California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · July 3, 2002

Student v. William S. Hart Union High School District (consolidated)

SEHO Case No. SN 2804-02 · Hearing Officer Trevor Skarda

William S. Hart Union High must pay half of Westmark tuition and ESY 2002 for a transfer student, and may assess her.

Split decision: student prevailed on 4 of 8 issues (4 in part)

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Noted in the decision

Before the hearing, a stay put request for Westmark was denied (order dated January 16/17, 2002). On February 14, 2002, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California denied the student's request for a TRO and preliminary injunction. No post-decision history is noted.

Summary

A 14-year-old student eligible for special education under specific learning disability moved into the William S. Hart Union High School District from Glendale Unified. Her Glendale IEP placed her at Westmark, a state-certified nonpublic school. Her mother enrolled her in Hart on October 3, 2001, and asked Hart to take over the Westmark tuition. On October 18, Hart held an IEP meeting without the parent. It offered a 30-day interim special day class at La Mesa Junior High using Lindamood-Bell, the same reading method Westmark used. Hart's attorney then wrote several letters inviting a new IEP meeting and seeking consent to assess, but the family's attorney did not respond. The student filed for due process, and Hart filed to assess. At the hearing, Hart stipulated that Westmark was appropriate. The Hearing Officer found that Hart denied FAPE from October 3 to 18 and again from November 2 onward, because it never made a permanent offer within the 30-day transfer period. The interim offer was appropriate for the time in between. Hart must pay Westmark half of the tuition the mother owes for the denial periods. The award was halved because of the attorney's delays. Hart must also fully fund Westmark for ESY 2002 and give one hour of compensatory speech therapy per missed hour, not the 1.5 hours requested. The 2002-2003 placement request was denied. Hart may assess, and an IEP meeting must follow.

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Why it matters

This decision shows how SEHO handled a student who transferred between SELPAs while placed at a nonpublic school. An interim offer with comparable services satisfied the district only during the 30-day interim period. The Hearing Officer cut tuition relief by half because the parent's counsel would not engage in the IEP process. A private evaluation did not block the district's own assessment.

Issues and holdings

  1. Student prevailed in partPlacement and LRE

    Issue 1. Did the William S. Hart Union High School District fail to offer STUDENT a FAPE from October 3, 2001, up to the date of this Decision?

    Hart denied FAPE from October 3 to October 18, 2001, and from November 2, 2001 through the decision. Its October 18 interim special day class offer was appropriate for the 30-day interim period, but Hart never made a permanent offer within the 30-day transfer period that began October 3.

  2. Issue 2a. Is STUDENT entitled to an order requiring Hart to pay Westmark for the cost of her placement from October 3, 2001, through the date of this Decision?

    Hart had stipulated that Westmark was appropriate. Hart must pay Westmark directly for half of the tuition the mother owes for the denial periods. The award was halved because of the student's attorney's dilatory conduct, as noted by the federal district court.

  3. Student prevailed in partPlacement and LRE

    Issue 2b. Is STUDENT entitled to an order requiring Hart to place her at Westmark, at District expense, during ESY 2002, the entire 2002-2003 school year, and ESY 2003?

    Hart must fully fund Westmark for ESY 2002, with no equitable reduction for prospective relief. The request for the 2002-2003 school year and ESY 2003 was denied; placement for those periods goes to the IEP team after Hart's assessment.

  4. Student prevailed in partFAPE: services offered

    Issue 2c. Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory speech and language services of one and one-half hours for every hour of services missed since October 3, 2001?

    The student is entitled to only one hour of compensatory speech services for each hour lost because of the denial of FAPE, not one and one-half hours.

  5. Issue 3. May the District conduct a triennial assessment of STUDENT pursuant to its assessment plan of October 18, 2001, as revised on March 22, 2002?

    The issue was ripe. A district need not rely only on a private evaluation (the H.E.L.P. Group assessment), and the revised plan adequately described the types of assessments. Hart may assess under the revised plan.

  6. Dismissed / withdrawnThreshold and jurisdiction

    Issue Dismissed 4. Did the District, its Governing Board, the SELPA and CDE each fail to adopt a policy addressing continued financial responsibility for a student placed at a nonpublic school who moves to another California district?

    Dismissed on the first day of hearing for lack of jurisdiction because it concerned policy adoption, not the provision of FAPE to this student.

  7. Dismissed / withdrawnThreshold and jurisdiction

    Issue Dismissed 9. Did the SELPA fail to give the District adequate support to comply with the IDEA and the Education Code in developing and implementing IEPs for in-state transfer students?

    Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as a claim about SELPA oversight. The SELPA was dismissed as a party.

  8. Dismissed / withdrawnThreshold and jurisdiction

    Issue Dismissed 10. Did the SELPA fail to give the District adequate support to comply with the IDEA and the Education Code in conducting triennial IEPs for in-state transfer students?

    Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as a claim about SELPA oversight.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • Order that district may assess without consent. Within 10 days of the decision, the mother must make the student available for assessment under the October 18, 2001 assessment plan as revised on March 22, 2002.
  • Order to convene IEP meeting. Within 15 days after the assessment is completed, the District must convene an IEP meeting to discuss the assessment results, compensatory speech and language services, and placement for 2002-2003.
  • Reimbursement. Within 30 business days after the mother provides proof of her obligation to pay Westmark tuition for October 3, 2001 through the decision date (excluding October 19 through November 2, 2001), the District must pay Westmark one-half of the total amount the mother owes.
  • Prospective funding of private placement. The District must pay in full for the student's placement at Westmark for the entire ESY 2002.
  • Compensatory education. One hour of direct, one-on-one speech and language services for every hour missed from October 3, 2001 through the decision date. This excludes October 19 through November 2, 2001 and any weeks school was not in session. The services are in addition to prospective services, and the IEP team decides how to deliver them.

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Key authorities

School Comm. of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985); Gregory K. v. Longview School Dist., 811 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1987); Andress v. Cleveland Independent School Dist., 64 F.3d 176 (5th Cir. 1995); Cal. Educ. Code § 56325; Cal. Educ. Code § 56321(b); Cal. Educ. Code § 56365(a); Cal. Educ. Code § 56501(a); Cal. Evid. Code § 452(h)

People named in the decision

  • Martin Lieberman, Director of special education, William S. Hart Union High School District
  • Bernice Baldwin, District staff member who scheduled the IEP meeting, William S. Hart Union High School District
  • Don Cook, Witness, Not stated
  • Westmark, State-certified nonpublic school, Nonpublic school
  • H.E.L.P. Group, Private neuropsychological assessor, Described in decision as at the University of California, Los Angeles
  • La Mesa Junior High School, Site of District's proposed interim special day class, William S. Hart Union High School District

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Trevor Skarda, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in Santa Clarita, California, on March 19 and 20, and April 9, 10, 11 and 12, 2002.

Petitioner STUDENT (Petitioner or STUDENT) was represented at the Hearing by attorney Steven Wyner and attorney Marcy Tiffany. Also present on behalf of STUDENT was her mother, MOTHER. The William S. Hart Union High School District (District or Hart) was represented at the Hearing by attorney Barrett Green and attorney Steven Groode of the law firm Littler Mendelson. Also appearing on behalf of Hart was Martin Lieberman, the District¡¯s director of special education.

Oral and documentary evidence was received. The parties submitted written closing arguments, the last of which was received by the Hearing Office on May 16, 2002. Thereafter, the record was closed and the matter was submitted for decision.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Dismissal of Issues for Lack of Jurisdiction

On the first day of hearing, the District and the Santa Clarita Special Education Local Plan Area (SELPA) moved to dismiss the following three issues that were proposed by the Petitioner in her issue statement:

4. Did the District, the Governing Board of Education . . . SELPA and the California Department of Education (¡°CDE¡±) each fail to adopt a plan, policy, procedure, practice or regulation, which addresses the issue of continued financial responsibility for tuition and related services for a student placed at a certified, nonpublic school by a California school district that student¡¯s relocation of residence within the boundaries of another California school district?

***** 9. Did the SELPA fail to provide [the District] with adequate support so that it could comply with the IDEA, and/or concomitant provisions of the California Education Code regarding the implementation and development of IEPs for in-state transfer students?

10. Did the SELPA fail to provide [the District] with adequate support so that it could comply with the IDEA, and/or concomitant provisions of the California Education Code regarding the conduct of triennial IEPs for in-state transfer students?

The Hearing Officer dismissed the issues upon the motion of the SELPA and District. The Hearing Office has jurisdiction to resolve disputes regarding: (1) a proposal to initiate or change identification, assessment or educational placement of a child or the provision of a free, appropriate public education, (2) a refusal to initiate or change the identification, assessment, or educational placement of a child or the provision of a free, appropriate public education, and (3) parental refusal to consent to an assessment of a child. Cal. Educ. Code ¡ì56501(a). The above-listed issues all generally involve alleged inadequate SELPA oversight, and the District¡¯s alleged failure to adopt appropriate policies. These issues are not within the jurisdiction of the Special Education Hearing Office as they do not relate directly to the provision of a FAPE to STUDENT, or any of the other types of disputes the Hearing Office may resolve at a due process hearing (Footnote 1).

Hart¡¯s stipulation regarding the appropriateness of Westmark

Also on the first day of the hearing, the District stipulated that STUDENT¡¯s private placement at Westmark, a State-certified nonpublic school for children with learning disabilities, was ¡°appropriate¡± for purposes of reimbursement from October 3, 2001 through the date of this Decision (Footnote 2). The District¡¯s stipulation, through its attorney, Barrett Green, was made during discussions involving witnesses. The District¡¯s stipulation was discussed at length and affirmed by Mr. Green. Mr. Green specifically stipulated that Westmark had been ¡°appropriate¡± for STUDENT as that term is defined by the Supreme Court in the matter School Comm. of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370, 105 S. Ct. 1996 (1985). That case held generally that hearing officers have the authority to award relief which is ¡°appropriate¡± in light of the purposes of the IDEA, and that this equitable relief may include retroactive reimbursement for a private placement by a district. Id.

The following day, after evidence had been accepted, the District moved to withdraw its stipulation. Petitioner opposed this motion. Because he had relied on the District¡¯s stipulation and because evidence had been taken, the Hearing Officer denied the District¡¯s motion to withdraw its stipulation in order to preserve the integrity of the due process hearing.

Request for Judicial Notice

In her closing brief, the Petitioner¡¯s attorneys submitted five new documents accompanied by a ¡°request for judicial notice.¡± The first document is a request for STUDENT¡¯s records from the District¡¯s director of special education to STUDENT¡¯s previous district of residence, dated February 6, 2002, more than four months after STUDENT was enrolled in the District. The second document, titled ¡°receipt of special education records¡± and dated February 8, 2002, was signed for by an individual from ¡°Now Legal Service Littler Mendelson.¡± (Footnote 3) It appears to be a list of all documents forwarded by Glendale to the District on that date. The final three documents are excerpts of deposition transcripts, none of which are verified.

There is no provision in the education code pertaining to whether a hearing officer may properly take judicial notice of such documents. Therefore, the Hearing Officer looks to State law for guidance. Section 452 of the California Evidence Code identifies areas where courts are permitted to take judicial notice. That section states, in pertinent part, that a court may take judicial notice of ¡°facts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.¡± Cal. Evid. Code ¡ì 452(h).

The Hearing Officer notes that the first two documents are relevant as they relate to the District¡¯s apparent delay in requesting STUDENT¡¯s educational records from Glendale. It is unclear why these documents were not proffered as evidence by the Petitioner at the hearing. Regardless, they are clearly not ¡°capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy¡± and the Hearing Officer declines to judicially notice the documents.

The final three documents, unverified, partial deposition transcripts, are similarly not the type of ¡°facts¡± that a court or hearing officer is permitted to judicially notice under California law. The Hearing Officer therefore declines to judicially notice these partial, unverified deposition transcripts.

ISSUES (Footnote 4)

1. Did the William S. Hart Union High School District (Hart) fail to offer STUDENT a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) from October 3, 2001, up to the date of this Decision?

2. If so, is STUDENT entitled to the following relief:

a. An order requiring Hart to pay Westmark for the cost of STUDENT¡¯s placement for the period from October 3, 2001, through the date of this Decision?

b. An order requiring Hart to place STUDENT at Westmark, at District expense, during the extended school year (ESY) 2002, the entire 2002-2003 school year, and the ESY 2003?

c. Compensatory education in the form of speech and language services in the amount of one and one-half hours for every hour of services STUDENT has missed since October 3, 2001?

3. May the District conduct a triennial assessment of STUDENT pursuant to its assessment plan of October 18, 2001, as revised on March 22, 2002? (Footnote 5)

BACKGROUND FACTS

STUDENT, age 14, currently resides with her mother, MOTHER, within the boundaries of the William S. Hart Union High School District. She has been eligible for special education and related services due to a specific learning disability (SLD) since 1997.

Until October 3, 2001, STUDENT received special education and related services from Glendale Unified School District (Glendale). Months prior to October 3, 2001, STUDENT and her mother had moved from the boundaries of Glendale to the boundaries of Hart, although MOTHER did not immediately inform either Glendale or Hart (Footnote 6). Glendale is located in the Foothill Special Education Local Plan Area and Hart is part of the Santa Clarita SELPA.

On October 3, 2001, after it was discovered by Glendale that MOTHER had moved to Hart, she enrolled her daughter in Hart. Testimony of MOTHER and Petitioner¡¯s Exh. 13. As of that date, STUDENT was still attending school at Westmark, a private, State-certified, nonpublic school for students with learning disabilities, pursuant to an IEP developed by Glendale on February 28, 2001 (hereinafter the ¡°Glendale IEP¡±). Also at the point she enrolled her daughter, MOTHER requested that Hart assume responsibility for STUDENT¡¯s tuition at Westmark and provided the District with a copy of the Glendale IEP.

The Glendale IEP that placed STUDENT at Westmark states that ¡°the IEP team agrees that STUDENT continues to need a [nonpublic school] and a special day class placement as [the] least restrictive environment, [and the] most appropriate educational setting¡± and that her current placement was ¡°Westmark.¡± It includes goals and objectives in the areas of speech and language, math calculation, reading comprehension, expressive language, written language and decoding. In addition to placement at Westmark, the IEP provides for one hour per week of speech and language services, 30 minutes of ¡°assistive technology¡± consultation each quarter, the use of a laptop computer, and extended school year (ESY) services. Additionally, the IEP provides for testing accommodation for state-standardized tests along with several modifications and accommodations to enable STUDENT to access the general education curriculum. Petitioner¡¯s Exh. 11.

Although Glendale paid for STUDENT¡¯s placement at Westmark up to the time of her enrollment in Hart, MOTHER was obligated to pay in the event that Glendale failed to pay. Petitioner¡¯s Exh. 12.

The District attempted to schedule an IEP team meeting for STUDENT as early as October 9, 2001. Testimony of MOTHER and District¡¯s Exh. 7. No such meeting took place, and the District attempted to reschedule an IEP team meeting for October 18, 2001. MOTHER testified that she did not receive any notice, verbal or written, prior to October 17, 2001, of the District¡¯s proposed IEP team meeting on October 18, 2001, and at that point, she learned of the proposed meeting from people at Westmark. The District maintains that MOTHER agreed to attend an IEP meeting during a telephone conversation with Bernice Baldwin from the District on October 9, 2001. Testimony of Bernice Baldwin and District¡¯s Exh. 4.

On October 17, 2001, MOTHER delivered to the District a letter addressed to Martin Lieberman, the District¡¯s director of special education. That letter states that the District had ¡°refused¡± speech and language services authorized by STUDENT¡¯s ¡°current¡± IEP and that, as a result, STUDENT had missed three speech sessions. The letter states further:

I was also informed by Westmark School that the Hart Union School District had informed Westmark that an IEP will be held at La Mesa Junior High tomorrow. I have not received written or oral notice of such IEP as required by the IDEA. I do not consent to the holding of an IEP in the absence of statutory notice.

On October 5, 2001 I told Sharon to contact attorney Steven Wyner to set a date for an IEP for STUDENT. Mr. Wyner has informed me that he has not been contacted.

Mr. Wyner is the attorney for STUDENT and me and I hereby consent to the release of all the information to Mr. Wyner regarding STUDENT.

Mr. Wyner has advised me to not communicate verbally with representatives of the WM. S. Hart Union School District based on the foregoing acts of noncompliance with IDEA. Please direct all communication to me in writing with copies to Mr. Wyner via fax @ 310-379-5648 and mail to the Law Office of Steven Wyner PO BOX 1540 Manhattan Beach California 90267. Mr. Wyner can be reached by phone @ 310-379-4827.

Demand is hereby made for full compliance with STUDENT¡¯s current [Glendale] IEP a copy of which was delivered to the district on October 4, 2001.

Petitioner¡¯s Exh. 14.

The District convened a meeting regarding STUDENT on October 18, 2001. Nobody appeared on STUDENT¡¯s behalf and no one from Westmark was in attendance. The team drafted a document on a SELPA IEP form and attached a pre-typed ¡°program description¡± that had been prepared the night before by special education director Martin Lieberman in consultation with the District¡¯s attorney, Barrett Green. Testimony of Lieberman. The IEP document has a start date of October 18, 2001, and a review date of December 7, 2001. It includes speech and language services, once a week for 60 minutes, counseling services, two to four times each month for 20 minutes, placement in a district special day class (SDC), and integration in the regular education program 32% of the day. Under the proposal, STUDENT would be integrated with typically developing peers for physical education, electives, school activities and assemblies. The IEP also provides for extended school year (ESY) instruction for ¡°up to 30 days¡± at a ¡°Hart District location.¡± The IEP summary reads as follows:

¡ñ IEP team met for the 2nd time. The first time was Oct 9th, 2001 mom did not show. The mother was notified on Oct 9th that the IEP meeting was going to reconvene on Oct. 18th 2001. Again on Oct. 18th 2001 mom did not show. ¡ñ IEP team will go ahead with IEP to propose an offer of FAPE. ¡ñ Purpose of today¡¯s IEP is to establish an Educational Program that will meet STUDENT¡¯s needs. ¡ñ Mother hand delivered a letter to District office at 4:30 stating that she had not received her 10 day notice. (10/17/01) ¡ñ IEP team met in good faith to enroll STUDENT in the Hart District and set up a programs to meet her needs. ¡ñ Offer of FAPE (Free and Appropriate Public Education) attached. ¡ñ Speech and language services Once a week for 60 min ¡ñ Extended School Year up to 30 days WM.S. Hart Dist.

¡ñ SDC (Special Ed Day Class) for English, History, Science and Math, as well as Lindamood-Bell Reading Class. ¡ñ DIS Counseling will be provided during transition 2 to 4 times a month for 30 minutes. ¡ñ Assistive technology on consult basis between home and school. Assessment to be completed as part of the triennial assessment Due 12/07/01. ¡ñ Statewide Testing accommodations/modifications to include untimed; reader/writer when allowed; multiple day; out of level (one year); Calculator when allowed; small group.

Petitioner¡¯s Exh. 15.

The ¡°program description¡± attached to the IEP describes the District¡¯s proposed interim placement of an SDC at La Mesa Junior High School in detail. It contains a specific description regarding the type of instruction STUDENT would be receiving in the SDC, including the same methodology used at Westmark to deliver STUDENT¡¯s reading program, Lindamood Bell. The program description states that the District¡¯s offer is for a 30-day interim placement. In that regard, the program description states:

Goals and objectives from the 2-28-01 [Glendale IEP] will be continued until the 30-day review. This offer of FAPE is pursuant to section 56325 of the California Education Code. This new IEP is being generated by the Hart District as an interim placement pending 30-day review.

Petitioner¡¯s Exh. 15.

On October 19, 2001, attorney Barrett Green sent attorney Steven Wyner a letter via facsimile in which he enclosed the interim IEP offer accompanied by an assessment plan for STUDENT¡¯s triennial assessment, which was due December 7, 2001. The letter also states:

The District is amenable to reconvening the IEP team meeting on an expedited basis to discuss interim placement and any related issues. Please let me know immediately what dates would be convenient for you and your client to conduct the IEP.

District¡¯s Exh. 33.

Mr. Wyner replied to Mr. Green¡¯s letter on the same day via email. In the email, he requested the names of the individuals who attended the interim IEP team meeting on October 18, 2001. He also wrote that the District had ¡°knowingly and intentionally violated STUDENT¡¯s IDEA-protected rights . . . .¡± Mr. Wyner failed to address the District¡¯s invitation to coordinate an IEP team meeting. District¡¯s Exh. 32.

Mr. Green sent a follow-up letter on October 23, 2001, to Mr. Wyner. He once again invited Mr. Wyner and MOTHER to attend an IEP team meeting. Mr. Green also requested a response to the District¡¯s proposed assessment plan. District¡¯s Exh. 31. Mr. Wyner did not respond to this letter. District¡¯s Exh. 6.

On November 6, 2001, Mr. Green sent Mr. Wyner still another letter. He again requested that Mr. Wyner and MOTHER attend an IEP team meeting and requested a response to the District¡¯s proposed assessment plan. Mr. Wyner did not respond to this letter. District¡¯s Exhs. 29 and 30.

On December 6, 2001, MOTHER received a letter from Westmark informing her that STUDENT would be disenrolled unless she signed a promissory note for tuition in the amount of $15,440.76, because Glendale would no longer pay STUDENT¡¯s tuition at Westmark. District¡¯s Exh. 7.

On December 27, 2001, Mr. Wyner requested a due process hearing on behalf of MOTHER, along with a request for a stay put order directing Hart to pay for Westmark during the pendency of the due process hearing (Footnote 7). District¡¯s Exh. 7. In a declaration in support of the request for a stay put order, Mr. Wyner stated the following regarding his failure to respond to Mr. Green¡¯s requests to coordinate an IEP team meeting and to assess STUDENT:

Based on the actions and conduct taken by the District, I concluded that responding to Mr. Green¡¯s self-serving letters would serve no purpose other than to run up my client¡¯s bill for legal fees. It was, and continues to be, readily apparent to me that the District has no intention of offering Student a FAPE.

I also concluded that the District should not be allowed to assess Student because its assessment would be biased in that the District has demonstrated its clear intention to not offer Student a placement in a nonpublic school, and any assessment conducted by the District would no doubt support that illegal determination.

District¡¯s Exh. 17.

In January 2002, MOTHER obtained a private neuropsychological assessment of STUDENT from the H.E.L.P. Group at the University of California, Los Angeles (HELP). The assessment report was completed at the end of February 2002. HELP assessed STUDENT in the following areas: intellectual functioning, academic achievement, attention and concentration, language skills, visual-spatial organization and visual-motor integration, memory and learning, executive functions, fine and gross motor skills, and emotional/behavioral functioning. Information was gathered from STUDENT, her mother, teachers, academic counselor, and therapist, as well as previous testing from UCLA and educational records. In addition, a school visit was conducted at Westmark. The assessment report includes specific, detailed recommendations in the areas of reading, mathematics, written language and expressive language. It concludes that ¡°STUDENT should remain at Westmark School so that she can continue to make academic gains and maintain consistency.¡± Petitioner¡¯s Exh. 32. Petitioner does not seek reimbursement for this privately obtained assessment.

On January 16, 2002, Hearing Office denied Petitioner¡¯s request for a stay put order requiring Hart to pay for Westmark. The Hearing Officer reasoned that:

It is undisputed that Petitioner is transferring from the Glendale Unified School District in the Foothill SELPA, to the Hart District in the Santa Clarita Valley SELPA. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the parties have been unable to agree to a new IEP within the William S. Hart High School District. Thus, for purpose of stay put, the District must provide Petitioner with an interim placement in conformity with her last operative Glendale IEP. Pursuant to that IEP, Petitioner was to be provided with an NPS and a special day class placement. Petitioner was then placed at Westmark. The transfer provisions in the Education Code envision that a district receiving a student from another SELPA need not provide placement at the exact same location as the previous SELPA. The provisions only require that the District provide services in conformity with the February 28, 2001 IEP, and to the extent possible with existing resources. Thus, District¡¯s obligation does not extend to offering placement at Westmark. Therefore, Petitioner¡¯s motion for stay put at Westmark is denied.

On February 4, 2002, the District filed a request for a due process hearing with the Hearing Office seeking to conduct its proposed assessment of October 18, 2001. The District¡¯s issue was consolidated with the Petitioner¡¯s issues at the Hearing.

On February 6, 2002, Petitioner filed a complaint for injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the Central District of California (Central District Court). The complaint sought an order for a preliminary injunction restraining Westmark from removing STUDENT and enjoining the District ¡°from failing to pay for the special education and related services identified in STUDENT¡¯s Individualized Education Program, dated February 28, 2001.¡± District¡¯s Exh. 7. Petitioner also requested a temporary restraining order seeking the same relief as the complaint for a preliminary injunction. District¡¯s Exh. 8.

On February 13, 2002, the Hearing Office received a motion from Petitioner titled ¡°Motion for Designation and/or Identification of Stay Put Placement,¡± together with a declaration of Steven Wyner. This motion was deemed by the Hearing Officer who ruled on the motion to be a request for clarification of the Hearing Office¡¯s prior order denying Petitioner¡¯s request for a stay put order, issued on January 17, 2002.

On February 14, 2002, the Central District Court issued an order denying Petitioner¡¯s request for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. The Court stated the following regarding Mr. Wyner¡¯s failure to respond to Mr. Green¡¯s inquiries regarding coordinating an IEP meeting and STUDENT¡¯s assessment plan:

Plaintiff has demonstrated a clear intent to preclude any possibility that a new agreed-upon IEP be created. Moreover, instead of disputing the IEP created at the District¡¯s October 18th meeting by accepting the District¡¯s invitation to conduct another IEP team meeting, or by filing for a due process hearing, Plaintiff did absolutely nothing. Not until December 27, 2001 ¨C over two months after the initial contact by the District with Plaintiff¡¯s counsel ¨C after Westmark informed Plaintiff of the possibility that it would disenroll Plaintiff from its program for lack of payment, did Plaintiff file for a due process hearing and seek to have the stay put order issued, which was subsequently denied. This matter was heard before Trevor Skarda, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in Santa Clarita, California, on March 19 and 20, and April 9, 10, 11 and 12, 2002.

Petitioner STUDENT (Petitioner or STUDENT) was represented at the Hearing by attorney Steven Wyner and attorney Marcy Tiffany. Also present on behalf of STUDENT was her mother, MOTHER. The William S. Hart Union High School District (District or Hart) was represented at the Hearing by attorney Barrett Green and attorney Steven Groode of the law firm Littler Mendelson. Also appearing on behalf of Hart was Martin Lieberman, the District¡¯s director of special education.

Oral and documentary evidence was received. The parties submitted written closing arguments, the last of which was received by the Hearing Office on May 16, 2002. Thereafter, the record was closed and the matter was submitted for decision.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Dismissal of Issues for Lack of Jurisdiction

On the first day of hearing, the District and the Santa Clarita Special Education Local Plan Area (SELPA) moved to dismiss the following three issues that were proposed by the Petitioner in her issue statement:

4. Did the District, the Governing Board of Education . . . SELPA and the California Department of Education (¡°CDE¡±) each fail to adopt a plan, policy, procedure, practice or regulation, which addresses the issue of continued financial responsibility for tuition and related services for a student placed at a certified, nonpublic school by a California school district that student¡¯s relocation of residence within the boundaries of another California school district?

***** 9. Did the SELPA fail to provide [the District] with adequate support so that it could comply with the IDEA, and/or concomitant provisions of the California Education Code regarding the implementation and development of IEPs for in-state transfer students?

10. Did the SELPA fail to provide [the District] with adequate support so that it could comply with the IDEA, and/or concomitant provisions of the California Education Code regarding the conduct of triennial IEPs for in-state transfer students?

The Hearing Officer dismissed the issues upon the motion of the SELPA and District. The Hearing Office has jurisdiction to resolve disputes regarding: (1) a proposal to initiate or change identification, assessment or educational placement of a child or the provision of a free, appropriate public education, (2) a refusal to initiate or change the identification, assessment, or educational placement of a child or the provision of a free, appropriate public education, and (3) parental refusal to consent to an assessment of a child. Cal. Educ. Code ¡ì56501(a). The above-listed issues all generally involve alleged inadequate SELPA oversight, and the District¡¯s alleged failure to adopt appropriate policies. These issues are not within the jurisdiction of the Special Education Hearing Office as they do not relate directly to the provision of a FAPE to STUDENT, or any of the other types of disputes the Hearing Office may resolve at a due process hearing (Footnote 1).

Hart¡¯s stipulation regarding the appropriateness of Westmark

Also on the first day of the hearing, the District stipulated that STUDENT¡¯s private placement at Westmark, a State-certified nonpublic school for children with learning disabilities, was ¡°appropriate¡± for purposes of reimbursement from October 3, 2001 through the date of this Decision (Footnote 2). The District¡¯s stipulation, through its attorney, Barrett Green, was made during discussions involving witnesses. The District¡¯s stipulation was discussed at length and affirmed by Mr. Green. Mr. Green specifically stipulated that Westmark had been ¡°appropriate¡± for STUDENT as that term is defined by the Supreme Court in the matter School Comm. of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370, 105 S. Ct. 1996 (1985). That case held generally that hearing officers have the authority to award relief which is ¡°appropriate¡± in light of the purposes of the IDEA, and that this equitable relief may include retroactive reimbursement for a private placement by a district. Id.

The following day, after evidence had been accepted, the District moved to withdraw its stipulation. Petitioner opposed this motion. Because he had relied on the District¡¯s stipulation and because evidence had been taken, the Hearing Officer denied the District¡¯s motion to withdraw its stipulation in order to preserve the integrity of the due process hearing.

Request for Judicial Notice

In her closing brief, the Petitioner¡¯s attorneys submitted five new documents accompanied by a ¡°request for judicial notice.¡± The first document is a request for STUDENT¡¯s records from the District¡¯s director of special education to STUDENT¡¯s previous district of residence, dated February 6, 2002, more than four months after STUDENT was enrolled in the District. The second document, titled ¡°receipt of special education records¡± and dated February 8, 2002, was signed for by an individual from ¡°Now Legal Service Littler Mendelson.¡± (Footnote 3) It appears to be a list of all documents forwarded by Glendale to the District on that date. The final three documents are excerpts of deposition transcripts, none of which are verified.

There is no provision in the education code pertaining to whether a hearing officer may properly take judicial notice of such documents. Therefore, the Hearing Officer looks to State law for guidance. Section 452 of the California Evidence Code identifies areas where courts are permitted to take judicial notice. That section states, in pertinent part, that a court may take judicial notice of ¡°facts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.¡± Cal. Evid. Code ¡ì 452(h).

The Hearing Officer notes that the first two documents are relevant as they relate to the District¡¯s apparent delay in requesting STUDENT¡¯s educational records from Glendale. It is unclear why these documents were not proffered as evidence by the Petitioner at the hearing. Regardless, they are clearly not ¡°capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy¡± and the Hearing Officer declines to judicially notice the documents.

The final three documents, unverified, partial deposition transcripts, are similarly not the type of ¡°facts¡± that a court or hearing officer is permitted to judicially notice under California law. The Hearing Officer therefore declines to judicially notice these partial, unverified deposition transcripts.

ISSUES (Footnote 4)

1. Did the William S. Hart Union High School District (Hart) fail to offer STUDENT a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) from October 3, 2001, up to the date of this Decision?

2. If so, is STUDENT entitled to the following relief:

a. An order requiring Hart to pay Westmark for the cost of STUDENT¡¯s placement for the period from October 3, 2001, through the date of this Decision?

b. An order requiring Hart to place STUDENT at Westmark, at District expense, during the extended school year (ESY) 2002, the entire 2002-2003 school year, and the ESY 2003?

c. Compensatory education in the form of speech and language services in the amount of one and one-half hours for every hour of services STUDENT has missed since October 3, 2001?

3. May the District conduct a triennial assessment of STUDENT pursuant to its assessment plan of October 18, 2001, as revised on March 22, 2002? (Footnote 5)

BACKGROUND FACTS

STUDENT, age 14, currently resides with her mother, MOTHER, within the boundaries of the William S. Hart Union High School District. She has been eligible for special education and related services due to a specific learning disability (SLD) since 1997.

Until October 3, 2001, STUDENT received special education and related services from Glendale Unified School District (Glendale). Months prior to October 3, 2001, STUDENT and her mother had moved from the boundaries of Glendale to the boundaries of Hart, although MOTHER did not immediately inform either Glendale or Hart (Footnote 6). Glendale is located in the Foothill Special Education Local Plan Area and Hart is part of the Santa Clarita SELPA.

On October 3, 2001, after it was discovered by Glendale that MOTHER had moved to Hart, she enrolled her daughter in Hart. Testimony of MOTHER and Petitioner¡¯s Exh. 13. As of that date, STUDENT was still attending school at Westmark, a private, State-certified, nonpublic school for students with learning disabilities, pursuant to an IEP developed by Glendale on February 28, 2001 (hereinafter the ¡°Glendale IEP¡±). Also at the point she enrolled her daughter, MOTHER requested that Hart assume responsibility for STUDENT¡¯s tuition at Westmark and provided the District with a copy of the Glendale IEP.

The Glendale IEP that placed STUDENT at Westmark states that ¡°the IEP team agrees that STUDENT continues to need a [nonpublic school] and a special day class placement as [the] least restrictive environment, [and the] most appropriate educational setting¡± and that her current placement was ¡°Westmark.¡± It includes goals and objectives in the areas of speech and language, math calculation, reading comprehension, expressive language, written language and decoding. In addition to placement at Westmark, the IEP provides for one hour per week of speech and language services, 30 minutes of ¡°assistive technology¡± consultation each quarter, the use of a laptop computer, and extended school year (ESY) services. Additionally, the IEP provides for testing accommodation for state-standardized tests along with several modifications and accommodations to enable STUDENT to access the general education curriculum. Petitioner¡¯s Exh. 11.

Although Glendale paid for STUDENT¡¯s placement at Westmark up to the time of her enrollment in Hart, MOTHER was obligated to pay in the event that Glendale failed to pay. Petitioner¡¯s Exh. 12.

The District attempted to schedule an IEP team meeting for STUDENT as early as October 9, 2001. Testimony of MOTHER and District¡¯s Exh. 7. No such meeting took place, and the District attempted to reschedule an IEP team meeting for October 18, 2001. MOTHER testified that she did not receive any notice, verbal or written, prior to October 17, 2001, of the District¡¯s proposed IEP team meeting on October 18, 2001, and at that point, she learned of the proposed meeting from people at Westmark. The District maintains that MOTHER agreed to attend an IEP meeting during a telephone conversation with Bernice Baldwin from the District on October 9, 2001. Testimony of Bernice Baldwin and District¡¯s Exh. 4.

On October 17, 2001, MOTHER delivered to the District a letter addressed to Martin Lieberman, the District¡¯s director of special education. That letter states that the District had ¡°refused¡± speech and language services authorized by STUDENT¡¯s ¡°current¡± IEP and that, as a result, STUDENT had missed three speech sessions. The letter states further:

I was also informed by Westmark School that the Hart Union School District had informed Westmark that an IEP will be held at La Mesa Junior High tomorrow. I have not received written or oral notice of such IEP as required by the IDEA. I do not consent to the holding of an IEP in the absence of statutory notice.

On October 5, 2001 I told Sharon to contact attorney Steven Wyner to set a date for an IEP for STUDENT. Mr. Wyner has informed me that he has not been contacted.

Mr. Wyner is the attorney for STUDENT and me and I hereby consent to the release of all the information to Mr. Wyner regarding STUDENT.

Mr. Wyner has advised me to not communicate verbally with representatives of the WM. S. Hart Union School District based on the foregoing acts of noncompliance with IDEA. Please direct all communication to me in writing with copies to Mr. Wyner via fax @ 310-379-5648 and mail to the Law Office of Steven Wyner PO BOX 1540 Manhattan Beach California 90267. Mr. Wyner can be reached by phone @ 310-379-4827.

Demand is hereby made for full compliance with STUDENT¡¯s current [Glendale] IEP a copy of which was delivered to the district on October 4, 2001.

Petitioner¡¯s Exh. 14.

The District convened a meeting regarding STUDENT on October 18, 2001. Nobody appeared on STUDENT¡¯s behalf and no one from Westmark was in attendance. The team drafted a document on a SELPA IEP form and attached a pre-typed ¡°program description¡± that had been prepared the night before by special education director Martin Lieberman in consultation with the District¡¯s attorney, Barrett Green. Testimony of Lieberman. The IEP document has a start date of October 18, 2001, and a review date of December 7, 2001. It includes speech and language services, once a week for 60 minutes, counseling services, two to four times each month for 20 minutes, placement in a district special day class (SDC), and integration in the regular education program 32% of the day. Under the proposal, STUDENT would be integrated with typically developing peers for physical education, electives, school activities and assemblies. The IEP also provides for extended school year (ESY) instruction for ¡°up to 30 days¡± at a ¡°Hart District location.¡± The IEP summary reads as follows:

¡ñ IEP team met for the 2nd time. The first time was Oct 9th, 2001 mom did not show. The mother was notified on Oct 9th that the IEP meeting was going to reconvene on Oct. 18th 2001. Again on Oct. 18th 2001 mom did not show. ¡ñ IEP team will go ahead with IEP to propose an offer of FAPE. ¡ñ Purpose of today¡¯s IEP is to establish an Educational Program that will meet STUDENT¡¯s needs. ¡ñ Mother hand delivered a letter to District office at 4:30 stating that she had not received her 10 day notice. (10/17/01) ¡ñ IEP team met in good faith to enroll STUDENT in the Hart District and set up a programs to meet her needs. ¡ñ Offer of FAPE (Free and Appropriate Public Education) attached. ¡ñ Speech and language services Once a week for 60 min ¡ñ Extended School Year up to 30 days WM.S. Hart Dist.

¡ñ SDC (Special Ed Day Class) for English, History, Science and Math, as well as Lindamood-Bell Reading Class. ¡ñ DIS Counseling will be provided during transition 2 to 4 times a month for 30 minutes. ¡ñ Assistive technology on consult basis between home and school. Assessment to be completed as part of the triennial assessment Due 12/07/01. ¡ñ Statewide Testing accommodations/modifications to include untimed; reader/writer when allowed; multiple day; out of level (one year); Calculator when allowed; small group.

Petitioner¡¯s Exh. 15.

The ¡°program description¡± attached to the IEP describes the District¡¯s proposed interim placement of an SDC at La Mesa Junior High School in detail. It contains a specific description regarding the type of instruction STUDENT would be receiving in the SDC, including the same methodology used at Westmark to deliver STUDENT¡¯s reading program, Lindamood Bell. The program description states that the District¡¯s offer is for a 30-day interim placement. In that regard, the program description states:

Goals and objectives from the 2-28-01 [Glendale IEP] will be continued until the 30-day review. This offer of FAPE is pursuant to section 56325 of the California Education Code. This new IEP is being generated by the Hart District as an interim placement pending 30-day review.

Petitioner¡¯s Exh. 15.

On October 19, 2001, attorney Barrett Green sent attorney Steven Wyner a letter via facsimile in which he enclosed the interim IEP offer accompanied by an assessment plan for STUDENT¡¯s triennial assessment, which was due December 7, 2001. The letter also states:

The District is amenable to reconvening the IEP team meeting on an expedited basis to discuss interim placement and any related issues. Please let me know immediately what dates would be convenient for you and your client to conduct the IEP.

District¡¯s Exh. 33.

Mr. Wyner replied to Mr. Green¡¯s letter on the same day via email. In the email, he requested the names of the individuals who attended the interim IEP team meeting on October 18, 2001. He also wrote that the District had ¡°knowingly and intentionally violated STUDENT¡¯s IDEA-protected rights . . . .¡± Mr. Wyner failed to address the District¡¯s invitation to coordinate an IEP team meeting. District¡¯s Exh. 32.

Mr. Green sent a follow-up letter on October 23, 2001, to Mr. Wyner. He once again invited Mr. Wyner and MOTHER to attend an IEP team meeting. Mr. Green also requested a response to the District¡¯s proposed assessment plan. District¡¯s Exh. 31. Mr. Wyner did not respond to this letter. District¡¯s Exh. 6.

On November 6, 2001, Mr. Green sent Mr. Wyner still another letter. He again requested that Mr. Wyner and MOTHER attend an IEP team meeting and requested a response to the District¡¯s proposed assessment plan. Mr. Wyner did not respond to this letter. District¡¯s Exhs. 29 and 30.

On December 6, 2001, MOTHER received a letter from Westmark informing her that STUDENT would be disenrolled unless she signed a promissory note for tuition in the amount of $15,440.76, because Glendale would no longer pay STUDENT¡¯s tuition at Westmark. District¡¯s Exh. 7.

On December 27, 2001, Mr. Wyner requested a due process hearing on behalf of MOTHER, along with a request for a stay put order directing Hart to pay for Westmark during the pendency of the due process hearing (Footnote 7). District¡¯s Exh. 7. In a declaration in support of the request for a stay put order, Mr. Wyner stated the following regarding his failure to respond to Mr. Green¡¯s requests to coordinate an IEP team meeting and to assess STUDENT:

Based on the actions and conduct taken by the District, I concluded that responding to Mr. Green¡¯s self-serving letters would serve no purpose other than to run up my client¡¯s bill for legal fees. It was, and continues to be, readily apparent to me that the District has no intention of offering Student a FAPE.

I also concluded that the District should not be allowed to assess Student because its assessment would be biased in that the District has demonstrated its clear intention to not offer Student a placement in a nonpublic school, and any assessment conducted by the District would no doubt support that illegal determination.

District¡¯s Exh. 17.

In January 2002, MOTHER obtained a private neuropsychological assessment of STUDENT from the H.E.L.P. Group at the University of California, Los Angeles (HELP). The assessment report was completed at the end of February 2002. HELP assessed STUDENT in the following areas: intellectual functioning, academic achievement, attention and concentration, language skills, visual-spatial organization and visual-motor integration, memory and learning, executive functions, fine and gross motor skills, and emotional/behavioral functioning. Information was gathered from STUDENT, her mother, teachers, academic counselor, and therapist, as well as previous testing from UCLA and educational records. In addition, a school visit was conducted at Westmark. The assessment report includes specific, detailed recommendations in the areas of reading, mathematics, written language and expressive language. It concludes that ¡°STUDENT should remain at Westmark School so that she can continue to make academic gains and maintain consistency.¡± Petitioner¡¯s Exh. 32. Petitioner does not seek reimbursement for this privately obtained assessment.

On January 16, 2002, Hearing Office denied Petitioner¡¯s request for a stay put order requiring Hart to pay for Westmark. The Hearing Officer reasoned that:

It is undisputed that Petitioner is transferring from the Glendale Unified School District in the Foothill SELPA, to the Hart District in the Santa Clarita Valley SELPA. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the parties have been unable to agree to a new IEP within the William S. Hart High School District. Thus, for purpose of stay put, the District must provide Petitioner with an interim placement in conformity with her last operative Glendale IEP. Pursuant to that IEP, Petitioner was to be provided with an NPS and a special day class placement. Petitioner was then placed at Westmark. The transfer provisions in the Education Code envision that a district receiving a student from another SELPA need not provide placement at the exact same location as the previous SELPA. The provisions only require that the District provide services in conformity with the February 28, 2001 IEP, and to the extent possible with existing resources. Thus, District¡¯s obligation does not extend to offering placement at Westmark. Therefore, Petitioner¡¯s motion for stay put at Westmark is denied.

On February 4, 2002, the District filed a request for a due process hearing with the Hearing Office seeking to conduct its proposed assessment of October 18, 2001. The District¡¯s issue was consolidated with the Petitioner¡¯s issues at the Hearing.

On February 6, 2002, Petitioner filed a complaint for injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the Central District of California (Central District Court). The complaint sought an order for a preliminary injunction restraining Westmark from removing STUDENT and enjoining the District ¡°from failing to pay for the special education and related services identified in STUDENT¡¯s Individualized Education Program, dated February 28, 2001.¡± District¡¯s Exh. 7. Petitioner also requested a temporary restraining order seeking the same relief as the complaint for a preliminary injunction. District¡¯s Exh. 8.

On February 13, 2002, the Hearing Office received a motion from Petitioner titled ¡°Motion for Designation and/or Identification of Stay Put Placement,¡± together with a declaration of Steven Wyner. This motion was deemed by the Hearing Officer who ruled on the motion to be a request for clarification of the Hearing Office¡¯s prior order denying Petitioner¡¯s request for a stay put order, issued on January 17, 2002.

On February 14, 2002, the Central District Court issued an order denying Petitioner¡¯s request for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. The Court stated the following regarding Mr. Wyner¡¯s failure to respond to Mr. Green¡¯s inquiries regarding coordinating an IEP meeting and STUDENT¡¯s assessment plan:

Plaintiff has demonstrated a clear intent to preclude any possibility that a new agreed-upon IEP be created. Moreover, instead of disputing the IEP created at the District¡¯s October 18th meeting by accepting the District¡¯s invitation to conduct another IEP team meeting, or by filing for a due process hearing, Plaintiff did absolutely nothing. Not until December 27, 2001 ¨C over two months after the initial contact by the District with Plaintiff¡¯s counsel ¨C after Westmark informed Plaintiff of the possibility that it would disenroll Plaintiff from its program for lack of payment, did Plaintiff file for a due process hearing and seek to have the stay put order issued, which was subsequently denied. The Hearing Officer notes that it was not disputed by the parties that the District has both the right and the obligation to assess STUDENT. STUDENT was new to the District as of October 3, 2001, and her triennial evaluation was to be completed by December 7, 2001. To that end, the District prepared an assessment dated October 18, 2001, seeking to assess STUDENT in the areas of academic achievement, cognitive development, social and adaptive behavior, communication development, and psychomotor development. Petitioner failed to consent to this assessment plan (Footnote 16).

On March 22, 2002, after two days of hearing, Hart revised its assessment plan ¡°in light of the fact that [STUDENT] recently underwent extensive private psychoeducational testing through H.E.L.P. Group and in light of the requests from [STUDENT¡¯s attorneys] that the District not re-test STUDENT in the areas recently tested by the H.E.L.P. group.¡± District¡¯s Exh. 136. The revised assessment plan significantly narrows the scope of the October 18, 2001 assessment.

Petitioner argues that Hart should not be allowed to assess STUDENT because: (1) the issue is not ripe, (2) the H.E.L.P. assessment is sufficient and therefore the District does not need to conduct additional tests on a student who it has never met, and (3) the October 18, 2001 assessment plan is invalid ¡°as a matter of law¡± because it lists too many tests. Each of these arguments will be addressed below.

Petitioner¡¯s first argument, that the issue of assessment was not ripe because the assessment plan was not revised until after the hearing had begun, is unavailing. The District presented its original, comprehensive assessment plan on October 18, 2001, well before the hearing began. The District revised its October 18, 2001 assessment plan in light of the testimony at the Hearing from the Petitioner¡¯s independent assessor. Both parties focused on the revised assessment plan during the questioning of witnesses during the last four days of hearing and in their closing briefs.

Petitioner¡¯s second argument, that the H.E.L.P. assessment is thorough and therefore the District cannot conduct its own assessment, is contrary to applicable law. A district is not required to rely solely on an independent evaluation and must be allowed to reassess a student itself. Wesley Andress v. Cleveland Independent School District, 64 F.3d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1995); Gregory K. v. Longview School Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1315 (9th Cir. 1987) (¡°If parents want [the student] to receive special education under the Act, they are obliged to permit such testing.¡±).

The Petitioner¡¯s third argument, that the October 18, 2001 assessment plan is invalid because too many tests are listed, is similarly unpersuasive. First, there is no requirement in the law that a district¡¯s proposed assessment plan list the exact assessment tools that will be used; what is required is that the assessment plan explain the ¡°types of assessments to be conducted.¡± Cal. Educ. Code ¡ì56321(b). The District¡¯s October 18, 2001 assessment plan adequately explained the types of assessments that were to be conducted. In any event, as discussed above, the District revised its assessment plan on March 22, 2002, and that revised plan lists the specific tests proposed by the District.

It was not disputed that the District¡¯s proposed assessment was otherwise appropriate, or that the proposed assessors are qualified to conduct the proposed assessment. It has also been found that the issue of assessment was ripe, that the District has an obligation to conduct its own assessment, and that the revised assessment plan adequately explains ¡°the types of assessments to be conducted.¡± As such, the District may conduct its assessment of October 18, 2001, as revised on March 22, 2002.

ORDER

4. Within 10 days of the date of this decision, MOTHER will make STUDENT available for an assessment pursuant to the October 18, 2001 assessment plan as revised on March 22, 2002. Within 15 days of completion of the District¡¯s assessment, the District shall convene an IEP team meeting. The IEP team shall discuss, in addition to any other appropriate topics, the assessment results, compensatory speech and language services and placement for the 2002-2003 school year.

5. Within 30 business days of receipt of appropriate proof from MOTHER of her obligation to pay the costs of STUDENT¡¯s tuition at Westmark for the period from October 3, 2001, through the date of this decision, excepting the period from October 19, 2001, through November 2, 3001, the District shall pay Westmark one-half the total amount owed by MOTHER.

6. Additionally, the District is required to pay for STUDENT¡¯s placement in full at Westmark during the entire ESY 2002.

7. As compensatory education, the District shall provide STUDENT with speech and language services in the amount of one hour of direct, one-on-one services for every hour STUDENT has missed from October 3, 2001, excepting the period from October 19, 2001 through November 2, 2001, and also excepting any other weeks school was not in session, up through the date of this decision. This compensatory education shall be over and above whatever speech and language services STUDENT requires prospectively to receive a FAPE. The IEP team shall determine the most appropriate way to provide STUDENT with these compensatory services at the IEP team meeting convened within 15 days of completion of the assessment, as ordered above.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to Education Code ¡ì 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute:

1. Did the William S. Hart Union High School District (Hart) fail to offer STUDENT a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) from October 3, 2001, up to the date of this Decision? -The Petitioner prevailed on this issue for the period from October 3, 2001 through October 18, 2001, and for the period from November 2 through the date of this decision. The District prevailed otherwise.

2. If so, is STUDENT entitled to the following relief:

a. An order requiring Hart to pay Westmark for the cost of STUDENT¡¯s placement for the period from October 3, 2001, through the date of this decision? -The Petitioner prevailed in part on this sub-issue. Only half of the cost of STUDENT¡¯s placement was awarded because of her attorney¡¯s dilatory conduct as noted by Central District Court.

b. An order requiring Hart to place STUDENT at Westmark, at District expense, during the extended school year (ESY) 2002, the entire 2002-2003 school year, and the ESY 2003? -The Petitioner prevailed on this sub-issue with regard to the 2002 ESY. The District prevailed with regard to the rest of the period, the 2002-2003 school year and the ESY 2003.

c. Compensatory education in the form of speech and language services in the amount of one and one-half hours for every hour of services STUDENT has missed since October 3, 2001? -The Petitioner prevailed in part on this sub-issue, as STUDENT was entitled to only one hour of speech services for each hour she lost as a result of the District¡¯s denial of FAPE.

3. May the District conduct a triennial assessment of STUDENT pursuant to its assessment plan of October 18, 2001, as revised on March 22, 2002? -The District prevailed on this issue.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this Decision. Education Code ¡ì 56505(j).

DATED: July 3, 2002 _____________________________________ Trevor Skarda, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

1. Because these were the only issues involving the SELPA, the Hearing Officer dismissed the SELPA.

2. Petitioner stated at the Hearing that she was not seeking ¡°reimbursement¡± for STUDENT¡¯s private placement at Westmark in the typical sense, as STUDENT¡¯s mother has never paid for her tuition after Glendale stopped. Instead, the Petitioner explained that she was seeking a Hearing Officer order requiring the District to pay Westmark directly for STUDENT¡¯s placement at Westmark from October 3, 2001, through the date of this Decision.

3. The District¡¯s attorney, Barrett K. Green, is from the law firm Littler Mendelson.

4. The issues listed here differ slightly from those noticed by the Petitioner before the hearing. Changes were made for the purposes of clarification.

5. This is the District¡¯s issue. On February 4, 2002, the District filed a request for a due process hearing with the Hearing Office seeking to conduct its proposed assessment of October 18, 2001. No new case number was established at this time, and no new file was opened. The District¡¯s issue was nonetheless consolidated with the Petitioner¡¯s issues at the Hearing because there was no prejudice to the Petitioner. Indeed, one of Petitioner¡¯s allegations in her issue statement was that Hart denied STUDENT a FAPE because it failed ¡°to notice or conduct¡± STUDENT¡¯s triennial IEP

6. There was persuasive evidence proffered at the Hearing that STUDENT and her mother, MOTHER, changed their residence from Glendale to Hart in March of 2001, and that MOTHER sought to enroll STUDENT on October 3, 2001, because on that date Glendale discovered that the PETITIONER had moved out of the District. District¡¯s Exh. 137. At a minimum, MOTHER was less than forthcoming with Glendale and Westmark regarding her change of residence. There was evidence that MOTHER purposefully deceived both Westmark and Glendale regarding her change of residence. MOTHER testified that she was unaware that she had any obligation to inform either Glendale or Westmark of her change of residence, but her actions betray her. MOTHER¡¯s former landlord testified MOTHER moved in the spring of 2001, and that she failed to provide a forwarding address. He further testified that MOTHER or her mother regularly returned to retrieve mail from their former address, in particular, mail from Glendale and Westmark. Testimony of Frank Frias and District¡¯s Exh. 137. Moreover, there was evidence that MOTHER continued to use her former address in documents related to Glendale or Westmark months after she had moved. Testimony of Don Cook, District¡¯s Exhs. 142 and 143. Immediately after the deception had been discovered, MOTHER enrolled her daughter in the correct district, the Hart District. The Hearing Officer notes that Glendale is pursuing a small claims action against MOTHER seeking, in part, damages representing the amount it paid to MOTHER for mileage to Westmark for the period of time after she had already moved away. District¡¯s Exh. 144.

The foregoing evidence of an apparent deception perpetrated on STUDENT¡¯s former district of residence is largely irrelevant to the issues in this hearing. Those issues relate to the Hart¡¯s undisputed obligation to provide STUDENT with a FAPE beginning on October 3, 2001. As the Hearing Officer stated to the parties at the Hearing, MOTHER¡¯s dealings with STUDENT¡¯s previous district of residence are relevant only insofar as they may diminish the weight the Hearing Officer gives to MOTHER¡¯s uncorroborated testimony in regard to any disputed fact of consequence.

7. The Hearing Office did not receive all necessary information on that date and the request was not processed until January 4, 2002.

8. One of the chief reasons Mr. Wyner and Mr. Green have been unable to schedule an IEP team meeting, in addition to their apparent inability to agree on anything, is that Petitioner insists that all of STUDENT¡¯s tutors and teachers at Westmark, in addition to numerous other individuals, attend the initial IEP meeting. This, of course, has proven to be a significant hurdle and an unnecessary one at that, because there is no such requirement under the law. Cal. Educ. Code ¡ì56341(b)(3). Part of the delay also stems from Mr. Green¡¯s failure to timely respond to Mr. Wyner¡¯s first set of proposed dates following the Central District Court Order. Despite the Hearing Officer¡¯s statement on the first day of hearing that the attorneys and parties should schedule an IEP team meeting as soon as possible, the parties were unable to accomplish this simple task. Lost in the mix of accusations and dilatory tactics, unfortunately, were STUDENT¡¯s needs.

9. Mr. Lieberman, the District¡¯s director of special education, testified that it is not uncommon for parents to come to the District without their child¡¯s last agreed-upon IEP. In those cases, it would be impossible to ¡°immediately¡± implement the IEP, i.e., on the day the child is enrolled. This is irrelevant in the instant case where all of the necessary information, including STUDENT¡¯s current IEP, was readily available and provided by MOTHER.

10. Petitioner¡¯s argument is also inconsistent with applicable law. California Education Code section 56365(a) states that a district shall contract with a nonpublic school only when no public program is available to provide appropriate special education services for a student:

[Nonpublic school services] shall be provided . . . under contract with the district . . . to provide the appropriate special education facilities, special education, or designated instruction and services required by the individual with exceptional needs when no appropriate public education program is available.

Cal. Educ. Code ¡ì56365(a). [Emphasis added].

It must be assumed that Glendale placed STUDENT in a nonpublic school only because Glendale lacked an appropriate public education program in which her needs could be met as identified in her February 2001 IEP. Hart District, unlike Glendale, had within its existing resources an available special day class in which STUDENT¡¯s IEP could be implemented during the 30-day interim period.

11. Petitioner¡¯s assertion that the October 18, 2001 offer was for a permanent placement is unpersuasive; the document states that it was intended to be a 30-day interim placement only. Petitioner¡¯s Exh. 15.

12. The Hearing Officer notes that STUDENT still had her laptop computer that was provided by Glendale, according to STUDENT¡¯s mother ¨C Glendale also seeks the return of its laptop in its small claims action against MOTHER. Nothing prevented STUDENT from using this at La Mesa during the 30-day interim period.

13. The statutory clock was not reset because the District belatedly offered STUDENT an appropriate interim placement on October 18, 2001. Thus, the District was required by law to convene an IEP team meeting and make a permanent offer of placement before the expiration of the original 30-day period, which began on October 3, 2001. This is discussed below.

14. The District argues that the parents did not request reimbursement at the Hearing and thus they are not entitled to reimbursement. Mr. Wyner explained, indeed, that Petitioner was not seeking ¡®direct¡¯ reimbursement because there was nothing to reimburse as MOTHER had never paid Westmark. In lieu of direct reimbursement to MOTHER, Petitioner requested an order from the Hearing Officer requiring the District to pay Westmark directly. This is an appropriate request for relief stemming from the District¡¯s failure to offer STUDENT a FAPE beginning on October 3, 2001 (excepting 15 days from October 18 through November 2, 2001 when the District did offer STUDENT an appropriate interim placement). When a parent incurs an obligation to pay a third party for educational services because of a district¡¯s failure to provide a FAPE, a request to pay the third party to satisfy the parent¡¯s obligation is comparable to a request for retroactive reimbursement. Both achieve the same goal.

15. In general, equitable factors do not apply to prospective relief and therefore, the District¡¯s obligation to pay for this prospective placement shall not be reduced.

16. that any assessment conducted by Hart would be biased:

I also concluded that the District should not be allowed to assess Student because its assessment would be biased in that the District has demonstrated its clear intention to not offer Student a placement in an nonpublic school, and any assessment conducted by the District would no doubt support that illegal determination.

District¡¯s Exh. 17.