California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · July 29, 2002

Student v. San Diego Unified School District (consolidated)

SEHO Case No. SN 597-02, SN02-01085 · Hearing Officer Van T. Vu

San Diego Unified must pay for a transfer student's private in-home autism program after missing the 30-day deadline for a final IEP offer.

Split decision: student prevailed on 3 of 5 issues (3 in part)

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Summary

A five-year-old preschooler with autism moved from San Bernardino City School District to San Diego Unified in January 2002. His last IEP included an in-home discrete trial program run by Lovaas Intervention for Early Intervention (LIFE). His mother turned down San Diego's interim offers, kept LIFE privately, and filed for a hearing. The District's own request to assess without consent was dismissed after she consented.

The Hearing Officer found that the San Bernardino IEP set no classroom placement. So it required only 15 hours a week of in-home therapy and no speech therapy. San Diego's January 31 school-based offer did not match that IEP, which denied FAPE through February 11. The February 12 offer was an appropriate interim placement. It included 25 in-home hours through the Center for Autism Research Education and Services (CARES) and more supervision. The district did not have to use the same provider. However, the District had to make a final offer by February 28, even if the parents would not attend a meeting. It held no IEP meeting until April 15. That IEP had no real present levels and only three goals. As a result, the student was denied FAPE from March 1 through the 2002 extended school year (ESY). Claims about 2002-2003 were not yet ripe. The District also did not have to use the specific tests the parent requested. The District must pay LIFE for services from March 1 through the 2002 ESY.

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Why it matters

This decision shows how SEHO applied Education Code section 56325 to a student who transferred between districts. The new district only had to follow the old IEP within its existing resources and did not have to use the same provider. However, it had to make a final placement offer within 30 days, even if the parents would not attend.

Issues and holdings

  1. Issue Procedural matter. District's consolidated request (SN02-01085) to override the parents' refusal of consent to assess the student.

    Mother consented to the proposed assessments before evidence was presented, so the District's case was dismissed as moot.

  2. Student prevailed in partPlacement and LRE

    Issue I. Did the San Diego Unified School District offer Petitioner a 30-day interim placement pursuant to Education Code section 56325(a) upon his interdistrict transfer into the District?

    The prior San Bernardino IEP set no classroom placement and required only 15 hours/week of in-home therapy plus supervision. The January 31 school-based offer did not conform to it, so FAPE was denied January 29 through February 11. The February 12 offer of 25 hours/week of in-home therapy through CARES conformed, and the District did not have to use the same provider (LIFE).

  3. Student prevailed in partIEP content

    Issue II. Did the District offer Petitioner a free and appropriate public education for the timeframe after the 30-day interim period through the end of the 2002-2003 school year and 2003 extended school year?

    The District had to make a final offer by February 28, 2002, even if the parents would not attend. Its April 15 IEP lacked present levels and adequate goals, and its 2002 ESY offer was unspecified, so FAPE was denied from March 1 through the 2002 ESY. Claims about 2002-2003 were not ripe.

  4. Issue III. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for the cost of his LIFE services?

    The District did not dispute that LIFE was appropriate, and the Hearing Officer declined to reduce reimbursement for lack of written notice. The District must pay LIFE for services from March 1, 2002 through the end of the 2002 ESY, but not for the late-February services, when the District's interim offer was appropriate.

  5. District prevailedAssessment

    Issue IV. Is the District required to assess Petitioner using the Bailey Scales of Infant Development - Revised, the Merrill-Palmer Scale of Mental Tests, and the Rynell Developmental Language Scale?

    The District's assessment plan covered the same areas, and the law does not require a district to use specific test instruments requested by parents.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • Reimbursement. Within 30 days of receiving appropriate proof of the mother's obligation to pay for the student's LIFE services from March 1, 2002 through the end of the 2002 extended school year, the District shall pay LIFE directly the amount owed. No dollar amount stated.

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Key authorities

Rowley; Gregory K. v. Longview School District; School Comm. of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ.; Cal. Educ. Code § 56325; Cal. Educ. Code § 56341.5; Cal. Educ. Code § 56320(e); 34 C.F.R. § 300.403(d)

People named in the decision

  • Debbie Ware, diagnostic resource teacher, San Diego Unified School District
  • Mary Lou Evans, itinerant autism specialist, San Diego Unified School District
  • Beth Hannaman, diagnostic resource teacher, San Diego Unified School District
  • Linda Gallagher, special education teacher (SEEC program); also spelled Gallager, San Diego Unified School District
  • Cathy Sweeten, psychologist, nonpublic agency offered by District, Center for Autism Research Education and Services (CARES)
  • Miriam Bakcht, director of operations, private in-home behavioral provider; witness for Student, Lovaas Intervention for Early Intervention (LIFE), San Diego
  • Lovaas Intervention for Early Intervention (LIFE), private in-home discrete trial therapy provider
  • Center for Autism Research Education and Services (CARES), nonpublic agency offered by District for in-home therapy

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Van T. Vu, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in San Diego, California, on June 4, 5, 13, and 14, 2002.

Petitioner STUDENT (Petitioner or STUDENT) was represented at hearing by attorney Ralph Lewis and his mother, MOTHER. Respondent San Diego Unified School District (Respondent or District) was represented at the hearing by attorney Ricardo Soto and diagnostic resource teacher Debbie Ware.

Petitioner called as witnesses MOTHER, Debbie Ware, and Miriam Bakcht, director of operations for the Lovaas Intervention for Early Intervention (LIFE). The District called the following persons as witnesses: Mary Lou Evans, itinerant autism specialist; Beth Hannaman, diagnostic resource teacher; Linda Gallagher, special education teacher; and Cathy Sweeten, psychologist with the Center for Autism Research Education and Services (CARES).

Oral and documentary evidence was received at hearing. The parties’ written closing briefs were received by the Hearing Office on July 1, 2002. The record was then closed, and the matter was submitted for decision.

PROCEDURAL MATTER

This matter was convened as a consolidated hearing with case SN02-01085. Case SN02-01085 was a matter requested by the District to override Petitioner’s parents’ refusal of consent for the District to assess him. Prior to the presentation of evidence, MOTHER consented to the assessments proposed by the District. Accordingly, the District’s case was dismissed as moot.

ISSUES

I. Did the San Diego Unified School District offer Petitioner a 30-day interim placement pursuant to California Education Code Section 56325(a) upon his interdistrict tranfer into the District?

II. Did the District offer Petitioner a free and appropriate public education for the timeframe after the 30-day interim period through the end of the 2002-2003 school year and 2003 extended school year?

III. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for the cost of his LIFE services?

IV. Is the District required to assess Petitioner using the Bailey Scales of Infant Development - Revised, the Merrill-Palmer Scale of Mental Tests, and the Rynell Developmental Language Scale?

BACKGROUND FACTS

STUDENT is a five-year-old preschool student who is eligible for special education and related services as a student with a diagnosis of autism. STUDENT currently resides within the boundaries of the San Diego Unified School District with his parents and older brother.

From early March 1999 through January 2002, when he moved to San Diego, STUDENT resided within the jurisdictional boundaries of the San Bernardino City School District (San Bernardino). In September 1999, when STUDENT turned three years old, the San Bernardino District became responsible for providing him with special education and related services to address his autism. From about this time through January 2002, at least nine IEP meetings were held in San Bernardino regarding STUDENT’s special education needs. STUDENT’s parents consented to only the last IEP developed by San Bernardino, which was the IEP developed on January 25, 2002, less than four days prior to his move out of the district.

According to the first page of the January 25, 2002 IEP, San Bernardino was to provide Petitioner with the following services:

· Regular Education Preschool with continued home program 5 days per week, up to 3 hours per day · Group speech therapy with a speech therapist twice per week for 60 minute sessions · Individual speech therapy with a speech therapist twice per week for 60 minute sessions · In-home one-to-one discrete trial program for behavior intervention therapy for 28 hours per week · Direct supervision of in-home program by LIFE for 8 hours per month · Indirect supervision of in-home program by LIFE for 4 hours per month · Consultation with/between LIFE and San Bernardino 3 times per month for 10 minutes. (Pet. Exh. 15.)

The notes on the IEP apparently qualified the amount of services that Petitioner was to receive under the IEP. The IEP specifically stated:

LIFE recommends 35-40 hrs per week intervention [and] recommends systematic transition that begins with 1 hr a day in school plus speech at 2 hrs per week individual speech therapy and 2 hrs per week group speech therapy – both provided by a speech therapist.

It is expected that Regional Center will participate in the funding of the in-home program. Mother is requesting Regional Center fund 12 hrs a week of in-home program. The [San Bernardino Unified School District] agreed to fund 28 hrs per week 1:1 behavioral intervention conditioned upon STUDENT attending a District school program for at least three hrs per day (five days per week). If STUDENT does not attend a District school program for at least three hours per day, then the S.B.C.U.S.D. District is only obligated to fund 15 hours per week 1:1 behavioral intervention therapy.

The District agrees to fund up to 12 hrs per month of supervision (consisting of up to 8 hrs of direct supervision and up to 4 hrs of indirect supervision) provided by LIFE or current provider for the 1:1 behavioral intervention….

The District will provide up to 2 hours per week of group speech therapy at school and 2 hours per week of individual therapy at school. Such therapy will be provided by a District speech and language therapist. (Id.)

Prior to STUDENT’s leaving San Bernardino, the portions in the IEP regarding the provision of speech and language therapy and the placement in a regular education classroom were never implemented. According to MOTHER, a general education preschool classroom was found and agreed upon for STUDENT, but he had not attended the placement prior to the move to San Diego and, thus, did not receive the speech services that were to be provided in the classroom. Accordingly, at the time he left San Bernardino, Petitioner was receiving only his in-home discrete trial therapy services, supervision, and consultation.

Sometime in January 2002, the STUDENT’s family moved within the San Diego Unified School District boundaries. MOTHER contacted the District on January 29, 2002, and faxed to the District a copy of the January 25, 2002 IEP from San Bernardino. Ms. Ware, diagnostic resource teacher with the District, contacted MOTHER the same day and scheduled a meeting with her for two days later.

On January 31, 2002, MOTHER met with Ms. Ware, and Ms. Ware gave MOTHER a tour of the District’s SEEC program taught by Ms. Linda Gallager and Ms. Mary Lou Evans. At the meeting with MOTHER and Ms. Evans, Ms. Ware developed an interim placement offer for STUDENT consisting of the following:

· Individual speech and language therapy for 2 hours per week · Placement in the District’s Special Education Early Childhood (SEEC) class for 6 ½ hours per day, four days per week (Footnote 1).

According to the notes of the meeting, STUDENT was to attend the SEEC’s special day class (SDC) extended assessment program, where he was to receive instruction in language, socialization, preacademics, behavior and sensory instruction. For the other half of the school day, STUDENT was to receive direct instruction using a variety of applied behavioral analysis techniques through the District’s autism resources program. The notes also indicate that the District would continue to search for a nonpublic agency to implement an in-home discrete trial program per the January 2002 San Bernardino IEP. MOTHER did not accept the District’s offer of an interim placement.

During the following week, Ms. Ware contacted Cathy Sweeten, psychologist from CARES, to discus whether CARES would be able to provide STUDENT with an in-home discrete trial program. When Ms. Sweeten indicated that CARES would be able to provide STUDENT with therapy services and supervision, Ms. Ware contacted MOTHER to schedule a meeting to discuss the provision of those services. That meeting, which included Ms. Ware, MOTHER, Ms. Sweeten, and Ms. Evans, occurred on February 12, 2002. At the meeting, MOTHER provided the District with her consent to obtain information from the San Bernardino District regarding STUDENT’s education. Also at the meeting, Ms. Ware revised the District’s offer to include:

· Placement in the SEEC SDC extended assessment class for 3 ½ hours per day for 4 days per week · Direct in-home therapy services from CARES for 25 hours per week · Supervision of in-home program for 9 hours per week during the first 3 weeks of the program · A reduction to 6 hours per week of supervision of the in-home program for the following 3 weeks · Individual speech and language therapy for 2 hours per week.

According to the IEP, the District’s revised offer of a 30-day interim placement was to last from February 25, 2002, through March 25, 2002. At hearing, Ms. Ware testified that the District decided that the revised offer of an interim placement would last for a period of at least 30 days from the implementation date in order to compensate for the District’s failure to find an NPA to provide STUDENT’s in-home services during the first few weeks of his enrollment within the District (Footnote 2). There is no indication that MOTHER agreed to the extension of the 30-day interim period.

MOTHER deferred making a decision regarding whether to accept the District’s offer of in-home therapy from CARES, and requested instead that the services be provided by LIFE. In response to her request, Ms. Ware informed MOTHER that the District had found an appropriate NPA to provide the in-home therapy and supervision, that the District did not have a master contract with LIFE to contract for services, and that therefore the District would not pursue services from LIFE. According to the notes from the meeting, MOTHER accepted the District’s offer of placement in the SEEC program and the speech and language therapy. (Pet. Exh. 8.) At hearing, MOTHER disputed accepting any of the services. MOTHER never placed STUDENT in the District’s SEEC program and she did not accept any speech and language services for STUDENT. Additionally, MOTHER refused the District’s offer of in-home services from CARES. Thus, MOTHER also refused the District’s revised interim placement offer.

Sometime at the end of February 2002, STUDENT started his privately procured in-home therapy services with the LIFE office in San Diego. (Test. of Miriam Bakcht.) His in-home program is supervised by Miriam Bakcht, director of operations of LIFE in San Diego. Describing the timeline of how STUDENT’s LIFE services were started in San Diego, Ms. Bakcht testified that MOTHER notified LIFE during the winter of 2001 to notify them that her family might be moving to San Diego. MOTHER also told LIFE at that time that STUDENT might require a transfer of his services to the LIFE office in San Diego. Ms. Bakcht was then notified approximately mid-January 2002 that STUDENT and his family had already moved and that they were requesting a continuation of his LIFE services. The members of LIFE in San Diego then worked with MOTHER for the following month to develop a program for STUDENT, and his services began soon thereafter.

On March 5, 2002, Ms. Ware sent MOTHER a letter expressing her surprise that STUDENT had not been attending the District’s SEEC program. Ms. Ware also stated that the District would be scheduling an IEP for STUDENT to occur on March 21, 2002, to discuss a more permanent educational program for him. (Pet. Exh. 7.) The next day, the District sent MOTHER a written notice of the meeting. (Pet. Exh. 6.) During a telephone conversation on March 11, MOTHER indicated that she would not be able to attend the March 21 IEP meeting. In response, on March 14, Mrs. Ware sent MOTHER a letter offering to convene the IEP meeting on April 4 instead.

On March 18, 2002, the District faxed to MOTHER an assessment plan in which it sought to assess STUDENT in the areas of intellectual development, learning processes, social/emotional/adaptive behavior, communication development, health development, academic/preacademic achievement, and motor development. The next day, MOTHER faxed to the Hearing Office a request for a special education due process hearing to challenge the District’s offers of interim placements for STUDENT.

On March 21, the District sent MOTHER another letter inquiring about her ability to attend an IEP meeting on April 4. (Pet. Exh. 3.) On or about April 2, MOTHER notified Ms. Ware during a telephone conversation that she did not intend to attend the April 4 IEP meeting because her attorney was unable to accompany her there. (Test. of Ms. Ware and MOTHER.) By letter dated April 3, 2002, Ms. Ware sent MOTHER a notice of an IEP meeting that was rescheduled to April 15, 2002.

On April 15, 2002, STUDENT’s IEP team convened without his parents or any personnel from LIFE in attendance. (Pet. Exh. 1., Test. of MOTHER and Ms. Ware.) As of the date of the meeting, MOTHER had not consented to the District’s conducting assessments of STUDENT and, therefore, no assessments had been completed. (Test. of Ms. Ware.) At the meeting, the only information available to the team members on STUDENT was a portion of his educational records from the San Bernardino District. From these incomplete records, the team developed an offer of placement for STUDENT that included the following placement and services:

· Placement in the SEEC SDC classroom for 25 hours per week · Individual speech and language therapy for 2 hours per week. (Pet. Exh. 1.

The IEP team did not develop any new goals and objectives for STUDENT, but agreed to adopt three goals and objective from STUDENT’s January 2002 San Bernardino IEP. (Id. and Test. of Ms. Ware.) Although the San Bernardino IEP also included twenty-six goals developed by LIFE, the San Diego IEP team incorrectly assumed that the three goals and objectives it adopted were the only goals and objectives that were agreed upon by MOTHER and San Bernardino. Additionally, as indicated in the April 15, 2002 IEP, the educational placement and program offered by the District was to last only until June 14, 2002, when another IEP meeting would convene to review STUDENT’s needs and to determine his services for the 2002-2003 school year. According to Ms. Ware, the IEP also included an offer of placement in a special day class for STUDENT for the 2002 extended school year. However, the IEP team may revise the ESY placement offer, if necessary, when it convened on or before June 14, 2002.

On or about April 18, 2002, the District sent to MOTHER a copy of the April 15 IEP and a letter requesting her consent to implement the IEP. (Pet. Exh. 2.) Through the conclusion of the hearing in this matter, the PARENTS have continued to refuse consent to implement the April 15, IEP. Additionally, no information was provided by the parties that any IEP meeting convened subsequently to develop an educational placement for Petitioner for the time period subsequent to June 14, 2002, when his April 15 IEP expires.

DISCUSSION

I. Did the San Diego Unified School District offer Petitioner a 30-day interim placement pursuant to California Education Code Section 56325(a) upon his interdistrict transfer into the district?

When STUDENT was enrolled in the District on January 29, 2002, the District was required to provide him immediately with an interim placement. California Education Code section 56325(a) states as follows:

Whenever a pupil transfers into a school district ... the administrator of a local program under this part shall ensure that the pupil is immediately provided an interim placement for a period not to exceed 30 days. The interim placement must be in conformity with an individualized education program, unless the parent or guardian agrees otherwise. The individualized education program implemented during the interim placement may be either the pupil’s existing individualized education program, implemented to the extent possible within existing resources, ... or a new individualized education program, developed pursuant to Section 56321.

Upon receiving STUDENT into the district, the Respondent chose to implement STUDENT’s January 25, 2002 IEP from the San Bernardino City School District within the existing resources of the San Diego District, rather than to immediately develop a new IEP for him (Footnote 3). The parties now dispute whether the interim placement offered by the District was in “conformity with” the San Bernardino IEP (Footnote 4). Accordingly, it is first necessary to determine what was required under the San Bernardino IEP before determining the appropriateness of the District’s interim placement under the law.

San Bernardino IEP

Petitioner argues that the District was required to provide the program and services outlined on the first page of the San Bernardino IEP. As discussed above, the first page of STUDENT’s San Bernardino IEP provides for the following services:

· Regular Education Preschool with continued home program 5 days per week, up to 3 hours per day

· Group speech therapy with a speech therapist twice per week for 60 minute sessions · Individual speech therapy with a speech therapist twice per week for 60 minute sessions · In-home one-to-one discrete trial program for behavior intervention therapy for 28 hours per week · Direct supervision of in-home program by LIFE for 8 hours per month · Indirect supervision of in-home program by LIFE for 4 hours per month · Consultation with/between LIFE and San Bernardino 3 times per month for 10 minutes. (Pet. Exh. 15.)

The District does not dispute that the San Bernardino IEP provides for 12 hours per month of direct and indirect supervision services of the in-home program and ½ hour per month of consultation services. However, the District does dispute that it was required to provide all of the remaining services listed on the first page of the San Bernardino IEP. The District asserts that the notes of the IEP meeting qualify the type and level of services that were to be provided and the IEP is ambiguous as to whether a placement for STUDENT was ever agreed upon. Specifically, the District argues that it was only required to provide up to 15 hours per week of in-home behavior intervention therapy because Petitioner was not attending school within the San Bernardino District. Additionally, the District essentially asserts that it is not required to provide Petitioner with a classroom placement because the January IEP does not contain an agreed-upon placement and the San Bernardino IEP team left the placement up to the receiving San Diego IEP team. Moreover, the District essentially asserts that it is also not required to provide speech and language therapy to Petitioner because those services were to be provided “at school” and, again, no school placement was ever agreed upon and the services were never provided (Footnote 5). The relevant portions of the IEP notes states:

The [San Bernardino Unified School District] agreed to fund 28 hrs per week 1:1 behavioral intervention conditioned upon STUDENT attending a District school program for at least three [hours] per day (five days per week). If STUDENT does not attend a District school program for at least three hours per day, then the S.B.C.U.S.D. District is only obligated to fund 15 hours per week 1:1 behavioral intervention therapy….

The District will provide up to 2 hours per week of group speech therapy at school and 2 hours per week of individual therapy at school. Such therapy will be provided by a District speech and language therapist. (Id.; emphasis added.)

The plain meaning and most reasonable construction of the IEP supports the District’s contentions. While the first page of the IEP provides for Petitioner’s placement in a regular education preschool placement, the third page of the IEP indicates that a number of placements were “considered” (e.g., general education and special day classes), but none of the placements were “recommended.” (Pet. Exh. 15 at pg. 3.) Additionally, in the section in which the team is to indicate the amount of Petitioner’s participation in the regular education program, the team wrote, “TBA when placement is decided.” Id. Furthermore, despite the designation of a regular education placement on the first page of the IEP, the IEP team notes indicated that “STUDENT qualifies for special day class based on [his] present levels of functioning.” (Pet. Exh. 15 at page 6.) As noted above, the IEP notes also indicated that both general and special education placement decisions were considered but the placement decision was ultimately left for STUDENT’s San Diego IEP team. (Id.) Considering the totality of all of the references in the IEP regarding STUDENT’s placement, the Hearing Officer finds that the January IEP indicates that no placement was agreed upon (Footnote 6). Because the San Bernardino IEP did not provide for any classroom placement for STUDENT, the San Diego District was not required to offer him any classroom placement as part of his interim placement.

Having determined that the San Bernardino IEP did not provide for a classroom placement for Petitioner, the Hearing Officer also finds that during the interim period the San Diego District was required to provide Petitioner with only 15 hours per week of in-home discrete trial therapy services and was not required to provide any speech and language therapy. According to the notes from the January IEP, Petitioner’s entitlement to 28 hours per week of in-home therapy services was contingent upon his attendance in a District school program for at least three hours per day, five days per week (Footnote 7). Otherwise, he would be entitled to only 15 hours per week of therapy services. Although Petitioner argues that the IEP team envisioned a slow transition from his home program to a school program, nothing in the IEP indicates that the contingency provision somehow would be ineffective during that transition period. Additionally, although MOTHER testified that the team orally agreed to fund 28 hours per week of his in-home therapy program during the transition, she also testified that the San Bernardino District had never paid for more than 15 hours of his home services up through the time he moved out of the district. Considering that the 15 hours of in-home therapy services funded by the San Diego District was consistent with a plain reading of the contingency provision in the IEP and November 2001 settlement agreement, the Hearing Officer does not find MOTHER’s testimony to be persuasive. Because no school placement was agreed upon at the IEP meeting and Petitioner never attended any San Bernardino District program, Petitioner was only entitled to a maximum of 15 hours per week of in-home therapy services under the San Bernardino IEP (Footnote 8).

Moreover, according to the notes from the San Bernardino IEP, the speech and language services agreed upon in the IEP were to be provided “at school.” Because no “school” placement was ever agreed upon in San Bernardino and Petitioner never attended school there, he was not entitled to any speech services under the IEP. This conclusion is further supported by the statement in the IEP that “speech and language goals will be developed in San Diego.” (Pet. Exh. 15 at page 7.) Without any existing speech and language goals and objectives, there was nothing in the San Bernardino IEP to drive the provision of speech and language therapy while he was in San Bernardino (Footnote 9). MOTHER also confirmed at hearing that STUDENT was never provided any speech and language services by San Bernardino pursuant to the January 2002 IEP. Given the fact that STUDENT was not yet entitled to receive speech and language services pursuant to the San Bernardino IEP, San Diego also was not required to offer STUDENT any speech and language services as part of his 30-day interim placement.

In summary, the San Diego District was required to provide an interim placement that included up to 15 hours per week of in-home discrete trial therapy. The additional hours of in-home therapy and the speech and language services included in the San Bernardino IEP were contingent upon the determination of STUDENT’s classroom placement (which had not been determined) and, therefore, the San Diego District was not required to provide them as part of STUDENT’s 30-day interim placement. With regard to the remaining portions of STUDENT’s San Bernardino IEP, as was discussed above, the parties do not dispute that Petitioner was entitled 12 hours per month of supervision services of the in-home discrete trial program and ½ hour per month of consultation services between the in-home therapy program supervisor and school district personnel.

Having established what services were offered or provided for in STUDENT’s last San Bernardino IEP, the next question is whether the District’s offers of a 30-day interim placement were appropriate. As noted above, the District made two distinct offers of an interim placement to STUDENT, one on January 31, 2002, and one on February 12, 2002. Each of these offers will be addressed below in turn.

Interim placement offer made on January 31, 2002

On January 31, 2002, the District offered STUDENT two hours per week of individualized speech therapy and a placement in its SEEC program for six and a half hours per day for four days per week. As noted above, the notes of the meeting indicate that STUDENT was to attend the SEEC’s special day class (SDC) extended assessment program, where he was to receive instruction in language, socialization, preacademics, behavior and sensory instruction. For the other half of the school day, STUDENT was to receive direct instruction using a variety of applied behavioral analysis techniques through the District’s autism resources program.

The District acknowledged that its January 31 offer of an interim placement was not “in conformity” with the San Bernardino IEP. (Test. of Ms. Ware.) While the San Bernardino IEP called for an in-home discrete trial training program with supervision services, the District’s offer to Petitioner was for a school-based program utilizing a variety of methodologies. Given the dissimilarities between the two programs and the District’s acknowledgement that its January 31 offer was not in conformity with the San Bernardino IEP, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District failed to offer Petitioner an appropriate interim placement offer at this time.

Interim placement offer made on February 12, 2002 On February 12, 2002, the District revised its interim placement offer to STUDENT to include the following services:

· Placement in the SEEC SDC extended assessment class for 3 ½ hours per day for 4 days per week · Direct in-home therapy services from CARES for 25 hours per week · Supervision of in-home program for 9 hours per week during the first 2 weeks of the program · A reduction to 6 hours per week of supervision of the in-home program for the subsequent 3 weeks · Individual speech and language therapy for 2 hours per week. (Pet. Exh. 8.)

Petitioner argues that the District’s offer was inappropriate because it included 25 hours per week of in home services instead of 28 hours per week provided for in the San Bernardino IEP, and because CARES would not be able to implement his in-home program exactly the way LIFE had implemented it when he was in San Bernardino (Footnote 10). Petitioner’s contentions are unpersuasive.

First, contrary to Petitioner’s assertions and as was discussed above, the Petitioner was only entitled to a maximum of 15 hours per week of in-home services rather than the 28 hours of services under the San Bernardino IEP because no placement was agreed upon for STUDENT while he was in San Bernardino. Thus, the District offered Petitioner ten more hours of in-home therapy services per week than was required. Additionally, even if the San Diego District was required to offer STUDENT a classroom placement and make available to him up to 28 hours of in-home therapy services if he chose to accept the classroom placement, MOTHER refused the District’s offer of the SEEC placement. Therefore, STUDENT would still only be entitled to 15 hours of in-home therapy services pursuant to the contingency provision in the San Bernardino IEP (Footnote 11).

Second, although Petitioner prefers that LIFE continue to provide his in-home program, Section 56325(a) does not require San Diego to provide him with the exact same service provider or to replicate his program from his prior school district. The statute requires districts to provide an interim placement in conformity with an existing IEP, but the districts have only to implement the interim placement to the extent possible within existing resources. This provision has consistently been interpreted by the Hearing Office to mean that during the 30-day interim period, a district need not provide the identical placement or pay for the same service providers if the student transfers from a different SELPA. Therefore, the District was not required to contract with LIFE to provide Petitioner with his in-home therapy services.

Rather, the evidence establishes that CARES would have been able to provide Petitioner with services that were sufficiently “in conformity” with the services provided for in his San Bernardino IEP. The San Bernardino states that the in-home services are a “discrete trial program” for behavioral intervention therapy. According to Miriam Bakcht, the director of operations for the San Diego office of LIFE, STUDENT’s program entails individualized instruction utilizing discrete trial training and behavioral interventions based on the theories of applied behavioral analysis. Additionally, STUDENT’s program is implemented on a one-to-one basis by “instructors” and the “instructors” are overseen by a “case-supervisor.”

Cathy Sweeten, psychologist of CARES, testified that CARES would be able to implement the goals and objectives developed by LIFE. She testified that those goals and objectives are similar to those developed by CARES and to those she has seen from other in-home programs. Additionally, Ms. Sweeten testified that STUDENT’s in-home program would be implemented by “tutors” on an individualized basis and that his instruction would be conducted in a discrete trial training format. Furthermore, like the instructors from LIFE, the tutors implementing the home program are supervised by case supervisors who monitor the student’s progress within the program. Moreover, Ms. Sweeten testified that CARES would be able to provide at least the same level of supervision services provided for by LIFE. Ms. Sweeten also testified that the instruction provided in the home program is based on the principles of applied behavioral analysis.

Given the significant similarities between the two programs, the evidence establishes that the District’s offer of services from CARES was in conformity with the services provided for in the San Bernardino IEP. From the above, the Hearing Officer concludes that District offered an appropriate 30-day interim placement offer on February 12, 2002.

However, the Hearing Officer notes that the San Diego District’s interim placement offer was only appropriate until February 28, 2002, when it was required to convene an IEP meeting to develop a more permanent educational placement for Petitioner. In this case, Petitioner transfered into the San Diego District on January 29, 2002. Thus, the 30-day interim period ended for Petitioner on February 28, 2002, and the District was required to make its “final recommendations regarding Petitioner’s educational placement by that date. However, as is discussed below, the District did not convene an IEP meeting or make final offer of placement until one and a half months later, on April 15, 2002.

II. Did the District offer Petitioner a free and appropriate public education for the timeframe after the 30-day interim period through the end of the 2002-2003 school year and extended school year?

Petitioner asserts that the District failed to offer him a FAPE for the 2001-2002 school year and 2002 extended school year as well as the 2002-2003 school year and 2003 extended school year. Particularly, Petitioner asserts that the District failed to offer an appropriate placement following the 30-day interim period and that its April 15 offer of an educational program and placement was not an offer of FAPE.

2001-2002 school year and extended school year

Before the expiration of the 30-day period, the District was required to convene an IEP team meeting and offer a permanent offer of placement. California Education Code section 56325(b) states as follows:

Before the expiration of the 30-day period, the interim placement shall be reviewed by the individualized education program team and a final recommendation shall be made by the team in accordance with the requirements of this chapter. The team may utilize information, records, and reports from the school district or county program from which the pupil transferred.

As noted above, Petitioner transfered into the San Diego District on January 29, 2002, and the 30-day interim period ended for Petitioner on February 28, 2002. Although the District was required to make its “final recommendations regarding Petitioner’s educational placement by that date, it did not convene an IEP meeting or make final offer of placement until April 15, 2002. Because the District was required to make its final offer of placement by February 28, 2002, and it did not do so until April 15, 2002, the District denied Petitioner a FAPE during this time period.

Although the District argued that it was unable to convene the IEP meeting earlier than April 15, 2002, because of scheduling difficulties with Petitioner’s parents, such argument is unpersuasive. The first IEP meeting planned by the District was scheduled to occur on March 21, 2002 – approximately three weeks after the District was required to convene the meeting and make its offer of placement. Thus, the District would not have complied with the requirement to make its final offer of placement prior to the end of the 30-day interim period even if the PARENTS had attended the first IEP meeting scheduled by the District for this purpose.

Additionally, the District had an obligation to convene an IEP team meeting regardless of whether the PARENTS refused to attend. The law envisions that parents may, unfortunately, refuse to participate in the IEP process. In those circumstances, the law requires a local educational agency to forge ahead and develop an offer of FAPE based on available information, after making reasonable efforts to persuade the parent to participate. In that regard, California Education Code section 56341.5(a) first required the District to “take steps to ensure” that the PARENTS attended the IEP team meeting. In the event the District could not convince them to attend, it was required to convene the IEP team meeting without them to provide STUDENT with a permanent offer of FAPE (Footnote 12). (Cal. Educ. Code §56341.5(g).) Because the District failed to conduct an IEP team meeting prior to the expiration of the 30 days to develop a permanent offer of placement, the District has denied STUDENT a FAPE from March 1, 2002, until at least April 15, 2002, when the offer was finally made.

With regard to the District’s April 15, 2002 offer, that offer of placement also resulted in a denial of FAPE to Petitioner. Under the IDEA and the decision of the Supreme Court in Rowley, an appropriate educational program must be designed to meet the student’s unique needs, provide the student with some educational benefit, and conform with the IEP. (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District, et al. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). In determining whether the school district has offered a FAPE, the focus is on the adequacy of the district’s proposed program. Gregory K. v. Longview School District, 811 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1987). If the District has offered a FAPE, the district is not required to place the student in the program preferred by the parents, even if the preferred program is likely to result in greater educational benefit to the student than the district’s program. Id.

The District’s offered program and placement were not designed to meet Petitioner’s unique and individual needs. In fact, the evidence establishes that the District had very little information regarding Petitioner’s unique and individual needs. At the time the IEP meeting was convened, the only information that the District had regarding Petitioner was the incomplete educational file from the San Bernardino District (Footnote 13). (Test. of Debbie Ware.) The educational file from San Bernardino lacked many of the Petitioner’s assessment reports and recent IEPs. (Test. of Ms. Ware.) Additionally, the District had limited information regarding Petitioner’s progress in his LIFE program, and the IEP team lacked the participation of Petitioner’s parents, home therapy providers, or prior educators from San Bernardino. Id. According to the testimony of Debbie Ware, the District had insufficient information about Petitioner when it convened the IEP meeting to determine all of his areas of need.

According to Petitioner’s most recent San Bernardino IEP and the assessment reports from San Bernardino, Petitioner had deficits in the following areas: preacademics, communication, fine/gross motor skills, social/emotional skills, behavior, and adaptive skills. However, the District’s April 15 offer did not include any detailed or specific statement of Petitioner’s present levels of performance. In fact, the District’s IEP indicates only that STUDENT’s needs are in the area of “language, social, and fine motor” and that “we do not have current present levels of performance or baselines.” Despite the District’s awareness that STUDENT’s needs related to his autism were addressed in an extensive in-home discrete trial therapy program, the District’s offered IEP includes only three goals and objectives in to increase his ability to “sit at the lunch table,” “transition from one class routine to another,” and to write his name without the use of a model. These goals alone do not begin to address all of STUDENT’s educational needs. Absent from the IEP are any goals to address his language needs or preacademic skills. Therefore, the District’s lack of a clear understanding of STUDENT’s present levels of performance, resulted in the failure to develop appropriate goals and objectives for STUDENT to meet his unique and individual needs and, additionally, the its offer was not reasonably calculated to provide him with educational benefit.

In summary, the District failed to develop a final offer of educational placement prior to the end of the 30-day interim period on February 28, 2002. Additionally, the placement offer contained in the April 15 IEP was not an offer of FAPE because it was not designed to meet Petitioner’s unique and individual needs nor reasonably calculated to provide him with more than de minimus educational benefit. Thus, the District denied Petitioner a FAPE from February 28, 2002, through the end of the 2001-2002 school year.

With regard to the 2002 ESY, the IEP states only that Petitioner is offered a placement in a special day class, with no other specifics of the placement provided. As stated above, the duration of the services that were offered in the April IEP for the 2001-2002 school year (including placement in the SEEC class and speech and language services) would have expired on June 14, 2002. Thus, there is no indication that these services were included as part of the 2002 ESY offer. Given the lack of information regarding the District’s offer for the 2002 ESY, it has not been established that the District offered Petitioner a FAPE for that time period. Additionally, for the same reasons stated above regarding the appropriateness of the 2001-2002 school year offer, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District also failed to offer Petitioner a FAPE for the 2002 ESY.

2002-2003 school year and extended school year

Petitioner asserts that the District’s April 15 offer of placement covers the 2002-2003 school year and extended school year, and that it was not an appropriate offer of FAPE for that time period. While it was found above that the April 15 offer was not an offer of FAPE for the 2001-2002 school year and ESY, the evidence indicates that that April 15 IEP did not include an offer of educational services for the 2002-2003 school year and ESY. The IEP itself indicates that another IEP meeting needs to be convened by June 14, 2002, to determine services for the next school year beginning in the fall. Additionally, Ms. Ware testified that the April 15 IEP team did not make any offer of services for the 2002-2003 school year and ESY. Moreover, Petitioner provided no evidence that the April IEP was intended to last beyond the 2002 ESY. Furthermore, no evidence was offered that the District was required to make an offer of educational services for the 2002-2003 school year and ESY in the April 15 IEP or at any time prior to the end of the hearing. The District simply has not had the opportunity to complete its assessments or make an offer of placement for that time period. Thus, issues regarding the 2002-2003 school year and ESY are not yet ripe, and the Hearing Officer cannot find that the District has denied STUDENT a FAPE for the 2002-2003 school year and ESY.

III. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for the cost of his LIFE services?

When a school district denies a student a FAPE, the student is entitled to relief that is “appropriate” in light of the purposes of the IDEA, which may include reimbursement to the student for privately obtained educational services and tuition. School Comm. of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369, 105 S. Ct. 1996 (1985); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (1997).

Petitioner requests an order requiring the San Diego District to pay for his LIFE services from February 2002, when he started the services, through the date of this decision - essentially, Petitioner seeks an order requiring the District to reimburse LIFE in an amount equal to Petitioner’s financial obligation for his LIFE services (Footnote 14). It was found above that the District denied STUDENT a FAPE from January 29 through February 12, 2002, and from March 1 through the end of the 2001-2002 school year and extended school year. Additionally, the District did not dispute that Petitioner’s privately procured LIFE program is “appropriate” under the Burlington standard, and it did not contest Ms. Bakcht’s extensive testimony that STUDENT derived educational benefit from his LIFE program and that the LIFE program met his educational needs. Thus, Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement for the LIFE program for the time periods that he was denied a FAPE (Footnote 15). However, According to the testimony of Miriam Bakcht, STUDENT began his LIFE program sometime during the end of February 2002. Because STUDENT is not entitled to reimbursement from February 12 through February 28, 2002, (i.e., during the period when his LIFE services in San Diego began), Petitioner is effectively only entitled to reimbursement for his LIFE services from March 1 through the end of the 2001-2002 school year.

IV. Is the District required to assess Petitioner using the Bailey Scales of Infant Development - Revised, the Merrill-Palmer Scale of Mental Tests, and the Rynell Developmental Language Scale?

Petitioner requests that the Hearing Officer order the District to assess him using the Bailey Scales of Infant Development – Revised, the Merrill-Palmer Scale of Mental Tests, and the Rynell Developmental Language Scale. According to the District, the assessment plan already consented to by the parents includes assessment tools that would assess Petitioner in the same areas covered by Petitioner’s requested assessments. The District essentially argues that it is within the District’s discretion to chose whichever assessment tools to use. The District argues, therefore, that it is not required to use the assessments Petitioner requested.

California Education Code ' 56320(e) requires that a student be assessed in all areas of suspected disability. The parties do not dispute that Petitioner needs to be assessed in the areas of intellectual development, learning processes, social/emotional/adaptive behavior, communication development, and health development. According to the testimony of Miriam Bakcht, the Bailey Scales of Infant Development- Revised, the Merrill-Palmer Scale of Mental Tests, and the Rynell Developmental Language Scale are assessments targeted to assess a child’s adaptive, cognitive, and language functioning. Those areas of need covered by the assessment plan proposed by the District. While the law requires that a student be assessed in all areas of suspected disability, nothing in the law requires a district to assess a student using the specific assessment tools requested by the parents of the students. There also is no evidence that the tools requested by Petitioner are necessary in addition to the assessments Petitioner has already consented to in the District’s assessment plan. In fact, the Petitioner’s own witness, Ms. Bakcht, testified that although LIFE utilizes those specific assessment tools, other assessment tools exist that could appropriately be used to assess Petitioner in the same areas (Footnote 16). Because the District has already proposed assessments to assess Petitioner in the areas covered by Petitioner’s requested assessments, and because the District has discretion to chose its own assessment tools, it is not required to utilize the assessments proposed by Petitioner.

ORDER

1. Within 30 days of receipt of appropriate proof from MOTHER of her obligation to pay for the cost of STUDENT’s LIFE services for the period from March 1, 2002, through the end of the 2002 extended school year, the District shall pay LIFE the amount owed by Petitioner.

2. All of Petitioner’s other requests for relief are denied.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute:

I. Did the San Diego Unified School District offer Petitioner an appropriate 30-day interim placement upon his interdistrict tranfer into the District?

-Petitioner and the District prevailed almost equally. The Petitioner prevailed in that it was determined that he was denied a FAPE from January 29, 2002, through February 11, 2002. The District prevailed with regard to the time period from February 12, 2002, through February 28, 2002.

II. Did the District offer Petitioner a free and appropriate public education for the timeframe after the 30-day interim period through the end of the 2002-2003 school year and extended school year?

-The Petitioner prevailed on this issue to the extent that it was determined that he was denied a FAPE from March 1, 2002, through the end of the 2001-2002 school year and extended school year. The District prevailed with regard to the 2002-2003 school year and extended school year.

III. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for the cost of his LIFE services?

-The Petitioner substantially prevailed in that reimbursement was ordered for any services obtained from March 1, 2002, through the end of the 2002 extended school year.

IV. Is the District required to assess Petitioner using the Bailey Scales of Infant Development - Revised, the Merrill-Palmer Scale of Mental Tests, and the Rynell Developmental Language Scale?

-The District prevailed on this issue.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this Decision. Education Code § 56505(i).

DATED: July 29, 2002 ____________________________________ Van T. Vu, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

1. first page of the Interim Placement Data Entry Form indicated that STUDENT was offered placement in the SEEC Extended Assessment program for “3.5 hours, 4 days per week.” However, the notes attached to the form indicate that a total of 6.5 hours of services in the SEEC program was offered, with half of his day in the Extended Assessment program. Because the District’s offer was explained more thoroughly in the notes of the document than on the first page, the Hearing Officer will rely on the placement offer described in the notes of the document when determining whether the interim offer was in conformity with the San Bernardino IEP.

2. as was found below, the San Diego District was under the false impression that the 30-day period could be restarted at some time after the date of a student’s transfer into the district.

3. MOTHER testified at hearing that no other IEP has ever been consented to during the two and a half years that STUDENT has attended the San Bernardino City School District. For a significant portion of that time, the PARENTS and the San Bernardino District were involved in pending due process matters involving STUDENT’s education. According to MOTHER, the January 25, 2002 IEP was developed to confirm and implement a settlement agreement reached with the San Bernardino District on November 28, 2001. (Pet. Exh. 37.)

4. In his closing brief, Petitioner argued extensively that the District violated his procedural due process rights by failing to convene an IEP meeting on January 31, 2002, with all necessary IEP team members when it made its initial offer of a 30-day interim placement. (See Cal. Educ. Code § 56341.) The Hearing Officer notes that, in this case, it is not necessary for the District to hold an IEP meeting in order to develop and make its interim placement offer. The statute envisions that the “administrator of the local program” immediately identify and offer an appropriate 30-day placement. Although decisions regarding a student’s special education placement and program must typically be made by an IEP team pursuant to California Education Code Section 56341, the interdistrict transfer provision allows for the receiving district to adopt the IEP from the previous district without the need for an IEP meeting. The receiving district is only required to conduct an IEP meeting in compliance with California Education Code Section 56341 if it choses to develop a new IEP for the Student. 5. The testimony of District witnesses indicates that the District was “confused” about what services were provided for in the January 2002 San Bernardino IEP. (See e.g., Test. of Ms. Ware.) It appears from the record that the District endeavored to provide Petitioner an interim placement in conformity with all of the services provided for on the first page of the San Bernardino IEP. However, at hearing, the District asserted that it was not required to provide all of those services under the law. For purposes of determining whether the District offered Petitioner an appropriate 30-day interim placement, the Hearing Officer looks to what the San Bernardino IEP in fact provided for rather than the San Diego District’s understanding of the contents of the San Bernardino IEP.

6. In light of MOTHER’s testimony described in footnote # 3 above that the January 25 IEP meeting was intended to confirm and implement the November 28, 2001 settlement agreement, the Hearing Officer also looked to the settlement agreement to determine if a regular education preschool placement had been agreed upon for STUDENT. According to paragraph (I) of the Settlement Agreement, the parties agreed to attend an IEP meeting in December 2001 to “formally identify a District placement for STUDENT and to develop a school attendance schedule for STUDENT.” (Pet. Exh. 37.) The IEP meeting referenced in the Settlement Agreement convened on December 20, 2001. According to that IEP, the District members of the team recommended STUDENT’s placement in a “regular kindergarten program at Palm.” (Pet. Exh. 16, emphasis added.) However, the PARENTS never provided consent to implement that IEP. (Test. of MOTHER.) From the above, it appears that the PARENTS and the San Bernardino District continued to disagree as to STUDENT’s educational placement up through the date of the January 25, 2002 IEP.

7. There was a similar contingency provision related to San Bernardino’s obligation to provide Petitioner with in-home therapy services in the November 2001 Settlement Agreement. Although MOTHER testified that she was “surprised” by the wording of the contingency provision in the January IEP, she did not dispute that she signed the IEP, thereby consenting to its implementation under the terms outlined in the IEP.

8. In any event, as is discussed below, the San Diego District offered STUDENT an interim placement on February 12, 2002, that included a classroom placement in its SEEC SDC class. Because MOTHER refused the classroom placement contained in that offer, STUDENT would still have only been entitled to 15 hours of in-home services even if the San Diego District were required to make an offer of placement and was bound by the contingency provision of the San Bernardino IEP.

9. This statement also supports the finding above that no placement was agreed upon by the San Bernardino IEP team. Leaving the development of the speech goals and objectives to the San Diego IEP team presumes that Petitioner would not be receiving speech and language services in San Bernardino, which he would have been entitled to had he attended a San Bernardino placement.

10. Petitioner also argued that the District failed to provide him with the same level of supervision services for his in-home therapy program. The Hearing Officer notes that the San Bernardino IEP provided for 12 hours per month of direct and indirect supervision services. In comparison, the District offered Petitioner supervision services in the amount of 9 hours per week for 2 weeks and 6 hours per week for 3 weeks, totaling approximately thirty-six hours per month of supervision services. Thus, the District actually offered Petitioner three times the amount of supervision services and not fewer services.

11. Although the District offered Petitioner 25 hours per week of in-home therapy services rather than 28 hours, it offered STUDENT three times the supervision hours he was entitled to under the San Bernardino IEP. Considering the entire offer of in-home services, the Hearing Officer concludes that the San Diego District’s offer of in-home services was comparable to those services offered in the San Bernardino IEP. Additionally, no evidence was provided as to the significance of the difference in therapy hours offered by the two districts.

12. California Education Code Section 56341.5(g) states, “a meeting may be conducted without a parent in attendance if the district . . . is unable to convince the parent that he or she should attend.”

13. Ms. Ware testified that she called the San Bernardino District to inquire about STUDENT’s educational records, but she did not receive a response from San Bernardino. Additionally, the District discussed with MOTHER as early as January 2002 its intent to assess STUDENT; however, the District did not provide MOTHER with the written assessment plan until March 18, 2002. Moreover, although the District intended to develop the assessment plan upon STUDENT’s enrollment in its program, the fact that STUDENT never enrolled in its program should not have resulted in a delay in developing the assessment plan or obtaining information to timely develop an educational program for him. As discussed above, the District was required to make an offer of placement prior to the end of the 30-day interim period.

14. Because MOTHER has not paid LIFE for most of the costs of its services for STUDENT, she requests an order requiring the District to pay LIFE directly to satisfy her financial obligation to LIFE. This is an appropriate request for relief stemming from the District’s failure to offer STUDENT a FAPE for the time periods discussed above. When a parent incurs an obligation to pay a third party for educational services because of a district’s failure to provide a FAPE, a request to pay the third party to satisfy the parent’s obligation is comparable to a request for retroactive reimbursement. Both achieve the same goal.

15. Pursuant to the IDEA, there are circumstances in which a hearing officer may reduce or deny reimbursement to a parent. The regulations accompanying the act at 34 C.F.R. § 300.403(d) states that the “cost of reimbursement… may be reduced or denied… if at least ten (10) business days… prior to the removal of the child from the public school, the parents did not give written notice to the public agency…” that they were rejecting the placement proposed by the public agency to provide FAPE to their child, including stating their concerns and their intent to enroll their child in a private school at public expense. Although there is no indication that MOTHER ever provided the District with such written notice, Ms. Ware testified that she learned from Ms. Sweeten on or about February 20, 2002, that MOTHER had rejected the District’s offer of services from CARES. Additionally, at the meeting on February 12 when the revised interim offer was made, MOTHER requested LIFE services from the District and was refused those services. Given these facts, and that the District did not contend that the Petitioner’s reimbursement should be reduced or denied on these grounds, the Hearing Officer declines to reduce or deny the order of reimbursement made below.

16. The assessments requested by Petitioner were originally requested of Petitioner by LIFE. According to Ms. Bakcht, the assessments are used by LIFE to compare with prior administrations of the same assessments to determine a child’s progress in the LIFE program. Thus, when STUDENT started his in-home program with LIFE in San Diego, the San Diego office of LIFE requested (and required) that MOTHER obtain those assessments prior to starting his services. Ms. Bakcht also testified that the assessments were only to determine progress and were not necessary for the development of his discrete trial program.