California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · March 30, 2000

San Francisco Unified School District v. Student

SEHO Case No. SN 21-00 · Hearing Officer Van T. Vu

San Francisco Unified's own hearing request fails: a nonpublic school offer that named no school did not offer FAPE.

Student prevailed on all issues

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Summary

San Francisco Unified School District filed for a hearing after the California Department of Education's Compliance Unit found it had not provided the resource specialist program (RSP) services in a student's IEP. The Compliance Unit ordered a new IEP meeting. The student was 19, in eleventh grade, and eligible for special education with a specific learning disability. He had stopped attending Thurgood Marshall High School in early 1999. At a May 1999 IEP meeting, the team recommended moving him from RSP to a nonpublic school, with accommodations and support for future classes at City College. He had turned 18, so the District needed his own consent, but he never signed the IEP or answered the District. The District asked the Hearing Officer to rule that it had offered a free appropriate public education (FAPE). No one appeared for the student. The Hearing Officer ruled for the student anyway. The IEP said only that his placement would change "From RSP to NPS" and never named a specific nonpublic school. Under Union School District v. Smith, that was not a clear written offer. The District's only witness also could not identify the student's processing deficit, so the record did not show the placement fit his needs. The District had to hold an IEP meeting within 20 calendar days and make a specific written offer. The student then had 30 days to respond in writing. If he did not respond, he would be treated as having refused the offer and withdrawn from school, but he could still seek services later.

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Why it matters

This decision shows how SEHO applied the Union v. Smith written-offer rule even when the student did not appear. A district that asked for a ruling that it had offered FAPE still lost because its IEP proposed only a generic nonpublic school and named no specific school.

Issues and holdings

  1. Issue 1. Did the District offer STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE)?

    The May 1999 IEP's generic change "From RSP to NPS" that named no specific nonpublic school was not a clear written offer under Union v. Smith, and the scant evidence did not show the placement met the student's needs, so the District denied FAPE.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • Order to convene IEP meeting. Within 20 calendar days of the decision, the District must convene an IEP meeting to develop an educational placement that addresses the student's unique and individual needs, and must provide an appropriate written offer of placement meeting the requirements of Union and the IDEA.
  • Within 30 calendar days of receiving the IEP, the student must tell the District in writing whether he consents to or refuses the placement offer and whether he intends to re-enroll or withdraw. If he does not respond, he is deemed to have refused the offer and withdrawn from school. This does not stop him from seeking educational services later.

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Key authorities

Rowley; Union School Dist. v. Smith; W.G. v. Target Range; Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm.

People named in the decision

  • Katherine Isheim, school psychologist and compliance consultant; District representative and sole witness, San Francisco Unified School District
  • Steven Holden, special education teacher (IEP team member), San Francisco Unified School District
  • Susan Schweiger, District administrator (IEP team member), San Francisco Unified School District
  • Judy Hirano, Hearing Officer who presided at the first, continued hearing session, California Special Education Hearing Office

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Van T. Vu, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, in San Francisco, California, on March 7, 2000.

San Francisco Unified School District (District) was represented at hearing by Katherine Isheim, compliance consultant. No one appeared on behalf of the student, STUDENT.

Katherine Isheim, who testified on behalf of the District, was the sole witness at the hearing.

Oral and documentary evidence was received and the District made its closing argument at hearing. The record was closed and the matter was submitted for decision.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

The hearing in this matter first convened on February 3, 2000, before Hearing Officer Judy Hirano. Prior to taking evidence or calling witnesses, the Student requested a continuance in order to consult with an attorney. The District did not object to the continuance, and the Hearing Officer continued the matter for this reason.

The hearing then convened on March 7, 2000, before the present Hearing Officer. However, no one appeared on behalf of the Student. After waiting fifteen minutes from the time the hearing was scheduled to begin, the Hearing Officer called the Hearing Office and requested that the student be telephoned regarding his intent to appear at hearing. The Hearing Office staff then called STUDENT and left a phone message requesting information as to whether he intended to attend the hearing. The Hearing Officer then waited an additional fifteen minutes but STUDENT did not appear at hearing or contact the Hearing Office regarding his intent to appear at hearing. As a result, the Hearing Officer began the hearing in his absence.

ISSUES

Did the District offer STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE)?

POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

The District asserted that the Compliance Unit of the California Department of Education compelled it to request a hearing to adjudicate the above issue. According to the District, during STUDENT’s 1998-1999 school year, the Compliance Unit determined that the District had failed to provide STUDENT with resource specialist program (RSP) services as was indicated on his individual education program (IEP) and ordered the District to convene an IEP meeting to determine services for STUDENT. Although an IEP meeting was convened and an IEP was developed, STUDENT has refused consent to implement the educational program and has refused to attend school since early 1999. Thus, the District contends that it has offered STUDENT a free appropriate public education but that STUDENT has effectively withdrawn from school. Accordingly, the District contended that they have fulfilled their present legal obligations to offer STUDENT a FAPE under State and federal special education law.

The Student offered no position regarding whether the District had provided him with a FAPE. As was stated above, no one appeared on behalf of the Student at the hearing on March 7, 2000. Additionally, the Student provided no documentary evidence, witnesses, or issues and proposed resolutions on his own behalf.

BACKGROUND FACTS(Footnote 1)

STUDENT is a nineteen-year-old eleventh-grader who is currently eligible for special education as a student with a specific learning disability.(Footnote 2) STUDENT has not attended school since early 1999. He currently requires 40 units of credit to graduate from high school and to receive his diploma.

During the 1998-1999 school year, STUDENT was a junior at Thurgood Marshall High School. Some time during the 1998 calendar year, a complaint was filed with the California Department of Education, Compliance Unit, on behalf of STUDENT alleging that the District had failed to provide STUDENT with the special education services that were outlined in his IEP. On August 1, 1998, while the compliance complaint was being investigated, STUDENT turned eighteen years old.(Footnote 3) Additionally, sometime during early 1999, STUDENT stopped attending school at Thurgood Marshall High School.

Subsequently, the Compliance Unit determined that the District had failed to provide STUDENT with any RSP services. As a result, the District was ordered to convene an IEP meeting to develop an educational program to remedy STUDENT’s past denial of FAPE. On May 5, 1999, the District convened an IEP meeting as was ordered by the Compliance Unit. Present at the IEP meeting were MOTHER, STUDENT’s mother; Katherine Isheim, school psychologist; Steven Holden, special education teacher; and Susan Schweiger, District administrator.

According to Katherine Isheim, the IEP team discussed changing STUDENT’s educational program from RSP services at Thurgood Marshall High School to a placement in a nonpublic school. Such placement was intended as a form of compensatory education to remedy STUDENT’s past denial of RSP services. Ms. Isheim testified that STUDENT required services to improve his attendance, to help him stay on task, to instruct him on study skills, and to improve his self-esteem. Thus, the IEP team determined that a placement in a nonpublic school with a low student-to-teacher ratio would allow him to receive individual attention in all of these areas.

The IEP team also determined that STUDENT required testing, program and classroom modifications. Such modifications included the use of modified/alternative textbooks, a calculator, and a computer. STUDENT was also to be provided extra time for completion of his assignments and exams. Additionally, directions to assignments were to be provided to him both orally and in writing and were to be broken down into manageable parts. Moreover, grading modifications were to be provided.

Because MOTHER expressed at the IEP meeting that STUDENT was interested in taking classes at the local community college, the IEP team developed a plan to transition STUDENT from high school to college. The plan included services by which STUDENT would receive academic assistance with his general education courses when he enrolled at the City College.

At the end of the IEP meeting, MOTHER signed her consent to the services offered in the IEP. However, because STUDENT had turned eighteen years old seven months prior, STUDENT’s educational rights had passed from his mother to him. Thus, the District informed MOTHER that it required STUDENT’s consent to implement the IEP. As a result, MOTHER informed the IEP team that she would bring the IEP document home for STUDENT to review.

According to Ms. Ishiem, she telephoned MOTHER and STUDENT’s residence approximately ten days after the IEP meeting to inquire about whether STUDENT intended to consent or refuse consent to the IEP. During her telephone conversation with MOTHER, MOTHER told her that STUDENT did not intend to sign the IEP or to return to school. Ms. Isheim did not speak with STUDENT directly at this time.

In December 1999, Ms. Isheim sent STUDENT and MOTHER a letter requesting STUDENT to either indicate whether he consented to the May 1999 IEP or to send her a letter stating that he no longer wished to pursue a high school education. Ms. Isheim also indicated that, if she did not receive a response within 10 days from the date of the letter, she would be compelled to initiate special education due process proceedings. The District did not receive a response to the letter from the Student.(Footnote 4)

On January 3, 2000, the District sent the Hearing Office a letter requesting a special education due process hearing.(Footnote 5)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Under both State law and the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), students with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1997); California Education Code § 56000. The term “free appropriate public education” means special education and related services that are available to the student at no charge to the parent or guardian, that meet the State educational standards, and that conform with the student’s individualized educational program (IEP). 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18) (1997).

In Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist., et al. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 175 (1982), the United States Supreme Court addressed the level of instruction and services that must be provided to a student with disabilities to satisfy the requirement of the IDEA. The Court determined that a student’s IEP must be reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit, but that the IDEA does not require school districts to provide special education students with the best education available or to provide instruction or services that maximize a student’s abilities. Id. at 198-200. The Court stated that school districts are required to provide only a “basic floor of opportunity” that consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the student. Id. at 201.

The Supreme Court in Rowley also recognized the importance of adherence to the procedural requirements of the IDEA. Id. at 205. Federal special education law requires states to establish and maintain certain procedural safeguards to ensure that each student with a disability receives the FAPE to which he/she is entitled and that parents are involved in the formulation of the student’s educational program. W.G. v. Bd. of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992). The procedural rights that extend to the parents, and the student upon turning 18 years old, include the right to be informed in writing when the educational agency proposes to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child. 20 U.S.C. §1415(b) (1997). Procedural flaws do not automatically require a finding of a denial of a FAPE, but procedural violations that result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringe on the parents’ or the student’s, upon reaching the age of majority, opportunity to participate in the IEP process do result in the denial of FAPE. W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484; see also Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 994 (1st Cir. 1990).

Among the procedural violations that may constitute a denial of FAPE is the failure of a school district to make a formal, written offer of placement in compliance with the IDEA’s procedural requirements. Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1526 (9th Cir. 1994), cert denied, 513 U.S. 965, 115 S.Ct. 428 (1994); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3) (1997). In Union, the Ninth Circuit stated, “We find that this formal requirement has an important purpose that is not merely technical, and we therefore believe it should be enforced rigorously.” Union, 15 F.3d at 1526. The Court went on to discuss the reasons for imposing the requirement: (1) to alert the parents of the need to consider seriously whether the school district’s proposed placement is appropriate under the IDEA; (2) to help the parents determine whether to oppose or accept the placement with supplemental services; and (3) so that the school district is more prepared to introduce sufficient relevant evidence of the appropriateness of the placement at a due process hearing. Id.

In this case, the District failed to make a legally sufficient written offer of placement for STUDENT from May 6, 1999, to the present. Although STUDENT’s IEP team recommended that he be placed in a nonpublic school, no specific nonpublic school was identified either at the IEP meeting in May 1999 or at any time subsequent to such meeting. STUDENT’s May 1999 IEP states only that his educational placement will change “From RSP to NPS” and that the “Student is to be assigned to a nonpublic school,” but it does not indicate any particular nonpublic school placement. Furthermore, at hearing, Katherine Isheim testified that no specific nonpublic school has been offered to STUDENT, although the District tends to work with at least two particular nonpublic schools. Moreover, no evidence was presented that STUDENT was provided with any clarification, either orally or in writing, subsequent to the May 1999 IEP meeting regarding which nonpublic school was being considered for, or offered to, him.

The District’s undefined placement offer constituted an incomplete placement selection process rather than a distinct, coherent offer of a placement selected to meet STUDENT’s needs and to implement the IEP goals and objectives. The District’s approach violated the intent of Union that a clear, coherent placement offer be made. Specifically, the District’s generic proposal to place STUDENT in a nonpublic school placement does not satisfy the requirement of special education law, which accords disabled students the right to an educational program specifically tailored to meet their unique and individual needs. U.S.C. § 1401(25); See also Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). No information was provided at hearing regarding the nonpublic school offer other than that nonpublic schools tend to have a lower student/teacher ratio than the public school and, therefore, could provide STUDENT with individual attention. Without additional information, STUDENT was expected to consider the educational placement offer solely on its vague classification as a nonpublic school. Without a written offer of a specific educational placement in an identified nonpublic school that would address his individual needs, STUDENT cannot be expected to consider seriously whether the District’s offer is appropriate for him.

Unfortunately, the District did not take the final step in the process of identifying an appropriate placement from a range of possibilities. While the District’s apparent goal in making a general offer was to allow STUDENT to determine what educational services he was comfortable accepting, given his hesitancy to return to school, the District is required to exercise its professional judgement by selecting and offering a specific educational placement which the District’s educational experts determined was appropriate to meet STUDENT’s unique and individual needs. Considering that the May 1999 IEP meeting was convened pursuant to an order from the State Compliance Unit, it is unclear whether the District’s apparent placement offer constituted an offer of FAPE or the remedy of compensatory education services. Additionally, no evidence was presented that what the District purportedly offered comports with the Student’s educational needs. In fact, upon questioning by the Hearing Officer, the District representative and sole witness could not identify STUDENT’s processing deficit that resulted in his learning disability. Thus, based on the scant evidence presented, the Hearing Officer cannot find that the District’s offer of placement was substantively appropriate for STUDENT.

Because the District has not made a legally sufficient offer of placement to STUDENT pursuant to the requirements of Union and the IDEA, and because the District has not developed a placement that substantively addresses STUDENT’s educational needs, it is found that the District has denied STUDENT a FAPE. Accordingly, the District is ordered to convene an IEP meeting to develop a specific, coherent written order of placement for STUDENT that addresses his unique and individual needs.

ORDER

1. Within 20 calendar days from the date of this decision, the District shall convene and IEP meeting to develop an educational placement for STUDENT that addresses his unique and individual needs and otherwise comports with the law. Additionally, the District shall provide STUDENT with an appropriate written offer of placement pursuant to the requirements of Union and the IDEA.

2. Within 30 calendar days of receipt of the IEP, the Student shall notify the District in writing of whether he consents or refuses consent to the proposed placement offer, and whether he intends to re-enroll in school or to withdraw from school.

3. If no written response is received from the Student by the District within the time designated above, the Student shall be deemed to have refused the placement offer and withdrawn from school.

4. Order number 3 above does not preclude the Student from seeking educational services at a subsequent time.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute: The Student prevailed on the issue decided.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. Education Code § 56505(i).

DATED: March 30, 2000 ____________________________________ Van T. Vu, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

1.Due to the scarcity of evidence presented in this matter, the background facts were obtained predominantly from the testimony of Katherine Isheim, the sole witness at hearing. The only other evidence presented at hearing was a ten-page IEP document and four half-page letters from the District to various persons 2.No evidence was offered at hearing regarding what processing deficit was the cause of STUDENT’s learning disability. Additionally, Katherine Isheim testified that STUDENT’s educational and psychological assessments from October 1997 indicated that STUDENT no longer met the eligibility criteria for special education services as a student with a specific learning disability. However, STUDENT’s IEP team determined that he would benefit from special education services and maintained his eligibility for such services. 3.When STUDENT turned eighteen, his educational rights under the IDEA passed from his parents to him. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(m); California Education Code § 56041.5. 4.The Hearing Officer acknowledges that the District has had a very difficult time communicating with STUDENT regarding his education within the District. According to Ms. Isheim, STUDENT has not returned any telephone calls or responded to any letters from the District since at least May 1999, when the IEP meeting was held concerning his education. 5.Upon receipt of the January 3, 2000 letter from the District requesting a special education due process hearing, the Hearing Office sent the District a letter requesting additional required information before the request could be processed. The information was received on January 5 and the Hearing Office sent the parties notice of the due process hearing on January 6, 2000.