had the education and experience necessary to provide psychotherapy to STUDENT and that she provided almost weekly psychotherapy services to STUDENT from approximately April 1996 to July 1998, when STUDENT left California to attend summer school at LKS. Ms. Carlton testified that her therapy with STUDENT focused on his high level of anxiety and other emotional and social issues, most of which arose from and were centered around educational matters. Additionally, she testified that she attended a number of IEP meetings to help explain to STUDENT’s teachers the nature of his processing deficits and the modifications and specialized instruction needed to accommodate the deficits. She also provided consultation to the parents with regard to STUDENT’s emotional issues and his needs in relation to school work.
Because Respondents failed to appropriately assess STUDENT’s social-emotional issues and processing deficits, failed to appropriately address STUDENT’s social-emotional issues, and failed to provide necessary modifications during the 1995-96, 1996-97, and 1997-98 school years, the Hearing Officer finds that Ms. Carlton’s services provided some of what the District failed to provide and that the parents are entitled to reimbursement on this basis. However, because the IEP team did not find that STUDENT was entitled to ESY services until September 1997 and no evidence was presented that STUDENT was eligible for ESY services prior to that date, the parents are not entitled to reimbursement for services provided by Ms. Carlton during the summers of 1996 and 1997 when there were no educational matters impacting STUDENT. Therefore, in light of the receipts submitted into evidence, the parents are entitled to reimbursement in the amount of $7,562.50 for expenses related to psychotherapy sessions, parent consultations, and fees for IEP preparation and attendance provided by Ms. Carlton during the course of the relevant school years and the 1998 ESY, all of which were services that the District and/or Mental Health should have provided to address STUDENT’s social-emotional issues and processing deficits and to have on the IEP team a member knowledgeable about the same. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-371. Because the District should have been providing services to address STUDENT’s social-emotional problems well before it made the referral to Mental Health and because these services would have continued until Mental Health was required to assume responsibility for providing such services, expenses that were incurred before the date by which Mental Health should have offered appropriate mental health services (i.e., late November 1997) are the sole responsibility of the District, and expenses incurred thereafter are the joint and several responsibility of the District and Mental Health. Consequently, the District is solely responsible for $5,737.50 and the District and Mental Health are jointly and severally responsible for $1,825.00.
The Hearing Officer further finds that Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement for the tutoring services provided by Ms. Gillman-Day during the 1995-96, 1996-97, and 1997-98 school years and the 1998 ESY. The evidence established that Ms. Gillman-Day had the education and experience necessary to provide tutoring services to STUDENT, including training that enabled her to recognize and accommodate his processing deficits. Ms. Gillman-Day testified that she tutored STUDENT from the summer of 1995 to the end of the 1997-98 school year. During the 1995-96 and 1996-97 school years, she saw him on an alternating schedule of two times per week and then three times per week, each session lasting about an hour. During the 1997-98 school year, the sessions were reduced to two times per week. According to Ms. Gillman-Day’s testimony, she modified the assignments STUDENT received from school through a number of different techniques, including breaking them down into smaller and more manageable parts, presenting the material using a multimodal approach, isolating problems on a separate sheet of paper to make the presentation less visually crowded, writing down the answers given by STUDENT, and using manipulatives. These were modifications and specialized instruction techniques that the District should have been providing for STUDENT during the 1995-96, 1996-97, and 1997-98 school years. Because the District either wholly failed to provide such services or failed to consistently provide such services, the parents are entitled to reimbursement for the services provided by Ms. Gillman-Day during the 1995-96, 1996-97, and 1997-98 school years. Since STUDENT’s entitlement to ESY services was not established by the evidence, the parents are not entitled to reimbursement for tutoring provided during the summers of 1995 and 1996. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement from the District for Ms. Gillman-Day’s tutoring services in the amount of $8,180.00.
The Hearing Officer does not find persuasive the District’s arguments to the contrary. Notwithstanding whether the parents ever requested outside tutoring or whether the IEP team recommended outside tutoring, the District had an obligation to provide STUDENT sufficient support services so that he could benefit from his regular education placement. It was determined above that the District failed to fulfill its obligation because, among other things, no modifications were included in STUDENT’s IEP despite the fact that he suffered from multiple processing deficits that made it very difficult for him to function in the regular education setting without the appropriate supports. Further, the District’s claim that STUDENT’s progress on goals and objectives demonstrated that he did not require outside tutoring is without merit. It is impossible to determine how much of STUDENT’s progress was a result of the instruction he received through the District’s program and how much was the result of the parents’ extraordinary efforts to help STUDENT every night and Ms. Gillman-Day’s frequent tutoring. It was clear from the evidence, however, that the District failed in its obligation to provide STUDENT a FAPE for three years and that the services provided by Ms. Carlton and Ms. Gillman-Day during this period were appropriate under the IDEA.
In summary, Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement for services provided by Ms. Carlton and Ms. Gillman-Day in the amount of $15,742.50. The District is solely responsible for $13,917.50. The District and Mental Health are jointly and severally responsible for $1,825.00. Petitioner’s remaining claims for expenses incurred during the 1995-96, 1996-97, and 1997-98 school years are denied. ISSUE NO. 5: Did the District fail to offer and/or provide an appropriate program and services to meet STUDENT’s needs for the 1998 extended school year?
As mentioned in Issue No. 4, a school district is required to provide a special education student with ESY programming when the student requires special education and related services in excess of the regular academic year, or the IEP team has determined that the student requires ESY programming. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3043 (1999). A special education student is deemed to require ESY programming when the student has handicaps which are likely to continue indefinitely or for a prolonged period, and interruption of his or her educational programming may cause regression, when coupled with limited recoupment capacity, would render it impossible or unlikely that the student will attain the level of self-sufficiency and independence that would otherwise be expected in view of his or her handicapping condition. Id. Where a student has been determined by his or her IEP team to be entitled to ESY services, the written IEP must include an ESY program. Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(b)(3) (Deering Supp. 1999); see also Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3043(f) (1999). Here, the evidence made clear that, although the IEP team determined during the September 1997 meeting that STUDENT was eligible for ESY services during the summer of 1998, the District failed to offer STUDENT appropriate ESY services.
First, there was no evidence that the District offered STUDENT a program that was designed to serve the purposes of ESY programming, i.e., a program designed to prevent regression and to maintain the level of self-sufficiency and independence that would otherwise be expected in view of STUDENT’s handicapping condition. See id. There was no discussion about what ESY services the District was offering until the meeting on May 8, 1998, and then the matter was only briefly discussed. At the May meeting, the parents were orally told that they could fill out an application to enroll STUDENT in the general education summer program at Stanford and that he could be put on the list for the services of an itinerate specialist, who would come to the classroom and check in on STUDENT, much like a case manager. The parents were also orally told that, at the time of the meeting, the team had no idea which teachers would be teaching the summer program. The parents were not provided any written information regarding the District’s proposed ESY program until June 8, 1998, when Ms. Davidson sent the parents a handwritten note with an application for the summer school program at Stanford. The note indicated that a place was being held for STUDENT in the summer program and that he could have a college aide accompany him during the program should the District find a candidate that met the parents’ approval. Ms. Davidson also provided the names of the teachers who would be teaching the summer program and the contents of the three classes in language arts, history, and science. Thus, it is clear that the District’s offer bore no relation to the areas of potential regression or in any way took into account STUDENT’s needs. Instead, the District was offering STUDENT the regular education summer school that was offered to all students in the District, whether handicapped or not.
Second, there was no evidence that the District’s program was appropriate for STUDENT. No further evidence was presented by the District at the hearing as to the specific ESY services that were offered for the summer of 1998. Consequently, no evidence was presented to show how STUDENT’s needs would have been addressed by the foregoing program. For example, there was no evidence that he would have received any of the accommodations and modifications included in his IEP that were necessary for him to benefit from his education. There was also no evidence presented as to the qualifications and training of the proposed aide, or what role he or she would have played in assisting STUDENT. Additionally, by the time the offer was made, there were only days remaining in the regular school year and the summer program was scheduled to begin in seventeen days. Yet the District had not proposed any specific person to fulfill the aide role and, as a whole, the timing of the District’s offer gave the parents little to no time to make a meaningful choice. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (1997) (providing that public agency may be required to reimburse parents for cost of unilateral placement if agency did not make FAPE available in a timely manner).
Based on the foregoing, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to offer an appropriate ESY program for the summer of 1998. First, an appropriate ESY program was never included in STUDENT’s IEP. A simple determination that STUDENT was eligible for ESY services is not equivalent to including an ESY program as part of his written educational program, as required by state law. Second, there was no evidence that the District’s offer would have served the purposes of ESY programming or that it was otherwise appropriate to meet STUDENT’s needs.
ISSUE NO. 6: Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for all expenses related to their search for an appropriate placement and all costs related to STUDENT’s placement at the Little Keswick School during the 1998 extended school year session?
Since the evidence failed to establish the appropriateness of the District’s offer for the 1998 ESY, the Hearing Officer turns to the question of whether the parents are entitled to reimbursement for the LKS five-week summer school program that they provided to STUDENT and the costs involved in the parents’ search for a school. The District contended that Petitioner is not entitled to reimbursement for the school search expenses because Petitioner failed to establish the nature and extent of the school search expenses or that the expenses were educationally necessary. The District additionally argued that the school search expenses claimed, which totaled $5,171.08, were exorbitant and unreasonable. With regard to the summer school program, the District contended that the residential program provided by the parents was not appropriate for STUDENT because it was not the least restrictive environment. In the alternative, the District argued that reimbursement should be denied or reduced because the parents failed to inform the IEP team at the meeting on May 8, 1998, that they were rejecting the District’s proposed placement and failed to provide written notice at least ten business days prior to their removal of STUDENT from the public school of their intent to remove him from the public school.
As stated in Issue No. 4, parents may be entitled to retroactive reimbursement for the services they have procured for their child when the school district failed to provide an appropriate placement and the placement provided by the parents was appropriate under the IDEA. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370; 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C) (1997). In Florence County School Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13, 114 S.Ct. 361 (1993), the Court specifically exempted parents from having to meet certain requirements of the IDEA in their unilateral placements. For example, parents are not required to conform their unilateral placement to the content of the student’s IEP or provide a placement that is certified by the state. Id. at 13-14. Although the Court has recognized that the parents’ placement does not have to meet a standard as high as a school district’s must meet, the parents’ placement must still meet other requirements of the IDEA, such as providing a placement that addresses the student’s needs and provides the student educational benefit. Id.
After a careful review of the evidence, the Hearing Officer finds that the parents are not entitled to reimbursement for the school search expenses claimed or the supplies bought at Target on June 18, 1998. The parents are entitled, however, to reimbursement for tuition and related travel costs for the LKS summer program.
The Hearing Officer agrees with the District’s contention that Petitioner failed to establish either the nature and extent or the necessity of the expenses claimed for the school search (which included travel costs in the form of airfare, lodging, fuel, meals, and car rentals). There was no evidence presented as to the schools that the parents allegedly visited in their quest to find what they felt would be an appropriate placement for STUDENT, and no explanation to substantiate the few hotel and airline receipts that were introduced into the record. Consequently, the Hearing Officer is totally uninformed about the purpose of the parents’ trips tp to places such as Hyannis, Massachusetts, and Salisbury, Connecticut. In the absence of any basis upon which to award reimbursement for expenses claimed to be due to the parents’ school search, the Hearing Officer must deny reimbursement for such expenses. Therefore, Petitioner’s claim for reimbursement for the $5,171.08 incurred in travel expenses from May 12 to 29, 1998, is denied.
For similar reasons, Petitioner’s reimbursement claim for supplies purchased at Target on June 18, 1998, in the amount of $150.59 is denied. Petitioner submitted a receipt for the expenses claimed, but no testimony was presented to substantiate the educational necessity of the expenses. In fact, the receipt showed that the supplies, which consisted of bed linens, toiletries, and cards, were not necessarily educational in nature.
In contrast, the evidence substantiated the parents’ claim for the tuition and related travel expenses incurred to place STUDENT in the LKS summer school program. The testimony of LKS personnel, Dr. Doyle, Dr. Camperlengo, and others familiar with STUDENT’s needs, as well as the IEPs and reports generated by LKS, left no doubt that the LKS summer program, including Dr. Camperlengo’s psychotherapy and consulting services, addressed STUDENT’s unique academic and nonacademic needs, was reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit, and comported with his IEP. The only argument against LKS’s appropriateness for STUDENT was that it was not the least restrictive environment. The Hearing Officer does not find this argument persuasive. While the evidence showed that LKS is a private facility that serves male students with special needs ranging from learning disabled to seriously emotionally disturbed, this does not preclude the parents from receiving reimbursement for a private program that was otherwise appropriate for STUDENT across all domains. Notwithstanding whether STUDENT could have also received an appropriate education in a less restrictive environment, the parents’ right to reimbursement is not barred because of any failure to meet the mainstreaming requirement imposed on public agencies. Cleveland Heights, 144 F.3d at 399. As the Sixth Circuit recently noted, “It will commonly be the case that parents who have not been treated properly under the IDEA, and who exercise the right of parental placement, will place their child in a school that specializes in teaching children with disabilities and thus will not satisfy the mainstreaming requirement. Adopting such a limitation on parental placements would therefore effectively vitiate that remedy.” Id. at n7; accord Warren G. v. Cumberland County Sch. Dist., 1999 WL 643168 (3d Cir. 1999).
The Hearing Officer does not find persuasive the District’s alternative argument that reimbursement should be reduced or denied because the parents failed to give advance notice of their unilateral placement in accordance with Section 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) of the IDEA. The IDEA provides that reimbursement for a unilateral parent placement may be reduced or denied if (1) at the most recent IEP meeting that the parents attended prior to removal of the child from the public school, the parents did not inform the IEP team that they were rejecting the placement proposed by the public agency to provide a FAPE to their child, including stating their concerns and their intent to enroll their child in a private school at public expense; or (2) ten business days prior to the removal of the child from the public school, the parents did not give written notice to the public agency of the aforementioned information. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(I) (1997). However, reimbursement may be reduced or denied only where the public agency gave the parents notice, pursuant to Section 1415, of the above requirement. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iv)(IV). Despite the District’s apparent attempt to establish that this affirmative defense applied, there was no evidence presented that the District gave the parents notice of this provision. Further, regardless of whether the parents knew of this requirement, they substantially complied with it. Petitioner’s attorney wrote a letter on June 25, 1998, that informed the District that the parents intended to place STUDENT at LKS and had already enrolled him at LKS, and that the District had failed to offer or provide STUDENT appropriate services, including a summer program. The parents expressed general disagreement with the District’s offers at the meeting held on May 8, 1998, and notified the District through a letter from their attorney dated June 25, 1998, that they had enrolled STUDENT at LKS. The LKS summer program did not begin until July 12. Based on the foregoing, the Hearing Office finds that a reduction or denial of the reimbursement award is not warranted in this case.
Petitioner claimed $4,995.00 for tuition, $580.44 for counseling services from Dr. Camperlengo during the 1998 ESY, and $2,837.36 in related travel expenses, for a total of $8,412.80. Petitioner is therefore entitled to reimbursement from Respondents in the amount of $8,412.80 for the private summer school program the parents provided to STUDENT during the summer of 1998. Respondents are jointly and severally liable for this amount. All of Petitioner’s other claims for expenses relating to the parents’ school search and supplies are denied.
ISSUE NO. 7: Did the District and Mental Health fail to offer and/or provide an appropriate program and services to meet STUDENT’s needs during the 1998-99 school year?
Among the procedural violations that may constitute a denial of FAPE is the failure of a school district to make a formal, written offer of placement in compliance with the IDEA’s procedural requirements. Union School District v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1526 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 115 S.Ct. 428 (1994); see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3) (1997). In Union, the Ninth Circuit stated, “We find that this formal requirement has an important purpose that is not merely technical, and we therefore believe it should be enforced rigorously.” Union, 15 F.3d at 1526. The Court went on to discuss the reasons for imposing the requirement: (1) to alert the parents of the need to consider seriously whether the school district’s proposed placement is appropriate under the IDEA; (2) to help the parents determine whether to oppose or accept the placement with supplemental services; and (3) so that the school district is more prepared to introduce sufficient relevant evidence of the appropriateness of the placement at a due process hearing. Id. The courts have continued to vigorously apply Union. See, e.g., Mill Valley Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Eastin, No. C 98-03812 CW, slip op. at __ (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 1999).
The last time STUDENT’s IEP team met on May 8, 1998, the members discussed Dr. Doyle’s report and recommendations and possible placements for the 1998-99 school year. At the meeting, the District made numerous suggestions for STUDENT’s 1998-99 placement, which were documented on the IEP document produced at that meeting. The suggestions included adapted physical education services and the appointment of a college student aide with behavioral training to accompany STUDENT to the regular education program, provide daily support and explanation, and ensure his understanding of assignments. The suggestion that a college aide be assigned to accompany STUDENT in the regular education program clearly envisioned that STUDENT would remain mainstreamed for a majority of the school day with some RSP support, as he had been placed in the preceding years. In the subsequent pages of the IEP, the District suggested placement in a special day class for emotionally disturbed students for the entire school day or in a learning handicapped program. A transcription of the meeting prepared by MOTHER confirmed that all of these multiple placements were offered to the parents, as well as an aphasia class. The District’s offer of multiple placements, which entailed widely divergent characteristics, student-teacher ratios, and educational focus, constituted an incomplete placement selection process rather than a distinct, coherent offer of a placement selected to meet STUDENT’s needs and to implement the IEP goals and objectives. While the District’s apparent goal was to accommodate the parents to the extent possible within existing District placements, it resulted in the parents’ being denied the benefit of the District’s educational expertise and having to gamble on their own ability to discern the differences between an appropriate and inappropriate placement for STUDENT. Parents cannot be assumed to have expertise in evaluating the appropriateness of educational programs offered for their children. Moreover, a smorgasbord approach is contrary to Union and did not relieve the District of its responsibility to make a specific written offer of placement that was designed to meet STUDENT’s unique and individual needs, was reasonably calculated to provide him with educational benefit, and conformed to his IEP.
Unfortunately, the District did not take the final step in the process of clearly identifying an appropriate placement from a range of possibilities, even after being informed on June 25 that the parents were unilaterally placing STUDENT at LKS because of what they perceived to be a denial of FAPE. Arguably, there was sufficient time remaining, even at that point, to allow the District to convene an IEP meeting and make a clear, coherent placement offer that the parents could seriously consider before the 1998-99 school year began. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2) (1997). The District cannot avoid its responsibility to exercise its professional judgment in selecting and offering a specific educational placement which the District’s educational experts determined is appropriate to meet STUDENT’s unique and individual needs. Moreover, no evidence was presented at the hearing to establish the appropriateness of any of these placement offers. It is highly unlikely that the District would have been able to show that all of the placements suggested were appropriate.
Based on the foregoing, the Hearing Officer finds that the District’s approach in offering a wide range of diverse placements violated the intent of Union that a clear, coherent placement offer be made. The offer must be detailed and specific so as to demonstrate to the parent that the District has carefully thought through and selected a placement that, in its professional judgment, will meet the unique and individual needs of the student. Four varying offers does not alert the parent to the necessity to seriously consider the appropriateness of the offers. Quite the reverse is true. Such a cafeteria-style approach suggested that the District did not know its own mind and that it was quite uncertain about what was appropriate for STUDENT. Moreover, in this case, there was some confusion as to which offers were being seriously proposed by the District. For example, the IEP document itself stated that the school psychologist disagreed that a special day class for emotionally disturbed students would be appropriate for STUDENT. Further, there was some vague testimony from District personnel that it was their understanding that the prior RSP placement continued to be the placement offered for the 1998-99 school year since the team did not offer a clear, coherent placement at the May meeting. Thus, it was apparently unclear to all involved what the District was offering for the 1998-99 school year.
To result in a denial of FAPE, a procedural violation must seriously infringe on the parent’s opportunity to participate in the IEP process or result in the loss of educational opportunity. W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484. Here, the parents were denied meaningful participation in the IEP process because of the District’s failure to make a written, specific offer of placement which the parents could consider for the 1998-99 school year. Further, there was no evidence presented that any of the District’s proposed offers would have been appropriate for STUDENT and no evidence that an appropriate ESY program was ever offered for the 1999 ESY. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 1998-99 school year.
ISSUE NO. 8: Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for all expenses for program and services provided by the Little Keswick School and for mental health services obtained during the 1998-99 school year and 1999 extended school year?
Parents are entitled to retroactive reimbursement for the services they have procured for their child when the school district failed to provide an appropriate placement and the placement provided by the parents was appropriate under the IDEA. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370; 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C) (1997). Petitioner contended that the parents are entitled to reimbursement for all expenses incurred for LKS program and services and for mental health services obtained during the 1998-99 school year and 1999 extended school year. Because it has already been determined that the District failed to offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 1998-99 school year, the Hearing Officer must determine whether the services provided by the parents during the 1998-99 school year were appropriate under the IDEA.
Petitioner contended that the parents are entitled to reimbursement for all expenses for the program and services provided by LKS and the mental health services obtained during the 1998-99 school year and the 1999 ESY, because Respondents failed to offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 1998-99 school year and the 1999 ESY. Respondents argued that reimbursement is not appropriate on a number of bases. First, Respondents contended that the program was not appropriate because it was not provided in the least restrictive environment. As noted in Issue No. 6, a parent’s right to reimbursement is not barred because of any failure to meet the mainstreaming requirement imposed on public agencies. Cleveland Heights, 144 F.3d at 399; Warren G., 1999 WL 643168. Rather than mandating that parents meet requirements that are generally available only to public agencies, such as the option of placement with nondisabled peers, parents are only required to show that the private placement was appropriate under the IDEA. As with the LKS summer program, the evidence presented (including the testimony of LKS staff and consultants, Dr. Doyle, and Dr. Griffith, and the LKS IEP documents and progress reports introduced into the record) left no doubt that the LKS program was appropriate, since it addressed STUDENT’s unique academic and nonacademic needs and was reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207-208. The LKS program provided STUDENT a twenty-four hour, highly structured and collaborative, therapeutic environment that was able to address all of his needs, including academic, social, processing, emotional, and behavioral. Given that the program addressed all of the issues that had heretofore interfered with STUDENT’s ability to benefit from his educational program, it was clear that the program was reasonably calculated to permit STUDENT to obtain educational benefit. The District did not present any persuasive evidence to refute the appropriateness of the LKS program.
Second, Respondents contended that reimbursement for the psychotherapy and consultation services provided by Dr. Camperlengo is not warranted because Mental Health offered appropriate services in this regard. It was determined in Issue No. 3 that Mental Health’s provision of services was not appropriate because Mental Health failed to develop appropriate objective criteria for measuring progress and failed to make available necessary group social skills training. There was no evidence that either of these facts changed by the time the 1998-99 school year began, or that group social skills training became available at any time thereafter. On the other hand, the evidence established that Dr. Camperlengo provided the necessary mental health services, including individual and group therapy, as well as frequent consultation with the educational and residential staff at LKS, all of which helped STUDENT work through social and emotional issues that he was otherwise unable to express during therapy. Additionally, the IEP developed by LKS for STUDENT contained detailed and measurable objective criteria for evaluating STUDENT’s progress in the areas of social-emotional functioning and behavior. In light of the foregoing, the Hearing Officer finds that Dr. Camperlengo and LKS provided appropriate and necessary mental health services, which Mental Health failed to offer STUDENT for the 1998-99 school year, and that reimbursement for services provided by Dr. Camperlengo during the 1998-99 school year is warranted.
Third, Respondents argued that Petitioner is not entitled to reimbursement for the occupational therapy services provided at LKS during the 1998-99 school year because Lorna Christenson, the occupational therapist who provided the services, did not testify and no testimony was offered to substantiate the appropriateness of the assessment she performed in July 1998 or the services she provided. The District also argued that it offered the parents an occupational therapy assessment to evaluate STUDENT’s sensory-motor integration abilities at the May 1998 meeting, but that the parents did not accept the offer. The District’s argument that its offer to perform an occupational therapy assessment precluded the parents from obtaining reimbursement for an independent assessment is not persuasive. The parents did not refuse the District’s offer; they merely conditioned their consent on Dr. Doyle’s approval of the assessor. However, there is no evidence that the District ever took affirmative steps to see that the assessment was performed, e.g., developed an assessment plan for the parents’ approval or informed the parents of the identity of the proposed assessor.
However, Petitioner is not entitled to reimbursement for Ms. Christenson’s assessment and services because, while the assessment report itself was entered into evidence, there was no corroborating testimony presented to establish the appropriateness of either her assessment or her findings. The only evidence in the record that relates to Ms. Christenson’s assessment is her assessment report. Standing alone, her report is insufficient to establish that her assessment was appropriate, because it did not indicate how the assessment was performed or Ms. Christianson’s qualifications to either perform the assessment or make occupational therapy recommendations. Many questions often go unanswered when an assessor or another knowledgeable person is not present to testify and when the assessor’s report fails to fully explain itself (i.e., fails to provide information that could establish the validity of the findings contained therein). For instance, there is no evidence in the record regarding Ms. Christenson’s experience in conducting such assessments or the testing conditions under which the results were obtained. Based on the above, the Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner failed to establish his entitlement to reimbursement for the occupational therapy assessment or services provided by Ms. Christenson.
Fourth, the District contended that reimbursement should be denied for the speech and language therapy received from Ms. Woodford because Ms. Woodford’s assessment did not include information from the District personnel who worked with STUDENT during the previous school year and was not based on California eligibility requirements for speech and language services. These contentions are without merit. The Hearing Officer already determined in Issue No. 2 that Ms. Woodford’s assessment was appropriate notwithstanding the omission of information from District personnel (whom, incidentally, STUDENT had had no contact with for at least six months). Further, it is unclear what “eligibility requirements” the District is referring to, i.e., the eligibility requirements that must be met to qualify as a special education student with a speech and language impairment or the requirements for the receipt of speech and language therapy as a related service. If it is the former, there is nothing that limits the receipt of speech therapy to only students that qualify as speech and language impaired, as discussed in Issue No. 2. Speech and language therapy, like any other related service, must be provided when required to assist a student to benefit educationally from his or her instructional program, not only when the student meets the state criteria for special education eligibility as a speech and language impaired student, as the District implies. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22) (1997); Cal. Educ. Code § 56363 (Deering 1987). Ms. Woodford’s assessment report and testimony established that speech and language therapy was necessary for STUDENT to benefit educationally from his instructional program during the 1998-99 school year. She found that STUDENT had a broad language disorder that affected his comprehension, oral expression, narrative skills, pragmatics, and conversational competence. More specifically, she found that he had moderate deficits in the semantic component of language and significant deficits in verbal expression and social-pragmatic communication skills. She also found that his deficits in word meaning, and his inability to explain circumstances, define words, narrate events in a sequential and logical order, and interpret figurative language affected his social interaction with peers and teachers because they, inter alia, caused STUDENT to misinterpret meanings, not be coherent and logical in his verbalizations, and not to be responsive to and take the perspective of a conversational partner. Ms. Woodford testified that STUDENT needed speech-language therapy to interact appropriately with others and to otherwise benefit from his education. The District did not present any persuasive evidence that refuted Ms. Woodford’s findings and testimony. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that the parents are entitled to reimbursement for the speech-language services provided by Ms. Woodford from December 1998 to the end of the 1998-99 school year.
Finally, Respondents contended that reimbursement should be reduced or denied because the parents failed to give the advance notice required under Section 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) of the IDEA. As with the 1998 ESY, the Hearing Officer does not find persuasive the District’s alternative argument that reimbursement should be reduced or denied because the parents failed to give advance notice of their unilateral placement. There was no evidence presented that the District gave the parents notice of Section 1412(a)(10)(C). Further, regardless of whether the parents knew of this requirement, they substantially complied with it. The parents made it clear at the IEP meeting held in May, which was the last IEP meeting held between the parties, that they were rejecting the placements offered by Respondents. The parents also notified the District of the unilateral placement at LKS on June 25, 1998, two months before they paid the first installment on the 1998-99 tuition and three months before STUDENT began attending LKS for the 1998-99 term. Consequently, the District had ample time following the parents’ notice to make a written offer for an appropriate placement for the 1998-99 school year before the parents significantly committed themselves to LKS. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Hearing Officer finds that a reduction or denial of reimbursement is not warranted.
To summarize, the evidence demonstrated that the parents placed STUDENT in an appropriate private program during the 1998-99 school year at LKS and that they are entitled to reimbursement for services provided during the 1998-99 school year, consisting of the LKS program, the psychotherapy and consultation services provided by Dr. Camperlengo, the speech and language therapy provided by Ms. Woodford, and related travel costs. By the first day of hearing, Petitioner was able to provide copies of bills for these services in the following amounts: $47,404.00 for tuition for the 1998-99 school year; $1,333.50 for out-of-pocket payments to Dr. Camperlengo for services provided up to November 18, 1998; $208 for payments to Ms. Woodford for therapy services provided up to December 16, 1998; and $3,574.27 in related travel costs (all of which amount to $52,519.77). Thus, the record supports a finding that Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement from Respondents in the amount of $52,519.77. Upon a presentation of proof, Respondents must also reimburse the parents for expenses incurred for psychotherapy and consultation services provided by Dr. Camperlengo between November 19, 1998, and the end of the 1998-99 school year. Additionally, upon a presentation of proof, Respondents must reimburse the parents for any expenses incurred for speech-language therapy provided by Ms. Woodford between December 17, 1998, and the end of the 1998-99 school year. For purposes of reimbursement, the date of the end of the 1998-99 school year shall be determined according to LKS’s school calendar.
The record did not, however, support an award of reimbursement for the following remaining expenses claimed by Petitioner for the 1998-99 school year: $1,250.00 for consultation services provided by Professional Boundary Conditions, Inc. (PBC) and $125.00 for consultation services provided by Dr. Doyle to LKS. No evidence was presented to substantiate the appropriateness or necessity of these services. In fact, the billing statement from PBC indicates that most, if not all, of the services provided were incurred in the course of Petitioner’s preparation for litigation in this matter. For example, PBC made a copy of an LKS projection show and created graphs and written analyses of behavioral records kept at LKS, the products of which were all introduced into evidence by Petitioner. Accordingly, Petitioner’s request for reimbursement of these expenses is denied.
The record also did not establish Petitioner’s entitlement to reimbursement for expenses related to a private placement for the 1999 ESY. The record is completely void of information regarding the 1999 ESY, including information about STUDENT’s eligibility for ESY services and whether he was even enrolled in or attended an ESY program. The hearing in this matter did not conclude until the end of June 1999, giving Petitioner sufficient time to introduce evidence that might have established STUDENT’s entitlement to ESY services and the expenses that the parents allegedly incurred to provide him with a summer program. This Petitioner failed to do. Merely alleging that the parents should be reimbursed for an ESY program fails to provide a sufficient basis upon which to award reimbursement. Furthermore, reimbursement for the 1999 ESY program would not be warranted on the basis of compensatory education because there was no evidence presented to establish a nexus between the educational opportunity lost and the ESY services provided. In light of the above, Petitioner’s request for reimbursement for 1999 ESY expenses is denied.
In conclusion, the Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement from Respondents for the tuition for the 1998-99 school year at LKS, psychotherapy and related consultation services provided by Dr. Camperlengo during the 1998-99 school year, and speech-language therapy provided by Ms. Woodford during the 1998-99 school year. Petitioner did not establish his entitlement to reimbursement for expenses incurred for any other services provided during the 1998-99 school year or for any expenses related to the 1999 ESY. Thus, Respondents are jointly and severally liable for reimbursing the parents the amount of $52,519.77, and, upon the parents’ presentation of proof, for expenses incurred for psychotherapy and consultation services provided by Dr. Camperlengo between November 19, 1998, and the end of the LKS 1998-99 school year and speech-language therapy provided by Ms. Woodford between December 17, 1998, and the end of the LKS 1998-99 school year.
ORDER
1. Petitioner STUDENT is entitled to reimbursement from Respondents in the amount of $81,795.79. The Long Beach Unified School District (District) is solely responsible for reimbursement of $15,538.22 of the total amount to be reimbursed. The District and Mental Health are jointly and severally responsible for reimbursement of the remainder.
The District and Mental Health shall reimburse the parents of STUDENT the foregoing amounts within thirty calendar days of the date of this decision.
2. Petitioner is also entitled to reimbursement from Respondents for psychotherapy and consultation services provided by Vanessa Camperlengo, M.D., between November 19, 1998, and the end of the 1998-99 school year, and speech-language therapy provided by Lee Woodford between December 17, 1998, and the end of the 1998-99 school year. For purposes of this order, the date of the end of the 1998-99 school year shall be determined by the school calendar of the Little Keswick School in Keswick, Virginia.
The District and Mental Health are jointly and severally liable for reimbursement for expenses incurred for services provided by Dr. Camperlengo and Ms. Woodford.
The District and Mental Health shall reimburse the parents for expenses incurred for the foregoing services within thirty calendar days of either the District’s or Mental Health’s receipt of proof from the parents. Petitioner is encouraged to submit proof of expenses to both the District and Mental Health.
3. All of Petitioner’s other claims for relief are denied.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following finding is made in accordance with this statute:
1. Did the District and/or Mental Health fail to assess or appropriately assess STUDENT in all areas of suspected need during the 1995-96, 1996-97, 1997-98, and 1998-99 school years? * Petitioner prevailed on this issue.
2. Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for assessments they obtained during the 1995-96, 1996-97, 1997-98, and 1998-99 school years? * Respondents prevailed on this issue with respect to the 1995-96 and 1996-97 school years, and Petitioner substantially prevailed on this issue with respect to the 1997-98 and 1998-99 school years.
3. Did the District and/or Mental Health fail to provide appropriate programs, services, accommodations, and modifications to meet STUDENT’s needs in accordance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) during the 1995-96, 1996-97, and 1997-98 school years? * Petitioner prevailed on this issue.
4. Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for educational, mental health, and consulting services they obtained during the 1995-96, 1996-97, and 1997-98 school years? * Petitioner substantially prevailed on this issue.
5. Did the District fail to offer and/or provide an appropriate program and services to meet STUDENT’s needs for the 1998 extended school year? * Petitioner prevailed on this issue.
6. Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for all expenses related to their search for an appropriate placement and all costs related to STUDENT’s placement at the Little Keswick School during the 1998 extended school year session? * Respondents prevailed on this issue with regard to school search expenses, and Petitioner prevailed on this issue with regard to reimbursement for the private summer school program.
7. Did the District and Mental Health fail to offer and/or provide an appropriate program and services to meet STUDENT’s needs during the 1998-99 school year? * Petitioner prevailed on this issue.
8. Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for all expenses for program and services provided by the Little Keswick School and for mental health services obtained during the 1998-99 school year and 1999 extended school year? * Petitioner substantially prevailed on this issue with respect to the 1998-99 school year, and Respondents prevailed on this issue with respect to the 1999 extended school year.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i) (Deering Supp. 1999).
Date: October 15, 1999 Hee C. Kim, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
FOOTNOTES
1. The issues listed here differ slightly in numbering and content from those noticed by Petitioner before the hearing. Changes were made for purposes of clarification and appropriate analysis, and to reflect the discussion held on the first day of hearing between the parties and the Hearing Officer with regard to the issues for hearing.
2. It was agreed by and between the parties that Mental Health had no involvement with this matter until the 1997-98 school year when the District first referred STUDENT for a mental health assessment. Accordingly, Mental Health's responsibilities toward STUDENT will be discussed only with regard to the 1997-98 school year and following.
3. Petitioner did not dispute that a three-year statute of limitations applies in California to claims brought under the IDEA (see Alexopulos v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 551, 555 (9th Cir. 1987); Cal. Educ. Code § 56043(p) (Deering Supp. 1999)) and that, accordingly, he was barred from raising any claims that arose on or before June 26, 1995. Petitioner indicated that he was therefore not seeking reimbursement for any expenses set forth in the record that were incurred on or before June 26, 1995.
4. In his statement of issues for hearing, Petitioner also contended that the District violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and STUDENT's civil rights under Section 1983. The Hearing Officer informed the parties on the first day of hearing that she did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims arising under the Rehabilitation Act or Section 1983 and that, absent statutory authority or case law vesting the Hearing Officer with such jurisdiction, claims arising under the Rehabilitation Act or Section 1983 would not be adjudicated through these proceedings. The parties have not submitted any authority that would vest the Hearing Officer with such jurisdiction. Accordingly, this decision will not deal with claims arising under the Rehabilitation Act or Section 1983.
5. This was STUDENT's first year in the fourth grade. He was retained in the fourth grade for the 1995-96 school year.
6. Encopresis is defined as the inability to control feces not due to organic defect or illness. Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 551 (28th ed. 1994).
7. While the term "evaluation" is used in federal special education law and the term "assessment" is used in state special education law, the terms will be used interchangeably during the course of this decision unless specifically noted otherwise.
8. In 1997, the IDEA was amended (IDEA ‘97). Most of the provisions of IDEA ‘97 became effective on June 4, 1997; others became effective January 1, 1998, or July 1, 1998. Thereafter, changes were made to a number of State code provisions, and new federal regulations were issued to reflect the mandates of IDEA ‘97. Senate Bill No. 1686, which became effective January 1, 1999, amended various State statutes relating to special education. The Department of Education issued new regulations to accompany IDEA ‘97 on March 12, 1999. Petitioner's claims relating to the 1995-96 school year and the 1996-97 school year arose prior to the enactment of IDEA ‘97. While IDEA ‘97 did not alter the general standards reflected in the IDEA, the Hearing Officer will apply the law and regulations that were in effect at the time the disputed events occurred in compliance with the general rules against the retroactive application of laws. Landgraff v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
9. Reevaluations are required when, inter alia, conditions warrant it. 34 C.F.R. § 300.534(b) (1996) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(A) (1997)); Cal. Educ. Code § 56381 (Deering 1987) (current version at Cal. Educ. Code § 56381(a) (Deering Supp. 1999)).
10. Trichotillomania is defined as the compulsive pulling out of one's hair. Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1743 (28th ed. 1994)
11. While the District's triennial evaluation of STUDENT appears to have failed to have met this requirement by the equivalent of one school month, the timeliness of the District's assessment will not be addressed since it was not raised as an issue in dispute between the parties. Regardless, the delay was de minimis.
12. IDEA ‘97 amended federal law to allow LEAs to reassess a student based on a review of present records without further assessment if the IEP team determines that no additional assessment data are needed. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(c)(1) (1997). State law was not amended to reflect this change until January 1, 1999. See Cal. Educ. Code § 56381(b) (Deering Supp. 1999). Thus, until January 1, 1999, state law imposed a greater duty to reassess disabled children than federal law in this respect. Accordingly, because state law imposed a greater duty and was not inconsistent with federal standards, state law applied with respect to the requirement of conducting a full reassessment of STUDENT in October 1997. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1 v. B.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1499 n.2 (9th Cir. 1996).
13. Marcelina Roussos, the school psychologist who conducted the psychoeducational portion of the triennial assessment, testified that the parents limited her ability to use formal instruments to test STUDENT. Even if true, this did not relieve the District of its responsibility to conduct an appropriate triennial evaluation of STUDENT. When parents refuse to consent to a necessary assessment or limit a school district's ability to conduct an appropriate assessment, the district has an affirmative duty to pursue the matter through the due process procedures. See Cal. Educ. Code § 56501(a)(3) (Deering Supp. 1999); compare with Cal. Educ. Code § 56346(b) (Deering Supp. 1999). Further, although Ms. Roussos did apparently rely on scores obtained by Ms. Carlton on a standardized measure of intellectual functioning that had been conducted "recently," Ms. Roussos did not bother to discover when the test had been given or whether the scores could be considered a valid indication of STUDENT's ability and never asked to see the protocols from the testing, even though she relied on the scores to make findings about STUDENT's then-present levels of performance.
14. Pragmatics is a branch of linguistics dealing with language in its situational context. Webster's College Dictionary 1059 (1991).
15. The expenses at issue which were incurred during the summer months will be considered when discussing the preceding school year.
16. The date stamp on the District's copy of the assessment showed that the District received a copy of the assessment at least four business days before the IEP meeting. Additionally, Andria Davidson's testimony confirmed that the District did in fact receive a copy of Dr. Doyle's assessment before the IEP meeting convened.
17. STUDENT was adopted by the PARENTS at birth, so that the above described injuries had already occurred by the time he came under their care.
18. For this reason, standardized testing results that show improvement in academic achievement are not the sine qua non of "educational benefit." Seattle Sch. Dist., 82 F.3d at 1500. Here, STUDENT's performance on standardized testing suggested that he did receive educational benefit during the 1995-96 school year. All of STUDENT's standard scores on the Wechsler Individual Achievement Test were significantly improved on April 29, 1996, from scores he obtained in May 1995. However, his difficulties with peer interaction continued and his anxiety increased. Furthermore, it cannot be determined how much of the progress was due to the District's efforts and how much was the result of the parent's extraordinary efforts to help STUDENT, both through their own time and the instruction of a private tutor. The evidence showed that STUDENT's parents spent more and more time with STUDENT each night as the year progressed (often two to three hours per night) modifying the assignments he brought home and reteaching him concepts and rules that were necessary to complete the assignments. Additionally, STUDENT's parents paid Deborah Gillman-Day to provide tutoring approximately ten times per month, one hour per session, to assist STUDENT with his lessons.
19. While this reflected that STUDENT obtained some educational benefit during the 1996-97 school year, it did not otherwise establish that the District's program was otherwise appropriate, i.e., that it either addressed all of his unique needs or was reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit, as required. See Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987). This is especially true where, as here, the parents provided so much assistance to the child outside of the regular school day that it makes it impossible to determine what services allowed the child to make the progress. Further, the goals and objectives listed in STUDENT's IEP did not address all of his unique needs.
20. However, the evidence did not establish that the regular education teachers received the IEP dated November 6, 1997, which was developed and agreed upon by the team after a review of the triennial assessment. The November IEP contained a number of substantive changes from the previous IEP and most of the changes directly impacted STUDENT's regular education program.
21. While the medication management services were not specifically included in the IEP document generated at the meeting, there is no dispute that Mental Health's offer included these services and that the parents understood Mental Health's offer to include these services.
22. ESY programming is educational programming that extends instruction beyond the conventional school year to prevent serious regression over the summer months. Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.3d 1298, 1301 (9th Cir. 1992). In California, a school district is required to provide a special education student with ESY programming when the student requires special education and related services in excess of the regular academic year or the IEP team has determined the need for ESY programming. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3043 (1999). Section 3043 of Title 5 of the California Code of Regulations defines such students in the following manner:
Such individuals shall have handicaps which are likely to continue indefinitely or for a prolonged period, and interruption of the pupil's educational programming may cause regression, when coupled with limited recoupment capacity, rendering it impossible or unlikely that the pupil will attain the level of self-sufficiency and independence that would otherwise be expected in view of his or her handicapping condition. The lack of clear evidence of such factors may not be used to deny an individual an extended school year program if the individualized program team determines the need for such a program and includes extended school year in the individualized education program ... .
(Italics added.) There was no evidence presented that STUDENT met these criteria until the summer of 1998.
23. In his closing brief, Petitioner for the first time made the claim that STUDENT should not now be moved out of the LKS placement. Because this claim was raised for the first time in the closing brief and Petitioner stated on the first day of hearing that a placement for the 1999-2000 school year was not at issue in these proceedings, there was clearly no notice to Respondents that this was an issue for hearing. For this reason, Petitioner's claim will not be addressed further in this decision.
24. In his closing brief, Petitioner for the first time made the claim that STUDENT should not now be moved out of the LKS placement. Because this claim was raised for the first time in the closing brief and Petitioner stated on the first day of hearing that a placement for the 1999-2000 school year was not at issue in these proceedings, there was clearly no notice to Respondents that this was an issue for hearing. For this reason, Petitioner's claim will not be addressed further in this decision.
25. Petitioner also contended that the parents were entitled to reimbursement on the separate basis of compensatory education due to Respondents' failure to provide a FAPE during the 1995-96, 1996-97, and 1997-98 school years. While Petitioner appears to have a strong case for compensatory education services, the contention need not be decided here since the parents are entitled to reimbursement under Burlington
26. Ms. Christenson's occupational therapy assessment was not dealt with earlier in the decision because the charges incurred for the assessment were not broken out as a specific request for reimbursement, but included as a package with the services.
27. While the related travel costs included trips taken by the parents for parent-teacher conferences and other visits, the testimony of LKS staff and Dr. Camperlengo established that these trips were necessary for the therapeutic benefits afforded to STUDENT individually and to the family.
