California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · December 11, 1996

Student v. Anaheim City School District (consolidated)

SEHO Case No. SN 987-96, SN 936-96 · Hearing Officer Leonard Garfinkel

Anaheim City School District must fund Prentice Day School after failing a fourth-grade nonreader; District may give the Brigance test.

Split decision: student prevailed on 2 of 5 issues

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Noted in the decision

Before the hearing, Hearing Officer John Passalacqua denied the District's motion to dismiss SN 936-96 (September 26, 1996). The cases were then consolidated. No later history appears in the decision.

Summary

The parents of an 11-year-old Anaheim City School District student with a learning disability sought public funding for Prentice Day School, a state-certified private school where they had placed him in March 1995. The District filed its own case for permission to give the Brigance, a skills inventory, over the parents' objection during an overdue three-year (triennial) reassessment. The two cases were consolidated.

The Hearing Officer found that after more than two years of resource specialist help at Guinn Elementary, the student was still essentially a nonreader in fourth grade. Meeting some Brigance-based objectives did not prove meaningful progress. His resource reading program was designed for younger children and used an unusual print format. His classroom teacher made no reading modifications and placed him in a group that was sometimes taught in Spanish. This program denied FAPE, so the Hearing Officer did not decide the procedural claims. Test results and teacher testimony showed that Prentice's Slingerland program was proper. The Hearing Officer refused to reduce reimbursement because the parents waited a year to request it. The parents had raised concerns, the student remained available for assessment, and the District never offered a new IEP. The District must reimburse Prentice tuition and mileage from March 1995 and pay for the rest of 1996-97. Reimbursement for Chapman University tutoring was denied. The District may give the Brigance.

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Why it matters

The decision shows how SEHO looked past progress on IEP objectives to whether a student could actually read classroom material. It also shows a Hearing Officer separating this case from Ash v. Lake Oswego. Reimbursement was not reduced for a one-year delay because the district already served the student, knew of the parents' concerns, and never offered a new placement.

Issues and holdings

  1. Student prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue 1. Did the District offer STUDENT a free, appropriate education (FAPE)? (Substantive: was the IEP reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit before the March 1995 private enrollment?)

    After more than two years of RSP services, the student was still essentially a nonreader in fourth grade; meeting some Brigance objectives did not show Rowley-level benefit, so the District denied FAPE before March 1995.

  2. Not reachedIEP procedure

    Issue 1 (procedural). Did the District comply with IDEA procedural requirements (rights explanation, assessments without consent, speech therapist attendance at IEP meetings, prewritten IEPs, unnoticed reduction of RSP time)?

    Because the substantive denial of FAPE was found, the Hearing Officer did not decide the procedural claims.

  3. Issue 2a. If not, must the District reimburse Petitioner for private educational expenditures? (Prentice Day School tuition and expenses, retroactive and prospective)

    Prentice provided a proper education. No equitable reduction applied: the District knew of the parents' concerns, the student stayed available for assessment, and the District never offered a new IEP. Full reimbursement since March 1995 and prospective funding were ordered.

  4. Issue 2b. If not, must the District reimburse Petitioner for private educational expenditures? (Chapman University tutoring, fall 1994)

    There was no evidence that the whole-language tutoring was proper or produced progress, so reimbursement was denied.

  5. Issue 3. Is the District entitled to conduct an assessment of STUDENT using the Brigance test?

    Unrebutted testimony showed that the Brigance is valid and gives organized, curriculum-wide skill information useful for present levels and goals, so the District may administer it as part of the triennial reassessment.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • Prospective funding of private placement. Beginning immediately, District pays tuition and associated costs for Prentice Day School for the remainder of the 1996-97 school year, including out-of-pocket transportation reimbursed at the government mileage rate.
  • Reimbursement. Within 30 days of receipt of proof, District reimburses tuition and associated costs (including transportation at the government mileage rate) for Prentice Day School from March 1995 through the date the District assumes payment. No dollar amount stated.
  • Order that district may assess without consent. District may assess the student using the Brigance test; parents must make the student reasonably available for the assessment.

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Key authorities

Rowley; Gregory K. v. Longview School Dist.; Hall v. Vance County Schools; W.G. v. Board of Trustees; Burlington; Union School Dist. v. Smith; Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School Dist.; Ash v. Lake Oswego School Dist.; Seattle School Dist. v. B.S.; Burger v. Murray County School Dist.

People named in the decision

  • John Passalacqua, SEHO Hearing Officer (denied motion to dismiss), California Special Education Hearing Office
  • Patricia Cromer, attorney for Student; witness, working with Joan Honeycutt
  • Kathy Ward, legal assistant; witness for Student
  • Dennis Roberson, director of special education, Anaheim City School District
  • Mary Ellen Blanton, deputy superintendent, Anaheim City School District
  • Marianne Stjern, resource specialist, Guinn Elementary School
  • Sylvia Brozic, resource specialist, Guinn Elementary School
  • Lynette Hirose, fourth grade teacher, Guinn Elementary School
  • Lynn Cudd, principal, Guinn Elementary School
  • Dianne Wiest, school psychologist, Anaheim City School District
  • Michael Monahan, school psychologist, Anaheim City School District
  • Patricia Rennick, resource specialist, Anaheim City School District
  • Linda Price, speech therapist, Anaheim City School District
  • Susan Hetrick, sixth grade teacher (private school), Prentice Day School
  • Diana Wilhite, secretary (private school), Prentice Day School
  • Debra Jarvis, principal (private school), Prentice Day School
  • Mrs. Wangard, fifth grade teacher (private school), Prentice Day School
  • Prentice Day School, private school (state-certified), unilateral placement
  • Chapman University, private tutoring program

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

These matters were heard before Leonard Garfinkel, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office, McGeorge School of Law, in Anaheim, California, on October 28, 29, 30, 31 and November 1, 1996.

Petitioner STUDENT was represented by attorney Joan Honeycutt. Also present on behalf of STUDENT were his parents, PARENTS.

Present during portions of the hearing were Kathy Ward, legal assistant, and Patricia Cromer, attorney.

Respondent was represented by attorney Bobbie Albanese. Also present on behalf of the District was Dennis Roberson, director of special education.

Petitioner called the following witnesses: Mr. and PARENT;

Ms. Cromer; Ms. Ward; Mary Ellen Blanton, deputy superintendent; Marianne Stjern, resource specialist; Sylvia Brozic, resource specialist; and Lynette Hirose, fourth grade teacher, Guinn Elementary School; and the following employees of Prentice Day School: Susan Hetrick, sixth grade teacher; Diana Wilhite, secretary, and Debra Jarvis, principal.

The District called the following witnesses: Mr. Roberson;

Ms. Stjern; Dianne Wiest, school psychologist; Michael Monahan, school psychologist; Patricia Rennick, resource specialist; Linda Price, speech therapist; and Lynn Cudd, principal, Guinn Elementary School.

Oral and documentary evidence was received. At the parties' request, the record was left open until November 19, 1996 for the receipt of written closing briefs.(FOOTNOTE 1) At that time, the record was closed and the matter submitted for decision.

ISSUES

1. Did the District offer STUDENT a free, appropriate education (FAPE)?

2. If not, must the District reimburse Petitioner for private educational expenditures?

3. Is the District entitled to conduct an assessment of STUDENT using the Brigance test?

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

1. Motion to dismiss

On September 3, 1996, the Hearing Office received a letter dated August 27 from attorney Ms. Honeycutt, requesting a hearing for STUDENT. The issues identified for hearing were whether the District had offered STUDENT a FAPE and whether the District was responsible for funding his private school placement, both retroactively and prospectively. The case was assigned case number 936-96 and set for hearing on September 24-25. On September 12, the Hearing Office received a motion to dismiss from the District's attorney, Ms. Albanese. Ms. Albanese asserted that the hearing request was premature in that the District had not had an opportunity to assess STUDENT, prepare an Individualized Education Plan (IEP), and recommend a placement and services. Ms. Albanese also requested a hearing on the issue of whether the District had the right to conduct an assessment of STUDENT. The District's case was assigned case number 987-96 and set for hearing on October 8-9.

On September 26, Hearing Officer John Passalacqua denied the motion to dismiss case number 936-96 on the grounds that Petitioner's issues appeared ripe for hearing.(FOOTNOTE 2) The parties subsequently agreed to continue and consolidate the two cases. The consolidated cases were set for hearing on October 28-November 1, 1996.

2. Motion to bifurcate issues

At the outset of the hearing, Ms. Albanese made a motion to bifurcate a portion of the hearing. More specifically, she requested that hearing on the appropriate placement for STUDENT for 1996-97 be postponed until after hearing on the District's assessment issue was completed. The motion was denied on the grounds that the issue of the appropriate placement for 1996-97 was ripe for hearing and there was no persuasive reason to delay hearing on that issue.

3. Burden of presenting evidence first

The parties agreed that the District would proceed first on the portion of the case that involved the District's issue -- whether the District was entitled to administer the Brigance test to STUDENT. The parties disagreed as to who should proceed first on the portion of the case that involved Petitioner's issues. Ms. Honeycutt made a motion to require the District to present its case (with respect to Petitioner's issues) first. She cited Seattle School District v. B.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1498 (9th Cir. 1996), where the Ninth Circuit stated "the school district has the burden of proving compliance with the IDEA at the administrative hearing, including the appropriateness of . . . its proposed placement." Petitioner asserted that because the District carried this burden of proof, the District was also required to present its evidence (with respect to Petitioner's issues) first.

The Hearing Officer ruled that Petitioner was required to present its case on its issues first. The reason for the ruling was that the party seeking to change the status quo typically has the duty to proceed first at a special education due process hearing. Burger v. Murray County School District, 612 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Ga. 1984). In this case, Petitioner made a unilateral change in the last agreed-upon IEP (November, 1994) and later sought retroactive and prospective funding for a private school placement. Therefore, Petitioner sought to change the status quo. The Hearing Officer found that the Ninth Circuit's language in Seattle School District regarding the burden of showing compliance with the IDEA does not necessarily address the issue of which party must present evidence first in a particular administrative hearing, nor does it change the general rule that the party seeking to change the status quo must present evidence first.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE

A. Introduction

STUDENT is eleven years old and lives with his parents, PARENTS within the District in Anaheim. STUDENT is eligible to receive special education and related services from the District because he has a learning disability. Currently, he attends the sixth grade at Prentice Day School, a private school in Santa Ana that has been certified by the state Department of Education to provide services to special education students.

B. Chronological Summary

STUDENT attended regular education kindergarten at Guinn Elementary School in the District during the 1990-91 school year. On one occasion, STUDENT became upset because, while other children could write their names, he could not write his name. At the end of the year, the teacher wrote that STUDENT still needed to learn his letters and numbers. (P 7)(FOOTNOTE 3)

In first grade (1991-92), STUDENT received some extra assistance in school through the Chapter One program. The assistance included some one-to-one instruction from the teacher and access to an instructional aide. (P 6, 8) Standardized test results in May, 1992, at the end of first grade, showed that STUDENT was achieving at an early first-grade level in word attack, vocabulary and reading comprehension, and approximately at grade level in language expression. (P 9) During the last academic quarter that year, STUDENT received grades of "N" (Needs improvement) in reading, spelling, and written expression, and an "S" (Satisfactory) in oral expression.

In October 1992, early in the first semester of STUDENT's second-grade year, he was referred to the school's "Student Study Team" (SST) because of his reading difficulties. (P 11) It was noted that "[STUDENT's] sounds are so limited that he's working on key words for sounds (read aloud program), one-on-one in areas of reading, sentences, etc. He cannot work alone." (P 11) The SST recommended that STUDENT be referred for assessment for special education. (P 12)

The District invited the parents to a meeting on October 22, 1992, at which time PARENT signed an assessment plan. (P 13, 14) Between late October and early December, the District performed comprehensive assessments of STUDENT. (P 16-19, 21-28). One of the tests given by resource specialist Sylvia Brozic in November was the Brigance Comprehensive Inventory of Basic Skills (hereafter "the Brigance"). The assessments concluded that STUDENT had low average intellectual ability, and that he was a "nonreader" who was unable to complete word recognition tasks. It was noted that he seemed "confused" in class. (Resp. Exh. GG) Once the assessments were completed, the District invited the parents to an IEP meeting. (P 29)

An IEP meeting was held on December 10, 1992. (P 30) STUDENT was found eligible for special education because he demonstrated a significant discrepancy between ability and achievement in basic reading, reading comprehension, and spelling. Based on the assessments, STUDENT's present level of performance in reading was described as the "reading readiness skills" stage. The annual goal established in reading was to progress further in reading readiness skills. The specific short-term objectives that were established in reading, reading comprehension, and spelling were taken directly from the Brigance test manual. It was determined that STUDENT would continue to attend some regular education classes, but that he would receive two hours of daily instruction in language arts and math from a resource specialist (RSP).(FOOTNOTE 4) The IEP also provided that STUDENT would receive speech and language therapy twice each week for thirty minutes. PARENT signed her agreement to the IEP.

For the remainder of the 1992-93 school year, STUDENT received RSP services from Sylvia Brozic. Ms. Brozic used a program called SRA Spelling, which she described as a multisensory program that emphasizes decoding skills, phonics, and blends. Ms. Brozic administered the Brigance test to STUDENT regularly to determine his progress on his short-term IEP objectives. STUDENT did not receive grades in language arts from his regular education classroom teacher. Rather, at the end of second grade, in the spring of 1993, STUDENT received a grade of "S" (Satisfactory) from Ms. Brozic in reading, language, writing, and spelling. She wrote of his "good progress" and "steady growth." (P 33)

During third grade (1993-94) STUDENT continued to spend the majority of his day in regular education classes and to receive two hours of daily RSP instruction from Ms. Brozic. She continued to use the SRA Spelling program, only now at a slightly higher level. In November, 1993 the District invited the parents to an annual IEP meeting. (P 39)

The meeting was held on December 10, 1993. (P 40) It was noted that STUDENT had met the previous year's goal of progressing in reading readiness skills. It was further noted that STUDENT had not met any of the previous year's objectives in oral reading, comprehension, or functional word recognition, and had met just three of seven objectives in word analysis. The IEP document stated that STUDENT now recognized words at the preprimer level.(FOOTNOTE 5) Annual goals established in reading included recognizing words at the primer level and oral reading and reading comprehension at the preprimer level. Short-term objectives in reading were again taken directly from the Brigance. The IEP called for STUDENT to continue to attend some regular education classes, to receive two hours of daily instruction in language arts and math from Ms. Brozic, and to receive speech and language therapy. (P 40)

In third grade, STUDENT again did not receive grades in language arts from his regular education classroom teacher.

Rather, at the end of third grade, in the spring of 1994, STUDENT again received a grade of "S" (Satisfactory) from Ms. Brozic in reading, language, writing, and spelling. Ms. Brozic wrote that STUDENT was "meeting his goals and objectives" and "making growth." (P 42)

In the fall of 1994, STUDENT entered the fourth grade at Guinn Elementary School. He spent the majority of his day in the regular education class taught by Lynette Hirose. STUDENT's RSP instruction was reduced from two hours to ninety minutes.(FOOTNOTE 6) A new resource specialist, Marianne Stjern, replaced Ms.

Brozic.

Ms. Stern chose to use a new reading program, SRA Reading Mastery, with STUDENT. Reading Mastery was described as a multisensory method that uses the auditory and visual modes. It is sequential and step-by-step method that involves repetition, review, and positive reinforcement. The early level of Reading Mastery emphasizes oral decoding of words and also includes a comprehension aspect. District resource specialist Patricia Rennick testified that it can be an appropriate program for children with low average intellect. However, she also testified that the Reading Mastery program is geared for students in grades 1-3. She testified that, based on advice from SRA, the developer of Reading Mastery, she does not use the program with students in grades 4-6 who are nonreaders or almost nonreaders because it is inappropriate for students of that maturity level.

Additionally, the lower levels of the Reading Mastery program use visual context clues in an unusual format that is not used in typical regular education classroom texts. Examples include: (1) a silent "e" is small and light; (b) no capital letters are used; (c) the letters "sh" appear very close together; (d) a bar is placed over an "a" to indicate a long "a" sound. (P 88) PARENT testified that on one occasion STUDENT complained that the contrast between the Reading Mastery format used in his RSP instruction and the format of typical reading material used in class was confusing for him.

Mrs. Hirose, the fourth grade teacher, testified that of her students for whom English was the primary language, STUDENT was reading at the lowest level. The reading material used in the class was at the fourth grade level. STUDENT was not reading at nearly that level. While Mrs. Hirose taught the class so as to meet a very diverse range of student needs, she did not make any specific curriculum modifications to address STUDENT's reading difficulties.(FOOTNOTE 7) Often she simply had him attempt an assignment, even though she did not expect that he would be able to do it because he could not read.

Mrs. Hirose did not testify as to whether STUDENT made any progress in reading in her class. She stated that she believed it was Ms. Stjern's responsibility to work on STUDENT's IEP goals and objectives in reading during RSP instruction. (Mrs. Hirose never saw the November/December 1993 IEP -- the one that was in effect for most of the fall 1994 semester.) Eventually, Mrs. Hirose placed STUDENT in a reading group comprised mostly of "ESL"

students -- that is, students for whom English was a second language. On occasion, a bilingual aide gave instruction to STUDENT's reading group in Spanish. (STUDENT does not speak Spanish.) STUDENT felt comfortable in the small reading group and made some oral contributions to discussions there. Mrs. Hirose described STUDENT as quiet, courteous, helpful, and well-liked. STUDENT had no complaints about school that year and had good attendance. He sometimes expressed frustration at home regarding his inability to complete written homework assignments.

Mrs. Hirose testified that she was a very lenient grader and placed a lot of weight on effort. She acknowledged that the "C" grade she gave to STUDENT in social studies and science bore no relationship to the fourth-grade curriculum, and that his progress was not on a par with that of other students. (P 55)

During the fall of 1994, while STUDENT was attending Mrs.

Hirose's fourth-grade class and receiving RSP instruction from Ms. Stjern, the parents enrolled STUDENT in a tutoring program at a local college, Chapman University. The tutoring program employed the "whole language" method for reading stories. STUDENT liked the tutoring and particularly enjoyed one session in which he and his tutor made an ice cream cone after discussing a story about ice cream.

In November 1994, the parents requested a meeting with the Guinn Elementary School principal, Lynn Cudd. At the meeting, PARENT told Ms. Cudd that he was very concerned about STUDENT's lack of progress in reading. He stated that he felt whatever the District was doing was not working, and asked if Ms. Cudd could persuade District staff to try a different approach. Ms. Cudd did not suggest any different approaches. At the hearing, the parents testified that, in their opinion, STUDENT was in November 1994 essentially a "nonreader." No District witness at the hearing contradicted that characterization.

An annual IEP meeting was held on November 30, 1994. (P 51)

This was the first IEP meeting that PARENT attended. According to the parents District representatives stated that the most the parents could expect was that by the end of sixth grade, STUDENT might be reading at a second grade level. No District witness recalled making or hearing this statement.

At the IEP meeting, it was noted that: STUDENT had not met his annual goal in reading, that he had not met any of his short-term objectives in oral reading, comprehension or word analysis; he had met one of two objectives in functional word recognition.

STUDENT's present level of performance in reading was described as follows: word recognition, 60% at the primer level; oral reading, below the preprimer level; and reading comprehension, below the primer level. Annual goals established in the area of reading were as follows: read words at the first-grade level, oral reading at 1-1 (first grade, first month); and reading comprehension at 1-1. Short-term objectives were again taken directly from the Brigance test manual.

The parents testified that PARENT stated he did not want to sign the IEP, but did so because a District representative stated that, otherwise, STUDENT would not receive any special education services the next day. Ms. Cudd, Ms. Hirose, and Ms. Stjern testified that the parents did not express reluctance to sign and that no one stated that STUDENT would not receive any services unless the parents signed. In any event, the parents signed their agreement to the IEP and did not write any dissenting statement.

According to PARENT, although the District had given her written copies of her rights many times before, it was only after this IEP meeting that she and her husband read them for the first time. PARENT began investigating other options for STUDENT. In January 1995, STUDENT's best friend in Mrs. Hirose's class transferred away from Guinn Elementary School. In February 1995, PARENT visited Prentice Day School. In March, a parent of another student in Mrs. Hirose's class told PARENT that STUDENT had been placed in a reading group in which some of the instruction was given in Spanish. PARENT spoke to Mrs. Hirose, who confirmed this.

PARENT testified that in approximately mid-March 1995 she informed Mrs. Hirose, Ms. Cudd, and Ms. Stjern that the parents were withdrawing STUDENT from Guinn and placing him at Prentice Day School because they were concerned about his lack of progress in reading. Mrs. Hirose testified that PARENT did so inform her prior to withdrawing STUDENT; Ms. Cudd testified that PARENT did not so inform her; and Ms. Stjern testified that PARENT informed her only after withdrawing STUDENT. At PARENT' request the District sent STUDENT's records to Prentice, and he began attending there on March 21. (P 1, 52-54) According to PARENT, the parents did not request that the District fund STUDENT's education at Prentice Day School at that time because they did not know if STUDENT would perform any better in reading at Prentice than he had at Guinn.

Prentice employs the "Slingerland" method of teaching language arts. Slingerland is described as a multisensory method which uses the student's visual, auditory, and tactile/kinesthetic modes of learning. As much as possible, the method seeks to use the different modes simultaneously. Other features of the method include (1) small class size, (2) highly structured, sequential learning activities using specific clues to help students with reading material, (3) frequent reminders as to what sounds particular letter combinations make, (4) frequent checks for understanding, and (5) modeling and repetition.

No one testified directly about any progress that STUDENT made at Prentice between March and June 1995. A document submitted into evidence showed that on March 21, 1995, achievement testing administered by Prentice showed that STUDENT's reading comprehension was at the primer level and his spelling was at grade level 1.7. (P 57) Further testing in June 1995 showed that STUDENT's reading comprehension was now at the first grade level, his spelling was at grade level 2.2, and that he was achieving in word identification at grade level 1.9, and achieving in word attack skills at grade level 1.5. (P 57)

In August 1995, STUDENT entered the fifth grade at Prentice Day School with Mrs. Wangard. Testing at that time revealed that his reading comprehension had returned to the primer level, that his spelling was at grade level 2.1, and that he was achieving in word identification at grade level 2.0, and achieving in word attack skills at grade level 1.8. (P 67) Written reports submitted by Mrs. Wangard, who did not testify, stated that STUDENT made steady progress in reading during the 1995-1996 school year. (P 59, 60, 65, and 68). Testing in February 1996 showed that STUDENT was now showing reading comprehension at grade level 2E (end of second grade), spelling at grade level 2.4, achievement in word identification at grade level 2.5, and achievement in word attack skills at grade level 1.9. (P 67)

The parents and the school district had no contact with each other from March 1995 through April 1996. PARENT testified that by early April 1996 he and his wife believed they had sufficient evidence to support their contention that STUDENT had performed better in reading at Prentice than he had at Guinn. In early April 1996, PARENT contacted Mr. Roberson, the District's special education director, and asked how to go about getting the District to fund STUDENT's education at Prentice, both retroactively and prospectively. PARENT told Mr. Roberson that STUDENT had struggled in reading at Guinn, but that he was doing better at Prentice.

Mr. Roberson mentioned reconvening the IEP team and that the IEP team might want to conduct assessments. When PARENT expressed reluctance at participating in any further IEP meetings, Mr.

Roberson offered to attend the meeting himself. However, he noted that any final decisions would be up to the IEP team and that if the parents disagreed with any such decisions, they had a right to request a due process hearing. PARENT stated that he would consult an attorney. In a letter to the parents dated April 11, Mr.

Roberson confirmed that "normally, a request for a due process hearing is requested after an IEP meeting if you disagree with special education services or placement being proposed by the District." (P 64) Shortly thereafter, the parents began looking for an attorney.On May 3, using a form provided by attorney Ms. Honeycutt, the parents wrote to Mr. Roberson, requesting copies of STUDENT's school records. (P 66) On May 10, PARENT came to the District office and Mr. Roberson gave him access to the records. Prentice testing in June 1996 revealed that STUDENT's reading comprehension remained at grade level 2E, his spelling was at grade level 2.6, and he was achieving in word identification at grade level 2.9, and achieving in word attack skills at grade level 2.5. (P 67)

In mid-July, Mr. Roberson and Patricia Cromer, an attorney working with Ms. Honeycutt, spoke by telephone. Ms. Cromer confirmed that the parents were requesting retroactive and prospective funding for Prentice. Mr. Roberson requested that Ms. Cromer send copies of STUDENT's achievement test scores from Prentice and a release signed by the parents that would authorize District staff to discuss STUDENT with Prentice staff. Mr.

Roberson testified that Ms. Cromer also requested that the District complete STUDENT's triennial assessment, which was due in December, 1995. Ms. Cromer testified that she did not say this.

On July 30, 1996, Ms. Cromer sent to Mr. Roberson STUDENT's Prentice test scores from March and June 1995. (P 73) On August 12, Mr. Roberson wrote to Ms. Cromer, noting that:

In reviewing STUDENT's file he is due for a three-year re-evaluation. The assessment team at Guinn School will develop an assessment plan and contact the parents for permission to assess STUDENT and schedule an IEP team meeting. The staff at Guinn will return to school on September 3, 1996. (P 74)

In mid-August, STUDENT began sixth grade at Prentice Day School with a new teacher, Susan Hetrick. On August 19, Ms.

Honeycutt wrote to Mr. Roberson, stating that STUDENT's triennial assessment was due in December 1995, and that while the parents would consent to implementation of an appropriate assessment plan, they would not wait until September 3 to begin the process. (P 75)

Deputy Superintendent Dr. Mary Ellen Blanton received the letter and telephoned Ms. Honeycutt to let her know that Mr.

Roberson would return from vacation on August 26. On August 27, not having heard from Mr. Roberson, Ms. Honeycutt filed a request for a due process hearing.(FOOTNOTE 8) On August 29, Mr. Roberson sent the parents a proposed assessment plan and sent a copy to Ms. Honeycutt. (P 76) On September 3, Ms. Honeycutt wrote to Mr. Roberson, complaining that he had sent the assessment plan directly to the parents and had not indicated that the assessment would be completed within a shortened timeline. (P 77) Ms. Honeycutt wrote:

. . . as long as the hearing is pending, neither you nor any employee of Anaheim City School District is to have any communication with Mr. or PARENT except through me.

Upon receiving that letter, Mr. Roberson telephoned Ms.

Honeycutt. She stated that the parents would consent to an assessment plan only if the District agreed to complete it and convene the IEP team within two weeks. Mr. Roberson responded that he believed the District could accomplish this. Also on September 3, Mr. Roberson wrote to Ms. Honeycutt, confirming that the District could complete the process by September 15 or the following week, depending on timely receipt of a signed assessment plan and STUDENT's availability. On September 5, Ms. Honeycutt wrote to Mr. Roberson, again requesting confirmation that the District would complete the process within two weeks, and indicating that Prentice staff would make STUDENT available for assessment. On September 7, Bobbie Albanese, the District's attorney, wrote to Ms. Honeycutt, complaining about Ms. Honeycutt's warning not to communicate with the parents and her attempt to condition the parents' consent to an assessment plan on a shortened timeline. (P 80)

On September 17 the parties met in voluntary mediation, accompanied by their attorneys. At the mediation, the parents provided the District with Prentice test scores from August, 1995 and February, 1996. (Pet. Exh. EE) During the course of the mediation, the District agreed to add certain tests to and delete certain tests from the assessment plan, at Ms. Honeycutt's request. (Pet. Exh. DD) However, the parents did not consent to the Brigance test and the District did not agree to delete it.

According to PARENT, Ms. Honeycutt suggested that the District proceed with those assessments as to which there was agreement. In any event, the parents did not sign any assessment plan that day. At the end of the mediation, the mediator wrote on the mediation summary form:

"Petitioner requests mediator to indicate that Respondent left mediation and refused to discuss Petitioner's issues. (This statement is per Petitioner and not the mediator.)" (P 69)

At the hearing, PARENT testified that at some point, the District representatives abruptly left the mediation. Mr. Roberson testified that he believed the meeting ended at a mutually pre-arranged, agreeable time in order to allow Ms. Albanese to reach her next appointment.

On September 27, Mr. Roberson sent both the parents and Ms.

Honeycutt a revised assessment plan which incorporated changes that were agreed upon at the mediation, but also included the Brigance. (P 81) PARENT signed the form three weeks later, on October 18, but specifically noted that she did not consent to the Brigance.

(P 82)(FOOTNOTE 9)

During the week of October 21-25, Mr. Monahan, the District school psychologist, began some testing of STUDENT at Prentice. At the hearing, he testified that preliminary results on the Peabody, a standardized achievement test, yielded grade equivalents of 1.6 in reading recognition and reading comprehension.

On October 29, the second day of the hearing, District speech therapist Linda Price, who had served STUDENT at Guinn, called Prentice and stated that she wanted to come observe and assess STUDENT that morning. Prentice staff called Ms. Honeycutt, who indicated that the parents had given consent for a District speech therapist to observe and assess STUDENT, subject to Prentice availability. Prentice staff informed Ms. Price that she could observe STUDENT, but that it was "picture day" and they would have to check to see if there was a room available in which she could assess him. When she arrived at the school, Mr. Price was told that she could observe STUDENT in class, but that there was no room available that day for assessment.

During the 1996-97 school year, STUDENT has been taught reading and writing by Ms. Hetrick. At the hearing, she estimated that STUDENT's current reading and spelling level is late second grade to early third-grade, that his reading comprehension is approximately at a fourth-grade level, and that his writing skills are at perhaps early fifth-grade. She has not yet formally tested STUDENT in these areas. She believes that STUDENT is benefitting from the Slingerland method as used at Prentice.

PARENT testified that since STUDENT has been at Prentice, his self-confidence has increased and he has become a "reader." When he was at Guinn, he had to ask his parents to read the TV Guide for him; now he can do it himself. Recently he was able to determine for himself, using an encyclopedia, how many states there were when Abraham Lincoln was President. PARENT testified that she, too, has seen an increase in STUDENT's self-confidence and reading ability since he has been attending Prentice. He is now also doing some writing, although spelling remains difficult for him.

C. Testimony about the Brigance test

Mike Monahan, District school psychologist, testified that the assessment plan signed by the parents on October 18, 1996, includes three standardized, or norm-referenced, reading achievement tests: the Peabody, WRAT, and Wechsler. A standardized test compares a student to other children his age. The Brigance, on the other hand, is a diagnostic, or criterion-referenced test that compares a student only to himself. The Brigance examines a student's present levels of performance and identifies his needs in a comprehensive, organized manner across all aspects of the curriculum. The test identifies specific strengths and weaknesses in individual skill areas. While both standardized tests and conversations with the student's classroom teacher can yield similar, useful information, only the Brigance provides such specific, organized, all-inclusive information. Mr. Monahan believes the Brigance is a valid test because it actually measures what it purports to measure. That is, in his experience, the grade equivalents that a child achieves on the Brigance in individual areas of skill development tend to be consistent with the grade equivalents that a child achieves in those same areas on similar tests. Because STUDENT has taken the Brigance before, a current administration of the test would be valuable in measuring recent progress.

Ms. Stjern, the resource specialist, testified that the Brigance is used for establishing present levels of performance and for preparing IEP goals and objectives. She acknowledged that all of STUDENT's reading IEP objectives were taken directly from the Brigance. She noted that, because he has taken the Brigance in the past, a current administration of the Brigance would be a valuable method of charting his recent progress. Also, she stated that once present levels of performance are established, the Brigance can be administered regularly to determine progress. Ms. Stjern believes that research shows that the grade equivalents in the Brigance are reliable. She does not believe the Brigance, developed in 1983 and not revised since then, is obsolete.

PARENT testified that formal testing can, at times, be difficult for STUDENT and can make him tired, anxious, or frustrated. She acknowledged, however, that he is tested several times each year at Prentice and that these tests have not been stressful for him. In any event, she believes he has already had a lot of testing. Because the Brigance can take several hours to administer, if given in its entirety, she would prefer that it not be administered to STUDENT.

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable legal standard

Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), children with disabilities are entitled to a free, appropriate education (FAPE) that emphasizes special education and related services to meet their unique needs. 20 U.S.C. §1400(c);

§1401(a)(16-18). In Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-207 (1982), the Supreme Court described a two-part inquiry in determining whether a FAPE has been provided, one part procedural, and one part substantive: (1) Has the [local educational agency] complied with the procedures set forth in [IDEA]? and (2) Is the IEP reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefit?

B. Did the District provide STUDENT with a FAPE prior to his enrollment in private school in March 1995?

1. Substantive: Was the IEP reasonably calculated to enable STUDENT to received educational benefit?

A substantively appropriate IEP is one that is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive "some" educational benefit. Rowley, supra, 458 U.S. at 200-201, 206-207. In determining whether the District has offered an appropriate education, the focus is on the adequacy of the District's program. Gregory K. v. Longview School District, 811 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987). If the District's program is adequate, the District has offered a FAPE, even if the parents prefer another program, and even if the parents' preferred program is better (i.e. would likely result in greater educational benefit to the child than the District's program). Id.

The District asserts that STUDENT made sufficient progress in reading at Guinn because he met some of his Brigance objectives each year. However, the analysis of whether STUDENT made progress in reading that satisfies the Rowley standard must focus not only on the Brigance test but also, importantly, whether he made progress in reading classroom material. The evidence showed that at the time of the November 30, 1994 IEP meeting, after two years in the resource specialist program, STUDENT remained, in the parents' words, essentially a "nonreader." No District witness disputed that characterization. Although he was midway through the fourth grade at the time of that IEP, STUDENT, who has at least low average intelligence, was not yet reading at a first grade level.

The evidence showed that there was a lack of coordination between the reading instruction STUDENT received from the resource specialist, Ms. Stjern, and that which he received from his fourth-grade regular classroom teacher, Mrs. Hirose. First, according to District resource specialist Ms. Rennick, the Reading Mastery program that Ms. Stjern used with STUDENT, a nonreader, was inappropriate because the material was below the maturity level of a fourth-grader. Second, the Reading Mastery program presented words in an unusual format that was different from how they appeared in the regular classroom texts. This was somewhat confusing to STUDENT. Third, although STUDENT spent the majority of his school day in Mrs. Hirose's class, Mrs. Hirose testified that she believed it was Ms. Stjern who was responsible for meeting STUDENT's IEP goals and objectives in reading.

The evidence did not demonstrate that STUDENT made any progress in reading classroom material in Mrs. Hirose's class. Rather, he could not read the fourth-grade material that was used there, and no particular modifications were made to allow him to do so. Often Mrs. Hirose simply had STUDENT attempt an assignment, even though she knew he could not do it because he could not read. He was reading at such a low level that she placed him in a small reading group comprised mostly of students for whom English was a second language. At times, a bilingual aide gave instruction to STUDENT's reading group in Spanish.

While STUDENT was described as a well-behaved and happy student, it appears that his reading needs somehow got lost in the shuffle of Mrs. Hirose's class. Based on all the evidence, the Hearing Officer concludes that STUDENT's fourth-grade program at Guinn was inappropriate to meet his unique, individual needs. 20 U.S.C. §1400(c); 1401(a)(16-18); Rowley, supra. Although he achieved some of his Brigance reading objectives, this fact alone does not demonstrate that he made progress in reading sufficient to meet the Rowley standard. The evidence showed, significantly, that he remained a nonreader in his regular education fourth-grade classes. See Hall v. Vance County Schools, 774 F.2d 629, 635-636 (4th Cir. 1985) ("social" promotion and minimal improvement on some test results not enough to show that RSP provided substantive FAPE to functionally illiterate fifth grader). Because the District's program did not provide STUDENT with substantive educational benefit sufficient to satisfy the Rowley standard, the Hearing Officer finds that the District denied STUDENT FAPE prior to his enrollment in private school in March, 1995.

2. Procedural: Did the District comply with IDEA requirements?

Procedural defects deny FAPE if they result in (1) loss of educational opportunity to the child or (2) a serious infringement of the parents' opportunity to participate in the IEP formulation process. W.G. v. Board of Trustees, 960 F.2d 1479, 1484 (9th Cir. 1992).

Petitioner asserts that the District committed a variety of procedural errors prior to their unilateral placement of STUDENT in private school, including: (1) failing to explain the parents' rights to them, (2) conducting certain "assessments" of STUDENT in 1993 and 1994 without obtaining parental consent, (3) failing to procure the attendance of STUDENT's speech therapist at IEP meetings, (4) bringing prewritten IEP documents to IEP meetings, and (5) reducing RSP instruction from 120 minutes to 90 minutes in September 1994, without giving the parents notice of the proposed reduction.

The Hearing Officer has concluded above that the District denied FAPE to STUDENT prior to his enrollment in private school because the District's program did not provide him with substantive educational benefit sufficient to meet the Rowley standard. For that reason, it is unnecessary to decide the merits of Petitioner's claim that the District also denied FAPE on procedural grounds.

C. Reimbursement issues

1. Prentice Day School tuition

Under IDEA, decision-makers can award "appropriate" relief for violations of FAPE. 20 U.S.C. §1415(e)(2). In School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education, 471 U.S. 359, 369-370 (1985), the Supreme Court stated that parents are entitled to be retroactively reimbursed for private school tuition (and other expenditures), if it is determined that the public school placement in the IEP was not appropriate and the unilateral private school placement was "proper." See also Union School District v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1524 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (1994).

The evidence showed that STUDENT has received a proper education at Prentice. The program described by his current teacher, Ms. Hetrick, is designed to meet his unique, individual needs, and test results show he has made progress in reading as a result of his attendance there.(FOOTNOTE 10) Importantly, the test results were corroborated by Ms. Hetrick's testimony that, as of late October 1996, early in his sixth grade year, STUDENT was able to participate in classroom reading on a late second grade/early third grade level. Accordingly, the Petitioner has established a prima facie case for reimbursement for Prentice tuition and expenses since March 1995.

The District asserts that the parents' conduct should negate or limit the parents' right to reimbursement here. Equitable factors are relevant in determining appropriate relief.

Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374; W.G. v. Board of Trustees, 960 F.2d at 1486; Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School District, 31 F.3d 1489, 1496 (9th Cir. 1994). Thus, the parents' conduct is relevant to determining the appropriate amount of reimbursement.

The District asserts that it has no duty to reimburse from March 1995 to April 1996 because, during that time, the parents had not informed the District that they had any disagreement with the District's program. The District further asserts that once the parents requested prospective funding for Prentice in April 1996, the District was entitled to a reasonable amount of time to complete an assessment and convene an IEP meeting to propose a placement and special education services. The District asserts that only then, if there was a disagreement, would the parents be entitled to initiate a due process hearing regarding reimbursement. The District cites Ash v. Lake Oswego School District, 766 F. Supp. 852 (D. Or. 1991), aff'd, 980 F.2d 585, 589 (9th Cir. 1992).

In Ash, an autistic student in Oregon began attending private school in 1982, after briefly attending a public preschool program. In 1985, the parents placed the student in a residential treatment center (RTC) in Japan. In 1987 the RTC opened a branch in Boston and the student transferred there. The parents did not have meaningful contact with the local school district regarding the child's education between 1982 and January 1989, when they sought to discuss the possibility of reimbursement. In March 1989, the District declined reimbursement and stated that it was necessary to assess the student and convene the IEP team. In May, the parents' attorney formally requested that the District conduct an assessment and develop an IEP. The student returned home in July, the assessment was completed in August, and, in September, an IEP was developed that recommended that the student attend a public special day class in the District. The parents rejected that placement offer and, in October, filed a request for a due process hearing, seeking reimbursement for the Japan and Boston placements since 1985.

The district court in Ash noted that there had been no disagreement between the District and the parents prior to the 1985 private placement. The court stated: "A disagreement is an essential element of the right to reimbursement under the Act." 766 F. Supp. at 864. The court found that, prior to the 1985 private placement, the District had not been given an opportunity to assess the student and propose a placement. The court found that the September 1989 IEP did not offer a FAPE, and that the child presently required the private placement in order to receive an appropriate education. However, the court found that the right to reimbursement began only in September 1989, at which time:

. . . the [District] had been asked to provide services to [student] and had been given a reasonable opportunity to complete the process of evaluating [student] and making a placement recommendation. 766 F. Supp. at 864.

This case is distinguishable from Ash on several grounds.

First, unlike in Ash, here there has been a finding that the District denied FAPE to the student prior to the unilateral placement. Beginning in late 1992, the District evaluated STUDENT, found him eligible for special education, prepared IEPs for him, placed him in District programs, and served him pursuant to IEPs for approximately two and one-half years. The evidence showed that the District's program did not offer STUDENT a FAPE prior to his enrollment in private school in March 1995. The evidence showed that the IEP of November 30, 1994 -- which was to be effective through November 30, 1995 -- was not appropriate to meet his unique needs. In fact, the District had continued to offer essentially the same IEP for several years despite a lack of demonstrated progress in reading.

Second, unlike in Ash, here, under all the circumstances, the District knew or reasonably should have known of a disagreement at the time of the unilateral placement. Although the parents did not request reimbursement until April, 1996 -- approximately one year after withdrawing STUDENT -- during the fall of 1995 they had expressed great concern to school officials regarding STUDENT's lack of progress in reading and had requested that the District try something new. In March 1995, after receiving confirmation from the District that STUDENT had been placed in a reading group that was clearly inappropriate to meet his needs, they informed the District that they were sending STUDENT to Prentice. The District has paid for certain District students to attend Prentice in the past, and was aware that in certain cases parents who unilaterally enroll their disabled students at Prentice later seek reimbursement from the District. Considering all the circumstances in this case, at the time STUDENT left Guinn in March 1995 the District knew or reasonably should have known of the IEP's inadequacy and the District's potential liability to the parents.

Third, unlike in Ash, here the student remained continuously available to the District for assessment. He continued to reside in the District, District personnel were aware that he was attending Prentice Day School, and there was no evidence that he was at any time unavailable for assessment. However, since STUDENT left Guinn in March 1995, the District has never convened an IEP meeting to offer STUDENT a placement. In fact, even after the parents requested prospective funding for Prentice in early April 1996, the District delayed in sending the parents a proposed assessment plan until August 29, which was (1) nearly five months later, (2) shortly after STUDENT had already started a new school year at Prentice, and (3) just days before the new school year was to start at Guinn. This delay on the District's part guaranteed that assessments would not be completed, an IEP meeting would not be convened, an IEP would not be developed, and a placement for 1996-1997 would not be offered, until well into the new school year. IDEA requires that an appropriate IEP be in effect at the beginning of the school year. 34 C.F.R. §300.342.

In conclusion, there is no equitable basis to negate or reduce the reimbursement award. The parents removed STUDENT from public school at their own financial risk. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 373-374. That is, the parents' right to reimbursement is dependent on ultimately proving at a due process hearing that the District's program was inappropriate for STUDENT and that the private school was able to provide a proper education. It has been determined herein that the District denied STUDENT FAPE prior to his unilateral enrollment in private school in March 1995, that the District has not offered him a FAPE at any time since then, and that Prentice Day School has provided STUDENT a proper education. Because it has also been determined that there is no equitable basis to negate or reduce the reimbursement award, the parents are entitled to be fully reimbursed for Prentice tuition and related expenses.

2. Chapman University tutoring, Fall 1994

There was no evidence upon which the Hearing Officer could base a determination as to whether the tutoring from Chapman University during the fall of 1994 was "proper." The only evidence provided was that the tutoring employed a whole language approach and that STUDENT enjoyed an exercise in which he and his tutor made an ice cream cone after reading a story about ice cream. No progress was attributed to the tutoring program -- indeed, the tutoring occurred during a time period when the parents testified they were not observing any progress in STUDENT's reading.

For the foregoing reasons, the request for reimbursement for tutoring from Chapman University during the fall of 1994 is denied. D. Is the District entitled to conduct an assessment of STUDENT using the Brigance test?

In accordance with the mandate to provide a FAPE, school districts in California are required to formally reassess special education pupils at least every three years in all areas of suspected disability. Education Code §56381; 56320. The District must obtain the parents' consent on a written assessment plan prior to conducting such a so-called "triennial" assessment. Education Code §56321(c). If consent is refused, the school district can perform the assessment only if it prevails in a due process hearing to override the failure to consent. Education Code §56506(e); 56321(c); 56501(a)(3). Thus, if the district believes it must conduct a particular assessment in order to provide a student with FAPE, and the parent refuses to consent, the district must initiate a due process hearing to attempt to override the failure to consent. Id. and 34 C.F.R. 300.504(c) and Note 3.

Here, STUDENT's initial assessment, which led to his placement in special education was conducted in December 1992. Therefore, his triennial assessment was due in December 1995. The parents have consented to all aspects of the District's proposed assessment plan except the Brigance test.

Petitioner asserts several objections to the Brigance test:

(1) it is unnecessary in that sufficient, relevant information about STUDENT can be obtained from standardized tests and interviewing STUDENT's teacher; (2) it is not standardized; (3) it is time-intensive; and (4) the District will likely use the results to prepare IEP objectives based solely on the Brigance.

The Hearing Officer finds that the District's determination that the Brigance is necessary to enable the District to conduct an appropriate triennial assessment of STUDENT is appropriate.

Regarding Petitioner's specific objections: First, although relevant information can be obtained from standardized tests and interviewing STUDENT's teacher, the District presented unrebutted testimony that (1) only the Brigance identifies specific strengths and weaknesses in an organized, comprehensive manner across all aspects of the curriculum, and (2) this information is helpful in establishing present levels of performance and preparing IEP goals and objectives. Second, although the test is not standardized, the District presented unrebutted testimony the Brigance is a valid test. Education Code 56320(b)(2). Third, although the Brigance is a lengthy test, and PARENT testified generally that District testing of STUDENT at Guinn was somewhat stressful for him, there was no evidence that any of Prentice's testing or the recent testing done by District school psychologist Mr. Monahan has been particularly stressful for him. Fourth, the issue of whether the District will prepare an appropriate IEP for STUDENT, based on the results of all the assessments including the Brigance, is not presently before the Hearing Officer.

For all the above reasons, the Hearing Officer finds that the District is entitled to conduct an assessment of STUDENT using the Brigance test. Should Petitioner disagree with the results of the assessment, it could seek reimbursement for an independent assessment. Education Code §56329.

ORDER

1. Beginning immediately, the District shall assume responsibility for paying tuition and associated costs (including reimbursement at the government mileage rate for out-of-pocket transportation costs) relating to STUDENT's attendance at Prentice Day School for the remainder of the 1996-97 school year.

2. Within 30 days of receipt of proof, the District shall reimburse Petitioner for tuition and associated costs (including reimbursement at the government mileage rate for out-of-pocket transportation costs) relating to STUDENT's attendance at Prentice Day School from March 1995 through the date the District assumes responsibility for paying tuition and associated costs.

3. The District is entitled to conduct an assessment of STUDENT using the Brigance test. PARENTS shall make STUDENT reasonably available to the District for the purpose of conducting the assessment.

All of Petitioner STUDENT' remaining requests for relief are denied.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to Education Code §56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this requirement:

Issue #1: Did the District offer STUDENT a free, appropriate education?

Petitioner STUDENT prevailed on this issue.

Issue #2: If not, must the District reimburse Petitioner for private educational expenditures?

Petitioner STUDENT substantially prevailed on this issue in that he was awarded retroactive and prospective relief relating to Prentice Day School tuition and expenses, although he was denied relief relating to Chapman University tutoring expenses.

Issue #3: Is the District entitled to conduct an assessment of STUDENT using the Brigance test?

Respondent District prevailed on this issue.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. Education Code §56505(i).

Dated: December 11, 1996 ______________________ Leonard Garfinkel Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

1. The parties initially agreed to submit briefs by November 15. On November 15, the parties mutually agreed to extend the deadline until November 19.

2. Although these are consolidated cases and each party is a Petitioner in one of them, for ease of reference and consistency STUDENT will be referred to as the Petitioner throughout this Decision.

3. Petitioner's exhibits are designated by "P" followed by exhibit numbers. Respondent's exhibits are designated by "Resp. Exh." followed by exhibit letters.

4. Resource specialists provide specialized instruction to special education students who attend regular education classes for the majority (i.e., at least 50%) of the school day. Education Code 56362.

5. Witnesses at the hearing testified that both "preprimer" and "primer" refer to reading levels below first grade.

6. While PARENT signed a document which included a reference to the reduced RSP time, the evidence at the hearing showed that the District did not explain the reason for the reduction to her.

7. Mrs. Hirose and PARENT did agree that because STUDENT could not take written tests, he could give oral responses to tests. 8. The letter was received by the Hearing Office on September 3, 1996.

9. The parents did not explain the approximately three-week delay in signing the form. Ms. Honeycutt stated on the record that her copy of the form was lost in her office for a period of time.

10. Although recent test scores obtained by District school psychologist Mr. Monahan suggest STUDENT is achieving at below a second grade level in certain reading areas, Ms. Hetrick's testimony corroborated the Prentice scores.