California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · November 24, 1997
Student v. Fontana Unified School District (consolidated)
SEHO Case No. SN 494-97, SN 822-97 · Hearing Officer JoAnn Irwin-Eshelman
Fontana Unified's 1997 assessment upheld; District denied further testing and ordered to hold an eligibility IEP meeting within 15 days.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Noted in the decision
Footnote 1 indicates this is a corrected version of the decision; the only change was removing an incorrect middle initial from the student's name in the caption.
Summary
A 16-year-old tenth grader at A.B. Miller High School was a general education student. He had been found ineligible for special education in 1996. Fontana Unified reassessed him in spring 1997 after his mother asked for testing. His mother filed for due process to challenge the 1997 assessment. The District filed its own case asking to give a nonverbal cognitive assessment that its Board of Education had directed. The two cases were consolidated.
The Hearing Officer found the 1997 assessment appropriate. The District properly added testing areas with the parent's written consent. It was allowed to use standard scores in the speech-language assessment. It tested the student in English, his primary language. A teacher's comment in the report about possible gang activity did not show bias. The Hearing Officer was troubled that five language scores fell below the 7th percentile, but no evidence challenged the specialist's conclusion. The 1996 assessment was also found procedurally sound.
On procedure, no law required 24 hours' notice before testing, and notice of the April 23 meeting was adequate. The District substantially complied with three rounds of records requests, and no harm from delay was shown. Because the completed assessment was appropriate, the District's request for more testing was denied. The request for an independent assessment at public expense was also denied. The District was ordered to hold an IEP meeting within 15 days to decide eligibility.
Why it matters
The decision shows how SEHO handled competing assessment claims. Once a district's assessment was found appropriate, the parent could not get an independent assessment at public expense. The district also could not force more testing it had not shown was needed. Short delays in producing records, without shown harm, were treated as substantial compliance.
Issues and holdings
- District prevailedAssessment
Issue 1. Was the District's 1997 assessment of STUDENT's educational needs appropriate?
The 1997 assessment was appropriate: added testing areas had written parental consent, standard scores were permissible, testing was in English (the student's primary language), and a teacher's gang comment in the report did not show bias; the 1996 assessment was also procedurally sound.
- District prevailedIEP procedure
Issue 2a. During the assessment process, did the District violate STUDENT's procedural rights by failing to give the parent proper notice of actual testing and IEP team meetings?
No law requires 24 hours' notice of testing, and two days' notice of the April 23 meeting gave the parent an opportunity to attend; complaints about that meeting's composition were moot because no meeting was actually held.
- District prevailedRecords
Issue 2b. During the assessment process, did the District violate STUDENT's procedural rights by failing to provide all student records as requested by the parent?
The District substantially complied with three rounds of records requests; any delays were minimal and caused no shown prejudice.
- Student prevailedDistrict-filed: assess without consent
Issue 3. Is the District entitled to complete the 1997 assessment of STUDENT with a nonverbal cognitive functioning assessment?
Because the completed 1997 assessment was appropriate and unbiased, and the purpose of the proposed assessment was unclear, the District was not entitled to further nonverbal cognitive testing.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- Order to convene IEP meeting. District to convene an IEP team meeting within 15 days of the order to determine eligibility for special education based on the 1997 assessments already completed.
Key authorities
Landgraf v. USI Film Products (1994) 511 U.S. 244; 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1412(5)(C); 34 C.F.R. Sec. 300.530-300.534; 34 C.F.R. Sec. 300.345; 34 C.F.R. Sec. 300.562; Cal. Ed. Code Sec. 56320, 56321, 56329(b), 56333, 56504; Title 5 CCR Sec. 3030
People named in the decision
- Carolyn deMorton, non-attorney advocate and witness for Student (registered occupational therapist), Mexican-American Political Association (MAPA)
- Steven Figueroa, advocate present for Student, Mexican-American Political Association (MAPA)
- Kristine Kaufman, director of special services; District witness, Fontana Unified School District
- James Evans, school psychologist; District witness, Fontana Unified School District
- Manuel Palacio, vice principal, A.B. Miller High School, Fontana Unified School District
- Ms. Williams, speech and language specialist (assessor), Fontana Unified School District
- Mr. Bloomfield, proposed witness for Student (testimony excluded for late notice)
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before JoAnn Irwin-Eshelman, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office, McGeorge School of Law, in Fontana, California on July 29 and 30, 1997.
Petitioner/Respondent STUDENT was represented by Francisco A. Suarez, Attorney at Law. Carolyn deMorton and Steven Figueroa of the Mexican-American Political Association (MAPA), and PARENT, STUDENT’s mother, were also present on his behalf. Respondent/Petitioner Fontana Unified School District (District) was represented by attorney Karen Gilyard, of Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo.(Footnote 2) Also present on behalf of the District was Kristine Kaufman, director of special services.
The Student called two witnesses: Carolyn deMorton and PARENT. The District called two witnesses in rebuttal: Kristine Kaufman and James Evans, school psychologist for the District.
Oral and documentary evidence was received. The record was held open to allow the parties to submit written closing briefs. The Student’s closing brief was received on August 21, 1997, and the District’s closing brief was received on August 20, 1997. The case was closed, and the matter was submitted for decision.
ISSUES
1. Was the District’s 1997 assessment of STUDENT’s educational needs appropriate?
2. During the assessment process, did the District violate STUDENT’s procedural rights by (a) failing to give the parent proper notice of actual testing and Individualized Education Program (IEP) team meetings, and (b) failing to provide all student records as requested by the parent?
3. Is the District entitled to complete the 1997 assessment of STUDENT with a nonverbal cognitive functioning assessment?
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
The Student’s request for due process hearing (SN 494-97), filed by his mother, PARENT, was received by the Hearing Office on April 28, 1997. On June 4, 1997, the District filed for due process hearing against the Student (SN 822-97).
On June 16, 1997, the Hearing Office denied the Student’s request for stay- put protection because he had not yet been found eligible for special education services. On July 3, 1997, the Hearing Office granted the District’s request for consolidation of the two cases. On July 25, 1997, this Hearing Officer denied the District’s request to strike the Student’s statement of issues received by the Hearing Office on July 24, 1997.
On the first day of hearing, the District objected on the ground of lack of notice to an expanded statement of issues presented by the Student. The objection was sustained. The Student’s case proceeded on the statement of issues received by the Hearing Office on July 24.(Footnote 3) The District’s offer to stipulate to STUDENT’s eligibility for special education services as of the 1997 assessment was declined by the Student.
The District objected to the Student’s offer of Exhibit J, consisting of approximately 65 pages of documents from the student file of a different STUDENT, erroneously provided by the District. The evidence was received subject to redaction of all personally identifying information about the other student. The Student took back Exhibit J for redaction but never re-submitted it to the Hearing Officer. The District did not submit an evidence packet in advance of the hearing, and submitted District Exhibits 1-13 at the hearing as rebuttal evidence.
The District objected to testimony by the Student’s proposed witness, Mr. Bloomfield, because the District received notice of this witness’ testimony one day before the hearing. The objection was sustained pursuant to California Education Code Section 56505(e)(7).
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT is 16 years old and, during the 1996-97 school year, was a tenth-grader at A.B. Miller High School in the District. He is a regular education student who was assessed for special education services during the 1995-96 school year but not found eligible.(Footnote 4) STUDENT was also assessed in spring 1997, but an IEP team meeting concerning his eligibility has not yet occurred.
On February 15, 1996, PARENT, STUDENT’s mother, spoke to the assistant principal at A.B. Miller High School to request special education testing. (District Exh. 2, testimony of Carolyn deMorton.) PARENT had requested help for STUDENT throughout his school years, but did not learn that he could be tested until shortly before this request. PARENT told school psychologist James Evans that STUDENT was unsure of himself in school and had poor reading skills. (District Exh. 2, 7.)
PARENT signed an assessment plan on February 23, 1996, and completed a "Parent Information Form" for the school psychologist.(Footnote 5) (District Exh. 6, 7.) STUDENT was then tested in March 1996. Based on the testing, the school psychologist concluded that a significant discrepancy did not exist between STUDENT’s intellectual ability and academic skills, and found that STUDENT did not qualify for special education as learning handicapped. (Student Exh. C.)
An Individualized Education Plan (IEP) meeting was scheduled for April 16, 1996 to review the assessment results with PARENT. (District Exh. 3.) The date and time for the meeting were arranged by Mr. Evans in a phone call with PARENT; however, she did not appear for that IEP meeting. (Testimony of James Evans.) A second meeting was scheduled for May 7, 1996. Again, the date and time were arranged with PARENT, but she did not appear. (Testimony of James Evans, District Exh. 4.) The meeting to review STUDENT’s assessment results proceeded without his mother in attendance on May 7.(Footnote 6) The IEP team concluded that STUDENT was not eligible for special education services as there was not a significant discrepancy between his ability and achievement scores. (Student Exh. H; District Exh. 5.)
Immediately after the May 7 IEP meeting, Mr. Evans contacted PARENT by phone. PARENT told Mr. Evans that she had no interest in attending because STUDENT’s last day at school was April 30, 1996, and he was moving to Missouri. (Student Exh. E; testimony of James Evans.)
In October 1996, STUDENT returned to the District and re-enrolled at A.B. Miller High School. In early February 1997, PARENT requested help from the high school because STUDENT was not attending. PARENT told the high school vice principal, Manuel Palacio, that STUDENT did not want to come to school because he could not read. STUDENT was offered continuation school, but refused to go because he was afraid he would "get beat up" and because he could not read. (Testimony of Carolyn deMorton; Student’s Exh. I, T.)
On March 7, 1997, STUDENT had a verbal confrontation with a physical education teacher at A.B. Miller. The teacher had been calling STUDENT names like "faggot, weakling and gay" all semester. (Testimony of Carolyn deMorton, Student Exh. T.) STUDENT refused to do push ups in class, and was told by the teacher, "you need to handle constructive criticism if you can’t this can lead to jail." (Student Exh. G.) STUDENT then threatened to put a bullet in the teacher’s head, was defiant, and used profanity. (Student Exh. G.) STUDENT was suspended for five days with a recommendation for expulsion. (Student Exh. Q.)
On March 11, 1997, PARENT and MAPA made a written request for special education assessment of STUDENT along with copies of his student records (cumulative file). On March 14, 1997, PARENT signed an assessment plan which identified five areas to be assessed: ability, academic achievement, adaptive behavior, social/emotional, and psycho-motor development. (District Exh. 9; Testimony of James Evans.)
On April 15, 1997, PARENT was contacted and arrangements were made for STUDENT to be assessed by the District. STUDENT was then assessed on April 21, 1997. An IEP team meeting was scheduled for April 23, 1997, at 7:15 a.m., to review preliminary results of the testing.(Footnote 7) Ms. deMorton and PARENT arrived at 7:30 a.m. for the IEP meeting, and, because all the teachers had to be in class, only Mr. Evans and an administrator were available. In a memorandum, Ms. deMorton and PARENT objected that "proper staff was not in attendance and the psychological report was not written up so Mother could follow in an organized fashion." The preliminary assessment results were not reviewed on April 23. (Student Exh. L, M.)
On April 24, 1997, arrangements were made for additional assessments of STUDENT the next day, April 25. Mr. Evans felt additional testing was necessary after he scored STUDENT’s performance on the Woodcock-Johnson and found a "dramatic drop" in STUDENT’s reading comprehension from the year before . (Testimony of James Evans.) STUDENT did not appear for testing as scheduled on April 25, so PARENT was contacted again to re-schedule STUDENT’s testing for April 28. On April 28, PARENT called and left a message canceling the re-scheduled assessment. Testing was scheduled again on April 30 and May 2, but STUDENT did not appear.
On May 5, 1997, the March 14 assessment plan was amended with the parent’s consent to provide testing in four additional areas: ability, adaptive behavior, psycho-motor development, and speech/language/communication development. (Student Exh. W; District Exh. 9.) Mr. Evans completed his portion of these additional assessments with STUDENT on May 5.
On May 5, 1997, the District’s speech and language specialist contacted PARENT concerning scheduling of the speech and language assessment. PARENT indicated that STUDENT was tired of testing, and that she might not allow additional assessment. The next day, PARENT was contacted again concerning the need to complete the speech and language assessment. She agreed to contact the school on May 7, to indicate if STUDENT would be coming in to be assessed. On May 7, 1997, PARENT canceled the speech and language assessment. On May 8, 1997, the speech and language assessment was started but not completed. PARENT picked up STUDENT after one hour of testing, because he said he was too tired to complete the assessment. (Student Exh. E.)
On May 13, 1997, PARENT left a message with Mr. Evans requesting an IEP meeting. The next day, Mr. Evans contacted her and advised that testing should be completed before an IEP meeting was held. PARENT indicated that STUDENT was tired of testing. On May 19, 1997, PARENT agreed to make STUDENT available to complete the speech and language assessment. On May 20, 1997, that assessment was completed, and the report provided to PARENT on May 23. (Student Exh. E, T.)
Based on the assessments completed, Mr. Evans concluded that STUDENT was not eligible for special education services on the basis of a specific learning disability because a significant discrepancy between ability and achievement did not exist. Mr. Evans also concluded that STUDENT was not eligible for special education services based on a serious emotional disturbance (SED). Mr. Evans noted in his report that "poor school attendance and environmental factors appear to play a significant role in learning issues" for STUDENT. (Student Exh. E.) The speech and language specialist, Ms. Williams, also concluded that STUDENT was not eligible for the speech and language services as his skills were "within normal limits for his ability." (Student Exh. N.)
After the District’s Board of Education heard the parents’ concerns about STUDENT’s expulsion, the Board directed that a "non-biased assessment" of STUDENT be done.(Footnote 8) (Testimony of Kristine Kaufman; Student Exh. T.) Kristine Kaufman, director of special services, sought clarification of this directive from the Superintendent as STUDENT had always been registered as "English only," and the Board did not have access to the assessments already completed. Ms. Kaufman received direction from the Superintendent to complete a nonverbal, cognitive functioning assessment of STUDENT, resulting in her June 13, 1997 letter to PARENT offering such an assessment plan. (District Exh. 10.) A second letter, dated July 1, 1997, was sent to PARENT requesting that she consent to the proposed additional assessment as directed by the Board. (District Exh. 11.) PARENT did not sign or return the proposed assessment plan.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
The Student contends that he was not appropriately assessed by the District in 1997, and that the District did not follow proper procedures in carrying out the assessment, denying STUDENT his due process rights under the IDEA. (Student’s Closing Brief, pg. 2.) The Student states that the 1997 assessment was a "rush job" to find STUDENT ineligible so that he could be expelled. The Student also contends that the 1997 assessment was biased because the written report refers to STUDENT as a "gang member." The Student claims that the District is not entitled to further assess STUDENT because such testing would be biased and inappropriate. The Student also argues that the District has failed to provide STUDENT’s complete student records despite repeated requests since March 1997. Finally, the Student contends that there were procedural flaws in the 1996 assessment process.(Footnote 9)
As a remedy, the Student requests "another unbiased assessment by an independent Doctor of the Petitioner’s request for Special Education and for suspected learning disabilities, that Petitioner receive an appropriate education and that the District comply with Special Education Codes." The Student also requests that he be awarded attorney’s fees and costs. (Student’s Closing Brief, pg. 12, emphasis in original.)
The District contends that its 1997 psychoeducational assessment, and speech and language assessment were appropriate and without procedural errors. The District points out that the Student’s only two witnesses, Ms. deMorton and PARENT, are not qualified to challenge the validity or appropriateness of the assessments given. The District claims that the reason for STUDENT’s academic difficulties is his cognitive ability, as well as his attitude, motivation, behavior and conduct, as evidenced by his educational history in his report cards.
The District denies violating STUDENT’s due process rights during the assessment process in either 1996 or 1997. The District states that STUDENT’s mother was given adequate notice of assessments and IEP meetings to review those assessments. The District also states that the Student has been provided all student records as requested. The District requests that the Hearing Officer order PARENT to make STUDENT available for a nonverbal cognitive functioning assessment as directed by the Board of Education, due to STUDENT’s performance on the verbal IQ portion of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children III (WISC-III).
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Issue No. 1: Was the District’s 1997 assessment of STUDENT’s educational needs appropriate?
Federal special education law provides for initial testing and evaluation of children with suspected disabilities through the use of appropriate materials and procedures selected and administered so as not to be racially or culturally discriminatory.(Footnote 10) The materials and procedures are to be provided and administered in the child’s native language or mode of communication, and no single procedure shall be the sole criterion for determining an appropriate educational program for a child. (20 U.S.C. Sec. 1412(5)(C); see also 34 C.F.R. Sec. 300.530-300.534.)
California special education law regarding the initial assessment of an individual with exceptional needs requires that the assessment be conducted by qualified persons, in accordance with a list of requirements which track those in federal law. (Cal. Ed. Code Sec. 56320.) The assessment process begins with a written referral for assessment by the parent, teacher, school personnel, or other appropriate agency or person. (Cal. Ed. Code Sec. 56302, 56321(a); Title 5 CCR Sec. 3021.) Within 15 days of referral the parent must be given a written assessment plan which explains the types of assessments to be conducted and meets certain other requirements. (Cal. Ed. Code Sec. 56321.) The parent then has 15 days to consent in writing to the proposed assessment. (Cal. Ed. Code Sec. 56321(c).) Once the signed assessment plan is received by the school district, it has 50 days, excluding vacation and days when school is not in session, to complete the assessments and develop an initial IEP if the student is found eligible for special education. (Cal. Ed. Code Sec. 56344.)
Once the assessment is completed, a written report must be prepared concerning the results of each assessment. (Cal. Ed. Code Sec. 56327.) An IEP team meeting must also be scheduled to discuss the assessment, the educational recommendations, and reasons for these recommendations with the parent. (Cal. Ed. Code Sec. 56329(a).) The decision as to whether or not the assessment results indicate a need for special education services must be made by the IEP team, including the assessment personnel. (Cal. Ed. Code Sec. 56341, 56323 ; Title 5 CCR Sec. 3030.)
On March 11, 1997, PARENT and MAPA made a written request for special education assessment of STUDENT. (Student’s Exh. I.)(Footnote 11) This request came four days after STUDENT was suspended from school with a recommendation for expulsion after threatening a physical education teacher. The uncontested evidence indicates that on March 14, 1997, well within the 15-day statutory time line, PARENT signed and expressly consented to the District’s assessment plan. (District Exh. 9.) PARENT testified that she signed the assessment form. No other evidence was presented indicating any deficiency in the proposed assessment plan. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the requirements and time lines for initial assessment under Education Code Sections 56302 and 56321-- specifically for referral, District proposal to assess, and parental consent to assessment-- have been satisfied with respect to the March 1997 assessment plan for STUDENT.
The Student contends that the additional assessments proposed and carried out by the District were improper because no statute or regulation permits "assessment modification." (Student’s Closing Brief, pg. 4.) The student claims that, even if the law permits such modification, the proposed change must be in writing with reasons stated.
Federal regulations for the IDEA assure students, "a full and individual evaluation" for special education and related services. (34 CFR Sec. 300.531.) Evaluation procedures in both federal regulation and state law require that a child be assessed in all areas of suspected disability. (34 CFR Sec. 300.532(f); Cal. Ed. Code Sec. 56320(f).) State law requires that the proposed initial assessment plan be written. (Ed. Code Sec. 56321(a).) Although language concerning "assessment modification" does not appear in federal or state law, if new areas of assessment are proposed, these would need to satisfy assessment requirements under Education Code Section 56321, i.e. be proposed in writing and consented to by the parent. There is no legal requirement that the district explain in writing its reasons for adding further assessments to its initial assessment plan.
Here, the District proposed to do additional assessments of STUDENT after the first round of psychological testing because his reading comprehension and speech processing scores had dropped dramatically from the prior year. (Testimony of James Evans.) Mr. Evans testified that he had a conference with PARENT and STUDENT on May 5, and that he recorded the results of that meeting on the "IEP Team Meeting Report" even though no IEP team meeting occurred. (Student Exh. W.) PARENT consented to the additional testing that day by writing her initials next to the four newly proposed areas as noted on the original assessment plan from March 14. (District Exh. 9; testimony of PARENT.) No evidence was presented as to whether Mr. Evans explained the reasons for adding the four new assessment areas to the March 14 assessment plan. However, based on the foregoing evidence, the Hearing Officer finds that the District’s procedure in adding additional assessments was done appropriately, and with parental consent. The Student’s objection to this procedure seems both frivolous and an exercise in form over substance, as the evidence indicates that the District was making every effort to complete a full and individual evaluation of STUDENT with the parent’s consent.
The Student also complains that the District’s speech and language specialist used standard scores rather than percentiles in evaluating STUDENT’s eligibility for speech and language services. Ms. deMorton stated her opinion that the District’s use of standard scores meant that the speech and language specialist did not follow the Education Code because these scores were compared to STUDENT’s own verbal IQ score rather than to the scores of his peers.(Footnote 12) (Testimony of Carolyn deMorton.) Ms. Kaufman testified that the law allows the District to use either standard scores or percentiles. She also stated that the District uses standard scores rather than percentiles when a student has a current cognitive assessment available. (Testimony of Kristine Kaufman.) Neither party presented testimony from the speech and language specialist who tested STUDENT.
State law provides that a pupil may be found eligible for special education on the basis of a speech and language disorder if he has "(d) Inappropriate or inadequate acquisition, comprehension, or expression of spoken language such that the pupil’s language performance level is found to be significantly below the language performance level or his or her peers." (Cal. Ed. Code Sec. 56333.) State regulations further explain that a language disorder exists when "the pupil scores at least 1.5 standard deviations below the mean, or below the 7th percentile, for his or her chronological age or developmental level on two or more standardized tests in one or more of the following areas of language development: morphology, syntax, semantics, or pragmatics." (Title 5 CCR Sec. 3030(c)(4)(A), emphasis added.)
In her written report, the speech and language specialist noted that STUDENT scored below the 7th percentile on five parts of the Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals-3 (CELF-3), specifically: CELF-3/Total Lang.= 02%ile, 68 standard score (SS); Semantic Relationships= 01%ile, (3) SS; Recept. Lang. Score= 05%ile, 75 SS; Recalling Sentences= 01%ile, (3) SS; Expressive Lang. Score= 01%ile, 65 SS. (Student Exh. N, emphasis in original.) On the Fullerton Language Test for Adolescents, the specialist noted that STUDENT’s standard score on convergent production was (32) and, in a column marked "SD+/-" which presumably means standard deviation +/-, 1.5 was noted. (Student Exh. N.) In her narrative, the specialist stated, "Even though STUDENT had high scores (above the 7 percentile) and low scores (below the 7 percentile) [on tests and subtests] his language skills do not qualify for language, speech and hearing (LSH) services. STUDENT’s standard scores (65-93) on his language testing are commensurate with his verbal ability (74) standard score, as derived by the school psychologist." (Student Exh. N.)
State regulations clearly provide for use of either standard scores or percentiles as criteria to determine whether a child has a language disorder which might qualify him for speech and language services. Here, the District has elected to use standard scores to evaluate STUDENT’s performance, which is permissible under the law. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the District did not violate state statute by relying on standard scores to evaluate STUDENT’s speech and language skills. However, it is troubling to the Hearing Officer that, by electing to rely on standard scores, the District appears to have avoided the eligibility implications of STUDENT’s five scores below the 7th percentile. No evidence was presented to explain this situation or to substantively contest the specialist’s determination that STUDENT was ineligible. Further, no IEP team meeting has been held at which STUDENT was, in fact, found ineligible for speech and language services. Therefore, this portion of the Student’s case remains as yet another unclear and inadequately presented issue. The Student claims that the school psychologist alone, not the IEP team, has determined whether STUDENT qualifies for special education as a result of the 1997 assessment. However, no evidence was presented to indicate that a concluding IEP team meeting to review all assessment results has occurred. Mr. Evans prepared his report and recommendations, as required under Education Code Section 56327. Thus, the Hearing Officer finds no violation of the requirement in Education Code Section 56323 that eligibility be determined by the entire IEP team because STUDENT’s IEP team meeting to review all assessments has not yet occurred.
Finally, the Student alleges that he has received a biased assessment because the school psychologist identified STUDENT as a "gang member" in the written psychoeducational report based on a teacher’s report of STUDENT’s classroom behavior. (Student’s Closing Brief, pg. 5.) No other basis for the Student’s allegation of bias was provided in testimony, documentary evidence, or in argument.
Both federal and state law address bias in terms of materials, testing procedures and personnel. The District must use appropriate materials and procedures which are selected and administered so as not to be racially or culturally discriminatory. (20 U.S.C. Sec. 1412(5)(C); Cal. Ed. Code Sec. 56320 (a).) Tests must be administered in the student’s native language, unless it is clearly not feasible to do so. (20 U.S.C. Sec. 1412(5)(C).) State law requires that the testing be in the pupil’s "primary language." (Cal. Ed. Code Sec. 56320(b)(1).) State law also requires that the psychological assessment be conducted by a credentialed school psychologist who is trained and prepared to assess cultural and ethnic factors appropriate to the student being assessed. (Cal. Ed. Code Sec. 56324(a).)
No evidence was presented which showed that materials and procedures used to test STUDENT were in any way racially or culturally discriminatory. Ms. Kaufman testified that STUDENT is an "English only" student and has always been so. Mr. Evans testified that he is a credentialed school psychologist, but was asked no questions concerning the testing which he performed or his training and preparation to assess cultural and ethnic factors. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the materials and procedures used to test STUDENT were not proven to be racially or culturally biased. Further, the uncontested evidence indicates that STUDENT was tested in English and there was no evidence offered to show that this was not his native or primary language. Thus, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT was tested appropriately in his native or primary language.
Concerning the reference in the written report to the possibility that STUDENT is a gang member, there was no evidence which indicated that this reference in any way reflected bias by Mr. Evans or the teacher or teachers who made the comment. The statement in Mr. Evan’s report was in the section on "social/emotional functioning," and was included in a discussion of teacher questionnaires returned to Mr. Evans. (Student Exh. E.) Mr. Evans noted, "In at least one classroom, STUDENT presents as a ‘gang’ member and appears to be trying to recruit gang members." (Student Exh. E.) Because Mr. Evans evaluated STUDENT under special education criteria for seriously emotionally disturbed, a discussion of STUDENT’s social functioning and interpersonal relationships with peers was appropriate. (See Title 5 CCR Sec. 3030(i)(2).) Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that Mr. Evans’ report of a teacher’s comment regarding possible gang activity by STUDENT does not reflect bias or in any other way indicate that STUDENT received a biased assessment.
No other evidence was presented on the issue of the appropriateness of STUDENT’s 1997 assessment. Further, the Hearing Officer found no evidence indicating that the District was attempting to do a "rush job" to find STUDENT ineligible for special education so that he could be expelled. Quite the contrary, the evidence shows that the District added to its initial assessment plan in order to do a complete evaluation of STUDENT’s educational needs. As mentioned previously, no IEP team meeting has yet been held to determine STUDENT’s eligibility. One assessment, as ordered by the District’s Board of Education, is still pending. Thus, the Hearing Officer concludes that STUDENT’s 1997 special education assessment already completed was appropriate.
Despite a ruling limiting the issues for hearing to the 1997 assessment, both the Student and the District presented evidence regarding procedures used in the 1996 assessment. Because the parties have placed those procedures at issue, the Hearing Officer will review the Student’s contentions concerning the 1996 assessment. The uncontested evidence indicates that PARENT requested a special education assessment of STUDENT on February 15, 1996. On February 23, 1996, well within the 15-day statutory time line, PARENT signed a written assessment plan for STUDENT, and expressly consented to the assessment. (District Exh. 6.) At the hearing, PARENT testified that it was her signature on the 1996 assessment plan, but that she did not sign the plan until May 1997. PARENT gave no explanation for this disparity. Mr. Evans testified that he discussed the 1996 assessment plan with PARENT over the telephone on February 21, 1996, and mailed the plan to her along with a "Parent Information Form." (District Exh. 2.) Mr. Evans also testified that he knew the "Parent Information Form" was completed by PARENT based on the content of her responses.
The Hearing Officer finds the testimony of the school psychologist concerning the development of the 1996 assessment plan to be specific, detailed and more credible than that of PARENT. PARENT’s claim that she signed the 1996 plan one year later, in 1997, was not documented in any way and, had this been true, would have prevented the District from taking any further steps to assess STUDENT in 1996. Further, it was PARENT who requested that STUDENT be assessed in 1996, so it seems unlikely that she would not have signed an assessment plan that year. PARENT acknowledged that the signature on the assessment plan was hers. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the requirements and time lines for initial assessment under California Education Code Sections 56302 and 56321-- specifically for referral, District proposal to assess, and parental consent to assessment -- have been satisfied with respect to the February 1996 assessment plan for STUDENT.
The Student complains that the District also violated California Education Code Section 56301, by referring STUDENT to the Student Study Team in 1996. However, this referral did not delay STUDENT’s assessment as the plan was signed by PARENT within eight days of her request for assessment. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that there is no evidence which indicated that the District violated Education Code Section 56301.
The Student also contests the 1996 assessment on grounds that PARENT did not know STUDENT was being assessed and was not included in IEP team meetings. The evidence indicated that PARENT did not appear for IEP meetings to review STUDENT’s assessment results on April 16, 1996 and May 7, 1996, despite notification. Mr. Evans testified that he determined the date and time for the April 16 and May 7 IEP meetings in phone calls with PARENT at the time he prepared the notices. According to the uncontested evidence, the two meeting notices were mailed on March 25, 1996, and April 29, 1996, respectively. (District Exh. 3, 4.) Immediately after the May 7 meeting, Mr. Evans called PARENT, and she told him that STUDENT’s last day at school was April 30, 1996 as he was moving to Missouri. Mr. Evans noted this information on the meeting notice form. (District Exh. 4.) PARENT testified that she did not remember any phone calls from Mr. Evans in 1996. Based on the more credible testimony of the school psychologist and corroborating District documentation, the Hearing Officer finds that PARENT had adequate notice of the two 1996 IEP meetings scheduled to review STUDENT’s assessment results but failed to attend those meetings.
A written report of STUDENT’s 1996 assessment was prepared as required by Education Code Section 56327. (Student’s Exh. C.) The May 7 IEP meeting to review the assessment results went forward without PARENT in attendance. The Student has also complained that the May 7 IEP meeting was held without a teacher in attendance in violation of Education Code Section 56341. The written IEP team meeting report for May 7 has a signature on the "special education teacher" line which indicates that a special education teacher was in attendance as permitted under Section 56341 (b)(2). (Student’s Exh. H; District Exh. 5.) No testimony was received from anyone present at the May 7 meeting concerning the teacher in attendance. Thus, based on the limited evidence presented, the Hearing Officer finds that no procedural violation has occurred, as a teacher was present at the May 7 IEP team meeting.(Footnote 13) Further, STUDENT was not found eligible, and his mother chose not to participate in that IEP meeting. Thus, even if the Student’s contention were correct, there would have been no prejudice to the Student.
No evidence, other than that already discussed, was presented by the Student in support of his contention that the 1996 assessment was inappropriate. Therefore, based on the foregoing findings, the Hearing Officer concludes that the February 1996 special education assessment of STUDENT was appropriate and STUDENT was afforded adequate procedural protections during the assessment process.
Issue No. 2: During the assessment process, did the District violate STUDENT’s procedural rights by (a) failing to give the parent proper notice of actual testing and Individualized Education Program (IEP) team meet- ings, and (b) failing to provide all student records as requested by the parent?
Notice of testing and IEP team meetings
The Student contends that the District committed a procedural error because STUDENT’s assessments and IEP team meetings were scheduled with less than 24 hours notice to the parent. However, the Student provides no authority for this position. Federal and state law are silent on the issue of notice to parents before scheduling of actual testing. As a practical matter, the evidence indicated that the District provided six days notice before the first round of psychological testing on April 21. During the second round of testing in late April and early May, the District provided at least one day’s notice on several occasions, and made repeated attempts to complete STUDENT’s assessment, but encountered many delays. Several times, STUDENT did not appear for testing as scheduled or his testing was canceled or interrupted by his mother. (Student Exh. E, pg. 2.) Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that no law was violated by the District in scheduling either the first or second round of testing for STUDENT.
Concerning prior notice of IEP team meetings, federal regulation provides that parents must be notified of meetings "early enough to ensure that they will have an opportunity to attend." (34 C.F.R. 300.345(a)(1).) No provision in state or federal law requires that the parent specifically receive 24 hours notice of an IEP team meeting. Here, an IEP team meeting was scheduled on April 21 for two days later, on April 23, to review the results of STUDENT’s first round of psychological testing. (Student Exh. E, pg. 2.) No evidence was presented that PARENT was unable to attend this particular meeting. In fact, both PARENT and Ms. deMorton appeared at the April 23 IEP team meeting, but they arrived 15 minutes late. (Student Exh. M.) Based on this evidence, the Hearing Officer finds that the District provided notice of the April 23 IEP team meeting early enough to allow the parent an opportunity to attend. No other IEP team meetings have been scheduled as the assessment process is not yet completed.
The Student has also complained that the April 23 IEP team meeting was held without proper staff in attendance and that the results of psychological testing were not provided in written form. Although, if true, these two points could have resulted in defects in the assessment process, the uncontested evidence indicated that some staff were not in attendance at the IEP meeting because both Ms. deMorton and PARENT arrived 15 minutes late and the teachers had gone to class. (Student Exh. L, M.) No actual IEP team review of the first round of psychological assessment occurred on April 23, as additional testing was required. (Student Exh. E, pg. 2, testimony of James Evans.) Moreover, the mother decided "not to go forward with the IEP meeting" after she arrived on April 23. (Testimony of Carolyn deMorton.) Once psychological testing was completed, a written report was prepared as required under Education Code Section 56327. Thus, because no IEP meeting was actually held for reasons stated above, the Hearing Officer finds that the Student’s complaint about composition of the April 23 IEP team is moot. The Hearing Officer also finds that because the assessment process was not yet complete on that date, the District was under no obligation to provide a written report of preliminary results of first-round psychological testing.
Student records requests
Special education law in California provides parents "the right and opportunity to examine all school records of the child and to receive copies...within five days after such request is made by the parent, either orally or in writing." (Cal. Ed. Code Sec. 56504.) Federal regulations concerning student records require that an educational agency comply with a records request without unnecessary delay and before any meeting regarding an IEP or any hearing relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child. (34 CFR Sec. 300.562.)
The Student requested records at three different times during 1997. The first phase of requests occurred on March 11, March 26, and April 23. (Student Exh. S, K, L.) On March 11, PARENT and MAPA made an initial request for STUDENT’s entire cumulative record. The District received this request on March 12, and, on March 14, provided what it apparently believed to be all of STUDENT’s cumulative files. In responding to this initial request, the District mistakenly included records from the cumulative file of a different STUDENT, triggering the Student’s two additional requests. (Student Exh. K, L, M; testimony of PARENT.) On April 24, the District forwarded more of the Student’s cumulative file to its child welfare and attendance office. (District Exh. 8.) No evidence was presented as to when these files were received by the Student or whether the April 24 response provided STUDENT’s complete cumulative file.
Based on this evidence, the District substantially complied with the five-day timeline in its initial response to the Student’s records request on March 14. Although all of STUDENT’s cumulative files were not received before the April 23 IEP meeting, as required under federal regulations, the Student has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the delay. PARENT requested that the April 23 IEP meeting not go forward, and no subsequent IEP meeting has occurred. (Student Exh. E, L, testimony of James Evans.) Further, the record indicates that the District was attempting to comply with PARENT’s request, but was unaware of additional cumulative files for STUDENT located at another school. Therefore, as to the first round of student records requests, the Hearing Officer finds that the District has substantially complied with state and federal procedural requirements.
A second round of record requests occurred shortly before the due process hearing in July 1997. On July 2, 1997 the District received a letter from Ms. deMorton requesting six specific items from STUDENT’s special education and cumulative files. (Student Exh. V; District Exh. 13.) On July 7, Ms. Kaufman responded to the request and provided three items. She noted that two items did not exist and that one item (i.e. speech and language test protocols) was not currently available but would be provided as soon as it became available. (District Exh. 13.) Ms. Kaufman testified that PARENT picked up the available items on July 7. The test protocols were provided by the District two days later, on July 9. (District Exh. 13.)
From this evidence, it is clear that the District has substantially complied with the Student’s second round of requests for records. The only item not provided within the five-day timeline was the speech and language test protocols, which were provided only two days later. Again, the Student has failed to show what, if any, prejudice he has suffered from the de minimus delay in the District’s response to his records request. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the District has substantially complied with state and federal procedural requirements in responding to the Student’s second round of records requests.
On July 18, the District received a third request for records, this time from the Student’s counsel. Mr. Suarez requested all special education and cumulative file records on STUDENT. (District Exh. 12.) In response, Ms. Kaufman had STUDENT’s entire cumulative file and special education file copied and mailed to Mr. Suarez. (Testimony of Kristine Kaufman.) No evidence was presented indicating that these records were not received in a timely manner. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the District complied with state and federal procedural requirements in responding to the third round of requests in mid-July.
In conclusion, the Hearing Officer finds that the Student has failed to show that any delay in providing the three rounds of requested records was prejudicial to him. The Hearing Officer also concludes that the Student’s procedural rights, under state law and the IDEA, were not significantly violated by the District in its response to the Student’s three rounds of records requests in 1997.
Issue No. 3: Is the District entitled to complete the 1997 assessment of STUDENT, with a nonverbal cognitive functioning assessment?
In response to PARENT’ and MAPA’s concerns expressed at the expulsion hearing, the District’s Board of Education ordered that an additional "non-biased" assessment of STUDENT be completed. (Testimony of Kristine Kaufman.) Upon consultation with the Superintendent, the District modified the Board’s directive and offered PARENT a nonverbal cognitive functioning assessment of STUDENT. (Testimony of Kristine Kaufman; District Exh. 10, 11.) From the evidence presented, it is not clear to the Hearing Officer what such an assessment entails or why it is necessary to determine STUDENT’s educational needs. PARENT has not consented to further evaluation of STUDENT, even though the assessment plan presented by the District is a response to her appearance before the Board.
The Hearing Officer has concluded that the 1997 assessment already completed is appropriate and is not racially or culturally biased in regards to testing materials and procedures or teacher’s observations noted in the psychoeducational report. Therefore, there is no need to proceed with yet another assessment of STUDENT as proposed by the District. Thus, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District is not entitled to complete a nonverbal cognitive functioning assessment of STUDENT.
Under California Education Code Section 56329(b) the parent has the right to obtain, at public expense, an independent educational assessment of the pupil from qualified specialists, if the parent disagrees with an assessment obtained by the district. However, the district may initiate a due process hearing to show that its assessment is appropriate. If the final decision resulting from the due process hearing is that the assessment is appropriate, the parent still has the right to get an independent educational assessment, but not at public expense. If the parent obtains an assessment privately, the results must be considered by the district. (Cal. Ed. Code Sec. 56329(b).)
Here, the parent has initiated a due process hearing on the issue of the appropriateness of the District’s 1997 assessment. That assessment has been found to be appropriate. Therefore, although the parent is still entitled to obtain an independent assessment, it may not be done at public expense. If the parent obtains a privately funded assessment, the results must be considered by the District pursuant to California Education Code Section 56329(b). Moreover, because an additional assessment by the District is not necessary, and because the IEP team has not met to determine STUDENT’s eligibility as a result of the already completed 1997 assessments, the District must convene an IEP team meeting for that purpose as soon as possible.
ORDER
1. The Student’s request for a free, independent assessment is denied.
2. The District’s request to assess STUDENT with a nonverbal cognitive functioning assessment is denied.
3. The District will convene an IEP team meeting within 15 days of the date of this order to determine STUDENT’s eligibility for special education services as a result of the 1997 assessments already completed.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
Pursuant to Education Code Section 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute:
Issue No. 1: The District prevailed on this issue.
Issue No. 2: The District prevailed on this issue.
Issue No. 3: The Student prevailed on this issue.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. (Cal. Ed. Code Sec. 56505(i).)
DATED: November 24, 1997 _____________________________________ JoAnn Irwin-Eshelman, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
1.The only change is to remove an incorrect middle initial "V." from STUDENT’s name in the caption. 2.For clarity in this consolidated case, the Hearing Officer will refer to the Student’s case and the District’s case rather than Petitioner/Respondent and Respondent/Petitioner, respectively. 3.In the July 24 statement of issues, the Student identified the validity of the 1997 assessment and related procedural matters as issues for hearing. The Student also made vague reference to the District’s "failure to identify STUDENT as a special education student even though testing began in 1994, 1996 and 1997." No evidence or argument was presented concerning STUDENT’s eligibility for special education services during 1994 or 1996. His eligibility for special education services in 1997 still has not been determined by the IEP team. Therefore, the Hearing Officer will not address eligibility in this decision as the Student has not pursued that issue at hearing. 4.The Student claims that he was also found ineligible for special education as a result of testing in 1994. Carolyn deMorton testified that STUDENT was assessed in 1994, but no evidence of testing was presented which confirmed this statement. District correspondence indicated that STUDENT was assessed only in 1996 and 1997, although a Woodcock-Johnson test was apparently given to STUDENT in January 1994. (Student Exh. M; District Exh. 13.) 5. PARENT testified that the signature on the February 23 assessment plan was hers but that she did not sign in 1996. She believes she signed the plan in May 1997. 6. Ms. deMorton testified that PARENT did not know STUDENT was being assessed in 1996 and, also, that PARENT did not know the IEP meeting to review assessment results was being held. PARENT testified that she did not remember receiving any phone calls from Mr. Evans in 1996 and did not remember any times being set for STUDENT to be tested. 7.The administrative panel, pre-expulsion hearing was also set for April 23, 1997, according to the testimony of Ms. deMorton. 8. No evidence was presented as to the date of the Board meeting. 9.Mr. Suarez also made extensive argument in his closing brief concerning STUDENT’s right to a free, appropriate education, placement decisions, and least restrictive environment. The relevance of these arguments is not clear considering that STUDENT is not currently a special education student, and was not found eligible in 1996. The Student made no argument and presented no evidence supporting a finding of eligibility for STUDENT in 1996. The IEP team has not yet determined STUDENT’s eligibility as a result of 1997 assessments. 10. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 1997 amendments were signed into law on June 4, 1997. However, in this decision, the Hearing Officer will apply prior law in accordance with rules regarding retroactivity. (Landgraf v. USI Film Products (1994) 511 U.S. 244.) 11.Ms. deMorton testified that it was her opinion that the District had refused to assess STUDENT in February 1997 when the mother requested help because STUDENT was not attending school. PARENT did not provide testimony on this point, and the Student’s counsel did not offer argument on it in his closing brief. Therefore, the Hearing Officer will not address the MAPA advocate’s opinion on this matter. 12. Ms. deMorton testified that she is a registered occupational therapist. She has never worked as a speech therapist and only once informally assessed a child for speech and language services. She has never administered standardized speech and language tests. Approximately 25 years ago, Ms. deMorton held an emergency teaching credential and taught English for one and one-half months in a regular education school setting. Ms. deMorton also testified that she has no legal training. 13. Hearsay evidence is not sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it would be admissible over objection in civil actions. Here, the written IEP Team Report from May 7 would be admissible as an official record.
