California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · June 24, 1998

Pleasant Valley School District v. Student

SEHO Case No. SN 807-97 · Hearing Officer JoAnn Irwin-Eshelman

Pleasant Valley School District could bring its case without parental consent, but the Hearing Officer found it had no valid written placement offer.

Split decision: student prevailed on 1 of 2 issues

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Summary

Pleasant Valley School District filed for due process for an eight-year-old boy with autism. His parents had never consented to special education. He had been out of school since October 1996, when he left a regular first grade class after a month. In December 1996, without the parents present, the district's IEP team found him eligible under autism and offered a special day class at Las Posas Elementary. The parents never signed the IEP. They argued the Hearing Office had no jurisdiction because they had never consented to special education.

Hearing Officer JoAnn Irwin-Eshelman rejected that argument. Education Code section 56346(b) required the district to file for a hearing once the parents withheld consent to a program it found necessary for a free appropriate public education (FAPE). Section 56501 gave the Hearing Office authority to decide the dispute.

However, the district lost on placement. It had effectively abandoned the December 1996 offer and now proposed a one-hour daily individualized program. A February 1998 oral interim agreement for diagnostic sessions was never put in writing. Testimony about future plans was not a formal written offer under Union School District v. Smith. So there was no appropriate offer for 1997-98, including extended school year (ESY).

The Hearing Officer ordered an IEP meeting within 15 days to set goals and a 1998-99 placement, with further assessment if needed. The parents' requests for attorney's fees and a mainstream program were denied.

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Why it matters

This decision shows that SEHO treated a district's due process filing under Education Code section 56346(b) as the way to resolve a parent's refusal to consent to initial placement. It also shows that a district seeking approval of its program still needed a current, formal written offer under Union v. Smith.

Issues and holdings

  1. District prevailedThreshold and jurisdiction

    Issue 1. Does the Hearing Office have jurisdiction to decide this case where the child's parents have never consented to initial placement in a special education program?

    Under Education Code sections 56501(a)(1)-(2) and 56346(b), the Hearing Office has jurisdiction to decide a district-filed case, even though the parents never consented to initial special education placement. The district was required to file once consent was withheld.

  2. Issue 2. Has the District offered Respondent an appropriate placement for the remainder of the 1997-98 school year, including the extended school year?

    The district had effectively abandoned its December 1996 special day class offer. The oral interim agreement and its testimony about a later placement were not formal written offers under Union v. Smith, so there was no appropriate placement offer for 1997-98, including ESY.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • Order to convene IEP meeting. Within 15 days of the decision, the District must convene an IEP team meeting with the members required by Education Code section 56341. The team must determine present levels of performance, goals and objectives, and an appropriate placement for the 1998-99 school year. If the team lacks enough current information, it must consider further assessment under Education Code section 56320 et seq.
  • Order declares the student eligible for special education. The District is entitled and obligated to find an appropriate special education placement for him.

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Key authorities

Union School Dist. v. Smith (9th Cir. 1994) 15 F.3d 1519; San Diego City Schools v. Student, SEHO SN 540-91 (12/23/91); Education Code section 56346(b); Education Code section 56501; Education Code section 56507(b)

People named in the decision

  • G. Robert Roice, educational consultant representing the District, Pleasant Valley School District
  • Cathrine Cartwright, director of special services, Pleasant Valley School District
  • Theresa McConville, attorney for Student
  • Joan Cherno, speech and language specialist, El Rancho Structured School
  • Kate Bartok, regular education kindergarten teacher, El Rancho Structured School
  • Dr. Dreamer, student's physician (diagnosed autism)
  • Shannon Coletti, regular education first grade teacher, El Rancho Structured School
  • Judy Harding, principal, El Rancho Structured School
  • Julie Porto, school psychologist, Pleasant Valley School District
  • Mr. Kimball, special day class teacher, El Rancho Structured School
  • Peggy Whelan, first/second grade special day class teacher (proposed placement), Las Posas Elementary School
  • Denise Borel, special day class teacher (interim 1:1 diagnostic sessions), Pleasant Valley School District
  • Dr. Candra Shiney-Norris, senior psychologist, Pleasant Valley School District

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before JoAnn Irwin-Eshelman, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office, McGeorge School of Law, in Camarillo, California, on March 19 and 20, 1998. Petitioner Pleasant Valley School District (District) was represented by G. Robert Roice, educational consultant. Cathrine Cartwright, director of special services, was also present on behalf of the District. Respondent STUDENT was represented by attorney Theresa McConville. PARENTS, STUDENT's parents, were also present on his behalf. STUDENT accompanied his parents to the hearing, but was out of the hearing room for significant periods of time both days. Oral and documentary evidence was received.(Footnote 1) The record was held open for the submission of written closing arguments, after which the case was closed and the matter submitted for decision. ISSUES 1. Does the Hearing Office have jurisdiction to decide this case where the child's parents have never consented to initial placement in a special education program? 2. Has the District offered Respondent an appropriate placement for the remainder of the 1997-98 school year, including the extended school year? BACKGROUND FACTS STUDENT is an eight-year-old boy with significant developmental delays in speech and language, social skills, and daily living skills. He is also delayed in academics and visual-motor skills, but his delays in these areas are not as severe as in the previously noted areas. When he was six years old, STUDENT was diagnosed as autistic by his physician. STUDENT has never received special education services pursuant to an individualized education program (IEP), and is not currently attending school. STUDENT first came to the attention of the District in September 1995, when he was five years old, and entered regular education kindergarten at Los Primeros School. At that time, STUDENT had virtually no oral language and was not toilet-trained. Early in the school year, STUDENT's parents agreed to a speech and language assessment and, soon thereafter, transferred him to kindergarten at his neighborhood school, El Rancho Structured School. A speech and language assessment was completed on October 3, 1995, by Joan Cherno, the speech and language specialist at El Rancho. Ms. Cherno did not administer any formal, standardized tests to STUDENT because he was functioning "more at the concrete stage than the iconic (picture stage)." (Dist. Exh. 4.) From her observations and informal evaluation, Ms. Cherno concluded that STUDENT was significantly delayed in speech and language and that the reasons for his delay were not clear without further information. Ms. Cherno referred STUDENT's case to the student study team (SST). On October 19, 1995, the SST met to review the results of the speech and language assessment and to further evaluate STUDENT's needs. STUDENT's parents did not attend this meeting. The SST recommended a full assessment of STUDENT in areas other than speech and language, namely academic/preacademic achievement, social/adaptive behavior, psycho-motor development, intellectual development, and health/developmental history. The SST prepared an assessment plan, and also developed a proposed IEP for STUDENT offering speech and language services. Because STUDENT's parents did not attend the SST meeting and did not re-schedule, Ms. Cherno sent a follow-up letter on October 26, 1995 advising them that the District would not proceed further until a mutually agreed upon meeting occurred. The assessment plan was also mailed to PARENTS at this time. In late January 1996, PARENT returned the assessment plan to the District noting that "No intervention desired at this time." (Dist. Exh. 7.) The District did not perform any further educational assessment of STUDENT during the 1995-96 school year. The regular education kindergarten which STUDENT attended at El Rancho during the 1995-96 school year was a small class in which the teacher, Kate Bartok, used a developmental approach. Ms. Bartok made a number of modifications throughout the year to assist STUDENT in class. She was concerned that STUDENT was not functioning at his age level, even though he made some progress during the year. In May 1996, STUDENT was diagnosed by his physician, Dr. Dreamer, as having "autism, in association with mild developmental delays and limited penetrance." (Dist. Exh. 10.) At the end of that school year, Ms. Bartok and other staff at El Rancho recommended that PARENTS observe a special day class at the school. The staff believed STUDENT would not be successful in a more structured, regular education first grade classroom. They were also concerned because STUDENT was not yet toilet-trained. In September 1996, STUDENT's parents enrolled him in a regular education first grade class at El Rancho. Initially, STUDENT attended the regular six-hour day, but his schedule was soon modified to a shorter, four-hour day. The modification proved necessary due to STUDENT's toileting problems and other difficulties he was having in class. However, even with the shortened day, STUDENT continued to have difficulties in class. STUDENT's teacher, Shannon Coletti, noted that he would get frustrated and then "wander the room." STUDENT also exhibited certain behaviors repeatedly, such as hand-washing, going into a closet to sit, emptying pencil sharpenings, and emptying the contents of trash cans into each other. Ms. Coletti tried to accommodate STUDENT's needs, but found it difficult to keep him on task. In October 1996, one month after entering Ms. Coletti's first grade class, STUDENT broke a dowel pointer during a time when he and his classmates were walking around the classroom or "reading the room." Soon thereafter, STUDENT was withdrawn from school by his parents. STUDENT did not produce any first grade work during his one month of attendance in Ms. Coletti's class. STUDENT's parents contacted Judy Harding, the principal at El Rancho, to request that he be returned to kindergarten. Ms. Harding refused this request because she believed that it is generally not helpful to retain a child. Further, if STUDENT was returned to kindergarten, he would have been older than the other children. The class would also have been different, as the developmental approach, previously used by Ms. Bartok, was being modified. (Testimony of Ms. Harding.) On October 7, 11, 14 and 17, 1996, STUDENT was assessed by the District psychologist, speech and language specialist, and resource specialist. Several standardized assessment tools were used, including the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-III, the Developmental Test of Visual-Motor Integration, the Draw-A-Person test, the Woodcock Johnson Achievement Test-Revised, the Peabody Individual Achievement Test-Revised, the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-Revised, the Test of Language Development-Prim.2, and the Expressive One-Word Picture Vocabulary test. In the psychoeducational report which followed, psychologist Julie Porto stated that STUDENT was functioning cognitively within the low average range of ability nonverbally, and within the intellectually deficient range in verbal skills. She noted that "STUDENT is having significant difficulty in all areas assessed," and concluded that he was qualified for special education services under the handicapping condition of speech impaired. (Dist. Exh. 10.) On November 21, 1996, the District held a "results conference" with PARENTS to review the assessments, and to discuss the parents' wishes regarding STUDENT's placement.(Footnote 2) At the meeting, PARENTS expressed their desire that STUDENT have a female teacher, a program similar to the one in kindergarten, and no behavior modification. They also presented a letter to the District from STUDENT's physician stating that STUDENT is autistic. Cathrine Cartwright, director of special services, suggested that the parents consider two county-operated programs as possible placement alternatives and offered to arrange for visits to these programs. On December 10, 1996, the District convened an initial IEP meeting to determine STUDENT's eligibility for special education, appropriate placement, and goals and objectives. PARENTS did not attend this meeting. (Dist. Exh. 16.) District members of the IEP team found STUDENT eligible due to the handicapping condition of autism and recommended that he be placed in a "non-severely handicapped" special day class.(Footnote 3) The team noted that PARENTS had already rejected out-of-District placement in county-operated programs, as well as placement in Mr. Kimball's special day class at El Rancho. Soon after the December 10 IEP team meeting, PARENT and STUDENT made an unscheduled visit to the special day class at Las Posas School which was STUDENT's proposed placement. No children were present in class on that day. The visit was not completed because PARENT had not followed District procedures for such visits. On January 7, 1997, the District sent PARENTS a letter, together with the December 10 IEP, requesting their signature on the IEP document. On January 17, 1997, a second letter was sent to PARENTS including a copy of the December 10 IEP goals and objectives, and again requesting their signature. On February 10, 1997, PARENTS responded to the District's letters, stating their position that "the District is asking us to accept a placement for our son and agree to an I.E.P. without providing us with an opportunity to visit the placement resulting from that I.E.P." (Dist. Exh. 16.) PARENTS did not return the December 10 IEP. On February 14, 1997, the District responded to PARENTS' letter and outlined procedures for visiting the special day class. PARENTS did not visit the class during the remaining months of the 1996-97 school year. Ms. Cartwright made three follow-up telephone calls to PARENTS to re-establish contact before the end of the school year in June 1997. However, no further direct communication occurred between PARENTS and the District, and STUDENT was not re-enrolled in school that year.(Footnote 4) At the end of the 1996-97 school year, PARENTS met with Ms. Harding at El Rancho. They expressed frustration with the special education process and requested that STUDENT be placed in kindergarten in the fall. Ms. Harding declined their request. On June 18, 1997, the Hearing Office received the District's request for due process hearing. After the District filed for due process, during informal mediation, PARENTS' attorney proposed assignment of a home teacher for STUDENT as an "interim solution." (Testimony of Ms. Cartwright.) However, the District believed that home teaching would not be appropriate for STUDENT. The District also had concerns about assigning a home teacher after learning of a sign on a gate at the PARENT's home which states, "No trespassers, no solicitors, no school officials." At the beginning of the current school year, PARENTS contacted Ms. Harding again and requested that STUDENT be placed in regular kindergarten. Their request was reviewed by the District superintendent and declined due to the pending due process hearing. STUDENT was not re-enrolled in school at that time. On February 12-13, 1998, the case was scheduled to go to due process hearing. Before the hearing began on February 12, PARENTS and the District reached an oral "interim agreement" for STUDENT to attend school for a limited number of 1:1 sessions with a special education teacher and no other children present in the classroom. These sessions were to last for one hour per day, five days per week for four weeks. The primary purpose of the sessions was to allow for further evaluation of STUDENT by the District. Denise Borel, a special day class teacher for the District, began the sessions in late February 1998. After the third day, PARENT became upset with a homework assignment given by Ms. Borel, and STUDENT did not return the next day. The schedule was re-arranged and STUDENT attended one additional day the following week before his parents suspended the sessions indefinitely for unknown reasons. Shortly thereafter, a police officer visited Ms. Borel's classroom stating that PARENTS had reported "stressed" behavior in STUDENT and requested police assistance.(Footnote 5) On March 13, 1998, a few days before the due process hearing commenced, the senior psychologist for the District, Dr. Candra Shiney-Norris, met with PARENTS to complete an assessment of STUDENT as the parties had agreed in February. Dr. Shiney-Norris observed STUDENT, and completed her assessments and interview of his parents. No written results or report were prepared by the first day of hearing. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES The District contends that STUDENT requires a special education placement and that his needs cannot be met in regular education despite PARENTS continuing request for such a placement. The District points out that there is no disagreement between the parties concerning STUDENT's diagnosis as autistic, or his eligibility for special education services. Due to STUDENT's absence from school for more than one year, the District states that he now needs "an individualized program of one-on-one teaching in a school setting" and "the opportunity to interact with typically developing peers on a gradual basis." Finally, the District argues that the Hearing Officer has the authority to order a special education placement which is binding on both parties pursuant to Education Code Section 56346. Respondent contends that the District is attempting to make all educational decisions without parental involvement, and is trying to "force" STUDENT into a special education placement. Respondent also contends that the Hearing Office does not have jurisdiction and that PARENTS have never "submitted to the jurisdiction of the special education program." Respondent requests reimbursement of attorney fees and placement in "an educational program designed to mainstream him with his peers." FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Issue No. 1: Does the Hearing Office have jurisdiction to decide this case where the child's parents have never consented to initial placement in a special education program? On the first day of hearing, Respondent challenged the Hearing Office's jurisdiction over this matter, contending that STUDENT's parents have never consented to special education eligibility or services for their son. Respondent continues to object to Hearing Office jurisdiction based upon Education Code Sections 56346(a) and 56506(f). Each of these code sections requires that the parents give written consent before their child is placed in a special education program. In addition, Section 56346(a) requires that the parent be informed, in writing, of the need for special education services, and of the contents of the IEP. The District contends that the Hearing Office has authority to hear the case and order a special education placement pursuant to Education Code Sections 56501 and 56346(a) and (b), and San Diego City Schools v. Student, Special Education Hearing Office decision SN 540-91, 12/23/91. The District argues that if both parties have the right to file for hearing pursuant to Section 56501, and receive a binding decision on the issue of placement, then the Hearing Officer also has authority to order a special education placement which is binding on both parties. The District further states that Section 56346(b) mandates that a district file for due process hearing where the parent has refused to consent to the proposed special education program and the district believes that the program is necessary for the child to receive FAPE. Education Code Section 56501 provides authority for the Hearing Office to hear and decide special education disputes between parents and districts. Sections 56501(a)(1) and (2) provide that either the parent or the public education agency involved may initiate due process hearing procedures where there is a proposal or refusal to initiate or change the identification, assessment, or educational placement of the child or the provision of a free, appropriate public education. Here, the District's proposal to place STUDENT in a special education program clearly falls within Education Code Section 56501(a)(1) as a proposal to initiate the educational placement of this child. Respondent's argument relying on Education Code Sections 56346(a) and 56506(f) appears to confuse the issues of written consent for special education program placement with due process hearing jurisdiction. Under each of these sections, the parents are certainly entitled to refuse to consent to a special education program placement. However, the story does not end there. Once consent is refused or withheld, the District must invoke Hearing Office jurisdiction under Education Code Section 56346(b) to resolve the impasse. Respondent also contends that the Hearing Office decision cited by the District, San Diego City Schools v. Student, Special Education Hearing Office decision SN 540-91, 12/23/91, can be distinguished factually from this case. Respondent argues that the parent in San Diego City Schools had already signed an IEP and consented to special education services, whereas PARENTS have not. Respondent is only partly correct. In San Diego City Schools, the mother initially signed the IEP, but later withdrew her consent to her child's placement in a special day class. In that case, respondent's attorney argued that a hearing officer does not have authority under California law to order placement of a child in a special education program unless the parent consents. The hearing officer concluded that, "Section 56346 and the general jurisdictional provisions of Section 56501 provide the jurisdiction for the hearing officer to address the issue of appropriate placement and provide authority for the hearing officer to override the parent's refusal to consent to an appropriate placement." (San Diego City Schools , supra, at pg. 11.) Under Education Code Section 56346, the District had the responsibility to initiate due process hearing procedures when PARENTS did not consent to the proposed placement and the District concluded that the program was needed to provide STUDENT a FAPE. Subsection (b) of Section 56346 states "(b) If the district, special education local plan area, or county office determines that the part of the proposed special education program to which the parent does not consent is necessary to provide a free and appropriate public education to the pupil, a due process hearing shall be initiated pursuant to Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 56500), unless a prehearing mediation conference is held. ... If a due process hearing is held, the hearing decision shall be the final administrative determination and shall be binding upon the parties. ..." (Emphasis added.) This language is unequivocal, and clearly required the District to file for due process because PARENTS had not consented to any portion of the special education program proposed for STUDENT. The District had determined through the IEP process that special education placement was necessary for STUDENT to receive a FAPE. If the District had not invoked the jurisdiction of the Hearing Office, the situation between the District and PARENTS would remain unresolved, and STUDENT would be denied his right to a free and appropriate public education under federal and state law. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that, under Education Code Section 56346(b), the District was required to invoke Hearing Office jurisdiction to resolve this matter. Based on all of the above, the Hearing Officer concludes that, under the combined authority of Education Code Sections 56501(a)(1) and (2) and 56346(b), the Hearing Office has jurisdiction to hear and decide this case even though STUDENT's parents have never consented to his initial placement in a special education program. The prior Hearing Office decision in San Diego City Schools v. Student, Special Education Hearing Office decision SN 540-91, 12/23/91, is not binding precedent, but is persuasive authority which provides further support for this conclusion. STUDENT is eligible for special education and the District is entitled to pursue a special education placement for him. Issue No. 2: Has the District offered Respondent an appropriate placement for the remainder of the 1997-98 school year, including the extended school year? Under Union School District v. B. Smith (9th Cir. 1994) 15 F.3d 1519, 20 IDELR 987, the District must make a "formal written offer" of placement to the parents. The Ninth Circuit explained that "this formal requirement has an important purpose that is not merely technical, and we therefore believe it should be enforced rigorously." The Court stated that a formal written offer of placement was necessary to create "a clear record...about when placements were offered, what placements were offered, and what additional educational assistance was offered to supplement a placement, if any." The Court also reasoned that "a formal, specific offer from a school district" would be helpful to the parents in determining what placement the district proposed, and whether to oppose or accept it. (Union School District, supra, at 1526, 990.) Here, the District has not convened an IEP team meeting since December 10, 1996, and no written offers of placement have been made since that time. (Testimony of Ms. Cartwright.) In the December 10, 1996 IEP, the District made a written offer to place STUDENT in a "non-severely handicapped special day class." (Dist. Exh. 13, see also footnote 3, supra.) However, the District presented minimal evidence of this proposed placement, and the testimony indicated that the District considers the placement no longer appropriate. (Testimony of Ms. Cartwright.) In closing argument, the District acknowledged this position, stating: "At this point, after being out of school for so long [over a year], he [STUDENT] has regressed to the point that the only placement that can presently meet his needs is a completely individualized program with a teacher and aide to work with him one hour per day at school." (Dist. Closing Argument, pg. 1.) Thus, the Hearing Officer finds that the District has effectively withdrawn or abandoned its previous offer to place STUDENT in the Las Posas special day class. Even if the District had not abandoned that offer, there is insufficient evidence to determine whether that special day class would be an appropriate placement for STUDENT for the remainder of the 1997-98 school year, including the extended school year. At a previously scheduled due process hearing on February 12, 1998, the parties entered into an oral "interim agreement" after informal mediation. The agreement provided for a four-week diagnostic interval to determine STUDENT's level of performance after his extended absence from school. (Testimony of Ms. Borel, Ms. Cartwright.) It is not clear that this was an offer of placement by the District which was accepted by the parents. However, even if the interim agreement had been a placement offer, it does not comport with the requirements of Union, as it was never reduced to writing. (Testimony of Ms. Cartwright.) The District also presented testimony regarding its proposed placement for STUDENT after the four-week diagnostic interval was completed. This testimony has little meaning or effect as it reflects neither the results of the four-week diagnostic interval, nor any specific recommendations of the IEP team. Moreover, such testimony does not satisfy the requirement under Union that placement offers be formal, specific and in writing. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the District has not made a legally sufficient placement offer to Petitioner for the 1997-98 school year, including the extended school year. Because this preliminary requirement has not been met, there is no placement offer on the table to be considered. Therefore, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District has not offered STUDENT an appropriate placement for the remainder of the 1997-98 school year, including the extended school year. Respondent has requested payment of attorney's fees and that "the school district be ordered to provide STUDENT with the education he deserves: An educational program designed to mainstream him with his peers." (Resp. Summation and Argument, pg. 7.) Under Education Code Section 56507(b), "an award of reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing parent...may only be made either with the agreement of the parties following the conclusion of the administrative hearing process or by a court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph (4) of subsection (e) of Section 1415 of Title 20 of the United States Code." No evidence was presented that the parties had reached an agreement as to attorney's fees. Therefore, the Hearing Officer has no authority to make such an award. Respondent's request for placement in an educational program designed to mainstream him with his peers is inconsistent with his contention that he has never consented to special education placement. With this request, Respondent seems to be seeking the very kind of placement in special education which he has so vigorously resisted. In any case, Respondent has presented no evidence to indicate the specific type of placement he seeks or why such a placement would meet his needs and provide him with a FAPE. Thus, the Hearing Officer has no basis upon which to order such a placement. Finally, the Hearing Officer is very concerned that STUDENT has been out of school during a very critical time in his young life, particularly considering his diagnosis of autism with mild developmental delays. The Hearing Officer understands that there has been much unpleasantness between the parties, but still urges all involved to move past the problems to provide STUDENT with the education he so desperately needs to become a functioning member of society. Although the Hearing Officer has found that the District has failed to provide STUDENT with a FAPE during the 1997-98 school year, the District has the ongoing obligation to serve STUDENT. (See Education Code Section 56302.) Therefore, the District must take all necessary steps to meet this obligation, including the scheduling of future IEP team meetings and possible further assessment of STUDENT. ORDER 1. STUDENT is eligible for special education and the District is entitled and obligated to find an appropriate special education placement for him. 2. Within 15 days of the date of this decision, the District shall convene an IEP team meeting composed of those parties named in Education Code Section 56341. The IEP team shall determine present levels of performance, appropriate goals and objectives, and an appropriate placement for STUDENT for the 1998-99 school year. If the team lacks sufficient current information about STUDENT to propose an appropriate placement, then the team shall consider whether to further assess STUDENT under Education Code Section 56320, et seq. 3. Respondent's requests for payment of attorney's fees and "an educational program designed to mainstream him with his peers" are both denied. PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE Pursuant to Education Code Section 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute: 1. Does the Hearing Office have jurisdiction to decide this case where the child's parents have never consented to initial placement in a special education program? The District prevailed on this issue. 2. Has the District offered Respondent an appropriate placement for the remainder of the 1997-98 school year, including the extended school year? Respondent prevailed on this issue. RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. (Cal. Ed. Code Sec. 56505(i).) DATED: June 24, 1998 __________________________________________ JoAnn Irwin-Eshelman, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

1) Respondent submitted no documentary evidence. 2) Ms. Cartwright testified that this conference was not an IEP meeting. No written documentation of the meeting was submitted into evidence by either party. 3) The written IEP does not identify the specific special day class proposed for STUDENT. However, the parties agreed during the hearing that the first and second grade special day class taught by Peggy Whelan at Las Posas Elementary School was the class proposed by the IEP team for STUDENT. 4) During that spring, Ms. Cartwright contacted Children's Protective Services (CPS) for further investigation, and the School Attendance Review Board (SARB). PARENTS filed a complaint against the District with the federal Department of Education Office of Civil Rights. 5) During his visit, the police officer asked about closets in the classroom, a compact disc (CD) player, and where CDS were kept. He commented, "You don't even have a closet." Neither the District not Ms. Borel heard anything further after the police officer's visit.