California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · March 13, 2001
Long Beach Unified School District v. Student
SEHO Case No. SN 248-01 · Hearing Officer Maxine R. Benmour
Long Beach Unified may assess 18-year-old student under mother's signed plan but cannot add a test without the student's consent.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Noted in the decision
Refers to a prior SEHO hearing on January 9, 2001, in which the parties stipulated that the mother would sign the December 15, 2000 assessment plan.
Summary
Long Beach Unified School District filed for due process to carry out an assessment plan that the student's mother had signed. The student, now 18, was eligible for special education as emotionally disturbed. She was last assessed at an out-of-state nonpublic school and had not attended a District school since May 1999. In an earlier January 2001 hearing, the mother agreed to sign the plan. After that, District assessors left many phone messages that went unreturned, and testing did not begin until late February. Neither the student nor her mother came to this hearing.
The Hearing Officer ruled for the District on two of three issues. First, the District may assess under the signed plan. The Hearing Officer found that a current assessment was needed, that the District had made reasonable efforts to schedule it, and that the plan met Education Code requirements. Second, the District may not add the Woodcock Johnson Test of Cognitive Abilities. The student turned 18 before the District asked to add the test, so the right to consent belonged to her, but the District asked only her mother. Third, the mother's delays kept the District from meeting the 50-day deadline to assess and develop an IEP, so the District may finish late. The student must make herself available for assessment within 30 days. The District may not use the Woodcock Johnson without her written consent, and it must develop an IEP within 20 days after it finishes the assessment.
Why it matters
This decision shows how SEHO applied the transfer of educational rights at age 18. A parent's consent given before the student's birthday covered the original plan. Any later change needed the adult student's own consent. The decision also shows a Hearing Officer extending the 50-day assessment timeline because a parent repeatedly failed to schedule testing.
Issues and holdings
- District prevailedDistrict-filed: assess without consent
Issue 1. Is the District entitled to assess Respondent in accordance with the assessment plan signed by her mother on January 2, 2001, and received by the District on January 9, 2001?
A current assessment was needed, the District made reasonable efforts to schedule it despite the mother's unreturned calls, and the plan met Education Code §§ 56320, 56321, 56322 and 56324, so the District may assess.
- Student prevailedAssessment
Issue 2. Is the District entitled to add the Woodcock Johnson Test of Cognitive Abilities to the assessment plan signed by Respondent's mother on January 2, 2001, and received by the District on January 9, 2001?
Educational rights passed to the student at 18, before the District proposed the added test, and the District sought only the mother's consent, so it may not add the test without the student's written consent.
- District prevailedAssessment
Issue 3. Is the District entitled to complete its assessment of Respondent beyond the fifty-day requirement of California Education Code § 56344?
The mother's delays kept the District from meeting the February 28, 2001 deadline, so the District may complete the assessment and IEP after the statutory deadline.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- Order that district may assess without consent. Student shall make herself available for assessment by the District under the January 2, 2001 assessment plan within 30 days of the decision.
- District shall not use the Woodcock Johnson Test of Cognitive Abilities unless the student consents in writing.
- Order to convene IEP meeting. District shall develop an IEP within 20 days of completing its assessment. The conclusions on Issue 3 also state that the time to complete the assessment and IEP is extended by 50 days from the date of the decision.
Key authorities
Gregory K. v. Longview School Dist. (9th Cir. 1987); Andress v. Cleveland Independent School Dist. (5th Cir. 1995); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(m)(1); Cal. Educ. Code § 56041.5; Cal. Educ. Code § 56344; Cal. Educ. Code § 56320; Cal. Educ. Code § 56321(b)
People named in the decision
- Adam J. Newman, attorney for District, Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo
- Sundee Johnson, law clerk for District, Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo
- Stanley Perlo, District administrator, Long Beach Unified School District
- Tiffany Brown, school psychologist (District lead school psychologist), Long Beach Unified School District
- Karen Yaghoubian, speech and language coordinator, Long Beach Unified School District
- Susan Melly, SELPA administrator/director (testified by telephone), SELPA
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Maxine R. Benmour, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in Long Beach, California, on March 1, 2001.
Petitioner Long Beach Unified School District (District) was represented at the hearing by attorney Adam J. Newman and law clerk Sundee Johnson from the law firm Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo. Also present at the hearing on the District’s behalf was Stanley Perlo, District administrator.
No one was present on behalf of Respondent STUDENT (Respondent).
The District called as witnesses Tiffany Brown, District school psychologist; Karen Yaghoubian, District speech and language coordinator; and Susan Melly, SELPA administrator.(Footnote 1) No evidence was presented on behalf of Respondent.
Oral and documentary evidence was received, and an oral closing argument was made by the District. Thereafter, the record was closed and the matter was submitted for a decision.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
The hearing convened after the Hearing Officer waited approximately thirty minutes for the parties to appear. However, although the Hearing Officer allowed this additional time, no one appeared on behalf of Respondent STUDENT. Fifteen minutes after the hearing was scheduled to begin, the Hearing Officer contacted the Hearing Office to have staff telephone Respondent’s mother, MOTHER (Ms. MOTHER), to inquire as to whether anyone intended to appear at the hearing on Respondent’s behalf. The staff member advised the Hearing Officer that there was no answer, and that the staff member left a message at the home of Respondent and Respondent’s mother.(Footnote 2) The Hearing Officer asked the staff member to leave a further message at the STUDENT’s residence that the hearing would proceed in their absence unless the Hearing Office received an immediate return phone call.
In addition, prior to commencing the hearing, Stanley Perlo, District administrator, physically walked around the building where the hearing was held to look for Respondent and her mother. He also checked with District personnel, but there had been no telephone call from Respondent or her mother. Mr. Perlo also stated that he had been present with Respondent and her mother in a hearing the prior week. At that time, MOTHER and STUDENT informed him that they were aware of the hearing date and would be present at the hearing scheduled for March 1, 2001.
Following the hearing, the Hearing Office staff member advised the Hearing Officer that the staff member subsequently received a telephone call from Respondent’s mother. MOTHER advised the staff member that, although she wanted the Hearing Officer to consider her arguments regarding her daughter’s proposed assessment, she did not plan to attend the hearing as she had other plans for the day.
After reviewing the hearing file, the Hearing Officer determined that Respondent and her mother had adequate notice of the time and place of the hearing. On February 9, 2001, the Hearing Office had sent individual written notices of the time and place of hearing to both Respondent and her mother. On February 26, 2001, the Hearing Office telephoned the STUDENT’s residence, leaving a message regarding the hearing dates and asking for a return telephone call to confirm if they would be present for the hearing. Neither Respondent nor her mother returned the Hearing Office’s telephone call.
Respondent’s mother indicated in her only telephone conversation with Hearing Office staff that she did not intend to attend the scheduled hearing. In this case, because the District is the petitioner, it has a right to timely resolution of the issues for hearing pursuant to California Education Code § 56502(f). Therefore, the Hearing Officer determined that the District was entitled to present its case in the absence of any representative for Respondent. No one had requested a continuance, and after contacting Respondent and her mother, and leaving two messages, the Hearing Office did not receive a return phone call until after the hearing had commenced. At that time, Respondent’s mother informed the Hearing Office that she was not participating in the hearing. Therefore, the hearing proceeded as scheduled.
ISSUES
1. Is the District entitled to assess Respondent in accordance with the assessment plan signed by her mother on January 2, 2001, and received by the District on January 9, 2001?
2. Is the District entitled to add the Woodcock Johnson Test of Cognitive Abilities to the assessment plan signed by Respondent’s mother on January 2, 2001, and received by the District on January 9, 2001?
3. Is the District entitled to complete its assessment of Respondent beyond the fifty-day requirement of California Education Code § 56344?
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT is an eighteen-year-old high school student(Footnote 3) who became eligible for special education as emotionally disturbed while in high school.(Footnote 4) She currently resides within the Long Beach Unified District’s geographic boundaries. STUDENT was placed in a nonpublic, residential treatment facility in Provo, Utah from December 1999 through September 2000.(Footnote 5) She was last assessed for special education eligibility and services while at the Utah facility.(Footnote 6) STUDENT’s mother referred STUDENT to the District after her return from Utah and requested that STUDENT be placed in a cosmetology training program. MOTHER expressed to District personnel that she wanted her daughter in a less restrictive environment than the one in Utah. STUDENT last attended school within the District in May 1999. She is currently not attending school and holds a part-time job.
On December 15, 2000, the District prepared an assessment plan which proposed to assess STUDENT in the areas of academic/preacademic achievement, speech/language, intellectual development, social/emotional/adaptive behavior, and career/vocational.
On January 9, 2001, a special education hearing was held regarding the District’s December 15, 2000 assessment plan. The District had filed for due process because of MOTHER’s failure to sign the assessment plan. At the hearing, the parties entered into a stipulation which provided that MOTHER would sign the assessment plan. The stipulation further provided that MOTHER was “in total agreement to that plan,” and that the parties agreed to substitute the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales (WAIS) for the Wechsler Childrens’ Intelligence Scales- III as an assessment tool to assess STUDENT’s cognitive functioning. MOTHER then provided the District with the assessment plan which she had signed on January 2, 2001.
Between January 9, 2001 and January 22, 2001, District psychologist Tiffany Brown left numerous telephone messages for MOTHER in order to schedule STUDENT for an assessment. MOTHER did not return any of the phone calls. On January 23, 2001, Ms. Brown sent a letter to MOTHER regarding the scheduling of the assessment because of her difficulty in reaching MOTHER by telephone. In her letter, Ms. Brown indicated that she would like to add the Woodcock Johnson Test of Cognitive Abilities to STUDENT’s assessment plan because STUDENT had become an adult since the plan was originally signed. Following this letter, Ms. Brown again left several telephone messages for MOTHER. MOTHER finally contacted Ms. Brown on February 22, 2001, and an assessment time was scheduled for February 27, 2001.
Ms. Brown began her assessment of STUDENT on February 27, 2001. At the time of the hearing on March 1, 2001, thirty per cent of the assessment had been completed. According to Ms. Brown, another two days will be needed in order to complete the assessment.(Footnote 7) Following this assessment, STUDENT agreed to again meet with Ms. Brown on March 2, 2001. Because of the difficulty in scheduling STUDENT for the assessment, Ms. Brown testified that she was not certain that STUDENT would appear for that appointment or that she would appear for the necessary third session.(Footnote 8)
Karen Yaghoubian, the District speech and language coordinator, was ultimately able to complete her speech and language assessment on February 28, 2001. Ms. Yaghoubian had also left numerous, unreturned telephone messages for MOTHER between January 9, 2001 and the scheduling of the assessment.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ISSUE NO. 1: Is the District entitled to assess Respondent in accordance with the assessment plan signed by her mother on January 2, 2001 and received by the District on January 9, 2001?
Federal and State special education law provide that, before any action can be taken with regard to the placement of a child in special education, an assessment of the student’s educational needs shall be conducted. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(A); California Education Code § 56320. In addition, a reassessment of a student shall be conducted at least every three years or more frequently, if conditions warrant a reassessment. California Education Code § 56381; 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(A). In Gregory K. v. Longview School Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1315 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit stated that, “if the parents want Gregory to receive special education under the Act, they are obligated to permit such testing.” In Andress v. Cleveland Independent School Dist., 64 F.3d 176 (5th Cir. 1995), the Fifth Circuit concluded that, “a parent who desires for her child to receive special education must allow the school district to reevaluate the child . . . there is no exception to this rule.”
In this case, the District contends that it is obligated to conduct an assessment of Respondent as she was last assessed while in a nonpublic school in Utah, and has since been referred to the District by her mother in September 2000. It further contends that testing in Utah may not have been adequate to assess STUDENT’s current functioning and ability to move into a large, urban high school from a smaller, more restrictive environment. Additionally, the District asserts that it should be entitled to assess Respondent in order to fulfill its legal obligations to do so, despite MOTHER’s failure to produce her daughter for such an assessment. The Hearing Officer agrees with the District regarding the need to conduct an assessment.
First, the evidence establishes that STUDENT has not been assessed by the District since the time of her referral to the District by her mother in September 2000. The evidence also establishes that STUDENT was last assessed while at a nonpublic school in Utah, and that at least part of the testing was not performed according to federal requirements. In addition, Ms. Brown, the school psychologist, testified that testing in the areas of academic achievement, intellectual development, social/emotional/adaptive behavior, and career/vocational are necessary in order to determine STUDENT’s present levels of performance and her readiness to return to school. In addition, Susan Melly, the SELPA administrator, testified that the District needs to determine if STUDENT would be able to make the dramatic change from a small, structured school setting to a large, urban high school. The Hearing Officer thus finds that, because STUDENT has not been assessed by the District since the referral by her mother in September 2000, and because she was last assessed by a nonpublic school, a full assessment is required in order for the District to assess STUDENT’s current levels of performance.
Second, the undisputed evidence shows that the District made numerous attempts to contact MOTHER in order to schedule its assessment of STUDENT. Despite having referred STUDENT to the District and her stated desire to enroll STUDENT in a cosmetology training program, MOTHER has thwarted the District’s numerous attempts to schedule an assessment of STUDENT.
Although Ms. Yaghoubian was able to complete her assessment on the day prior to the hearing, she made numerous attempts to contact MOTHER in order to do so. Between the date of the due process hearing on January 9, 2001 and the date that the assessment actually took place on February 28, 2001, Ms. Yaghoubian telephoned MOTHER on eleven different occasions. On two occasions, she spoke with MOTHER because MOTHER called her to reschedule appointments.
Further, Ms. Brown had a similar experience in attempting to schedule STUDENT for an assessment. Between January 9, 2001 and the date of her first meeting with STUDENT on February 27, 2001, she left eight telephone messages for MOTHER before receiving a return phone call on February 22, 2001. Ms. Brown also sent MOTHER a letter on January 23, 2001 regarding the scheduling of an appointment with STUDENT.
Ms. Brown and Ms. Yaghoubian both testified that, of the many assessments performed in their respective careers, this one was the most difficult to schedule. Susan Melly, the SELPA director, also testified that, in her many years working in special education for various districts, she had never experienced this amount of difficulty in scheduling an assessment. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the District has made reasonable efforts to schedule STUDENT for an assessment, but it has been unable to do so because of her mother’s failure to return telephone calls and to schedule appointments with District personnel.
Third, the District’s proposed assessment plan signed by MOTHER on January 2, 2001 conformed to the requirements of the law. Pursuant to California Education Code § 56321(b), a proposed assessment plan given to parents shall: (1) be in language that is easily understood by the general public, (2) be provided in the primary language of the parent, (3) explain the types of assessments to be conducted, and (4) state that no individualized education program (IEP) will result from the assessment without the consent of the parent. The Hearing Officer finds that the assessment plan conforms to all of the above subsections. The descriptions of the assessments to be performed are in easily understood language. The plan is in English, which appears to be STUDENT’s and MOTHER’s primary language. The plan explains the purpose of each of the tests to be performed. In addition, the procedural safeguards attached to the assessment plan state that no IEP services will result from the assessment without the consent of the parent. For the reasons discussed above, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District met the requirements of California Education Code § 56321(b).
Finally, there is credible evidence that the District’s proposed assessment will meet the requirements of California Education Code §§ 56320, 56322, and 56324.(Footnote 9) California Education Code § 56320, subsections (a) through (d), state in relevant part that testing and assessment materials and procedures must be selected and administered so as not to be racially, culturally, or sexually discriminatory; provided and administered in the student’s primary language or other mode of communication; validated for the purpose for which they are used; administered by trained personnel in conformance with test instructions; tailored to assess specific areas of need; and selected and administered to best ensure that, when administered to a pupil with impaired speaking skills, the test produces results that accurately reflect the student’s aptitude, achievement level, or any other factors the test purports to measure.
The District’s assessment plan proposed to assess STUDENT in the areas of academic achievement, intellectual development, social/emotional/adaptive behavior, and career/vocational.(Footnote 10) Additionally, the assessment plan called for the administration of a battery of achievement tests; the use of the WAIS, the Test of Auditory Perceptual Skills, and the Wide Range Test of Memory and Learning to assess intellectual development; a review of school records, interviews with teachers, and behavior scales to assess social/emotional/adaptive behavior; and testing, observations, and surveys to assess career/vocational needs. There is no indication that testing and assessment materials and procedures were to be given in a discriminatory manner or in a language or means of communication not easily understood by STUDENT. In addition, Ms. Brown testified that she selected the battery of tests she would administer to STUDENT based upon STUDENT’s suspected areas of disability. She further testified that the tests she planned to administer were complementary and not duplicative of each other. In addition, as the District’s lead school psychologist, she is trained to administer the selected tests. She testified that she has performed three hundred similar assessments in her career as a school psychologist. It is therefore concluded that the District’s assessments will likely meet the requirements contained in subsection (a) through (d).
California Education Code §§ 56320(e) and (f) require that a student be assessed in all areas of suspected disability and that no single procedure is used as the sole criterion for determining an appropriate educational program for an individual with exceptional needs. As indicated previously, Ms. Brown intends to assess STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability and to use a variety of tools in order to do so. Furthermore, the assessment plan lists more than one test instrument or procedure. Therefore, no single procedure will be used to determine STUDENT’s disability.
Pursuant to subsection (g), the assessment must be conducted by persons knowledgeable of the student’s disability. California Education Code § 56322 also requires that the assessments be conducted by persons competent to perform the assessments. Additionally, California Education Code § 56324 requires that any psychological assessment be performed by a credentialed school psychologist. The assessments proposed are to be conducted by Ms. Brown, a credentialed school psychologist who has worked at the District since 1997 and who has been the District’s lead school psychologist since August 2000. In addition, she has performed approximately 300 assessments during her career. Thus, the person who will be assessing STUDENT is knowledgeable about her disability and is competent to perform the assessments. Therefore, the proposed assessments are also appropriate as they relate to these provisions of the law.
In summary, the District is entitled to assess STUDENT as she has not attended school within the District since May 1999, she has been assessed only by a nonpublic school in Utah during that time, and no information exists regarding her current functioning and her ability to adjust to a large, urban high school. Further, the District has proposed an assessment plan that is appropriate and fulfills the requirements of the law. Because no reason was provided as to why the assessments should not be conducted, the District may assess STUDENT. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the District is entitled to assess STUDENT pursuant to the proposed assessment plan signed by MOTHER on January 2, 2001, and received by the District on January 9, 2001.
ISSUE NO. 2: Is the District entitled to add the Woodcock Johnson Test of Cognitive Abilities to the assessment plan signed by Respondent’s mother on January 2, 2001 and received by the District on January 9, 2001?
Pursuant to federal and State law, whenever an individual with exceptional needs reaches the age of eighteen, unless the individual has been determined to be incompetent under state law, all rights accorded to a parent under special education law transfer to the individual with exceptional needs. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(m)(1); California Education Code § 56041.5.
STUDENT became eighteen years of age on January 17, 2001, subsequent to the signing of the assessment plan by her mother on January 2, 2001, and the receipt of the signed assessment plan by the District on January 9, 2001. Therefore, all rights accorded to her mother under special education law transferred to STUDENT on her eighteenth birthday. Although her mother signed and delivered an assessment plan to the District while STUDENT was seventeen years of age, the District proposed that the Woodcock Johnson Test of Cognitive Abilities be added to the assessment in Ms. Brown’s letter to MOTHER dated January 23, 2001. At that time, STUDENT was eighteen years of age, and the right to consent to additional assessments had transferred to her a week earlier.
There is no indication that the District contacted STUDENT to request her consent to the additional assessment. The letter dated January 23, 2001 is addressed only to STUDENT’s mother and states that the District needs only the mother’s consent to amend the assessment plan. However, because STUDENT was eighteen years old at the time, the District was required to obtain her consent rather than her mother’s. As there is no evidence that STUDENT has been determined to be incompetent under State law, all educational rights, including the right to consent to assessments, now belong to her. As the District did not request and obtain STUDENT’s consent to the assessment, it may not perform any additional assessments unless STUDENT consents.(Footnote 11) The Hearing Officer thus finds that the District is not entitled to add the Woodcock Johnson Test of Cognitive Abilities to the assessment plan signed by Respondent’s mother on January 2, 2001, and received by the District on January 9, 2001. ISSUE NO. 3: Is the District entitled to complete its assessment of Respondent beyond the fifty-day requirement of California Education Code § 56344?
California Education Code § 56344 provides that a district must develop an individualized education program (IEP) pursuant to an assessment within a total time not to exceed fifty days, not counting days between the pupil’s regular school sessions, terms, or days of school vacation in excess of five school days, from the date of receipt of the parent’s written consent for assessment, unless the parent agrees in writing to an extension. In this case, MOTHER signed the assessment plan on January 2, 2001, and delivered it to the District on January 9, 2001. As the date of receipt was January 9, 2001, the District was required to have completed its assessment and developed an IEP for STUDENT on or before February 28, 2001. There is no evidence of any written agreement to extend the time.
The evidence establishes that the District was unable to complete its assessments and IEP for STUDENT within the required fifty days because of MOTHER’s failure to return telephone calls, rescheduling of appointments, and failure to respond to written communication regarding the scheduling of appointments for STUDENT. MOTHER did not speak with District personnel until February 22, 2001, despite having signed and returned the assessment plan by January 9, 2001. Appointments for STUDENT were not scheduled until February 27, 2001 and February 28, 2001, the date that the assessments and IEP were required to be completed. The Hearing Officer finds that the District was unable to complete its assessments and IEP within the fifty day time line due to the dilatory tactics of MOTHER.
Therefore, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District is entitled to conduct its assessment of Respondent after the February 28, 2001 statutory deadline. The time for the District to complete its assessment and develop an IEP shall be extended by fifty days from the date of this decision due to STUDENT’s failure to appear for her first appointment until the time that the original assessment and IEP were to be completed.
ORDER
1. STUDENT shall make herself available for an assessment by Long Beach Unified School District pursuant to the January 2, 2001 assessment plan within thirty (30) days of the date of this decision.
2. Long Beach Unified School District shall not use the Woodcock Johnson Test of Cognitive Abilities to assess Respondent STUDENT unless STUDENT consents in writing to this assessment.
3. Long Beach Unified School District shall develop an IEP for STUDENT within twenty (20) days of the date of the completion of its assessment of STUDENT.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute:
1. Is the District entitled to assess Respondent in accordance with the assessment plan signed by her mother on January 2, 2001 and received by the District on January 9, 2001? The District prevailed on this issue.
2. Is the District entitled to add the Woodcock Johnson Test of Cognitive Abilities to the assessment plan signed by Respondent’s mother on January 2, 2001 and received by the District on January 9, 2001? Respondent prevailed on this issue.
3. Is the District entitled to complete its assessment of Respondent beyond the fifty-day requirement of California Education Code § 56344? The District prevailed on this issue.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. California Education Code § 56505(i).
Dated: March 13, 2001 ____________________________________ Maxine R. Benmour, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
Footnote 1: The Hearing Officer permitted Ms. Melly to testify by telephone as she was out of town on the day of the hearing. Footnote 2: Respondent and her mother live at the same address and have the same telephone number. Footnote 3: STUDENT became eighteen years of age on January 17, 2001. Footnote 4: The documents submitted by the District do not contain any background information regarding STUDENT. The limited information regarding STUDENT’s background is from the testimony of the District witnesses at the hearing. Footnote 5: The District witnesses were not aware of the manner in which STUDENT was placed in Utah Footnote 6: Ms. Yaghoubian testified that the speech and language assessment done in Utah was incomplete as it did not comply with the Title 5 requirement that more than one assessment tool be administered. Footnote 7: According to Ms. Brown, it is best practice to complete an assessment on two or three separate occasions in order to best assess a student’s abilities and obtain the best results. It also avoids problems such as fatigue or physical illness. Footnote 8: The District indicated at the conclusion of the hearing that it would notify the Hearing Officer if STUDENT appeared for her March 2, 2001 appointment with Ms. Brown. The District did not contact the Hearing Officer, and the Hearing Officer thus concludes that STUDENT did not appear for her appointment. Footnote 9: As the assessments have not been completed, the Hearing Officer makes no determination as to whether the assessments are actually appropriate. Footnote 10: As the speech and language assessment has been completed, that portion of the assessment plan is no longer at issue. Footnote 11: If STUDENT refuses to consent to an assessment plan, the District may file for due process in order to attempt to override her refusal to consent. California Education Code § 56501(a)(3).
