California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · May 30, 2002
Student v. Alhambra City Elementary School District (consolidated)
SEHO Case No. SN 2591-01 · Hearing Officer Van T. Vu
Alhambra City Elementary School District prevails on every issue; settlement bars fall 2001 claims and District may assess behavior without consent.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Noted in the decision
None noted in the decision. The decision refers to prior consolidated SEHO cases SN 2071-00 and SN 258-01, which were dismissed after the September 20, 2001 settlement.
Summary
Parents of an 8-year-old boy eligible for special education based on autistic-like behaviors and language delays represented him at hearing. Alhambra City Elementary School District also sought permission to conduct a functional analysis assessment (FAA) of his behavior. In September 2001, a settlement agreement placed the student in a full inclusion first grade class at Garfield Elementary School. It included a one-to-one aide, discrete trial training (DTT) through California PsychCare, and related services, pending triennial assessments and a December 2001 IEP meeting.
The Hearing Officer found that the settlement covered placement claims through December 18, 2001, and that the parents knowingly agreed to it. The District did not materially breach it. Most missed OT and DTT hours resulted from the parents shortening school days, refusing a therapist, and withdrawing the student. Claims for that period, and earlier speech and OT claims, were therefore barred.
The Hearing Officer held that the December 18, 2001 IEP offered a FAPE. It provided a special day class at Wilson School, a one-to-one aide, 10 hours per week of home DTT, and assistive technology consultation. Procedural claims about the November 2001 IEP meeting failed: the location change was minor, the parents chose not to attend, and the IEP copy arrived in about two weeks. All six District assessments were found appropriate, so no independent evaluations were ordered. Claims about progress reports, lists of other placements, and daily classroom visits also failed. The District may conduct the FAA without parental consent.
Why it matters
The decision shows how SEHO treated a settlement agreement as a contract that can waive claims for a future period. Parents who keep a child from attending or refuse providers can excuse missed services. It also shows a district getting permission for a behavior assessment without consent after its strategies failed.
Issues and holdings
Issue I. Did the District offer and provide STUDENT with a FAPE from September 20, 2001, through the date of the IEP meeting on December 18, 2001?
The September 20, 2001 settlement agreement was validly formed and was meant to resolve placement claims through December 18, 2001. The District did not materially breach it: most missed OT and DTT hours resulted from the parents' conduct, and the other alleged breaches were not required by the agreement. The FAPE claims for this period were therefore waived and moot.
- District prevailedPlacement and LRE
Issue II. Did the December 18, 2001 IEP offer STUDENT a FAPE?
The IEP offered a FAPE. It placed the student in a special day class at Wilson School and provided a one-to-one aide (not needed during one-to-one services from other adults), assistive technology consultation, 10 hours per week of home DTT with supervision and consultation, and related services.
- District prevailedIEP procedure
Issue III.A. With regard to the November 2, 2001 IEP meeting, did the District violate procedural rights by changing location of the meeting, thereby denying the parents an opportunity to participate?
Notice was proper. The new location was a couple of minutes' walk away and the parents learned of the change in time to attend. They chose not to attend, so the District could hold the meeting without them.
- District prevailedIEP procedure
Issue III.B. Did the District violate procedural rights by distributing copies of the IEP before providing the parents a copy, without the parents' signatures, and without their consent to release such information?
No law requires that parents receive or sign the IEP before team members who wrote it get copies. Under Education Code section 56347, teachers and service providers may have the IEP.
- District prevailedIEP procedure
Issue III.C. Did the District violate procedural rights by not providing the parents a copy of the IEP until three weeks after the IEP meeting?
The IEP was mailed within five days and resent on November 15 after an addressing error, so it arrived about two weeks after the meeting. No procedural violation was established, and no prejudice was shown.
- District prevailedIEP content
Issue III.D. Did the District violate procedural rights by continuing the former goals and objectives with new achievement dates?
The team considered the available information on present levels, and the goals matched the student's needs. Carrying over prior goals did not by itself make them inappropriate.
- District prevailedAssessment
Issue IV.A. Was the OT assessment appropriate?
The assessment was appropriate. It used multiple sources, including the prior OT providers. No law requires parent interviews or advance notice of the specific test instruments.
- District prevailedAssessment
Issue IV.B. Was the speech and language assessment appropriate?
The assessment was appropriate. Parent and former-therapist interviews and a records review are not legally required.
- District prevailedAssessment
Issue IV.C. Was the assistive technology assessment appropriate?
The assessment was valid. No parent interview is required, and there was no evidence that the student's illness on the testing day affected the results.
- District prevailedAssessment
Issue IV.D. Was the academic assessment dated December 2001 appropriate?
The assessment relied on observation, records, and interviews with the teacher, aide, and DTT supervisor. It was appropriate even without formal tools, which could not be given because of the student's frequent absences and tardiness.
- District prevailedAssessment
Issue IV.E. Was the psychology assessment conducted in August 2001 appropriate?
Dr. Kaler's assessment was current and valid. Observing the student at the child care center rather than at Garfield did not undermine it.
- District prevailedAssessment
Issue IV.F. Was the adaptive physical education assessment conducted in July 2001 appropriate?
The gross motor assessment was appropriate. A parent interview was not required.
- District prevailedDistrict-filed: assess without consent
Issue V. Is the District entitled to conduct a functional analysis assessment (FAA) of STUDENT?
The student had serious assaultive behaviors that interfered with his IEP, and prior strategies had failed. The District may conduct an FAA without parental consent, in compliance with 5 CCR section 3052.
- District prevailedIEP procedure
Issue VI.A. During 2001-2002, has the District improperly failed to keep the parents informed of STUDENT's progress by not providing any progress reports from the teacher, aide, and related service providers?
Parents are entitled to progress reports only as often as parents of nondisabled students, which was once per trimester. The District sent a December report and offered conferences and IEP meetings.
- District prevailedIEP procedure
Issue VI.B. Has the District improperly failed to keep the parents informed by not informing the parents of any behavioral problems in the classroom?
The behavior logs were not sent home, but staff told the parents about the behaviors many times. There was no prejudice.
- District prevailedIEP procedure
Issue VII. Are the parents entitled to receive a list of and information regarding other placements available in the District and SELPA, as well as programs elsewhere, that would provide STUDENT with a FAPE?
No law requires a list of all possible placements. Under Union v. Smith, the District must make one coherent offer of FAPE.
- District prevailedIEP procedure
Issue VIII. Is MOTHER entitled to visit STUDENT's classroom every day?
The law requires classroom observation within a reasonable timeframe under board procedures. A one-to-two-day approval process is reasonable, and there is no right to daily visits.
- BarredImplementation
Issue IX. Did the District provide STUDENT with speech and language and OT services in accordance with his IEPs between May 2001 and September 2001?
The settlement agreement resolved all claims through September 20, 2001, so the Hearing Officer did not decide this claim.
- District prevailedFAPE: services offered
Issue X. Is Petitioner entitled to compensatory education services?
No compensatory education was awarded because the District offered or provided a FAPE at all relevant times.
- District prevailedIndependent educational evaluation (IEE)
Issue XI. Is Petitioner entitled to independent educational evaluations at the District's expense?
All of the District's assessments were appropriate, so no IEEs at public expense were ordered.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- Order that district may assess without consent. The District's request to conduct a functional analysis assessment over the parents' lack of consent is granted. The District must comply with Title 5, California Code of Regulations section 3052.
- All of Petitioner's claims for relief are denied.
Key authorities
Rowley; W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist.; Gregory K. v. Longview School District; Union School Dist. v. Smith; Pacific Gas & Electric v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.; Rano v. SIPA Press; Miller v. Fairchild Indus.; Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm.
People named in the decision
- Laurel Bear, director of pupil services, Alhambra City Elementary School District
- Ana Marina Rivera, special education instructional aide (1:1 aide), Alhambra City Elementary School District
- Delcey Kawasaki, regular education teacher, Garfield Elementary School
- Wendy Sandberg, speech and language pathologist, Alhambra City Elementary School District
- Kathleen Parente, lead DTT therapist, California PsychCare
- Hannah Park, occupational therapist / OT assessor, District
- Terry Kappe, speech and language therapist / assistive technology assessor, District
- Dr. Ali Sadeghi, licensed clinical psychologist, autism consultant, California PsychCare
- Leili Zarbakhsh, licensed educational psychologist, California PsychCare
- Dr. Sandra Kaler, psychologist / psychological assessor, District witness, District
- Dr. Bruce Gale, clinical psychologist, District witness
- Eileen Kaiser, adaptive physical education specialist / assessor, District
- Mona Neter, inclusion specialist / academic assessor, Alhambra City Elementary School District
- Ms. Mercer, school principal, Garfield Elementary School
- Alana Hampton, DTT supervisor and autism consultant, California PsychCare
- Neva Garcia, prior occupational therapist
- Debbie Uriquidi, prior occupational therapist
- Sayaka, DTT therapist, California PsychCare
- California PsychCare, nonpublic agency providing discrete trial training
- Childtime Children's Center, private school or child care facility where the parents placed the student
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This consolidated matter was heard before Van T. Vu, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in Alhambra, California, on January 8, February 5, 6, 19, 20, 26, 27, and March 19 and 20, 2002.
STUDENT (STUDENT or Petitioner) was represented at the hearing by his parents, PARENTS.(Footnote 1) The Alhambra City Elementary School District (District) was represented at hearing by attorney Denise Godfrey, from the law firm of Lozano Smith. Laurel Bear, director of pupil services, was also present on behalf of the District.
The Petitioner called the following witnesses: Ana Marina Rivera, special education aide; Delcey Kawasaki, regular education teacher; Wendy Sandberg, speech and language pathologist; Kathleen Parente, STUDENT’s lead therapist from California PsychCare; Hannah Park, occupational therapist; Terry Kappe, speech and language therapist; Dr. Ali Sadeghi, licensed clinical psychologist; and Leili Zarbakhsh, licensed educational psychologist. Mr. and MOTHER also testified on STUDENT’s behalf.
The District called the following witnesses: Dr. Sandra Kaler, psychologist; Dr. Bruce Gale, clinical psychologist; Eileen Kaiser, adaptive physical education specialist; Mona Neter, inclusion specialist; and Laurel Bear.
Oral and documentary evidence was received and the record was left open for the submission of closing arguments. The parties’ closing arguments were received on April 9, 2002. The record was then closed, and the matter was submitted for decision.
PROCEDURAL MATTER
The District moved to dismiss Petitioner’s Issue I relating to the settlement agreement on two occasions prior to the parties’ presentation of their cases at hearing. Specifically, the District alleged that Petitioner was seeking to enforce the settlement agreement through the hearing process and that such an issue was outside the jurisdiction of the Hearing Office. On both occasions and by two different hearing officers, the District’s motion was denied.
The second denial by the present Hearing Officer at hearing was based, in part, on the determination that Petitioner’s issues reached beyond mere enforcement and implementation of the settlement agreement. Petitioner essentially argues that he did not waive claims beyond September 20, 2001, in the settlement agreement, even though the settlement agreement provides for prospective rights and obligations of the parties. In the alternative, Petitioner contends that the District materially breached the settlement agreement, which, according to the agreement itself, would provide a possible basis for rescission. Therefore, evidence needed to be taken at hearing regarding the scope of the release and waiver of claims provision in the settlement agreement and regarding Petitioner’s allegations of the District’s breach of the settlement agreement. Accordingly, a determination of these issues was necessary to determine whether Petitioner can even raise a FAPE claim regarding the time period at issue and, therefore, dismissal was inappropriate at that time.
ISSUES(Footnote 2)
I. Did the District offer and provide STUDENT with a FAPE from September 20, 2001, through the date of the IEP meeting on December 18, 2001?
II. Did the December 18, 2001 IEP offer STUDENT a FAPE?
III. With regard to the IEP meeting convened on November 2, 2001, did the District violate STUDENT’s procedural rights to a FAPE by
A. changing location of the meeting, thereby denying the parents an opportunity to participate in the meeting; B. distributing copies of the IEP before providing the parents a copy, without the parents’ signatures on the IEP, and without the parents’ consent to release such information; C. not providing the parents a copy of the IEP until three weeks after the IEP meeting; and D. continuing the former goals and objectives with new achievement dates?
IV. Were the following assessments conducted in 2001 appropriate:
A. the OT assessment, B. the speech and language assessment, C. the assistive technology assessment, D. the academic assessment dated December 2001, E. the psychology assessment conducted in August 2001, and F. the adaptive physical education assessment conducted in July 2001?
V. Is the District entitled to conduct a functional analysis assessment (FAA) of STUDENT?
VI. During the 2001-2002 school year, has the District improperly failed to keep the parents informed of STUDENT’s progress by
A. not providing any progress reports from the teacher, aide, and related service providers, and B. not informing the parents of any behavioral problems in the classroom?
VII. Are the parents entitled to receive a list of and information regarding other placements available in the District and special education local plan area (SELPA), as well as programs available elsewhere, that would provide STUDENT with a FAPE?
VIII. Is MOTHER entitled to visit STUDENT’s classroom every day?
IX. Did the District provide STUDENT with speech and language and OT services in accordance with his IEPS during the period between May 2001 and September 2001?
X. Is Petitioner entitled to compensatory education services?
XI. Is Petitioner entitled to independent educational evaluations?
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT is an eight-year-old student who resides within the jurisdictional boundaries of the Alhambra Elementary School District. STUDENT is eligible for special education and related services as a student with autistic-like behaviors and delayed oral language and reciprocal social interaction skills that adversely affect his communication. STUDENT is not currently attending public or private school; however, he is receiving twenty hours per week of home-based discrete trial training therapy from the District through California PsychCare, a nonpublic agency (NPA).
During the fall of 2000, STUDENT began the first grade. At the request of his parents, STUDENT’s IEP team placed him in a special day class at Sunrise School. At an IEP meeting held approximately two months after his placement in the special day class, the PARENTS requested that STUDENT be placed in a general education first grade classroom at Garfield Elementary School. According to FATHER, STUDENT was not challenged academically in the special day class and he began to exhibit negative behaviors such as tantrumming and refusing to attend school. The District members of the IEP team disagreed that STUDENT’s placement should be changed. On November 21, 2000, the PARENTS filed for a due process hearing to determine the appropriateness of the District’s offered and provided placement for the 2000-2001 school year. The Hearing Office assigned the matter case number SN 2071-00. Without notifying the District, the PARENTS withdrew STUDENT from the Sunrise School and eventually placed him at a school or childcare facility known as Childtime Children’s Center. Although the PARENTS refused to return STUDENT to the school district, they allowed the District to continue to provide STUDENT with discrete trial training services through California PsychCare from approximately November 2000 through September 2001. Additionally, during at least part of this time, STUDENT also received speech and language and occupational therapy services through the District.
In February 2001, STUDENT’s triennial assessments were due to be conducted. MOTHER disputed several aspects of the District’s right to conduct these assessments. As it became apparent that the parties would not be able to resolve their differences, the District filed its own request for a due process hearing to resolve issues regarding the District’s right to conduct STUDENT’s triennial assessment. The Hearing Office assigned the District’s matter case number SN 258-01. The Student’s case and the District’s case was eventually consolidated by the Hearing Office.
During most of February through September 2001, the consolidated case remained off-calendar while the parties attempted to resolve their issues informally. In June 2001, the parties entered into an “interim” stipulation, which permitted the District to conduct STUDENT’s triennial assessments subject to various terms and conditions. The stipulation allowed the District to assess STUDENT in the areas of academic/preacademic achievement, social adaptive behavior, psychomotor development, speech and language needs, assistive technology needs, and occupational therapy needs. During June and July 2001, the District was able to complete a psychological assessment by Dr. Sandra Kaler, an adaptive physical education assessment by Eileen Kaiser, and a discrete trial training report by California PsychCare. However, the PARENTS refused to allow the District to complete the remainder of its triennial assessment. As a result, the consolidated case was placed back on calendar.
On September 20, 2001, the parties appeared for hearing before another hearing officer. Prior to the presentation of evidence, the parties participated in settlement discussions. After negotiating most of the day, the parties reached a final settlement agreement and, as a result, the consolidated case was dismissed. The settlement agreement provided for, among other things, STUDENT’s full inclusion placement in a regular education classroom at Garfield Elementary School, inclusion support services, a full-time classroom aide, transportation from home to school and back, speech and language services for two hours per week, occupational therapy services for two hours per week, adaptive physical education services (commencing 30 days after his placement), discrete trial training (DTT) services for twenty hours per week, DTT supervision services for seventeen hours per week, autism consultant services for up to ten hours per month, and transition services to be coordinated by the District’s inclusion specialist. Additionally, the settlement agreement allowed the District to assess STUDENT beginning thirty days after the placement in the areas of assistive technology, occupational therapy, and academics/preacademics, and required the District to complete its speech and language assessment on or before October 29, 2001. An IEP meeting was to be held either on October 29, 2001, or November 2, 2001, at 9:00 a.m. for purposes of reviewing STUDENT’s goals and objectives. Furthermore, another IEP meeting was to convene on December 17 or 18, 2001, to review STUDENT’s triennial assessment reports.
According to Laurel Bear, the time period from September 20 through December 18 would have allowed the District to collect information on STUDENT, both in his educational placement and through the triennial evaluation. Thus, according to witness testimony, the IEP meeting on December 18, 2001, would be the first meeting with STUDENT’s IEP team at which the District had complete and current information on STUDENT’s needs. According to the District, the December IEP meeting was the event that would have ended the time period covered by the settlement agreement.
Soon after the settlement agreement was signed on September 20, 2000, the District arranged for the PARENTS to visit two regular education classrooms at Garfield Elementary School that had space available to accommodate STUDENT. After observing STUDENT’s behavior and comfort level during the classroom visits, the PARENTS chose to place STUDENT in Ms. Delcey Kawasaki’s class. In preparation for STUDENT’s return to the District, District inclusion specialist Mona Neter reviewed information from California PsycCare and met with Mrs. Kawasaki to provide her information on autism and to discuss STUDENT’s needs. Additionally, Ms. Neter assigned to Ms. Kawasaki’s class an instructional aide named Ana Rivera, who has extensive experience working with children with autism, to work with STUDENT in class and to ride with him on the school bus. Moreover, Ms. Neter coordinated the scheduling of STUDENT’s related services, taking into account the suggestions of MOTHER. STUDENT began attending Ms. Kawasaki’s class on September 24, 2001.
The parties understood that during STUDENT’s first week of school STUDENT would be transported to and from school by his parents and would only stay for a half day in order to ease his transition back to school. That week, STUDENT was often brought to school approximately a half-hour later than the rest of the children and would leave either at the midday or soon thereafter. According to the settlement agreement, STUDENT was to be transported to and from school by bus beginning the week of October 1, 2001. At that time, STUDENT was to attend school for the full school day. However, the PARENTS did not allow STUDENT to be bused to school until at least the second week of October and then only for one week. For most of the remainder of the two months he attended Garfield School, STUDENT continued to be brought to school late and taken home early and he also was frequently absent from school. FATHER was generally the parent who transported STUDENT to school, and he often stayed at school to observe STUDENT’s educational program and related services.
Also during STUDENT’s first week of school, MOTHER requested a parent-teacher conference with Ms. Kawasaki and Ms. Neter to discuss “inclusion, transition, and [STUDENT’s] progress” in the classroom. MOTHER also later requested a classroom visit to Ms. Kawasaki's class to occur after the parent/teacher conference. The District responded to MOTHER’s requests and eventually scheduled the conference for 7:30 a.m. on October 10, 2001, with the classroom visitation to occur immediately afterwards. During the exchange of correspondence between the PARENTS and the District regarding the scheduling of the conference, MOTHER also requested that the District arrange visits to “other elementary inclusion grade one classrooms in the District and in the SELPA.” By letter dated October 9, 2001, the District indicated that STUDENT was already placed in an inclusion program within his home school, that the PARENTS had already visited all available inclusion classrooms at STUDENT’s home school, and that any questions regarding the District’s programs could be addressed to Mona Neter at the November 2, 2001 IEP meeting. The District also referred the PARENTS to someone from the SELPA who could provide information about SELPA programs.
The parent-teacher conference eventually convened on October 10, 2001, as scheduled, but MOTHER did not appear. In her place, FATHER attended the meeting with a list of questions MOTHER wanted answered by Ms. Neter and Ms. Kawasaki. According to Ms. Neter, most of the conference was spent with Ms. Neter and Ms. Kawasaki responding to FATHER’s questions. She also testified that FATHER asked questions about the use of Ms. Rivera as STUDENT’s aide, but not much time was left to discuss STUDENT’s transition. Although Ms. Neter was available to further discuss STUDENT’s program with FATHER, once his questions were answered, he indicated that he needed to go home and, therefore, he did not take advantage of her offer. Apparently, no classroom visit occurred that day despite one having been arranged at the request of MOTHER.
Also about this time, STUDENT exhibited behaviors such as wandering around the room, running out of the classroom, pulling things from the walls and tables, hitting, kicking, and punching others, and tantrumming. When the behaviors began, Ms. Kawasaki directed STUDENT’s instructional assistant, Ana Rivera, to redirect STUDENT; however, STUDENT’s behaviors persisted. Additionally, Ms. Kawasaki spoke with the school psychologist, STUDENT’s discrete trial training therapists, FATHER, and Ms. Neter regarding STUDENT’s behaviors. According to Ms. Kawasaki, FATHER told her that he did not want to hear negative information about his son or to have negative information sent home. After STUDENT had been attending school for about one month, Ms. Kawasaki and Ms. Rivera began to maintain a “behavior log,” describing STUDENT’s behaviors in class each day until he was disenrolled. By all accounts, the behavior logs were never sent home to the PARENTS.
On or about October 19, 2001, the District sent the PARENTS a notice of the IEP meeting to be held on November 2, 2001, at 9:00 a.m. at Garfield Elementary School. As stated in the settlement agreement, the purpose of the IEP meeting was to review and implement STUDENT’s goals and objectives. MOTHER signed the notice on October 22, 2001, indicating that she would attend the IEP meeting, and she returned the document to the District the next day. Attached to the signed notice of IEP meeting was a request from MOTHER that a classroom visit to Ms. Kawasaki’s class be arranged during the hour prior to the IEP meeting. By letter, the District obliged MOTHER’s request and arranged for a classroom visit to occur at 8:30 a.m. the morning of the IEP meeting. However, MOTHER did not arrive for the scheduled classroom visit on November 2, 2001. To accommodate the large number of attendees at the IEP meeting, the District moved the meeting from Garfield Elementary School to the adjacently located district offices only a “couple” of minutes walking distance away. When FATHER arrived at the school, he was directed to the new IEP room, where he waited for MOTHER to arrive. Sometime after 9:00 a.m., MOTHER arrived at the office at Garfield School, where Ms. Neter stood waiting for her. Upon being informed that the meeting location had been changed, MOTHER refused to attend the meeting.
Learning that MOTHER had arrived at the school, Ms. Bear and school principal Ms. Mercer went to the office to direct MOTHER to the IEP meeting location. As they approached the office, a school custodian who was nearby spoke briefly with Mrs. Mercer. Seeing the custodian talking to Ms. Mercer, MOTHER assumed that he was a security guard who was ready to call the police to have her arrested. MOTHER testified that she refused to attend the IEP meeting because she felt Ms. Bear and Ms. Mercer were threatening her with possible imprisonment. After indicating that she would not attend the meeting, MOTHER called FATHER at the IEP location regarding the events that had just transpired. FATHER then left the IEP meeting before it began, despite requests from members of the IEP team to stay.
The IEP meeting eventually convened in the absence of the PARENTS. At the meeting, the educational members of the team discussed the severity and frequency of STUDENT’s behavioral problems, including incidents in which STUDENT hit Ms. Sandberg and Ms. Rivera while they worked with him. During the discussion, the team agreed that a functional analysis assessment was necessary in order to develop a behavior plan for STUDENT. Additionally, the team discussed STUDENT’s progress in the classroom and Ms. Sandberg reviewed the results of her speech and language assessment, which was conducted in October 2001. Ms. Sandberg also presented to the team her draft goals and objectives for STUDENT.
On or about November 7, 2001, Ms. Bear sent to the PARENTS by overnight mail a copy of the November 2, 2001 IEP, along with a copy of the District’s notice of parent rights and an assessment plan for the FAA recommended by the IEP team. Because of a clerical error, the package was returned to the District. On November 15, 2001, Ms. Bear resent by overnight mail the entire package, this time to the correct address. By all accounts, the PARENTS never consented to the FAA requested by the District or to the implementation of the November 2 IEP.
By letter dated November 13, 2001, MOTHER indicated that she would be taking STUDENT out of school at noon each day and that she would be rescheduling the discrete trial training therapy provided at school in the mornings to the afternoons and to be provided at home. MOTHER also again requested visitations to other district and SELPA inclusion programs. In response, Ms. Bear wrote the PARENTS explaining that changes to STUDENT’s schedule must be made by an IEP team, and she offered to schedule an IEP meeting to discuss their concerns. MOTHER declined the District’s offer to convene the IEP meeting and proceeded to remove STUDENT from school early. Ms. Bear also reiterated that the PARENTS had already visited all available inclusion programs at STUDENT’s home school, and she again referred the PARENTS to a SELPA representative who could respond to their questions regarding SELPA programs.
In the meantime, during October and November 2001, the District completed its triennial evaluation of STUDENT. The triennial evaluation included the occupational therapy assessment by Hannah Park, the assistive technology assessment by Terry Kappe, and the academic assessment by Mona Neter. During the last week of November or the first week of December, which was approximately two months after STUDENT had started attending Ms. Kawasaki’s class, the PARENTS withdrew STUDENT from Garfield Elementary School.
On December 12, 2001, the District notified the PARENTS of an IEP meeting to be held on December 18, 2001, as agreed to by the parties in their settlement agreement from September 2001. One purpose of the meeting was to review the results of STUDENT’s triennial evaluation and to develop new goals and objectives for STUDENT. MOTHER responded to the notice that she did not intend to attend the meeting. The IEP team eventually convened in the absence of the PARENTS. After the team reviewed the triennial evaluations and developed STUDENT’s goals and objectives, the members present all agreed to the recommendation that STUDENT be placed in a special day class at Wilson School. Additionally, the team recommended that STUDENT be provided speech and language services, adaptive physical education, occupational therapy services, discrete trial training therapy (along with DTT consultation and supervision), services of an autism consultant, assistive technology, and the services of a one-to-one aide.
A copy of the IEP was eventually mailed to the PARENTS for approval. To date, the PARENTS have withheld their consent to implement the IEP.
DISCUSSION
Under both State law and the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), students with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). 20 U.S.C. ' 1400; Education Code ' 56000. The term Afree appropriate public education@ means special education and related services that are available to the student at no charge to the parent or guardian, that meet the State educational standards, and that conform with the student=s individualized educational program (IEP). 20 U.S.C. ' 1401(a)(8).
The right to a FAPE also includes the important entitlement to certain procedural protections during the process of developing an individualized education program for a disabled child. W.G. v. Bd. of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992); Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205 (1982). Federal special education law requires states to establish and maintain certain procedural safeguards to ensure that each student with a disability receives the FAPE to which he/she is entitled and that parents are involved in the formulation of the student’s educational program. W.G., 960 F.2d at 1483 (9th Cir. 1992). In Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, the Supreme Court recognized the importance of adherence to the procedural requirements of the IDEA as part of the provision of FAPE. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205 (1982).
Accordingly, the analysis of whether a student has been provided a free appropriate public education (FAPE) is twofold, requiring the Hearing Officer to consider both whether procedural steps have been followed and whether the proposed placement and program are substantively appropriate. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206208.
I. Did the District offer and provide STUDENT with a FAPE from September 20, 2001, through the date of the IEP meeting on December 18, 2001?
As noted above, STUDENT was placed at Garfield Elementary School pursuant to a settlement agreement entered into by the parties on September 20, 2001. Petitioner’s placement remained the same from this date through December 2001, when his parents unilaterally removed him from Garfield School and when the District held an IEP meeting and recommended a change of placement to a special day class at Wilson School.(Footnote 3) Petitioner challenges the appropriateness of the Garfield placement and program.
Although Petitioner acknowledges that his parents entered into a settlement agreement that provided for a prospective educational placement, he argues that the settlement agreement does not waive claims past the date the agreement was signed on September 20, 2001. He also argued that his parents should not be bound by the settlement agreement because they did not understand the terms of the agreement when it was entered into. Alternatively, Petitioner essentially argues that the District breached the settlement agreement, thereby enabling him to rescind the contract and to raise claims regarding the appropriateness of the educational placement and program provided after the settlement agreement was signed on September 20, 2001. Additionally, Petitioner contends that, for him to receive a FAPE during this time period, the District should have provided him with the services contained in the settlement agreement as well as (1) increased services from the inclusion specialist, (2) a teacher adequately trained in the inclusion of students with disabilities such as STUDENT and in providing direct instruction to and modifying work for students such as STUDENT, and (3) adaptive physical education services.
The District contends that the settlement agreement was to provide for a placement to enable STUDENT to return to school pending the District’s assessments and the collection of information on his then-current needs. The District also contends that the PARENTS knowingly and voluntarily entered into the settlement agreement and that they should be bound by the contract terms. Additionally, the District disputes that it ever materially breached the settlement agreement and contends that it implemented the settlement agreement pursuant to the requirements of the agreement. The District also argues that any services not provided to Petitioner resulted directly from the PARENTS’ actions, such as terminating STUDENT’s school day early and unilaterally removing him from the Garfield placement.(Footnote 4) Moreover, the District argues that the settlement agreement resolved all issues pertaining to his educational placement during the time period from September 20, 2001 through December 18, 2001, when the IEP was to convene with completed assessments and information to discuss Petitioner’s placement in light of his then-current needs. Accordingly, the District argues that Petitioner is prohibited from raising issues regarding the appropriateness of the placement at hearing. In the alternative, the District asserts that the services outlined in the September 2001 settlement agreement were sufficient to provide STUDENT with a FAPE from the date of the agreement until December 18, 2001, when it developed an IEP and new offer of placement and program for STUDENT.
In light of the parties’ contentions, the Hearing Officer must decide whether the settlement agreement provides for a release and waiver of all of Petitioner’s educationally related claims through the date of the December 18, 2001 IEP meeting. If so, it must then be determined whether Petitioner has a basis to void the formation of the contract or to rescind the contract based on the District’s alleged breach. If the contract can be voided or rescinded, Petitioner would not be bound by the release and waiver of claims provisions in the settlement agreement and, thus, would be free to raise claims regarding the appropriateness of services provided during all or part of this time period. However, if the contract cannot be voided or rescinded, Petitioner would be bound by the settlement agreement and his issues regarding FAPE during this time period would have effectively been resolved by the agreement under contract law. In any event, the Hearing Officer looks to contract law in analyzing the parties’ settlement agreement.
A. Contract Interpretation: Did Petitioner waive claims between September 20, 2001, and December 18, 2001?
The law governing settlement agreements in California is clear. An agreement to settle a legal dispute is a contract and its enforceability is governed by familiar principles of contract law. Miller v. Fairchild Indus., 797 F.2d 727, 733 (9th Cir. 1986); Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 223 U.S. App. D.C. 39, 689 F.2d 222, 230 (D.C.Cir. 1982). In such a situation, each party agrees to "extinguish those legal rights it sought to enforce through litigation in exchange for those rights secured by the contract." Village of Kaktovik, 689 F.2d at 230; Protective Closures Co. v. Clover Inds., Inc., 394 F.2d 809, 812 (2d Cir. 1968). A release generally extends to all matters within the parties' contemplation at the time it is executed. Chadwick v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 33 Wn. App. 297, 654 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Wash.App. 1982).
At the time the parties in the present case entered into the settlement agreement, they were involved in a due process hearing regarding the appropriateness of Petitioner’s educational program and placement from the 2000-2001 school year forward and regarding the District’s right to conduct Petitioner’s triennial evaluations. Pursuant to the agreement, the purpose of the agreement was to “resolve all educational claims on Student’s behalf against the District (including those issues presented… in CSEHO Case No. SN 2071-00… [and] Case No. 258-01) through the date of this Agreement.” (Emphasis added.) The agreement also included a waiver of unknown claims, which provides that the settlement “resolves and settles any and all educational claims” through the date of the agreement. (Emphasis added.) The Hearing Officer notes that the settlement was signed on September 20, 2001. Thus, while the settlement agreement clearly waives all known and unknown claims through September 20, 2001, issues regarding Petitioner’s placement subsequent to September 20, 2001, would only be waived or released by the contract if those issues were included in the “issues presented” in the prior consolidated case, as referenced in the agreement. Because the settlement agreement does not state what the specific “claims” are that were resolved by the agreement and what issues were raised in the prior consolidated due process hearing case, it is necessary for the Hearing Officer to interpret the agreement to determine the intent of the parties. This consolidated matter was heard before Van T. Vu, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in Alhambra, California, on January 8, February 5, 6, 19, 20, 26, 27, and March 19 and 20, 2002.
STUDENT (STUDENT or Petitioner) was represented at the hearing by his parents, PARENTS.(Footnote 1) The Alhambra City Elementary School District (District) was represented at hearing by attorney Denise Godfrey, from the law firm of Lozano Smith. Laurel Bear, director of pupil services, was also present on behalf of the District.
The Petitioner called the following witnesses: Ana Marina Rivera, special education aide; Delcey Kawasaki, regular education teacher; Wendy Sandberg, speech and language pathologist; Kathleen Parente, STUDENT’s lead therapist from California PsychCare; Hannah Park, occupational therapist; Terry Kappe, speech and language therapist; Dr. Ali Sadeghi, licensed clinical psychologist; and Leili Zarbakhsh, licensed educational psychologist. Mr. and MOTHER also testified on STUDENT’s behalf.
The District called the following witnesses: Dr. Sandra Kaler, psychologist; Dr. Bruce Gale, clinical psychologist; Eileen Kaiser, adaptive physical education specialist; Mona Neter, inclusion specialist; and Laurel Bear.
Oral and documentary evidence was received and the record was left open for the submission of closing arguments. The parties’ closing arguments were received on April 9, 2002. The record was then closed, and the matter was submitted for decision.
PROCEDURAL MATTER
The District moved to dismiss Petitioner’s Issue I relating to the settlement agreement on two occasions prior to the parties’ presentation of their cases at hearing. Specifically, the District alleged that Petitioner was seeking to enforce the settlement agreement through the hearing process and that such an issue was outside the jurisdiction of the Hearing Office. On both occasions and by two different hearing officers, the District’s motion was denied.
The second denial by the present Hearing Officer at hearing was based, in part, on the determination that Petitioner’s issues reached beyond mere enforcement and implementation of the settlement agreement. Petitioner essentially argues that he did not waive claims beyond September 20, 2001, in the settlement agreement, even though the settlement agreement provides for prospective rights and obligations of the parties. In the alternative, Petitioner contends that the District materially breached the settlement agreement, which, according to the agreement itself, would provide a possible basis for rescission. Therefore, evidence needed to be taken at hearing regarding the scope of the release and waiver of claims provision in the settlement agreement and regarding Petitioner’s allegations of the District’s breach of the settlement agreement. Accordingly, a determination of these issues was necessary to determine whether Petitioner can even raise a FAPE claim regarding the time period at issue and, therefore, dismissal was inappropriate at that time.
ISSUES(Footnote 2)
I. Did the District offer and provide STUDENT with a FAPE from September 20, 2001, through the date of the IEP meeting on December 18, 2001?
II. Did the December 18, 2001 IEP offer STUDENT a FAPE?
III. With regard to the IEP meeting convened on November 2, 2001, did the District violate STUDENT’s procedural rights to a FAPE by
A. changing location of the meeting, thereby denying the parents an opportunity to participate in the meeting; B. distributing copies of the IEP before providing the parents a copy, without the parents’ signatures on the IEP, and without the parents’ consent to release such information; C. not providing the parents a copy of the IEP until three weeks after the IEP meeting; and D. continuing the former goals and objectives with new achievement dates?
IV. Were the following assessments conducted in 2001 appropriate:
A. the OT assessment, B. the speech and language assessment, C. the assistive technology assessment, D. the academic assessment dated December 2001, E. the psychology assessment conducted in August 2001, and F. the adaptive physical education assessment conducted in July 2001?
V. Is the District entitled to conduct a functional analysis assessment (FAA) of STUDENT?
VI. During the 2001-2002 school year, has the District improperly failed to keep the parents informed of STUDENT’s progress by
A. not providing any progress reports from the teacher, aide, and related service providers, and B. not informing the parents of any behavioral problems in the classroom?
VII. Are the parents entitled to receive a list of and information regarding other placements available in the District and special education local plan area (SELPA), as well as programs available elsewhere, that would provide STUDENT with a FAPE?
VIII. Is MOTHER entitled to visit STUDENT’s classroom every day?
IX. Did the District provide STUDENT with speech and language and OT services in accordance with his IEPS during the period between May 2001 and September 2001?
X. Is Petitioner entitled to compensatory education services?
XI. Is Petitioner entitled to independent educational evaluations?
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT is an eight-year-old student who resides within the jurisdictional boundaries of the Alhambra Elementary School District. STUDENT is eligible for special education and related services as a student with autistic-like behaviors and delayed oral language and reciprocal social interaction skills that adversely affect his communication. STUDENT is not currently attending public or private school; however, he is receiving twenty hours per week of home-based discrete trial training therapy from the District through California PsychCare, a nonpublic agency (NPA).
During the fall of 2000, STUDENT began the first grade. At the request of his parents, STUDENT’s IEP team placed him in a special day class at Sunrise School. At an IEP meeting held approximately two months after his placement in the special day class, the PARENTS requested that STUDENT be placed in a general education first grade classroom at Garfield Elementary School. According to FATHER, STUDENT was not challenged academically in the special day class and he began to exhibit negative behaviors such as tantrumming and refusing to attend school. The District members of the IEP team disagreed that STUDENT’s placement should be changed. On November 21, 2000, the PARENTS filed for a due process hearing to determine the appropriateness of the District’s offered and provided placement for the 2000-2001 school year. The Hearing Office assigned the matter case number SN 2071-00. Without notifying the District, the PARENTS withdrew STUDENT from the Sunrise School and eventually placed him at a school or childcare facility known as Childtime Children’s Center. Although the PARENTS refused to return STUDENT to the school district, they allowed the District to continue to provide STUDENT with discrete trial training services through California PsychCare from approximately November 2000 through September 2001. Additionally, during at least part of this time, STUDENT also received speech and language and occupational therapy services through the District.
In February 2001, STUDENT’s triennial assessments were due to be conducted. MOTHER disputed several aspects of the District’s right to conduct these assessments. As it became apparent that the parties would not be able to resolve their differences, the District filed its own request for a due process hearing to resolve issues regarding the District’s right to conduct STUDENT’s triennial assessment. The Hearing Office assigned the District’s matter case number SN 258-01. The Student’s case and the District’s case was eventually consolidated by the Hearing Office.
During most of February through September 2001, the consolidated case remained off-calendar while the parties attempted to resolve their issues informally. In June 2001, the parties entered into an “interim” stipulation, which permitted the District to conduct STUDENT’s triennial assessments subject to various terms and conditions. The stipulation allowed the District to assess STUDENT in the areas of academic/preacademic achievement, social adaptive behavior, psychomotor development, speech and language needs, assistive technology needs, and occupational therapy needs. During June and July 2001, the District was able to complete a psychological assessment by Dr. Sandra Kaler, an adaptive physical education assessment by Eileen Kaiser, and a discrete trial training report by California PsychCare. However, the PARENTS refused to allow the District to complete the remainder of its triennial assessment. As a result, the consolidated case was placed back on calendar.
On September 20, 2001, the parties appeared for hearing before another hearing officer. Prior to the presentation of evidence, the parties participated in settlement discussions. After negotiating most of the day, the parties reached a final settlement agreement and, as a result, the consolidated case was dismissed. The settlement agreement provided for, among other things, STUDENT’s full inclusion placement in a regular education classroom at Garfield Elementary School, inclusion support services, a full-time classroom aide, transportation from home to school and back, speech and language services for two hours per week, occupational therapy services for two hours per week, adaptive physical education services (commencing 30 days after his placement), discrete trial training (DTT) services for twenty hours per week, DTT supervision services for seventeen hours per week, autism consultant services for up to ten hours per month, and transition services to be coordinated by the District’s inclusion specialist. Additionally, the settlement agreement allowed the District to assess STUDENT beginning thirty days after the placement in the areas of assistive technology, occupational therapy, and academics/preacademics, and required the District to complete its speech and language assessment on or before October 29, 2001. An IEP meeting was to be held either on October 29, 2001, or November 2, 2001, at 9:00 a.m. for purposes of reviewing STUDENT’s goals and objectives. Furthermore, another IEP meeting was to convene on December 17 or 18, 2001, to review STUDENT’s triennial assessment reports.
According to Laurel Bear, the time period from September 20 through December 18 would have allowed the District to collect information on STUDENT, both in his educational placement and through the triennial evaluation. Thus, according to witness testimony, the IEP meeting on December 18, 2001, would be the first meeting with STUDENT’s IEP team at which the District had complete and current information on STUDENT’s needs. According to the District, the December IEP meeting was the event that would have ended the time period covered by the settlement agreement.
Soon after the settlement agreement was signed on September 20, 2000, the District arranged for the PARENTS to visit two regular education classrooms at Garfield Elementary School that had space available to accommodate STUDENT. After observing STUDENT’s behavior and comfort level during the classroom visits, the PARENTS chose to place STUDENT in Ms. Delcey Kawasaki’s class. In preparation for STUDENT’s return to the District, District inclusion specialist Mona Neter reviewed information from California PsycCare and met with Mrs. Kawasaki to provide her information on autism and to discuss STUDENT’s needs. Additionally, Ms. Neter assigned to Ms. Kawasaki’s class an instructional aide named Ana Rivera, who has extensive experience working with children with autism, to work with STUDENT in class and to ride with him on the school bus. Moreover, Ms. Neter coordinated the scheduling of STUDENT’s related services, taking into account the suggestions of MOTHER. STUDENT began attending Ms. Kawasaki’s class on September 24, 2001.
The parties understood that during STUDENT’s first week of school STUDENT would be transported to and from school by his parents and would only stay for a half day in order to ease his transition back to school. That week, STUDENT was often brought to school approximately a half-hour later than the rest of the children and would leave either at the midday or soon thereafter. According to the settlement agreement, STUDENT was to be transported to and from school by bus beginning the week of October 1, 2001. At that time, STUDENT was to attend school for the full school day. However, the PARENTS did not allow STUDENT to be bused to school until at least the second week of October and then only for one week. For most of the remainder of the two months he attended Garfield School, STUDENT continued to be brought to school late and taken home early and he also was frequently absent from school. FATHER was generally the parent who transported STUDENT to school, and he often stayed at school to observe STUDENT’s educational program and related services.
Also during STUDENT’s first week of school, MOTHER requested a parent-teacher conference with Ms. Kawasaki and Ms. Neter to discuss “inclusion, transition, and [STUDENT’s] progress” in the classroom. MOTHER also later requested a classroom visit to Ms. Kawasaki's class to occur after the parent/teacher conference. The District responded to MOTHER’s requests and eventually scheduled the conference for 7:30 a.m. on October 10, 2001, with the classroom visitation to occur immediately afterwards. During the exchange of correspondence between the PARENTS and the District regarding the scheduling of the conference, MOTHER also requested that the District arrange visits to “other elementary inclusion grade one classrooms in the District and in the SELPA.” By letter dated October 9, 2001, the District indicated that STUDENT was already placed in an inclusion program within his home school, that the PARENTS had already visited all available inclusion classrooms at STUDENT’s home school, and that any questions regarding the District’s programs could be addressed to Mona Neter at the November 2, 2001 IEP meeting. The District also referred the PARENTS to someone from the SELPA who could provide information about SELPA programs.
The parent-teacher conference eventually convened on October 10, 2001, as scheduled, but MOTHER did not appear. In her place, FATHER attended the meeting with a list of questions MOTHER wanted answered by Ms. Neter and Ms. Kawasaki. According to Ms. Neter, most of the conference was spent with Ms. Neter and Ms. Kawasaki responding to FATHER’s questions. She also testified that FATHER asked questions about the use of Ms. Rivera as STUDENT’s aide, but not much time was left to discuss STUDENT’s transition. Although Ms. Neter was available to further discuss STUDENT’s program with FATHER, once his questions were answered, he indicated that he needed to go home and, therefore, he did not take advantage of her offer. Apparently, no classroom visit occurred that day despite one having been arranged at the request of MOTHER.
Also about this time, STUDENT exhibited behaviors such as wandering around the room, running out of the classroom, pulling things from the walls and tables, hitting, kicking, and punching others, and tantrumming. When the behaviors began, Ms. Kawasaki directed STUDENT’s instructional assistant, Ana Rivera, to redirect STUDENT; however, STUDENT’s behaviors persisted. Additionally, Ms. Kawasaki spoke with the school psychologist, STUDENT’s discrete trial training therapists, FATHER, and Ms. Neter regarding STUDENT’s behaviors. According to Ms. Kawasaki, FATHER told her that he did not want to hear negative information about his son or to have negative information sent home. After STUDENT had been attending school for about one month, Ms. Kawasaki and Ms. Rivera began to maintain a “behavior log,” describing STUDENT’s behaviors in class each day until he was disenrolled. By all accounts, the behavior logs were never sent home to the PARENTS.
On or about October 19, 2001, the District sent the PARENTS a notice of the IEP meeting to be held on November 2, 2001, at 9:00 a.m. at Garfield Elementary School. As stated in the settlement agreement, the purpose of the IEP meeting was to review and implement STUDENT’s goals and objectives. MOTHER signed the notice on October 22, 2001, indicating that she would attend the IEP meeting, and she returned the document to the District the next day. Attached to the signed notice of IEP meeting was a request from MOTHER that a classroom visit to Ms. Kawasaki’s class be arranged during the hour prior to the IEP meeting. By letter, the District obliged MOTHER’s request and arranged for a classroom visit to occur at 8:30 a.m. the morning of the IEP meeting. However, MOTHER did not arrive for the scheduled classroom visit on November 2, 2001. To accommodate the large number of attendees at the IEP meeting, the District moved the meeting from Garfield Elementary School to the adjacently located district offices only a “couple” of minutes walking distance away. When FATHER arrived at the school, he was directed to the new IEP room, where he waited for MOTHER to arrive. Sometime after 9:00 a.m., MOTHER arrived at the office at Garfield School, where Ms. Neter stood waiting for her. Upon being informed that the meeting location had been changed, MOTHER refused to attend the meeting.
Learning that MOTHER had arrived at the school, Ms. Bear and school principal Ms. Mercer went to the office to direct MOTHER to the IEP meeting location. As they approached the office, a school custodian who was nearby spoke briefly with Mrs. Mercer. Seeing the custodian talking to Ms. Mercer, MOTHER assumed that he was a security guard who was ready to call the police to have her arrested. MOTHER testified that she refused to attend the IEP meeting because she felt Ms. Bear and Ms. Mercer were threatening her with possible imprisonment. After indicating that she would not attend the meeting, MOTHER called FATHER at the IEP location regarding the events that had just transpired. FATHER then left the IEP meeting before it began, despite requests from members of the IEP team to stay.
The IEP meeting eventually convened in the absence of the PARENTS. At the meeting, the educational members of the team discussed the severity and frequency of STUDENT’s behavioral problems, including incidents in which STUDENT hit Ms. Sandberg and Ms. Rivera while they worked with him. During the discussion, the team agreed that a functional analysis assessment was necessary in order to develop a behavior plan for STUDENT. Additionally, the team discussed STUDENT’s progress in the classroom and Ms. Sandberg reviewed the results of her speech and language assessment, which was conducted in October 2001. Ms. Sandberg also presented to the team her draft goals and objectives for STUDENT.
On or about November 7, 2001, Ms. Bear sent to the PARENTS by overnight mail a copy of the November 2, 2001 IEP, along with a copy of the District’s notice of parent rights and an assessment plan for the FAA recommended by the IEP team. Because of a clerical error, the package was returned to the District. On November 15, 2001, Ms. Bear resent by overnight mail the entire package, this time to the correct address. By all accounts, the PARENTS never consented to the FAA requested by the District or to the implementation of the November 2 IEP.
By letter dated November 13, 2001, MOTHER indicated that she would be taking STUDENT out of school at noon each day and that she would be rescheduling the discrete trial training therapy provided at school in the mornings to the afternoons and to be provided at home. MOTHER also again requested visitations to other district and SELPA inclusion programs. In response, Ms. Bear wrote the PARENTS explaining that changes to STUDENT’s schedule must be made by an IEP team, and she offered to schedule an IEP meeting to discuss their concerns. MOTHER declined the District’s offer to convene the IEP meeting and proceeded to remove STUDENT from school early. Ms. Bear also reiterated that the PARENTS had already visited all available inclusion programs at STUDENT’s home school, and she again referred the PARENTS to a SELPA representative who could respond to their questions regarding SELPA programs.
In the meantime, during October and November 2001, the District completed its triennial evaluation of STUDENT. The triennial evaluation included the occupational therapy assessment by Hannah Park, the assistive technology assessment by Terry Kappe, and the academic assessment by Mona Neter. During the last week of November or the first week of December, which was approximately two months after STUDENT had started attending Ms. Kawasaki’s class, the PARENTS withdrew STUDENT from Garfield Elementary School.
On December 12, 2001, the District notified the PARENTS of an IEP meeting to be held on December 18, 2001, as agreed to by the parties in their settlement agreement from September 2001. One purpose of the meeting was to review the results of STUDENT’s triennial evaluation and to develop new goals and objectives for STUDENT. MOTHER responded to the notice that she did not intend to attend the meeting. The IEP team eventually convened in the absence of the PARENTS. After the team reviewed the triennial evaluations and developed STUDENT’s goals and objectives, the members present all agreed to the recommendation that STUDENT be placed in a special day class at Wilson School. Additionally, the team recommended that STUDENT be provided speech and language services, adaptive physical education, occupational therapy services, discrete trial training therapy (along with DTT consultation and supervision), services of an autism consultant, assistive technology, and the services of a one-to-one aide.
A copy of the IEP was eventually mailed to the PARENTS for approval. To date, the PARENTS have withheld their consent to implement the IEP.
DISCUSSION
Under both State law and the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), students with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). 20 U.S.C. ' 1400; Education Code ' 56000. The term Afree appropriate public education@ means special education and related services that are available to the student at no charge to the parent or guardian, that meet the State educational standards, and that conform with the student=s individualized educational program (IEP). 20 U.S.C. ' 1401(a)(8).
The right to a FAPE also includes the important entitlement to certain procedural protections during the process of developing an individualized education program for a disabled child. W.G. v. Bd. of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992); Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205 (1982). Federal special education law requires states to establish and maintain certain procedural safeguards to ensure that each student with a disability receives the FAPE to which he/she is entitled and that parents are involved in the formulation of the student’s educational program. W.G., 960 F.2d at 1483 (9th Cir. 1992). In Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, the Supreme Court recognized the importance of adherence to the procedural requirements of the IDEA as part of the provision of FAPE. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205 (1982).
Accordingly, the analysis of whether a student has been provided a free appropriate public education (FAPE) is twofold, requiring the Hearing Officer to consider both whether procedural steps have been followed and whether the proposed placement and program are substantively appropriate. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206208.
I. Did the District offer and provide STUDENT with a FAPE from September 20, 2001, through the date of the IEP meeting on December 18, 2001?
As noted above, STUDENT was placed at Garfield Elementary School pursuant to a settlement agreement entered into by the parties on September 20, 2001. Petitioner’s placement remained the same from this date through December 2001, when his parents unilaterally removed him from Garfield School and when the District held an IEP meeting and recommended a change of placement to a special day class at Wilson School.(Footnote 3) Petitioner challenges the appropriateness of the Garfield placement and program.
Although Petitioner acknowledges that his parents entered into a settlement agreement that provided for a prospective educational placement, he argues that the settlement agreement does not waive claims past the date the agreement was signed on September 20, 2001. He also argued that his parents should not be bound by the settlement agreement because they did not understand the terms of the agreement when it was entered into. Alternatively, Petitioner essentially argues that the District breached the settlement agreement, thereby enabling him to rescind the contract and to raise claims regarding the appropriateness of the educational placement and program provided after the settlement agreement was signed on September 20, 2001. Additionally, Petitioner contends that, for him to receive a FAPE during this time period, the District should have provided him with the services contained in the settlement agreement as well as (1) increased services from the inclusion specialist, (2) a teacher adequately trained in the inclusion of students with disabilities such as STUDENT and in providing direct instruction to and modifying work for students such as STUDENT, and (3) adaptive physical education services.
The District contends that the settlement agreement was to provide for a placement to enable STUDENT to return to school pending the District’s assessments and the collection of information on his then-current needs. The District also contends that the PARENTS knowingly and voluntarily entered into the settlement agreement and that they should be bound by the contract terms. Additionally, the District disputes that it ever materially breached the settlement agreement and contends that it implemented the settlement agreement pursuant to the requirements of the agreement. The District also argues that any services not provided to Petitioner resulted directly from the PARENTS’ actions, such as terminating STUDENT’s school day early and unilaterally removing him from the Garfield placement.(Footnote 4) Moreover, the District argues that the settlement agreement resolved all issues pertaining to his educational placement during the time period from September 20, 2001 through December 18, 2001, when the IEP was to convene with completed assessments and information to discuss Petitioner’s placement in light of his then-current needs. Accordingly, the District argues that Petitioner is prohibited from raising issues regarding the appropriateness of the placement at hearing. In the alternative, the District asserts that the services outlined in the September 2001 settlement agreement were sufficient to provide STUDENT with a FAPE from the date of the agreement until December 18, 2001, when it developed an IEP and new offer of placement and program for STUDENT.
In light of the parties’ contentions, the Hearing Officer must decide whether the settlement agreement provides for a release and waiver of all of Petitioner’s educationally related claims through the date of the December 18, 2001 IEP meeting. If so, it must then be determined whether Petitioner has a basis to void the formation of the contract or to rescind the contract based on the District’s alleged breach. If the contract can be voided or rescinded, Petitioner would not be bound by the release and waiver of claims provisions in the settlement agreement and, thus, would be free to raise claims regarding the appropriateness of services provided during all or part of this time period. However, if the contract cannot be voided or rescinded, Petitioner would be bound by the settlement agreement and his issues regarding FAPE during this time period would have effectively been resolved by the agreement under contract law. In any event, the Hearing Officer looks to contract law in analyzing the parties’ settlement agreement.
A. Contract Interpretation: Did Petitioner waive claims between September 20, 2001, and December 18, 2001?
The law governing settlement agreements in California is clear. An agreement to settle a legal dispute is a contract and its enforceability is governed by familiar principles of contract law. Miller v. Fairchild Indus., 797 F.2d 727, 733 (9th Cir. 1986); Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 223 U.S. App. D.C. 39, 689 F.2d 222, 230 (D.C.Cir. 1982). In such a situation, each party agrees to "extinguish those legal rights it sought to enforce through litigation in exchange for those rights secured by the contract." Village of Kaktovik, 689 F.2d at 230; Protective Closures Co. v. Clover Inds., Inc., 394 F.2d 809, 812 (2d Cir. 1968). A release generally extends to all matters within the parties' contemplation at the time it is executed. Chadwick v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 33 Wn. App. 297, 654 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Wash.App. 1982).
At the time the parties in the present case entered into the settlement agreement, they were involved in a due process hearing regarding the appropriateness of Petitioner’s educational program and placement from the 2000-2001 school year forward and regarding the District’s right to conduct Petitioner’s triennial evaluations. Pursuant to the agreement, the purpose of the agreement was to “resolve all educational claims on Student’s behalf against the District (including those issues presented… in CSEHO Case No. SN 2071-00… [and] Case No. 258-01) through the date of this Agreement.” (Emphasis added.) The agreement also included a waiver of unknown claims, which provides that the settlement “resolves and settles any and all educational claims” through the date of the agreement. (Emphasis added.) The Hearing Officer notes that the settlement was signed on September 20, 2001. Thus, while the settlement agreement clearly waives all known and unknown claims through September 20, 2001, issues regarding Petitioner’s placement subsequent to September 20, 2001, would only be waived or released by the contract if those issues were included in the “issues presented” in the prior consolidated case, as referenced in the agreement. Because the settlement agreement does not state what the specific “claims” are that were resolved by the agreement and what issues were raised in the prior consolidated due process hearing case, it is necessary for the Hearing Officer to interpret the agreement to determine the intent of the parties. According to the California Supreme Court, the primary objective in interpreting a contract is to “ascertain and carry out the intention of the parties.” City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court, 914 P.2d 160, 164 (1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 511 (1996). When a contract is unclear or ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be admitted to aid the interpretation of a written contract. Pacific Gas and Electric v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33 (1968). To determine the admissibility of extrinsic evidence, the fact finder must engage in a preliminary consideration of all credible extrinsic evidence to determine “whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible.” Id. At 37. If the fact finder concludes that the proffered interpretation is reasonable, the extrinsic evidence relative to those meanings is admissible to determine what agreement the parties in fact made. If the contract is not reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning, then the interpretative process should conclude after the court has completed its preliminary look at the context and the extrinsic evidence. Id. It is not clear from the reading of the agreement whether the waiver and release provision covers the time period subsequent to September 20, 2001. Petitioner, in asserting issues outside of the agreement, appears to contend that the agreement did not waive claims subsequent to September 20, 2001. To the contrary, the District asserts that the agreement did in fact cover the time period through December 18, 2001, which would effectively bar Petitioner from raising FAPE claims regarding this time period. The four corners of the settlement agreement strongly indicate that the parties intended to resolve issues regarding Petitioner’s prospective placement from September 20, 2001, through December 18, 2001. According to the agreement, Petitioner was to be placed at Garfield Elementary School with specific services pending the District’s assessment and an IEP meeting in December 2001 to review the assessment results and to determine the proper placement and program for Petitioner. Thus, the agreement itself provided for the parties’ prospective rights and obligations during the fall of the 2001-2002 school year. Similarly, Laurel Bear testified that at the time of the settlement agreement, Petitioner had not been attending school within the District for almost one year, and the District was seeking to assess him to determine an appropriate placement and services for him. Therefore, the agreement reached by the parties provided for a placement at which Petitioner could return pending the District’s collection of information about Petitioner’s needs through the assessment process. Moreover, the documentary evidence provided by the parties also establishes that the parties were concerned about Petitioner’s prospective placement for the 2001-2002 school year when they convened for hearing on September 20, 2001. (See Dist. Exhs. 37, 39, and 40.) In letters between the District and MOTHER, Petitioner’s placement for the 2001-2002 school year was indicated as an issue to be resolved at the due process hearing on September 20, 2001. In reaching the agreement, the parties agreed that all issues regarding case SN 2071-00/SN 258-00 had been resolved, and they did not object to the then presiding Hearing Officer dismissing the case accordingly. On the other hand, no evidence was presented to support Petitioner’s interpretation of the agreement. In light of the reading of the settlement agreement as a whole and the uncontested extrinsic evidence presented by the parties, only the District’s interpretation of the agreement is reasonable or supported. Thus, the Hearing Officer finds that the parties’ waiver of claims provision in the settlement agreement encompassed the parties’ intent to resolve all issues regarding Petitioner’s placement from September 20, 2001, through at least December 18, 2001. B. Contract Formation: Was the settlement agreement validly formed? The PARENTS argue next that the settlement agreement should be voided because they did not understand the terms of the agreement and were rushed into signing the agreement. “Ordinarily, one who accepts or signs an instrument, which on its face is a contract, is deemed to assent to all its terms….” 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, Contracts, § 89. Accordingly, when a person with the capacity of reading and understanding an instrument signs it, he is bound by its contents and is estopped from maintaining that its provisions are contrary to his intentions or understanding. Edwards v. Comstock Ins. Co., 205 Cal. App. 3d 1164, 1167, 252 Cal.Rtpr. 807 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1988). In Brant, the California Supreme Court stated, “[W]here the terms of an agreement are set forth in writing, and the words are not equivocal or ambiguous[,] the writing or writings will constitute the contract of the parties, and one party is not permitted to escape from its obligations by showing that he did not intend to do what his words bound him to do.” Brant v. California Dairies, Inc., 4 Cal.2d 128, 134, 48 P.2d 13 (Cal. 1935).
The evidence does not support Petitioner’s contentions. There is no evidence that the PARENTS labored under any physical or mental disability at the time of contracting. Nor did they declare that they were unable to comprehend the plain language of the agreement. Additionally, there was no evidence that they placed such trust and confidence in the District that they were not dealing at arm’s length when they negotiated the settlement and release. In fact, the converse is true. As noted above, at the time of the settlement negotiations, the parties were engaged in a due process hearing and hence had adopted an adversarial stance. Furthermore, the PARENTS acknowledged during testimony that the negotiations for settlement lasted the better part of a business day and that they offered amendments to the District’s settlement offers that were discussed with the District at length and later incorporated into the final settlement agreement. The settlement agreement itself also contains a provision that states that each party “acknowledges and warrants that the party’s execution of this agreement is free and voluntary.” Because all of the terms of the settlement agreement were understandable, the PARENTS’ absolute and unqualified acceptance of the settlement offer resulted in the parties having entered into a binding contract. Without some reasonable expectation that parties will be held to the terms of the settlement agreements they have entered into, parents and school districts alike will be loathe to expend the time, energy, and money necessary to resolve special education disputes informally.
C. Contract Rescission: Did the District materially breach the agreement?
As noted above, Petitioner also argues that the settlement agreement should be rescinded because the District breached various provisions of the settlement agreement. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that the District breached the settlement agreement by failing to fully implement the agreement with respect to the provision of (1) occupational therapy (OT) services, (2) the services of a full-time aide, (3) discrete trial training therapy (DTT), (4) the services of an autism consultant, (5) the opportunity for parent input and participation in the transition process, (6) assistive technology services, (7) physical education services, and (8) adaptive physical education services.
Where, as here, the parties have dealt openly with each other, the written manifestation of their agreement is binding as the deliberate and definite expression of their intention, subject to rights of rescission where they exist. Larsen v. Johannes, 7 Cal. App. 3d 491, 503 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1970). The settlement agreement entered into by the parties provides that a breach of one of the provisions results in a breach of the entire agreement. Specifically, the agreement states:
This agreement contains the entire agreement between the parties. A breach of any portion of this Agreement shall be considered a breach of the whole Agreement. Should either party breach any portion of this Agreement, the breaching party shall forfeit any and all consideration promised or received under the terms of this Agreement.
In United Elec., R. & M. Wkrs. v. National Labor Rel. Bd. (1955) 223 F.2d 338, 341 (96 App.D.C. 46), the court stated, “It is general law that one party to a contract need not perform if the other party refuses in a material respect to do so.” Accordingly, a breach will justify rescission of an agreement only when it is “of so material and substantial a nature that [it] affects the very essence of the contract and serves to defeat the object of the parties . . . . [The breach must constitute] a total failure in the performance of the contract.” Rano v. SIPA Press, Inc., 987 F.2d. 580, 586 (9th Cir. 1993). “After considerable performance, a slight breach which does not go “to the root’ of the contract will not justify termination.” Id. Additionally, prevention or hindrance of the other party’s performance operates as an excuse for the nonperformance. 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, § 794.
1. Occupational Therapy
The settlement agreement provides that STUDENT was to receive two hours per week of occupational therapy services during the 2001-2002 school year. Petitioner asserts that the District failed to provide him with approximately twelve to fourteen hours of OT services between September 20, 2001, and December 18, 2001.
According to the testimony of occupational therapist Hannah Park, Ms. Park’s therapy logs, and the District’s OT therapy billing statements, STUDENT was provided his services from the date of the settlement agreement through the beginning of the last week of October 2001. Between the last week of October and December 18, 2001, STUDENT did not receive any OT therapy services. According to Ms. Park, she could not provide one of the one-hour therapy sessions due to her back strain. Ms. Park testified also that the rest of the therapy sessions were not provided because of shortened school days and holidays or because STUDENT was removed from school early or was absent on the days that he was to receive therapy. As noted above, STUDENT was withdrawn from Garfield School either the last week of November 2001 or the first week of December 2001. Ms. Park testified that she has been ready and willing to provide STUDENT with OT services and to make up for the session she cancelled should STUDENT return to school.
While it is clear that STUDENT did not receive all of his OT therapy sessions during this time period at issue, it is also clear from the record that the District was responsible for missing only one one-hour session due to Ms. Park’s back strain. However, the District sought to make up the session, and the failure to provide the one session alone does not constitute a material breach to the agreement. Regarding the other missed sessions, there was no dispute that the District was not required to provide the OT therapy sessions that were scheduled on school holidays or shortened days.
The remainder of missed sessions is excusable due to the PARENTS’s hindrance of the District’s ability to provide STUDENT the services by removing him from school. Because the District could not reasonably provide services to STUDENT when his parents failed to make him available for the services, the District’s failure to provide services during this time cannot be held against the District. In summary, although STUDENT missed a significant portion of his OT therapy, the District stood ready to provide the services, and the missed sessions were attributable to the misconduct of the PARENTS.
2. Full-Time Aide
Pursuant to the settlement agreement, STUDENT was to be provided a “classroom aide” and an “aide to ride on the bus with Student.” The uncontested testimony presented by the District established that the “classroom aide” to be provided to Petitioner is equivalent to a one-to-one aide. Petitioner contends that he was denied the full services of a classroom aide because the aide did not remain with him while he received direct services from his other service providers. He does not dispute that he received aide services while he rode on the school bus. In response, the District contends that the settlement agreement does not require that an aide be by Petitioner’s side at all times, particularly when he is accompanied by another adult.
The undisputed evidence established that STUDENT’s aide, Ana Rivera, worked with STUDENT at all times that he was not working directly with his teacher or another adult service provider. Therefore, Ms. Rivera fulfilled her responsibility to provide one-to-one services to STUDENT while he was in Ms. Kawasaki’s classroom, and STUDENT was always provided individual instruction throughout the day. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that such provision of aide services was consistent with the settlement agreement, and the fact that Ms. Rivera did not work with STUDENT while he was with another adult does not constitute a breach of the agreement.
Moreover, even if Ms. Rivera were required to remain at STUDENT’s side at all times, her failure to provide aide services while STUDENT was with another adult is not a material breach that would warrant rescission of the contract. There appears to be no dispute that Ms. Rivera’s services were intended to assist STUDENT to be fully included in Ms. Kawasaki’s regular education classroom. According to Ms. Rivera, her duties included modifying work for STUDENT and assisting him with the instruction during class time. While STUDENT was receiving designated instructional services (DIS) from his other service providers, STUDENT did not require Ms. Rivera’s services. STUDENT’s speech and language, OT, and DTT services were all provided to him on a one-to-one basis by the service providers. Furthermore, all of the service providers testified that Ms. Rivera’s services were not needed during their therapy sessions with STUDENT. In fact, one of STUDENT’s DTT therapists testified that Ms. Rivera’s presence distracted STUDENT from his therapy. Because the evidence establishes that Ms. Rivera’s services were not necessary during STUDENT’s DIS therapy to assist in STUDENT’s integration into the regular education environment, and because the intent of the parties regarding aide services was to assist STUDENT with his transition into the regular education environment, any failure to provide the aide services did not result in a material breach of the agreement warranting rescission of the contract.
3. Discrete Trial Training
The settlement agreement provides that STUDENT would be provided twenty hours per week of discrete trial training services. The time period from September 20, 2001, through the date of the December 18, 2001 IEP equals approximately twelve and a half weeks, which also equals approximately 250 hours of DTT services. Petitioner argues that the District failed to provide him with at least fifty hours of direct DTT services.
According to the District’s billing records, STUDENT received approximately 181 hours of DTT therapy between September 20 and December 18, 2001. Additionally, STUDENT was provided approximately ten hours of “make-up” DTT therapy during the District’s winter break after December 18, 2001. (Test. of Dr. Sadeghi and Dist. Exh. 92.) Because STUDENT was not provided approximately a quarter of the services he was entitled to under the contract, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District has failed to perform its obligation to provide DTT services under the agreement. The Hearing Officer turns next to whether the missed hours were excusable, material, and would warrant rescission of the contract. The evidence establishes that it does not.
The Hearing Officer notes that most of the missed DTT hours occurred during the month of November 2001 (approximately 40 hours). According to Dr. Sadeghi, MOTHER requested that one of STUDENT’s DTT therapist (Sayaka) be removed and replaced sometime at the beginning of October or the beginning of November 2001. Dr. Sadeghi testified that MOTHER refused to allow Sayaka to provide services to STUDENT until he was able to hire and train another therapist to work with STUDENT. He also testified that he explained to MOTHER that STUDENT’s services would be disrupted without another therapist to cover Sayaka’s hours, but she continued to refuse services from Sayaka. Additionally, Dr. Sadeghi stated that although he had a male therapist who would have been able to provide DTT therapy to STUDENT in Sayaka’s absence, MOTHER refused services from any male therapist. Thus, Dr. Sadeghi was unable to provide STUDENT with therapy services because of MOTHER’s refusal of Sayaka’s services and because it took time for him to find a replacement therapist acceptable to MOTHER. Because the PARENTS blocked the District’s ability to provide a significant amount of these services by refusing the services from Sayaka and forcing the District to search for a new therapist, most of the missed hours are the fault of the parents and are excusable.
The remaining missed hours are also largely the result of the parents’ conduct and do not constitute a material breach of its obligations. The record establishes that STUDENT’s inability to attend school and to receive his services was caused by his parents despite the efforts of the District. There is no dispute that STUDENT was to receive at least half of his DTT services at Garfield School, in part, to assist with his transition. However, the PARENTS removed him from school approximately two months after he started school. Although STUDENT was removed from school, the District continued to provide him with DTT services (all in the home environment) although they arguably had no obligation to do so. In summary, because the District’s nonperformance was largely excusable and did not result in a material breach, the nonperformance does not warrant rescission of the settlement agreement.
4. Autism Consultant
The Settlement agreement provides that STUDENT would receive “up to ten hours per month” of “consultative services from an autism consultant in collaboration with the District’s inclusion specialist.” Petitioner argues that the District failed to provide him with any autism consultation services, which should have totaled approximately thirty hours of services.
Petitioner’s argument again fails. First, the agreement requires that the District provide “up to” ten hours of consultative services per month and not “a total” of ten hours of services per month. Thus, the failure to provide the maximum services does not create a breach of the agreement. Second, the evidence established that Petitioner was in fact provided with significant autism consultative services. According to the uncontested testimony of Ms. Neter and Dr. Sadeghi, Dr. Sadeghi and Alana Hampton were the autism consultants who worked with her on STUDENT’s case. Ms. Neter and Dr. Sadehi stated that they met for approximately two hours soon after STUDENT enrolled at Garfield. Ms. Neter also testified that she and Ms. Hampton met or spoke on the phone almost every week to discuss STUDENT’s inclusion in Ms. Kawasaki’s classroom. Ms. Neter further stated that the meetings and phone calls with Ms. Hampton lasted from a half hour to two hours each. From the uncontroverted evidence that the District provided autism consultant services to STUDENT, the Hearing Officer concludes that there was no breach of the settlement agreement here.
5. Parent Input and Participation in the Transition Process
The PARENTS contend that the District breached the settlement agreement by denying them input and participation in STUDENT’s transition process. However, the settlement agreement does not specifically require the District to ensure parent input and participation in the transition process. Rather, the only provision in the settlement agreement that references parent involvement relates to the definition of the role of the inclusion specialist. Specifically, the agreement states that a role of the inclusion specialist is to coordinate transition services, which include the scheduling and coordination of team meetings that are to “include parents.” There is no dispute that Ms. Neter, the District’s inclusion specialist, arranged for at least one meeting that included Ms. Neter, Mrs. Kawasaki, and the PARENTS to discuss Petitioner’s transition to Garfield School. Although Ms. Neter also scheduled a transition planning meeting during the first week of Petitioner’s enrollment at Garfield that did not include the PARENTS, nothing in the contract states that all transition meetings must include parent attendance. In light of the above, there is no indication that the District was to involve the PARENTS in STUDENT’s transition process beyond what it has already done. Accordingly, the record is absent of any support for Petitioner’s allegation that the District breached the settlement agreement here.
6. Assistive Technology
Petitioner asserts that he should have been provided twenty to twenty-four hours of assistive technology services and that he was denied these services. However, the settlement agreement provides that STUDENT would be assessed for assistive technology services and that an IEP meeting would convene on December 17 or 18, 2001, to review the assessment results and recommendations. Thus, pursuant to the agreement, Petitioner would not be provided assistive technology services until at least the IEP meeting in December 2001, and then only if the PARENTS consented to the services recommended by the District members of the IEP team. Because Petitioner was not entitled to any assistive technology services under the settlement agreement during the time period at issue, the fact that the District did not provide him these services did not result in a breach of any provision of the contract.
7. Physical Education
The settlement agreement does not address physical education at all. Despite this, Petitioner argues that he should have been provided physical education service in accordance with state standards. Because there was no provision in the agreement regarding physical education, the District had no obligation in this area that it could have breached.
8. Adaptive Physical Education
Pursuant to the settlement agreement, Petitioner was to receive adaptive physical education services in accordance with the recommendations contained in the assessment report of Eileen Kaiser. The agreement further states that APE services would not commence immediately, but that the commencement of the APE services would be determined at the November 2, 2001 IEP meeting. Petitioner argues that he should have been provided one hour per week of adaptive physical education services and that he was denied such services.
There is no support for Petitioner’s allegation of a breach in the agreement here. First, the settlement agreement did not provide that he would receive APE services until at least the date of the IEP meeting in November, when the commencement of such services would be determined by the IEP team. Thus, Petitioner was not entitled to APE services from the District from September 20, 2001, when the settlement agreement was signed, until at least November 2, 2001. Second, although the IEP team convened in November 2001, the PARENTS were not present to consent to the provision of APE services. In fact, the PARENTS continued to withhold consent for both the District’s November and December 2001 IEPs through the date of the hearing. By placing the determination regarding the commencement of the APE services on the IEP team, the consent of the PARENTS, as part of the IEP team, was necessary for the implementation of the services. Because the District was not required to provide APE services under the settlement agreement, and could not provide services without parent consent to receive services, the Hearing Officer finds that any failure to provide APE services during this time did not result in a breach of the settlement agreement.
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In summary, it was concluded above that the parties’ settlement agreement was intended to resolve all issues and to waive the claims regarding Petitioner’s placement through December 18, 2001. Additionally, it was determined above that the contract was a validly formed contract and that there was no basis to rescind the agreement. Accordingly, the parties are bound to terms of the agreement and Petitioner cannot now raise claims regarding FAPE for this time period after having waived the right to those claims in the agreement.(Footnote 5) Therefore, the effect of the settlement agreement renders the issue of FAPE for this time period moot, and it is not necessary to discuss whether the District should have provided services beyond those agreed to in the settlement agreement to provide Petitioner with a FAPE.
II. Did the December 18, 2001 IEP offer STUDENT a FAPE?
Under the IDEA and the decision of the Supreme Court in Rowley, an appropriate educational program must be designed to meet the student’s unique needs, provide the student with some educational benefit, and conform with the IEP. (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District, et al. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). In determining whether the school district has offered a FAPE, the focus is on the adequacy of the district’s proposed program. Gregory K. v. Longview School District, 811 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1987). If the District has offered a FAPE, the district is not required to place the student in the program preferred by the parents, even if the preferred program is likely to result in greater educational benefit to the student than the district’s program. Id.
Petitioner contends that the District’s offer contained in the December 18, 2001 IEP was not an offer of FAPE because the District’s offer was not designed to meet his unique and individual needs. Petitioner argues that he requires an aide to accompany him at all times. Additionally, Petitioner asserts the level of services offered by the District regarding certain DIS services was insufficient. The District asserts that the placement and services offered in the December 18, 2001 IEP constituted an offer of FAPE.
Before it can be determined whether the District’s offered placement and program is designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs, it is necessary to first determine what those needs are. The testimony of witnesses and the results of testing all describe STUDENT as a child with autistic-like behaviors and delays in cognition, communication, social skills, and gross and fine motor skills. Generally, STUDENT has basic academic skills at the 4-to-5-year level and social adaptive skills at the 3-to-4-year level. Additionally, STUDENT has apraxia, which impacts his oral motor abilities, and expressive and receptive language delays, which manifest as difficulty with articulation, following directions, and social language. There is also evidence that STUDENT has exhibited significant behavioral problems. According to everyone who testified, except MOTHER, STUDENT’s behaviors include wandering around the room, running out of the classroom, pulling things from the walls and tables, hitting, kicking, and punching others, and tantrumming. Additionally, the witness testimony established that STUDENT is very distractible and has difficulty staying on task. In summary, Petitioner requires an educational program that provides individualized instruction, addresses his behaviors, distractibility, and provides DIS services to address his language, OT, and social difficulties.
In its December 18, 2001 IEP, the District offered Petitioner placement in a special day class (SDC) at Wilson Elementary School. Additionally, the District recommended that STUDENT receive individual speech and language services four times per week for thirty-minute sessions, individual occupational therapy twice per week for sixty-minute sessions, individual adaptive physical education services twice per week for thirty-minute sessions, and autism consultation services for ten hours per month. Petitioner disputes the appropriateness of the special day class placement. However, he does not dispute that he requires the DIS services offered by the District, and the appropriate level and frequency of these DIS services are not at issue.(Footnote 6)
The District also offered Petitioner a one-to-one instructional aide, DTT in the home for ten hours per week, DTT supervision for six hours per month, and DTT consultation for two hours per week. Additionally, the District offered assistive technology consultation services to the classroom teacher, a one-to-one aide, and a speech and language pathologist at duration of eight hours during Petitioner’s first month in his placement, four hours during the second month of Petitioner’s placement, and two hours per month for each month thereafter.
Petitioner argues that he requires a full-time aide that accompanies him at all times while at school, including when he attends individual DIS therapy with his service providers. Additionally, although Petitioner does not dispute the type of DIS services that was offered, he disputes that the level of services offered were sufficient to meet his needs. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that he requires two hours per week of assistive technology services, twenty hours per week of DTT, to be provided both at home and at school, seventeen hours per month of DTT consultation services, and two hours per week of autism consultation services. Each of Petitioner’s contentions will be discussed below to determine if the services and placement offered by the District were designed to meet his unique needs and were reasonably calculated to provide him with educational benefit. Because Petitioner was never made available for the District’s offered placement and program, it is unnecessary to determine if the actual placement and program was properly implemented and comported with his IEP.
A. Full-time Aide
Contrary to Petitioner’s arguments, the evidence establishes that STUDENT does not require the assistance of an instructional aide while he is being provided individual instruction and services from another adult. As noted above, the parties do not dispute that STUDENT requires individualized instruction to meet his needs and to benefit from his education. While STUDENT is with his teacher and service providers, he is with an adult who can provide him with individualized instruction and assist him with staying on task. In fact, all of the direct DIS services that STUDENT would be provided under the IEP are presented on a one-to-one basis. Therefore, the aide’s presence is not necessary for STUDENT to receive individualized instruction during the times he is with another adult. Furthermore, Ms. Sandberg, Ms. Park, and Ms. Parente (STUDENT’s speech pathologist, OT therapist, and DTT therapist, respectively) all testified that they did not require the assistance of the instructional aide during their therapy with STUDENT. In fact, Ms. Parente testified that the presence of the instructional assistance during DTT therapy confused STUDENT and interfered with his ability to do the DTT drill. Although the PARENTS prefer that his instructional assistant be present while he is receiving assistance from another adult, they presented no evidence to establish why the instructional aide’s presence is educationally necessary for STUDENT. In light of the above, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District’s offer of one-to-one aide services is designed to meet STUDENT’s needs and is reasonably calculated to confer him educational benefit.
B. Assistive Technology
The evidence also establishes that the District’s offer of assistive technology and consultative services was appropriate. According to the December IEP, the District recommended that STUDENT be provided with assistive technology devices such as “Tech-Speak, Intellekeys, and an iMac computer.”(Footnote 7) The District also recommended assistive technology consultation services to train STUDENT’s teacher, aide, and speech pathologist on ways to use and implement the devices in STUDENT’s program to assist him in meeting his goals and objectives. According to Ms. Kappe, the specialist who assessed STUDENT, STUDENT does not require that an assistive technology specialist work directly with him, because the devices are better implemented by his educators in his everyday program. Rather, her role is to train and consult with STUDENT’s educators to enable them to use the devices during STUDENT’s instruction. Ms. Kappe also stated that the schedule of hours for consultation services is sufficient to set up the equipment for STUDENT and to enable his educators to use the devices on an ongoing basis. She testified that once the equipment is set up and the staff is trained, the consultation hours can be appropriately reduced because the hours would primarily be spent consulting with STUDENT’s educators and service provider.
No evidence was presented regarding the nature of the assistive technology services requested by Petitioner or why he requires anything but what the District offered. Accordingly, the evidence establishes that the District’s offer of assistive technolgy services is designed to meet STUDENT’s needs and is reasonably calculated to provide him with education benefit
C. Discrete Trial Training Therapy and Consultation Services
The evidence also establishes that the District’s offer of DTT therapy and consultation and supervision services is appropriate. Up until the December 2000 IEP meeting, STUDENT was receiving twenty hours per week of DTT therapy and seventeen hours per week of “supervision” services. Until STUDENT was withdrawn from school, he received his DTT therapy in the full inclusion classroom at Garfield. At the IEP meeting, the educational members of the team recommended a reduction in DTT therapy to ten hours per week and recommended that the services be provided at home rather than at school. Additionally, the District offered six hours of supervision services per month and two hours per week of DTT consultation in order to carry over the home therapy to the school environment. While the parties do not dispute that STUDENT requires DTT therapy and consultative and supervision services, the parties dispute the level of services to be provided.
According to Dr. Sandra Kaler, the psychologist who conducted STUDENT’s psychological assessment, STUDENT has benefited from the one-to-one DTT therapy he has received, but he appears to use the DTT therapy to self-stimulate. For example, as stated in her report, “STUDENT insisted on labeling each of the words on cards although it was this examiner’s impression that he did not understand what he was reading…. Further, STUDENT repetitively wrote his name and numbers, but was not able to respond appropriately to requests to copy figures initiated by the examiner.” At hearing, Dr. Kaler testified that the twenty hours per week of DTT services enabled and encouraged STUDENT’s self-stimulation on his drills. Thus, Dr. Kaler testified that his DTT therapy should be reduced in hours and provided in the home environment to focus his engagement during his therapy. According to Dr. Kaler, STUDENT would receive the same educational benefit from ten hours of therapy per week that he received with twenty hours per week of therapy. However, by reducing his DDT therapy hours, STUDENT’s self-stimulatory behaviors would also be reduced and discouraged. Dr. Kaler also testified that Alana Hampton, STUDENT’s then DTT supervisor who had been working with him for most of that year, concurred with her recommendation for reduced DTT therapy due to STUDENT’s “saturation” with his services. (See also Dist. Exh. 56 at page 9 of 58.)
Both Dr. Sadeghi and Leili Zarbakhsh, psychologists from California Psch Care, testified that they would not necessarily oppose a reduction in services. Dr. Sadeghi testified that a decision to reduce services would need to be made on a “clinical basis” and that STUDENT’s progress is considered. Dr. Sadeghi also testified that STUDENT received ten hours per week of therapy at home and ten hours at school. According to Dr. Sadeghi, he would not oppose eliminating the school therapy hours if STUDENT were placed in an appropriate classroom placement. Ms. Zarbakhsh testified similarly. As discussed below, the District’s offered SDC class at Wilson School is appropriate to meet his needs.
The evidence also establishes that the consultation and supervision hours recommended by the District were appropriate. Dr. Kaler assessed STUDENT and was present for his December IEP meeting to hear and participate in the discussions regarding his needs. Thus, she considered STUDENT’s needs and progress before making the recommendation to reduce services. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds Dr. Kaler’s recommendations for a reduction in services reasoned, supported, and persuasive as sufficient to meet STUDENT’s needs.
Dr. Kaler testified credibly that the consultation hours were intended to enable the DTT providers to communicate with District staff in order to transition his skills to the school environment. Additionally, it is uncontrovered that the supervision hours are appropriate in light of the reduction in DTT therapy hours. In the absence of contrary evidence, it is found that the consultation and supervision hours offered by the District were sufficient to address STUDENT’s needs and to confer him educational benefit. In summary, the District’s offer of DTT therapy, consultation, and supervision services was designed to meet STUDENT’s needs and was reasonably calculated to confer him with educational benefit.
D. Placement in Special Day Class at Wilson Elementary School
Lastly, the evidence establishes that the District’s offer of placement in the SDC class at Wilson school was also appropriate. According to Dr. Kaler, the SDC class contains about twelve students who, like STUDENT, are mildly and cognitively impaired, one teacher, and two classroom aides. Some of the children in the class are not autistic, and many of the children exhibit normal social interactions. Dr. Kaler also described the class curriculum and instruction as very “language based.” Mona Neter testified that the classroom does not have many things on the walls as distractions, and has a number of workstations where the children can work individually. Additionally, Ms. Neter testified that the class provides for many play activities for the students to work on social skills and language.
By all accounts, the placement at Wilson is appropriate to meet STUDENT’s needs. According to Ms. Neter, the placement would provide for social, language, and academic opportunities for STUDENT, which are particular areas of need. Dr. Kaler testified that the SDC class at Wilson is appropriate because it encompasses all of the characteristics that STUDENT requires. Specifically, the class has a small student/adult ratio, a teacher that has expertise in working with children with autism, students who are developmentally at STUDENT’s level, a program that emphasizes language use and acquisition, and an opportunity to interact with peers in a meaningful way. Additionally, it appears from the record that the structure of an SDC classroom is necessary to address STUDENT’s distractibility. Although the PARENTS expressed concern that STUDENT would not be challenged academically in an SDC setting, STUDENT’s program would be dictated by the goals and objectives in his IEP and not simply the type of classroom in which he is placed. According to the testimony of Dr. Kaler, the students in the SDC class are approximately at STUDENT’s cognitive and developmental level. There was no dispute that STUDENT’s goals and objectives could be implemented in the SDC classroom. From the above, the Hearing Officer concludes that the SDC class at Wilson school would meet STUDENT’s needs and would provide him with educational benefit.
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In conclusion, it was found above that the District’s offer of placement in an SDC class at Wilson School, a one-to-one instructional aide, DTT in the home for ten hours per week, DTT supervision for six hours per month, DTT consultation for two hours per week, and assistive technology consultation services was designed to meet STUDENT’s needs and was reasonably calculated to confer him educational benefit. Additionally, it is noted above that no other portion of the IEP was specifically contested by Petitioner. Given the findings above, it is concluded that the District’s offer as contained in the December 18, 2001 IEP is an offer of FAPE. Because the IEP extends until December 18, 2002, that placement is also appropriate for the fall of the 2002-2003 school year.
III. With regard to the IEP meeting convened on November 2, 2001, did the District commit procedural violations that resulted in STUDENT’s denial of FAPE by
A. changing the location of the meeting, thereby denying the parents an opportunity to participate in the meeting; B. distributing copies of the IEP before providing the parents a copy, without the parents’ signatures on the IEP, and without the parents’ consent to release such information; C. not providing the parents a copy of the IEP until three weeks after the IEP meeting; and D. continuing the former goals and objectives with new achievement dates?
The procedural rights that extend to parents under the IDEA include the right to participate in the development of the child’s IEP and the opportunity for mediation and a due process hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b). Procedural flaws do not automatically require a finding of a denial of a FAPE, but procedural violations that result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringe on the parent’s opportunity to participate in the IEP process do result in the denial of a FAPE. W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484; see also Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 994 (1st Cir. 1990).
Petitioner alleged that the District committed a number of procedural violations. Each of Petitioner’s allegations will be addressed in turn below.
A. Changing the location of the meeting, thereby denying the parents an opportunity to participate in the meeting.
California Education Code ' 56341(a) requires that a child=s IEP team conduct meetings during which the child=s IEP will be developed, reviewed, or revised. In convening an IEP meeting, a school district is required to take steps to ensure that one or both of the parents of the individual with exceptional needs are present at each IEP meeting or are afforded the opportunity to participate in the IEP process. 34 C.F.R. § 300.345(a); Cal. Educ. Code § 56341.5(a). Similarly, California Education Code Section 56341(f) states that parents of disabled children have the right to present information to the IEP team in person or through a representative and the right to participate in meetings relating to eligibility for special education and related services, recommendations, and program planning.
To this end, a school district must notify parents of the IEP meeting early enough to ensure the opportunity to attend. Cal. Educ. Code § 56341.5(b). The notice shall indicate, among other things, the time and location of the meeting. Cal. Educ. Code § 56341.5(c). If the district is unable to convince the parent that he or she should attend the IEP meeting, the meeting may be conducted without a parent in attendance. Cal. Educ. Code § 56341.5(g).
Petitioner asserts that his parents were deprived the opportunity to participate in the November 2, 2001 IEP meeting because the District members of the IEP team changed the location of the IEP meeting the morning of the meeting from the Garfield School to the District offices, and that his parents’ inability to attend the IEP meeting resulted in a denial of FAPE to Petitioner.(Footnote 8) Petitioner’s argument is unpersuasive. First, Mr. and Mrs. PARENT had knowledge of the date of the November 2 IEP meeting as early as September 20, 2001, when the settlement agreement was signed. In the agreement, the parties agreed that an IEP meeting would convene on October 29 or November 2, 2001. Petitioner’s parents also acknowledged receipt of the notice of the IEP meeting that was sent to them by the District on October 19, 2001, that indicated the time and date of the IEP meeting.
Although it is undisputed that the location of the IEP meeting was changed on the morning of the meeting from Garfield School to the District offices, the two locations are adjacent to each other and the PARENTS were informed of the change early enough to attend the meeting. Because of the close proximity of the two locations, which, by most accounts, are a “couple” of minute’s apart by foot, notice of the change of location that morning did not prevent the PARENTS from attending the meeting. In fact, FATHER was actually at the hearing location when MOTHER arrived at Garfield School that morning, and he left the hearing at the request of MOTHER.
From the above, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District gave the PARENTS proper notice of the IEP meeting to ensure their opportunity to attend the meeting. While the PARENTS chose not to attend the meeting, their reasons were not due to any failure of the District to provide adequate notice of the meeting. Given that they were provided adequate notice of the meeting and the District was unable to persuade them to attend or remain at the meeting, the District was entitled to hold the meeting in their absence.
B. Distributing copies of the IEP before providing the parents a copy, without the parents’ signatures on the IEP, and without the parents’ consent to release such information.
California Education Code Section 56347 states that each district shall ensure the student’s teachers and other persons who provide special education and/or related services “shall be knowledgeable of the content of the individualized education program.” Additionally, service providers from other agencies who provide instruction or a related service to the individual off the school site shall be provided a copy of the IEP. Cal. Educ. Code § 56347.
Petitioner asserts that the District improperly distributed copies of the IEP document to the members of the IEP team because it was done before the parents received a copy of the IEP or signed consent to the IEP, or consented to the release of that information. Petitioner’s argument is unpersuasive and not supported by the law. It appears that Petitioner is arguing that the District violated his privacy by distributing this information. However, as was stated above, the law allows for the student’s teachers and service providers to have this information. Additionally, the persons Petitioner objects to being provided the IEP were the very persons who were present and/or participated in the IEP meeting and who developed the document at issue. As was determined above, the District was entitled to convene the November IEP meeting in the absence of the PARENTS. Not only does the law allow Petitioner’s teachers and service providers to have such information, but no privacy interests were adversely affected by their being provided a document that they in fact created.
Finally, Petitioner did not cite, and the Hearing Officer is unaware of, any law that requires that he be provided the IEP before anyone else or requires that the IEP be signed by the parents before being distributed to other members of the IEP team. Thus, while is undisputed that the IEP was distributed prior to his parents’ receipt of the document or their consent to the document, such allegation does not necessarily give rise to a claim under special education law.
In summary, the District did not violate Petitioner’s procedural rights by distributing copies of his IEP to other members of the IEP team prior to his parents receiving a copy of the IEP or signing consent to the IEP. Additionally, written consent was not required in order for the District to distribute this information to the IEP team because the law allows for the team to have such information.
C. Not providing the parents a copy of the IEP until three weeks after the IEP meeting.
California Education Code Section 56341.5(i) states that the district “shall give the parent a copy of the individualized education program.” Petitioner argues that he was denied a FAPE because he was not provided with the November 2 IEP until three weeks after the IEP meeting. The District argues that Petitioner was provided a copy of the IEP approximately two weeks after the meeting rather than three weeks alleged by Petitioner, and it disputes that any alleged delay resulted in a denial of FAPE. The evidence supports the District’s contentions.
First, while the law requires that parents be provided a copy of the IEP, it is silent as to when that IEP must be provided. In this case, the evidence established that Petitioner was provided a copy of the IEP less than two weeks after the IEP meeting convened, rather than the three weeks alleged by Petitioner. According to the testimony of Ms. Bear, a copy of the IEP was sent to the PARENTS five days after the IEP meeting convened. However, because of a clerical error in addressing the envelope containing the IEP, the IEP was returned to the District as undeliverable. Discovering the mistake, the District resent the IEP to the PARENTS by Federal Express with the correct address on November 15, 2001. Thus, the IEP would not have reached the PARENTS until about two weeks after the date of the meeting. However, regardless of whether the PARENTS received the IEP two or three weeks after the IEP meeting, there was no evidence presented that established that any procedural violation occurred.
Second, even if it were found that the District committed a procedural violation by failing to provide the IEP to the PARENTS sooner, there does not appear to be any prejudice resulting from the alleged delay. At hearing, Petitioner did not assert how he was prejudiced by the delay or present any evidence to establish prejudice. There is no indication that any delay in the receipt of the IEP resulted in an infringement of the PARENTS’ opportunity to participate in the development of Petitioner’s IEP. As was noted above, the PARENTS had the opportunity to attend the IEP meeting (and FATHER was even present in the IEP room), but declined to attend or remain to participate. There was no information that the PARENTS requested a copy of the IEP during the two weeks prior to receipt of the document despite their knowledge that the IEP meeting had occurred and that they had a right to receive a copy of the IEP. Additionally, the extensive evidence of correspondence between the PARENTS and the District establishes that the District was generally prompt in addressing the PARENTS’ concerns and responsive to their requests for meetings and discussion of Petitioner’s educational program. Given the sheer number of letters that were sent to the District between September and December 2001, it is apparent that the PARENTS were intricately involved in Petitioner’s education. Moreover, Ms. Bear testified that she attempted to set up another IEP meeting soon after the November meeting to enable the PARENTS to participate in IEP team discussions, but the PARENTS refused to attend any such meeting. They also could have addressed their concerns to the IEP team at the December IEP meeting, which occurred only a month and a half after the November meeting. However, the PARENTS also declined to attend that meeting.
The purpose of the November IEP meeting was to review Petitioner’s transition to Garfield and to review his progress, and it did not result in any reduction in his services. Although the District members of the November IEP team sought the PARENTS’ permission to provide adaptive physical education services and to conduct a functional analysis assessment of Petitioner, as of the conclusion of the hearing, the PARENTS have never consented to the APE services or the assessment. There was no evidence to indicate that, had the PARENTS received the IEP sooner, the circumstances at the time would have made them more inclined to consent to the services and assessment. Thus, there is no indication that Petitioner was deprived of any educational opportunity as a result of his parents not receiving a copy of the IEP.
In conclusion, although the parties do not dispute that the PARENTS were given a copy of the IEP two weeks after the IEP convened, there is no indication from the record that this resulted in a procedural violation, or caused Petitioner to be deprived educational opportunity, or infringed upon his parents’ opportunity to participate in the development of his IEP.
D. Continuing the former goals and objectives with new achievement dates.
California Education Code Section 56345(a)(2) and Title 34 of the Code of Federal Regulations Section 300.346(a)(2) require that IEPs include annual goals and objectives. Annual goals are “statements that describe what a child with a disability can reasonably be expected to accomplish within a twelve-month period in the child’s special education program. Short-term instructional objectives (i.e., IEP objectives) are measurable, intermediate steps between the child’s present levels of educational performance and the annual goals that are established for the child.” 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. C, Q. 39 (1996). The objectives should be developed based on a logical breakdown of the major components of the annual goals and should be projected to be accomplished over an extended period of time, such as a school quarter or semester. Id. IEP objectives are necessary in order to provide general benchmarks for measuring the student’s progress toward meeting the annual goals and otherwise gauging the efficacy of the services provided. Id.; see also Cleveland Heights-University Heights City Sch. Dist. v. Boss, 44 F.3d 391, 399 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that omission of appropriate objective criteria in IEP was significant violation that “went to the heart of the substance of the plan”).
Petitioner asserts generally that the District offered goals and objectives that were outdated and developed without parent involvement. As was discussed above, the PARENTS opted not to attend the November IEP meeting and the District was entitled to convene the IEP meeting in their absence. Thus, the District members’ act of developing the goals and objectives at that meeting in the PARENTS’ absence was appropriate. Additionally, Petitioner provided no specific information or evidence at hearing to establish how the goals and objectives were inappropriate. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Petitioner’s goals and objectives contained in the November IEP were continued from previous IEPs, this fact alone would not establish that the goals and objectives were “outdated” or inappropriate for Petitioner as of the date of the November IEP.
On the contrary, the evidence established that the goals and objectives in the November IEP were appropriate at the time. As noted above, State and federal law requires that goals and objectives be developed in light of the child’s present levels of performance. When Petitioner was placed at Garfield Elementary School pursuant to a settlement agreement with the District, Petitioner had not been attending school within the District for approximately ten months. At that time, the Petitioner and the District were involved in a yearlong dispute over the District’s ability to conduct its triennial evaluation of Petitioner. According to the settlement agreement, the District was entitled to conduct its evaluation and the results of the bulk of the evaluation was to be discussed at an IEP meeting in December 2001. Thus, when the November IEP meeting occurred, the District had very little current information regarding Petitioner’s present levels of performance. Although Petitioner had been attending Ms. Kawasaki’s class for a little over a month, his attendance was inconsistent and he generally did not attend school for the entire school day.
At the November meeting, the team members who were present considered the existing information available regarding STUDENT’s progress and present levels of performance prior to making determinations regarding Petitioner’s goals and objectives. Inclusion specialist Mona Neter testified that information regarding Petitioner’s present levels of performance was determined from looking at his prior goals and objectives and from discussions with Petitioner’s discrete trial training providers and a recent report from California PsychCare. Occupational therapist Hannah Park testified that Petitioner’s previous OT goals were appropriate for his gross and fine motor skills in November 2001. Additionally, speech and language therapist Wendy Sandberg testified that she proposed draft goals and objectives for Petitioner based on her work with him and her observation of his abilities. Accordingly, the undisputed evidence indicates that the IEP team considered Petitioner’s present levels of performance in determining his goals and objectives and that those goals and objectives proposed corresponded to his needs.
IV. Were the District’s 2001 assessments appropriate?
Petitioner challenges the appropriateness of the District’s (1) occupational therapy assessment conducted by Hannah Park in November 2001, (2) the speech and language assessment conducted by Wendy Sandberg dated October 19, 2001, (3) the assistive technology assessment conducted by Terry Kappe dated November 19, 2001, (4) the academic assessment conducted by Mona Neter dated December 5, 2001, (5) the psychological assessment conducted by Dr. Sandra Kaler dated September 2, 2001, and (6) the adaptive physical education assessment conducted by Eileen Kaiser dated July 17, 2001.
There is no dispute that the evaluations challenged by Petitioner are reevaluations and not an initial evaluation conducted prior to the student’s initial admission into special education. Under federal and State special education law, as part of any reevaluation, the IEP team shall review existing evaluation data on the child, including evaluations and information provided by the parents of the child, current classroom-based assessments and observations, and teacher and related services providers observation. 20 U.S.C. §1414(c)(1)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56381. Additionally, as part of the evaluation, the IEP team can identify what additional data are needed to determine, among other things, whether the child continues to have such a disability, the present levels of performance and educational needs of the child, and whether any additions or modifications to the special education and related services are needed to enable the child to meet the measurable goals set out in the IEP. Id. Regarding assessments that are completed, California Education Code ' 56320 states in relevant part that testing and assessment materials and procedures are administered by trained personnel in conformance with test instructions and are tailored to assess specific areas of need. Additionally, California Education Code ' 56320 (f) requires that no single procedure be used as the sole criterion for determining an appropriate educational program for an individual with exceptional needs. Pursuant to subsection (g), the assessment must be conducted by persons knowledgeable of the student=s disability. California Education Code ' 56322 also requires that the assessments be conducted by persons competent to perform the assessments. Additionally, California Education Code ' 56324 requires that any psychological assessment be performed by a credentialed school psychologist.
A. Occupational Therapy Assessment conducted by Hannah Park.
Petitioner asserts that the OT assessment was inappropriate because it did not contain parent interviews or input from STUDENT’s prior occupational therapist, and because his parents were not informed of which formal tests the therapist intended to conduct. The assessment, which was conducted by occupational therapist Hannah Park on during November 2001, included observations from therapy, an interview with STUDENT’s instructional aide, a review of work samples, the administration of the Analysis of Sensory Behavior Inventory, a review of records, and interviews with STUDENT’s previous occupational therapy providers. (Test. of Hannah Park.)
With regard to Petitioner’s first ground, Petitioner did not present any evidence that the lack of parent interviews in the assessment invalidated the assessment or made it otherwise inappropriate under the law. Rather, occupational therapist Hannah Park testified that parent interviews were not an essential component of her assessment of STUDENT’s needs and that the lack of such interviews in the assessment did not affect the validity of her test. Additionally, Ms. Park testified that the other information she collected during the course of her assessment was sufficient to assess STUDENT’s occupational therapy needs at school. The Hearing Officer also notes that, as is indicated above, the occupational therapy assessment included interviews, observations, assessment tools, and reviews of work samples and records. Thus, no single procedure was used as the sole criterion for determining an appropriate educational program for an individual with exceptional needs. In light of Ms. Park’s uncontested testimony, the Hearing Officer concludes that the lack of parent interviews in the occupational therapy assessment did not render the District’s assessment inappropriate.
Petitioner’s second ground is simply not supported by the evidence. Although Petitioner argues that the occupational therapy assessment lacked information from his previous occupational therapists, the assessment report and Ms. Park’s testimony dispute his contention. According to the assessment report, Ms. Park interviewed STUDENT’s prior occupational therapists Neva Garcia and Debbie Uriquidi regarding his OT needs. During her testimony, Ms. Park confirmed that she spoke with Neva Garcia and Debbie Uriquidi as part of her assessment. Thus, the contested evidence established that the assessment did in fact contain information from Petitioner’s previous assessors.(Footnote 9)
Rather, her role is to train and consult with STUDENT’s educators to enable them to use the devices during STUDENT’s instruction. Ms. Kappe also stated that the schedule of hours for consultation services is sufficient to set up the equipment for STUDENT and to enable his educators to use the devices on an ongoing basis. She testified that once the equipment is set up and the staff is trained, the consultation hours can be appropriately reduced because the hours would primarily be spent consulting with STUDENT’s educators and service provider.
No evidence was presented regarding the nature of the assistive technology services requested by Petitioner or why he requires anything but what the District offered. Accordingly, the evidence establishes that the District’s offer of assistive technolgy services is designed to meet STUDENT’s needs and is reasonably calculated to provide him with education benefit
C. Discrete Trial Training Therapy and Consultation Services
The evidence also establishes that the District’s offer of DTT therapy and consultation and supervision services is appropriate. Up until the December 2000 IEP meeting, STUDENT was receiving twenty hours per week of DTT therapy and seventeen hours per week of “supervision” services. Until STUDENT was withdrawn from school, he received his DTT therapy in the full inclusion classroom at Garfield. At the IEP meeting, the educational members of the team recommended a reduction in DTT therapy to ten hours per week and recommended that the services be provided at home rather than at school. Additionally, the District offered six hours of supervision services per month and two hours per week of DTT consultation in order to carry over the home therapy to the school environment. While the parties do not dispute that STUDENT requires DTT therapy and consultative and supervision services, the parties dispute the level of services to be provided.
According to Dr. Sandra Kaler, the psychologist who conducted STUDENT’s psychological assessment, STUDENT has benefited from the one-to-one DTT therapy he has received, but he appears to use the DTT therapy to self-stimulate. For example, as stated in her report, “STUDENT insisted on labeling each of the words on cards although it was this examiner’s impression that he did not understand what he was reading…. Further, STUDENT repetitively wrote his name and numbers, but was not able to respond appropriately to requests to copy figures initiated by the examiner.” At hearing, Dr. Kaler testified that the twenty hours per week of DTT services enabled and encouraged STUDENT’s self-stimulation on his drills. Thus, Dr. Kaler testified that his DTT therapy should be reduced in hours and provided in the home environment to focus his engagement during his therapy. According to Dr. Kaler, STUDENT would receive the same educational benefit from ten hours of therapy per week that he received with twenty hours per week of therapy. However, by reducing his DDT therapy hours, STUDENT’s self-stimulatory behaviors would also be reduced and discouraged. Dr. Kaler also testified that Alana Hampton, STUDENT’s then DTT supervisor who had been working with him for most of that year, concurred with her recommendation for reduced DTT therapy due to STUDENT’s “saturation” with his services. (See also Dist. Exh. 56 at page 9 of 58.)
Both Dr. Sadeghi and Leili Zarbakhsh, psychologists from California Psch Care, testified that they would not necessarily oppose a reduction in services. Dr. Sadeghi testified that a decision to reduce services would need to be made on a “clinical basis” and that STUDENT’s progress is considered. Dr. Sadeghi also testified that STUDENT received ten hours per week of therapy at home and ten hours at school. According to Dr. Sadeghi, he would not oppose eliminating the school therapy hours if STUDENT were placed in an appropriate classroom placement. Ms. Zarbakhsh testified similarly. As discussed below, the District’s offered SDC class at Wilson School is appropriate to meet his needs.
The evidence also establishes that the consultation and supervision hours recommended by the District were appropriate. Dr. Kaler assessed STUDENT and was present for his December IEP meeting to hear and participate in the discussions regarding his needs. Thus, she considered STUDENT’s needs and progress before making the recommendation to reduce services. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds Dr. Kaler’s recommendations for a reduction in services reasoned, supported, and persuasive as sufficient to meet STUDENT’s needs.
Dr. Kaler testified credibly that the consultation hours were intended to enable the DTT providers to communicate with District staff in order to transition his skills to the school environment. Additionally, it is uncontrovered that the supervision hours are appropriate in light of the reduction in DTT therapy hours. In the absence of contrary evidence, it is found that the consultation and supervision hours offered by the District were sufficient to address STUDENT’s needs and to confer him educational benefit. In summary, the District’s offer of DTT therapy, consultation, and supervision services was designed to meet STUDENT’s needs and was reasonably calculated to confer him with educational benefit.
D. Placement in Special Day Class at Wilson Elementary School
Lastly, the evidence establishes that the District’s offer of placement in the SDC class at Wilson school was also appropriate. According to Dr. Kaler, the SDC class contains about twelve students who, like STUDENT, are mildly and cognitively impaired, one teacher, and two classroom aides. Some of the children in the class are not autistic, and many of the children exhibit normal social interactions. Dr. Kaler also described the class curriculum and instruction as very “language based.” Mona Neter testified that the classroom does not have many things on the walls as distractions, and has a number of workstations where the children can work individually. Additionally, Ms. Neter testified that the class provides for many play activities for the students to work on social skills and language.
By all accounts, the placement at Wilson is appropriate to meet STUDENT’s needs. According to Ms. Neter, the placement would provide for social, language, and academic opportunities for STUDENT, which are particular areas of need. Dr. Kaler testified that the SDC class at Wilson is appropriate because it encompasses all of the characteristics that STUDENT requires. Specifically, the class has a small student/adult ratio, a teacher that has expertise in working with children with autism, students who are developmentally at STUDENT’s level, a program that emphasizes language use and acquisition, and an opportunity to interact with peers in a meaningful way. Additionally, it appears from the record that the structure of an SDC classroom is necessary to address STUDENT’s distractibility. Although the PARENTS expressed concern that STUDENT would not be challenged academically in an SDC setting, STUDENT’s program would be dictated by the goals and objectives in his IEP and not simply the type of classroom in which he is placed. According to the testimony of Dr. Kaler, the students in the SDC class are approximately at STUDENT’s cognitive and developmental level. There was no dispute that STUDENT’s goals and objectives could be implemented in the SDC classroom. From the above, the Hearing Officer concludes that the SDC class at Wilson school would meet STUDENT’s needs and would provide him with educational benefit.
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In conclusion, it was found above that the District’s offer of placement in an SDC class at Wilson School, a one-to-one instructional aide, DTT in the home for ten hours per week, DTT supervision for six hours per month, DTT consultation for two hours per week, and assistive technology consultation services was designed to meet STUDENT’s needs and was reasonably calculated to confer him educational benefit. Additionally, it is noted above that no other portion of the IEP was specifically contested by Petitioner. Given the findings above, it is concluded that the District’s offer as contained in the December 18, 2001 IEP is an offer of FAPE. Because the IEP extends until December 18, 2002, that placement is also appropriate for the fall of the 2002-2003 school year.
III. With regard to the IEP meeting convened on November 2, 2001, did the District commit procedural violations that resulted in STUDENT’s denial of FAPE by
A. changing the location of the meeting, thereby denying the parents an opportunity to participate in the meeting; B. distributing copies of the IEP before providing the parents a copy, without the parents’ signatures on the IEP, and without the parents’ consent to release such information; C. not providing the parents a copy of the IEP until three weeks after the IEP meeting; and D. continuing the former goals and objectives with new achievement dates?
The procedural rights that extend to parents under the IDEA include the right to participate in the development of the child’s IEP and the opportunity for mediation and a due process hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b). Procedural flaws do not automatically require a finding of a denial of a FAPE, but procedural violations that result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringe on the parent’s opportunity to participate in the IEP process do result in the denial of a FAPE. W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484; see also Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 994 (1st Cir. 1990).
Petitioner alleged that the District committed a number of procedural violations. Each of Petitioner’s allegations will be addressed in turn below.
A. Changing the location of the meeting, thereby denying the parents an opportunity to participate in the meeting.
California Education Code ' 56341(a) requires that a child=s IEP team conduct meetings during which the child=s IEP will be developed, reviewed, or revised. In convening an IEP meeting, a school district is required to take steps to ensure that one or both of the parents of the individual with exceptional needs are present at each IEP meeting or are afforded the opportunity to participate in the IEP process. 34 C.F.R. § 300.345(a); Cal. Educ. Code § 56341.5(a). Similarly, California Education Code Section 56341(f) states that parents of disabled children have the right to present information to the IEP team in person or through a representative and the right to participate in meetings relating to eligibility for special education and related services, recommendations, and program planning.
To this end, a school district must notify parents of the IEP meeting early enough to ensure the opportunity to attend. Cal. Educ. Code § 56341.5(b). The notice shall indicate, among other things, the time and location of the meeting. Cal. Educ. Code § 56341.5(c). If the district is unable to convince the parent that he or she should attend the IEP meeting, the meeting may be conducted without a parent in attendance. Cal. Educ. Code § 56341.5(g).
Petitioner asserts that his parents were deprived the opportunity to participate in the November 2, 2001 IEP meeting because the District members of the IEP team changed the location of the IEP meeting the morning of the meeting from the Garfield School to the District offices, and that his parents’ inability to attend the IEP meeting resulted in a denial of FAPE to Petitioner.(Footnote 8) Petitioner’s argument is unpersuasive. First, Mr. and Mrs. PARENT had knowledge of the date of the November 2 IEP meeting as early as September 20, 2001, when the settlement agreement was signed. In the agreement, the parties agreed that an IEP meeting would convene on October 29 or November 2, 2001. Petitioner’s parents also acknowledged receipt of the notice of the IEP meeting that was sent to them by the District on October 19, 2001, that indicated the time and date of the IEP meeting.
Although it is undisputed that the location of the IEP meeting was changed on the morning of the meeting from Garfield School to the District offices, the two locations are adjacent to each other and the PARENTS were informed of the change early enough to attend the meeting. Because of the close proximity of the two locations, which, by most accounts, are a “couple” of minute’s apart by foot, notice of the change of location that morning did not prevent the PARENTS from attending the meeting. In fact, FATHER was actually at the hearing location when MOTHER arrived at Garfield School that morning, and he left the hearing at the request of MOTHER.
From the above, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District gave the PARENTS proper notice of the IEP meeting to ensure their opportunity to attend the meeting. While the PARENTS chose not to attend the meeting, their reasons were not due to any failure of the District to provide adequate notice of the meeting. Given that they were provided adequate notice of the meeting and the District was unable to persuade them to attend or remain at the meeting, the District was entitled to hold the meeting in their absence.
B. Distributing copies of the IEP before providing the parents a copy, without the parents’ signatures on the IEP, and without the parents’ consent to release such information.
California Education Code Section 56347 states that each district shall ensure the student’s teachers and other persons who provide special education and/or related services “shall be knowledgeable of the content of the individualized education program.” Additionally, service providers from other agencies who provide instruction or a related service to the individual off the school site shall be provided a copy of the IEP. Cal. Educ. Code § 56347.
Petitioner asserts that the District improperly distributed copies of the IEP document to the members of the IEP team because it was done before the parents received a copy of the IEP or signed consent to the IEP, or consented to the release of that information. Petitioner’s argument is unpersuasive and not supported by the law. It appears that Petitioner is arguing that the District violated his privacy by distributing this information. However, as was stated above, the law allows for the student’s teachers and service providers to have this information. Additionally, the persons Petitioner objects to being provided the IEP were the very persons who were present and/or participated in the IEP meeting and who developed the document at issue. As was determined above, the District was entitled to convene the November IEP meeting in the absence of the PARENTS. Not only does the law allow Petitioner’s teachers and service providers to have such information, but no privacy interests were adversely affected by their being provided a document that they in fact created.
Finally, Petitioner did not cite, and the Hearing Officer is unaware of, any law that requires that he be provided the IEP before anyone else or requires that the IEP be signed by the parents before being distributed to other members of the IEP team. Thus, while is undisputed that the IEP was distributed prior to his parents’ receipt of the document or their consent to the document, such allegation does not necessarily give rise to a claim under special education law.
In summary, the District did not violate Petitioner’s procedural rights by distributing copies of his IEP to other members of the IEP team prior to his parents receiving a copy of the IEP or signing consent to the IEP. Additionally, written consent was not required in order for the District to distribute this information to the IEP team because the law allows for the team to have such information.
C. Not providing the parents a copy of the IEP until three weeks after the IEP meeting.
California Education Code Section 56341.5(i) states that the district “shall give the parent a copy of the individualized education program.” Petitioner argues that he was denied a FAPE because he was not provided with the November 2 IEP until three weeks after the IEP meeting. The District argues that Petitioner was provided a copy of the IEP approximately two weeks after the meeting rather than three weeks alleged by Petitioner, and it disputes that any alleged delay resulted in a denial of FAPE. The evidence supports the District’s contentions.
First, while the law requires that parents be provided a copy of the IEP, it is silent as to when that IEP must be provided. In this case, the evidence established that Petitioner was provided a copy of the IEP less than two weeks after the IEP meeting convened, rather than the three weeks alleged by Petitioner. According to the testimony of Ms. Bear, a copy of the IEP was sent to the PARENTS five days after the IEP meeting convened. However, because of a clerical error in addressing the envelope containing the IEP, the IEP was returned to the District as undeliverable. Discovering the mistake, the District resent the IEP to the PARENTS by Federal Express with the correct address on November 15, 2001. Thus, the IEP would not have reached the PARENTS until about two weeks after the date of the meeting. However, regardless of whether the PARENTS received the IEP two or three weeks after the IEP meeting, there was no evidence presented that established that any procedural violation occurred.
Second, even if it were found that the District committed a procedural violation by failing to provide the IEP to the PARENTS sooner, there does not appear to be any prejudice resulting from the alleged delay. At hearing, Petitioner did not assert how he was prejudiced by the delay or present any evidence to establish prejudice. There is no indication that any delay in the receipt of the IEP resulted in an infringement of the PARENTS’ opportunity to participate in the development of Petitioner’s IEP. As was noted above, the PARENTS had the opportunity to attend the IEP meeting (and FATHER was even present in the IEP room), but declined to attend or remain to participate. There was no information that the PARENTS requested a copy of the IEP during the two weeks prior to receipt of the document despite their knowledge that the IEP meeting had occurred and that they had a right to receive a copy of the IEP. Additionally, the extensive evidence of correspondence between the PARENTS and the District establishes that the District was generally prompt in addressing the PARENTS’ concerns and responsive to their requests for meetings and discussion of Petitioner’s educational program. Given the sheer number of letters that were sent to the District between September and December 2001, it is apparent that the PARENTS were intricately involved in Petitioner’s education. Moreover, Ms. Bear testified that she attempted to set up another IEP meeting soon after the November meeting to enable the PARENTS to participate in IEP team discussions, but the PARENTS refused to attend any such meeting. They also could have addressed their concerns to the IEP team at the December IEP meeting, which occurred only a month and a half after the November meeting. However, the PARENTS also declined to attend that meeting.
The purpose of the November IEP meeting was to review Petitioner’s transition to Garfield and to review his progress, and it did not result in any reduction in his services. Although the District members of the November IEP team sought the PARENTS’ permission to provide adaptive physical education services and to conduct a functional analysis assessment of Petitioner, as of the conclusion of the hearing, the PARENTS have never consented to the APE services or the assessment. There was no evidence to indicate that, had the PARENTS received the IEP sooner, the circumstances at the time would have made them more inclined to consent to the services and assessment. Thus, there is no indication that Petitioner was deprived of any educational opportunity as a result of his parents not receiving a copy of the IEP.
In conclusion, although the parties do not dispute that the PARENTS were given a copy of the IEP two weeks after the IEP convened, there is no indication from the record that this resulted in a procedural violation, or caused Petitioner to be deprived educational opportunity, or infringed upon his parents’ opportunity to participate in the development of his IEP.
D. Continuing the former goals and objectives with new achievement dates.
California Education Code Section 56345(a)(2) and Title 34 of the Code of Federal Regulations Section 300.346(a)(2) require that IEPs include annual goals and objectives. Annual goals are “statements that describe what a child with a disability can reasonably be expected to accomplish within a twelve-month period in the child’s special education program. Short-term instructional objectives (i.e., IEP objectives) are measurable, intermediate steps between the child’s present levels of educational performance and the annual goals that are established for the child.” 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. C, Q. 39 (1996). The objectives should be developed based on a logical breakdown of the major components of the annual goals and should be projected to be accomplished over an extended period of time, such as a school quarter or semester. Id. IEP objectives are necessary in order to provide general benchmarks for measuring the student’s progress toward meeting the annual goals and otherwise gauging the efficacy of the services provided. Id.; see also Cleveland Heights-University Heights City Sch. Dist. v. Boss, 44 F.3d 391, 399 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that omission of appropriate objective criteria in IEP was significant violation that “went to the heart of the substance of the plan”).
Petitioner asserts generally that the District offered goals and objectives that were outdated and developed without parent involvement. As was discussed above, the PARENTS opted not to attend the November IEP meeting and the District was entitled to convene the IEP meeting in their absence. Thus, the District members’ act of developing the goals and objectives at that meeting in the PARENTS’ absence was appropriate. Additionally, Petitioner provided no specific information or evidence at hearing to establish how the goals and objectives were inappropriate. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Petitioner’s goals and objectives contained in the November IEP were continued from previous IEPs, this fact alone would not establish that the goals and objectives were “outdated” or inappropriate for Petitioner as of the date of the November IEP.
On the contrary, the evidence established that the goals and objectives in the November IEP were appropriate at the time. As noted above, State and federal law requires that goals and objectives be developed in light of the child’s present levels of performance. When Petitioner was placed at Garfield Elementary School pursuant to a settlement agreement with the District, Petitioner had not been attending school within the District for approximately ten months. At that time, the Petitioner and the District were involved in a yearlong dispute over the District’s ability to conduct its triennial evaluation of Petitioner. According to the settlement agreement, the District was entitled to conduct its evaluation and the results of the bulk of the evaluation was to be discussed at an IEP meeting in December 2001. Thus, when the November IEP meeting occurred, the District had very little current information regarding Petitioner’s present levels of performance. Although Petitioner had been attending Ms. Kawasaki’s class for a little over a month, his attendance was inconsistent and he generally did not attend school for the entire school day.
At the November meeting, the team members who were present considered the existing information available regarding STUDENT’s progress and present levels of performance prior to making determinations regarding Petitioner’s goals and objectives. Inclusion specialist Mona Neter testified that information regarding Petitioner’s present levels of performance was determined from looking at his prior goals and objectives and from discussions with Petitioner’s discrete trial training providers and a recent report from California PsychCare. Occupational therapist Hannah Park testified that Petitioner’s previous OT goals were appropriate for his gross and fine motor skills in November 2001. Additionally, speech and language therapist Wendy Sandberg testified that she proposed draft goals and objectives for Petitioner based on her work with him and her observation of his abilities. Accordingly, the undisputed evidence indicates that the IEP team considered Petitioner’s present levels of performance in determining his goals and objectives and that those goals and objectives proposed corresponded to his needs.
IV. Were the District’s 2001 assessments appropriate?
Petitioner challenges the appropriateness of the District’s (1) occupational therapy assessment conducted by Hannah Park in November 2001, (2) the speech and language assessment conducted by Wendy Sandberg dated October 19, 2001, (3) the assistive technology assessment conducted by Terry Kappe dated November 19, 2001, (4) the academic assessment conducted by Mona Neter dated December 5, 2001, (5) the psychological assessment conducted by Dr. Sandra Kaler dated September 2, 2001, and (6) the adaptive physical education assessment conducted by Eileen Kaiser dated July 17, 2001.
There is no dispute that the evaluations challenged by Petitioner are reevaluations and not an initial evaluation conducted prior to the student’s initial admission into special education. Under federal and State special education law, as part of any reevaluation, the IEP team shall review existing evaluation data on the child, including evaluations and information provided by the parents of the child, current classroom-based assessments and observations, and teacher and related services providers observation. 20 U.S.C. §1414(c)(1)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56381. Additionally, as part of the evaluation, the IEP team can identify what additional data are needed to determine, among other things, whether the child continues to have such a disability, the present levels of performance and educational needs of the child, and whether any additions or modifications to the special education and related services are needed to enable the child to meet the measurable goals set out in the IEP. Id. Regarding assessments that are completed, California Education Code ' 56320 states in relevant part that testing and assessment materials and procedures are administered by trained personnel in conformance with test instructions and are tailored to assess specific areas of need. Additionally, California Education Code ' 56320 (f) requires that no single procedure be used as the sole criterion for determining an appropriate educational program for an individual with exceptional needs. Pursuant to subsection (g), the assessment must be conducted by persons knowledgeable of the student=s disability. California Education Code ' 56322 also requires that the assessments be conducted by persons competent to perform the assessments. Additionally, California Education Code ' 56324 requires that any psychological assessment be performed by a credentialed school psychologist.
A. Occupational Therapy Assessment conducted by Hannah Park.
Petitioner asserts that the OT assessment was inappropriate because it did not contain parent interviews or input from STUDENT’s prior occupational therapist, and because his parents were not informed of which formal tests the therapist intended to conduct. The assessment, which was conducted by occupational therapist Hannah Park on during November 2001, included observations from therapy, an interview with STUDENT’s instructional aide, a review of work samples, the administration of the Analysis of Sensory Behavior Inventory, a review of records, and interviews with STUDENT’s previous occupational therapy providers. (Test. of Hannah Park.)
With regard to Petitioner’s first ground, Petitioner did not present any evidence that the lack of parent interviews in the assessment invalidated the assessment or made it otherwise inappropriate under the law. Rather, occupational therapist Hannah Park testified that parent interviews were not an essential component of her assessment of STUDENT’s needs and that the lack of such interviews in the assessment did not affect the validity of her test. Additionally, Ms. Park testified that the other information she collected during the course of her assessment was sufficient to assess STUDENT’s occupational therapy needs at school. The Hearing Officer also notes that, as is indicated above, the occupational therapy assessment included interviews, observations, assessment tools, and reviews of work samples and records. Thus, no single procedure was used as the sole criterion for determining an appropriate educational program for an individual with exceptional needs. In light of Ms. Park’s uncontested testimony, the Hearing Officer concludes that the lack of parent interviews in the occupational therapy assessment did not render the District’s assessment inappropriate.
Petitioner’s second ground is simply not supported by the evidence. Although Petitioner argues that the occupational therapy assessment lacked information from his previous occupational therapists, the assessment report and Ms. Park’s testimony dispute his contention. According to the assessment report, Ms. Park interviewed STUDENT’s prior occupational therapists Neva Garcia and Debbie Uriquidi regarding his OT needs. During her testimony, Ms. Park confirmed that she spoke with Neva Garcia and Debbie Uriquidi as part of her assessment. Thus, the contested evidence established that the assessment did in fact contain information from Petitioner’s previous assessors.(Footnote 9)
Petitioner’s third ground, that the assessment is inappropriate because he was not informed of the assessment tools prior to the testing, is not supported by the law. Petitioner has not cited, and the Hearing Officer is unaware of, any law that requires that the District notify Petitioner or his parents of the specific formal assessments that it intends to conduct. Although California Education Code ' 56321(b)(3) requires that the proposed assessment plan given to parents explain the types of assessments to be conducted, this provision does not require districts to further detail the exact assessment tools to be used. As there is no legal requirement that the PARENTS be told of the assessment tools prior to the assessment, the occupational therapy assessment cannot be determined to be inappropriate on this basis.
B. Speech and Language Assessment conducted by Wendy Sandberg.
Petitioner asserts that the District’s speech and language assessment conducted by Wendy Sandberg dated October 19, 2001, was inappropriate because it lacked interviews with his parents and former speech and language therapist, and information from a review of STUDENT’s educational records. Petitioner’s contentions are not supported by the evidence or the law.
First, nothing in the law requires that speech and language assessments include interviews from parents and former therapists or a review of prior educational records in order for the assessments to be appropriate. Additionally, Ms. Sandberg testified that interviews with the PARENTS and STUDENT’s former therapists are not necessary for the assessment to be valid. In conducting the assessment, Ms. Sandberg administered an oral-motor examination, observed STUDENT during her therapy sessions with him, took a language sample, spoke with his discrete trial training therapist and instructional assistant, and administered the Expressive One Word Picture Vocabulary Test - III, Goldman-Fristoe Test of Articulation – II, and the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test – III. According to Ms. Sandberg, her testing was an accurate reflection of STUDENT’s skills. In light of Ms. Sandberg’s uncontested testimony and the lack of support for Petitioner’s position in the law, the Hearing Officer finds that the District’s speech and language assessment was appropriate.
C. Assistive Technology Assessment conducted by Terry Kappe.
Petitioner asserts that the assistive technology assessment dated November 19, 2001, was inappropriate because it lacked any parent interviews and was done when STUDENT was feeling under the weather. Again, Petitioner’s contentions are not supported by the evidence or the law.
As was stated above, nothing in the law requires that assessments include parent interviews. Nevertheless, Ms. Kappe testified that she briefly spoke with FATHER during the assessment and that she obtained enough information to complete her assessment of STUDENT’s needs. Additionally, Ms. Kappe testified that the validity of her assessment was not compromised because the assessment lacked more in-depth interviews with STUDENT’s parents. Although Petitioner challenges the appropriateness of the District’s assessment because it was allegedly conducted when he was not well, no evidence was presented as to how his alleged illness compromised the assessment and Ms. Kappe testified that STUDENT’s physical condition did not significantly affect the assessment. Rather, as was noted above, Ms. Kappe testified that her assessment was valid. In summary, Petitioner’s challenges to the District’s assistive technology assessment are not supported by the facts or the law. On the contrary, the evidence established that the District’s assessment was valid.
D. Academic Assessment conducted by Mona Neter.
Petitioner contends that the academic assessment conducted by Mona Neter dated December 2001 was inappropriate because it lacked any parent interviews and failed to include formal assessment tools. While the District acknowledged that its academic assessment of Petitioner lacked parent interviews and formal assessment tools, it disputes that its assessment was inappropriate for these reasons. The Hearing Officer agrees with the District.
The District’s academic assessment of STUDENT conducted by Mona Neter included observations of STUDENT in his classroom, a review of a recent progress report by California PsychCare, a review of Dr. Kaler’s psychological assessment report, and interviews with Alana Hampton, Ms. Kawasaki, and Ms. Rivera. According to Ms. Neter, the purpose of the assessment was to determine STUDENT’s academic and preacademic skills. As was stated above, the law does not require that assessments include parent interviews in order to be appropriate. The law also does not require that formal assessment tools be utilized in every assessment. Ms. Neter testified that although she would liked to have administered various assessment tools, she was unable to administer her assessments to STUDENT because of his frequent tardiness and absences. However, Ms. Neter was confident that her collection of information for the assessment was a valid indicator of STUDENT’s academic skills. Ms. Neter particularly relied on the information provided by Alana Hampton, STUDENT’s discrete trial training supervisor, who was aware of his academic strengths and weaknesses and his behaviors. Ms. Hampton’s information regarding STUDENT’s progress was further supported by the progress report of his academic skills from California PsychCare, the agency providing STUDENT with his discrete trial training therapy. There is no indication from the record that parent interviews or the administration of formal assessment tools would have added significantly to the records collected by Ms. Neter and the information obtained from three of the persons most familiar with his academic progress, i.e., his teacher, instructional aide, and discrete trial training supervisor. From the above, it is found that the District’s assessment appropriately assessed Petitioner’s academic skills and is not inappropriate on the grounds asserted by Petitioner.
E. Psychological Assessment conducted by Dr. Sandra Kaler.
Petitioner contends that the psychological assessment conducted by Dr. Kaler dated September 2, 2001, was inappropriate because it included outdated information and was not conducted in his regular education placement at Garfield. Dr. Kaler’s testimony regarding her assessment of STUDENT disputes the contentions that the assessment was outdated and establishes the appropriateness of the District’s assessment.
For the assessment, Dr. Kaler interviewed MOTHER and STUDENT’s then discrete trial training supervisor Alana Hampton, performed behavioral observations of STUDENT at Childtime Children’s Center, and administered portions of the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence – Revised (WPPSI-R), portions of the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale- IV, the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales, and the Beery Buktenica Developmental Test Visual Motor Integration (Beery VMI). Dr. Kaler testified that all of the formal assessment instruments used were validated for the purposes that they were used, were administered in conformance with test instructions, and were selected to ensure that the scores were an accurate reflection of Petitioner’s skills in light of his impaired speaking skills. According to Dr. Kaler, the assessment was valid and was representative of STUDENT’s abilities.
At hearing, Dr. Kaler testified that her September 2001 assessment continued to be valid when her assessment results were presented to the IEP meeting in December 2001 and when she testified at hearing in February 2001. Dr. Kaler also testified that reevaluation of students earlier than one year from the date of the first assessment would not be appropriate because of a test/retest effect, in which the child’s score rise due to familiarity with the tests. In light of Dr. Kaler’s uncontroverted testimony, the Hearing Officer finds that Dr. Kaler’s September 2001 assessment contained information that was current and that Petitioner’s contention otherwise is not supported by the evidence.
Although Petitioner also contended that the assessment is inappropriate because it was not conducted while he was attending the full inclusion placement at Garfield School, Dr. Kaler disputes that this fact rendered her assessment invalid. The only part of the assessment that was specific to a particular location was Dr. Kaler’s observation of STUDENT at Childtime. According to Dr. Kaler, STUDENT was in a classroom setting with other children but was working individually with Alana Hampton. Thus, Dr. Kaler stated that she doubts that the results of her assessment would be any different had she observed STUDENT at Garfield because he was working with Ms. Hampton and not interacting with the children in the classroom. Dr. Kaler also stated that the rest of the assessment tools administered would not have changed regardless of where STUDENT attended school. From Dr. Kaler’s uncontroverted testimony, and in the absence of any evidence to support Petitioner’s contention, the Hearing Officer finds that the District’s psychological assessment of Petitioner was appropriately conducted.
F. Adaptive Physical Education Assessment conducted by Eileen Kaiser.
Petitioner argues that the adaptive physical education assessment conducted in July 2001 was inappropriate because it lacked any parent interviews. Again, nothing in the law requires that these assessments include parent interviews. In any event, Ms. Kaiser testified that the purpose of her evaluation was to assess STUDENT’s gross motor skills. According to Ms. Kaiser, she was able to assess the gross motor skills by administering the Test of Gross Motor Development and by observing STUDENT. Ms. Kaiser also stated that interviews with the PARENTS were not required for the assessment to be valid. In light of Ms. Kaiser’s uncontested testimony and the absence of legal support for Petitioner’s challenge to the District’s assessment, the Hearing Officer finds that the District’s assessment was appropriate.
V. Is the District entitled to conduct a functional analysis assessment (FAA) of STUDENT?
In this case, the District is seeking to conduct a functional assessment of STUDENT=s behavior in order to develop a behavioral intervention plan to address his emotional needs. In 1990, California passed Education Code Sections 56520 et seq., relating to behavioral interventions. These provisions are commonly known as the AHughes Bill.@ Regulations implementing the Hughes Bill are contained in Title 5, California Code of Regulations ' 3001 and § 3052. According to the Hughes Bill, a functional analysis assessment (FAA) forms the basis of a behavioral intervention plan. 5 C.C.R. § 3052 (a)(3). Subsection (h) of Code § 3001 states that the Abehavioral intervention plan@ is a written document which is developed when the individual exhibits a serious behavior problem that significantly interferes with the implementation of the goals and objectives of the individual=s IEP. The regulations define serious behavior problems as Abehaviors which are self-injurious, assaultive, or cause serious property damage and other severe behavior problems that are pervasive and maladaptive for which instructional/behavioral approaches specified in the student=s IEP are found to be ineffective.@ 5 C.C.R. § 3001(ah). When members of an IEP team find that the instructional/behavioral approaches specified in the student=s IEP are found to be ineffective, a functional analysis assessment must be conducted. 5 C.C.R. § 3052 (a)(6)(b).
Parental consent for an evaluation of a child is required nevertheless before a school district can assess the child. California Education Code ' 56321(c) and U.S.C. ' 1414(a)(1)(A)(i). A local educational agency can overcome a lack of parental consent for an evaluation by utilizing due process hearing procedures. California Education Code ' 56321(c) and ' 56506(e); U.S.C. ' 1414(a)(1)(A)(ii). The District may assess a student, despite the lack of parental consent to assess, if the District proves at a due process hearing that the assessment is necessary. California Education Code ' 56506(e) and U.S.C. ' 1414(a)(1)(A)(ii).
As noted above, STUDENTexhibits serious behavior problems that impacted his ability to progress in Mrs. Kawasaki’s full inclusion class. These behaviors include wandering around the room, running out of the classroom, pulling things from the walls and tables, hitting, kicking and punching others, and tantrumming. Moreover, the testimony of Dr. Sadeghi and Dr. Kaler also indicates that STUDENT exhibited similar behaviors in other settings such as Childtime and at home. There is no dispute that some of these behaviors are self-injurious and assaultive. Additionally, according to Mrs. Kawasaki, Ms. Rivera, and other members of his educational team, STUDENT’s behaviors have interfered with his ability to attend in class and to participate in his educational program. According to the December 2001 IEP, STUDENT made very little progress towards his goals and objectives. By all accounts, STUDENT’s behaviors were significantly attributable to his lack of progress. In light of these behaviors, Dr. Sadeghi, Ms. Neter, Dr. Gale, and Dr. Kaler all testified that STUDENT requires an FAA to provide the basis for a behavior intervention plan to address the behaviors.
Although MOTHER asserts that behavior modifications must be attempted before an FAA is conducted, the evidence indicates that many strategies have already been implemented in vain to address STUDENT’s behaviors. These modifications and strategies included redirecting him, “extinguishing” his behavior, and using verbal and physical prompts. Additionally, STUDENT’s sensory needs were addressed with his occupational therapy services and STUDENT’s teacher and service providers worked closely with his DTT providers to address his behaviors. However, by all accounts, none of the strategies worked in alleviating STUDENT’s behaviors.
The great weight of the evidence therefore establishes that STUDENT requires an FAA. In the absence of any indication why an FAA would not be appropriate for STUDENT, the Hearing Officer grants the District’s request to conduct the FAA over the PARENTS’ refusal of consent. The District must conduct the FAA in accordance with the requirements of Title 5 of the California Code of Regulations Section 3052.
VI. During the 2001-2002 school year, has the District improperly failed to keep the parents informed of STUDENT’s progress by
A. failing to provide any progress reports from the teacher, aide, and related service providers, and B. failing to inform the parents of any behavioral problems in the classroom?
According to California Education Code Section 56345(a)(10), a student’s IEP must include a statement of how the pupil’s parents will be regularly informed, at least as often as parents are informed of their nondisabled pupil’s progress, of the pupil’s progress toward the annual goals and short-term objectives or benchmarks. The Petitioner asserts that his parents are legally entitled to receive progress reports from the District upon request and that they requested such reports at least weekly since the beginning of the school year but have been refused the reports. Additionally, the Petitioner contends that the District maintained a log of his negative behaviors at school during the fall of 2001 but that his parents were never provided any “behavior logs” or notice of the behavioral incidents. The Petitioner requests that his parents receive progress reports daily for two months following his return to school and at least on a weekly basis thereafter.
First, the Hearing Officer is unaware of any legal support for Petitioner’s argument that his parents are entitled to receive progress reports “upon request.” Rather, as noted above, the law requires that parents be provided progress reports only “at least as often as parents are informed of their nondisabled pupil’s progress.” According to Ms. Kawasaki, the nondisabled students are given progress reports once every trimester. Additionally, Ms. Kawasaki testified that she created and sent home a progress report for STUDENT in December 2001, during the one and only trimester that he attended her class. The PARENTS were also invited to attend a parent-teacher conference with Ms. Kawasaki and Ms. Neter during November 2001, at which they were given the opportunity to discuss Petitioner’s progress towards his goals and objectives and any concerns that they may have had about Petitioner’s education. Additionally, as discussed above, Petitioner’s IEP meeting was convened on November 2, 2001, for the very purpose of discussing his transition to Garfield and his progress in his educational program, but the PARENTS opted not to participate in the meeting. The PARENTS also declined to attend the IEP meeting in December 2001, at which Petitioner’s needs and progress in his educational program was further discussed. From the above, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District surpassed its obligation to keep Petitioner’s parents informed of his educational progress, but its efforts were often thwarted by the PARENTS.
Regarding the behavior logs, it is undisputed that the District never provided the PARENTS with a copy of the actual behavior logs prior to the parents’ request for educational records in connection with their request for a due process hearing. However, the evidence established that the information regarding Petitioner’s behaviors was communicated to the PARENTS, but they refused to accept the information. For example, Ms. Kawasaki testified persuasively that she notified FATHER of STUDENT’s behavioral difficulties, but FATHER indicated that he did not want to hear about “negative” behaviors and did not want any negative information to be sent home. Additionally, FATHER testified that he accompanied STUDENT to school on most occasions and was often present to observe STUDENT during school hours. According to the testimony of Ana Rivera, FATHER was present at school and observed some of STUDENT’s behavioral outbursts. According to Ms. Neter, FATHER was called to school on November 6, 2001, to assist school personnel with addressing STUDENT’s behavioral outbursts that day. Moreover, Wendy Sandberg testified that she wrote notes in a journal that was sent home to inform the PARENTS that STUDENT exhibited behaviors such as hitting, but the journal returned to her with the pages torn out. Moreover, the IEP team met on November 2, 2001, to discuss STUDENT’s progress and his behavior problems, but the PARENTS refused to attend the meeting. The District then sent the PARENTS the IEP, thereby notifying them of STUDENT’s behavior problems and the team’s decision that STUDENT needed a functional analysis assessment. Because the District did in fact notify the PARENTS on multiple occasions of the very same behaviors that were recorded on the behavior logs, there was no prejudice in not providing the PARENTS with the actual logs.
In summary, the District met its legal obligation to provide the PARENTS with STUDENT’s progress reports and information regarding STUDENT’s progress towards meeting his goals and objectives. Additionally, the District provided the PARENTS with information on multiple occasions regarding STUDENT’s behavior problems, and its failure to provide the PARENTS with the actual behavior logs did not impact their ability to participate in his education.
VII. Are the parents entitled to receive a list of and information regarding other placements available in the District and special education local plan area (SELPA), as well as programs available elsewhere, that would provide STUDENT with a FAPE?
California Education Code Section 56360 states that each special education local plan area shall ensure that a continuum of program options is available to meet the needs of individuals with exceptional needs for special education and related services. The Petitioner asserts that the District must provide his parents with documents containing a list of, and information regarding, other FAPE placements available, regardless of location, including recreation programs, after-school programs, and academic services. Petitioner’s argument fails.
There is simply no legal support for Petitioner’s contention that he is entitled to information regarding all other FAPE placements available inside and outside of the District. On the contrary, the Ninth Circuit in Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1526 (9th Cir. 1994), cert denied, 513 U.S. 965, 115 S.Ct. 428 (1994), determined that districts must make one coherent written offer of placement rather than a smorgasbord offer of placements to chose from. Additionally, nothing in the law requires districts to provide parents with information about every conceivable program available, even those not within the jurisdiction or responsibility of the school district and those that are not appropriate to meet the student’s needs. Although Petitioner’s parents prefer the “smorgasbord” approach and would like to be informed of all conceivable placement options, the District’s responsibility is to make only one offer of FAPE and to consider options that would be viable to meet his needs. For the above reasons, the Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner is not entitled to be provided a list of, and information regarding, other placements available in the District and special education local plan area (SELPA), as well as programs available elsewhere, that would provide him with a FAPE.
VIII. Is MOTHER entitled to visit STUDENT’s classroom everyday?
According to the District, a school board policy requires that classroom visits be previously approved. (See also Dist. Exh. 34.) Although the Petitioner acknowledged as “acceptable” the District’s requirement that approval be obtained prior to a classroom visit, he asserts that his parents should be entitled to visit his classroom “everyday” and that the process to obtain prior approval should take no longer than two hours from the time the request for a classroom visit is made.
Again, Petitioner’s contention is not supported by the law. California Education Code § 56126 states that the superintendent shall encourage the maximum practicable involvement of parents of children enrolled in special education programs. (Emphasis added.) California law also provides as follows:
A parent or guardian has the right to observe instruction and other school activities that involve his or her child in accordance with procedures determined by the governing board of the school district to ensure the safety of pupils and school personnel and to prevent undue interference with instruction or harassment of school personnel…. Upon written request by the parent or guardian, school officials shall arrange for the parental observation of the requested class or classes or activities by that parent or guardian in a reasonable timeframe and in accordance with procedures determined by the governing board of the school district.
The law does not specifically permit parents to visit classrooms “everyday” or require that the classroom visitations be arranged within two hours of the request. Rather, the law requires only that the classroom visits be arranged within a “reasonable timeframe.” According to MOTHER, the approval process generally takes one to two days.
Although MOTHER alleged generally that this approval process was too long, she did not provide any allegation or evidence as to why one to two days was not “reasonable” under the law. Additionally, there was no evidence presented that established that the District’s school board policy actually prohibited or somehow infringed upon the PARENTS’ involvement in STUDENT’s special education programs. On the contrary, the evidence established that MOTHER visited STUDENT’s classroom on at least one occasion and was never refused the opportunity to visit the classroom. Additionally, FATHER acknowledged that he was often present at school to observe STUDENT. Thus, Petitioner’s parents were in fact provided the opportunity to visit and did in fact participate in his educational program. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the Hearing Officer finds that the one to two days it takes to obtain approval for classroom visits is a “reasonable” timeframe, and such requirement does not interfere with the PARENTS’ “maximum practicable involvement” in STUDENT’s educational program.
IX. Did the District provide STUDENT with speech and language and OT services in accordance with his IEPs during the period between May 2001 and September 2001?
Petitioner asserts that the District failed to provide him various speech and language and OT services from May 2001 through September 2001. However, as was found above, the parties entered into a settlement agreement that resolved all educational issues through September 20, 2001, when the agreement was signed. It also was found above that the District did not materially breach the settlement agreement or otherwise subject itself to liability for educationally related claims already settled by the settlement agreement. Because the settlement agreement resolved all issues prior to September 20, 2001, it is unnecessary to determine whether Petitioner was appropriately provided speech and language and OT services prior to this time.
X. Is Petitioner entitled to compensatory education services?
Courts have consistently held that the authority to award compensatory education is derived from 20 U.S.C. ' 1415(i)(2)(B)(iii), which authorizes a court to grant such Arelief as it determines is appropriate.@ AThe purpose of compensatory education is to replace lost educational services.@ Moubry v. Independent School District Number 696, 951 F.Supp. 867 (8th Cir. 1996). Compensatory education may be an appropriate equitable remedy when the responsible educational authority has failed to provide a disabled child with an appropriate education as required by the IDEA. Todd v. Andrews, 933 F.2d 1576 (11th Cir. 1991).
As was found above, the District provided or offered to provide Petitioner with a free appropriate public education at all times relevant to this proceeding. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to compensatory education services.
XI. Is Petitioner entitled to independent educational evaluations at the District’s expense?
Pursuant to special education law, a parent has the right to obtain an independent educational assessment of the student if the parent disagrees with an assessment obtained by a district. If a request for such an independent assessment is made, a district must either agree to pay for it, or it must file for a due process hearing requesting a determination that its assessment was appropriate. If the educational agency establishes at a due process hearing that its assessment is appropriate, it is not required to pay for the independent evaluation. In such a situation, the parent still has the right to an independent educational assessment, but not at public expense. If the parent obtains an independent educational assessment at private expense, the results of the assessment shall be considered by the public education agency with respect to the provision of a free, appropriate public education to the child and may be presented as evidence at a due process hearing pursuant to Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 56500) regarding the child. Ed. Code Section 56329(b); 34 CFR Section 300.502(b).
Petitioner requests independent educational evaluations in the areas of occupational therapy, speech and language therapy, assistive technology, academics, psychological functioning, and adaptive physical education. As was found above, the District appropriately assessed Petitioner in all areas contested by Petitioner. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to an independent educational evaluation in these areas at the expense of the District. Therefore, Petitioner’s request for independent educational evaluations is denied.
ORDER
1. All of Petitioner’s claims for relief are denied.
2. The District’s request to conduct a functional analysis assessment over the PARENTS’ lack of consent is granted. In conducting the FAA, the District must comply with Title 5 of the California Code of Regulations Section 3052.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute: The District prevailed on all of the issues heard and decided.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this Decision. Education Code § 56505(i).
DATED: May 30, 2002 ____________________________________ Van T. Vu, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
FOOTNOTES
1. Because most of the issues were raised by the Student, he is referred to below as the Petitioner. 2. The parties’ issues were outlined in the Memorandum of Clarification of Issues dated January 17, 2002. For purposes of organization and proper analysis, the Hearing Officer has reorganized and renumbered many of the issues contained in the Memorandum. 3. As noted above, STUDENT’s parents unilaterally removed him from Garfield Elementary School during approximately the first week of December 2001. 4. The PARENTS’ action of shortening STUDENT’s school day and of removing him from Garfield School likely were material breaches to the settlement agreement. As is discussed below, the parties’ intent in reaching the settlement agreement was to determine STUDENT’s prospective placement and to enable him to return to school. By pulling STUDENT out of school and limiting his attendance, the PARENTS were acting in a way that not only was contrary to the settlement agreement, but also interfered with the District’s ability to perform under the agreement. 5. As was noted above, Petitioner argued that he was denied a FAPE from September 20, 2001 through December 18, 2001. Among his arguments, Petitioner alleged that he needed additional services beyond the settlement agreement to receive a FAPE. 6. At the beginning of the hearing, MOTHER contended that the autism consultation services were insufficient, and she requested at least two hours per week of such services. However, upon comparing MOTHER’s requested levels of services with the District’s offer, the Hearing Officer concludes that there is essentially no difference between the amount requested and the amount offered. The District offered ten hours of consultation services per month, which equates to more than two hours per week of services during a four-week month. Thus, there appears to be no dispute as to the level of autism consultation services that Petitioner requires to meet his unique needs.
7. There is no dispute regarding the appropriateness of the assistive technology devices that were recommended for STUDENT. Petitioner contends that he requires direct assistive technology services rather than the consultation services recommended by the District. 8. As discussed above, Petitioner also argued that the District threatened to arrest his mother so that she would not attend the IEP meeting. According to MOTHER, Ms. Bear and Mrs. Mercer approached her with a “security guard,” who could have called the police to take her away. However, there is no evidence that the District ever intended or took any actions to threaten or arrest MOTHER to prevent her attendance at the IEP meeting. On the contrary, the evidence indicates that Ms. Bear and Mrs. Mercer were attempting to escort MOTHER to the location where the IEP meeting was being held. Additionally, the evidence establishes that the man MOTHER saw was a substitute school custodian, who just happened to be in the general vicinity of Mrs. Bear and Mrs. Mercer.
9. Having found Petitioner’s factual allegation to be unsupported by the evidence, it is unnecessary to determine factually if the occupational therapy assessment indeed required information from his previous therapy providers to be appropriate. However, the Hearing Officer notes that nothing in the law states that the assessment must specifically contain interviews from previous therapy providers.
