California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · April 19, 2004

Student v. Auburn Union School District et al. (consolidated)

SEHO Case No. SN 455-03, SN-455-03 · Hearing Officer John G. Andersen

Auburn Union must reimburse a parent's mileage to clinic therapy and may reassess over objection; no compensatory education owed.

Split decision: student prevailed on 4 of 15 issues (2 in part)

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Noted in the decision

None noted. The decision mentions an earlier Hearing Office stay put order dated April 10, 2003, which kept OT at Sierra Pediatrics. The LEAs' December 8, 2003 motion to disqualify Student's counsel was denied during the hearing.

Summary

The parent of a five-year-old with profound disabilities filed against Auburn Union School District and the Placer County Office of Education, challenging three school years of services. The student has hydranencephaly and cerebral palsy and is medically fragile. She receives instruction at home and gets physical, occupational and speech therapy at private clinics (Sierra Pediatrics and Speech & Language Associates). The district filed separately to reassess her without consent. After a 14-day hearing, the Hearing Officer found two denials of a free appropriate public education (FAPE). First, the district provided no home instruction from the September 2001 initial IEP until April 2002. Second, it never offered transportation to the clinic therapies. The Hearing Officer called that need obvious, even though the parent never asked. Late assessments and IEPs that left out the hours of home instruction were procedural violations, but they did not cost the student educational opportunity. The Hearing Officer rejected claims for ten hours of weekly instruction, direct assistive technology and vision services, and separate collaboration time for providers. He also found that the district's 2003 offers to move therapy into the home with district therapists, and the home placement itself, were appropriate. No compensatory education was ordered because no witness showed that extra hours would measurably help the student. The district must reimburse the mother's mileage to clinic therapy for set periods. It may also reassess under its September 2003 plan. A motion to disqualify the student's attorney was denied.

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Why it matters

This decision shows how SEHO handled a student with very limited capacity for progress. It found substantive and procedural violations but denied compensatory education for lack of proof of harm. It also shows a district being required to offer obviously needed transportation without a parent's request, and being allowed to reassess after a parent sought much higher service levels.

Issues and holdings

  1. District prevailedAssessment

    Issue 1(a). 2001-2002 school year and 2002 ESY: Was Student timely assessed in all areas of suspected disability (including whether the assessments referred at the September 19, 2001 initial IEP should have been completed before that meeting)?

    The district had no duty to assess before age three. The infant program's assessments covered every area of suspected disability before the initial IEP, and assistive technology is not an area of disability.

  2. Procedural violation, no denial of FAPEAssessment

    Issue 1(b). Did Student lose educational opportunities by virtue of assessment delays (OT, ATAAC, SMD teacher and VI assessments referred September 2001)?

    The assessment timelines were violated and the follow-up IEP was not held until April 24, 2002. Given the student's very limited capacity to gain or regress, no loss of educational opportunity was shown.

  3. Student prevailed in partFAPE: services offered

    Issue 1(c). Did Student receive special education and therapeutic services designed to meet her unique educational needs during 2001-2002 (ten hours of weekly in-home instruction, direct ATAAC and VI services, collaborative consultation time)?

    FAPE was denied from September 19, 2001 to April 24, 2002 because no in-home instruction was offered. Claims for ten weekly hours, direct ATAAC/VI services and separate collaboration time were rejected, and the testimony of Student's expert was given little weight.

  4. Procedural violation, no denial of FAPEIEP procedure

    Issue 1(d). Did Student receive an offer of placement and services which conformed to Union (frequency/duration of in-home instruction omitted from April 2002 IEP; 'as needed' ATAAC consultation)?

    Leaving the hours of in-home instruction out of the IEP violated Union, but the mother knew the actual service level, so her participation was not seriously infringed. 'As needed' consultation does not violate Union.

  5. Student prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue 1(e). Was Student denied appropriate transportation services during 2001-2002?

    The need for transportation to the clinic therapies was patently obvious. The district had to offer it even without a parent request, and failing to do so denied the 'free' part of FAPE.

  6. Procedural violation, no denial of FAPEAssessment

    Issue 2(a). 2002-2003 school year and 2003 ESY: Did Student suffer lost educational opportunity as the result of the untimely VI teacher assessment?

    The unexplained eight-month delay in finishing the vision assessment was a clear procedural violation, but credible testimony from the vision specialist showed no harm.

  7. Procedural violation, no denial of FAPEIEP procedure

    Issue 2(b). Was Mother's right to participate in the IEP process seriously infringed during 2002-2003 (frequency/duration omitted from January 2003 IEP; 'as needed' ATAAC and VI consultation)?

    The Union violation was repeated in the January 2003 IEP, but it did not seriously infringe the mother's participation because she knew the services being delivered.

  8. District prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue 2(c). Did Student receive special education and services during 2002-2003 designed to meet her unique educational needs (ten hours of instruction, direct ATAAC/VI, collaborative consultation)?

    The team had no information showing a need for more instruction or for separate collaboration time. The teacher testified that six hours a week was enough to address all goals.

  9. Student prevailed in partFAPE: services offered

    Issue 2(d). Transportation services during 2002-2003

    FAPE was denied before January 14, 2003 because no transportation was offered with the clinic therapy. Later offers of in-home therapy removed the need for transportation.

  10. District prevailedPlacement and LRE

    Issue 2(e). Was the proposed change to in-home therapeutic services through District providers designed to meet Student's unique educational needs?

    The January and April 2003 offers of in-home therapy by district therapists were a FAPE. Continuity of providers was not a unique need, and an offer need not name individual providers or their qualifications.

  11. District prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue 3(a). 2003-2004 school year and 2004 ESY: Was Student offered appropriate services to meet her unique educational needs (ten hours of instruction, collaborative consultation)?

    The November 5, 2003 IEP did not have to offer ten hours of instruction or collaboration time to provide a FAPE.

  12. Student prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue 3(b). Transportation as part of the November 5, 2003 offer of NPA clinic-based therapy

    Offering clinic-based therapy without transportation denied FAPE for 2003-2004, even though no one raised the issue at the meeting.

  13. District prevailedPlacement and LRE

    Issue 3(c). Was Student offered an appropriate placement in the least restrictive environment?

    Because of the student's medical fragility, in-home placement was the LRE for all three years. The district's 'administrative offers' of a special day class were settlement proposals and were not ruled on.

  14. District prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue 4. Is Student entitled to compensatory education?

    No compensatory education was ordered for the 26 missed hours of instruction because no evidence showed measurable harm or benefit. The transportation failure was financial only and was remedied by mileage reimbursement.

  15. Issue 5. Is the District entitled to assess Student pursuant to its September 15, 2003 written Assessment Plan?

    Conditions warranted reassessment, including conflicting medical reports and the parent's demand for much higher service levels. The district may assess without parental consent.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • Order that district may assess without consent. The district may assess in all areas of its September 15, 2003 assessment plan (pre-academics/academics, cognitive ability, communication, motor development, health). The district must set a date and give the parents 15 calendar days' notice, and the parents must make the student available.
  • Reimbursement. The district must reimburse the mother's mileage for driving the student to clinic-based PT, OT and speech therapy from September 19, 2001 through January 14, 2003, and from November 5, 2003 until the IEP team agrees on a different transportation arrangement. Payment uses the district's customary per-mile rate, actual round-trip mileage from home to the NPA, and the actual therapy dates; two trips on one day are both reimbursed. Past amounts are due within 10 calendar days after a written request listing mileage and dates. Later amounts are paid monthly, no later than 10 calendar days after the end of the prior month.

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Key authorities

Rowley; Union School Dist. v. Smith; Amanda J. v. Clark County School Dist.; W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School Dist.; Gregory K. v. Longview School Dist.; Fuhrman v. East Hanover; Walczak v. Florida Union Free School Dist.; Mrs. B. v. Milford Board of Education; Daniel R.R. v. State Board of Education; School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education; Florence County School Dist. Four v. Carter; Student W. v. Puyallup School Dist.; Andress v. Cleveland Independent School Dist.

People named in the decision

  • Jean Paul Chretien, M.D., pediatric neurologist; witness for Student
  • Mary Currier, private speech-language pathologist, Speech & Language Associates (formerly Sierra Pediatrics)
  • Kathy O'Brien, speech pathologist and ATAAC assessor (May 2003), Placer County Office of Education
  • Kristine Corn, private physical therapist; director of nonpublic agency, Sierra Pediatrics Therapy Clinic; founder of Ride-to-Walk Foundation
  • Regina Ross, special education teacher providing in-home instruction (district contractor), Auburn Union School District (contract)
  • Steven Daley, Ph.D., expert witness for Student; professor of special education, California State University, Sacramento
  • Carol Loeffler, private occupational therapist, Sierra Pediatrics Therapy Clinic
  • Karen Kesler, teacher of the visually impaired; vision assessor, Placer County Office of Education
  • Dennis Hart, M.D., physical medicine and rehabilitation specialist; witness for LEAs, California Children's Services
  • Cynthia Whitson-White, special education program specialist; IEP team member, Placer/Nevada County SELPA
  • Helen Painter, occupational therapist and special education program manager, Auburn Union School District
  • Jillian King, speech-language pathologist; ATAAC evaluator and consultant, Placer/Nevada County SELPA
  • Claudia Malin, director of special education, Auburn Union School District
  • Mary Schug, special education coordinator, Placer County Office of Education
  • Nancy Miller, school nurse, Auburn Union School District
  • Pamela Trafton, school psychologist, Auburn Union School District
  • William Dobbins, M.D., physician who documented medical fragility and recommended home services
  • Barbara Schack, teacher of the severely multiply disabled; assessor, Placer County Office of Education
  • Sierra Pediatrics Therapy Clinic, nonpublic agency (PT, OT, speech therapy)
  • Speech & Language Associates, private speech therapy clinic / nonpublic agency
  • Ride-to-Walk Foundation, nonprofit equestrian program for neurologically impaired children
  • Placer County Infant Development Program, early intervention program
  • Alta Regional Center, regional center (funded early therapy)

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before John G. Andersen, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), University of the Pacific’s McGeorge School of Law, in Auburn, California, on November 13, 14, 18, 20, 21 and December 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 16, 2003.

Student was represented at the hearing by attorneys Geralyn Clancy and Roberta Savage of the Varma & Clancy law firm. Appearing on behalf of Student was her Mother. Student’s father also attended one day of the hearing. The Auburn Union School District (District) and Placer County Office of Education (PCOE) (collectively, the LEAs) were represented by attorneys Marcella Gutierrez and Scott Holbrook of the Girard & Vinson law firm. Appearing on behalf of the District was its director of special education, Claudia Malin. Appearing on behalf of PCOE was its special education coordinator, Mary Schug. Student herself was present on occasion during the hearing. Although she did not testify, the Hearing Officer did have a considerable opportunity to directly observe her by virtue of these occasional appearances.

Student offered testimony from the following witnesses: Jean Paul Chretien, M.D., Student’s pediatric neurologist; Mary Currier, Student’s current speech therapist; (Footnote 1) Kathy O’Brien, a PCOE speech pathologist who evaluated Student’s assistive technology/alternative augmentative communication (ATAAC) needs in May of 2003; Dr. Kristine Corn, Student’s current physical therapist and the Director of Sierra Pediatrics Therapy Clinic (Sierra Pediatrics), the state-certified non-public agency (NPA) where Student receives her physical and occupational therapy, and where she initially began receiving speech therapy services; Regina Ross, the District-employed special education teacher who has provided all of Student’s in-home instructional; (Footnote 2) Steven Daley, Ph.D., a professor of special education at California State University in Sacramento, California, who testified as an expert witness; Carol Loeffler, Student’s current occupational therapist through Sierra Pediatrics; Karen Kesler, a PCOE teacher of the visually impaired who assessed Student in December of 2003; and Student’s mother.

The LEAs offered testimony from the following witnesses: Dennis Hart, M.D., Student’s physical medicine and rehabilitation specialist through California Children’s Service (CCS) since she was two months old; Cynthia Whitson-White, a special education program specialist with the Placer/Nevada County Special Education Local Planning Agency (SELPA), who was a member of Student’s IEP team throughout the schools years at issue; Helen Painter, a District-employed occupational therapist who was Student’s special education program manager during the 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 school years and who provided occupational therapy to Student for a brief time in early 2003; Jillian King, a SELPA speech and language pathologist who evaluated Student’s ATAAC needs in October of 2001 and was an ATAAC consultant to her IEP team; Claudia Malin, the District’s director of special education, who also was a member of Student’s IEP team during the three school years at issue; Nancy Miller, a school nurse for the District; and Pamela Trafton, a school psychologist for the District. The LEAs also recalled Ms. O’Brien as a witness for further testimony.

Oral and documentary evidence was received from the parties. At the conclusion of the testimony, counsel presented oral arguments, and final written briefs were received by the Hearing Officer on January 19, 2004. Thereafter, the record was closed, and the matter was submitted for decision.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

On December 8, 2003, the hearing was suspended following an oral motion by the LEAs to disqualify Student’s counsel on the basis of a claimed conflict of interest. The LEAs asserted that an attorney-client relationship exists between Ms. Clancy and Sierra Pediatrics, the clinic where Student currently receives therapeutic services. Because of this alleged relationship, the LEAs argued that Ms. Clancy was violating California Education Code section 56042 (Footnote 3) by advocating in this proceeding for Student’s continued placement at Sierra Pediatrics. The LEAs also claimed that a “more subtle conflict of interest exists” because Ms. Clancy is on the board of directors of the Ride-to-Walk Foundation (RTW), a non-profit organization which promotes equestrian activities for neurologically impaired children. Dr. Corn, the director and owner of Sierra Pediatrics, is also the founder and operator of RTW. Finally, the LEAs point out that Student is a regular participant in RTW activities, and that Mother is a former employee of RTW. On the basis of these relationships and perceived resulting conflicts of interest, the LEAs sought disqualification of Ms. Clancy and her entire law firm as counsel to Student in this proceeding, as well as a continuance of the hearing in order to allow Student to retain new counsel.

Because of the nature of the motion, the parties were directed to prepare and submit written briefs in support of their respective positions and to appear the following day for an evidentiary hearing to establish a complete factual record of the underlying circumstances. Ultimately, however, no evidentiary hearing on the motion to disqualify Student’s counsel was convened. After reviewing the parties’ written briefs supporting and opposing the motion, and after further consideration of the matter the Hearing Officer concluded that no evidentiary hearing was necessary.

While the close relationship between Ms. Clancy and Dr. Corn certainly gives rise to an appearance of witness bias on the part of Dr. Corn, the LEAs failed to demonstrate that the sought remedy of disqualification is within the jurisdiction or inherent power of the Hearing Officer. Section 56042, itself, provides no remedy for the prohibited conduct. Moreover, neither the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), nor California law, specify that a Hearing Officer has the authority to disqualify a party’s counsel from a special education due process proceeding for any reason. Indeed, on its face, section 56042 does not appear to prohibit, limit or apply to advocacy in a due process hearing. Further, to the extent section 56042 defines a conflict of interest or prohibits a Student’s attorney from giving certain advice or advocating certain issues, the LEAs have not demonstrated that they have standing to challenge the conduct at issue. Such a conflict would appear to be a matter between Ms. Clancy and her client, rather than a concern of the LEAs.

ISSUES TO BE DECIDED

Through counsel appearing by telephone for a pre-hearing conference on November 12, 2003, the following were identified as the issues submitted for resolution by the Hearing Officer:

1. Did the District provide Student with a free appropriate public education for the 2001-2002 and 2002 extended school year?

2. Did the District provide Student with a free appropriate public education for the 2002-2003 and 2003 extended school year?

3. Did the District offer Student a free appropriate public education for the 2003-2004 and 2004 extended school year?

4. Is Student entitled to compensatory education?

5. Is the District entitled to assess Student pursuant to its September 15, 2003 written Assessment Plan?

FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Student is a profoundly disabled five-year old who currently resides within the geographic boundary of the District. Due to a prenatal vascular event, Student’s brain was damaged and normal development was interrupted. The resulting medical diagnosis, hydranencephaly, is a condition where the cerebral hemispheres are absent and replaced by cerebrospinal fluid-filled sacs. Student also has been diagnosed with cortical blindness, a condition in which the cerebral cortex is absent or otherwise not viable enough to interpret light. Diagnostic imaging indicates that she only has a brain stem and cerebellum, structures associated with cardio-pulmonary function and hormonal regulation. Because of her incomplete brain development, Student suffers from hypertonicity and spastic quadriplegia, neuro-muscular conditions which severely impair her ability to control and move her head, trunk and all extremities. These conditions are all within the group of disorders categorized as cerebral palsy. Additionally, Student experiences moderate seizure activity, which is considered typical in light of her malformed brain. Student has been prescribed medication for her seizures. In all other respects, however, Student’s condition and resulting impairments are considered permanent.

Student is fully dependent for all daily living needs. She has been fed through a gastric tube since birth. (Footnote 4) Student also is medically quite fragile and can suffer life-threatening complications as the result of even minor illness or infections. Because she lacks critical brain structures, Student is not expected ever to progress beyond the six-month developmental age-level, physically or cognitively. She will never walk or have functional use of her body, and she will never read, write, speak or acquire any other form of symbolic communication.

Due to her disabilities, Student began receiving various publicly funded medical and social services when she was two months old, (Footnote 5) including physical therapy (PT) through California Children’s Services (CCS) to address her hypertonicity and joint mobility deficits. Shortly after the CCS-funded therapy commenced, however, Mother terminated those services and initiated PT for Student with Dr. Corn at Sierra Pediatrics, in Roseville, California. (Footnote 6) Mother testified that the CCS physical therapist was not providing services of any benefit to Student. With Dr. Corn’s assistance, funding for Student’s PT at Sierra Pediatrics was secured through the Alta Regional Center (ARC) and the Parents’ private medical insurance. (Footnote 7)

Over the following two years, Student’s services at Sierra Pediatrics were expanded to include occupational therapy (OT) and speech/language therapy (SLT), all of which was funded through the Alta Regional Center and the Parents’ private medical insurance. During this same period, in addition to the PT, OT and SLT at Sierra Pediatrics, Student also received weekly developmental services through the Placer County Infant Development Program (PIDP), as well as early intervention services through the Alta Regional Center.

On March 28, 2001, a transition planning meeting was held by PIDP to prepare for Student’s transition to a school district preschool program when she reached three years of age. At the time, Student and her parents resided in Emigrant Gap, outside the District’s boundary. During the meeting, however, Mother informed the transition team that the family would be moving to Auburn in the near future. Based upon this information, the transition team identified a number of educational placement options for Mother to consider, including a Special Day Class (SDC) at the District’s Auburn Elementary School and a Severe Multiple Disability Class (SMDC) operated by PCOE. The transition team also discussed the option of a home placement, if Student’s doctors provided the necessary documentation of medical need. The meeting adjourned with Mother indicating that she would visit each of the identified placement options, and further indicating a preference for the SMDC class due to proximity with her job in Roseville.

On September 19, 2001, Student’s initial Individualized Education Program (IEP) team meeting was held. Student’s areas of need were agreed upon and her present levels of performance were identified. At this meeting, despite previously indicating an interest in either the SDC or SMDC placements, Mother instead requested that Student receive instructional services in the home. Mother also provided the team with a prescription-pad note from William Dobbins, M.D., stating that Student was “medically fragile.” Due to the risk of exposure to frequent infections, Dr. Dobbins recommended that Student receive her therapy and education in the home setting. Accordingly, the team agreed to request an assessment by a PCOE teacher of the severe multiply disabled (SMD teacher) to determine the appropriate instructional component of an in-home special education program for Student. The team further agreed to a referral for an assessment by a PCOE teacher of the visually impaired (VI teacher), an OT assessment by a PCOE occupational therapist, and an evaluation by an ATAAC specialist from the SELPA. Finally, goals and objectives were developed for Student, and the team agreed that the District would contract with Sierra Pediatrics to provide clinical-based PT, OT and SLT services pursuant to the new IEP.

Student’s next IEP team meeting was not held until April 24, 2002, apparently due to delays in the completion of the SMD teacher assessment. (Footnote 8) At the meeting, Student’s present levels of performance were reviewed, and written assessment reports from the PCOE occupational therapist, the ATAAC specialist and SMD teacher were presented. Based upon these reports, the IEP team substantially expanded Student’s written goals and objectives, and also agreed to implement home instruction from a special education teacher. Apparently through an oversight, however, the agreed frequency and duration of Student’s special education teacher services were omitted from the April 24, 2002 IEP document. Nonetheless, Student thereafter began receiving the agreed weekly, sixty-minute session of in-home instruction from Ms. Ross. The existing PT, OT and SLT services were continued with the same frequency, duration and providers. (Footnote 9) All therapies and instructional services were offered for the 2002 extended school year (ESY). Finally, the April 2002 IEP document again reflects a referral for the VI teacher assessment first referenced in the September 19, 2001 IEP document. The vision assessment referral discussed at the September 2001 meeting apparently was not initiated due to delays in obtaining medical documentation of Student’s visual status from Mother. That documentation was provided to the District by Mother in early April of 2002.

Although Student’s IEP team intended to meet again in September of 2002 to conduct an annual review, the next meeting did not occur until January 14, 2003. The LEAs suggest that the delay was due to Mother’s unavailability, but the record only indicates that she was unavailable for meetings in December of 2002. No explanation was offered for the fact an IEP team meeting was not held in September 2002. Indeed, the record indicates that the VI assessment for which Student had been referred following the April 2002 IEP meeting actually was not completed by Ms. Kessler until December of 2002. No explanation was offered for this eight-month delay in completing the VI assessment.

At the January 2003 meeting, Student’s present levels of performance in all areas were reviewed, and Ms. Ross, Dr. Corn and Ms. Currier all reported on Student’s slow, steady progress in therapy. The team members agreed to substantially expand the number and scope of her goals and objectives. The December 2002 VI teacher assessment also was reviewed. The team agreed to add VI services, in the form of consultation on an “as needed basis.” In all other respects, the frequency and duration of Student’s existing services remained unchanged. None of the team members recommended any change in Student’s direct services. However, the District did propose to change the therapeutic service providers, as well as the therapeutic service location. Rather than clinic-based therapy at Sierra Pediatrics and Speech & Language Associates, the District proposed in-home PT, OT and SLT services through its own employee and contract therapists.

Mother refused to consent to the proposed changes in Student’s PT or SLT providers. A change in the OT provider was allowed, however, because Student had not been receiving any OT services since September 2002, when Sierra Pediatrics lost the only credentialed occupational therapist on its clinical staff. (Footnote 10) Under the circumstances, despite her preference for therapy at Sierra Pediatrics, Mother agreed to allow the offered in-home OT from the District’s therapist.

On March 5, 2003, Ms. Clancy filed a due process hearing request on behalf of Student. At that time, the only disputed issue was whether Student should continue to receive her PT, OT and SLT through Sierra Pediatrics and Speech & Language Associates. (Footnote 11) Shortly thereafter, however, when the parties began bringing their attorneys to the IEP team meetings, the issues in dispute grew to encompass the appropriate frequency and duration of Student’s instructional services, the appropriate placement for her instructional and therapeutic services, the appropriate level of consult services provided by ATAAC and VI specialists, and the appropriate level of collaboration between and among Student’s educational and therapeutic service providers.

Student’s first IEP team meeting after initiation of the administrative hearing process occurred on April 9, 2003. The District scheduled this meeting for the specific purpose of discussing an increase in the frequency and duration of Student’s in-home educational services. The meeting was prompted by a February 21, 2003 written request from Mother for such an increase in services. Although Mother requested that the IEP meeting be scheduled promptly, the parties’ counsel subsequently arranged to hold the IEP team meeting on April 9, 2003, in coordination with a mediation session scheduled for the same day.

The only agreed changes made to Student’s IEP at the April 9, 2003 meeting were a five-hour increase in the home instructional services provided by Ms. Ross, as well as the addition of a specific frequency and duration for the previous “as needed” VI and ATAAC consultation. This six-fold increase in Student’s home instructional services was not the result of any new assessment, evaluation or specific determination of Student’s needs, but rather a compromise amount to which the District agreed in the face of Ms. Clancy’s demand for a nine-hour increase. The District’s renewed offer to provide PT, OT and SLT services in the Parents’ home, through the District’s therapists, again was rejected by Mother. The IEP document reflects that Mother and Ms. Clancy intended to submit a written addendum setting forth Student’s position on the partially accepted and partially rejected offer. However, no such addendum was ever offered, and the record is silent regarding the basis of the April 9, 2003 request for ten hours of weekly instruction.

Following the April 9, 2003 IEP team meeting, the parties continued to pursue a mediated resolution of their dispute. These efforts persisted until shortly before this hearing was convened. In June, August and October of 2003, however, the District did submit certain written proposals, titled variously “Administrative Offer of Placement,” “Administrative Offer of Compensatory Education and Addendum to IEP,” “Administrative Offer of Compensatory Education” and “Administrative Offer of Compensatory Education and Addendum to IEP,” which were characterized as additional offers of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to Student for the remainder of the 2002-2003 regular and extended school year, as well as the 2003-2004 regular and extended school year. With regard to placement and services, the June 2003 proposal’s only substantive change from the April 9, 2003 IEP was the offer of Sierra Pediatrics as the PT provider, rather than a District therapist. Transportation reimbursement also was offered in conjunction with the June 2003 proposal for PT services at Sierra Pediatrics. The October 2003 proposal, on the other hand, specifies an SDC placement with all therapeutic services delivered at the SDC site through District providers. Round-trip transportation to the SDC site was included with this administrative offer. The October 2003 SDC placement proposal, which also included proposed “compensatory services,” contained language indicating that it was conditioned upon Mother’s specific agreement that the services and placement constituted a FAPE. (Footnote 12) Neither “administrative offer” of placement and services was accepted by Student.

On September 15, 2003, the District submitted a written assessment plan to Mother and Ms. Clancy which contemplated testing Student in the areas of pre-academics, cognition, communication, motor development and health. Mother refused to provide consent for the proposed assessment and, on October 22, 2003, the District filed its own due process hearing request seeking to override the lack of consent. The District’s request was consolidated with the Student’s March 5, 2003 filing.

On November 5, 2003, the parties and their attorneys gathered for a final time to address Student’s education and services for the 2003-2004 regular and extended school year. At this last meeting, the District altered course again on the issue of placement and service providers, taking the position that no changes to Student’s currently implemented program should occur until after she had been fully assessed pursuant to the September 15, 2003 assessment plan. Although Mother signed the November 5, 2003 IEP and accepted the District’s offer of placement, services and providers for the 2003-2004 regular and extended school year, she did so with certain specific reservations. Mother continues to assert that Student requires additional hours of instructional service, as well as separate collaborative consultation time for Student’s teacher and therapists. Mother also remains steadfast in her belief that Student should not be educated in the school setting and should not receive therapeutic services from the District’s regular providers. Finally, Mother continues to object to any assessment of Student at this time.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

Student asserts that the LEAs have failed to offer and provide her a FAPE since the time she first became eligible for services on her third birthday in September of 2001. Specifically, Student claims that she should have been receiving ten hours of weekly in-home instruction all along, rather than only the one hour per week received from May 2002 until April 2003, and the six hours per week received since April 2003. Student also claims that she should have been receiving direct ATAAC and VI services all along at the level offered on November 5, 2003. Student additionally claims that the LEAs have never offered or provided appropriate services in the form of collaborative consultation among and between her individual teachers and therapists, as well as transportation to her clinical therapy sites. With respect to the January 2003 and April 2003 IEPs, Student contends that the proposed, unimplemented changes in placement and service providers were not designed to met her unique educational needs. Student further alleges that the District consistently violated the statutory, procedural requirements for timely completion and review of assessments. Compensatory education and services are sought to remedy these alleged denials of FAPE and procedural violations.

The LEAs contend that, based upon the information available to the IEP team, Student was offered and provided a FAPE for all three years in dispute. According to the LEAs, additional assessments are needed before the IEP team can make any further determination regarding changes or modifications to Student’s current placement and services. At the same time, the LEAs argue that the proposed SDC placement, though never implemented, was appropriate based upon the then current medical opinions regarding Student’s fragile health status. Finally, with respect to the alleged procedural violations, the LEAs contend that the delays and mistakes which occurred did not cause Student any loss of educational opportunity or deprive her parents of the right to participate in the IEP process. Accordingly, the District asserts that no award of compensatory education to Student is warranted.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Although Student raises numerous procedural and substantive challenges to her IEPs and the special education and related services provided by the District during the three regular and extended school years in question, the ultimate resolution of the disputed issues in most instances turns largely on Student’s extraordinary disabilities and resulting, limited educational needs at this time. As mentioned earlier in this decision, Student suffers from hydranencephaly. She simply does not possess the cerebral and cortical brain structures associated with cognition and communication. Although she is capable of auditory, visual and tactile sensory reception, she lacks the brain structures to process the sensory stimulation in a functional manner. Moreover, secondary to the hydranencephaly, Student also suffers from spastic quadriplegia and hypertonicity. Because of her malformed brain, Student cannot control her voluntary muscle groups, and her neck and extremities tend to remain in rigid flexion or extension. These are conditions which will not change over time. Student will never redevelop the absent brain structures, nor will she ever gain functional motor control of her body or extremities. The medical testimony presented by parties in this regard is both powerful and unequivocal.

Student’s birth defects have resulted in significant, global developmental delays. Although she is now chronologically five years of age, none of Student’s doctors or therapist testified that she had progressed beyond the developmental level of a normal six-month old infant. Dr. Chretien, the pediatric neurologist who has followed Student since she was two months old, testified that she is currently at the two-month level of cognitive development and has been at that level for most of her life. Dr. Chretien further testified that there is less than a fifty-percent chance Student’s level of cognitive development will ever improve beyond the two-month level, and that she likely will never reach the six-month level of development. Dr. Corn and Ms. Loeffler, the current physical and occupational therapists, also testified to similarly delayed gross and fine motor development, placing Student’s present level of motor function at three to four months. This is the same motor development level observed in Student over two years ago, when she was assessed as part of her transition out of the Placer County Infant Development Program.

Although Student’s physical, occupational and speech therapists consistently testified that she has been making slow, steady progress over the years, they willingly concede that this progress is minimal, with one aptly characterizing it as “qualitative,” rather than quantitative. Dr. Hart, Student’s doctor through CCS and a specialist in pediatric cerebral palsy, testified that the written therapy records document no functional improvement in Student’s motor or communication skills since she turned three years old. This lack of functional improvement is due to Student’s medical condition. Dr. Hart testified credibly, and without contradiction, that no amount of increased therapy or other intervention will allow Student to ever reach a twelve month level in any area of development. Dr. Hart further credibly testified that, in light of no functional gains having been observed in any area over the last two years of therapy, Student is unlikely ever to progress beyond her current stage of cognitive, motor or communicative development.

The evidence presented at the hearing demonstrates that Student will remain at the infant stage of development for the duration of her life. (Footnote 13) She will never reach the point at which children are considered developmentally ready to receive educational instruction of any type. At the age of six months, typically developing infants learn through stimulation and interaction with their environment and other people. Development at this early age is, essentially, genetically pre-programed and does not involve any symbolic communication. Due to her medical condition and resulting disabilities, however, Student’s ability to interact withher environment is virtually non-existent. Although she has some ability to receive visual input, Student has no neural-optic pathway or brain structures to interpret the input from her eyes. Moreover, because of limited motor abilities, she is unable to physically interact with her environment or manipulate any objects within that environment. Finally, and most critically, even if she were able to interact physically and visually with her environment, Student lacks the cortical brain structures and functions to understand cause and effect within her environment.

1. Did the District provide Student with a free appropriate public education for the 2001-2002 and 2002 extended school year?

Student contends that her IEP process with the District was flawed from the outset in 2001. Student claims that the assessments which the team agreed upon at the initial IEP meeting on September 19, 2001 should have been previously completed and presented at that initial meeting. Student further contends that these assessments were not completed and reviewed by the IEP team in a timely manner even after the referrals were made following the September 2001 meeting. Because of the delays in completing the agreed assessments, Student asserts that she did not begin receiving any instructional services until May of 2002. Moreover, Student contends that the frequency and duration of the educational and ATAAC services she did receive during the 2001-2002 regular and 2002 extended school year (2001-2002 school year) were insufficient to meet her unique needs. Student also asserts that, because the frequency and duration of her educational services were omitted from the April 24, 2002 IEP, the offer of such services did not meet the specificity requirements of Union. Finally, although the issue apparently was never raised at any IEP meeting, Student contends that she was deprived of a FAPE because transportation services were never offered to her during the 2001-2002 school year.

Was Student timely assessed in all areas of suspected disability?

The IDEA provides that students shall be assessed in all areas of suspected disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (b)(3)(C). California law specifically requires that a student be assessed “in all areas related to the suspected disability, including, if appropriate, health and development, vision . . . hearing, motor abilities, language function, general intelligence, academic performance, communicative status, self-help, orientation and mobility skills, career and vocational abilities and interests, and social and emotional status.” Cal. Educ. Code § 56302(f).

At the initial IEP meeting in September 2001, Student’s team reviewed developmental assessment reports from her early intervention specialists at the Placer Infant Development Program, both of whom attended the meeting and explained their findings regarding her low cognitive, motor, vision, language, hearing, feeding and social-emotional status. Thereafter, the team agreed to make referrals for additional assessments by an SMD teacher, a VI teacher and an occupational therapist. The team also agreed to refer Student for an evaluation and consultation with the SELPA assistive technology team. No person attending the meeting recommended any additional assessments. No person attending the meeting asserted that Student’s suspected areas of disability were unknown or unclear. No person suggested that Student required any different or additional services.

Student does not contend that the PIDP assessments reviewed at the September 2001 were inadequate or failed to encompass all areas of suspected disability. Instead, Student argues that the assessments and evaluations proposed at the September, 2001 IEP meeting should have been completed before the September 19, 2001 meeting. Student claims that she lost substantial educational opportunity because of the delay in her receipt of the services which eventually were provided as a result of the proposed assessments. According to Student, she should have begun receiving in-home instruction and direct ATAAC and VI services immediately upon her entry into the District’s special education program in September 2001.

The Hearing Officer is unpersuaded by the argument that the assessments proposed on September 19, 2001 should have been undertaken before the initial IEP team meeting. Student has failed to provide any statutory, regulatory or case law supporting the suggestion that school districts are obligated to assess children under the age of three years old. Although Dr. Daley testified that “best practice” is to start assessing a child six months before the transition from an IFSP to an IEP, the fact remains that a school district’s legal obligation to provide special education and services, including the obligation to assess in all areas of suspected disability, does not arise until a child reaches three years of age. See Cal. Educ. Code § 56440. Finally, and most critically, Student has not actually identified any area of suspected disability that was not assessed before the September 2001 IEP meeting.

The fact that the IEP team agreed to make referrals for additional assessments and evaluations does not, itself, establish that Student had not previously been assessed in all areas of suspected disability. Moreover, the testimony and documentary evidence conclusively establish that Student was assessed - - by her PIDP intervention specialists - - in all areas of suspected disability prior to her initial IEP meeting. Although no ATAAC evaluation was done before the initial IEP, none was required to identify Student’s areas of need. Under California law, assistive technology is not considered a related area of suspected disability for purposes of assessments. See Cal. Educ. Code § 56320(f). Rather, assistive technology is a device provided to students who require such a device to benefit from their special education and related services. 34 C.F.R. § 300.308. Simply put, Student has no disability in the area of assistive technology; she has motor and communication disabilities, which were well documented and fully assessed at the time of the September 2001 IEP. The purpose of an assistive technology evaluation is to identify assistive and alternate communication devices and strategies which may be used by the student, teacher and/or special education service providers. Rather than identifying Student’s needs, the assistive technology evaluation referral was made for the purpose of refining and modifying her special education and services in light of her disabilities and needs. The referral for the SMD teacher assessment was similarly motivated.

Although in-home education was one of the options discussed with Mother prior to Student’s third birthday, less restrictive SDC and SMDC placements also were raised. Indeed, prior to the September 19, 2001 IEP, Mother had indicated a preference for the SMDC placement due to its proximity with her job site. Thus, it was not until the first IEP team meeting that the in-home services were specifically requested, and it was not until this time that Mother provided the team with medical documentation to support the request. As a practical matter, the District could not have undertaken the SMD teacher assessment prior to the September 19, 2001 meeting. Moreover, the purpose of the teacher assessment was not to identify or define Student’s disability. Rather, as stated in the September 2001 IEP document itself, the teacher assessment referral was made, “to determine educational component [and] needs as part of transition to when Student may be able to participate in a group-based program.”

The assessment referrals made by the IEP team on September 18, 2001 were not necessary to determine or define any area of Student’s disability. Those assessments, however, were necessary for the team’s development of appropriate goals, objectives and services to meet Student’s unique educational needs. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(b)(2). Accordingly, the delays in completing these assessments, as well as the educational impact of those delays, must be examined.

Did Student lose educational opportunities by virtue of assessment delays?

Under California law, a written assessment plan must be provided to a pupil’s parent or guardian within fifteen days of the referral for the assessment. Cal. Educ. Code § 56321(a). Further, a school district is required to develop an individualized education program as the result of an assessment within fifty days of receiving a parent’s written consent to such an assessment. Cal. Educ. Code § 56344(a). Essentially, therefore, a follow-up IEP meeting must be held within approximately sixty-five days after an assessment referral.

In Rowley, the Supreme Court affirmed the importance of adhering to the procedural requirements and protections afforded by the IDEA, which are designed to ensure effective parental participation in the IEP process and careful consideration of a Student’s educational needs. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205. However, not every procedural flaw constitutes a denial of a FAPE. Procedural flaws must result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student, or seriously infringe on the parent’s participation in the IEP process, to constitute a denial of a FAPE. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07; see also Amanda J. v. Clark County School District, 267 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2001); W.G. v. Board of Target Range School District, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483-84 (9th Cir. 1992).

Here, there is no dispute that the statutory assessment time-line was violated in some fashion with respect to each of the referrals made at the September 2001 meeting. After all, Student’s IEP team did not convene again until April 24, 2002, one-hundred-ninety-seven days after the initial meeting. Indeed the only two instances where the LEAs complied with the time-line were the preparation of the assessment plan for the ATAAC evaluation, and the completion of the OT assessment by the PCOE occupational therapist. There is no record of any written assessment plan even being prepared or submitted to Mother for the OT, VI and SMD teacher evaluation. Moreover, even though an ATAAC assessment plan was prepared by the District in a timely fashion and signed by Mother on October 16, 2001, the written ATAAC evaluation was not completed until January 29, 2002. Further, the SMD teacher assessment was not completed until March 12, 2002, and the assessment by the VI teacher was not completed until December 2002.

In light of the referrals made on September 19, 2001, all four assessments should have been finished and Student’s second IEP meeting should have been held sometime in December of 2001 or January of 2002. When the team finally did convene in April 2002, however, only the OT, ATAAC and SMD teacher assessments had been conducted. After reviewing these assessments, the team agreed to begin providing Student with weekly, sixty-minute sessions of in-home instruction from a credentialed special education teacher, as well as consultation with the District’s ATAAC specialist. The offer of in-home instructional services was not actually recommended in the written SMD teacher assessment. Instead, the SMD teacher report simply noted Student’s lack of postural control and visual activity, closing with generalized recommendations for increasing the overall level of stimulation in her daily environment. Similarly, the ATAAC assessment report notes Student’s significantly limited motor abilities, makes suggestions for increased sensory stimulation, and recommends five specific, simple switches for Student to use. No recommendation for direct ATAAC services or any specific frequency of consultative ATAAC services was specified. Finally, although the VI teacher assessment was not actually completed until December 2002, no direct vision therapy ultimately was recommended. Instead, the assessor simply recommended continued visual and auditory stimulation for Student in all aspects of her activities and environment.

Student’s argument that she suffered lost educational opportunities during the 2001-2002 school year is based exclusively on the fact that the IEP team subsequently agreed to provide Student with a higher frequency and duration of services than were initially offered in September of 2001. However, the fact that an additional five hours of weekly in-home education was offered to Student at the April 2003 IEP, and the fact that direct, rather than consultative, ATAAC and VI services were offered to Student at the November 2003 IEP, are of little utility in determining whether delayed assessments in the 2001-2002 school year caused any lost educational opportunity. This is particularly so because the increased services for the 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 school years were not offered on the basis of any assessment or specific teacher recommendation. Although Ms. Ross testified that she felt Student needed more than sixty minutes of weekly in-home education services, this opinion was formed after the January 2003 IEP team meeting at which Student’s written goals and objectives were substantially increased.

No persuasive evidence was presented at the hearing indicating that Student suffered any lost educational opportunity during the 2001-2002 school year by virtue of delays in completing the OT, ATAAC, SMD teacher and VI teacher assessments. No knowledgeable witness testified that any of Student’s limited skills and abilities regressed in any manner during the 2001-2002 school year, or during the period from September 2001 to April 2002, before in-home instructional services were provided. Although Dr. Daley testified that the lack of instruction until May 2002 “caused a decay of Student’s abilities,” and also that he saw no indication of progress on IEP goals and objectives before Student began receiving in-home educational services in May of 2002, this opinion evidence is not persuasive. Because Dr. Daley has never assessed Student or provided her with any type of direct service or consultation, he lacks sufficient personal knowledge of Student’s skills and abilities to effectively contradict the otherwise consistent percipient witness testimony regarding her qualitative progress and lack of regression.

Student’s limited cognitive, motor and visual abilities preclude any determination that she suffered a loss of educational opportunities as a result of the assessment delays during the 2001-2002 school year. Student has only a very limited capacity to improve her motor and visual skills, and no capacity to improve her cognitive skills. Student’s disabilities limit both her ability to receive educational benefit from her services and her ability to suffer educational losses due to shortcomings in those services. Based upon the preponderance of evidence presented, the Hearing Officer finds that Student experienced no loss of educational opportunities during the 2001-2002 school year.

Did Student receive special education and therapeutic services designed to meet her unique educational needs?

Under both State law and the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), students with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); Cal. Educ. Code § 56000. The term “free appropriate public education” is defined as special education and related services that are available to the student at no charge to the parent or guardian, which meet the State’s educational standards, and conform with the student’s individualized education program (IEP). 20 U.S.C. § 1418(a)(8). “Special education is defined as specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of the student, including instruction provided in the classroom, in the home, in hospitals and institutions, and in other settings. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16). The term “related services,” which is also referenced in California as “designated instructional and services” (DIS), includes developmental, corrective, and supportive services that may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22); Cal. Educ. Code § 56363.

In Hendrick Hudson Board of Education v. Rowley, 485 U.S. 176, 200-02 (1982), the United States Supreme Court interpreted the IDEA to require that a disabled student’s education be designed to meet the student’s unique needs, provide the student with some educational benefit, and conform with the student’s IEP. 485 U.S. at 200-01. Finding that Congress included no language suggesting an obligation to maximize the potential of disabled students, however, the Court characterized the Act as providing a “basic floor of opportunity.” Id. Thus, in resolving the question of whether a school district has offered a FAPE, the focus is on the adequacy of the district’s proposed program. See Gregory K. v. Longview School District, 811 F.2d. 1307 (9th Cir. 1987). A school district is not required to place a student in a program preferred by a parent, even if that program will result in greater educational benefit to the student, so long as the district’s proposed program is designed to meet the student’s unique needs, comports with the student’s IEP, and provides the student with some educational benefit. Id.

The law requires that a student’s special education program be designed to enable the student to advance appropriately toward attaining the annual goals specified in the IEP. 34 C.F.R. § 300.347: Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(a)(3). Also, a school district must make a good faith effort to assist the child to achieve the goals and short-term objectives specified in the IEP. 34 C.F.R. § 300.350(a). Nonetheless, a school district will not be held accountable if the student does not achieve the growth projected by the annual goals. 34 C.F.R. § 300.350(b). De minimus educational benefit or only trivial advancement, however, is insufficient to satisfy the Rowley standard of “some benefit.” Walczack v. Florida Union Free School District, 142 F. 3d at 103 (2d Cir. 1998). Academic progress must be viewed in light of the limitations imposed by the child’s disability and must be gauged in relation to the child’s potential. Mrs. B. v. Milford Board of Education, 103 F. 3d 1114, 1121 (2d Cir. 1997). Moreover, “the adequacy of an IEP can only be determined as of the time it is offered to the Student, and not at some later date.” Furhman v. East Hanover, 993 F.2d 1031 (3rd Cir. 1993). Neither the statute nor logical reasoning allow such a determination to be made with the benefit of hindsight. Id.

There is no real dispute between the parties here regarding Student’s unique needs during the 2001-2002 school year, or any other period at issue. Student has needs in all areas, including motor skills/mobility, communication, social/emotional, recreation/leisure, self care/independent living, vocational and academics. As a practical matter, however, because of her extreme physical and cognitive impairment and resulting delayed development, Student’s needs boil down to the fundamental areas of motor skills/mobility and communication. In light of her low level of function, Student’s motor and communication needs are indistinguishable from her self care/independent living, social/emotional, recreation/leisure, vocational and academic needs. Ms. Loeffler testified that, given Student’s current stage of development, she could not truly separate Student’s PT and OT needs. Because of Student’s limited level of development, her IEP team cannot begin to separately address any more specific or developmentally advanced areas of need. For this reason, the Hearing Officer is not persuaded by the testimony of Dr. Daley suggesting that each of Student’s written IEPs were deficient because they failed to provide a separate set of goals and objectives for each of the seven areas of need. Student is developmentally an infant, not a preschool age child who has progressed to the point where practical areas of need exist beyond motor and communication skills improvement. On the other hand, the Hearing Officer found particularly persuasive Dr. Corn’s explanation that improvement of motor skills beyond Student’s current level is the necessary prerequisite for further development of any other skills. Simply put, Student needs to be able to maintain head and trunk control before she can develop whatever visual ability she might possess, and Student needs to be able to maintain head and trunk control before she can begin to develop any ability to control use her arms or hands. This same basic need for posture and upper extremity motor control also stands as a prerequisite to the development of whatever ability Student might possess to utilize ATAAC devices to broaden her communication behaviors.

In Student’s case, characterizing her unique needs is of little real utility in determining the appropriate special education and services she requires. She has global deficits and global needs for improvement as the result of permanent medical conditions. Despite her global needs for improvement, Student unfortunately has virtually no ability to make any real improvement in any of those areas of need. Student’s educational needs, therefore, must be a function of both the areas in which she has need for improvement and her limited ability to improve in any of those areas. This is a particularly important consideration with respect to the issue of Student’s current need for instructional services from a credentialed special education teacher. Quite simply, much of the expert and percipient witness testimony presented at the hearing strongly suggests that Student lacks the ability to learn or understand anything she might be taught. The parties, however, agree that Student does have educational needs and that she requires PT, OT and SLT at the frequency and duration which has been provided to her since September 2001 as part of her specialized program addressing those educational needs. (Footnote 14)

Despite their relative consensus regarding the existence and nature of Student’s educational needs and her need for PT, OT and SLT services, Student and the LEAs are widely divided on the question of additional services required to address those needs. Student contends that, during the entire 2001-2002 regular and extended school year, she should have been receiving ten hours of in-home educational services per week, rather than the one hour per week she began to receive following the April 24, 2002 IEP team meeting. Student also contends that she should have been receiving monthly, direct ATAAC and VI services, and that her IEP should have provided a specific, separate amount of time each month for her teacher and therapists to consult among themselves regarding her program and progress.

The LEAs, on the other hand, contend that no assessment information available to Student’s IEP team during the 2001-2002 school year indicated any need for more than the sixty minutes of weekly in-home educational services agreed upon by the team at the April 2002 meeting. Similarly, the LEAs contend that direct ATAAC and VI services for Student were never recommended by any assessment. Finally, with respect to the question of collaborative consultation time, the LEAs assert that none of Student’s service providers indicated a need for such separate time during the 2001-2002 school year.

The LEAs correctly assert that none of the assessments in the possession of Student’s IEP team during the 2001-2002 regular and extended school year recommend any specific frequency or duration of in-home instruction from a credentialed special education teacher, or that she receive direct ATAAC or VI services. The March 12, 2002 SMD teacher assessment simply documents Student’s severely limited cognitive, motor, communication and sensory abilities. The only suggestions apparent from the teacher’s written report are that Student receive frequent sensory stimulation and that ATAAC devices be explored as a potential means of expanding Student’s communication behaviors. In fact, shortly after beginning her ATAAC evaluation process in October 2001, Ms. King had begun providing Mother and the therapists at Sierra Pediatrics with such devices from the District’s loan library pending final determination of the appropriate materials to be ordered for Student’s exclusive use. (Footnote 15) No direct ATAAC service were recommended as a result of the ATAAC evaluation because, as Ms. King explained, the teachers and PT, OT and SLT therapists who utilize the devices are generally quite familiar with them by virtue of their education, training and experience, and the ATAAC specialist is typically only required on an “as needed” consulting basis.

The LEAs also are correct in asserting that none of Student’s teachers or therapists ever advised the IEP team during the 2001-2002 school year that they required additional or specific time for collaborative consultation. Indeed, Dr. Corn testified that such collaboration already occurred as a consequence of Student’s therapists all working within the same clinic and “co-treating” Student during her visits to Sierra Pediatrics. (Footnote 16) District witnesses gave similar testimony that separate collaboration time typically is not necessary when a pupil is receiving their education and therapies at the school site.

Although her current therapists and teacher all testified at the hearing that separate collaborative consultation time is necessary, none testified that they were unable to deliver educationally beneficial services to Student at any time during the three school years at issue in this proceeding. Only Ms. Ross testified that she actually felt the need for collaboration with the other specialists on Student’s team, primarily relating to the ATAAC devices. However, Ms. Ross never raised any such concern with Student’s IEP team and, apparently, never pursued ATAAC consultation with Ms. King beyond a single telephone message to which no reply was received. Similarly, despite knowing that Ms. King was the person to contact if she had any questions regarding ATAAC matters, Mother never made any attempt to contact her to discuss any questions or concerns regarding ATAAC devices and strategies. At most, this testimony indicates a need by Student’s IEP team members to take advantage of the ATAAC specialist consultations available to them pursuant to the IEP.

The only witness who testified that Student requires ten hours of instruction each week was Dr. Daley and, again, his opinions are not particularly persuasive. Dr. Daley testified that he believes ten hours per week of educational services are necessary in order to address “all identified needs and goals that should have been in the IEP.” He testified that this opinion was formulated after spending seven to eight hours reviewing a selection of documents provided to him by Ms. Clancy, and spending approximately thirty minutes observing Student interact with Ms. Ross during in-home instruction one day in September 2003. Dr. Daley offered no further detail on the methodology or decision making process by which he arrived at the ten hour per week figure.

The Hearing Officer is skeptical of Dr. Daley’s testimony regarding the appropriate frequency and duration of Student’s in-home instructional services, particularly because it directly parallels the level of service sought by Mother and Ms. Clancy at the April 24, 2003 IEP meeting scheduled in concert with the parties’ mediation session that same date. Dr. Daley should have been able to provide a better explanation of the process by which he concluded that ten hours, rather than eight, seven or six hours, was the appropriate frequency and duration for Student’s in-home instruction, particularly after he acknowledged on cross-examination that Student had been making progress on her goals and objectives since the April 9, 2003 IEP when her services were increase from one hour to six hours per week. Dr. Daley’s testimony regarding the necessity of ten hours per week was further undermined by his inability or unwillingness to offer any opinion regarding appropriate compensatory education in light of the lesser frequency and duration of services actually provided by the District. Finally, the Hearing Officer notes that Dr. Daley’s opinions and conclusions were never shared with Student’s IEP team at any time before he testified at the hearing on November 20, 2003.

As discussed earlier, the Hearing Officer does not consider the fact that direct ATAAC and VI services were offered at the November 2003 IEP meeting to be any evidence that such direct services were required at any earlier time. Thus, Dr. Daley’s testimony also was the only evidence specifically supporting the assertion that Student required direct ATAAC and VI services during the 2001-2002 school year. However, Dr. Daley did not offer any explanation or reasoning behind his opinions regarding the necessity of direct ATAAC and VI services. Essentially, he only expressed concurrence with the frequency and duration of those services offered by the District in November of 2003 and stated that they should have been offered from the outset. Further, the Hearing Officer notes that Dr. Daley does not possess any specific qualifications in the areas of speech and language pathology, its related sub-specialty of augmentative and alternative communication, or visual impairments. Once again, therefore, the Hearing Officer can give little weight to these opinions and recommendations by Dr. Daley regarding the appropriate service that should have been offered by Student’s IEP team during the 2001-2002 school year.

The genesis of the team’s agreement to provide Student with sixty-minutes of weekly in-home instruction was collaboration and consultation between its members, including Mother, at the April 24, 2002 IEP meeting. The SMD teacher who assessed Student, Barbara Schack, was present at the meeting, as were all of Student’s therapy service providers. Apart from the fact of that agreement, no other specific evidence was presented at the hearing which convincingly demonstrates that Student required direct instructional services from a credentialed special education teacher during the 2001-2002 school year. In the case of the April 2002 IEP team meeting, however, the participants’ agreement that Student required a certain level of service - - specifically, one hour per week - - carries considerable evidentiary weight. Unlike the agreements reached at subsequent meetings in April and November 2003, the team decisions reached at this earlier meeting were not the result of attorney-directed negotiation stratagems which blurred the distinction between the IEP process and the parties’ effort to obtain a favorable settlement of the pending administrative proceeding.

The question of whether Student should have received sixty minutes of instructional services before the April 2002 IEP meeting, however, cannot be resolved simply by the fact that no agreement or assessment report recommending such services existed before April 24, 2002. The LEAs argue that instructional services could not be offered until the SMD teacher assessment had been completed. However, no argument is made that Student lacked educational needs requiring instruction before April 24, 2002. No evidence of any change in Student’s educational needs between September 2001 and April 2002 was presented at the hearing. Although the SMD teacher assessment may have been required to help the IEP team further develop and refine Student’s instructional services, no evidence was presented that an in-home instructor could not have begun addressing the goals and objectives written at the September 2001 IEP meeting. The evidence persuades the Hearing Officer to conclude that Student should have been offered in-home instructional services at the time of her September 19, 2001 IEP meeting.

Based upon the preponderance of evidence presented, the Hearing Officer finds that Student was not offered appropriate special education and therapeutic services throughout the 2001-2002 school year that were designed to meet her unique needs and provide some educational benefit. Specifically, the Hearing Officer finds that Student was denied a FAPE from September 19, 2001 through April 24, 2002 as the result of not receiving in-home instructional services from a credentialed special education teacher. This finding, however, does not fully resolve the issue of whether Student received a FAPE during the entire 2001-2002 school year. As discussed earlier, although Student began to receive one-hour of weekly services from Ms. Ross following the April 2002 team meeting, the IEP document itself does not specify the frequency and duration of those services. Also, the September 2001 and April 2002 IEP documents do not reflect any offer of transportation services. These two points will be discussed separately below.

Did Student receive an offer of placement and services which conformed to Union?

One of the rights afforded to parents of is the right to be provided a formal written offer of placement and services by the school district. Union v. Smith, 157 F.3d 1519 (9th Cir. 1994); cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 428 (1994). The Union court noted that one of the reasons for requiring a formal written offer is to provide parents with the opportunity to decide whether the proposed placement and services are appropriate and whether or not to accept the offer. Id. Again, however, not every procedural flaw constitutes a denial of a FAPE. Procedural flaws must result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student, or seriously infringe on the parent’s participation in the IEP process, to constitute a denial of a FAPE. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07. Here, Student contends that Union was violated both because the April 2002 IEP document failed to specify the frequency and duration of the in-home instructional services and because her ATAAC consultation was offered on an “as needed” basis.

With respect to the “as needed” consultations specified in Student’s IEP, the Hearing Officer declines to extend the Union ruling to require a more specific frequency or duration of a service that an IEP team determined appropriate, particularly in the context of consultative specialist services. Indeed, Student’s argument fails to recognize the essential difference between consultative and direct services. (Footnote 17) No assessment information was ever provided to Student’s IEP team during the 2001-2002 school year indicating that directATAAC services were required to meet her needs, and the team never agreed or offered to provide such direct services. No violation of Union occurred here because the April 2002 IEP clearly specifies exactly what the District was offering; ATAAC specialist consultation on an “as needed basis.”

With respect to the in-home instructional services, Mother is the only witness who testified that there was no mention of the frequency and duration for those services at the April 2002 IEP team meeting, yet she does not deny that such in-home services were discussed. Ms. Whitson and Ms. Malin both testified that one hour per week was discussed and agreed upon by the team. Dr. Corn and Ms. Currier, the only other meeting participants who testified, had no clear recollection on the issue of frequency or duration, but do recall in-home instruction being discussed. (Footnote 18) The fact that Student did begin to receive one hour of weekly services from Ms. Ross strongly supports the testimony that an agreement was reached. On the other hand, the fact that no frequency and duration is specified, itself, supports Student’s position.

Mother was a relative novice in the IEP process. The fact that Mother still signed the IEP, despite the missing frequency and duration information, does not indicate anything more than a significant procedural oversight by Ms. Malin in the preparation of the document. By signing the IEP, Mother was not consenting to its inadequacies. Although Mother was consistently provided the District’s standard typewritten form describing Student’s procedural rights at each IEP meeting, she certainly may have had some unexpressed difficulty following and understanding the team discussions on April 24, 2002. This risk of confusion by a pupil’s parent or guardian is precisely the reason why a specific written description of services and placement must be provided to constitute an offer of FAPE under Union and its progeny.

Student’s right to a written offer of placement and services was undisputedly violated here. However, the secondary inquiry in light of the clear Union violation, whether the omission of the frequency and duration information seriously infringed upon Mother’s participation in the IEP process, is more difficult to resolve. Despite the omission, Student began to receive the sixty minutes per week of services from Ms. Ross that was agreed upon by the team at the April 24, 2002 meeting. Moreover, Mother raised no objection to the frequency and duration of Ms. Ross’ services at any time during the 2001-2002 school year after those services commenced. Clearly, Student suffered no lost educational opportunity or services by virtue of the information omitted from the IEP document. By the same token, the District made no effort to remedy the purported oversight at any time. (Footnote 19) Indeed, the frequency and duration of Ms. Ross’ services also was omitted from the subsequent January 2003 IEP document. However, most critically, Mother was directly aware of the nature, frequency and duration of the service provided through Ms. Ross at all times during the 2001-2002 school year. These were in-home services, and Mother concedes to being present or in the house at virtually all times the services were being delivered. At any time after the in-home instruction commenced, Mother could have contacted the District or requested another IEP meeting to answers questions or concerns she had regarding the services Student was receiving.

The omission of the frequency and duration information on the September 2001 IEP document prevented Mother from receiving a full written description of the services offered to Student and, therefore, precluded Mother from developing a clear understanding of the District’s offer at that time. Under the circumstances, the Hearing Officer finds that Mother’s right to participate fully in Student’s April 24, 2002 IEP meeting was infringed. However, this was not a situation where the IEP team meeting was the sole means by which the parent participated in the IEP process. Because Mother was intimately aware of and involved with the in-home instruction provided by Ms. Ross at all times after the April 24, 2002 meeting, and because she never expressed any concern that those services were inconsistent with the discussions at the April 2002 meeting, the Hearing Officer finds that the Union violation did not seriously infringe Mother participation in the overall IEP process during the 2001-2002 school year.

Was Student denied appropriate transportation services?

The most troubling testimonial dispute in this proceeding revolves around the issue of transportation services. Mother unequivocally testified that she requested transportation at the September 2001 IEP meeting and was advised that such services were not available. According to Mother, the reply to her transportation request was “No, we never do that.” No other witness who was present at the September 2001 meeting corroborates Mother’s testimony on this point. The District representatives at the meeting, Ms. Whitson and Ms. Malin, both testified that the subject of transportation never came up, and Dr. Corn had no recollection of transportation being discussed. Further, Ms. Malin and Ms. Whitson testified that the District does provide appropriate transportation services to its special education pupils, including milage reimbursement for such services provided by parents, guardians or care-providers.

The LEAs offer no explanation why transportation services were not offered to Student during the 2001-2002 school year, only stating in the final written brief that “it was not determined at that time that transportation to and from therapy was necessary.” However, no witness testified that such an affirmative determination actually was made by the IEP team. Further, no specific argument was made at the hearing that transportation was an inappropriate or unnecessary service for Student during the 2001-2002 school year. The LEAs’ position on transportation is simply that, because Mother never objected to the lack of transportation services for Student or specifically requested such services, Student should be estopped from now contending that transportation was required.

The Hearing Officer has great difficulty accepting Mother’s testimony that she was affirmatively denied transportation services at the September 2001 IEP team meeting. The “we [the District] never do that” statement ascribed to an otherwise unidentified IEP team member is not particularly believable. Regardless of whether Mother requested transportation services, however, the District should have offered those services.

The case law cited by the LEAs in support of the contention that a parent must request transportation before an IEP team even is obligated to consider such services is entirely distinguishable. In Yakima School District, 36 IDLER 289 (2002) the pupil’s need for transportation services was not readily apparent from the nature of his disability. In the case of Student, however, the need for transportation services is patently obvious. The suggestion that Student’s IEP team had no reason to suspect a need for transportation services is unsupportable. Indeed, any such suggestion is flatly contradicted by the fact that transportation was “administratively” offered by the District in June and October of 2003. (Footnote 20)

By neglecting to offer Student transportation, the District failed to provide a related service necessary to meet her unique educational needs and, therefore, denied her the “free” component of the FAPE to which she was entitled during the 2001-2002 school year. Also, Student was denied a FAPE because she was not provided with any in-home instructional services from September 19, 2001 until April 24, 2002. In all other respects, however, Student’s challenges to the substantive and procedural propriety of IEPs and services during the 2001-2002 school year are without merit or sufficient evidentiary support.

2. Did the District provide Student with a free appropriate public education for the 2002-2003 and 2003 extended school year?

During the 2002-2003 regular and 2003 extended school year (2002-2003 school year), Student’s IEP team held meetings on January 14, 2003 and April 9, 2003. At each meeting, Student’s areas of need, present levels of performance and progress toward goals and objectives were reviewed. As with the prior school year, there is no real dispute regarding the nature of Student’s educational needs. Although her goals and objectives were expanded on January 14, 2003 to include more specific oral motor skills for implementation by Ms. Currier, Student’s primary areas of need remained motor skills and communication. Further, while all of Student’s service providers assert that she continued to show qualitative progress, none contend that any functional improvement was made. Her hydranencephaly and cerebral palsy preclude anything more than qualitative progress in any areas. Student remained at the infant level in all areas of function and development throughout the 2002-2003 school year.

For the 2002-2003 school year, only two significant changes were made in Student’s special education services. First, following the review and consideration of the VI teacher assessment report at the January 14, 2003 IEP meeting, consultation with the VI specialist was added on an “as needed” basis. Second, at the April 9, 2003 meeting, the team agreed to increase the frequency and duration of Student’s in-home instructional services to six hours per week. In addition, at the April 9, 2003 meeting, the team changed the “as needed” consultation with ATAAC and VI specialists to three separate sixty-minutes consultations per year. It is unclear whether the IEP team intended this change in ATAAC and VI consultation to be an increase or decrease over the prior need-based consult model. No assessment data or specific teacher recommendations supporting the April 9, 2003 changes have been identified by either party. None apparently exists. Without such data, the only inference the Hearing Officer will draw from the attorney-negotiated changes in Student’s services on April 9, 2003 is that those changes were required at that time to meet her current needs.

The other, perhaps more significant, facet of Student’s special education program during the 2002-2003 school year was the change that did not take place. This entire administrative proceeding emanates from the District’s proposal to provide Student with in-home PT, OT and SLT services, through the LEAs’ staff of itinerant therapists, instead of Sierra Pediatrics and Speech & Language Associates. Until this change in placement was proposed at the January 14, 2003 IEP meeting, the team - - including Mother - - had acted with collaborative unanimity. After Mother determined that a change in service providers would not be in Student’s best interest and refused to approve the change, little further cooperation and collaboration within the team took place.

Student also contends that her procedural rights were violated in the 2002-2003 school year because the District did not timely complete the VI teacher assessment for which she was first referred in September 2001. Student also again claims a violation of Union because the January 14, 2003 IEP does specify the frequency and duration of the in-home instructional services she was receiving, and because ATAAC and VI consultation were offered on an “as needed” basis. Student also once again contends that she was denied a FAPE because she did not receive ten hours per week of in-home instruction and did not receive appropriate transportation services. Further, Student contends that her IEP for the 2002-2003 school year should have included direct ATAAC and VI services, as well as separate time for collaborative consultation among her teacher and therapeutic service provides. Finally, of course, Student contends that the proposed changes in therapeutic service providers, as well as the change from clinic-based therapy to in-home delivery of services, are not designed to meet her unique educational needs. With the exception of the proposed change in placement and providers, Student’s challenge to the procedural and substantive appropriateness of her education program through the District for the 2002-2003 school year is no different from the challenge to the prior year.

Did Student suffer lost educational opportunity during the 2002-2003 school year as the result of the untimely VI teacher assessment?

As discussed earlier, the VI teacher assessment for Student was not completed until long after the referral was made. The referral was in September of 2001 and a second referral was made in April 2002, yet the assessment was not completed until December 2002. The initial delays were blamed on Mother’ss failure to provide the team with the medical report documenting Student’s cortical blindness. This medical report was provided by Mother on April 2, 2002. No explanation was offered by the LEAs for the subsequent eight-moth delay in completing the VI teacher assessment.

As the Hearing Officer previously found in the context of the 2001-2002 school year, however, no persuasive evidence of lost educational opportunity resulting from this clear procedural violation has been presented. Only speculative testimony about what Student “might” be doing differently now if she had received earlier VI services was offered by unqualified witnesses. None described any regression in any of Student’s skills during the 2002-2003 school year. Indeed, the testimony and written record reflect that Student made slow, steady progress on her goals and objectives throughout the 2002-2003 school year. Further, Ms. Kessler, the only witness with visual impairment expertise, specifically and credibly testified that Student was not harmed by any delay in completing the assessment or delay in receipt of consultative VI services. The evidence strongly suggests that, as a practical matter, there is little that a visual impairment education specialist can recommend for Student given her missing cortical brain structures and resulting limited visual activity. The Hearing Officer is persuaded by this evidence and, accordingly, finds that no educational opportunity was lost by Student during the 2002-2003 school year as a result of the procedural errors involved in completing the VI teacher assessment.

Was Mother’s right to participate in the IEP process seriously infringed during the 2002-2003 school year?

For the 2001-2002 school year, Student asserted that her Mother’s right to participate in the IEP process was seriously infringed by virtue of the District’s failure to specify the frequency and duration of her in-home educational services in the April 24, 2002 IEP document as required by Union. Student also claimed that the “as needed” level of ATAAC consultation services offered during the 2001-2002 school year did not conform to Union. These same procedural challenges are again raised for the 2002-2003 school year.

There is no dispute that the January 14, 2003 IEP document, like the April 24, 2002 IEP document, fails to specify the frequency and duration of Student’s in-home instructional services and only specifies ATAAC and VI consultation on an “as needed” basis. The Hearing Officer previously determined that Union was violated by the omission of the frequency and duration figures for Student’s in-home educational services, but that Union does not prohibit “as needed” consultation services. The same findings will be made regarding those issues for the 2002-2003 school year. Mother’s right to participate in the April 24, 2002 and January 15, 2003 IEP meetings was infringed by virtue of the omitted information. However, because Mother was directly aware at all times of the nature and scope of the services Student received during the 2002-2003 school year, including the frequency and duration of the in-home services provided by Ms. Ross, this violation of Union again did not result in any serious infringement of Mother’s parental right to participate in the overall IEP process.

Did Student receive special education and services during the 2002-2003 school year that were designed to meet her unique educational needs?

Student offers the same challenges to her services for the 2002-2003 school year as she made for the prior year. Student contends that she required ten hours of weekly in-home instructional services, that she required direct services from the ATAAC and VI specialists, and that her IEP should have included separate time for collaborative consultation by her service providers. As with the prior year, Student also claims that she was not offered or provided appropriate transportation services.

Student’s IEP team had no information in its possession during the 2002-2003 school year indicating that she required a higher level of in-home instruction than she was already receiving. All service providers reported that Student was making progress on her goals and objectives during the 2002-2003 school year. None of the team members expressed any concern regarding the level of services Student received until after the dispute arose regarding the District’s proposed change in placement and service providers. Although Ms. Ross claims to have formed an earlier belief that Student required more than one hour per week of in-home instruction, this opinion was not formed until after the January 2003 IEP meeting and was not shared with the IEP team until the April 9, 2003 meeting at which the five-hour increase was agreed upon.

Again, only the opinions of Dr. Daley were offered in support of the argument for the additional educational services. However, the Hearing Officer has previously found Dr. Daley’s testimony regarding the need for ten hours of weekly education services to be unpersuasive. Such a determination is also appropriate in the context of the 2002-2003 school year. Indeed, Dr. Daley’s opinion is directly controverted by Ms. Ross, who testified that the six hours of weekly instruction provided after the April 9, 2003 IEP meeting were sufficient time to address all of Student’s goals and objectives. Further, reliance by the Hearing Officer on Dr. Daley’s forensic opinions regarding appropriate levels of service would deprive the District of its right to have the issue of FAPE determined on the basis of the information available to the IEP team at the time of the offer. As such, based upon the preponderance of credible evidence presented, the Hearing Officer finds that Student did receive appropriate in-home instructional services designed to meet her unique needs during the 2002-2003 school year, and that such services did provide Student with some educational benefit.

The contention that separate collaborative consultation time must be provided in the IEP for Student’s teacher and therapists also was raised in the context of the 2001-2002 school year. As with the prior year, however, the IEP team received no indication from any of Student’s providers during the 2002-2003 school year indicating the need for such collaborative consultation. None of Student’s therapists testified that they required specific collaborative consultation with other team members in order to effectively work on Student’s goals and objectives. Only Ms. Ross testified that she needed consultation with other service providers, and this need for consultation was essentially limited to ATAAC devices and strategies. Student offered no explanation how the ATAAC consultation specified in the January and April, 2003 IEP’s did not afford Ms. Ross a means to resolved these ATAAC questions. The fact that Ms. Ross did not make the most effective use of the consult services available to her does not support a finding that consultation between service providers should have been a separate component of Student’s IEP. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer concludes that separate, collaborative consultation between Student’s service providers was not required to meet her unique needs during the 2002-2003 school year.

Finally, the issue of transportation is raised again for the 2002-2003 school year. As with the prior year, there is no dispute of the fact that transport services were not offered as part of the District’s placement of Student with the NPAs for clinic-based therapy. Again, the LEAs suggest that Mother should be faulted for not requesting transportation at any of the IEP meetings. Also once again, no explanation is offered for why such necessary services were not offered to Student as a matter of course along with the NPA clinic-based therapies. During the second half of the 2002-2003 school year, however, transportation was not required as part of the District’s offer of placement and services. At both the January 14, 2003 and April 9, 2003 IEP team meetings, the District proposed to deliver all therapeutic services to Student in her home through a new group of service providers, thus eliminating Student’s transportation needs under her IEP.

Was the proposed change to in-home therapeutic services designed to meet Student’s unique educational needs?

The record indicates that, during the 2002-2003 school year, the District sought to determine whether Student had a continuing need to receive educational services in the home setting and, at the same time, receive NPA clinic-based therapies. After unsuccessfully seeking further information from Dr. Dobbins regarding the possibility of placing Student in a District classroom and providing therapy at the school site, the District proposed to resolve the apparent inconsistency by delivering therapy to Student in the same home setting where instructional services were being provided. This proposed change in placement, which also involved a change to District-employed therapists, was presented and immediately rejected by Mother at the January 14, 2003 IEP team meeting. The in-home placement for therapeutic services through District providers also was proposed and rejected at the April 9, 2003 IEP meeting. No change in PT, OT or SLT service providers ever has taken place.

Student does not dispute the appropriateness of in-home PT, OT and SLT services; indeed, all of Student’s current therapists agree that home-based therapy would be fully consistent with her medical-based need for in-home instruction. Student’s objection to the proposed placement change relates only to the fact that she would no longer receive her therapies from Dr. Corn, Ms. Currier and Ms. Loeffler. (Footnote 21) Student asserts that the District’s regular therapists are not qualified to work with Student. Student also decries the proposed change because

[it] would have dismantled the only services that [Student] has received consistently and has benefitted from since age 3 and would have interrupted the therapy plans that each service provider was following for [her].

However, no testimony or other evidence was presented indicating that continuity of therapeutic service providers was a component of Student’s unique educational needs, or that Student would be harmed by any change from the current therapists. Indeed, all of the therapists agreed that any appropriately trained and experienced therapist would be able to deliver services to Student in conformity with her IEP.

Student asserts that the District has failed to shoulder its burden of demonstrating that appropriately qualified new therapists were offered to replace Student’s existing providers. Student contends that the LEAs are legally obligated to offer service providers who are qualified to provide appropriate services to Student . . . [and that] any general offer of a qualified District or PCOE service provider is also inappropriate and does not provide the parents with specific information about the qualifications to make an informed decision.

However, no statute, regulation or court ruling was cited for this proposition that an offer of placement and services must include specific information regarding the professional qualifications of an individual therapist. Indeed, regulations specifying the information which must be included in an IEP make no mention of individual service provider qualifications. See 34 C.F.R. § 344. Moreover, as the LEAs correctly assert, the Hearing Office consistently has held that the failure to provide detailed information regarding a proposed service provider does not render a school district’s offer of services fatally vague or unspecific. The District is required to offer appropriate placement and services, and is required to deliver the offered services through a qualified provider. The law does not require an offer of an individual service provider, or a description of the provider’s qualifications.

Based upon the testimony and documentary evidence presented, the Hearing Officer concludes that Student was offered a FAPE at the January 14, 2003 and April 9, 2003 IEP meetings. With regard to the portion of the 2002-2003 school year preceding January 14, 2003, however, Student was denied a FAPE because transportation was not offered in conjunction with the NPA clinic-based therapy she was receiving at that time. In all other respects, Student’s challenge to the substantive and procedural appropriateness of her special education and services during the 2002-2003 school year are without merit or sufficient evidentiary support.

3. Did the District offer Student a free appropriate public education for the 2003-2004 and 2004 extended school year?

During the 2003-2004 regular and 2004 extended school year (2003-2004 school year), Student’s IEP team has only held one meeting, on November 5, 2003. Student’s placement and services during the initial months of the 2003-2004 school year were governed by the April 9, 2003 IEP, with the exception that all clinic-based services continued through the existing NPA providers pursuant to the Hearing Offices’ stay put placement order. At the November 5, 2003 meeting, Student’s areas of need, present levels of performance and progress toward goals and objectives again were reviewed. As with the prior school years, there was no dispute regarding the nature of Student’s educational needs. Student’s primary areas of need remained motor skills and communication. Although all service providers reported positive progress, again no quantitative improvement was noted. As expected, Student remained at the infant level in all areas of function and development when her IEP team convened in November 2003.

The November 2003 IEP meeting was conducted with counsel present, only eight days before this hearing was scheduled to commence. In addition to counsel for each side, Mother and Student, seventeen other education and therapeutic service professionals attended the November 5, 2003 meeting. Ms. Clancy renewed the prior demand that Student receive ten hours of weekly instruction. For its part, the District took a new position; asserting that additional assessments of Student in all areas of function were necessary before any further changes could be considered in her placement or services. Thus, pending further assessments, the District offered to provide Student with clinic-based therapeutic services through Sierra Pediatrics and Speech & Language Associates, and to continue the previously agreed six hours of weekly in-home instruction. The team also agreed to begin providing direct, rather than consultive, ATAAC and VI specialist services. The November 2003 IEP, however, does not specify any collaborative consultation and, curiously, does not include an offer transportation services. (Footnote 22)

The November 2003 agreement to continue with the status quo of in-home instruction and NPA clinic-based therapeutic services represented a complete reversal of course by the District. Between the time of the April and November 2003 IEP team meetings, the District submitted various “administrative offers” to Mother, one of which proposed to place Student is an SDC class at Auburn Elementary School for all educational and therapeutic services. The proposed SDC placement opened a new front in the parties’ conflict. Whereas Student’s in-home placement for educational services was previously sacrosanct, the administrative offer of an SDC placement raised the question of Student’s continued medical need for in-home instruction and, by implication, the additional question of whether Student has been offered a placement in the least restrictive environment. The SDC placement was recommended by the District at the November 2003 IEP meeting, but in-home instruction was nevertheless the final placement offer.

Although she would not consent to the District’s assessment plan, Mother has agreed to accept the placement and services offered on November 5, 2003. Student continues to assert that she requires ten hours of weekly in-home instruction, as well as collaborative consultations, in order to appropriately address her unique educational needs. Student also contends that transportation services, in the form of milage reimbursement for transportation by Mother, must be provided as a component of the NPA clinic-based PT, OT and SLT services offered on November 5, 2003. Student has no other objections to the FAPE offer made at the November 2003 IEP team meeting.

Was Student offered appropriate services to meet her unique educational needs?

Student makes the same challenge to the services offered for the 2003-2004 school year as she made for the prior two years. No different argument or evidence was presented in support of the contention that Student requires ten hours of weekly instruction and collaborative consultation time for her service providers during the 2003-2004 school year. Accordingly, the rationale for rejecting these contentions remains the same. The IEP team had no assessment, recommendation or other reliable information in its possession on November 5, 2003, suggesting that Student required additional instructional services or that her service providers required collaborative consultation. The Hearing Officer finds that the District was not required to offer ten hour of instructional services, and was not required to offer collaborative consultation time, in order to provide Student with a FAPE.

As with its initial offers of service through Sierra Pediatrics during the 2001-2002 school year, the District again did not offer transportation services on November 5, 2003. No explanation for this omission was presented by either side at the hearing. Though neither Ms. Clancy nor Mother raised the issue of transportation at the November 2003 meeting, the District was obligated to offer such necessary services without request. By proposing NPA clinic-based therapy without transportation services, the District failed to offer Student a FAPE for the 2003-2004 school year.

Was Student offered an appropriate placement in the least restrictive environment?

At the commencement of these proceedings the Hearing Officer overruled objections by Student to the introduction of the “administrative offers” regarding placement, services and compensatory education made by the District to Student in June, August and October 2003. Student argued that these were, in essence, inadmissible settlement offers. However, because the documents were characterized as placement and service offers when created and transmitted to Student, the Hearing Officer determined that the documents would be admitted and accorded appropriate weight and significance based upon their content and context.

After carefully reviewing the four “administrative offers,” the Hearing Officer has concluded that they were not offers of placement or services to Student, but instead were offers made in an effort to achieve a resolution of the disputed issues in this administrative proceeding. (Footnote 23) Accordingly the Hearing Officer will not determine the appropriateness of placing Student in the Auburn Elementary School SDC. The Hearing Officer has no jurisdiction to rule on the sufficiency of the parties settlement proposals. Nonetheless, the Hearing Officer will address the question of least restrictive environment because it is an issue implicated by the testimony and evidence, even in the absence of an SDC placement proposal.

Special education law requires that a student be educated in the least restrictive environment (LRE). 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) states that:

To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, including children public or private institutions or other care facilities, are to be educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular education environment should occur only when the nature or severity of the disability of the child is such that education in regular education classes with the use of supplementary aides and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.

The requirement that disabled children be educated to the maximum extent appropriate with non-disabled children is often referred to as “main streaming,” or education in the “least restrictive environment” (LRE). The law demonstrates a “strong preference for ‘main streaming’ which rises to the level of a rebuttable presumption.” Daniel R. v. State Board of Education, 874 F.2d 1036, 1044-45 (5th Cir. 1989).

Student contends that, because of her limited motor and cognitive development and her medical fragility, a least restrictive environment analysis is not required. Simply put, Student contends that her home is the only appropriate educational environment. Despite the fact that in-home service is typically considered the most restrictive on the continuum of placement options, Student asserts that any school site placement which adequately addressed her medical needs actually would be more restrictive than the home environment.

The testimony and documentary evidence support the IEP team’s decision to offer in-home placement. Student is medically fragile due to her cerebral palsy and hydranencephaly. Because she lacks many physiological defense mechanisms to fight illness, Student faces a greatly increased risk of illness from exposure to sources of infection and disease. Instead of merely experiencing fever or congestion, Student is at risk of dying whenever she comes downwith an upper respiratory infection. Moreover, the risk of illness also implicates Student’s seizure disorder. Whenever she is ill or feverish, Student apparently experiences increase seizure activity, which is itself a separate health risk.

The Hearing Officer is persuaded by the medical evidence presented at the hearing that any pre-school group placement for Student during the past two years would have placed her at a greatly elevated and unnecessary risk of illness. Further, no credible evidence was presented that the District employs a level of pre-school classroom hygiene which could adequately ensure that Student would be insulated from contaminated surfaces and materials. Similarly, no credible evidence was presented that the District employs pupil health and attendance rules which could adequately ensure that Student would not be exposed to other children who are ill or otherwise contagious. These two findings are implicitly confirmed by testimony indicating that, at the November 2003 IEP meeting, the District discussed the possibility of placing Student in a separate room, adjacent to the SDC class, where she would be attended by a teacher’s aide and linked to the SDC class via an audio monitoring system through which the SDC classroom sounds would be fed through to Student and her aide. Nonetheless, Student’s health status in terms of a group placement has not specifically been assessed by the IEP team. Additional or different information developed in a future health assessment may indicate that a group placement is no longer such a threat to Student’s health and well being.

In addition to her medical fragility, Student argues that an in-home educational placement is appropriate because the home is her “natural environment.” Student contends that, because of her limited cognitive and functional abilities, she will not benefit from group instruction or the group instruction environment. Student asserts that she can only benefit from one-to-one instruction, and that such instruction must be provided in the home because she spends all of her time and will spend all of her time in the home environment. The evidentiary support for this argument, however, is insufficient. While the Hearing Officer is persuaded that one-to-one interaction always will be Student’s primary means of improving the skills and abilities targeted by her IEP’s goals and objectives, there is no evidence suggesting that Student would not receive some benefit from group interactions with other young children. Indeed, the evidence strongly suggests that, in light of her limited developmental prognosis, sensory stimulation should be as much the focus of Student’s educational services as functional skills improvement.

Based upon the preponderance of evidence presented, the Hearing Officer finds that Student was offered placement in the least restrictive environment for the 2003-2004 school year, as well as the prior two years. Further, in light of her medical fragility and the medical opinions currently available to her IEP team, the group placement options explored at the November 2003 meeting were not appropriate to meet Student’s unique educational needs and protect her from potential life threatening illness. The Hearing Officer rejects any suggestion that in-home instruction is more restrictive than placing Student in a separate room with an aide and an audio feed to the pre-school SDC. While further assessment information and other placement options may cause Student’s IEP team to conclude that an appropriate, less restrictive environment is available and should be offered, there is no indication in the record that such a conclusion should have been reached on November 5, 2003, or at any earlier time.

4. Is Student entitled to compensatory education?

When a school district fails to offer a pupil the free appropriate public education mandated by the IDEA, such pupil is entitled to relief that is “appropriate” in light of the purposes of the IDEA. School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education, 471 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1985); see also 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(2)(B)(iii). Court decisions subsequent to Burlington have extended the available relief to include compensatory education. See, e.g. Lester H. v. K. Gilhool and the Chester Upland School District, 916 F.2d 865 (3rd Cir. 1990); Miener v. State of Missouri, 800 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1986). There is no obligation, however, to provided day-for-day or hour-for-hour compensation. “Appropriate relief is relief designed to ensure the [pupil] is appropriately educated within the meaning of the IDEA.” Student W. v. Puyallup School District, 31 F.3d 1489, 1496-97 (9th Cir. 1994).

The Hearing Officer has concluded that, with the exception of transportation services during the period September 19, 2001 through January 15, 2003 and the period from November 5, 2003 through the present, and with the exception of in-home instructional services during the period from September 19, 2001 through April 24, 2002, the District provided and offered Student a FAPE for all school years at issue in this proceeding. However, only the failure to provide appropriate in-home instructional services implicates compensatory education for Student. The District’s failure to offer transportation never had any actual, direct impact on Student’s receipt of educational or therapeutic services.

Taking into consideration the school holiday/vacation schedule during the 2001-2002 school year, the record supports a finding that Student should have received twenty-six hours of instruction from September 19, 2001 through April 24, 2002. Nevertheless, the testimony does not establish that Student requires additional hours of instruction at the present time to compensate her for those twenty-six hours she previously did not receive. Indeed, Dr. Daley testified that he had no opinion on the question of compensatory education to remedy the insufficiencies he found in Student’s level of in-home instructional services. Ms. Ross similarly testified that she had no opinion regarding appropriate compensatory education. The inability of any witness to articulate the educational basis of a compensatory remedy here is a tacit acknowledgment that Student’s minimal capacity to improve her limited abilities precludes any determination that she suffered measurable harm which could be remedied through increased or additional services. No testimony was presented suggesting that Student’s skills and abilities would be measurably different today if she had received weekly instruction between September 2001 and May 2002. Moreover, no witness testified that Student’s skills and abilities would be measurably impacted by providing her with an additional twenty-six hours of instruction at the present time. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that no compensatory education has been proven necessary to remedy the District’s failure to offer Student instructional services at the outset of the 2001-2002 school year.

The failure to provide or offer Student appropriate transportation services did not have any educational effect on Student. Mother testified that she always has and always will provide transportation to Student, rather than entrust her to a strange driver. Thus, neither Student’s receipt of services, nor her ability to receive services, has ever been impacted by the District’s failure to offer transportation services. The issue of transportation is simply financial. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that Student is not entitled to any compensatory education. This finding, however, does not leave Student without a remedy.

Under Burlington, the parents of a special education eligible pupil may be entitled to reimbursement for the costs of a placement or service they have procured for their child when a district has failed to provide a FAPE. Such private placement or services, however, must be appropriate under the IDEA and replace services that the district was required to provide. Burlington at 369-70; Puyallup at 1496. Nonetheless, the Burlington rule of reimbursement is not so narrow as to permit reimbursement only when the placement or services chosen by the parent are found to be the exact proper placement or services required under the IDEA. Alamo Heights Ind. Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1161 (6th Cir. 1986). A parent’s placement need only address the child’s needs and provide educational benefit. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13-14 (1993).

The Hearing Officer has concluded that the District’s offer of placement and services was inadequate to meet Student’s needs because transportation to and from her NPA clinical therapies was not included. Specifically, from September 19, 2001 through January 14, 2003, and from November 5, 2003 through the present time, Student’s IEP specified PT, OT and SLT services through Sierra Pediatrics and Speech Language Associates, yet did not make any provision for transportation relative to such services. The evidence shows that, during these periods, Mother provided all transportation for Student’s therapy at the NPAs. These transportation services were appropriate and necessary for Student to receive her NPA clinic-based therapy specified in her IEPs. Indeed, in light of Student’s medical condition and limited development, the evidence strongly suggests that transportation from Mother is the most appropriate form of that required service. Accordingly, Mother is entitled to be reimbursed for providing transportation services during these periods and until such time as Student’s IEP team convenes and agrees upon a different means or mechanism to provide Student with transportation or transportation expense reimbursement.

5. Is the District entitled to assess Student pursuant to its September 15, 2003 written Assessment Plan?

Reassessment of a student with disabilities must be conducted at least every three years, or more frequently, if conditions warrant a reassessment or if an assessment is requested by the student’s teacher or parent. Cal. Educ. Code § 56381; 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(A). In Gregory K. v. Longview School District, the Ninth Circuit held that “if the parents want [their child] to receive special education under the Act, they are obligated to permit such testing.” 811 F.2d 1307, 1315 (9th Cir. 1987). Similarly, in Andress v. Cleveland Independent School District, the Fifth Circuit court ruled that “a parent who desires for her child to receive special education must allow the school district to evaluate the child . . . there is no exception to this rule. 64 F. 3d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Vander Malle v. Ambach, 673 F.2d 49, 53 (2nd Cir. 1983).

Despite a school district’s right and obligation to conduct reassessments, the law requires parental consent before a student can actually be evaluated. Cal. Educ. Code § 56321(c); 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(C)(i). To obtain consent, the school district must first develop an assessment plan for presentation to the student’s parents. Cal. Educ. Code § 56321(b). The parents must be allowed at least fifteen days to provide a response or consent to the assessment plan. Cal. Educ. Code § 56321(a). If the parents do not consent to the assessment plan, a school district can override the lack of parental consent it establishes at a due process hearing the need to conduct such an assessment. Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56321(c), 56501(a)(3), 56506(e); 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(C)(ii). Accordingly, to proceed with an assessment over a parent’s objection, a school district must demonstrate that consent for the assessment has been withheld and that, pursuant to Education Code section 56381, it is time for the student’s triennial assessment, conditions warrant reassessment, or the student’s parent or teacher is requesting the reassessment.

There is no dispute, and the evidence clearly establishes, that the District prepared an assessment plan in compliance with California Education Code section 56321(b) and that consent for the assessment has been withheld by Student’s parents. The assessment plan proposes evaluations in the following areas: pre-academics/academics, cognitive ability, communication, motor development and health. These assessments were not requested by Student’s parents or her teacher, and her triennial evaluation is not due until September of 2004. The only statutory basis for the request here, therefore, is that conditions warrant a reassessment at this time. (Footnote 24) Student suggests the Hearing Officer can only make a finding that conditions warrant a reassessment if a “substantial change” has occurred in Student’s academic performance or disabling condition. However, no such limitation is found in the statute itself, or in any regulation or court decision interpreting the statute.

Student asserts that no reassessment is needed at this time because the District has been able to propose and agree upon changes to Student’s placement and service since January 2003 without the benefit of such assessment information, and because no significant change in her condition has occurred during the interim. Student asserts that the reassessment plan was prompted by her due process hearing request, rather than any changed conditions warranting the new evaluations. However, Mother candidly admitted her primary concern with the proposed assessment is that testing by assessors unfamiliar with Student will produce unreliable results which then will be used by the District to change Student’s current program and placement. Mother’s refusal to allow the proposed assessment is simply her attempt to delay any change from in-home instruction and the NPA clinic-base therapy services.

The fact that Student’s IEP team was capable of proposing and agreeing to changes in her special education program both before and after the assessment was sought in September 2003 is of little significance in determining whether conditions warrant the reassessment. An IEP team’s offer of a program change does not constitute a pronouncement that the team already possesses all information necessary to make all educational decisions. Nor does a team’s proposal for a reassessment constitute an admission that prior team program decisions were made without adequate information.

The testimony and documentary evidence persuade the Hearing Officer that conditions now warrant Student’s reassessment as proposed in the September 15, 2003 Assessment Plan. Although Student’s teacher and therapeutic service providers all testified that they did not need assessment information in order to provide their services, they all agreed that assessment information would be useful in the IEP team’s development of an appropriate special education program for Student. Further, the District recently has received conflicting medical reports on whether Student’s medical fragility requires educational services in the home year around, or merely during the wet and cold months of the year. Finally, and most significantly, conditions warrant a reassessment now in light of Student’s request for significantly increased instructional service hours.

As indicated earlier in this decision, the Hearing Officer does not believe the assessment data currently in the IEP team’s possession provides any clear indication that Student requires in-home instructional services in any frequency or duration. Conditions warranting a reassessment arose on April 9, 2003, when the IEP team first was faced with a parental demand for a service level increase far in excess of the level previously agreed upon and far in excess of the services indicated by currently available assessment information. This is particularly true because Student offered no assessment data or other information to the IEP team supporting the demand for increased services. Accordingly the Hearing Officer concludes that the District may assess Student without the consent of her parents.

ORDERS

1. The District is entitled to assess Student in all areas set forth in its September 15, 2003 assessment plan.

2. The District shall set a date for the assessment and shall provide Student’s parents with fifteen calendar days notice of that date for the assessment. Student’s parents shall make her available on that date.

3. The District shall reimburse Mother for providing transportation to Student for her clinic-based PT, OT and SLT services during the period from September 19, 2001 through January 14, 2003, and the period from November 5, 2003 through the date on which Student’s IEP team convenes and agree upon a different means or mechanism to provide Student with transportation services or transportation service expense reimbursement for her NPA therapy. The reimbursement ordered herein shall be paid based upon the District’s customary per-mile rate, the actual round-trip milage from the Parents’ home to the NPA in question, and the dates on which Student actually received therapy at the NPA. If two separate trips were made on one day, Mother shall be reimbursed for both trips. Reimbursement for all past transportation services shall be paid by the District within ten calendar days after receipt of a written request from Mother which includes report of the round-trip milage from her home to each of the NPAs and a schedule or other summary of each date on which Student received services at one or the other NPA during the time periods specified above. Reimbursement for transportation services provided after the date of the initial request shall be made on a monthly basis, no later than 10 calendar days after the end of the prior month.

4. All of Students’ other requests for relief are denied.

PREVAILING PARTY FINDINGS

Pursuant to California Education Code section 56507(d), the following findings are made as to the prevailing party on each issue submitted for resolution:

Issue No. 1

Did the District provide Student with a free appropriate public education for the 2001-2002 and 2002 extended school year?

Each party prevailed in part on this issue. The LEAs are the substantially prevailing parties on this issue.

Issue No. 2

Did the District provide Student with a free appropriate public education for the 2002-2003 and 2003 extended school year?

Each party prevailed in part on this issue. The LEAs are the substantially prevailing parties on this issue.

Issue No. 3

Did the District offer Student a free appropriate public education for the 2003-2004 and 2004 extended school year?

Each party prevailed in part on this issue. The LEAs are the substantially prevailing parties on this issue.

Issue No. 4

Is Student entitled to compensatory education?

The LEAs are the prevailing parties on this issue

Issue No. 5

Is the District entitled to assess Student pursuant to its September 15, 2003 written Assessment Plan?

The LEAs are the prevailing parties on this issue.

RIGHT TO APPEAL

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. Any such appeal must be made within ninety (90) days of receiving this decision.

Dated: April 19, 2004 ____________________________ John G. Andersen, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

1. Ms. Currier formerly provided speech services to Student at Sierra Pediatrics and, thereafter provided these services through her own clinic, Speech & Language Associates. For a brief period of time in late 2001, Student continued to receive SLT at Sierra Pediatrics through another staff therapist before she followed Ms. Currier to Speech & Language Associates.

2. The District contracts with Ms. Ross to provide Student’s in-home instructional services. Separately, Mother contracts with Ms. Ross to provide in-home respite services authorized and reimbursed through California Children’s Services.

3. Education Code section 56042 states that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, an attorney or advocate for a parent of an individual with exceptional needs shall not recommend placement in a nonpublic, nonsectarian school or agency with which the attorney or advocate is employed or contracted, or otherwise has a conflict of interest or from which the attorney or advocate receives a benefit.”

4. Due to Student’s limited oral motor abilities and the resulting risk of aspiration and infection, oral feeding is medically proscribed for Student at this time.

5. Student was adopted shortly after her birth by Parents

6. At the time, Mother was employed by Dr. Corn at RTW.

7. These services were primarily funded through the Parents’ private medical insurance plan. With Dr. Corn’s help, Alta Regional Center at some point was persuaded to begin paying the portion of the therapy fees not covered by the medical insurance.

8. The initially assigned PCOE teacher took an emergency leave-of-absence before the assessment was completed, and a second teacher was assigned to conduct the evaluation.

9. At some point in time following the initial IEP meeting, Ms. Courrier’s Speech and Language Associates clinic became the actual provider of SLT services. No contemporaneous documentation of this change was provided at the hearing, but the change appears to have been consensual and is not a matter of controversey in these proceedings.

10. Prior to the January 14, 2003 meeting, neither Mother nor Sierra Pediatrics ever advised the District that OT required pursuant to the April 24, 2002 IEP had not been provided to Student since September of 2002. At the hearing, Mother testified that this lack of IEP services for nearly four months was “fine” with her and had no negative impact on Student.

11. Although Mother had agreed to in-home OT from a District therapist, on January 24, 2003, Student began receiving weekly OT services from Ms. Loeffler, the newly hired occupational therapist at Sierra Pediatrics. Thereafter, on February 7, 2003, pursuant to the January 14, 2003 IEP, Student began to receive weekly in-home OT services from Ms. Painter, a District-employed occupational therapist. These duplicate OT services continued until the Hearing Office issued an order on April 10, 2003, holding that Student’s stay put placement required OT services through Sierra Pediatrics.

12. As discussed infra, the conditional nature of this and the other “administrative offers” lead the Hearing Officer to conclude that these documents were settlement offers with only limited significance to these proceedings.

13. Dr. Chretien testified that children with hydranencephaly experience an extremely high and progressive rate of mortality.

14. Credible testimony was given at the hearing suggesting just the opposite. In particular, Dr. Hart testified that Student had no “medical need” for any further physical or occupational therapy because she has shown no functional gains in her motor skills over the last three years. Similarly, Ms. O’Brien, the speech therapist and ATAAC specialist who assessed Student in May of 2003 testified that she saw no purpose or benefit to Student receiving SLT services focusing on oral motor skills, increased vocalizations or feeding skills because Student will never develop any language or ability to feed.

15. Ms. King testified that Student actually already was using one of the recommended devices, a “BigMac”switch, as part of her therapy at Sierra Pediatrics when she first observed Student as part of her evaluation.

16. Although Ms. Currier no longer works for Sierra Pediatrics, Dr. Corn testified that they continue to have regular contact regarding Student’s therapies and progress.

17. Consultation with the ATAAC specialist does not involve any consultation with Student, but rather with her teachers and service providers about Student. Consultation is offered in order to provide the direct service providers with a resource to which they can turn if they have questions regarding the ATAAC devices and strategies they are using with Student as they work on her goals and objectives.

18. Ms. Currier testified that she did not actually attend the entire meeting, and departed at some point after SLT goals, objectives and services had been fully addressed by the team.

19. Ms. Malin testified that the omission was not noted until after the administrative hearing process was initiated in March of 2003.

20. The Hearing Officer suspects that the issue of transportation was intentionally not addressed at the September 2001 or April 2002 meetings. Mother did not raise the issue because she was most concerned with obtaining the team’s consent to continued PT, OT and SLT services through Sierra Pediatrics; and the District did not offer transportation because it felt that Mother was being afforded a significant accommodation in the form of continuing services through the NPA she so clearly preferred. Nonetheless, transportation was a service that Student required and continues to require in order to benefit from her special education related services outside the home. Any agreement by Mother and the District to compromise on NPA placement and transportation should have been reflected in IEP documents.

21. Student attempts to characterize the January and April 2003 IEPs as proposals to change Student’s OT services from a direct to a consultive model. The IEP documents, themselves, do not support this contention. Neither document indicates any change in the nature of the OT Student was to receive.

22. Transportation was included with the District’s administrative offer only one week earlier on October 28, 2003.

23. Each of the four documents includes language expressly indicating its conditional, non-severable nature. Further, three of the four documents include language specifying that acceptance of the offered services operated as an The Hearing Officer disagrees with LEAs’ suggestion that California Education Code section 56445 requires a reassessment because Student has reached kindergarten age. Section 56445 addresses permissive reassessment of disabled pre-school students to determine whether they will still be in need of special education services after transition to kindergarten. The statute itself includes a statement of legislative intent confirming the purpose of reassessment is to ensure that a disabled child’s services are not removed too rapidly. Here, there is no question of Student’s continued eligibility for special education and related services after she reaches kindergarten age.

24. The Hearing Officer disagrees with LEAs’ suggestion that California Education Code section 56445 requires a reassessment because Student has reached kindergarten age. Section 56445 addresses permissive reassessment of disabled pre-school students to determine whether they will still be in need of special education services after transition to kindergarten. The statute itself includes a statement of legislative intent confirming the purpose of reassessment is to ensure that a disabled child’s services are not removed too rapidly. Here, there is no question of Student’s continued eligibility for special education and related services after she reaches kindergarten age.